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Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +01001/**
2 * \file psa/crypto.h
3 * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module
4 */
5
6#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H
7#define PSA_CRYPTO_H
8
9#include "crypto_platform.h"
10
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +010011#include <stddef.h>
12
Gilles Peskine62a7e7e2018-02-07 21:54:47 +010013#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +010014/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that
15 * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions
16 * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed
17 * documentation that includes those definitions. */
18
Gilles Peskine62a7e7e2018-02-07 21:54:47 +010019/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions
20 * @{
21 */
22
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +010023/** \brief Key slot number.
24 *
25 * This type represents key slots. It must be an unsigned integral
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +010026 * type. The choice of type is implementation-dependent.
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +010027 * 0 is not a valid key slot number. The meaning of other values is
28 * implementation dependent.
29 *
30 * At any given point in time, each key slot either contains a
31 * cryptographic object, or is empty. Key slots are persistent:
32 * once set, the cryptographic object remains in the key slot until
33 * explicitly destroyed.
34 */
35typedef _unsigned_integral_type_ psa_key_slot_t;
36
Gilles Peskine62a7e7e2018-02-07 21:54:47 +010037/**@}*/
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +010038#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */
Gilles Peskine62a7e7e2018-02-07 21:54:47 +010039
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +010040#ifdef __cplusplus
41extern "C" {
42#endif
43
44/** \defgroup basic Basic definitions
45 * @{
46 */
47
Gilles Peskinee9a0a9d2018-06-20 13:59:04 +020048#if defined(PSA_SUCCESS)
49/* If PSA_SUCCESS is defined, assume that PSA crypto is being used
50 * together with PSA IPC, which also defines the identifier
51 * PSA_SUCCESS. We must not define PSA_SUCCESS ourselves in that case;
52 * the other error code names don't clash. Also define psa_status_t as
53 * an alias for the type used by PSA IPC. This is a temporary hack
54 * until we unify error reporting in PSA IPC and PSA crypo.
55 *
56 * Note that psa_defs.h must be included before this header!
57 */
58typedef psa_error_t psa_status_t;
59
60#else /* defined(PSA_SUCCESS) */
61
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +010062/**
63 * \brief Function return status.
64 *
Gilles Peskinee9a0a9d2018-06-20 13:59:04 +020065 * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success,
66 * or a nonzero value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are
67 * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here.
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +010068 */
itayzafrirc2a79762018-06-18 16:20:16 +030069typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
Gilles Peskinee9a0a9d2018-06-20 13:59:04 +020070
itayzafrirc2a79762018-06-18 16:20:16 +030071/** The action was completed successfully. */
72#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
Gilles Peskinee9a0a9d2018-06-20 13:59:04 +020073
74#endif /* !defined(PSA_SUCCESS) */
itayzafrirc2a79762018-06-18 16:20:16 +030075
76/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
77 * by this implementation.
78 *
79 * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
80 * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
81 * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
82 * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
83#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)1)
84
85/** The requested action is denied by a policy.
86 *
87 * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
88 * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
89 * denies the requested operation.
90 *
91 * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
92 * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
93 * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
94 * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
95 * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
96#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)2)
97
98/** An output buffer is too small.
99 *
Gilles Peskinebe42f312018-07-13 14:38:15 +0200100 * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
itayzafrirc2a79762018-06-18 16:20:16 +0300101 * description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
102 *
103 * Implementations should preferably return this error code only
104 * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
105 * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
106 * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
107 * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
108#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)3)
109
110/** A slot is occupied, but must be empty to carry out the
111 * requested action.
112 *
113 * If the slot number is invalid (i.e. the requested action could
114 * not be performed even after erasing the slot's content),
115 * implementations shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
116#define PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT ((psa_status_t)4)
117
118/** A slot is empty, but must be occupied to carry out the
119 * requested action.
120 *
121 * If the slot number is invalid (i.e. the requested action could
122 * not be performed even after creating appropriate content in the slot),
123 * implementations shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
124#define PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT ((psa_status_t)5)
125
126/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
127 *
128 * Multipart operations return this error when one of the
129 * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
130 * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
131 *
132 * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
133 * that a key slot is occupied when it needs to be free or vice versa,
134 * but shall return #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT or #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
135 * as applicable. */
136#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)6)
137
138/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
139 *
140 * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
141 * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
142 *
143 * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
144 * that a key slot is occupied when it needs to be free or vice versa,
145 * but shall return #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT or #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
146 * as applicable. */
147#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)7)
148
149/** There is not enough runtime memory.
150 *
151 * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
152 * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
153#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)8)
154
155/** There is not enough persistent storage.
156 *
157 * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
158 * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
159 * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
160 * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
161 * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
162#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)9)
163
164/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
165 *
166 * This can indicate a communication failure between the application
167 * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
168 * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
169 * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
170 *
171 * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
172 * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
173 * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenver
174 * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
175 * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
176 * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
177 * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
178 */
179#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)10)
180
181/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
182 *
183 * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
184 * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
185 * (use #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED), for a communication error
186 * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
187 * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
188 * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
189 *
190 * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
191 * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
192 * longer be readable from storage.
193 *
194 * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
195 * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
196 * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
197 * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
198 * its integrity canont be guaranteed.
199 *
200 * Implementations should only use this error code to report a
201 * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
202 * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
203 * reported using this error code. */
204#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)11)
205
206/** A hardware failure was detected.
207 *
208 * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
209 * cause. */
210#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)12)
211
212/** A tampering attempt was detected.
213 *
214 * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
215 * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
216 * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
217 * and should enter a safe failure state.
218 *
219 * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
220 * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
221 * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
222 * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
223 * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
224 *
225 * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
226 * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
227 * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
228 * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
229 * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
230 * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
231 * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
232 * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
233 * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
234 * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
235 * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
236 * instead).
237 *
238 * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
239 * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
240 * the application itself. */
241#define PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)13)
242
243/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
244 * for the requested action.
245 *
246 * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
247 * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
248 * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
249 * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
250 * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
251 * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
252 * to certain attacks.
253 *
254 * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
255 * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
256 * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
257 * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
258 * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
259 * during normal operation. */
260#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)14)
261
262/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
263 *
264 * Verification functions return this error if the verification
265 * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
266 * was determined to be incorrect.
267 *
268 * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
269 * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
270#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)15)
271
272/** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
273 *
274 * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
275 * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
276 * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
277 * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
278 * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
279 * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
280 * to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
281 *
282 * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
283 * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
284 * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
285 * depend on the validity of the padding. */
286#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)16)
287
288/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
289 * failure cause.
290 *
291 * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
292 * error codes are applicable. */
293#define PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR ((psa_status_t)17)
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +0100294
295/**
296 * \brief Library initialization.
297 *
298 * Applications must call this function before calling any other
299 * function in this module.
300 *
301 * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call
302 * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed.
303 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200304 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
305 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
306 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
307 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
308 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
309 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +0100310 */
311psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);
312
Gilles Peskine2905a7a2018-03-07 16:39:31 +0100313#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8)
314#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8)
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +0100315
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +0100316/**@}*/
317
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100318/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
319 * @{
320 */
321
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100322/** \brief Encoding of a key type.
323 */
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100324typedef uint32_t psa_key_type_t;
325
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +0100326/** An invalid key type value.
327 *
328 * Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
329 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100330#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x00000000)
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +0100331
332/** Vendor-defined flag
333 *
334 * Key types defined by this standard will never have the
335 * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
336 * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
337 * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
338 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100339#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x80000000)
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100340
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100341#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x7e000000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200342
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200343/** Raw data.
