Check sig_pk for signature verification
diff --git a/library/x509parse.c b/library/x509parse.c
index a44cf11..b686403 100644
--- a/library/x509parse.c
+++ b/library/x509parse.c
@@ -3305,7 +3305,6 @@
static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
x509_crl *crl_list)
{
- int ret;
int flags = 0;
unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const md_info_t *md_info;
@@ -3346,14 +3345,12 @@
md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
- if( ca->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
+ if( crl_list->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{
- if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
- crl_list->sig_md, 0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) == 0 )
+ if( ca->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
+ rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
+ crl_list->sig_md, 0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) != 0 )
{
- /*
- * CRL is not trusted
- */
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break;
}
@@ -3361,17 +3358,14 @@
else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
- if( pk_can_ecdsa( ca->pk ) ) {
- if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &ca->pk ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ca->pk.data,
+ if( crl_list->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
+ {
+ if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( ca->pk ) ||
+ pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &ca->pk ) != 0 ||
+ ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ca->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size,
crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
- /*
- * CRL is not trusted
- */
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break;
}
@@ -3490,9 +3484,10 @@
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
- if( trust_ca->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
+ if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{
- if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( trust_ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
+ if( trust_ca->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
+ rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( trust_ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 )
{
trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
@@ -3502,11 +3497,11 @@
else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
- if( pk_can_ecdsa( trust_ca->pk ) ) {
- if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &trust_ca->pk ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) trust_ca->pk.data,
+ if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
+ {
+ if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( trust_ca->pk ) ||
+ pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &trust_ca->pk ) != 0 ||
+ ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) trust_ca->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
@@ -3588,9 +3583,10 @@
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
- if( parent->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
+ if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{
- if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( parent->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
+ if( parent->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
+ rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( parent->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
@@ -3599,11 +3595,11 @@
else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
- if( pk_can_ecdsa( parent->pk ) ) {
- if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &parent->pk ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) parent->pk.data,
+ if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
+ {
+ if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( parent->pk ) ||
+ pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &parent->pk ) != 0 ||
+ ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) parent->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{