|  | /* BEGIN_HEADER */ | 
|  | /* Testing of mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() specifically, focusing on negative | 
|  | * testing (using malformed inputs). */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <mbedtls/ssl.h> | 
|  | #include <ssl_misc.h> | 
|  | #include <test/ssl_helpers.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* END_HEADER */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES | 
|  | * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C | 
|  | * END_DEPENDENCIES | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ | 
|  | void ssl_decrypt_null(int hash_id) | 
|  | { | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform transform_in, transform_out; | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_in); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_out); | 
|  | const mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; | 
|  | const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL; | 
|  | mbedtls_record rec_good = { | 
|  | .ctr = { 0 }, | 
|  | .type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA, | 
|  | .ver = { 0, 0 },    /* Will be set by a function call below */ | 
|  | .buf = NULL, | 
|  | .buf_len = 0, | 
|  | .data_offset = 0, | 
|  | .data_len = 0, | 
|  | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) | 
|  | .cid_len = 0, | 
|  | .cid = { 0 }, | 
|  | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ | 
|  | }; | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec_good.ver, | 
|  | MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, | 
|  | version); | 
|  | const char sample_plaintext[3] = "ABC"; | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); | 
|  | uint8_t *buf = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&transform_in, &transform_out, | 
|  | cipher_type, hash_id, 0, 0, | 
|  | version, | 
|  | 0, 0), 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | const size_t plaintext_length = sizeof(sample_plaintext); | 
|  | rec_good.buf_len = plaintext_length + transform_in.maclen; | 
|  | rec_good.data_len = plaintext_length; | 
|  | TEST_CALLOC(rec_good.buf, rec_good.buf_len); | 
|  | memcpy(rec_good.buf, sample_plaintext, plaintext_length); | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec_good, | 
|  | &transform_out), 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Good case */ | 
|  | mbedtls_record rec = rec_good; | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Change any one byte of the plaintext or MAC. The MAC will be wrong. */ | 
|  | TEST_CALLOC(buf, rec.buf_len); | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < rec.buf_len; i++) { | 
|  | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, rec.buf_len); | 
|  | buf[i] ^= 1; | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); | 
|  | } | 
|  | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | buf = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Shorter input buffer. Either the MAC will be wrong, or there isn't | 
|  | * enough room for a MAC. */ | 
|  | for (size_t n = 1; n < rec.buf_len; n++) { | 
|  | mbedtls_test_set_step(n); | 
|  | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | TEST_CALLOC(buf, n); | 
|  | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | rec.buf_len = n; | 
|  | rec.data_len = n; | 
|  | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, n); | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); | 
|  | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | buf = NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* For robustness, check a 0-length buffer (non-null, then null). | 
|  | * This should not reach mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() as used in the library, | 
|  | * so the exact error doesn't matter, but we don't want a crash. */ | 
|  | { | 
|  | const uint8_t buf1[1] = { 'a' }; | 
|  | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | /* We won't write to buf1[0] since it's out of range, so we can cast | 
|  | * the const away. */ | 
|  | rec.buf = (uint8_t *) buf1; | 
|  | rec.buf_len = 0; | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
|  | } | 
|  | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | rec.buf = NULL; | 
|  | rec.buf_len = 0; | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
|  |  | 
|  | exit: | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_in); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_out); | 
|  | mbedtls_free(rec_good.buf); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); | 
|  | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); | 
|  | } | 
|  | /* END_CASE */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ | 
|  | void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac, | 
|  | int length_selector) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification | 
|  | * of padding and MAC. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Actually depends on TLS 1.2 and either AES, ARIA or Camellia, but since | 
|  | * the test framework doesn't support alternation in dependency statements, | 
|  | * just depend on AES. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows: | 
|  | * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied | 
|  | * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied | 
|  | * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246: | 
|  | *   it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the | 
|  | *   byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length | 
|  | *   that gives this padding_length is automatically selected. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; | 
|  | mbedtls_record rec, rec_save; | 
|  | unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL; | 
|  | size_t buflen, olen = 0; | 
|  | size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i; | 
|  | unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */ | 
|  | int exp_ret; | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  | const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1); | 
|  | MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */ | 
|  | ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, | 
|  | 0, trunc_hmac, | 
|  | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, | 
|  | 0, 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Determine padding/plaintext length */ | 
|  | TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255); | 
|  | block_size = t0.ivlen; | 
|  | if (length_selector < 0) { | 
|  | plaintext_len = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Minimal padding | 
|  | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ | 
|  | padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Maximal padding? */ | 
|  | if (length_selector == -2) { | 
|  | padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size); | 
|  | } | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | padlen = length_selector; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding. | 
|  | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ | 
|  | plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Prepare a buffer for record data */ | 
|  | buflen = block_size | 
|  | + plaintext_len | 
|  | + t0.maclen | 
|  | + padlen + 1; | 
|  | TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen); | 
|  | TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Prepare a dummy record header */ | 
|  | memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr)); | 
|  | rec.type    = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, | 
|  | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); | 
|  | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) | 
|  | rec.cid_len = 0; | 
|  | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Prepare dummy record content */ | 
|  | rec.buf     = buf; | 
|  | rec.buf_len = buflen; | 
|  | rec.data_offset = block_size; | 
|  | rec.data_len = plaintext_len; | 
|  | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Set dummy IV */ | 
|  | memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen); | 
|  | memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec, &t0)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Pad */ | 
|  | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1); | 
|  | rec.data_len += padlen + 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Save correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | rec_save = rec; | 
|  | rec_save.buf = buf_save; | 
|  | memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success | 
|  | */ | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and | 
|  | * decrypting it, expecting failure every time. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) { | 
|  | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | rec = rec_save; | 
|  | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */ | 
|  | rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Encrypt */ | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Decrypt and expect failure */ | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC, | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests | 
|  | * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer | 
|  | * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make | 
|  | * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads | 
|  | * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or | 
|  | * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't | 
|  | * hurt to test.) | 
|  | * | 
|  | * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record | 
|  | * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) { | 
|  | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | rec = rec_save; | 
|  | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Set padding bytes to new value */ | 
|  | memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Encrypt */ | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */ | 
|  | exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; | 
|  | TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | exit: | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0); | 
|  | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1); | 
|  | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | mbedtls_free(buf_save); | 
|  | MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); | 
|  | } | 
|  | /* END_CASE */ |