344 *
345 * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
346 * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100347#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x02000000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200348
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100349#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x04000000)
350#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x06000000)
351#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x01000000)
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100352
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200353/** HMAC key.
354 *
355 * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
356 * used for.
357 *
358 * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
Gilles Peskinebe42f312018-07-13 14:38:15 +0200359 * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where
360 * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100361#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x02000001)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200362
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200363/** Key for an cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
364 *
365 * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
366 * 32 bytes (AES-256).
367 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100368#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x04000001)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200369
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200370/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
371 *
372 * The size of the key can be 8 bytes (single DES), 16 bytes (2-key 3DES) or
373 * 24 bytes (3-key 3DES).
374 *
375 * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
376 * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
377 * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
378 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100379#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x04000002)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200380
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200381/** Key for an cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
382 * Camellia block cipher. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100383#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x04000003)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200384
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200385/** Key for the RC4 stream cipher.
386 *
387 * Note that RC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in
388 * legacy protocols. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100389#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x04000004)
390
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100391/** RSA public key. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100392#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x06010000)
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100393/** RSA key pair (private and public key). */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100394#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x07010000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200395
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100396/** DSA public key. */
397#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x06020000)
398/** DSA key pair (private and public key). */
399#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x07020000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200400
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100401#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x06030000)
402#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x07030000)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100403#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000ffff)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200404/** Elliptic curve key pair. */
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100405#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(curve) \
406 (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR_BASE | (curve))
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200407/** Elliptic curve public key. */
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100408#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
409 (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100410
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +0100411/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100412#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100413 (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100414
415/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100416#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \
417 (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC)
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100418/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100419#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
Moran Pekerb4d0ddd2018-04-04 12:47:52 +0300420 (((type) & (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)) == \
421 PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC)
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100422/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
423 * part. */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100424#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR(type) \
425 (((type) & (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)) == \
426 (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG))
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100427/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. */
428#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEYPAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
429 ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)
430/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. */
431#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) \
432 ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)
Gilles Peskine61a60372018-07-08 21:48:44 +0200433/** Whether a key type is an RSA key pair or public key. */
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +0100434#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100435 (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
436/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair or public key. */
Gilles Peskinec66ea6a2018-02-03 22:43:28 +0100437#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \
Gilles Peskine06dc2632018-03-08 07:47:25 +0100438 ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) & \
439 ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100440
Gilles Peskinee1fed0d2018-06-18 20:45:45 +0200441/** The type of PSA elliptic curve identifiers. */
442typedef uint16_t psa_ecc_curve_t;
443/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
444#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE(type) \
445 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \
446 ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
447 0))
448
449/* The encoding of curve identifiers is currently aligned with the
450 * TLS Supported Groups Registry (formerly known as the
451 * TLS EC Named Curve Registry)
452 * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
453 * The values are defined by RFC 4492, RFC 7027 and RFC 7919. */
454#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0001)
455#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0002)
456#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0003)
457#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0004)
458#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0005)
459#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0006)
460#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0007)
461#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0008)
462#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0009)
463#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000a)
464#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000b)
465#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000c)
466#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000d)
467#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000e)
468#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x000f)
469#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0010)
470#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0011)
471#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0012)
472#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0013)
473#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0014)
474#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0015)
475#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0016)
476#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0017)
477#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0018)
478#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0019)
479#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001a)
480#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001b)
481#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001c)
482#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001d)
483#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001e)
484#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_FFDHE_2048 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0100)
485#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_FFDHE_3072 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0101)
486#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_FFDHE_4096 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0102)
487#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_FFDHE_6144 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0103)
488#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_FFDHE_8192 ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x0104)
489
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +0100490/** The block size of a block cipher.
491 *
492 * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
493 *
494 * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200495 * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200496 * cipher key type.
497 *
498 * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
499 * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR).
500 * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
501 * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update()
502 * might buffer for future processing in general.
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +0100503 *
504 * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
505 *
506 * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
507 */
Gilles Peskine03182e92018-03-07 16:40:52 +0100508#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(type) \
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100509 ( \
510 (type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ? 16 : \
511 (type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ? 8 : \
512 (type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ? 16 : \
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +0100513 (type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ? 1 : \
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100514 0)
515
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100516/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.
517 *
518 * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type
519 * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers
520 * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher
521 * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded
522 * via #psa_key_type_t.
523 */
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +0100524typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
525
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100526#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000)
527#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000)
528#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000000)
529#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000)
530#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000)
531#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000)
532#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10000000)
533#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x12000000)
534#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x22000000)
535#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000000)
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +0100536
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100537#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \
538 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200539
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100540/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
541 *
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +0100542 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100543 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200544 * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
545 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +0100546 * algorithm identifier.
547 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100548#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \
549 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200550
551/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
552 *
553 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
554 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200555 * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
556 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200557 * algorithm identifier.
558 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100559#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \
560 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200561
562/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
563 *
564 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
565 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200566 * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
567 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200568 * algorithm identifier.
569 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100570#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \
571 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200572
573/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
574 * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
575 *
576 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
577 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200578 * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
579 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200580 * algorithm identifier.
581 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100582#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \
583 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200584
585/** Whether the specified algorithm is a public-key signature algorithm.
586 *
587 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
588 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200589 * \return 1 if \p alg is a public-key signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
590 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200591 * algorithm identifier.
592 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100593#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \
594 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200595
596/** Whether the specified algorithm is a public-key encryption algorithm.
597 *
598 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
599 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200600 * \return 1 if \p alg is a public-key encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
601 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200602 * algorithm identifier.
603 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100604#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \
605 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200606
607/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
608 *
609 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
610 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200611 * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
612 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200613 * algorithm identifier.
614 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100615#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
616 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200617
618/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
619 *
620 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
621 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200622 * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
623 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200624 * algorithm identifier.
625 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100626#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
627 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
628
629#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff)
630#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000001)
631#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000002)
632#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000003)
Gilles Peskinee3f694f2018-03-08 07:48:40 +0100633#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000004)
634#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000005)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100635#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000008)
636#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000009)
637#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000a)
638#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000b)
639#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000c)
640#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0100000d)
641#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000010)
642#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000011)
643#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000012)
644#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x01000013)
645
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100646#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100647#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02800000)
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200648/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
649 *
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +0200650 * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200651 *
Gilles Peskineea4469f2018-06-28 13:57:23 +0200652 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200653 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200654 *
Gilles Peskineea4469f2018-06-28 13:57:23 +0200655 * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
656 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
657 * hash algorithm.
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +0200658 */
659#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100660 (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200661
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100662#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(hmac_alg) \
663 (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200664
665/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
666 *
667 * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
668 *
669 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
670 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200671 * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
672 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200673 * algorithm identifier.
674 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100675#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \
676 (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
677 PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200678
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100679#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00000)
680#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00001)
681#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00002)
682#define PSA_ALG_GMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02c00003)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200683
684/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
685 *
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +0200686 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
687 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200688 * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
689 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200690 * algorithm identifier.
691 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100692#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \
693 (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
694 PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100695
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100696#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000)
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +0100697#define PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000)
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100698#define PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_MODE_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff)
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +0100699#define PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_PADDING_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200700
701/** Use a block cipher mode without padding.
702 *
703 * This padding mode may only be used with messages whose lengths are a
704 * whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
705 */
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +0100706#define PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00000000)
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +0200707
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100708#define PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00010000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200709
710/** Whether the specified algorithm is a block cipher.
711 *
712 * A block cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
713 * by chopping them into fixed-size blocks. Processing a message requires
714 * applying a _padding mode_ to transform the message into one whose
715 * length is a whole number of blocks. To construct an algorithm
716 * identifier for a block cipher, apply a bitwise-or between the block
717 * cipher mode and the padding mode. For example, CBC with PKCS#7 padding
718 * is `PSA_ALG_CBC_BASE | PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_PKCS7`.
719 *
720 * The transformation applied to each block is determined by the key type.
721 * For example, to use AES-128-CBC-PKCS7, use the algorithm above with
722 * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
723 *
724 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
725 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200726 * \return 1 if \p alg is a block cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
727 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200728 * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
729 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100730#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \
731 (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
732 PSA_ALG_BLOCK_CIPHER_BASE)
733
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200734/** The CBC block cipher mode.
735 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100736#define PSA_ALG_CBC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000001)
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100737#define PSA_ALG_CFB_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000002)
738#define PSA_ALG_OFB_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000003)
739#define PSA_ALG_XTS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000004)
Gilles Peskine5d1888e2018-07-12 00:32:42 +0200740
741#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800000)
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +0200742
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200743/** The CTR stream cipher mode.
744 *
745 * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. The
746 * underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. For example,
747 * to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
748 * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
749 */
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100750#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800001)
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +0200751
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200752/** The ARC4 stream cipher algorithm.
753 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100754#define PSA_ALG_ARC4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800002)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100755
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200756/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
757 *
758 * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
759 * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
760 * from a key.
761 *
762 * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
763 *
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200764 * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
765 * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200766 * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
767 */
Moran Pekerbed71a22018-04-22 20:19:20 +0300768#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \
769 (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
Gilles Peskine5d1888e2018-07-12 00:32:42 +0200770 PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER_BASE)
Moran Pekerbed71a22018-04-22 20:19:20 +0300771
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +0100772#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000001)
773#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000002)
Gilles Peskine98f0a242018-02-06 18:57:29 +0100774
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200775#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10020000)
776/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
777 *
778 * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
779 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
780 * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
781 *
782 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200783 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200784 *
785 * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
786 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
787 * hash algorithm.
788 */
Gilles Peskinea5926232018-03-28 14:16:50 +0200789#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200790 (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
791/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
792 *
793 * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
794 * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), &sect;9.2
795 * steps 3&ndash;6.
796 */
797#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
Gilles Peskinea5926232018-03-28 14:16:50 +0200798#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200799 (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200800
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200801#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10030000)
802/** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
803 *
804 * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
805 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
806 * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1. The specified
807 * hash algorithm is used to hash the input message, to create the
808 * salted hash, and for the mask generation.
809 *
810 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200811 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200812 *
813 * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
814 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
815 * hash algorithm.
816 */
817#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \
818 (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
819#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \
820 (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
821
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200822#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10040000)
823/** DSA signature with hashing.
824 *
825 * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4,
826 * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
827 *
828 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200829 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200830 *
831 * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
832 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
833 * hash algorithm.
834 */
835#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \
836 (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
837#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10050000)
838#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00010000)
839#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \
840 (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
841#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \
842 (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
843 PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE)
844#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
845 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
846
847#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10060000)
848/** ECDSA signature with hashing.
849 *
850 * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
851 * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
852 *
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +0200853 * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
854 * the concatentation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
855 * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
856 * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
857 * in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
858 *
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200859 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200860 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200861 *
862 * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
863 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
864 * hash algorithm.
865 */
866#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
867 (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
868/** ECDSA signature without hashing.
869 *
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +0200870 * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200871 * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
872 * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
873 * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
874 * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
875 * the curve size.
876 */
877#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
878#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10070000)
879/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
880 *
881 * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
882 *
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +0200883 * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
884 *
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200885 * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200886 * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200887 * same private key are accepted. In other words,
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200888 * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
889 * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200890 *
891 * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200892 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200893 *
894 * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
895 * algorithm.
896 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
897 * hash algorithm.
898 */
899#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
900 (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
901#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \
902 (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
903 PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
904#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
905 (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
906
Gilles Peskine7ed29c52018-06-26 15:50:08 +0200907/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
908 *
909 * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
910 * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
911 * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
912 * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
913 * itself.
914 *
915 * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +0200916 * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine7ed29c52018-06-26 15:50:08 +0200917 *
918 * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
919 * algorithm.
920 * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
921 * follow the hash-and-sign structure.
922 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
923 * if it is not supported by the implementation.
924 */
925#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \
Gilles Peskinea81d85b2018-06-26 16:10:23 +0200926 (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \
927 PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) ? \
Gilles Peskine7ed29c52018-06-26 15:50:08 +0200928 ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
929 0)
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100930
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200931/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
932 */
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200933#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x12020000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200934
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200935#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x12030000)
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +0200936/** RSA OAEP encryption.
937 *
938 * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
939 * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
940 * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
941 *
942 * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
943 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
944 * for MGF1.
945 *
946 * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP signature algorithm.
947 * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported
948 * hash algorithm.
949 */
Gilles Peskine55bf3d12018-06-26 15:53:48 +0200950#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \
951 (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
952#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \
953 (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
Gilles Peskined1e8e412018-06-07 09:49:39 +0200954
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100955/**@}*/
956
957/** \defgroup key_management Key management
958 * @{
959 */
960
961/**
962 * \brief Import a key in binary format.
963 *
Gilles Peskinef5b9fa12018-03-07 16:40:18 +0100964 * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the
965 * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type.
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100966 *
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100967 * \param key Slot where the key will be stored. This must be a
968 * valid slot for a key of the chosen type. It must
969 * be unoccupied.
970 * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +0200971 * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +0200972 * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100973 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200974 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100975 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200976 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +0200977 * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
978 * implementation in general or in this particular slot.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200979 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +0100980 * The key slot is invalid,
981 * or the key data is not correctly formatted.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200982 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +0200983 * There is already a key in the specified slot.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +0200984 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
985 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
986 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
987 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
988 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +0100989 */
990psa_status_t psa_import_key(psa_key_slot_t key,
991 psa_key_type_t type,
992 const uint8_t *data,
993 size_t data_length);
994
995/**
Gilles Peskine154bd952018-04-19 08:38:16 +0200996 * \brief Destroy a key and restore the slot to its default state.
997 *
998 * This function destroys the content of the key slot from both volatile
999 * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall
1000 * make a best effort to ensure that any previous content of the slot is
1001 * unrecoverable.
1002 *
1003 * This function also erases any metadata such as policies. It returns the
1004 * specified slot to its default state.
1005 *
1006 * \param key The key slot to erase.
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01001007 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001008 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001009 * The slot's content, if any, has been erased.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001010 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001011 * The slot holds content and cannot be erased because it is
1012 * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001013 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001014 * The specified slot number does not designate a valid slot.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001015 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001016 * There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor.
1017 * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001018 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001019 * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort
1020 * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications
1021 * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the
1022 * key material is not recoverable in such cases.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001023 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine65eb8582018-04-19 08:28:58 +02001024 * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or
1025 * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have
1026 * been compromised.
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01001027 */
1028psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(psa_key_slot_t key);
1029
1030/**
1031 * \brief Get basic metadata about a key.
1032 *
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001033 * \param key Slot whose content is queried. This must
1034 * be an occupied key slot.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001035 * \param[out] type On success, the key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001036 * This may be a null pointer, in which case the key type
1037 * is not written.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001038 * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits.
Gilles Peskine9a1ba0d2018-03-21 20:49:16 +01001039 * This may be a null pointer, in which case the key size
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001040 * is not written.
1041 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001042 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1043 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1044 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1045 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1046 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01001047 */
1048psa_status_t psa_get_key_information(psa_key_slot_t key,
1049 psa_key_type_t *type,
1050 size_t *bits);
1051
1052/**
1053 * \brief Export a key in binary format.
1054 *
1055 * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
1056 * create an equivalent object.
1057 *
1058 * If a key is created with psa_import_key() and then exported with
1059 * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is
1060 * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation
Gilles Peskine92b30732018-03-03 21:29:30 +01001061 * of the same key if the format permits it.
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01001062 *
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001063 * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
1064 *
1065 * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the
1066 * raw bytes of the key.
1067 * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be
1068 * correct.
1069 * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the
1070 * two or three DES keys.
Gilles Peskine92b30732018-03-03 21:29:30 +01001071 * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR), the format
Gilles Peskine2743e422018-06-27 22:57:11 +02001072 * is the non-encrypted DER representation defined by PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017)
1073 * as RSAPrivateKey.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001074 * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the format
Gilles Peskine971f7062018-03-20 17:52:58 +01001075 * is the DER representation defined by RFC 5280 as SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001076 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001077 * \param key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must
1078 * be an occupied key slot.
1079 * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001080 * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001081 * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes
1082 * that make up the key data.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001083 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001084 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1085 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1086 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
1087 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1088 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1089 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01001090 */
1091psa_status_t psa_export_key(psa_key_slot_t key,
1092 uint8_t *data,
1093 size_t data_size,
1094 size_t *data_length);
1095
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001096/**
1097 * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format.
1098 *
1099 * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
1100 * create an object that is equivalent to the public key.
1101 *
1102 * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
1103 *
1104 * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY),
Moran Pekerdd4ea382018-04-03 15:30:03 +03001105 * the format is the DER representation of the public key defined by RFC 5280
Gilles Peskine971f7062018-03-20 17:52:58 +01001106 * as SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001107 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001108 * \param key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must
1109 * be an occupied key slot.
1110 * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001111 * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001112 * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes
1113 * that make up the key data.
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001114 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001115 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1116 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1117 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
1118 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1119 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1120 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001121 */
1122psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_slot_t key,
1123 uint8_t *data,
1124 size_t data_size,
1125 size_t *data_length);
1126
1127/**@}*/
1128
1129/** \defgroup policy Key policies
1130 * @{
1131 */
1132
1133/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. */
1134typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
1135
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001136/** Whether the key may be exported.
1137 *
1138 * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
1139 * regardless of the value of this permission flag.
1140 *
1141 * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
1142 * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
1143 * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
1144 * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
1145 * where it is encrypted by another key.
1146 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001147#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001)
1148
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001149/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
1150 *
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001151 * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
1152 * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
1153 * or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
1154 * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
1155 *
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001156 * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
1157 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001158#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100)
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001159
1160/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
1161 *
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001162 * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
1163 * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
1164 * or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
1165 * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
1166 *
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001167 * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
1168 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001169#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200)
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001170
1171/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
1172 *
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001173 * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
1174 * or for an asymmetric signature operation,
1175 * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
1176 *
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001177 * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
1178 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001179#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001180
1181/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
1182 *
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001183 * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
1184 * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
1185 * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy.
1186 *
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001187 * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
1188 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001189#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
1190
1191/** The type of the key policy data structure.
1192 *
1193 * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
1194 * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except
1195 * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
1196typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t;
1197
1198/** \brief Initialize a key policy structure to a default that forbids all
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001199 * usage of the key.
1200 *
1201 * \param[out] policy The policy object to initialize.
1202 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001203void psa_key_policy_init(psa_key_policy_t *policy);
1204
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001205/** \brief Set the standard fields of a policy structure.
1206 *
1207 * Note that this function does not make any consistency check of the
1208 * parameters. The values are only checked when applying the policy to
1209 * a key slot with psa_set_key_policy().
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001210 *
1211 * \param[out] policy The policy object to modify.
1212 * \param usage The permitted uses for the key.
1213 * \param alg The algorithm that the key may be used for.
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001214 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001215void psa_key_policy_set_usage(psa_key_policy_t *policy,
1216 psa_key_usage_t usage,
1217 psa_algorithm_t alg);
1218
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001219/** \brief Retrieve the usage field of a policy structure.
1220 *
1221 * \param[in] policy The policy object to query.
1222 *
1223 * \return The permitted uses for a key with this policy.
1224 */
Gilles Peskineaa7bc472018-07-12 00:54:56 +02001225psa_key_usage_t psa_key_policy_get_usage(const psa_key_policy_t *policy);
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001226
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001227/** \brief Retrieve the algorithm field of a policy structure.
1228 *
1229 * \param[in] policy The policy object to query.
1230 *
1231 * \return The permitted algorithm for a key with this policy.
1232 */
Gilles Peskineaa7bc472018-07-12 00:54:56 +02001233psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_get_algorithm(const psa_key_policy_t *policy);
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001234
1235/** \brief Set the usage policy on a key slot.
1236 *
1237 * This function must be called on an empty key slot, before importing,
1238 * generating or creating a key in the slot. Changing the policy of an
1239 * existing key is not permitted.
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001240 *
1241 * Implementations may set restrictions on supported key policies
1242 * depending on the key type and the key slot.
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001243 *
1244 * \param key The key slot whose policy is to be changed.
1245 * \param[in] policy The policy object to query.
1246 *
1247 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1248 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
1249 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
1250 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
1251 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1252 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1253 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001254 */
1255psa_status_t psa_set_key_policy(psa_key_slot_t key,
1256 const psa_key_policy_t *policy);
1257
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001258/** \brief Get the usage policy for a key slot.
Gilles Peskine6ac73a92018-07-12 19:47:19 +02001259 *
1260 * \param key The key slot whose policy is being queried.
1261 * \param[out] policy On success, the key's policy.
1262 *
1263 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1264 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1265 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1266 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine7e198532018-03-08 07:50:30 +01001267 */
Gilles Peskine7698bcf2018-03-03 21:30:44 +01001268psa_status_t psa_get_key_policy(psa_key_slot_t key,
1269 psa_key_policy_t *policy);
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01001270
1271/**@}*/
1272
Gilles Peskine609b6a52018-03-03 21:31:50 +01001273/** \defgroup persistence Key lifetime
1274 * @{
1275 */
1276
1277/** Encoding of key lifetimes.
1278 */
1279typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
1280
1281/** A volatile key slot retains its content as long as the application is
1282 * running. It is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
1283 */
1284#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000)
1285
1286/** A persistent key slot retains its content as long as it is not explicitly
1287 * destroyed.
1288 */
1289#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001)
1290
1291/** A write-once key slot may not be modified once a key has been set.
1292 * It will retain its content as long as the device remains operational.
1293 */
1294#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_WRITE_ONCE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x7fffffff)
1295
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001296/** \brief Retrieve the lifetime of a key slot.
1297 *
1298 * The assignment of lifetimes to slots is implementation-dependent.
Gilles Peskine8ca56022018-04-17 14:07:59 +02001299 *
Gilles Peskine9bb53d72018-04-17 14:09:24 +02001300 * \param key Slot to query.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001301 * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime value.
Gilles Peskine8ca56022018-04-17 14:07:59 +02001302 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001303 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
mohammad1603804cd712018-03-20 22:44:08 +02001304 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001305 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
mohammad1603a7d245a2018-04-17 00:40:08 -07001306 * The key slot is invalid.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001307 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1308 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1309 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001310 */
Gilles Peskine609b6a52018-03-03 21:31:50 +01001311psa_status_t psa_get_key_lifetime(psa_key_slot_t key,
1312 psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime);
1313
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001314/** \brief Change the lifetime of a key slot.
1315 *
1316 * Whether the lifetime of a key slot can be changed at all, and if so
Gilles Peskine19067982018-03-20 17:54:53 +01001317 * whether the lifetime of an occupied key slot can be changed, is
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001318 * implementation-dependent.
Gilles Peskine8ca56022018-04-17 14:07:59 +02001319 *
Gilles Peskine9bb53d72018-04-17 14:09:24 +02001320 * \param key Slot whose lifetime is to be changed.
1321 * \param lifetime The lifetime value to set for the given key slot.
Gilles Peskine8ca56022018-04-17 14:07:59 +02001322 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001323 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
mohammad1603804cd712018-03-20 22:44:08 +02001324 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001325 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
mohammad1603804cd712018-03-20 22:44:08 +02001326 * The key slot is invalid,
mohammad1603a7d245a2018-04-17 00:40:08 -07001327 * or the lifetime value is invalid.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001328 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinef0c9dd32018-04-17 14:11:07 +02001329 * The implementation does not support the specified lifetime value,
1330 * at least for the specified key slot.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001331 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
Gilles Peskinef0c9dd32018-04-17 14:11:07 +02001332 * The slot contains a key, and the implementation does not support
1333 * changing the lifetime of an occupied slot.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001334 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1335 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1336 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001337 */
1338psa_status_t psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_slot_t key,
mohammad1603ea050092018-04-17 00:31:34 -07001339 psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime);
Gilles Peskined393e182018-03-08 07:49:16 +01001340
Gilles Peskine609b6a52018-03-03 21:31:50 +01001341/**@}*/
1342
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001343/** \defgroup hash Message digests
1344 * @{
1345 */
1346
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001347/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations.
1348 *
Gilles Peskine92b30732018-03-03 21:29:30 +01001349 * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001350 * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except
1351 * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001352typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
1353
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001354/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes.
1355 *
1356 * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects.
1357 *
1358 * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02001359 * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm
Gilles Peskinebe42f312018-07-13 14:38:15 +02001360 * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a
Gilles Peskine35855962018-04-19 08:39:16 +02001361 * hash algorithm).
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001362 *
1363 * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm.
1364 * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
1365 * An implementation may return either 0 or the correct size
1366 * for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
1367 */
Gilles Peskine7ed29c52018-06-26 15:50:08 +02001368#define PSA_HASH_SIZE(alg) \
1369 ( \
1370 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \
1371 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \
1372 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \
1373 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \
1374 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \
1375 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \
1376 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \
1377 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \
1378 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \
1379 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \
1380 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \
1381 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \
1382 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \
1383 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \
1384 PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001385 0)
1386
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001387/** Start a multipart hash operation.
1388 *
1389 * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest)
1390 * is as follows:
1391 * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
1392 * listed here.
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001393 * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001394 * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001395 * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash
1396 * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
1397 * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish().
1398 * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify().
1399 *
1400 * The application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001401 * has been initialized with psa_hash_setup().
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001402 *
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001403 * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must
Gilles Peskineed522972018-03-20 17:54:15 +01001404 * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
1405 * operation:
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001406 * - A failed call to psa_hash_update().
Gilles Peskine19067982018-03-20 17:54:53 +01001407 * - A call to psa_hash_finish(), psa_hash_verify() or psa_hash_abort().
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001408 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001409 * \param[out] operation The operation object to use.
1410 * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
1411 * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001412 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001413 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001414 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001415 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001416 * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001417 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1418 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1419 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1420 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001421 */
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001422psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001423 psa_algorithm_t alg);
1424
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001425/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation.
1426 *
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001427 * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001428 *
1429 * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
1430 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001431 * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
1432 * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001433 * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001434 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001435 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001436 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001437 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001438 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001439 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1440 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1441 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1442 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001443 */
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001444psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
1445 const uint8_t *input,
1446 size_t input_length);
1447
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001448/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message.
1449 *
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001450 * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001451 * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
1452 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().
1453 *
1454 * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
1455 *
1456 * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
1457 * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead.
1458 * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
1459 * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
1460 * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
1461 * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess
1462 * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls.
1463 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001464 * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
1465 * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written.
1466 * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
1467 * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes
1468 * that make up the hash value. This is always
Gilles Peskinebe42f312018-07-13 14:38:15 +02001469 * #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where \c alg is the
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001470 * hash algorithm that is calculated.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001471 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001472 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001473 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001474 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001475 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001476 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001477 * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02001478 * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg)
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001479 * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001480 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1481 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1482 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1483 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001484 */
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001485psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
1486 uint8_t *hash,
1487 size_t hash_size,
1488 size_t *hash_length);
1489
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001490/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with
1491 * an expected value.
1492 *
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001493 * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001494 * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
1495 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then
1496 * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a
1497 * parameter to this function.
1498 *
1499 * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
1500 *
Gilles Peskine19067982018-03-20 17:54:53 +01001501 * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001502 * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed
1503 * in constant time.
1504 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001505 * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
1506 * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001507 * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001508 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001509 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001510 * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001511 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001512 * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
1513 * differs from the expected hash.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001514 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001515 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001516 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1517 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1518 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1519 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001520 */
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001521psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
1522 const uint8_t *hash,
1523 size_t hash_length);
1524
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001525/** Abort a hash operation.
1526 *
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02001527 * This function may be called at any time after psa_hash_setup().
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001528 * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001529 * \p operation structure itself.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001530 *
1531 * Implementation should strive to be robust and handle inactive hash
1532 * operations safely (do nothing and return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE). However,
1533 * application writers should beware that uninitialized memory may happen
1534 * to be indistinguishable from an active hash operation, and the behavior
1535 * of psa_hash_abort() is undefined in this case.
1536 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001537 * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001538 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001539 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1540 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001541 * \p operation is not an active hash operation.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001542 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1543 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1544 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01001545 */
1546psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01001547
1548/**@}*/
1549
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001550/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes
1551 * @{
1552 */
1553
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001554/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations.
1555 *
Gilles Peskine92b30732018-03-03 21:29:30 +01001556 * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001557 * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except
1558 * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001559typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
1560
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001561/** Start a multipart MAC calculation operation.
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001562 *
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001563 * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
1564 * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
1565 * To verify the MAC of a message against an
1566 * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.
1567 *
1568 * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001569 * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
1570 * listed here.
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001571 * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001572 * The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
1573 * of the key slot changes.
1574 * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
1575 * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
1576 * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001577 * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish
1578 * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001579 *
1580 * The application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001581 * has been initialized with psa_mac_sign_setup().
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001582 *
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001583 * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must
1584 * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001585 * - A failed call to psa_mac_update().
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001586 * - A call to psa_mac_sign_finish() or psa_mac_abort().
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001587 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001588 * \param[out] operation The operation object to use.
1589 * \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
1590 * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
1591 * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001592 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001593 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001594 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001595 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1596 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
1597 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001598 * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001599 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001600 * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001601 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1602 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1603 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1604 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine7e4acc52018-02-16 21:24:11 +01001605 */
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001606psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
1607 psa_key_slot_t key,
1608 psa_algorithm_t alg);
1609
1610/** Start a multipart MAC verification operation.
1611 *
1612 * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
1613 * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
1614 *
1615 * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:
1616 * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
1617 * listed here.
1618 * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
1619 * The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
1620 * of the key slot changes.
1621 * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
1622 * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
1623 * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
1624 * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish
1625 * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against
1626 * the expected value.
1627 *
1628 * The application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
1629 * has been initialized with psa_mac_verify_setup().
1630 *
1631 * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must
1632 * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
1633 * - A failed call to psa_mac_update().
1634 * - A call to psa_mac_verify_finish() or psa_mac_abort().
1635 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001636 * \param[out] operation The operation object to use.
