library/ssl_srv.c

/*
 *  TLS server-side functions
 *
 *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 *
 *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
 *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
 *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 *  limitations under the License.
 */

#include "common.h"

#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#        include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#    else
#        include <stdlib.h>
#        define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#        define mbedtls_free   free
#    endif

#    include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#    include "ssl_misc.h"
#    include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#    include "mbedtls/error.h"
#    include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"

#    include <string.h>

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#        include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#        include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                        const unsigned char *info,
                                        size_t ilen)
{
    if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER)
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;

    mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id);

    if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL)
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;

    memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen);
    ssl->cli_id_len = ilen;

    return 0;
}

void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                   mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
                                   mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
                                   void *p_cookie)
{
    conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write;
    conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check;
    conf->p_cookie = p_cookie;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
static int ssl_parse_servername_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                    const unsigned char *buf,
                                    size_t len)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len;
    const unsigned char *p;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension"));

    if (len < 2) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    servername_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1]));
    if (servername_list_size + 2 != len) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    p = buf + 2;
    while (servername_list_size > 2) {
        hostname_len = ((p[1] << 8) | p[2]);
        if (hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) {
            ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, ssl, p + 3, hostname_len);
            if (ret != 0) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret);
                mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
                    ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
            }
            return 0;
        }

        servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3;
        p += hostname_len + 3;
    }

    if (servername_list_size != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf)
{
    if (conf->f_psk != NULL)
        return 1;

    if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL)
        return 0;

    if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0)
        return 1;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
    if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque))
        return 1;
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */

    return 0;
}

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_use_opaque_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
    if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) {
        /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
         * the static configuration is irrelevant. */

        if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque))
            return 1;

        return 0;
    }

    if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque))
        return 1;

    return 0;
}
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */

static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                        const unsigned char *buf,
                                        size_t len)
{
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
        /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
        if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
                                     ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
                ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
    {
        if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
                ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
        }

        ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
    }

    return 0;
}

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)

/*
 * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension:
 *
 * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension
 * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange
 * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows.
 *
 * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate
 * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair.
 * This needs to be done at a later stage.
 *
 */
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                              const unsigned char *buf,
                                              size_t len)
{
    size_t sig_alg_list_size;

    const unsigned char *p;
    const unsigned char *end = buf + len;

    mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur;
    mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur;

    if (len < 2) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    sig_alg_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1]));
    if (sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message
     * according to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so
     * it suffices to remember only one suitable hash for each possible
     * signature algorithm.
     *
     * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures,
     * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash
     * pair list from the extension.
     */

    for (p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2) {
        /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */

        if ((sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(p[1])) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext"
                                      " unknown sig alg encoding %d",
                                      p[1]));
            continue;
        }

        /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */
        md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(p[0]);
        if (md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                  ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
                                   " unknown hash alg encoding %d",
                                   p[0]));
            continue;
        }

        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_cur) == 0) {
            mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur,
                                         md_cur);
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                  ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
                                   " match sig %u and hash %u",
                                   (unsigned)sig_cur, (unsigned)md_cur));
        } else {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                  ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: "
                                   "hash alg %u not supported",
                                   (unsigned)md_cur));
        }
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                               const unsigned char *buf,
                                               size_t len)
{
    size_t list_size, our_size;
    const unsigned char *p;
    const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves;

    if (len < 2) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1]));
    if (list_size + 2 != len || list_size % 2 != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */
    if (ssl->handshake->curves != NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    }

    /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
     * and leave room for a final 0 */
    our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
    if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX)
        our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;

    if ((curves = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, sizeof(*curves))) == NULL) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
    }

    ssl->handshake->curves = curves;

    p = buf + 2;
    while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) {
        curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id((p[0] << 8) | p[1]);

        if (curve_info != NULL) {
            *curves++ = curve_info;
            our_size--;
        }

        list_size -= 2;
        p += 2;
    }

    return 0;
}

static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                             const unsigned char *buf,
                                             size_t len)
{
    size_t list_size;
    const unsigned char *p;

    if (len == 0 || (size_t)(buf[0] + 1) != len) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    list_size = buf[0];

    p = buf + 1;
    while (list_size > 0) {
        if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
            p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
            ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
#        endif
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
            mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                             p[0]);
#        endif
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0]));
            return 0;
        }

        list_size--;
        p++;
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                  const unsigned char *buf,
                                  size_t len)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;

    if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension"));
        return 0;
    }

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf,
                                              len)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret);
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        return ret;
    }

    /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
    ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                             const unsigned char *buf,
                                             size_t len)
{
    if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    }

    ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                             const unsigned char *buf,
                             size_t len)
{
    size_t peer_cid_len;

    /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
    if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    }

    /*
     * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
     *
     *   struct {
     *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
     *   } ConnectionId;
     */

    if (len < 1) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    peer_cid_len = *buf++;
    len--;

    if (len != peer_cid_len) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */
    if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
        /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default
         * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                              ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled"));
        return 0;
    }

    if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    }

    ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
    ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t)peer_cid_len;
    memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated"));
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len);

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          const unsigned char *buf,
                                          size_t len)
{
    if (len != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    ((void)buf);

    if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) {
        ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                     const unsigned char *buf,
                                     size_t len)
{
    if (len != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    ((void)buf);

    if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) {
        ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                        unsigned char *buf,
                                        size_t len)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    mbedtls_ssl_session session;

    mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session);

    if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL ||
        ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) {
        return 0;
    }

    /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len));

    if (len == 0)
        return 0;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating"));
        return 0;
    }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */

    /*
     * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
     */
    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, buf,
                                         len)) != 0) {
        mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);

        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC)
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic"));
        else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED)
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired"));
        else
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret);

        return 0;
    }

    /*
     * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
     * inform them we're accepting the ticket  (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
     */
    session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
    memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len);

    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate);
    memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));

    /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket"));

    ssl->handshake->resume = 1;

    /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */
    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                              const unsigned char *buf,
                              size_t len)
{
    size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len;
    const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end;
    const char **ours;

    /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */
    if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL)
        return 0;

    /*
     * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
     *
     * struct {
     *     ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
     * } ProtocolNameList;
     */

    /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
    if (len < 4) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
    if (list_len != len - 2) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /*
     * Validate peer's list (lengths)
     */
    start = buf + 2;
    end = buf + len;
    for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) {
        cur_len = *theirs++;

        /* Current identifier must fit in list */
        if (cur_len > (size_t)(end - theirs)) {
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
        if (cur_len == 0) {
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
                ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Use our order of preference
     */
    for (ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++) {
        ours_len = strlen(*ours);
        for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) {
            cur_len = *theirs++;

            if (cur_len == ours_len && memcmp(theirs, *ours, cur_len) == 0) {
                ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
                return 0;
            }
        }
    }

    /* If we get there, no match was found */
    mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
        MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                  const unsigned char *buf,
                                  size_t len)
{
    mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
    size_t i, j;
    size_t profile_length;
    uint16_t mki_length;
    /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */
    const size_t size_of_lengths = 3;

    /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) ||
        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) {
        return 0;
    }

    /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1
     * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
     *
     * struct {
     *   SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
     *   opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
     * } UseSRTPData;

     * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
     */

    /*
     * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes)
     *                  and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte)
     * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length
     * and one of srtp_mki length
     */
    if (len < size_of_lengths) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;

    /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */
    profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
    buf += 2;

    /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths
     * fields */
    if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths ||
        profile_length % 2 != 0) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length
                                    must be even */
    {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    /*
     * parse the extension list values are defined in
     * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
     */
    for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) {
        uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1];
        client_protection =
            mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value);

        if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                3, ("found srtp profile: %s",
                    mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(client_protection)));
        } else {
            continue;
        }
        /* check if suggested profile is in our list */
        for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) {
            if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) {
                ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile =
                    ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                      ("selected srtp profile: %s",
                                       mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
                                           client_protection)));
                break;
            }
        }
        if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile !=
            MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)
            break;
    }
    buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */
    mki_length = *buf;
    buf++;

    if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ||
        mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */
    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support ==
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED &&
        mki_length > 0) {
        ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length;

        memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length);

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
                              ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len);
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */

/*
 * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions
 */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
 * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise
 */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
                               const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves)
{
    const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves;
    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id;

    while (*crv != NULL) {
        if ((*crv)->grp_id == grp_id)
            return 0;
        crv++;
    }

    return -1;
}
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */

/*
 * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite,
 * return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
 */
static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                         const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info)
{
    mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL;
    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
        mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
    uint32_t flags;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
    if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL)
        list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
    else
#        endif
        list = ssl->conf->key_cert;

    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE)
        return 0;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate"));

    if (list == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate"));
        return -1;
    }

    for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
        flags = 0;
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
                              cur->cert);

        if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg)) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type"));
            continue;
        }

        /*
         * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
         * keyUsage or other extensions.
         *
         * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for
         * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing
         * and decrypting with the same RSA key.
         */
        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: "
                                      "(extended) key usage extension"));
            continue;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
        if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA &&
            ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve"));
            continue;
        }
#        endif

        /*
         * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still
         * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only
         * one we got that satisfies the other conditions.
         */
        if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
            cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) {
            if (fallback == NULL)
                fallback = cur;
            {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate not preferred: "
                                          "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client"));
                continue;
            }
        }

        /* If we get there, we got a winner */
        break;
    }

    if (cur == NULL)
        cur = fallback;

    /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */
    if (cur != NULL) {
        ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur;
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate",
                              ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert);
        return 0;
    }

    return -1;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */

/*
 * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc
 * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches.
 */
static int
ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                      int suite_id,
                      const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info)
{
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
    mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type;
#    endif

    suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id);
    if (suite_info == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
                              (unsigned int)suite_id, suite_info->name));

    if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver ||
        suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version"));
        return 0;
    }

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
        (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS))
        return 0;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
    if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
        (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake "
                                  "not configured or ext missing"));
        return 0;
    }
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) &&
        (ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
                                  "no common elliptic curve"));
        return 0;
    }
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
    /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
     * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) &&
        ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key"));
        return 0;
    }
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
    /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
     * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
    if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
        sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info);
        if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
            mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
                                          sig_type) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
                    "for signature algorithm %u",
                    (unsigned)sig_type));
            return 0;
        }
    }

#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
    /*
     * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
     * certificate/key of a particular type:
     * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or
     * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't
     * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list.
     */
    if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
                                  "no suitable certificate"));
        return 0;
    }
#    endif

    *ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
    return 0;
}

/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during
   ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is
   not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */
static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret, got_common_suite;
    size_t i, j;
    size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset;
    size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len;
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len;
#    endif
    unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext;
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
#    endif
    int handshake_failure = 0;
    const int *ciphersuites;
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
    int major, minor;

    /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present,
     * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed
     * signature-hash pairs. */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
    int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello"));

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
read_record_header:
#    endif
    /*
     * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(),
     * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2
     * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format.
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE)
#    endif
    {
        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) {
            /* No alert on a read error. */
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    }

    buf = ssl->in_hdr;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl));

    /*
     * TLS Client Hello
     *
     * Record layer:
     *     0  .   0   message type
     *     1  .   2   protocol version
     *     3  .   11  DTLS: epoch + record sequence number
     *     3  .   4   message length
     */
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", buf[0]));

    if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d",
                              (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1]));

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", buf[1],
                              buf[2]));

    mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1);

    /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
     * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
     * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
     * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
    if (major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
    }

    /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence
     * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
        && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
#        endif
    ) {
        /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */
        if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }

        memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6);

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
        if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record, discarding"));
            ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
            ssl->in_left = 0;
            goto read_record_header;
        }

        /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */
        mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl);
#        endif
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */

    msg_len = (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1];

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
        /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
        msg_len = ssl->in_hslen;
    } else
#    endif
    {
        if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) +
                                                    msg_len)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
            return ret;
        }

        /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
        if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
            ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl);
        else
#    endif
            ssl->in_left = 0;
    }

    buf = ssl->in_msg;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len);

    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len);

    /*
     * Handshake layer:
     *     0  .   0   handshake type
     *     1  .   3   handshake length
     *     4  .   5   DTLS only: message seqence number
     *     6  .   8   DTLS only: fragment offset
     *     9  .  11   DTLS only: fragment length
     */
    if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0]));

    if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %d",
                              (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]));

    /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
    if (buf[1] != 0 ||
        msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
        /*
         * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes,
         * check sequence number on renego.
         */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
        if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
            /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */
            unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5];

            if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: "
                                          "%u (expected %u)",
                                          cli_msg_seq,
                                          ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq));
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
            }

            ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++;
        } else
#        endif
        {
            unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5];
            ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq;
            ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1;
        }

        /*
         * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure
         * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
         */
        if (ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 ||
            memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
                                  ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
        }
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */

    buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
    msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);

    /*
     * ClientHello layer:
     *     0  .   1   protocol version
     *     2  .  33   random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time)
     *    34  .  35   session id length (1 byte)
     *    35  . 34+x  session id
     *   35+x . 35+x  DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
     *   36+x .  ..   DTLS only: cookie
     *    ..  .  ..   ciphersuite list length (2 bytes)
     *    ..  .  ..   ciphersuite list
     *    ..  .  ..   compression alg. list length (1 byte)
     *    ..  .  ..   compression alg. list
     *    ..  .  ..   extensions length (2 bytes, optional)
     *    ..  .  ..   extensions (optional)
     */

    /*
     * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
     * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
     * read at least up to session id length without worrying.
     */
    if (msg_len < 38) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /*
     * Check and save the protocol version
     */
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2);

    mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver,
                             ssl->conf->transport, buf);
    ssl->session_negotiate->minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;

    ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver;
    ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;

    if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver ||
        ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
            1, ("client only supports ssl smaller than minimum"
                " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]",
                ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->conf->min_major_ver,
                ssl->conf->min_minor_ver));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
    }

    if (ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver) {
        ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver;
        ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver;
    } else if (ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)
        ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver;

    /*
     * Save client random (inc. Unix time)
     */
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32);

    memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32);

    /*
     * Check the session ID length and save session ID
     */
    sess_len = buf[34];

    if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) ||
        sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */
    {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len);

    ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
    memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id));
    memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35,
           ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);

    /*
     * Check the cookie length and content
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
        cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len;
        cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset];

        if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie",
                              buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len);

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
        if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL
#            if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
            && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
#            endif
        ) {
            if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie,
                                          buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len,
                                          ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed"));
                ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1;
            } else {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed"));
                ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
            }
        } else
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
        {
            /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */
            if (cookie_len != 0) {
                /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
            }

            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped"));
        }

        /*
         * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later)
         */
        ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len;
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
        ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len;

    ciph_len = (buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8) | (buf[ciph_offset + 1]);

    if (ciph_len < 2 || ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for
                                                                       comp.
                                                                       alg. len
                                                                     */
        (ciph_len % 2) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
                          buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len);

    /*
     * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one
     */
    comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len;

    comp_len = buf[comp_offset];

    if (comp_len < 1 || comp_len > 16 || comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", buf + comp_offset + 1,
                          comp_len);

    ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
    /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
        ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
#    endif
    /*
     * Check the extension length
     */
    ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len;
    if (msg_len > ext_offset) {
        if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        ext_len = (buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8) | (buf[ext_offset + 1]);

        if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }
    } else
        ext_len = 0;

    ext = buf + ext_offset + 2;
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len);

    while (ext_len != 0) {
        unsigned int ext_id;
        unsigned int ext_size;
        if (ext_len < 4) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }
        ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) | (ext[1]));
        ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) | (ext[3]));

        if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }
        switch (ext_id) {
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension"));
                if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL)
                    break;

                ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */

            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension"));
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
                renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
#    endif

                ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                      ("found signature_algorithms extension"));

                ret =
                    ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;

                sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                    3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension"));

                ret =
                    ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;

            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                    3, ("found supported point formats extension"));
                ssl->handshake->cli_exts |=
                    MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT;

                ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                      ("found max fragment length extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                    3, ("found extended master secret extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension"));

                ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
                if (ret != 0)
                    return ret;
                break;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */

            default:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                    3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id));
        }

        ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
        ext += 4 + ext_size;
    }

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)

    /*
     * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client
     * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations.
     */
    if (sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0) {
        mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;

        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_default) != 0)
            md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;

        mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
                                            md_default);
    }

#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */

    /*
     * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
     */
    for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) {
        if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                  ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO "));
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
            if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
                                          "during renegotiation"));
                mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
                    ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
            }
#    endif
            ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
            break;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Renegotiation security checks
     */
    if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
        ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
            MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
                              ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake"));
        handshake_failure = 1;
    }
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
             ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
             renegotiation_info_seen == 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
            1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)"));
        handshake_failure = 1;
    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
               ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
                   MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed"));
        handshake_failure = 1;
    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
               renegotiation_info_seen == 1) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
            1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)"));
        handshake_failure = 1;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */

    if (handshake_failure == 1) {
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    }

    /*
     * Search for a matching ciphersuite
     * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions
     * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.)
     */
    got_common_suite = 0;
    ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
    ciphersuite_info = NULL;

    if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref ==
        MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) {
        for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2)
            for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) {
                if (p[0] != ((ciphersuites[i] >> 8) & 0xFF) ||
                    p[1] != ((ciphersuites[i]) & 0xFF))
                    continue;

                got_common_suite = 1;

                if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
                                                 &ciphersuite_info)) != 0)
                    return ret;

                if (ciphersuite_info != NULL)
                    goto have_ciphersuite;
            }
    } else {
        for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++)
            for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len;
                 j += 2, p += 2) {
                if (p[0] != ((ciphersuites[i] >> 8) & 0xFF) ||
                    p[1] != ((ciphersuites[i]) & 0xFF))
                    continue;

                got_common_suite = 1;

                if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
                                                 &ciphersuite_info)) != 0)
                    return ret;

                if (ciphersuite_info != NULL)
                    goto have_ciphersuite;
            }
    }

    if (got_common_suite) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, "
                                  "but none of them usable"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    } else {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common"));
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    }

have_ciphersuite:
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
                          ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name));

    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i];
    ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;

    ssl->state++;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
        mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
#    endif

        /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
    if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
        mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
            mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info);
        if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
            mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(
                &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_alg);
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
                3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d",
                    mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg)));
        } else {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                                  ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
                                   "%u - should not happen",
                                   (unsigned)sig_alg));
        }
    }
#    endif

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello"));

    return 0;
}

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static void
ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;
    size_t ext_len;
    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;

    *olen = 0;

    /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if
     * the client hasn't offered it. */
    if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED)
        return;

    /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
     * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
    if (end < p || (size_t)(end - p) < (unsigned)(ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension"));

    /*
     * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
     *
     *   struct {
     *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
     *   } ConnectionId;
     */

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID)&0xFF);
    ext_len = (size_t)ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((ext_len >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((ext_len)&0xFF);

    *p++ = (uint8_t)ssl->own_cid_len;
    memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len);

    *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                           unsigned char *buf,
                                           size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL;
    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL;

    if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    /*
     * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
     * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
     * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
     * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
     */
    if ((suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
             ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) == NULL ||
        (cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(suite->cipher)) == NULL ||
        cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                          ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension"));

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)&0xFF);

    *p++ = 0x00;
    *p++ = 0x00;

    *olen = 4;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                      unsigned char *buf,
                                      size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;

    if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret "
                              "extension"));

    *p++ =
        (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)&0xFF);

    *p++ = 0x00;
    *p++ = 0x00;

    *olen = 4;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                         unsigned char *buf,
                                         size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;

    if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension"));

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET)&0xFF);

    *p++ = 0x00;
    *p++ = 0x00;

    *olen = 4;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */

static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                        unsigned char *buf,
                                        size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;

    if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension"));

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO)&0xFF);

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
        *p++ = 0x00;
        *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF;
        *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF;

        memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
        p += ssl->verify_data_len;
        memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
        p += ssl->verify_data_len;
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
    {
        *p++ = 0x00;
        *p++ = 0x01;
        *p++ = 0x00;
    }

    *olen = p - buf;
}

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                              unsigned char *buf,
                                              size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;

    if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension"));

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)&0xFF);

    *p++ = 0x00;
    *p++ = 1;

    *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;

    *olen = 5;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                                  unsigned char *buf,
                                                  size_t *olen)
{
    unsigned char *p = buf;
    ((void)ssl);

    if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts &
         MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                          ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension"));

    *p++ =
        (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS)&0xFF);

    *p++ = 0x00;
    *p++ = 2;

    *p++ = 1;
    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;

    *olen = 6;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                       unsigned char *buf,
                                       size_t *olen)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    unsigned char *p = buf;
    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
    size_t kkpp_len;

    *olen = 0;

    /* Skip costly computation if not needed */
    if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE)
        return;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension"));

    if (end - p < 4) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
        return;
    }

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP)&0xFF);

    ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p + 2,
                                          end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
                                          ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
    if (ret != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret);
        return;
    }

    *p++ = (unsigned char)((kkpp_len >> 8) & 0xFF);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)((kkpp_len)&0xFF);

    *olen = kkpp_len + 4;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
static void
ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen)
{
    if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) {
        *olen = 0;
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding alpn extension"));

