feat(imx8m): add support for high assurance boot
Introduce support for High Assurance Boot (HABv4), which is used to
establish and extend the Root-of-Trust during FW loading at any given
boot stage.
This commit introduces support for HAB ROM Vector Table (RVT) API, which
is normally used by post-ROM code to authenticate additional boot images
(Kernel, FDT, FIT, etc.) that are taking part in the Root-of-Trust.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com>
Change-Id: I780d308369824fa4850844eb9e91768e417166a0
diff --git a/plat/imx/imx8m/imx_hab.c b/plat/imx/imx8m/imx_hab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..222046f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/imx/imx8m/imx_hab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017-2020 NXP
+ * Copyright 2022 Leica Geosystems AG
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <imx_sip_svc.h>
+
+#define HAB_CID_ATF U(2) /* TF-A Caller ID */
+
+/* HAB Status definitions */
+enum hab_status {
+ HAB_STS_ANY = 0x00, /* Match any status in report_event() */
+ HAB_FAILURE = 0x33, /* Operation failed */
+ HAB_WARNING = 0x69, /* Operation completed with warning */
+ HAB_SUCCESS = 0xf0 /* Operation completed successfully */
+};
+
+/* HAB Configuration definitions */
+enum hab_config {
+ HAB_CFG_RETURN = 0x33, /* Field Return IC */
+ HAB_CFG_OPEN = 0xf0, /* Non-secure IC */
+ HAB_CFG_CLOSED = 0xcc /* Secure IC */
+};
+
+/* HAB State definitions */
+enum hab_state {
+ HAB_STATE_INITIAL = 0x33, /* Initializing state (transitory) */
+ HAB_STATE_CHECK = 0x55, /* Check state (non-secure) */
+ HAB_STATE_NONSECURE = 0x66, /* Non-secure state */
+ HAB_STATE_TRUSTED = 0x99, /* Trusted state */
+ HAB_STATE_SECURE = 0xaa, /* Secure state */
+ HAB_STATE_FAIL_SOFT = 0xcc, /* Soft fail state */
+ HAB_STATE_FAIL_HARD = 0xff, /* Hard fail state (terminal) */
+ HAB_STATE_NONE = 0xf0 /* No security state machine */
+};
+
+/* HAB Verification Target definitions */
+enum hab_target {
+ HAB_TGT_MEMORY = 0x0f, /* Check memory allowed list */
+ HAB_TGT_PERIPHERAL = 0xf0, /* Check peripheral allowed list */
+ HAB_TGT_ANY = 0x55 /* Check memory & peripheral allowed list */
+};
+
+/* Authenticate Image Loader Callback prototype */
+typedef enum hab_status hab_loader_callback_f_t(void **, size_t *, const void *);
+
+/*
+ * HAB Rom VectorTable (RVT) structure.
+ * This table provides function pointers into the HAB library in ROM for
+ * use by post-ROM boot sequence components.
+ * Functions are ordered in the structure below based on the offsets in ROM
+ * image, and shall not be changed!
+ * Details on API allocation offsets and function description could be
+ * found in following documents from NXP:
+ * - High Assurance Boot Version 4 Application Programming Interface
+ * Reference Manual (available in CST package)
+ * - HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations (AN12263)
+ */
+struct hab_rvt_api {
+ uint64_t hdr;
+ enum hab_status (*entry)(void);
+ enum hab_status (*exit)(void);
+ enum hab_status (*check_target)(enum hab_target type, const void *start, size_t bytes);
+ void* (*authenticate_image)(uint8_t cid, long ivt_offset, void **start,
+ size_t *bytes, hab_loader_callback_f_t loader);
+ enum hab_status (*run_dcd)(const uint8_t *dcd);
+ enum hab_status (*run_csf)(const uint8_t *csf, uint8_t cid, uint32_t srkmask);
+ enum hab_status (*assert)(long type, const void *data, uint32_t count);
+ enum hab_status (*report_event)(enum hab_status status, uint32_t index,
+ uint8_t *event, size_t *bytes);
+ enum hab_status (*report_status)(enum hab_config *config, enum hab_state *state);
+ void (*failsafe)(void);
+ void* (*authenticate_image_no_dcd)(uint8_t cid, long ivt_offset, void **start,
+ size_t *bytes, hab_loader_callback_f_t loader);
+ uint32_t (*get_version)(void);
+ enum hab_status (*authenticate_container)(uint8_t cid, long ivt_offset, void **start,
+ size_t *bytes, hab_loader_callback_f_t loader, uint32_t srkmask, int skip_dcd);
+};
+
+struct hab_rvt_api *g_hab_rvt_api = (struct hab_rvt_api *)HAB_RVT_BASE;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Handler for servicing HAB SMC calls
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int imx_hab_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+ u_register_t x1,
+ u_register_t x2,
+ u_register_t x3,
+ u_register_t x4)
+{
+ switch (x1) {
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_ENTRY:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->entry();
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_EXIT:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->exit();
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_CHECK_TARGET:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->check_target((enum hab_target)x2,
+ (const void *)x3, (size_t)x4);
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_AUTH_IMG:
+ return (unsigned long)g_hab_rvt_api->authenticate_image(HAB_CID_ATF,
+ x2, (void **)x3, (size_t *)x4, NULL);
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_REPORT_EVENT:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->report_event(HAB_FAILURE,
+ (uint32_t)x2, (uint8_t *)x3, (size_t *)x4);
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_REPORT_STATUS:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->report_status((enum hab_config *)x2,
+ (enum hab_state *)x3);
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_FAILSAFE:
+ g_hab_rvt_api->failsafe();
+ break;
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_AUTH_IMG_NO_DCD:
+ return (unsigned long)g_hab_rvt_api->authenticate_image_no_dcd(
+ HAB_CID_ATF, x2, (void **)x3, (size_t *)x4, NULL);
+ case IMX_SIP_HAB_GET_VERSION:
+ return g_hab_rvt_api->get_version();
+ default:
+ return SMC_UNK;
+ };
+
+ return SMC_OK;
+}