commit b8f3969f381139052cf853d8f85f70709009155b
author Andrzej Puzdrowski <andrzej.puzdrowski@nordicsemi.no> Fri Jul 02 15:05:37 2021 +0200
committer David Brown <davidb@davidb.org> Thu Aug 26 16:22:04 2021 -0600
tree e0a811aa6d53f253ed99d62f91e6ccc0c2a79977
parent 914204db415a8abd18477d7e41030a6909bc6cd2

loader: added hooks for override mcuboot image access operation

Added hook for read image header.

Added hook which is for inject an image check implementation which can
be used instead of boot_image_check() internal implementation on a primary
slot.
This is usefully especially when primary has to be checked by other entity
on MCUboot's demand.

Added hook which allow to implement image update process
differently.

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Puzdrowski <andrzej.puzdrowski@nordicsemi.no>

boot/bootutil/src/loader.c

diff --git a/boot/bootutil/src/loader.c b/boot/bootutil/src/loader.c
index e977d65..8816d63 100644
--- a/boot/bootutil/src/loader.c
+++ b/boot/bootutil/src/loader.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include "bootutil/boot_record.h"
 #include "bootutil/fault_injection_hardening.h"
 #include "bootutil/ramload.h"
+#include "bootutil/boot_hooks.h"
 
 #ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES
 #include "bootutil/enc_key.h"
@@ -102,7 +103,12 @@
     int i;
 
     for (i = 0; i < BOOT_NUM_SLOTS; i++) {
-        rc = boot_read_image_header(state, i, boot_img_hdr(state, i), bs);
+        rc = BOOT_HOOK_CALL(boot_read_image_header_hook, BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR,
+                            BOOT_CURR_IMG(state), i, boot_img_hdr(state, i));
+        if (rc == BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR)
+        {
+            rc = boot_read_image_header(state, i, boot_img_hdr(state, i), bs);
+        }
         if (rc != 0) {
             /* If `require_all` is set, fail on any single fail, otherwise
              * if at least the first slot's header was read successfully,
@@ -759,8 +765,12 @@
         }
     }
 #endif
-
-    FIH_CALL(boot_image_check, fih_rc, state, hdr, fap, bs);
+    BOOT_HOOK_CALL_FIH(boot_image_check_hook, fih_int_encode(BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR),
+                       fih_rc, BOOT_CURR_IMG(state), slot);
+    if (fih_eq(fih_rc, BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR))
+    {
+        FIH_CALL(boot_image_check, fih_rc, state, hdr, fap, bs);
+    }
     if (!boot_is_header_valid(hdr, fap) || fih_not_eq(fih_rc, FIH_SUCCESS)) {
         if ((slot != BOOT_PRIMARY_SLOT) || ARE_SLOTS_EQUIVALENT()) {
             flash_area_erase(fap, 0, flash_area_get_size(fap));
@@ -1107,6 +1117,12 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+    rc = BOOT_HOOK_CALL(boot_copy_region_post_hook, 0, BOOT_CURR_IMG(state),
+                        BOOT_IMG_AREA(state, BOOT_PRIMARY_SLOT), size);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        return rc;
+    }
+
 #ifdef MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT
     /* Update the stored security counter with the new image's security counter
      * value. Both slots hold the new image at this point, but the secondary
@@ -1964,7 +1980,13 @@
         case BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_TEST:          /* fallthrough */
         case BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_PERM:          /* fallthrough */
         case BOOT_SWAP_TYPE_REVERT:
-            rc = boot_perform_update(state, &bs);
+            rc = BOOT_HOOK_CALL(boot_perform_update_hook, BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR,
+                                BOOT_CURR_IMG(state), &(BOOT_IMG(state, 1).hdr),
+                                BOOT_IMG_AREA(state, BOOT_SECONDARY_SLOT));
+            if (rc == BOOT_HOOK_REGULAR)
+            {
+                rc = boot_perform_update(state, &bs);
+            }
             assert(rc == 0);
             break;