    /*
     * 0 . 1    ext identifier
     * 2 . 3    ext length
     * 4 . 5    protocol list length
     * 6 . 6    protocol name length
     * 7 . 7+n  protocol name
     */
    buf[0] = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8) & 0xFF);
    buf[1] = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN)&0xFF);

    *olen = 7 + strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen);

    buf[2] = (unsigned char)(((*olen - 4) >> 8) & 0xFF);
    buf[3] = (unsigned char)(((*olen - 4)) & 0xFF);

    buf[4] = (unsigned char)(((*olen - 6) >> 8) & 0xFF);
    buf[5] = (unsigned char)(((*olen - 6)) & 0xFF);

    buf[6] = (unsigned char)(((*olen - 7)) & 0xFF);

    memcpy(buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7);
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                   unsigned char *buf,
                                   size_t *olen)
{
    size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0;
    uint16_t profile_value = 0;
    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;

    *olen = 0;

    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
        (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile ==
         MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) {
        return;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension"));

    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support ==
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) {
        mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
    }

    /* The extension total size is 9 bytes :
     * - 2 bytes for the extension tag
     * - 2 bytes for the total size
     * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length
     * - 2 bytes for the protection profile
     * - 1 byte for the mki length
     * +  the actual mki length
     * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */
    if ((size_t)(end - buf) < mki_len + 9) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
        return;
    }

    /* extension */
    buf[0] = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP >> 8) & 0xFF);
    buf[1] = (unsigned char)((MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP)&0xFF);
    /*
     * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes)
     *              and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki  )
     */
    ext_len = 5 + mki_len;
    buf[2] = (unsigned char)((ext_len >> 8) & 0xFF);
    buf[3] = (unsigned char)(ext_len & 0xFF);

    /* protection profile length: 2 */
    buf[4] = 0x00;
    buf[5] = 0x02;
    profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
        ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
    if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
        buf[6] = (unsigned char)((profile_value >> 8) & 0xFF);
        buf[7] = (unsigned char)(profile_value & 0xFF);
    } else {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile"));
        return;
    }

    buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF;
    memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len);

    *olen = 9 + mki_len;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
    unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request"));

    /*
     * struct {
     *   ProtocolVersion server_version;
     *   opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
     * } HelloVerifyRequest;
     */

    /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated
     * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */
    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
                              ssl->conf->transport, p);
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2);
    p += 2;

    /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */
    if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }

    /* Skip length byte until we know the length */
    cookie_len_byte = p++;

    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(
             ssl->conf->p_cookie, &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
             ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)(p - (cookie_len_byte + 1));

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1,
                          *cookie_len_byte);

    ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg;
    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;

    ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT;

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
        return ret;
    }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
        (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
        return ret;
    }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request"));

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */

static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret;
    mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp;
    mbedtls_ssl_session *const session = ssl->session_negotiate;

    /* Resume is 0  by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
     * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */
    if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1)
        return;
    if (session->id_len == 0)
        return;
    if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL)
        return;
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE)
        return;
#    endif

    mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp);

    ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, session->id,
                                 session->id_len, &session_tmp);
    if (ret != 0)
        goto exit;

    if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite ||
        session->compression != session_tmp.compression) {
        /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */
        goto exit;
    }

    /* Move semantics */
    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session);
    *session = session_tmp;
    memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp));

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache"));
    ssl->handshake->resume = 1;

exit:

    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp);
}

static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
    mbedtls_time_t t;
#    endif
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
    unsigned char *buf, *p;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello"));

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
        ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated"));
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));

        return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl);
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */

    if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
    }

    /*
     *     0  .   0   handshake type
     *     1  .   3   handshake length
     *     4  .   5   protocol version
     *     6  .   9   UNIX time()
     *    10  .  37   random bytes
     */
    buf = ssl->out_msg;
    p = buf + 4;

    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
                              ssl->conf->transport, p);
    p += 2;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", buf[4],
                              buf[5]));

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
    t = mbedtls_time(NULL);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(t >> 24);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(t >> 16);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(t >> 8);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(t);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
        3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
            (long long)t));
#    else
    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0)
        return ret;

    p += 4;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */

    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0)
        return ret;

    p += 28;

    memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32);

    ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl);

    if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) {
        /*
         * New session, create a new session id,
         * unless we're about to issue a session ticket
         */
        ssl->state++;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
        ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL);
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
        if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
            ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
            memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32);
        } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
        {
            ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
            if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng,
                                        ssl->session_negotiate->id, n)) != 0)
                return ret;
        }
    } else {
        /*
         * Resuming a session
         */
        n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
        ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    }

    /*
     *    38  .  38     session id length
     *    39  . 38+n    session id
     *   39+n . 40+n    chosen ciphersuite
     *   41+n . 41+n    chosen compression alg.
     *   42+n . 43+n    extensions length
     *   44+n . 43+n+m  extensions
     */
    *p++ = (unsigned char)ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
    memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
    p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
        3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n));
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n);
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed",
                              ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no"));

    *p++ = (unsigned char)(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite >> 8);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
    *p++ = (unsigned char)(ssl->session_negotiate->compression);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
                              mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(
                                  ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)));
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
                          ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
                           (unsigned int)ssl->session_negotiate->compression));

    /*
     *  First write extensions, then the total length
     */
    ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
    ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
    ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
    ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
    ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
            ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))) {
        ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
        ext_len += olen;
    }
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
    ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
    ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
    ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
    ext_len += olen;
#    endif

