Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* BEGIN_HEADER */ |
| 2 | /* Testing of mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() specifically, focusing on negative |
| 3 | * testing (using malformed inputs). */ |
| 4 | |
| 5 | #include <mbedtls/ssl.h> |
| 6 | #include <ssl_misc.h> |
| 7 | #include <test/ssl_helpers.h> |
| 8 | |
| 9 | /* END_HEADER */ |
| 10 | |
| 11 | /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES |
| 12 | * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C |
| 13 | * END_DEPENDENCIES |
| 14 | */ |
| 15 | |
| 16 | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| 17 | void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac, |
| 18 | int length_selector) |
| 19 | { |
| 20 | /* |
| 21 | * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification |
| 22 | * of padding and MAC. |
| 23 | * |
| 24 | * Actually depends on TLS 1.2 and either AES, ARIA or Camellia, but since |
| 25 | * the test framework doesn't support alternation in dependency statements, |
| 26 | * just depend on AES. |
| 27 | * |
| 28 | * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows: |
| 29 | * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied |
| 30 | * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied |
| 31 | * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246: |
| 32 | * it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the |
| 33 | * byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length |
| 34 | * that gives this padding_length is automatically selected. |
| 35 | */ |
| 36 | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ |
| 37 | mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; |
| 38 | mbedtls_record rec, rec_save; |
| 39 | unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL; |
| 40 | size_t buflen, olen = 0; |
| 41 | size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i; |
| 42 | unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */ |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 43 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| 44 | psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 45 | #endif |
| 46 | int exp_ret; |
| 47 | int ret; |
| 48 | const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */ |
| 49 | |
| 50 | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); |
| 51 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0); |
| 52 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1); |
| 53 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */ |
| 56 | ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, |
| 57 | 0, trunc_hmac, |
| 58 | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, |
| 59 | 0, 0); |
| 60 | |
| 61 | TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); |
| 62 | |
| 63 | /* Determine padding/plaintext length */ |
| 64 | TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255); |
| 65 | block_size = t0.ivlen; |
| 66 | if (length_selector < 0) { |
| 67 | plaintext_len = 0; |
| 68 | |
| 69 | /* Minimal padding |
| 70 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ |
| 71 | padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; |
| 72 | |
| 73 | /* Maximal padding? */ |
| 74 | if (length_selector == -2) { |
| 75 | padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size); |
| 76 | } |
| 77 | } else { |
| 78 | padlen = length_selector; |
| 79 | |
| 80 | /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding. |
| 81 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ |
| 82 | plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | /* Prepare a buffer for record data */ |
| 86 | buflen = block_size |
| 87 | + plaintext_len |
| 88 | + t0.maclen |
| 89 | + padlen + 1; |
| 90 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen); |
| 91 | TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen); |
| 92 | |
| 93 | /* Prepare a dummy record header */ |
| 94 | memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr)); |
| 95 | rec.type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; |
| 96 | mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, |
| 97 | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); |
| 98 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| 99 | rec.cid_len = 0; |
| 100 | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /* Prepare dummy record content */ |
| 103 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 104 | rec.buf_len = buflen; |
| 105 | rec.data_offset = block_size; |
| 106 | rec.data_len = plaintext_len; |
| 107 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len); |
| 108 | |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 109 | /* Set dummy IV */ |
| 110 | memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen); |
| 111 | memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen); |
| 112 | |
| 113 | /* |
| 114 | * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it. |
| 115 | */ |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 116 | mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out = &t0; |
| 117 | mbedtls_record *record = &rec; |
| 118 | |
| 119 | /* Serialized version of record header for MAC purposes */ |
| 120 | unsigned char add_data[13]; |
| 121 | memcpy(add_data, record->ctr, 8); |
| 122 | add_data[8] = record->type; |
| 123 | add_data[9] = record->ver[0]; |
| 124 | add_data[10] = record->ver[1]; |
| 125 | add_data[11] = (record->data_len >> 8) & 0xff; |
| 126 | add_data[12] = (record->data_len >> 0) & 0xff; |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 127 | |
| 128 | /* MAC with additional data */ |
| 129 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 130 | size_t sign_mac_length = 0; |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 131 | TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 132 | transform_out->psa_mac_enc, |
| 133 | transform_out->psa_mac_alg)); |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 134 | TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, 13)); |
| 135 | TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation, |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 136 | record->buf + record->data_offset, |
| 137 | record->data_len)); |
| 138 | /* Use a temporary buffer for the MAC, because with the truncated HMAC |
| 139 | * extension, there might not be enough room in the record for the |
| 140 | * full-length MAC. */ |
| 141 | unsigned char mac[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 142 | TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, |
| 143 | mac, sizeof(mac), |
| 144 | &sign_mac_length)); |
| 145 | #else |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 146 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc, add_data, 13)); |
| 147 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc, |
| 148 | record->buf + record->data_offset, |
| 149 | record->data_len)); |
| 150 | /* Use a temporary buffer for the MAC, because with the truncated HMAC |
| 151 | * extension, there might not be enough room in the record for the |
| 152 | * full-length MAC. */ |
| 153 | unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| 154 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac)); |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 155 | #endif |
Gilles Peskine | ac5fabe | 2023-09-18 13:05:35 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 156 | memcpy(record->buf + record->data_offset + record->data_len, mac, transform_out->maclen); |
| 157 | record->data_len += transform_out->maclen; |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 158 | |
| 159 | /* Pad */ |
| 160 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1); |
| 161 | rec.data_len += padlen + 1; |
| 162 | |
| 163 | /* Save correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 164 | rec_save = rec; |
| 165 | rec_save.buf = buf_save; |
| 166 | memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen); |
| 167 | |
| 168 | /* |
| 169 | * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success |
| 170 | */ |
| 171 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( |
| 172 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, |
| 173 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 174 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 175 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 176 | |
| 177 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 178 | |
| 179 | /* |
| 180 | * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and |
| 181 | * decrypting it, expecting failure every time. |
| 182 | */ |
| 183 | for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) { |
| 184 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); |
| 185 | |
| 186 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 187 | rec = rec_save; |
| 188 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 189 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); |
| 190 | |
| 191 | /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */ |
| 192 | rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01; |
| 193 | |
| 194 | /* Encrypt */ |
| 195 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( |
| 196 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, |
| 197 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 198 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 199 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 200 | |
| 201 | /* Decrypt and expect failure */ |
| 202 | TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC, |
| 203 | mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 204 | } |
| 205 | |
| 206 | /* |
| 207 | * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests |
| 208 | * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer |
| 209 | * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make |
| 210 | * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads |
| 211 | * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or |
| 212 | * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't |
| 213 | * hurt to test.) |
| 214 | * |
| 215 | * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record |
| 216 | * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.) |
| 217 | */ |
| 218 | for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) { |
| 219 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); |
| 220 | |
| 221 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 222 | rec = rec_save; |
| 223 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 224 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); |
| 225 | |
| 226 | /* Set padding bytes to new value */ |
| 227 | memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1); |
| 228 | |
| 229 | /* Encrypt */ |
| 230 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( |
| 231 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, |
| 232 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 233 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 234 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 235 | |
| 236 | /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */ |
| 237 | exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; |
| 238 | TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | |
| 241 | exit: |
Gilles Peskine | 68ec3cc | 2023-09-18 14:35:52 +0200 | [diff] [blame^] | 242 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| 243 | psa_mac_abort(&operation); |
| 244 | #endif |
Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 245 | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); |
| 246 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0); |
| 247 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1); |
| 248 | mbedtls_free(buf); |
| 249 | mbedtls_free(buf_save); |
| 250 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | /* END_CASE */ |