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Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001/*
2 * The RSA public-key cryptosystem
3 *
Paul Bakker530927b2015-02-13 14:24:10 +01004 * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
Paul Bakkerb96f1542010-07-18 20:36:00 +00005 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde12abf92015-01-28 17:13:45 +00006 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://polarssl.org)
Paul Bakkere0ccd0a2009-01-04 16:27:10 +00007 *
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00008 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
11 * (at your option) any later version.
12 *
13 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
14 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
15 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
16 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 *
18 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
19 * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
20 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
21 */
22/*
23 * RSA was designed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman.
24 *
25 * http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/rsapaper.pdf
26 * http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap8.pdf
27 */
28
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000029#include "polarssl/config.h"
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000030
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000031#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000032
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000033#include "polarssl/rsa.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000034
35#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +000036#include "polarssl/md.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000037#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000038
39#include <stdlib.h>
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000040#include <stdio.h>
41
42/*
43 * Initialize an RSA context
44 */
45void rsa_init( rsa_context *ctx,
46 int padding,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000047 int hash_id )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000048{
49 memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( rsa_context ) );
50
51 ctx->padding = padding;
52 ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000053}
54
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000055#if defined(POLARSSL_GENPRIME)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000056
57/*
58 * Generate an RSA keypair
59 */
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000060int rsa_gen_key( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +000061 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
62 void *p_rng,
63 unsigned int nbits, int exponent )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000064{
65 int ret;
66 mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
67
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000068 if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000069 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000070
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +000071 mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 ); mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000072
73 /*
74 * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
75 * GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
76 */
77 MPI_CHK( mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) );
78
79 do
80 {
81 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, ( nbits + 1 ) >> 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000082 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000083
84 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, ( nbits + 1 ) >> 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000085 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000086
87 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) < 0 )
88 mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
89
90 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) == 0 )
91 continue;
92
93 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
94 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) != nbits )
95 continue;
96
97 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
98 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
99 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
100 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
101 }
102 while( mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 );
103
104 /*
105 * D = E^-1 mod ((P-1)*(Q-1))
106 * DP = D mod (P - 1)
107 * DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
108 * QP = Q^-1 mod P
109 */
110 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D , &ctx->E, &H ) );
111 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
112 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
113 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
114
115 ctx->len = ( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) + 7 ) >> 3;
116
117cleanup:
118
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000119 mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000120
121 if( ret != 0 )
122 {
123 rsa_free( ctx );
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000124 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000125 }
126
127 return( 0 );
128}
129
130#endif
131
132/*
133 * Check a public RSA key
134 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000135int rsa_check_pubkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000136{
Paul Bakker37940d9f2009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000137 if( !ctx->N.p || !ctx->E.p )
138 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
139
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000140 if( ( ctx->N.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ||
141 ( ctx->E.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000142 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000143
144 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) < 128 ||
Paul Bakkerfe3256e2011-11-25 12:11:43 +0000145 mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) > POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000146 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000147
148 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->E ) < 2 ||
Paul Bakkerb0af5632014-04-30 13:33:35 +0200149 mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000150 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000151
152 return( 0 );
153}
154
155/*
156 * Check a private RSA key
157 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000158int rsa_check_privkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000159{
160 int ret;
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000161 mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G, G2, L1, L2, DP, DQ, QP;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000162
163 if( ( ret = rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) ) != 0 )
164 return( ret );
165
Paul Bakker37940d9f2009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000166 if( !ctx->P.p || !ctx->Q.p || !ctx->D.p )
167 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
168
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000169 mpi_init( &PQ ); mpi_init( &DE ); mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 );
170 mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &I ); mpi_init( &G ); mpi_init( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000171 mpi_init( &L1 ); mpi_init( &L2 ); mpi_init( &DP ); mpi_init( &DQ );
172 mpi_init( &QP );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000173
174 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
175 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &DE, &ctx->D, &ctx->E ) );
176 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
177 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
178 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000179 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
180
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000181 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G2, &P1, &Q1 ) );
182 MPI_CHK( mpi_div_mpi( &L1, &L2, &H, &G2 ) );
183 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &I, &DE, &L1 ) );
184
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000185 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
186 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
187 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000188 /*
189 * Check for a valid PKCS1v2 private key
190 */
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000191 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->N ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000192 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DP, &ctx->DP ) != 0 ||
193 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->DQ ) != 0 ||
194 mpi_cmp_mpi( &QP, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000195 mpi_cmp_int( &L2, 0 ) != 0 ||
196 mpi_cmp_int( &I, 1 ) != 0 ||
197 mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000198 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000199 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000200 }
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000201
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000202cleanup:
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000203 mpi_free( &PQ ); mpi_free( &DE ); mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 );
204 mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &I ); mpi_free( &G ); mpi_free( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000205 mpi_free( &L1 ); mpi_free( &L2 ); mpi_free( &DP ); mpi_free( &DQ );
206 mpi_free( &QP );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000207
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000208 if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED )
209 return( ret );
210
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000211 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000212 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000213
214 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000215}
216
217/*
218 * Do an RSA public key operation
219 */
220int rsa_public( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000221 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000222 unsigned char *output )
223{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000224 int ret;
225 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000226 mpi T;
227
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000228 mpi_init( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000229
230 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
231
232 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
233 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000234 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000235 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000236 }
237
238 olen = ctx->len;
239 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
240 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
241
242cleanup:
243
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000244 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000245
246 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000247 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000248
249 return( 0 );
250}
251
252/*
253 * Do an RSA private key operation
254 */
255int rsa_private( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200256 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
257 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000258 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000259 unsigned char *output )
260{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000261 int ret;
262 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200263 mpi T, T1, T2, Vi, Vf;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000264
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000265 mpi_init( &T ); mpi_init( &T1 ); mpi_init( &T2 );
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200266 mpi_init( &Vi ); mpi_init( &Vf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000267
268 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
269
270 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
271 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000272 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000273 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000274 }
275
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100276 /*
277 * Blinding: T = T * Vi mod N
278 */
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200279 if( f_rng != NULL )
280 {
Paul Bakkerff6e2472014-07-07 13:34:41 +0200281 int count = 0;
282
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100283 /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number relatively prime to N */
Paul Bakkerff6e2472014-07-07 13:34:41 +0200284 do {
285 if( count++ > 10 )
286 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED );
287
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100288 /* Use Vi as a temporary variable here */
Paul Bakkerff6e2472014-07-07 13:34:41 +0200289 MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
290 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &Vi, &Vf, &ctx->N ) );
291 } while( mpi_cmp_int( &Vi, 1 ) != 0 );
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200292
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200293 /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */
294 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &Vi, &Vf, &ctx->N ) );
295 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &Vi, &Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
296
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100297 /* Apply blinding */
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200298 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &Vi ) );
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200299 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
300 }
301
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100302#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
303 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
304#else
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000305 /*
306 * faster decryption using the CRT
307 *
308 * T1 = input ^ dP mod P
309 * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q
310 */
311 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, &ctx->DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
312 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) );
313
314 /*
315 * T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
316 */
317 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T1, &T2 ) );
318 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->QP ) );
319 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T1, &ctx->P ) );
320
321 /*
322 * output = T2 + T * Q
323 */
324 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->Q ) );
325 MPI_CHK( mpi_add_mpi( &T, &T2, &T1 ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd730aa52014-11-12 16:21:24 +0100326#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT */
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200327
328 if( f_rng != NULL )
329 {
330 /*
331 * Unblind
332 * T = T * Vf mod N
333 */
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200334 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &Vf ) );
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200335 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
336 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000337
338 olen = ctx->len;
339 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
340
341cleanup:
342
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000343 mpi_free( &T ); mpi_free( &T1 ); mpi_free( &T2 );
Paul Bakker6b065022013-10-07 12:03:59 +0200344 mpi_free( &Vi ); mpi_free( &Vf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000345
346 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000347 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000348
349 return( 0 );
350}
351
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000352#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
353/**
354 * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
355 *
Paul Bakkerb125ed82011-11-10 13:33:51 +0000356 * \param dst buffer to mask
357 * \param dlen length of destination buffer
358 * \param src source of the mask generation
359 * \param slen length of the source buffer
360 * \param md_ctx message digest context to use
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000361 */
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000362static void mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, size_t slen,
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000363 md_context_t *md_ctx )
364{
365 unsigned char mask[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
366 unsigned char counter[4];
367 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000368 unsigned int hlen;
369 size_t i, use_len;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000370
371 memset( mask, 0, POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE );
372 memset( counter, 0, 4 );
373
374 hlen = md_ctx->md_info->size;
375
376 // Generate and apply dbMask
377 //
378 p = dst;
379
380 while( dlen > 0 )
381 {
382 use_len = hlen;
383 if( dlen < hlen )
384 use_len = dlen;
385
386 md_starts( md_ctx );
387 md_update( md_ctx, src, slen );
388 md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 );
389 md_finish( md_ctx, mask );
390
391 for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i )
392 *p++ ^= mask[i];
393
394 counter[3]++;
395
396 dlen -= use_len;
397 }
398}
399#endif
400
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100401#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
402/*
403 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
404 */
405int rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
406 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
407 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100408 int mode,
409 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
410 size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100411 const unsigned char *input,
412 unsigned char *output )
413{
414 size_t olen;
415 int ret;
416 unsigned char *p = output;
417 unsigned int hlen;
418 const md_info_t *md_info;
419 md_context_t md_ctx;
420
421 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 || f_rng == NULL )
422 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
423
424 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
425
426 if( md_info == NULL )
427 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
428
429 olen = ctx->len;
430 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
431
432 if( olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 || f_rng == NULL )
433 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
434
435 memset( output, 0, olen );
436
437 *p++ = 0;
438
439 // Generate a random octet string seed
440 //
441 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 )
442 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
443
444 p += hlen;
445
446 // Construct DB
447 //
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100448 md( md_info, label, label_len, p );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100449 p += hlen;
450 p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
451 *p++ = 1;
452 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
453
454 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
455
456 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
457 //
458 mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
459 &md_ctx );
460
461 // maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed
462 //
463 mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
464 &md_ctx );
465
466 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
467
468 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
469 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200470 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100471}
472#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
473
474/*
475 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
476 */
477int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
478 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
479 void *p_rng,
480 int mode, size_t ilen,
481 const unsigned char *input,
482 unsigned char *output )
483{
484 size_t nb_pad, olen;
485 int ret;
486 unsigned char *p = output;
487
488 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 || f_rng == NULL )
489 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
490
491 olen = ctx->len;
492
493 if( olen < ilen + 11 )
494 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
495
496 nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
497
498 *p++ = 0;
499 if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
500 {
501 *p++ = RSA_CRYPT;
502
503 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
504 {
505 int rng_dl = 100;
506
507 do {
508 ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
509 } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
510
511 // Check if RNG failed to generate data
512 //
513 if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0)
514 return POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret;
515
516 p++;
517 }
518 }
519 else
520 {
521 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
522
523 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
524 *p++ = 0xFF;
525 }
526
527 *p++ = 0;
528 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
529
530 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
531 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200532 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100533}
534
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000535/*
536 * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
537 */
538int rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +0000539 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +0000540 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000541 int mode, size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000542 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000543 unsigned char *output )
544{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000545 switch( ctx->padding )
546 {
547 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100548 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen,
549 input, output );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000550
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000551#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
552 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100553 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
554 ilen, input, output );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000555#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000556
557 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000558 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000559 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000560}
561
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100562#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000563/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100564 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000565 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100566int rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200567 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
568 void *p_rng,
569 int mode,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100570 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
571 size_t *olen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100572 const unsigned char *input,
573 unsigned char *output,
574 size_t output_max_len )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000575{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000576 int ret;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100577 size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
578 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +0000579 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000580 unsigned char lhash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000581 unsigned int hlen;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000582 const md_info_t *md_info;
583 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100584
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100585 /*
586 * Parameters sanity checks
587 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100588 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
589 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000590
591 ilen = ctx->len;
592
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000593 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000594 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000595
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100596 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
597 if( md_info == NULL )
598 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
599
600 /*
601 * RSA operation
602 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000603 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
604 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200605 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000606
607 if( ret != 0 )
608 return( ret );
609
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100610 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100611 * Unmask data and generate lHash
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100612 */
613 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
614
615 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
616
617 /* Generate lHash */
618 md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash );
619
620 /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
621 mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
622 &md_ctx );
623
624 /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
625 mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
626 &md_ctx );
627
628 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
629
630 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100631 * Check contents, in "constant-time"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100632 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000633 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100634 bad = 0;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000635
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100636 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100637
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100638 p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100639
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard34114642013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100640 /* Check lHash */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100641 for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ )
642 bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100643
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100644 /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
645 * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
646 pad_len = 0;
647 pad_done = 0;
648 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ )
649 {
650 pad_done |= p[i];
651 pad_len += ( pad_done == 0 );
652 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100653
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100654 p += pad_len;
655 bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100656
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd237d262013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100657 /*
658 * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
659 * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
660 * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
661 * the different error conditions.
662 */
663 if( bad != 0 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100664 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
665
666 if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len)
667 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
668
669 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
670 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
671
672 return( 0 );
673}
674#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
675
676/*
677 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
678 */
679int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200680 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
681 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100682 int mode, size_t *olen,
683 const unsigned char *input,
684 unsigned char *output,
685 size_t output_max_len)
686{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100687 int ret;
688 size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i;
689 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100690 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
691
692 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
693 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
694
695 ilen = ctx->len;
696
697 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
698 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
699
700 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
701 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200702 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100703
704 if( ret != 0 )
705 return( ret );
706
707 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100708 bad = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100709
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100710 /*
711 * Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
712 */
713 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100714
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100715 /* This test does not depend on secret data */
716 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000717 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100718 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_CRYPT;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000719
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100720 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
721 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
722 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
723 {
724 pad_done |= ( p[i] == 0 );
725 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
726 }
Paul Bakkere6ee41f2012-05-19 08:43:48 +0000727
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100728 p += pad_count;
729 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100730 }
731 else
732 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100733 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_SIGN;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100734
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100735 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
736 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
737 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
738 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardc675e4b2014-02-03 11:58:55 +0100739 pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100740 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
741 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100742
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100743 p += pad_count;
744 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000745 }
746
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9975c5d2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100747 if( bad )
Paul Bakker8804f692013-02-28 18:06:26 +0100748 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
749
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000750 if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len)
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000751 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +0000752
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000753 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000754 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
755
756 return( 0 );
757}
758
759/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100760 * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
761 */
762int rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200763 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
764 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100765 int mode, size_t *olen,
766 const unsigned char *input,
767 unsigned char *output,
768 size_t output_max_len)
769{
770 switch( ctx->padding )
771 {
772 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200773 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen,
774 input, output, output_max_len );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100775
776#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
777 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200778 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
779 olen, input, output, output_max_len );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100780#endif
781
782 default:
783 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
784 }
785}
786
787#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
788/*
789 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
790 */
791int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
792 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
793 void *p_rng,
794 int mode,
795 int hash_id,
796 unsigned int hashlen,
797 const unsigned char *hash,
798 unsigned char *sig )
799{
800 size_t olen;
801 unsigned char *p = sig;
802 unsigned char salt[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
803 unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
804 int ret;
805 size_t msb;
806 const md_info_t *md_info;
807 md_context_t md_ctx;
808
809 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 || f_rng == NULL )
810 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
811
812 olen = ctx->len;
813
814 switch( hash_id )
815 {
816 case SIG_RSA_MD2:
817 case SIG_RSA_MD4:
818 case SIG_RSA_MD5:
819 hashlen = 16;
820 break;
821
822 case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
823 hashlen = 20;
824 break;
825
826 case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
827 hashlen = 28;
828 break;
829
830 case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
831 hashlen = 32;
832 break;
833
834 case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
835 hashlen = 48;
836 break;
837
838 case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
839 hashlen = 64;
840 break;
841
842 default:
843 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
844 }
845
846 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
847 if( md_info == NULL )
848 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
849
850 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
851 slen = hlen;
852
853 if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
854 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
855
856 memset( sig, 0, olen );
857
858 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
859
860 // Generate salt of length slen
861 //
862 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
863 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
864
865 // Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
866 //
867 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
868 p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
869 *p++ = 0x01;
870 memcpy( p, salt, slen );
871 p += slen;
872
873 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
874
875 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
876 //
877 md_starts( &md_ctx );
878 md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 );
879 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
880 md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen );
881 md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
882
883 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
884 //
885 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
886 offset = 1;
887
888 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
889 //
890 mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, &md_ctx );
891
892 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
893
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100894 sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
895
896 p += hlen;
897 *p++ = 0xBC;
898
899 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
900 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200901 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100902}
903#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
904
905/*
906 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
907 */
908/*
909 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
910 */
911int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +0200912 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
913 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100914 int mode,
915 int hash_id,
916 unsigned int hashlen,
917 const unsigned char *hash,
918 unsigned char *sig )
919{
920 size_t nb_pad, olen;
921 unsigned char *p = sig;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2bc45052015-09-03 20:03:15 +0200922 unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
923 size_t i;
924 unsigned char diff;
925 volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
926 int ret;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100927
928 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
929 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
930
931 olen = ctx->len;
932
933 switch( hash_id )
934 {
935 case SIG_RSA_RAW:
936 nb_pad = olen - 3 - hashlen;
937 break;
938
939 case SIG_RSA_MD2:
940 case SIG_RSA_MD4:
941 case SIG_RSA_MD5:
942 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 34;
943 break;
944
945 case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
946 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 35;
947 break;
948
949 case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
950 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 47;
951 break;
952
953 case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
954 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 51;
955 break;
956
957 case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
958 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 67;
959 break;
960
961 case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
962 nb_pad = olen - 3 - 83;
963 break;
964
965
966 default:
967 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
968 }
969
970 if( ( nb_pad < 8 ) || ( nb_pad > olen ) )
971 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
972
973 *p++ = 0;
974 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
975 memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad );
976 p += nb_pad;
977 *p++ = 0;
978
979 switch( hash_id )
980 {
981 case SIG_RSA_RAW:
982 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
983 break;
984
985 case SIG_RSA_MD2:
986 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_MDX, 18 );
987 memcpy( p + 18, hash, 16 );
988 p[13] = 2; break;
989
990 case SIG_RSA_MD4:
991 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_MDX, 18 );
992 memcpy( p + 18, hash, 16 );
993 p[13] = 4; break;
994
995 case SIG_RSA_MD5:
996 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_MDX, 18 );
997 memcpy( p + 18, hash, 16 );
998 p[13] = 5; break;
999
1000 case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
1001 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA1, 15 );
1002 memcpy( p + 15, hash, 20 );
1003 break;
1004
1005 case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
1006 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA2X, 19 );
1007 memcpy( p + 19, hash, 28 );
1008 p[1] += 28; p[14] = 4; p[18] += 28; break;
1009
1010 case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
1011 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA2X, 19 );
1012 memcpy( p + 19, hash, 32 );
1013 p[1] += 32; p[14] = 1; p[18] += 32; break;
1014
1015 case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
1016 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA2X, 19 );
1017 memcpy( p + 19, hash, 48 );
1018 p[1] += 48; p[14] = 2; p[18] += 48; break;
1019
1020 case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
1021 memcpy( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA2X, 19 );
1022 memcpy( p + 19, hash, 64 );
1023 p[1] += 64; p[14] = 3; p[18] += 64; break;
1024
1025 default:
1026 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1027 }
1028
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2bc45052015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001029 if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1030 return( rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
1031
1032 /*
1033 * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
1034 * temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
1035 */
1036 sig_try = malloc( ctx->len );
Simon Butchere5049f42016-01-02 01:24:15 +00001037 if( sig_try == NULL )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2bc45052015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001038 return( POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED );
1039
Simon Butchere5049f42016-01-02 01:24:15 +00001040 verif = malloc( ctx->len );
1041 if( verif == NULL )
1042 {
1043 free( sig_try );
1044 return( POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED );
1045 }
1046
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2bc45052015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001047 MPI_CHK( rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
1048 MPI_CHK( rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
1049
1050 /* Compare in constant time just in case */
1051 for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
1052 diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
1053 diff_no_optimize = diff;
1054
1055 if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
1056 {
1057 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
1058 goto cleanup;
1059 }
1060
1061 memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
1062
1063cleanup:
1064 free( sig_try );
1065 free( verif );
1066
1067 return( ret );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001068}
1069
1070/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001071 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
1072 */
1073int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001074 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001075 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001076 int mode,
1077 int hash_id,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001078 unsigned int hashlen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +00001079 const unsigned char *hash,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001080 unsigned char *sig )
1081{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001082 switch( ctx->padding )
1083 {
1084 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001085 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, hash_id,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001086 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001087
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001088#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1089 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001090 return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, hash_id,
1091 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001092#endif
1093
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001094 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001095 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001096 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001097}
1098
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001099#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001100/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001101 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001102 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001103int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001104 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1105 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001106 int mode,
1107 int hash_id,
1108 unsigned int hashlen,
1109 const unsigned char *hash,
1110 unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001111{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001112 int ret;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001113 size_t siglen;
1114 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +00001115 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker1fe7d9b2011-11-15 15:26:03 +00001116 unsigned char result[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001117 unsigned char zeros[8];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001118 unsigned int hlen;
1119 size_t slen, msb;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001120 const md_info_t *md_info;
1121 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001122
1123 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
1124 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1125
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001126 siglen = ctx->len;
1127
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +00001128 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001129 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001130
1131 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1132 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001133 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001134
1135 if( ret != 0 )
1136 return( ret );
1137
1138 p = buf;
1139
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001140 if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC )
1141 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1142
1143 switch( hash_id )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001144 {
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001145 case SIG_RSA_MD2:
1146 case SIG_RSA_MD4:
1147 case SIG_RSA_MD5:
1148 hashlen = 16;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001149 break;
1150
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001151 case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
1152 hashlen = 20;
1153 break;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001154
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001155 case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
1156 hashlen = 28;
1157 break;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001158
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001159 case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
1160 hashlen = 32;
1161 break;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001162
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001163 case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
1164 hashlen = 48;
1165 break;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001166
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001167 case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
1168 hashlen = 64;
1169 break;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001170
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001171 default:
1172 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1173 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001174
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001175 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
1176 if( md_info == NULL )
1177 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001178
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001179 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
1180 slen = siglen - hlen - 1;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001181
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001182 memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001183
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001184 // Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
1185 //
1186 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001187
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001188 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
1189 //
1190 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
1191 {
1192 p++;
1193 siglen -= 1;
1194 }
1195 if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
1196 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001197
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001198 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001199
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001200 mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker02303e82013-01-03 11:08:31 +01001201
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001202 buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001203
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001204 while( *p == 0 && p < buf + siglen )
1205 p++;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001206
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001207 if( p == buf + siglen ||
1208 *p++ != 0x01 )
1209 {
1210 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
1211 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1212 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001213
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001214 slen -= p - buf;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001215
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001216 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
1217 //
1218 md_starts( &md_ctx );
1219 md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
1220 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
1221 md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
1222 md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001223
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001224 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001225
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001226 if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
1227 return( 0 );
1228 else
1229 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1230}
1231#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
Paul Bakker40628ba2013-01-03 10:50:31 +01001232
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001233/*
1234 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
1235 */
1236int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001237 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1238 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001239 int mode,
1240 int hash_id,
1241 unsigned int hashlen,
1242 const unsigned char *hash,
1243 unsigned char *sig )
1244{
1245 int ret;
1246 size_t len, siglen;
1247 unsigned char *p, c;
1248 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
1249
1250 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
1251 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1252
1253 siglen = ctx->len;
1254
1255 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
1256 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1257
1258 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1259 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001260 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001261
1262 if( ret != 0 )
1263 return( ret );
1264
1265 p = buf;
1266
1267 if( *p++ != 0 || *p++ != RSA_SIGN )
1268 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1269
1270 while( *p != 0 )
1271 {
1272 if( p >= buf + siglen - 1 || *p != 0xFF )
1273 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1274 p++;
1275 }
1276 p++;
1277
1278 len = siglen - ( p - buf );
1279
1280 if( len == 33 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA1 )
1281 {
1282 if( memcmp( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA1_ALT, 13 ) == 0 &&
1283 memcmp( p + 13, hash, 20 ) == 0 )
1284 return( 0 );
1285 else
1286 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1287 }
1288 if( len == 34 )
1289 {
1290 c = p[13];
1291 p[13] = 0;
1292
1293 if( memcmp( p, ASN1_HASH_MDX, 18 ) != 0 )
1294 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1295
1296 if( ( c == 2 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_MD2 ) ||
1297 ( c == 4 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_MD4 ) ||
1298 ( c == 5 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_MD5 ) )
1299 {
1300 if( memcmp( p + 18, hash, 16 ) == 0 )
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001301 return( 0 );
1302 else
1303 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001304 }
1305 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001306
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001307 if( len == 35 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA1 )
1308 {
1309 if( memcmp( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA1, 15 ) == 0 &&
1310 memcmp( p + 15, hash, 20 ) == 0 )
1311 return( 0 );
1312 else
1313 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1314 }
1315 if( ( len == 19 + 28 && p[14] == 4 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA224 ) ||
1316 ( len == 19 + 32 && p[14] == 1 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA256 ) ||
1317 ( len == 19 + 48 && p[14] == 2 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA384 ) ||
1318 ( len == 19 + 64 && p[14] == 3 && hash_id == SIG_RSA_SHA512 ) )
1319 {
1320 c = p[1] - 17;
1321 p[1] = 17;
1322 p[14] = 0;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001323
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001324 if( p[18] == c &&
1325 memcmp( p, ASN1_HASH_SHA2X, 18 ) == 0 &&
1326 memcmp( p + 19, hash, c ) == 0 )
1327 return( 0 );
1328 else
1329 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1330 }
1331
1332 if( len == hashlen && hash_id == SIG_RSA_RAW )
1333 {
1334 if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) == 0 )
1335 return( 0 );
1336 else
1337 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001338 }
1339
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001340 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001341}
1342
1343/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001344 * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
1345 */
1346int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001347 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1348 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001349 int mode,
1350 int hash_id,
1351 unsigned int hashlen,
1352 const unsigned char *hash,
1353 unsigned char *sig )
1354{
1355 switch( ctx->padding )
1356 {
1357 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001358 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
1359 hash_id, hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001360
1361#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1362 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001363 return rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, hash_id,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001364 hashlen, hash, sig );
1365#endif
1366
1367 default:
1368 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1369 }
1370}
1371
1372/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001373 * Free the components of an RSA key
1374 */
1375void rsa_free( rsa_context *ctx )
1376{
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +00001377 mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); mpi_free( &ctx->RN );
1378 mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->DP );
1379 mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); mpi_free( &ctx->P ); mpi_free( &ctx->D );
1380 mpi_free( &ctx->E ); mpi_free( &ctx->N );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001381}
1382
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001383#if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001384
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001385#include "polarssl/sha1.h"
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001386
1387/*
1388 * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
1389 */
1390#define KEY_LEN 128
1391
1392#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
1393 "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
1394 "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
1395 "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
1396 "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
1397 "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
1398 "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
1399 "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
1400
1401#define RSA_E "10001"
1402
1403#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
1404 "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
1405 "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
1406 "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
1407 "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
1408 "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
1409 "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
1410 "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
1411
1412#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
1413 "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
1414 "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
1415 "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
1416
1417#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
1418 "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
1419 "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
1420 "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
1421
1422#define RSA_DP "C1ACF567564274FB07A0BBAD5D26E298" \
1423 "3C94D22288ACD763FD8E5600ED4A702D" \
1424 "F84198A5F06C2E72236AE490C93F07F8" \
1425 "3CC559CD27BC2D1CA488811730BB5725"
1426
1427#define RSA_DQ "4959CBF6F8FEF750AEE6977C155579C7" \
1428 "D8AAEA56749EA28623272E4F7D0592AF" \
1429 "7C1F1313CAC9471B5C523BFE592F517B" \
1430 "407A1BD76C164B93DA2D32A383E58357"
1431
1432#define RSA_QP "9AE7FBC99546432DF71896FC239EADAE" \
1433 "F38D18D2B2F0E2DD275AA977E2BF4411" \
1434 "F5A3B2A5D33605AEBBCCBA7FEB9F2D2F" \
1435 "A74206CEC169D74BF5A8C50D6F48EA08"
1436
1437#define PT_LEN 24
1438#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
1439 "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
1440
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001441static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001442{
Paul Bakker95a11f82014-04-30 16:02:38 +02001443#if !defined(__OpenBSD__)
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001444 size_t i;
1445
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001446 if( rng_state != NULL )
1447 rng_state = NULL;
1448
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001449 for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
1450 output[i] = rand();
Paul Bakker95a11f82014-04-30 16:02:38 +02001451#else
1452 if( rng_state != NULL )
1453 rng_state = NULL;
1454
1455 arc4random_buf( output, len );
1456#endif /* !OpenBSD */
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001457
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001458 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001459}
1460
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001461/*
1462 * Checkup routine
1463 */
1464int rsa_self_test( int verbose )
1465{
Paul Bakker7890e622014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001466 int ret = 0;
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001467 size_t len;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001468 rsa_context rsa;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001469 unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
1470 unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
1471 unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001472#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
1473 unsigned char sha1sum[20];
1474#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001475
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +00001476 rsa_init( &rsa, RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001477
1478 rsa.len = KEY_LEN;
Paul Bakker7890e622014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001479 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.N , 16, RSA_N ) );
1480 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.E , 16, RSA_E ) );
1481 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.D , 16, RSA_D ) );
1482 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.P , 16, RSA_P ) );
1483 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.Q , 16, RSA_Q ) );
1484 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.DP, 16, RSA_DP ) );
1485 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.DQ, 16, RSA_DQ ) );
1486 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.QP, 16, RSA_QP ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001487
1488 if( verbose != 0 )
1489 printf( " RSA key validation: " );
1490
1491 if( rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 ||
1492 rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 )
1493 {
1494 if( verbose != 0 )
1495 printf( "failed\n" );
1496
1497 return( 1 );
1498 }
1499
1500 if( verbose != 0 )
1501 printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " );
1502
1503 memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
1504
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +00001505 if( rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, &myrand, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, PT_LEN,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001506 rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1507 {
1508 if( verbose != 0 )
1509 printf( "failed\n" );
1510
1511 return( 1 );
1512 }
1513
1514 if( verbose != 0 )
1515 printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " );
1516
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001517 if( rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, &myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, &len,
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +00001518 rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001519 sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001520 {
1521 if( verbose != 0 )
1522 printf( "failed\n" );
1523
1524 return( 1 );
1525 }
1526
1527 if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
1528 {
1529 if( verbose != 0 )
1530 printf( "failed\n" );
1531
1532 return( 1 );
1533 }
1534
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001535#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001536 if( verbose != 0 )
1537 printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 data sign : " );
1538
1539 sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum );
1540
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001541 if( rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, &myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, SIG_RSA_SHA1, 20,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001542 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1543 {
1544 if( verbose != 0 )
1545 printf( "failed\n" );
1546
1547 return( 1 );
1548 }
1549
1550 if( verbose != 0 )
1551 printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
1552
Paul Bakker43f97992013-09-23 11:23:31 +02001553 if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, &myrand, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, SIG_RSA_SHA1, 20,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001554 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1555 {
1556 if( verbose != 0 )
1557 printf( "failed\n" );
1558
1559 return( 1 );
1560 }
1561
1562 if( verbose != 0 )
1563 printf( "passed\n\n" );
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001564#endif /* POLARSSL_SHA1_C */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001565
Paul Bakker7890e622014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001566cleanup:
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001567 rsa_free( &rsa );
Paul Bakker7890e622014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001568 return( ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001569}
1570
1571#endif
1572
1573#endif