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
        3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
            ext_len));

    if (ext_len > 0) {
        *p++ = (unsigned char)((ext_len >> 8) & 0xFF);
        *p++ = (unsigned char)((ext_len)&0xFF);
        p += ext_len;
    }

    ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));

    return ret;
}

#    if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));

    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#    else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
    uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
    size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
    unsigned char *buf, *p;
    const unsigned char *const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
    const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
    int authmode;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));

    ssl->state++;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
    if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET)
        authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
    else
#        endif
        authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;

    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) ||
        authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
        return 0;
    }

    /*
     *     0  .   0   handshake type
     *     1  .   3   handshake length
     *     4  .   4   cert type count
     *     5  .. m-1  cert types
     *     m  .. m+1  sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
     *    m+1 .. n-1  SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
     *     n  .. n+1  length of all DNs
     *    n+2 .. n+3  length of DN 1
     *    n+4 .. ...  Distinguished Name #1
     *    ... .. ...  length of DN 2, etc.
     */
    buf = ssl->out_msg;
    p = buf + 4;

    /*
     * Supported certificate types
     *
     *     ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
     *     enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType;
     */
    ct_len = 0;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
    p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
#        endif
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
    p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
#        endif

    p[0] = (unsigned char)ct_len++;
    p += ct_len;

    sa_len = 0;
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
    /*
     * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
     *
     *     SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
     *
     *     struct {
     *           HashAlgorithm hash;
     *           SignatureAlgorithm signature;
     *     } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
     *
     *     enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm;
     *     enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm;
     */
    if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
        const int *cur;

        /*
         * Supported signature algorithms
         */
        for (cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++) {
            unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*cur);

            if (MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash ||
                mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash))
                continue;

#            if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
            p[2 + sa_len++] = hash;
            p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA;
#            endif
#            if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
            p[2 + sa_len++] = hash;
            p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA;
#            endif
        }

        p[0] = (unsigned char)(sa_len >> 8);
        p[1] = (unsigned char)(sa_len);
        sa_len += 2;
        p += sa_len;
    }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */

    /*
     * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
     * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
     */
    p += 2;

    total_dn_size = 0;

    if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) {
        /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned
         *       via a CA callback (configured through
         *       `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
         *       CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL)
            crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
        else
#        endif
            crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain;

        while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) {
            /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length
             * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */
            dn_size = (uint16_t)crt->subject_raw.len;

            if (end < p || (size_t)(end - p) < 2 + (size_t)dn_size) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short"));
                break;
            }

            *p++ = (unsigned char)(dn_size >> 8);
            *p++ = (unsigned char)(dn_size);
            memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size);
            p += dn_size;

            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size);

            total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size;
            crt = crt->next;
        }
    }

    ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
    ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)(total_dn_size >> 8);
    ssl->out_msg[5 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)(total_dn_size);

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request"));

    return ret;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;

    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
    }

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                                       mbedtls_pk_ec(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)),
                                       MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret);
        return ret;
    }

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          size_t *signature_len)
{
    /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
     * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
     * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
     * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
     * ssl->out_msglen. */
    unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2;
    size_t sig_max_len =
        (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - sig_start);
    int ret =
        ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len);
    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
        ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
        mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
    }
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret);
    return ret;
}
#    endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
              defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */

/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including
 * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the
 * signature and sending the message. */
static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                           size_t *signature_len)
{
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED)
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
    unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL;
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */

    (void)ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */
#    if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
    (void)signature_len;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
    size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
#        else
    size_t out_buf_len =
        MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
#        endif
#    endif

    ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */

    /*
     *
     * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite.
     *
     */

    /*
     * - ECJPAKE key exchanges
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
        size_t len = 0;

        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
            &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
            MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len,
            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
        if (ret != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret);
            return ret;
        }

        ssl->out_msglen += len;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */

    /*
     * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support
     * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature,
     * we use empty support identity hints here.
     **/
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */

    /*
     * - DHE key exchanges
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
        size_t len = 0;

        if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
        }

        /*
         * Ephemeral DH parameters:
         *
         * struct {
         *     opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
         *     opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
         *     opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
         * } ServerDHParams;
         */
        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
                                         &ssl->conf->dhm_P,
                                         &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params(
                 &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
                 (int)mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx),
                 ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng,
                 ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret);
            return ret;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
        dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
#        endif

        ssl->out_msglen += len;

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X);
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P);
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G);
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX);
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */

    /*
     * - ECDHE key exchanges
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
        /*
         * Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
         *
         * struct {
         *     ECParameters curve_params;
         *     ECPoint      public;
         * } ServerECDHParams;
         */
        const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL;
        const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid;
        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
        size_t len = 0;

        /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
        for (gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++)
            for (curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++)
                if ((*curve)->grp_id == *gid)
                    goto curve_matching_done;

curve_matching_done:
        if (curve == NULL || *curve == NULL) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name));

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                                      (*curve)->grp_id)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(
                 &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len,
                 ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen,
                 ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret);
            return ret;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
        dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
#        endif

        ssl->out_msglen += len;

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q);
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */

    /*
     *
     * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the
     *         exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here.
     *
     */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) {
        size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed;
        size_t hashlen = 0;
        unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;

        /*
         * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
         *      For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
         *      to choose appropriate hash.
         */

        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
        mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
            mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
        if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
            /*    For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
             *    (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */
            if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ||
                (md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(
                     &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_alg)) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
                /* (... because we choose a cipher suite
                 *      only if there is a matching hash.) */
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
            }
        } else {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
        }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing",
                                  (unsigned)md_alg));

        /*
         * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
         */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
        if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(
                ssl, hash, &hashlen, dig_signed, dig_signed_len, md_alg);
            if (ret != 0)
                return ret;
        } else
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
        {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen);

        /*
         * 2.3: Compute and add the signature
         */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
        if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
            /*
             * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm
             * explicitly through a prefix to the signature.
             *
             * struct {
             *    HashAlgorithm hash;
             *    SignatureAlgorithm signature;
             * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
             *
             * struct {
             *    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
             *    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
             * } DigitallySigned;
             *
             */

            ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] =
                mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg);
            ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] =
                mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg);
        }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
        if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) {
            ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
                                                md_alg, hash, hashlen);
            switch (ret) {
                case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
                    /* act as if f_async_sign was null */
                    break;
                case 0:
                    ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
                    return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len);
                case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
                    ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
                default:
                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret);
                    return ret;
            }
        }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */

        if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
        }

        /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
         * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
         * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
         * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
         * ssl->out_msglen. */
        if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash,
                                   hashlen, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2,
                                   out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2,
                                   signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng,
                                   ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */

    return 0;
}

/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
 * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
 * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state
 * machine. */
static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    size_t signature_len = 0;
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange"));

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
    /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange
     * is not needed. */
    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) {
        /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters
         * from certificate at this point. */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
        if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) {
            ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl);
        }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */

        /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use
         * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
        defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
    /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing
     * signature operation, resume signing. */
    if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation"));
        ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
    } else
#    endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
              defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
    {
        /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */
        ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
    }

    if (ret != 0) {
        /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen
         * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message,
         * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be
         * preserved. */
        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS)
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
                                  ("<= write server key exchange (pending)"));
        else
            ssl->out_msglen = 0;
        return ret;
    }

    /* If there is a signature, write its length.
     * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature
     * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
    if (signature_len != 0) {
        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)(signature_len >> 8);
        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)(signature_len);

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature", ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
                              signature_len);

        /* Skip over the already-written signature */
        ssl->out_msglen += signature_len;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */

    /* Add header and send. */
    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;

    ssl->state++;

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange"));
    return 0;
}

static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done"));

    ssl->out_msglen = 4;
    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;

    ssl->state++;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
        mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl);
#    endif

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
        return ret;
    }

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
        (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
        return ret;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done"));

    return 0;
}

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                      unsigned char **p,
                                      const unsigned char *end)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
    size_t n;

    /*
     * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
     */
    if (*p + 2 > end) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1];
    *p += 2;

    if (*p + n > end) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    *p += n;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY);

    return ret;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                  unsigned char *peer_pms,
                                  size_t *peer_pmslen,
                                  size_t peer_pmssize)
{
    int ret =
        ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize);
    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
        ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
        mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
    }
    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret);
    return ret;
}
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */

static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                     const unsigned char *p,
                                     const unsigned char *end,
                                     unsigned char *peer_pms,
                                     size_t *peer_pmslen,
                                     size_t peer_pmssize)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
    mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)->pk;
    size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key);

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
    /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing
     * decryption operation, resume signing. */
    if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation"));
        return (
            ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize));
    }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */

    /*
     * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
     */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
    if (p + 2 > end) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
    if (*p++ != ((len >> 8) & 0xFF) || *p++ != ((len)&0xFF)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }
#        endif

    if (p + len != end) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /*
     * Decrypt the premaster secret
     */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
    if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) {
        ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
                                               p, len);
        switch (ret) {
            case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
                /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */
                break;
            case 0:
                ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
                return (ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen,
                                               peer_pmssize));
            case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
                ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
            default:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret);
                return ret;
        }
    }
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */

    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
    }

    ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len, peer_pms, peer_pmslen,
                             peer_pmssize, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
    return ret;
}

static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                   const unsigned char *p,
                                   const unsigned char *end,
                                   size_t pms_offset)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
    unsigned char ver[2];
    unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
    unsigned char mask;
    size_t i, peer_pmslen;
    unsigned int diff;

    /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
     * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
     * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
     * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0.
     * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This
     * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory,
     * even if it's an unsigned char). */
    peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
    peer_pmslen = 0;

    ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, peer_pms, &peer_pmslen,
                                    sizeof(peer_pms));

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS)
        return ret;
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */

    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
                              ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
                              ssl->conf->transport, ver);

    /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
     * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
     * attacks. */
    diff = (unsigned int)ret;
    diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
    diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
    diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];

    /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
     * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
#        if defined(_MSC_VER)
#            pragma warning(push)
#            pragma warning(disable : 4146)
#        endif
    mask = -((diff | -diff) >> (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 - 1));
#        if defined(_MSC_VER)
#            pragma warning(pop)
#        endif

    /*
     * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
     * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
     * bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
     * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must
     * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was
     * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret,
     * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not.
     */
    ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms));
    if (ret != 0) {
        /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal
         * anything about the RSA decryption. */
        return ret;
    }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
    if (diff != 0)
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
#        endif

    if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset ||
        sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }
    ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;

    /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
     * data-dependent branches. */
    for (i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++)
        pms[i] = (mask & fake_pms[i]) | ((~mask) & peer_pms[i]);

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                         unsigned char **p,
                                         const unsigned char *end)
{
    int ret = 0;
    uint16_t n;

    if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
    }

    /*
     * Receive client pre-shared key identity name
     */
    if (end - *p < 2) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1];
    *p += 2;

    if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) {
        if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0)
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
    } else {
        /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
         * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
        if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) {
            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
        }
    }

    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n);
        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
    }

    *p += n;

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */

static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
    unsigned char *p, *end;

    ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange"));

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) &&         \
        (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
         defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED))
    if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
         ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) &&
        (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) {
        /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous
         * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the
         * record. */
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
            3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record"));
    } else
#    endif
        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
    end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;

    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    }

    if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    }

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) {
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if (p != end) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(
                 &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, ssl->handshake->premaster,
                 MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
                 ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||   \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||    \
        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
            ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ==
                MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
            ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
            ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, p,
                                            end - p)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(
                 &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
                 ssl->handshake->premaster, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
                 ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z);
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||   \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||    \
              MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) {
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if (p != end) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
        /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically
         * and skip the intermediate PMS. */
        if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1)
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"));
        else
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
            if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(
                     ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
        if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
            /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to
             * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip
             * directly to resuming this operation. */
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed"));
            /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
             * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */
            p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2;
        } else
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
            if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
        /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
        if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1)
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#        endif

        if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(
                 ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) {
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
            return ret;
        }
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
        /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
        if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1)
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#        endif

        if (p != end) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(
                 ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
            return ret;
        }

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, p,
                                            end - p)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
        /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
        if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1)
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#        endif

        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);

        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(
                 ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) {
        if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"),
                                  ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p,
                                             end - p);
        if (ret != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret);
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
        }

        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                            ssl->handshake->premaster, 32,
                                            &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
                                            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
        if (ret != 0) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret);
            return ret;
        }
    } else
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
    {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    ssl->state++;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange"));

    return 0;
}

#    if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));

    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#    else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
    size_t i, sig_len;
    unsigned char hash[48];
    unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
    size_t hashlen;
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
#        endif
    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
    mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));

    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }

#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }
#        else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
        ssl->state++;
        return 0;
    }
#        endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */

    /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
    ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */);
    if (0 != ret) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret);
        return ret;
    }

    ssl->state++;

    /* Process the message contents */
    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
        ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    }

    i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);

#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
    peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#        else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
        /* Should never happen */
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }
    peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */

    /*
     *  struct {
     *     SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
     *     opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
     *  } DigitallySigned;
     */
#        if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
    if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) {
        if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
        }

        /*
         * Hash
         */
        md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]);

        if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ||
            mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
                                      " for verify message"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }

#            if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
        if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg)
            hash_start += 16;
#            endif

        /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
        hashlen = 0;

        i++;

        /*
         * Signature
         */
        if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) ==
            MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
                                      " for verify message"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }

        /*
         * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
         */
        if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) {
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key"));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
        }

        i++;
    } else
#        endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
    {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    }

    if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    sig_len = (ssl->in_msg[i] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i + 1];
    i += 2;

    if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
    }

    /* Calculate hash and verify signature */
    {
        size_t dummy_hlen;
        ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen);
    }

    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
                                 ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify"));

    return ret;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
    size_t tlen;
    uint32_t lifetime;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket"));

    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
    ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;

    /*
     * struct {
     *     uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
     *     opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
     * } NewSessionTicket;
     *
     * 4  .  7   ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified)
     * 8  .  9   ticket_len (n)
     * 10 .  9+n ticket content
     */

    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(
             ssl->conf->p_ticket, ssl->session_negotiate, ssl->out_msg + 10,
             ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &tlen, &lifetime)) !=
        0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret);
        tlen = 0;
    }

    ssl->out_msg[4] = (lifetime >> 24) & 0xFF;
    ssl->out_msg[5] = (lifetime >> 16) & 0xFF;
    ssl->out_msg[6] = (lifetime >> 8) & 0xFF;
    ssl->out_msg[7] = (lifetime)&0xFF;

    ssl->out_msg[8] = (unsigned char)((tlen >> 8) & 0xFF);
    ssl->out_msg[9] = (unsigned char)((tlen)&0xFF);

    ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen;

    /*
     * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and
     * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state.
     */
    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
        return ret;
    }

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket"));

    return 0;
}
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */

/*
 * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step
 */
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
    int ret = 0;

    if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL)
        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;

    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state));

    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0)
        return ret;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
        ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) {
        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0)
            return ret;
    }
#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */

    switch (ssl->state) {
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
            ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
            break;

        /*
         *  <==   ClientHello
         */
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
            ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl);
            break;

#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
#    endif

        /*
         *  ==>   ServerHello
         *        Certificate
         *      ( ServerKeyExchange  )
         *      ( CertificateRequest )
         *        ServerHelloDone
         */
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
            ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
            ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
            ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
            ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl);
            break;

        /*
         *  <== ( Certificate/Alert  )
         *        ClientKeyExchange
         *      ( CertificateVerify  )
         *        ChangeCipherSpec
         *        Finished
         */
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
            ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
            ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl);
            break;

        /*
         *  ==> ( NewSessionTicket )
         *        ChangeCipherSpec
         *        Finished
         */
        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
            if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0)
                ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl);
            else
#    endif
                ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl);
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done"));
            ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
            break;

        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
            break;

        default:
            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state));
            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
    }

    return ret;
}

void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order)
{
    conf->respect_cli_pref = order;
}

#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */