| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* BEGIN_HEADER */ | 
|  | 2 | /* Testing of mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() specifically, focusing on negative | 
|  | 3 | * testing (using malformed inputs). */ | 
|  | 4 |  | 
|  | 5 | #include <mbedtls/ssl.h> | 
|  | 6 | #include <ssl_misc.h> | 
|  | 7 | #include <test/ssl_helpers.h> | 
|  | 8 |  | 
|  | 9 | /* END_HEADER */ | 
|  | 10 |  | 
|  | 11 | /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES | 
|  | 12 | * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C | 
|  | 13 | * END_DEPENDENCIES | 
|  | 14 | */ | 
|  | 15 |  | 
| Gilles Peskine | d2e004e | 2023-09-18 14:05:55 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 16 | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ | 
|  | 17 | void ssl_decrypt_null(int hash_id) | 
|  | 18 | { | 
|  | 19 | mbedtls_ssl_transform transform_in, transform_out; | 
|  | 20 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_in); | 
|  | 21 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_out); | 
|  | 22 | const mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; | 
|  | 23 | const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL; | 
|  | 24 | mbedtls_record rec_good = { | 
|  | 25 | .ctr = { 0 }, | 
|  | 26 | .type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA, | 
|  | 27 | .ver = { 0, 0 },    /* Will be set by a function call below */ | 
|  | 28 | .buf = NULL, | 
|  | 29 | .buf_len = 0, | 
|  | 30 | .data_offset = 0, | 
|  | 31 | .data_len = 0, | 
|  | 32 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) | 
|  | 33 | .cid_len = 0, | 
|  | 34 | .cid = { 0 }, | 
|  | 35 | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ | 
|  | 36 | }; | 
|  | 37 | mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec_good.ver, | 
|  | 38 | MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, | 
|  | 39 | version); | 
|  | 40 | const char sample_plaintext[3] = "ABC"; | 
|  | 41 | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; | 
|  | 42 | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); | 
|  | 43 | uint8_t *buf = NULL; | 
|  | 44 |  | 
|  | 45 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); | 
|  | 46 |  | 
|  | 47 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&transform_in, &transform_out, | 
|  | 48 | cipher_type, hash_id, 0, 0, | 
|  | 49 | version, | 
|  | 50 | 0, 0), 0); | 
|  | 51 |  | 
|  | 52 | const size_t plaintext_length = sizeof(sample_plaintext); | 
|  | 53 | rec_good.buf_len = plaintext_length + transform_in.maclen; | 
|  | 54 | rec_good.data_len = plaintext_length; | 
|  | 55 | TEST_CALLOC(rec_good.buf, rec_good.buf_len); | 
|  | 56 | memcpy(rec_good.buf, sample_plaintext, plaintext_length); | 
|  | 57 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec_good, | 
|  | 58 | &transform_out), 0); | 
|  | 59 |  | 
|  | 60 | /* Good case */ | 
|  | 61 | mbedtls_record rec = rec_good; | 
|  | 62 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), 0); | 
|  | 63 |  | 
|  | 64 | /* Change any one byte of the plaintext or MAC. The MAC will be wrong. */ | 
|  | 65 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, rec.buf_len); | 
|  | 66 | for (size_t i = 0; i < rec.buf_len; i++) { | 
|  | 67 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  | 68 | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | 69 | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | 70 | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, rec.buf_len); | 
|  | 71 | buf[i] ^= 1; | 
|  | 72 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | 73 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); | 
|  | 74 | } | 
|  | 75 | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | 76 | buf = NULL; | 
|  | 77 |  | 
|  | 78 | /* Shorter input buffer. Either the MAC will be wrong, or there isn't | 
|  | 79 | * enough room for a MAC. */ | 
|  | 80 | for (size_t n = 1; n < rec.buf_len; n++) { | 
|  | 81 | mbedtls_test_set_step(n); | 
|  | 82 | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | 83 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, n); | 
|  | 84 | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | 85 | rec.buf_len = n; | 
|  | 86 | rec.data_len = n; | 
|  | 87 | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, n); | 
|  | 88 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | 89 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); | 
|  | 90 | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | 91 | buf = NULL; | 
|  | 92 | } | 
|  | 93 |  | 
|  | 94 | /* For robustness, check a 0-length buffer (non-null, then null). | 
|  | 95 | * This should not reach mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() as used in the library, | 
|  | 96 | * so the exact error doesn't matter, but we don't want a crash. */ | 
|  | 97 | { | 
|  | 98 | const uint8_t buf1[1] = { 'a' }; | 
|  | 99 | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | 100 | /* We won't write to buf1[0] since it's out of range, so we can cast | 
|  | 101 | * the const away. */ | 
|  | 102 | rec.buf = (uint8_t *) buf1; | 
|  | 103 | rec.buf_len = 0; | 
|  | 104 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | 105 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
|  | 106 | } | 
|  | 107 | rec = rec_good; | 
|  | 108 | rec.buf = NULL; | 
|  | 109 | rec.buf_len = 0; | 
|  | 110 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), | 
|  | 111 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
|  | 112 |  | 
|  | 113 | exit: | 
|  | 114 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_in); | 
|  | 115 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_out); | 
|  | 116 | mbedtls_free(rec_good.buf); | 
|  | 117 | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); | 
|  | 118 | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | 119 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); | 
|  | 120 | } | 
|  | 121 | /* END_CASE */ | 
|  | 122 |  | 
| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 123 | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ | 
|  | 124 | void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac, | 
|  | 125 | int length_selector) | 
|  | 126 | { | 
|  | 127 | /* | 
|  | 128 | * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification | 
|  | 129 | * of padding and MAC. | 
|  | 130 | * | 
|  | 131 | * Actually depends on TLS 1.2 and either AES, ARIA or Camellia, but since | 
|  | 132 | * the test framework doesn't support alternation in dependency statements, | 
|  | 133 | * just depend on AES. | 
|  | 134 | * | 
|  | 135 | * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows: | 
|  | 136 | * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied | 
|  | 137 | * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied | 
|  | 138 | * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246: | 
|  | 139 | *   it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the | 
|  | 140 | *   byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length | 
|  | 141 | *   that gives this padding_length is automatically selected. | 
|  | 142 | */ | 
|  | 143 | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ | 
|  | 144 | mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; | 
|  | 145 | mbedtls_record rec, rec_save; | 
|  | 146 | unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL; | 
|  | 147 | size_t buflen, olen = 0; | 
|  | 148 | size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i; | 
|  | 149 | unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */ | 
| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 150 | int exp_ret; | 
|  | 151 | int ret; | 
|  | 152 | const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */ | 
|  | 153 |  | 
|  | 154 | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); | 
|  | 155 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0); | 
|  | 156 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1); | 
|  | 157 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); | 
|  | 158 |  | 
|  | 159 | /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */ | 
|  | 160 | ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, | 
|  | 161 | 0, trunc_hmac, | 
|  | 162 | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, | 
|  | 163 | 0, 0); | 
|  | 164 |  | 
|  | 165 | TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); | 
|  | 166 |  | 
|  | 167 | /* Determine padding/plaintext length */ | 
|  | 168 | TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255); | 
|  | 169 | block_size = t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 170 | if (length_selector < 0) { | 
|  | 171 | plaintext_len = 0; | 
|  | 172 |  | 
|  | 173 | /* Minimal padding | 
|  | 174 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ | 
|  | 175 | padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; | 
|  | 176 |  | 
|  | 177 | /* Maximal padding? */ | 
|  | 178 | if (length_selector == -2) { | 
|  | 179 | padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size); | 
|  | 180 | } | 
|  | 181 | } else { | 
|  | 182 | padlen = length_selector; | 
|  | 183 |  | 
|  | 184 | /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding. | 
|  | 185 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ | 
|  | 186 | plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; | 
|  | 187 | } | 
|  | 188 |  | 
|  | 189 | /* Prepare a buffer for record data */ | 
|  | 190 | buflen = block_size | 
|  | 191 | + plaintext_len | 
|  | 192 | + t0.maclen | 
|  | 193 | + padlen + 1; | 
|  | 194 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen); | 
|  | 195 | TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen); | 
|  | 196 |  | 
|  | 197 | /* Prepare a dummy record header */ | 
|  | 198 | memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr)); | 
|  | 199 | rec.type    = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; | 
|  | 200 | mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, | 
|  | 201 | MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); | 
|  | 202 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) | 
|  | 203 | rec.cid_len = 0; | 
|  | 204 | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ | 
|  | 205 |  | 
|  | 206 | /* Prepare dummy record content */ | 
|  | 207 | rec.buf     = buf; | 
|  | 208 | rec.buf_len = buflen; | 
|  | 209 | rec.data_offset = block_size; | 
|  | 210 | rec.data_len = plaintext_len; | 
|  | 211 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len); | 
|  | 212 |  | 
| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 213 | /* Set dummy IV */ | 
|  | 214 | memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen); | 
|  | 215 | memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen); | 
|  | 216 |  | 
|  | 217 | /* | 
|  | 218 | * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it. | 
|  | 219 | */ | 
| Gilles Peskine | 9099d3f | 2023-09-18 13:11:50 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 220 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec, &t0)); | 
| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 221 |  | 
|  | 222 | /* Pad */ | 
|  | 223 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1); | 
|  | 224 | rec.data_len += padlen + 1; | 
|  | 225 |  | 
|  | 226 | /* Save correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | 227 | rec_save = rec; | 
|  | 228 | rec_save.buf = buf_save; | 
|  | 229 | memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen); | 
|  | 230 |  | 
|  | 231 | /* | 
|  | 232 | * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success | 
|  | 233 | */ | 
|  | 234 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | 235 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | 236 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | 237 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 238 | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 239 |  | 
|  | 240 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  | 241 |  | 
|  | 242 | /* | 
|  | 243 | * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and | 
|  | 244 | * decrypting it, expecting failure every time. | 
|  | 245 | */ | 
|  | 246 | for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) { | 
|  | 247 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  | 248 |  | 
|  | 249 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | 250 | rec = rec_save; | 
|  | 251 | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | 252 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); | 
|  | 253 |  | 
|  | 254 | /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */ | 
|  | 255 | rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01; | 
|  | 256 |  | 
|  | 257 | /* Encrypt */ | 
|  | 258 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | 259 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | 260 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | 261 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 262 | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 263 |  | 
|  | 264 | /* Decrypt and expect failure */ | 
|  | 265 | TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC, | 
|  | 266 | mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  | 267 | } | 
|  | 268 |  | 
|  | 269 | /* | 
|  | 270 | * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests | 
|  | 271 | * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer | 
|  | 272 | * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make | 
|  | 273 | * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads | 
|  | 274 | * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or | 
|  | 275 | * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't | 
|  | 276 | * hurt to test.) | 
|  | 277 | * | 
|  | 278 | * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record | 
|  | 279 | * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.) | 
|  | 280 | */ | 
|  | 281 | for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) { | 
|  | 282 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); | 
|  | 283 |  | 
|  | 284 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ | 
|  | 285 | rec = rec_save; | 
|  | 286 | rec.buf = buf; | 
|  | 287 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); | 
|  | 288 |  | 
|  | 289 | /* Set padding bytes to new value */ | 
|  | 290 | memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1); | 
|  | 291 |  | 
|  | 292 | /* Encrypt */ | 
|  | 293 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper( | 
|  | 294 | &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, | 
|  | 295 | rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); | 
|  | 296 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 297 | rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen; | 
|  | 298 |  | 
|  | 299 | /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */ | 
|  | 300 | exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; | 
|  | 301 | TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); | 
|  | 302 | } | 
|  | 303 |  | 
|  | 304 | exit: | 
| Gilles Peskine | a3237ef | 2023-09-18 14:23:13 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 305 | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); | 
|  | 306 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0); | 
|  | 307 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1); | 
|  | 308 | mbedtls_free(buf); | 
|  | 309 | mbedtls_free(buf_save); | 
|  | 310 | MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); | 
|  | 311 | } | 
|  | 312 | /* END_CASE */ |