| # (Minimal) ClientHello breakdown: |
| # 160303rlrl - record header, 2-byte record contents len |
| # 01hlhlhl - handshake header, 3-byte handshake message len |
| # 0303 - protocol version: 1.2 |
| # 0123456789abcdef (repeated, 4 times total) - 32-byte "random" |
| # 00 - session ID (empty) |
| # 0002cvcv - ciphersuite list: 2-byte len + list of 2-byte values (see below) |
| # 0100 - compression methods: 1-byte len then "null" (only legal value now) |
| # [then end, or extensions, see notes below] |
| # elel - 2-byte extensions length |
| # ... |
| # 000a - elliptic_curves aka supported_groups |
| # 0004 - extension length |
| # 0002 - length of named_curve_list / named_group_list |
| # 0017 - secp256r1 aka NIST P-256 |
| # ... |
| # 002b - supported version (for TLS 1.3) |
| # 0003 - extension length |
| # 02 - length of versions |
| # 0304 - TLS 1.3 ("SSL 3.4") |
| # ... |
| # 000d - signature algorithms |
| # 0004 - extension length |
| # 0002 - SignatureSchemeList length |
| # 0403 - ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 |
| # ... |
| # 0033 - key share |
| # 0002 - extension length |
| # 0000 - length of client_shares (empty is valid) |
| # |
| # Note: currently our TLS "1.3 or 1.2" code requires extension length to be |
| # present even it it's 0. This is not strictly compliant but doesn't matter |
| # much in practice as these days everyone wants to use signature_algorithms |
| # (for hashes better than SHA-1), secure_renego (even if you have renego |
| # disabled), and most people want either ECC or PSK related extensions. |
| # See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9963 |
| # |
| # Also, currently we won't negotiate ECC ciphersuites unless at least the |
| # supported_groups extension is present, see |
| # https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7458 |
| # |
| # For TLS 1.3 with ephemeral key exchange, mandatory extensions are: |
| # - supported versions (as for all of TLS 1.3) |
| # - supported groups |
| # - key share |
| # - signature algorithms |
| # (see ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange()). |
| # |
| # Note: cccc is currently not assigned, so can be used get a consistent |
| # "no matching ciphersuite" behaviour regardless of the configuration. |
| # c02b is MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (1.2) |
| # 1301 is MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (1.3) |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 with secp256r1 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.2 good (for reference) |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300370100003303030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002c02b01000008000a000400020017":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # Same as the above test with s/c02b/cccc/ as the ciphersuite |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.2 unknown ciphersuite (for reference) |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303002f0100002b03030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002cccc01000000":"got no ciphersuites in common":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 good (for reference) |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # Same as the above test with s/1301/cccc/ as the ciphersuite |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 unknown ciphersuite (for reference) |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002cccc0100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"No matched ciphersuite":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + 72 OK |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000401000048160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 3 + 73 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000301000016030300494803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 2 + 74 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300020100160303004a004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 1 + 75 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000101160303004b00004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 0 + 76 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030000160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"ssl_get_next_record() returned":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 72 + 4 OK |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300480100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033160303000400020000":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 73 + 3 OK |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300490100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033001603030003020000":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 74 + 2 OK |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004a0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033000216030300020000":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 73 + 1 OK |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004b0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033000200160303000100":"":0 |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + appdata + 72 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300040100004817030300020102160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + alert(warn) + 72 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481503030002015a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + alert(fatal) + 72 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481503030002025a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + CCS + 72 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000401000048140303000101160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE |
| |
| # See "ClientHello breakdown" above |
| # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + invalid type + 72 rejected |
| depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY |
| inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481003030002015a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"unknown record type":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD |
| |
| # The buffer is actually larger than IN_CONTENT_LEN as we leave room for |
| # record protection overhead (IV, MAC/tag, padding (up to 256 bytes)), CID... |
| # The maximum size for an unencrypted (and without CID with is DTLS only) |
| # handshake message we can hold in the buffer is |
| # MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 4 |
| # (the 4 is for the handshake header). |
| # However, due to overhead, fragmented messages need to be 5 bytes shorter in |
| # order to actually fit (leave room for an extra record header). |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: reassembled 1 byte larger than the buffer |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 3:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: would just fit except for overhead |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 4:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (1) |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 5:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (2) |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 6:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (3) |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 7:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (4) |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 8:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |
| |
| # Since we're sending dummy contents (all 0x2a) for the ClientHello, |
| # the first thing that's going to fail is the version check. The fact that we |
| # got around to checking it confirms reassembly completed sucessfully. |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: just fits |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 9:0:"Unsupported version of TLS":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION |
| |
| # We're generating a virtual record header for the reassembled HS message, |
| # which requires that the length fits in two bytes. Of course we won't get |
| # there because if the length doesn't fit in two bytes then the message won't |
| # fit in the buffer, but still add a test just in case. |
| Send large fragmented ClientHello: length doesn't fit in two bytes |
| send_large_fragmented_hello:0x10000:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |