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Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +01001# Mbed TLS PSA keystore format stability testing strategy
2
3## Introduction
4
5The PSA crypto subsystem includes a persistent key store. It is possible to create a persistent key and read it back later. This must work even if Mbed TLS has been upgraded in the meantime (except for deliberate breaks in the backward compatibility of the storage).
6
7The goal of this document is to define a test strategy for the key store that not only validates that it's possible to load a key that was saved with the version of Mbed TLS under test, but also that it's possible to load a key that was saved with previous versions of Mbed TLS.
8
Gilles Peskinecf62f102021-01-05 11:49:18 +01009Interoperability is not a goal: PSA crypto implementations are not intended to have compatible storage formats. Downgrading is not required to work.
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010010
11## General approach
12
13### Limitations of a direct approach
14
15The goal of storage format stability testing is: as a user of Mbed TLS, I want to store a key under version V and read it back under version W, with W V.
16
17Doing the testing this way would be difficult because we'd need to have version V of Mbed TLS available when testing version W.
18
19An alternative, semi-direct approach consists of generating test data under version V, and reading it back under version W. Done naively, this would require keeping a large amount of test data (full test coverage multiplied by the number of versions that we want to preserve backward compatibility with).
20
21### Save-and-compare approach
22
Gilles Peskine06b0fcd2021-05-11 22:33:46 +020023Importing and saving a key is deterministic. Therefore we can ensure the stability of the storage format by creating test cases under a version V of Mbed TLS, where the test case parameters include both the parameters to pass to key creation and the expected state of the storage after the key is created. The test case creates a key as indicated by the parameters, then compares the actual state of the storage with the expected state.
24
25In addition, the test case also loads the key and checks that it has the expected data and metadata. Import-and-save testing and load-and-check testing can be split into separate test functions with the same payloads.
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010026
27If the test passes with version V, this means that the test data is consistent with what the implementation does. When the test later runs under version W ≥ V, it creates and reads back a storage state which is known to be identical to the state that V would have produced. Thus, this approach validates that W can read storage states created by V.
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Gilles Peskine06b0fcd2021-05-11 22:33:46 +020029Note that it is the combination of import-and-save passing on version V and load-and-check passing on version W with the same data that proves that version W can read back what version V wrote. From the perspective of a particular version of the library, the import-and-save tests guarantee forward compatibility while the load-and-check tests guarantee backward compatibility.
30
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010031Use a similar approach for files other than keys where possible and relevant.
32
33### Keeping up with storage format evolution
34
35Test cases should normally not be removed from the code base: if something has worked before, it should keep working in future versions, so we should keep testing it.
36
37If the way certain keys are stored changes, and we don't deliberately decide to stop supporting old keys (which should only be done by retiring a version of the storage format), then we should keep the corresponding test cases in load-only mode: create a file with the expected content, load it and check the data that it contains.
38
39## Storage architecture overview
40
41The PSA subsystem provides storage on top of the PSA trusted storage interface. The state of the storage is a mapping from file identifer (a 64-bit number) to file content (a byte array). These files include:
42
43* [Key files](#key-storage) (files containing one key's metadata and, except for some secure element keys, key material).
44* The [random generator injected seed or state file](#random-generator-state) (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`).
45* [Storage transaction file](#storage-transaction-resumption).
46* [Driver state files](#driver-state-files).
47
48For a more detailed description, refer to the [Mbed Crypto storage specification](../mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md).
49
50In addition, Mbed TLS includes an implementation of the PSA trusted storage interface on top of C stdio. This document addresses the test strategy for [PSA ITS over file](#psa-its-over-file) in a separate section below.
51
Gilles Peskine528144f2021-01-18 23:36:18 +010052## Key storage testing
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010053
Gilles Peskineff457502021-01-19 12:51:10 +010054This section describes the desired test cases for keys created with the current storage format version. When the storage format changes, if backward compatibility is desired, old test data should be kept as described under [“Keeping up with storage format evolution”](#keeping-up-with-storage-format-evolution).
55
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010056### Keystore layout
57
58Objective: test that the key file name corresponds to the key identifier.
59
Gilles Peskine528144f2021-01-18 23:36:18 +010060Method: Create a key with a given identifier (using `psa_import_key`) and verify that a file with the expected name is created, and no other. Repeat for different identifiers.
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010061
62### General key format
63
Gilles Peskine528144f2021-01-18 23:36:18 +010064Objective: test the format of the key file: which field goes where and how big it is.
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010065
Gilles Peskine528144f2021-01-18 23:36:18 +010066Method: Create a key with certain metadata with `psa_import_key`. Read the file content and validate that it has the expected layout, deduced from the storage specification. Repeat with different metadata. Ensure that there are test cases covering all fields.
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010067
68### Enumeration of test cases for keys
69
70Objective: ensure that the coverage is sufficient to have assurance that all keys are stored correctly. This requires a sufficient selection of key types, sizes, policies, etc.
71
Gilles Peskine33d0f7f2021-05-11 22:33:09 +020072In particular, the tests must validate that each `PSA_xxx` constant that is stored in a key is covered by at least one test case:
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010073
74* Usage flags: `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`.
75* Algorithms in policies: `PSA_ALG_xxx`.
76* Key types: `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`, `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`.
77
Gilles Peskine8d202be2021-05-11 22:39:43 +020078In addition, the coverage of key material must ensure that any variation in key representation is detected. See [“Considerations on key material representations”](#Considerations-on-key-material-representations) for considerations regarding key types.
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Gilles Peskine528144f2021-01-18 23:36:18 +010080Method: Each test case creates a key with `psa_import_key`, purges it from memory, then reads it back and exercises it. Generate test cases automatically based on an enumeration of available constants and some knowledge of what attributes (sizes, algorithms, …) and content to use for keys of a certain type. Note that the generated test cases will be checked into the repository (generating test cases at runtime would not allow us to test the stability of the format, only that a given version is internally consistent).
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +010081
Gilles Peskine697ee192021-01-18 23:38:21 +010082### Testing with alternative lifetime values
83
84Objective: have test coverage for lifetimes other than the default persistent lifetime (`PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT`).
85
86Method:
87
88* For alternative locations: have tests conditional on the presence of a driver for that location.
89* For alternative persistence levels: TODO
90
Gilles Peskine8d202be2021-05-11 22:39:43 +020091### Considerations on key material representations
92
93The risks of incompatibilities in key representations depends on the key type and on the presence of drivers. Compatibility of and with drivers is currently out of scope of this document.
94
95Some types only have one plausible representation. Others admit alternative plausible representations (different encodings, or non-canonical representations).
96Here are some areas to watch for, with an identified risk of incompatibilities.
97
98* HMAC keys longer than the block size: pre-hashed or not?
99* DES keys: was parity enforced?
100* RSA keys: can invalid DER encodings (e.g. leading zeros, ignored sign bit) have been stored?
101* RSA private keys: can invalid CRT parameters have been stored?
102* Montgomery private keys: were they stored in masked form?
103
Gilles Peskine739e08a2020-12-14 18:50:17 +0100104## Random generator state
105
106TODO
107
108## Driver state files
109
110Not yet implemented.
111
112TODO
113
114## Storage transaction resumption
115
116Only relevant for secure element support. Not yet fully implemented.
117
118TODO
119
120## PSA ITS over file
121
122TODO