1637 * \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
1638 * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
1639 * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001640 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001641 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001642 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001643 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1644 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
1645 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001646 * \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001647 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001648 * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001649 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1650 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1651 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1652 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine89167cb2018-07-08 20:12:23 +02001653 */
1654psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
1655 psa_key_slot_t key,
1656 psa_algorithm_t alg);
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001657
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001658/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation.
1659 *
1660 * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup()
1661 * before calling this function.
1662 *
1663 * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
1664 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001665 * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
1666 * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to
1667 * the MAC calculation.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001668 * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001669 *
1670 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1671 * Success.
1672 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1673 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
1674 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1675 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1676 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1677 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1678 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001679psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
1680 const uint8_t *input,
1681 size_t input_length);
1682
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001683/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message.
1684 *
1685 * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function.
1686 * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
1687 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().
1688 *
1689 * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
1690 *
1691 * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
1692 * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead.
1693 * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
1694 * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
1695 * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
1696 * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
1697 * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
1698 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001699 * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
1700 * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
1701 * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
1702 * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes
1703 * that make up the MAC value. This is always
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +02001704 * #PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001705 * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +02001706 * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001707 * MAC algorithm that is calculated.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001708 *
1709 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1710 * Success.
1711 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1712 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
1713 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001714 * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001715 * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE().
1716 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1717 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1718 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1719 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1720 */
Gilles Peskineacd4be32018-07-08 19:56:25 +02001721psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
1722 uint8_t *mac,
1723 size_t mac_size,
1724 size_t *mac_length);
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001725
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001726/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with
1727 * an expected value.
1728 *
1729 * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.
1730 * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
1731 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then
1732 * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a
1733 * parameter to this function.
1734 *
1735 * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
1736 *
1737 * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
1738 * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed
1739 * in constant time.
1740 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001741 * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
1742 * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001743 * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001744 *
1745 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1746 * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message.
1747 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
1748 * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
1749 * differs from the expected MAC.
1750 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1751 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
1752 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1753 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1754 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1755 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1756 */
Gilles Peskineacd4be32018-07-08 19:56:25 +02001757psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
1758 const uint8_t *mac,
1759 size_t mac_length);
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001760
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001761/** Abort a MAC operation.
1762 *
1763 * This function may be called at any time after psa_mac_sign_setup()
1764 * or psa_mac_verify_setup().
1765 * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001766 * \p operation structure itself.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001767 *
1768 * Implementation should strive to be robust and handle inactive MAC
1769 * operations safely (do nothing and return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE). However,
1770 * application writers should beware that uninitialized memory may happen
1771 * to be indistinguishable from an active MAC operation, and the behavior
1772 * of psa_mac_abort() is undefined in this case.
1773 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001774 * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001775 *
1776 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1777 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001778 * \p operation is not an active MAC operation.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001779 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1780 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1781 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1782 */
Gilles Peskine8c9def32018-02-08 10:02:12 +01001783psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
1784
1785/**@}*/
1786
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001787/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers
1788 * @{
1789 */
1790
1791/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
1792 *
1793 * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
1794 * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except
1795 * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
1796typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
1797
1798/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation.
1799 *
1800 * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
1801 * is as follows:
1802 * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
1803 * listed here.
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001804 * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001805 * The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
1806 * of the key slot changes.
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001807 * -# Call either psa_encrypt_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001808 * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use
1809 * psa_encrypt_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing
1810 * requires a specific IV value.
1811 * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
1812 * of the message each time.
1813 * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
1814 *
1815 * The application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001816 * has been initialized with psa_cipher_encrypt_setup().
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001817 *
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001818 * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must
Gilles Peskineed522972018-03-20 17:54:15 +01001819 * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
1820 * operation:
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001821 * - A failed call to psa_encrypt_generate_iv(), psa_cipher_set_iv()
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001822 * or psa_cipher_update().
Gilles Peskine19067982018-03-20 17:54:53 +01001823 * - A call to psa_cipher_finish() or psa_cipher_abort().
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001824 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001825 * \param[out] operation The operation object to use.
1826 * \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
1827 * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
1828 * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
1829 * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001830 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001831 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001832 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001833 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1834 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
1835 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001836 * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001837 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001838 * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001839 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1840 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1841 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1842 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001843 */
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001844psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
1845 psa_key_slot_t key,
1846 psa_algorithm_t alg);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001847
1848/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation.
1849 *
1850 * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
1851 * is as follows:
1852 * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
1853 * listed here.
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001854 * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001855 * The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
1856 * of the key slot changes.
1857 * -# Call psa_cipher_update() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
1858 * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call
1859 * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the
1860 * beginning of the message.
1861 * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
1862 * of the message each time.
1863 * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
1864 *
1865 * The application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001866 * has been initialized with psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001867 *
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001868 * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must
Gilles Peskineed522972018-03-20 17:54:15 +01001869 * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
1870 * operation:
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001871 * - A failed call to psa_cipher_update().
Gilles Peskine19067982018-03-20 17:54:53 +01001872 * - A call to psa_cipher_finish() or psa_cipher_abort().
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001873 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001874 * \param[out] operation The operation object to use.
1875 * \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
1876 * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
1877 * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
1878 * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001879 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001880 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001881 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001882 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
1883 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
1884 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001885 * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001886 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001887 * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02001888 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1889 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1890 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1891 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001892 */
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001893psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
1894 psa_key_slot_t key,
1895 psa_algorithm_t alg);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001896
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001897/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation.
1898 *
1899 * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce
1900 * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate
1901 * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size.
1902 *
1903 * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
1904 * calling this function.
1905 *
1906 * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
1907 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001908 * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
1909 * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001910 * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001911 * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the
1912 * generated IV.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001913 *
1914 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1915 * Success.
1916 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1917 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
1918 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +02001919 * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001920 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1921 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1922 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1923 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1924 */
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001925psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
1926 unsigned char *iv,
1927 size_t iv_size,
1928 size_t *iv_length);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001929
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001930/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.
1931 *
1932 * This function sets the random IV (initialization vector), nonce
1933 * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation.
1934 *
1935 * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
1936 * calling this function.
1937 *
1938 * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
1939 *
1940 * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv()
1941 * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
1942 * a non-random IV.
1943 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001944 * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
1945 * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use.
1946 * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001947 *
1948 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1949 * Success.
1950 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1951 * The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
1952 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001953 * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001954 * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
1955 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1956 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1957 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1958 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1959 */
Gilles Peskinefe119512018-07-08 21:39:34 +02001960psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
1961 const unsigned char *iv,
1962 size_t iv_length);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001963
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001964/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation.
1965 *
Gilles Peskine9ac94262018-07-12 20:15:32 +02001966 * Before calling this function, you must:
1967 * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
1968 * The choice of setup function determines whether this function
1969 * encrypts or decrypts its input.
1970 * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv()
1971 * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv().
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001972 *
1973 * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
1974 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001975 * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
1976 * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to
1977 * encrypt or decrypt.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001978 * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001979 * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02001980 * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02001981 * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
1982 * that make up the returned output.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02001983 *
1984 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
1985 * Success.
1986 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
1987 * The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
1988 * not set, or already completed).
1989 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
1990 * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
1991 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
1992 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
1993 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
1994 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
1995 */
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01001996psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
1997 const uint8_t *input,
mohammad1603503973b2018-03-12 15:59:30 +02001998 size_t input_length,
Gilles Peskine2d277862018-06-18 15:41:12 +02001999 unsigned char *output,
2000 size_t output_size,
mohammad1603503973b2018-03-12 15:59:30 +02002001 size_t *output_length);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01002002
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002003/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation.
2004 *
2005 * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or
2006 * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice
2007 * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or
2008 * decrypts its input.
2009 *
2010 * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message
2011 * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
2012 * psa_cipher_update().
2013 *
2014 * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
2015 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002016 * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
2017 * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002018 * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002019 * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
2020 * that make up the returned output.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002021 *
2022 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2023 * Success.
2024 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
2025 * The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
2026 * not set, or already completed).
2027 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
2028 * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
2029 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2030 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2031 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2032 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
2033 */
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01002034psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
mohammad1603503973b2018-03-12 15:59:30 +02002035 uint8_t *output,
Moran Peker0071b872018-04-22 20:16:58 +03002036 size_t output_size,
mohammad1603503973b2018-03-12 15:59:30 +02002037 size_t *output_length);
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01002038
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002039/** Abort a cipher operation.
2040 *
2041 * This function may be called at any time after
2042 * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
2043 * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002044 * \p operation structure itself.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002045 *
2046 * Implementation should strive to be robust and handle inactive cipher
2047 * operations safely (do nothing and return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE). However,
2048 * application writers should beware that uninitialized memory may happen
2049 * to be indistinguishable from an active cipher operation, and the behavior
2050 * of psa_cipher_abort() is undefined in this case.
2051 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002052 * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002053 *
2054 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2055 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002056 * \p operation is not an active cipher operation.
Gilles Peskinedcd14942018-07-12 00:30:52 +02002057 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2058 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2059 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
2060 */
Gilles Peskine428dc5a2018-03-03 21:27:18 +01002061psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation);
2062
2063/**@}*/
2064
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002065/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
2066 * @{
2067 */
2068
Gilles Peskine5e39dc92018-06-08 11:41:57 +02002069/** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002070 *
Gilles Peskine5e39dc92018-06-08 11:41:57 +02002071 * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
2072 * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02002073 * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskine5e39dc92018-06-08 11:41:57 +02002074 *
2075 * \return The tag size for the specified algorithm.
2076 * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified
2077 * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of
2078 * the ciphertext, return 0.
2079 * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
2080 * An implementation may return either 0 or a
2081 * correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
2082 * recognizes, but does not support.
2083 */
2084#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_SIZE(alg) \
2085 ((alg) == PSA_ALG_GCM ? 16 : \
2086 (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM ? 16 : \
2087 0)
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002088
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002089/** Process an authenticated encryption operation.
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002090 *
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002091 * \param key Slot containing the key to use.
2092 * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
2093 * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02002094 * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002095 * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use.
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002096 * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002097 * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002098 * but not encrypted.
2099 * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002100 * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002101 * encrypted.
2102 * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002103 * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002104 * encrypted data. The additional data is not
2105 * part of this output. For algorithms where the
2106 * encrypted data and the authentication tag
2107 * are defined as separate outputs, the
2108 * authentication tag is appended to the
2109 * encrypted data.
2110 * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
2111 * This must be at least
2112 * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg,
2113 * \p plaintext_length).
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002114 * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002115 * in the \b ciphertext buffer.
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002116 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002117 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002118 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002119 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
2120 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
2121 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002122 * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002123 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002124 * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002125 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2126 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2127 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2128 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002129 */
mohammad160339ee8712018-04-26 00:51:02 +03002130psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt( psa_key_slot_t key,
2131 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2132 const uint8_t *nonce,
2133 size_t nonce_length,
2134 const uint8_t *additional_data,
2135 size_t additional_data_length,
2136 const uint8_t *plaintext,
2137 size_t plaintext_length,
2138 uint8_t *ciphertext,
2139 size_t ciphertext_size,
2140 size_t *ciphertext_length );
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002141
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002142/** Process an authenticated decryption operation.
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002143 *
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002144 * \param key Slot containing the key to use.
2145 * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
2146 * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02002147 * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002148 * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use.
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002149 * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002150 * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002151 * but not encrypted.
2152 * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002153 * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002154 * encrypted. For algorithms where the
2155 * encrypted data and the authentication tag
2156 * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer
2157 * must contain the encrypted data followed
2158 * by the authentication tag.
2159 * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002160 * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data.
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002161 * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes.
2162 * This must be at least
2163 * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg,
2164 * \p ciphertext_length).
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002165 * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output
mohammad1603fb5b9cb2018-06-06 13:44:27 +03002166 * in the \b plaintext buffer.
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002167 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002168 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002169 * Success.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002170 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
2171 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
Gilles Peskine1e7d8f12018-06-01 16:29:38 +02002172 * The ciphertext is not authentic.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002173 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
2174 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002175 * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002176 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002177 * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002178 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2179 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2180 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2181 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002182 */
mohammad160339ee8712018-04-26 00:51:02 +03002183psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt( psa_key_slot_t key,
2184 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2185 const uint8_t *nonce,
2186 size_t nonce_length,
2187 const uint8_t *additional_data,
2188 size_t additional_data_length,
2189 const uint8_t *ciphertext,
2190 size_t ciphertext_length,
2191 uint8_t *plaintext,
2192 size_t plaintext_size,
2193 size_t *plaintext_length );
Gilles Peskine3b555712018-03-03 21:27:57 +01002194
2195/**@}*/
2196
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01002197/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography
2198 * @{
2199 */
2200
2201/**
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +02002202 * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +01002203 *
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +02002204 * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits.
2205 * \return Signature size in bytes.
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +01002206 *
2207 * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +01002208 */
Gilles Peskineeae6eee2018-06-28 13:56:01 +02002209#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \
2210 (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2)
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +01002211
Gilles Peskine0189e752018-02-03 23:57:22 +01002212/**
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01002213 * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
2214 *
Gilles Peskine08bac712018-06-26 16:14:46 +02002215 * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02002216 * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
Gilles Peskine08bac712018-06-26 16:14:46 +02002217 * and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
2218 * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
2219 * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
2220 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002221 * \param key Key slot containing an asymmetric key pair.
2222 * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002223 * the type of \p key.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002224 * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002225 * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002226 * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the
2227 * signature algorithm.
2228 * If the signature algorithm does not support
2229 * a salt, pass \c NULL.
2230 * If the signature algorithm supports an
2231 * optional salt and you do not want to pass
2232 * a salt, pass \c NULL.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002233 * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
2234 * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002235 * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002236 * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002237 * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
2238 * that make up the returned signature value.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002239 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002240 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2241 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002242 * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002243 * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02002244 * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002245 * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002246 * respectively of \p key.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002247 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2248 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
2249 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2250 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2251 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2252 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
2253 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01002254 */
2255psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign(psa_key_slot_t key,
2256 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2257 const uint8_t *hash,
2258 size_t hash_length,
2259 const uint8_t *salt,
2260 size_t salt_length,
2261 uint8_t *signature,
2262 size_t signature_size,
2263 size_t *signature_length);
2264
2265/**
2266 * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key.
2267 *
Gilles Peskine08bac712018-06-26 16:14:46 +02002268 * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
Gilles Peskineda8191d1c2018-07-08 19:46:38 +02002269 * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
Gilles Peskine08bac712018-06-26 16:14:46 +02002270 * and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
2271 * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
2272 * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
2273 *
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002274 * \param key Key slot containing a public key or an
2275 * asymmetric key pair.
2276 * \param alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002277 * the type of \p key.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002278 * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
Gilles Peskine08bac712018-06-26 16:14:46 +02002279 * verified.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002280 * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002281 * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the signature
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002282 * algorithm.
2283 * If the signature algorithm does not support a
2284 * salt, pass \c NULL.
2285 * If the signature algorithm supports an optional
2286 * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
2287 * pass \c NULL.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002288 * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
2289 * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002290 * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002291 * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002292 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002293 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002294 * The signature is valid.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002295 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
Gilles Peskine308b91d2018-02-08 09:47:44 +01002296 * The calculation was perfomed successfully, but the passed
2297 * signature is not a valid signature.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002298 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2299 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
2300 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2301 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2302 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2303 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01002304 */
2305psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_verify(psa_key_slot_t key,
2306 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2307 const uint8_t *hash,
2308 size_t hash_length,
2309 const uint8_t *salt,
2310 size_t salt_length,
Gilles Peskinee9191ff2018-06-27 14:58:41 +02002311 const uint8_t *signature,
Gilles Peskine526fab02018-06-27 18:19:40 +02002312 size_t signature_length);
Gilles Peskine20035e32018-02-03 22:44:14 +01002313
Gilles Peskine723feff2018-05-31 20:08:13 +02002314#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \
2315 (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP_MGF1(alg) ? \
2316 2 * PSA_HASH_FINAL_SIZE(PSA_ALG_RSA_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \
2317 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/)
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002318
2319/**
2320 * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key.
2321 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002322 * \param key Key slot containing a public key or an
2323 * asymmetric key pair.
2324 * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002325 * compatible with the type of \p key.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002326 * \param[in] input The message to encrypt.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002327 * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002328 * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the
2329 * encryption algorithm.
2330 * If the algorithm does not support a
2331 * salt, pass \c NULL.
2332 * If the algorithm supports an optional
2333 * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
2334 * pass \c NULL.
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002335 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002336 * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
2337 * supported.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002338 * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
2339 * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002340 * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to
2341 * be written.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002342 * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002343 * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
2344 * that make up the returned output.
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002345 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002346 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2347 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002348 * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002349 * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
Gilles Peskine7256e6c2018-07-12 00:34:26 +02002350 * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002351 * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002352 * respectively of \p key.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002353 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2354 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
2355 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2356 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2357 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2358 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
2359 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002360 */
2361psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(psa_key_slot_t key,
2362 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2363 const uint8_t *input,
2364 size_t input_length,
2365 const uint8_t *salt,
2366 size_t salt_length,
2367 uint8_t *output,
2368 size_t output_size,
2369 size_t *output_length);
2370
2371/**
2372 * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key.
2373 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002374 * \param key Key slot containing an asymmetric key pair.
2375 * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002376 * compatible with the type of \p key.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002377 * \param[in] input The message to decrypt.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002378 * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002379 * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the
2380 * encryption algorithm.
2381 * If the algorithm does not support a
2382 * salt, pass \c NULL.
2383 * If the algorithm supports an optional
2384 * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
2385 * pass \c NULL.
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002386 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002387 * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
2388 * supported.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002389 * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
2390 * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002391 * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
2392 * be written.
2393 * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
2394 * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
2395 * that make up the returned output.
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002396 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002397 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2398 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002399 * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002400 * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +02002401 * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002402 * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002403 * respectively of \p key.
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002404 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2405 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
2406 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2407 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2408 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2409 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
2410 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
2411 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
Gilles Peskine6944f9a2018-03-28 14:18:39 +02002412 */
2413psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(psa_key_slot_t key,
2414 psa_algorithm_t alg,
2415 const uint8_t *input,
2416 size_t input_length,
2417 const uint8_t *salt,
2418 size_t salt_length,
2419 uint8_t *output,
2420 size_t output_size,
2421 size_t *output_length);
2422
Gilles Peskine2f9c4dc2018-01-28 13:16:24 +01002423/**@}*/
2424
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002425/** \defgroup generation Key generation
2426 * @{
2427 */
2428
2429/**
2430 * \brief Generate random bytes.
2431 *
2432 * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status
2433 * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return
2434 * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS.
2435 *
2436 * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead.
2437 *
Gilles Peskineedd11a12018-07-12 01:08:58 +02002438 * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data.
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002439 * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output.
2440 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002441 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2442 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2443 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
2444 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2445 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2446 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002447 */
2448psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output,
2449 size_t output_size);
2450
Gilles Peskine4c317f42018-07-12 01:24:09 +02002451/** Extra parameters for RSA key generation.
2452 *
Gilles Peskinebe42f312018-07-13 14:38:15 +02002453 * You may pass a pointer to a structure of this type as the \c extra
Gilles Peskine4c317f42018-07-12 01:24:09 +02002454 * parameter to psa_generate_key().
2455 */
2456typedef struct {
2457 uint32_t e; /**! Public exponent value. Default: 65537. */
2458} psa_generate_key_extra_rsa;
2459
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002460/**
2461 * \brief Generate a key or key pair.
2462 *
Gilles Peskine4e69d7a2018-06-19 20:19:14 +02002463 * \param key Slot where the key will be stored. This must be a
2464 * valid slot for a key of the chosen type. It must
2465 * be unoccupied.
2466 * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
2467 * \param bits Key size in bits.
Gilles Peskine53d991e2018-07-12 01:14:59 +02002468 * \param[in] extra Extra parameters for key generation. The
Gilles Peskine4e69d7a2018-06-19 20:19:14 +02002469 * interpretation of this parameter depends on
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002470 * \p type. All types support \c NULL to use
Gilles Peskine3fa675c2018-07-12 01:31:03 +02002471 * default parameters. Implementation that support
2472 * the generation of vendor-specific key types
2473 * that allow extra parameters shall document
2474 * the format of these extra parameters and
2475 * the default values. For standard parameters,
2476 * the meaning of \p extra is as follows:
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002477 * - For a symmetric key type (a type such
Gilles Peskine3fa675c2018-07-12 01:31:03 +02002478 * that #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\p type) is
2479 * false), \p extra must be \c NULL.
Gilles Peskinefa4070c2018-07-12 19:23:03 +02002480 * - For an elliptic curve key type (a type
Gilles Peskine3fa675c2018-07-12 01:31:03 +02002481 * such that #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(\p type) is
2482 * false), \p extra must be \c NULL.
Gilles Peskinedda3bd32018-07-12 19:40:46 +02002483 * - For an RSA key (\p type is
2484 * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR), \p extra is an
2485 * optional #psa_generate_key_extra_rsa structure
Gilles Peskine3fa675c2018-07-12 01:31:03 +02002486 * specifying the public exponent. The
2487 * default public exponent used when \p extra
2488 * is \c NULL is 65537.
Gilles Peskine53d991e2018-07-12 01:14:59 +02002489 * \param extra_size Size of the buffer that \p extra
2490 * points to, in bytes. Note that if \p extra is
2491 * \c NULL then \p extra_size must be zero.
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002492 *
Gilles Peskine28538492018-07-11 17:34:00 +02002493 * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
2494 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
2495 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
2496 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
2497 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
2498 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
2499 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
2500 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002501 */
2502psa_status_t psa_generate_key(psa_key_slot_t key,
2503 psa_key_type_t type,
2504 size_t bits,
Gilles Peskine53d991e2018-07-12 01:14:59 +02002505 const void *extra,
2506 size_t extra_size);
Gilles Peskine9e7dc712018-03-28 14:18:50 +02002507
2508/**@}*/
2509
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +01002510#ifdef __cplusplus
2511}
2512#endif
2513
Gilles Peskine0cad07c2018-06-27 19:49:02 +02002514/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation
2515 * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */
2516#include "crypto_sizes.h"
2517
Gilles Peskine9ef733f2018-02-07 21:05:37 +01002518/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for
2519 * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */
2520#include "crypto_struct.h"
2521
2522/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This
2523 * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */
Gilles Peskinee59236f2018-01-27 23:32:46 +01002524#include "crypto_extra.h"
2525
2526#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */