diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 0792920..26986d6 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
 # Generated documentation:
 /apidoc
 
+# PSA Crypto compliance test repo, cloned by test_psa_compliance.py
+/psa-arch-tests
+
 # Editor navigation files:
 /GPATH
 /GRTAGS
diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index a63f070..60218b0 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
 increase code size for a security fix.)
 
 For contributors, see the [Backwards Compatibility section of
-CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#cackwords-compatibility).
+CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#backwards-compatibility).
 
 ## Current Branches
 
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 210aba4..cd990ab 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
 
 option(UNSAFE_BUILD "Allow unsafe builds. These builds ARE NOT SECURE." OFF)
 option(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS "Compiler warnings treated as errors" ON)
+if(WIN32)
+    option(GEN_FILES "Generate the auto-generated files as needed" OFF)
+else()
+    option(GEN_FILES "Generate the auto-generated files as needed" ON)
+endif()
 
 string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}")
 string(REGEX MATCH "GNU" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}")
@@ -135,6 +140,22 @@
     endif()
 endfunction(link_to_source)
 
+# Get the filename without the final extension (i.e. convert "a.b.c" to "a.b")
+function(get_name_without_last_ext dest_var full_name)
+    # Split into a list on '.' (but a cmake list is just a ';'-separated string)
+    string(REPLACE "." ";" ext_parts "${full_name}")
+    # Remove the last item if there are more than one
+    list(LENGTH ext_parts ext_parts_len)
+    if (${ext_parts_len} GREATER "1")
+        math(EXPR ext_parts_last_item "${ext_parts_len} - 1")
+        list(REMOVE_AT ext_parts ${ext_parts_last_item})
+    endif()
+    # Convert back to a string by replacing separators with '.'
+    string(REPLACE ";" "." no_ext_name "${ext_parts}")
+    # Copy into the desired variable
+    set(${dest_var} ${no_ext_name} PARENT_SCOPE)
+endfunction(get_name_without_last_ext)
+
 string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}")
 
 include(CheckCCompilerFlag)
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md
index b3a9547..dcaa360 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@
 The list of maintained branches can be found in the [Current Branches section
 of BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md#current-branches).
 
-Currently maintained LTS branches are:
-1. [mbedtls-2.7](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.7)
+The only currently maintained LTS branch is:
 1. [mbedtls-2.16](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.16)
 
 
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_psa_m_aead.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_psa_m_aead.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa4e7ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_psa_m_aead.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+   * Implement the PSA multipart AEAD interface, currently supporting
+     ChaChaPoly and GCM.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/base64-ranges.txt b/ChangeLog.d/base64-ranges.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3f3862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/base64-ranges.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Changes
+   * Improve the performance of base64 constant-flow code. The result is still
+     slower than the original non-constant-flow implementation, but much faster
+     than the previous constant-flow implementation. Fixes #4814.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c04c4aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix a bug in mbedtls_gcm_starts() when bits of iv are longer than 2^32.
+   * Fix #4884.
+
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ccm_star_no_tag.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ccm_star_no_tag.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbd25d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/ccm_star_no_tag.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Changes
+   * Ignore plaintext/ciphertext lengths for CCM*-no-tag operations.
+     For CCM* encryption/decryption without authentication, input
+     length will be ignored.
+
+Features
+   * Add support for CCM*-no-tag cipher to the PSA.
+     Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
+     For decryption a minimum of 16-byte long input is expected.
+     These restrictions may be subject to change.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/chacha20-poly1305-invalid-nonce.txt b/ChangeLog.d/chacha20-poly1305-invalid-nonce.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca3f9ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/chacha20-poly1305-invalid-nonce.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Changes
+   * Indicate in the error returned if the nonce length used with
+     ChaCha20-Poly1305 is invalid, and not just unsupported.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/check-return.txt b/ChangeLog.d/check-return.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..045b180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/check-return.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Failures of alternative implementations of AES or DES single-block
+     functions enabled with MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT,
+     MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT were ignored.
+     This does not concern the implementation provided with Mbed TLS,
+     where this function cannot fail, or full-module replacements with
+     MBEDTLS_AES_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES_ALT. Reported by Armelle Duboc in #1092.
+
+Features
+   * Warn if errors from certain functions are ignored. This is currently
+     supported on GCC-like compilers and on MSVC and can be configured through
+     the macro MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN. The warnings are always enabled
+     (where supported) for critical functions where ignoring the return
+     value is almost always a bug. Enable the new configuration option
+     MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING to get warnings for other functions. This
+     is currently implemented in the AES and DES modules, and will be extended
+     to other modules in the future.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt b/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67faecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Changes
+   * Implement multi-part CCM API.
+     The multi-part functions: mbedtls_ccm_starts(), mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
+     mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(), mbedtls_ccm_update(), mbedtls_ccm_finish()
+     were introduced in mbedTLS 3.0 release, however their implementation was
+     postponed until now.
+     Implemented functions support chunked data input for both CCM and CCM*
+     algorithms.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt b/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebb0b7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Changes
+    * The mbedcrypto library includes a new source code module constant_time.c,
+      containing various functions meant to resist timing side channel attacks.
+      This module does not have a separate configuration option, and functions
+      from this module will be included in the build as required. Currently
+      most of the interface of this module is private and may change at any
+      time.
+
+Features
+    * Add new API mbedtls_ct_memcmp for constant time buffer comparison.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/do-not-use-obsolete-header.txt b/ChangeLog.d/do-not-use-obsolete-header.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a57ef1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/do-not-use-obsolete-header.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Don't use the obsolete header path sys/fcntl.h in unit tests.
+     These header files cause compilation errors in musl.
+     Fixes #4969.
+
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-mbedtls_cipher_crypt-aes-ecb.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-mbedtls_cipher_crypt-aes-ecb.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dc4724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-mbedtls_cipher_crypt-aes-ecb.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix mbedtls_cipher_crypt: AES-ECB when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-needed-shared-libraries-linux.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-needed-shared-libraries-linux.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74ad3bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-needed-shared-libraries-linux.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix issue in Makefile on Linux with SHARED=1, that caused shared libraries
+     not to list other shared libraries they need.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa_gen_key-status.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa_gen_key-status.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7860988
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa_gen_key-status.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix the error returned by psa_generate_key() for a public key. Fixes #4551.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_compilation_ssl_tests.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_compilation_ssl_tests.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..202e5c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_compilation_ssl_tests.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix an uninitialized variable warning in test_suite_ssl.function with GCC
+     version 11.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue5065.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue5065.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..943ee47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/issue5065.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix compile-time or run-time errors in PSA
+     AEAD functions when ChachaPoly is disabled. Fixes #5065.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/muladdc-memory.txt b/ChangeLog.d/muladdc-memory.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218be5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/muladdc-memory.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix missing constraints on x86_64 and aarch64 assembly code
+     for bignum multiplication that broke some bignum operations with
+     (at least) Clang 12.
+     Fixes #4116, #4786, #4917, #4962.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/no-strerror.txt b/ChangeLog.d/no-strerror.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69743a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/no-strerror.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix the build of sample programs when neither MBEDTLS_ERROR_C nor
+     MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY is enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_alg_rsa_pss.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_alg_rsa_pss.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c6048f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_alg_rsa_pss.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS verification accepting an arbitrary salt length.
+     This algorithm now accepts only the same salt length for verification
+     that it produces when signing, as documented. Use the new algorithm
+     PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT to accept any salt length. Fixes #4946.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_update_ecp.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_update_ecp.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c3fbc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_update_ecp.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix a parameter set but unused in psa_crypto_cipher.c. Fixes #4935.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_api_macros.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_api_macros.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff53e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_api_macros.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Features
+   * Add missing PSA macros declared by PSA Crypto API 1.0.0:
+     PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, PSA_ALG_NONE, PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH, PSA_KEY_ID_NULL.
+
+Bugfix
+   * The existing predicate macro name PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN is now reserved
+     for algorithm values that fully encode the hashing step, as per the PSA
+     Crypto API specification. This excludes PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW and
+     PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY. The new predicate macro PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH covers
+     all algorithms that can be used with psa_{sign,verify}_hash(), including
+     these two.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_gcm_buffer_limitation.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_gcm_buffer_limitation.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c07e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_gcm_buffer_limitation.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Remove PSA'a AEAD finish/verify output buffer limitation for GCM.
+     The requirement of minimum 15 bytes for output buffer in
+     psa_aead_finish() and psa_aead_verify() does not apply to the built-in
+     implementation of GCM.
+   * Move GCM's update output buffer length verification from PSA AEAD to
+     the built-in implementation of the GCM.
+     The requirement for output buffer size to be equal or greater then
+     input buffer size is valid only for the built-in implementation of GCM.
+     Alternative GCM implementations can process whole blocks only.
+
+API changes
+   * New error code for GCM: MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+     Alternative GCM implementations are expected to verify
+     the length of the provided output buffers and to return the
+     MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL in case the buffer length is too small.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/remove-greentea-support.txt b/ChangeLog.d/remove-greentea-support.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af4df4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/remove-greentea-support.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Removals
+   * Remove the partial support for running unit tests via Greentea on Mbed OS,
+     which had been unmaintained since 2018.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/remove-ssl-export-keys.txt b/ChangeLog.d/remove-ssl-export-keys.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a4b31d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/remove-ssl-export-keys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Changes
+   * Remove MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS, making it always on and increasing the
+     code size by about 80B on an M0 build. This option only gated an ability
+     to set a callback, but was deemed unnecessary as it was yet another define
+     to remember when writing tests, or test configurations. Fixes #4653.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index b80ee11..c8d9450 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 
 The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically.
 
-The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`. Also, when loading shared libraries using dlopen(), you'll need to load libmbedcrypto first, then libmbedx509, before you can load libmbedtls.
+The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`.
 
 ### Tool versions
 
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 Any of the following methods are available to generate the configuration-independent files:
 
 * If not cross-compiling, running `make` with any target, or just `make`, will automatically generate required files.
+* On non-Windows systems, when not cross-compiling, CMake will generate the required files automatically.
 * Run `make generated_files` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
 * On Unix/POSIX systems, run `tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
 * On Windows, run `scripts\make_generated_files.bat` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
@@ -298,3 +299,10 @@
 ------------
 
 We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. Please see the [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details on how to do this.
+
+Contact
+-------
+
+* To report a security vulnerability in Mbed TLS, please email <mbed-tls-security@lists.trustedfirmware.org>. For more information, see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md).
+* To report a bug or request a feature in Mbed TLS, please [file an issue on GitHub](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/new/choose).
+* Please see [`SUPPORT.md`](SUPPORT.md) for other channels for discussion and support about Mbed TLS.
diff --git a/configs/config-thread.h b/configs/config-thread.h
index be889a1..36d8245 100644
--- a/configs/config-thread.h
+++ b/configs/config-thread.h
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
 
 /* mbed TLS modules */
 #define MBEDTLS_AES_C
diff --git a/docs/.gitignore b/docs/.gitignore
index 33ae5ac..23f832b 100644
--- a/docs/.gitignore
+++ b/docs/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
 *.html
 *.pdf
-!PSACryptoDriverModelSpec.pdf
diff --git a/docs/PSACryptoDriverModelSpec.pdf b/docs/PSACryptoDriverModelSpec.pdf
deleted file mode 100644
index cf11380..0000000
--- a/docs/PSACryptoDriverModelSpec.pdf
+++ /dev/null
Binary files differ
diff --git a/docs/architecture/tls13-experimental.md b/docs/architecture/tls13-experimental.md
index 0009c68..88d0b73 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/tls13-experimental.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/tls13-experimental.md
@@ -66,3 +66,342 @@
   as part of `MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL`:
 
   - Reader ([`library/mps_reader.h`](../../library/mps_reader.h))
+
+
+MVP definition
+--------------
+
+- Overview
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP implements only the client side of the protocol.
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports ECDHE key establishment.
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support DHE key establishment.
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
+    session resumption. This implies that it does not support sending early
+    data (0-RTT data).
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports the authentication of the server by the client
+    but does not support authentication of the client by the server. In terms
+    of TLS 1.3 authentication messages, this means that the TLS 1.3 MVP
+    supports the processing of the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages
+    but not of the CertificateRequest message.
+
+  - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support the handling of server HelloRetryRequest
+    message. In practice, this means that the handshake will fail if the MVP
+    does not provide in its ClientHello the shared secret associated to the
+    group selected by the server for key establishement. For more information,
+    see the comment associated to the `key_share` extension below.
+
+  - If the TLS 1.3 MVP receives a HelloRetryRequest or a CertificateRequest
+    message, it aborts the handshake with an handshake_failure closure alert
+    and the `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` returns in error with the
+    `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE` error code.
+
+- Supported cipher suites: depends on the library configuration. Potentially
+  all of them:
+  TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+  TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
+
+- Supported ClientHello extensions:
+
+  | Extension                    |   MVP   | Prototype (1) |
+  | ---------------------------- | ------- | ------------- |
+  | server_name                  | YES     | YES           |
+  | max_fragment_length          | no      | YES           |
+  | status_request               | no      | no            |
+  | supported_groups             | YES     | YES           |
+  | signature_algorithms         | YES     | YES           |
+  | use_srtp                     | no      | no            |
+  | heartbeat                    | no      | no            |
+  | apln                         | no      | YES           |
+  | signed_certificate_timestamp | no      | no            |
+  | client_certificate_type      | no      | no            |
+  | server_certificate_type      | no      | no            |
+  | padding                      | no      | no            |
+  | key_share                    | YES (2) | YES           |
+  | pre_shared_key               | no      | YES           |
+  | psk_key_exchange_modes       | no      | YES           |
+  | early_data                   | no      | YES           |
+  | cookie                       | no      | YES           |
+  | supported_versions           | YES (3) | YES           |
+  | certificate_authorities      | no      | no            |
+  | post_handshake_auth          | no      | no            |
+  | signature_algorithms_cert    | no      | no            |
+
+  (1) This is just for comparison.
+
+  (2) The MVP sends one shared secret corresponding to the configured preferred
+      group. The preferred group is the group of the first curve in the list of
+      allowed curves as defined by the configuration. The allowed curves are
+      by default ordered as follow: `secp256r1`, `x25519`, `secp384r1`
+      and finally `secp521r1`. This default order is aligned with the
+      list of mandatory-to-implement groups (in absence of an application
+      profile standard specifying otherwise) defined in section 9.1 of the
+      specification. The list of allowed curves can be changed through the
+      `mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()` API.
+
+  (3) The MVP proposes only TLS 1.3 and does not support version negociation.
+      Out-of-protocol fallback is supported though if the Mbed TLS library
+      has been built to support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2: just set the
+      maximum of the minor version of the SSL configuration to
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 (`mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version()` API) and
+      re-initiate a server handshake.
+
+- Supported groups: depends on the library configuration.
+  Potentially all ECDHE groups but x448:
+  secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1 and secp521r1.
+
+  Finite field groups (DHE) are not supported.
+
+- Supported signature algorithms (both for certificates and CertificateVerify):
+  depends on the library configuration.
+  Potentially:
+  rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+  ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 and ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512.
+
+  Note that in absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise
+  the three first ones in the list above are mandatory (see section 9.1 of the
+  specification).
+
+- Supported versions: only TLS 1.3, version negotiation is not supported.
+
+- Compatibility with existing SSL/TLS build options:
+
+  The TLS 1.3 MVP is compatible with all TLS 1.2 configuration options in the
+  sense that when enabling the TLS 1.3 MVP in the library there is no need to
+  modify the configuration for TLS 1.2. Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related features are
+  not supported or not applicable to the TLS 1.3 MVP:
+
+  | Mbed TLS configuration option            | Support |
+  | ---------------------------------------- | ------- |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES           | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE                | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION        | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL                    | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC             | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET       | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE        | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION                | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH          | no      |
+  |                                          |         |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS              | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS                  | no (1)  |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION       | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH       | no      |
+  |                                          |         |
+  | MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE                  | no      |
+  | MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED     | no      |
+  |                                          |         |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED         | n/a (2) |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED     | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED   | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED     | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED         | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED     | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED   | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED  | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED    | n/a     |
+  | MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED     | n/a     |
+  |                                          |         |
+  | MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO                   | no      |
+
+  (1) Some support has already been upstreamed but it is incomplete.
+  (2) Key exchange configuration options for TLS 1.3 will likely to be
+      organized around the notion of key exchange mode along the line
+      of the MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE/PSK/PSK_EPHEMERAL/EPHEMERAL
+      runtime configuration macros.
+
+- Quality considerations
+  - Standard Mbed TLS review bar
+  - Interoperability testing with OpenSSL and GnuTLS. Test with all the
+    cipher suites and signature algorithms supported by OpenSSL/GnuTLS server.
+  - Negative testing against OpenSSL/GnuTLS servers with which the
+    handshake fails due to incompatibility with the capabilities of the
+    MVP: TLS 1.2 or 1.1 server, server sending an HelloRetryRequest message in
+    response to the MVP ClientHello, server sending a CertificateRequest
+    message ...
+
+Coding rules checklist for TLS 1.3
+----------------------------------
+
+The following coding rules are aimed to be a checklist for TLS 1.3 upstreaming
+work to reduce review rounds and the number of comments in each round. They
+come along (do NOT replace) the project coding rules
+(https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards). They have been
+established and discussed following the review of #4882 that was the
+PR upstreaming the first part of TLS 1.3 ClientHello writing code.
+
+TLS 1.3 specific coding rules:
+
+  - TLS 1.3 specific C modules, headers, static functions names are prefixed
+    with `ssl_tls13_`. The same applies to structures and types that are
+    internal to C modules.
+
+  - TLS 1.3 specific exported functions, structures and types are
+    prefixed with `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_`.
+
+  - Use TLS1_3 in TLS 1.3 specific macros.
+
+  - The names of macros and variables related to a field or structure in the
+    TLS 1.3 specification should contain as far as possible the field name as
+    it is in the specification. If the field name is "too long" and we prefer
+    to introduce some kind of abbreviation of it, use the same abbreviation
+    everywhere in the code.
+
+    Example 1: #define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32, macro for the length of the
+        `random` field of the ClientHello message.
+
+    Example 2 (consistent abbreviation): `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext()`
+        and `MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG`, `sig_alg` standing for
+        `signature_algorithms`.
+
+  - Regarding vectors that are represented by a length followed by their value
+    in the data exchanged between servers and clients:
+
+    - Use `<vector name>_len` for the name of a variable used to compute the
+      length in bytes of the vector, where <vector name> is the name of the
+      vector as defined in the TLS 1.3 specification.
+
+    - Use `p_<vector_name>_len` for the name of a variable intended to hold
+      the address of the first byte of the vector length.
+
+    - Use `<vector_name>` for the name of a variable intended to hold the
+      address of the first byte of the vector value.
+
+    - Use `<vector_name>_end` for the name of a variable intended to hold
+      the address of the first byte past the vector value.
+
+    Those idioms should lower the risk of mis-using one of the address in place
+    of another one which could potentially lead to some nasty issues.
+
+    Example: `cipher_suites` vector of ClientHello in
+             `ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites()`
+    ```
+    size_t cipher_suites_len;
+    unsigned char *p_cipher_suites_len;
+    unsigned char *cipher_suites;
+    ```
+
+  - Where applicable, use:
+    - the macros to extract a byte from a multi-byte integer MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}.
+    - the macros to write in memory in big-endian order a multi-byte integer
+      MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
+    - the macros to read from memory a multi-byte integer in big-endian order
+      MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
+    - the macro to check for space when writing into an output buffer
+      `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR`.
+    - the macro to check for data when reading from an input buffer
+      `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`.
+
+    These macros were introduced after the prototype was written thus are
+    likely not to be used in prototype where we now would use them in
+    development.
+
+    The three first types, MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE
+    and MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE improve the readability of the code and
+    reduce the risk of writing or reading bytes in the wrong order.
+
+    The two last types, `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR` and
+    `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`, improve the readability of the code and
+    reduce the risk of error in the non-completely-trivial arithmetic to
+    check that we do not write or read past the end of a data buffer. The
+    usage of those macros combined with the following rule mitigate the risk
+    to read/write past the end of a data buffer.
+
+    Examples:
+    ```
+    hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( total_hs_len );
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0 );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 7 );
+    ```
+
+  - To mitigate what happened here
+    (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/4882#discussion_r701704527) from
+    happening again, use always a local variable named `p` for the reading
+    pointer in functions parsing TLS 1.3 data, and for the writing pointer in
+    functions writing data into an output buffer and only that variable. The
+    name `p` has been chosen as it was already widely used in TLS code.
+
+  - When an TLS 1.3 structure is written or read by a function or as part of
+    a function, provide as documentation the definition of the structure as
+    it is in the TLS 1.3 specification.
+
+General coding rules:
+
+  - We prefer grouping "related statement lines" by not adding blank lines
+    between them.
+
+    Example 1:
+    ```
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( ssl, buf, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    buf += output_len;
+    ```
+
+    Example 2:
+    ```
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cipher_suites_iter, end, 2 );
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( cipher_suite, cipher_suites_iter, 0 );
+    cipher_suites_iter += 2;
+    ```
+
+  - Use macros for constants that are used in different functions, different
+    places in the code. When a constant is used only locally in a function
+    (like the length in bytes of the vector lengths in functions reading and
+    writing TLS handshake message) there is no need to define a macro for it.
+
+    Example: `#define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32`
+
+  - When declaring a pointer the dereferencing operator should be prepended to
+    the pointer name not appended to the pointer type:
+
+    Example: `mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;`
+
+  - Maximum line length is 80 characters.
+
+    Exceptions:
+
+    - string literals can extend beyond 80 characters as we do not want to
+      split them to ease their search in the code base.
+
+    - A line can be more than 80 characters by a few characters if just looking
+      at the 80 first characters is enough to fully understand the line. For
+      example it is generally fine if some closure characters like ";" or ")"
+      are beyond the 80 characters limit.
+
+    If a line becomes too long due to a refactoring (for example renaming a
+    function to a longer name, or indenting a block more), avoid rewrapping
+    lines in the same commit: it makes the review harder. Make one commit with
+    the longer lines and another commit with just the rewrapping.
+
+  - When in successive lines, functions and macros parameters should be aligned
+    vertically.
+
+    Example:
+    ```
+    int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               unsigned hs_type,
+                                               unsigned char **buf,
+                                               size_t *buf_len );
+    ```
+
+  - When a function's parameters span several lines, group related parameters
+    together if possible.
+
+    For example, prefer:
+
+    ```
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type,
+                                           buf, buf_len );
+    ```
+    over
+    ```
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type, buf,
+                                           buf_len );
+    ```
+    even if it fits.
diff --git a/docs/getting_started.md b/docs/getting_started.md
index 70c5ff4..fdbf0e9 100644
--- a/docs/getting_started.md
+++ b/docs/getting_started.md
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Import an AES key...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
 
     /* Import the key */
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to import key\n");
         return;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 }
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
                         0xa9, 0xe8, 0xcc, 0xac, 0xd0, 0xf6, 0x54, 0x5c};
     uint8_t signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
     size_t signature_length;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Sign a message...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -154,14 +154,14 @@
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 1024);
 
     /* Import the key */
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to import key\n");
         return;
     }
 
     /* Sign message using the key */
-    status = psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW,
+    status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW,
                            hash, sizeof(hash),
                            signature, sizeof(signature),
                            &signature_length);
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 }
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
     size_t iv_len;
     uint8_t output[block_size];
     size_t output_len;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
     psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
     printf("Encrypt with cipher...\t");
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to import a key\n");
         return;
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Encrypt the plaintext */
-    status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation, key, alg);
+    status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation, key_id, alg);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to begin cipher operation\n");
         return;
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
     psa_cipher_abort(&operation);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 }
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@
     uint8_t iv[block_size] = ENCRYPTED_WITH_IV;
     uint8_t output[block_size];
     size_t output_len;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Decrypt with cipher...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to import a key\n");
         return;
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Decrypt the ciphertext */
-    status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation, key, alg);
+    status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation, key_id, alg);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to begin cipher operation\n");
         return;
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
     psa_cipher_abort(&operation);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 }
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@
     size_t output_length = 0;
     size_t tag_length = 16;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Authenticate encrypt...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -726,11 +726,11 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_CCM);
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, sizeof(key), &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, sizeof(key), &key_id);
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Authenticate and encrypt */
-    status = psa_aead_encrypt(key, PSA_ALG_CCM,
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt(key_id, PSA_ALG_CCM,
                               nonce, sizeof(nonce),
                               additional_data, sizeof(additional_data),
                               input_data, sizeof(input_data),
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@
     free(output_data);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 ```
@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@
     size_t output_size = 0;
     size_t output_length = 0;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Authenticate decrypt...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_CCM);
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
-    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data, sizeof(key_data), &key);
+    status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data, sizeof(key_data), &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to import a key\n");
         return;
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
     /* Authenticate and decrypt */
-    status = psa_aead_decrypt(key, PSA_ALG_CCM,
+    status = psa_aead_decrypt(key_id, PSA_ALG_CCM,
                               nonce, sizeof(nonce),
                               additional_data, sizeof(additional_data),
                               input_data, sizeof(input_data),
@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@
     free(output_data);
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 ```
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@
     size_t exported_length = 0;
     static uint8_t exported[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)];
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_key_id_t key;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id;
 
     printf("Generate a key pair...\t");
     fflush(stdout);
@@ -867,14 +867,14 @@
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes,
                      PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1));
     psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key_bits);
-    status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key);
+    status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to generate key\n");
         return;
     }
     psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
 
-    status = psa_export_public_key(key, exported, sizeof(exported),
+    status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exported, sizeof(exported),
                                    &exported_length);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         printf("Failed to export public key %ld\n", status);
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@
     printf("Exported a public key\n");
 
     /* Destroy the key */
-    psa_destroy_key(key);
+    psa_destroy_key(key_id);
 
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
 ```
diff --git a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ec2dca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+This document describes the compile-time configuration option
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective, more specifically its
+current effects as well as the parts that aren't covered yet.
+
+Current effects
+===============
+
+General limitations
+-------------------
+
+Compile-time: enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires
+`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` and
+`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` to be disabled.
+
+Effect: `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` currently has no effect on TLS 1.3 (which is
+itself experimental and only partially supported so far): TLS 1.3 always uses
+the legacy APIs even when this option is set.
+
+Stability: any API that's only available when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is
+defined is considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any
+time. Said otherwise, these APIs are explicitly excluded from the usual API
+stability promises.
+
+New APIs / API extensions
+-------------------------
+
+Some of these APIs are meant for the application to use in place of
+pre-existing APIs, in order to get access to the benefits; in the sub-sections
+below these are indicated by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: opt-in", meaning that
+this requires changes to the application code for the (X.509 and) TLS layers
+to pick up the improvements.
+
+Some of these APIs are mostly meant for internal use by the TLS (and X.509)
+layers; they are indicated below by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: automatic",
+meaning that no changes to the application code are required for the TLS (and
+X.509) layers to pick up the improvements.
+
+### PSA-held (opaque) keys in the PK layer
+
+There is a new API function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` that can be used to
+wrap a PSA keypair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key
+operations and its public part can be exported.
+
+Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+
+Limitations: only for private keys, only ECC. (That is, only ECDSA signature
+generation. Note: currently this will use randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses
+deterministic ECDSA by default.) The following operations are not supported
+with a context set this way, while they would be available with a normal
+`ECKEY` context: `mbedtls_pk_verify()`, `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`,
+`mbedtls_pk_debug()`.
+
+Use in X.509 and TLS: opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context
+using the new API in order to get the benefits; it can then pass the
+resulting context to the following existing APIs:
+
+- `mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert()` or `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert()` to use the
+  key together with a certificate for ECDSA-based key exchanges (note: while
+this is supported on both sides, it's currently only tested client-side);
+- `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()` to generate a CSR (certificate signature
+  request).
+
+In the TLS and X.509 API, there are two other functions which accept a key or
+keypair as a PK context: `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key()` and
+`mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`. Use of opaque contexts here probably
+works but is so far untested.
+
+### PSA-held (opaque) keys for TLS pre-shared keys (PSK)
+
+There are two new API functions `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and
+`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`. Call one of these from an application to
+register a PSA key for use with a PSK key exchange.
+
+Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets.
+
+Limitations: the key can only be used with "pure"
+PSK key exchanges (ciphersuites starting with `TLS_PSK_WITH_`), to the
+exclusion of RSA-PSK, DHE-PSK and ECDHE-PSK key exchanges. It is the responsibility of
+the user to make sure that when provisioning an opaque pre-shared key, the
+only PSK ciphersuites that can be negotiated are "pure" PSK; other XXX-PSK key
+exchanges will result in a handshake failure with the handshake function
+returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE`.
+
+Use in TLS: opt-in. The application needs to register the key using the new
+APIs to get the benefits.
+
+### PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer
+
+There is a new API function `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` to set up a context
+that will call PSA to store the key and perform the operations.
+
+Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers; partial isolation of short-term secrets
+(still generated outside of PSA, but then held by PSA).
+
+Limitations: the key is still passed in the clear by the application. The
+multi-part APIs are not supported, only the one-shot APIs. The only modes
+supported are ECB, CBC without padding, GCM and CCM (this excludes stream
+ciphers and ChachaPoly); the only cipher supported is AES (this excludes Aria,
+Camellia, and ChachaPoly). (Note: ECB is currently not tested.) (Note: it is
+possible to perform multiple one-shot operations with the same context;
+however this is not unit-tested, only tested via usage in TLS.)
+
+Use in TLS: automatic. Used when the cipher and mode is supported (with
+gracious fallback to the legacy API otherwise) in all places where a cipher is
+used. There are two such places: in `ssl_tls.c` for record protection, and in
+`ssl_ticket.c` for protecting tickets we issue.
+
+Internal changes
+----------------
+
+All of these internal changes are active as soon as `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`
+is enabled, no change required on the application side.
+
+### TLS: cipher operations based on PSA
+
+See "PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer" above.
+
+### PK layer: ECDSA verification based on PSA
+
+Scope: `mbedtls_pk_verify()` will call to PSA for ECDSA signature
+verification.
+
+Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+
+Use in TLS and X.509: in all places where an ECDSA signature is verified.
+
+### TLS: ECDHE computation based on PSA
+
+Scope: Client-side, for ECDHE-RSA and ECDHE-ECDSA key exchanges, the
+computation of the ECDHE key exchange is done by PSA.
+
+Limitations: client-side only, ECDHE-PSK not covered
+
+Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+
+### TLS: handshake hashes and PRF computed with PSA
+
+Scope: with TLS 1.2, the following are computed with PSA:
+- the running handshake hashes;
+- the hash of the ServerKeyExchange part that is signed;
+- the `verify_data` part of the Finished message;
+- the TLS PRF.
+
+Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+
+### X.509: some hashes computed with PSA
+
+Scope: the following hashes are computed with PSA:
+- when verifying a certificate chain, hash of the child for verifying the
+  parent's signature;
+- when writing a CSR, hash of the request for self-signing the request.
+
+Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+
+Parts that are not covered yet
+==============================
+
+This is only a high-level overview, grouped by theme
+
+TLS: 1.3 experimental support
+-----------------------------
+
+No part of the experimental support for TLS 1.3 is covered at the moment.
+
+TLS: key exchanges / asymmetric crypto
+--------------------------------------
+
+The following key exchanges are not covered at all:
+
+- RSA
+- DHE-RSA
+- DHE-PSK
+- RSA-PSK
+- ECDHE-PSK
+- ECDH-RSA
+- ECDH-ECDSA
+- ECJPAKE
+
+The following key exchanges are only partially covered:
+
+- ECDHE-RSA: RSA operations are not covered and, server-side, the ECDHE
+  operation isn't either
+- ECDHE-ECDSA: server-side, the ECDHE operation isn't covered. (ECDSA
+  signature generation is only covered if using `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`.)
+
+PSK if covered when the application uses `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` or
+`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`.
+
+TLS: symmetric crypto
+---------------------
+
+- some ciphers not supported via PSA yet: ARIA, Camellia, ChachaPoly (silent
+  fallback to the legacy APIs)
+- the HMAC part of the CBC and NULL ciphersuites
+- the HMAC computation in `ssl_cookie.c`
+
+X.509
+-----
+
+- most hash operations are still done via the legacy API, except the few that
+  are documented above as using PSA
+- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation (from PSA-held keys)
+- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification
+- RSA-PSS signature verification
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
index 879c3f2..e381c11 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aes.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
 
 #include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -163,6 +164,7 @@
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                     unsigned int keybits );
 
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                     unsigned int keybits );
 
@@ -201,6 +204,7 @@
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
                                 const unsigned char *key,
                                 unsigned int keybits );
@@ -221,6 +225,7 @@
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
                                 const unsigned char *key,
                                 unsigned int keybits );
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@
 
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                     int mode,
                     const unsigned char input[16],
@@ -296,6 +302,7 @@
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH
  *                 on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                     int mode,
                     size_t length,
@@ -340,6 +347,7 @@
  *                     smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p
  *                     length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB).
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
                            int mode,
                            size_t length,
@@ -388,6 +396,7 @@
  *
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                        int mode,
                        size_t length,
@@ -432,6 +441,7 @@
  *
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                     int mode,
                     size_t length,
@@ -486,6 +496,7 @@
  *
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                        size_t length,
                        size_t *iv_off,
@@ -500,10 +511,6 @@
  * \brief      This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption
  *             operation.
  *
- *             This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode
- *             parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer
- *             defined in the \p input parameter.
- *
  *             Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule
  *             for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you
  *             must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc()
@@ -572,6 +579,7 @@
  *
  * \return                 \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                        size_t length,
                        size_t *nc_off,
@@ -592,6 +600,7 @@
  *
  * \return          \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                                   const unsigned char input[16],
                                   unsigned char output[16] );
@@ -607,6 +616,7 @@
  *
  * \return          \c 0 on success.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
                                   const unsigned char input[16],
                                   unsigned char output[16] );
@@ -618,6 +628,7 @@
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         \c 1 on failure.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose );
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
index f45fc17..4746c1c 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@@ -152,9 +152,9 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf
 {
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag);                /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */
-    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len);             /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
-    unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p);       /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */
+    int tag;                /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */
+    size_t len;             /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
+    unsigned char *p;       /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */
 }
 mbedtls_asn1_buf;
 
@@ -163,9 +163,9 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring
 {
-    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len);                 /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
-    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unused_bits);  /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */
-    unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p);           /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */
+    size_t len;                 /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
+    unsigned char unused_bits;  /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */
+    unsigned char *p;           /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */
 }
 mbedtls_asn1_bitstring;
 
@@ -174,8 +174,16 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence
 {
-    mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf);                   /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */
-    struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);    /**< The next entry in the sequence. */
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf buf;                   /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */
+
+    /** The next entry in the sequence.
+     *
+     * The details of memory management for sequences are not documented and
+     * may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL when
+     * initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS
+     * library functions.
+     */
+    struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next;
 }
 mbedtls_asn1_sequence;
 
@@ -184,10 +192,24 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data
 {
-    mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid);                   /**< The object identifier. */
-    mbedtls_asn1_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(val);                   /**< The named value. */
-    struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);  /**< The next entry in the sequence. */
-    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged);      /**< Merge next item into the current one? */
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf oid;                   /**< The object identifier. */
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf val;                   /**< The named value. */
+
+    /** The next entry in the sequence.
+     *
+     * The details of memory management for named data sequences are not
+     * documented and may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL
+     * when initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS
+     * library functions.
+     */
+    struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next;
+
+    /** Merge next item into the current one?
+     *
+     * This field exists for the sake of Mbed TLS's X.509 certificate parsing
+     * code and may change in future versions of the library.
+     */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged);
 }
 mbedtls_asn1_named_data;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
index b3adecc..1be1689 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
@@ -76,7 +76,27 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context
 {
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16];    /*!< The Y working buffer */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16];  /*!< The counter buffer */
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx);    /*!< The cipher context used. */
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len);   /*!< Total plaintext length */
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len);         /*!< Total authentication data length */
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len);         /*!< Total tag length */
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed);       /*!< Track how many bytes of input data
+                                                  were processed (chunked input).
+                                                  Used independently for both auth data
+                                                  and plaintext/ciphertext.
+                                                  This variable is set to zero after
+                                                  auth data input is finished. */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q);        /*!< The Q working value */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode);     /*!< The operation to perform:
+                                                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
+                                                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
+                                                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
+                                                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state);              /*!< Working value holding context's
+                                                  state. Used for chunked data
+                                                  input */
 }
 mbedtls_ccm_context;
 
@@ -178,6 +198,7 @@
  * \param ctx       The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be
  *                  initialized and bound to a key.
  * \param length    The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ *                  For tag length = 0, input length is ignored.
  * \param iv        The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
  *                  buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
@@ -259,6 +280,7 @@
  * \param ctx       The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be
  *                  initialized and bound to a key.
  * \param length    The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ *                  For tag length = 0, input length is ignored.
  * \param iv        The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
  *                  buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index 9c9a2e8..892771e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -140,9 +140,15 @@
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM,          /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM,          /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM,          /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM,     /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM,     /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM,     /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB,         /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB,         /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB,         /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */
@@ -161,6 +167,9 @@
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM,         /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM,         /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM,         /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB,          /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB,          /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB,          /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
@@ -187,6 +196,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,                    /**< The GCM cipher mode.         */
     MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM,                 /**< The stream cipher mode.      */
     MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,                    /**< The CCM cipher mode.         */
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,        /**< The CCM*-no-tag cipher mode. */
     MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS,                    /**< The XTS cipher mode.         */
     MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY,             /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */
     MBEDTLS_MODE_KW,                     /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */
@@ -258,6 +268,13 @@
 /**
  * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions
  * in a generic way.
+ *
+ * \note        The library does not support custom cipher info structures,
+ *              only built-in structures returned by the functions
+ *              mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(),
+ *              mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(),
+ *              mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(),
+ *              mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa().
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t
 {
@@ -415,6 +432,82 @@
                                               const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode );
 
 /**
+ * \brief               Retrieve the identifier for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info      The cipher info structure to query.
+ *                      This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return              The full cipher identifier (\c MBEDTLS_CIPHER_xxx).
+ * \return              #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(
+    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info )
+{
+    if( info == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE );
+    else
+        return( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief               Retrieve the operation mode for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info      The cipher info structure to query.
+ *                      This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return              The cipher mode (\c MBEDTLS_MODE_xxx).
+ * \return              #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(
+    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info )
+{
+    if( info == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE );
+    else
+        return( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief               Retrieve the key size for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info      The cipher info structure to query.
+ *                      This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return              The key length in bits.
+ *                      For variable-sized ciphers, this is the default length.
+ *                      For DES, this includes the parity bits.
+ * \return              \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(
+    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info )
+{
+    if( info == NULL )
+        return( 0 );
+    else
+        return( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief               Retrieve the human-readable name for a
+ *                      cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info      The cipher info structure to query.
+ *                      This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return              The cipher name, which is a human readable string,
+ *                      with static storage duration.
+ * \return              \c NULL if \c info is \p NULL.
+ */
+static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name(
+    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info )
+{
+    if( info == NULL )
+        return( NULL );
+    else
+        return( info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) );
+}
+
+/**
  * \brief               This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE.
  *
  * \param ctx           The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
index 9080cd1..5615a68 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
 #endif
 
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS
+#endif
+
 
 
 /****************************************************************/
@@ -267,6 +273,18 @@
 #endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
 #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */
 
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+    defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
+    defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
+
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
 #define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
@@ -301,6 +319,7 @@
  * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these
  * situations. */
 #if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+    defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
 #define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1
@@ -381,6 +400,7 @@
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+    defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1
 #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
@@ -390,6 +410,7 @@
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+    defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
     defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1
 #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C
@@ -586,7 +607,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1
-#endif /* MBEDTLSS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
@@ -629,6 +650,11 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
@@ -660,7 +686,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+    defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
 #endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5de57a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ *  Constant-time functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be
+ * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param a     Pointer to the first buffer.
+ * \param b     Pointer to the second buffer.
+ * \param n     The number of bytes to compare in the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return      Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same,
+ *              otherwise non-zero.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a,
+                       const void *b,
+                       size_t n );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/des.h b/include/mbedtls/des.h
index 63a8e00..be74cb1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/des.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/des.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
 
 #include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
 /**
@@ -152,6 +154,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
 /**
@@ -166,6 +169,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
 /**
@@ -180,6 +184,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
 /**
@@ -190,6 +195,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                       const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] );
 
@@ -201,6 +207,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                       const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] );
 
@@ -212,6 +219,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                       const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] );
 
@@ -223,6 +231,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                       const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] );
 
@@ -239,6 +248,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
                     const unsigned char input[8],
                     unsigned char output[8] );
@@ -266,6 +276,7 @@
  *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
  *                 instead.
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
                     int mode,
                     size_t length,
@@ -283,6 +294,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0 if successful
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                      const unsigned char input[8],
                      unsigned char output[8] );
@@ -308,6 +320,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
 int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
                      int mode,
                      size_t length,
@@ -338,6 +351,7 @@
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
  */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose );
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 384d060..5b26084 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -130,10 +130,8 @@
 
 /**
  * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
- *
- * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded.
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX     12
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX     14
 
 /*
  * Curve types
@@ -147,13 +145,17 @@
 
 /**
  * Curve information, for use by other modules.
+ *
+ * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be
+ * accessed directly by applications. Future versions of the library may
+ * add extra fields or reorder existing fields.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info
 {
-    mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);    /*!< An internal identifier. */
-    uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_id);                /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */
-    uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bit_size);              /*!< The curve size in bits. */
-    const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);               /*!< A human-friendly name. */
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;    /*!< An internal identifier. */
+    uint16_t tls_id;                /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */
+    uint16_t bit_size;              /*!< The curve size in bits. */
+    const char *name;               /*!< A human-friendly name. */
 } mbedtls_ecp_curve_info;
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index 27420ce..8b2b9ea 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * Module   Nr  Codes assigned
  * ERROR     2  0x006E          0x0001
  * MPI       7  0x0002-0x0010
- * GCM       3  0x0012-0x0014   0x0013-0x0013
+ * GCM       3  0x0012-0x0016   0x0013-0x0013
  * THREADING 3  0x001A-0x001E
  * AES       5  0x0020-0x0022   0x0021-0x0025
  * CAMELLIA  3  0x0024-0x0026   0x0027-0x0027
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
index 9d9155f..7dc9dfb 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED                       -0x0012
 /** Bad input parameters to function. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT                         -0x0014
+/** An output buffer is too small. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                  -0x0016
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index d470c00..c2f4587 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -521,6 +521,29 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING
+ *
+ * If this macro is defined, emit a compile-time warning if application code
+ * calls a function without checking its return value, but the return value
+ * should generally be checked in portable applications.
+ *
+ * This is only supported on platforms where #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is
+ * implemented. Otherwise this option has no effect.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to get warnings on using fallible functions without checking
+ * their return value.
+ *
+ * \note  This feature is a work in progress.
+ *        Warnings will be added to more functions in the future.
+ *
+ * \note  A few functions are considered critical, and ignoring the return
+ *        value of these functions will trigger a warning even if this
+ *        macro is not defined. To completely disable return value check
+ *        warnings, define #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN with an empty expansion.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING
+
+/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
  *
  * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers.
@@ -1599,16 +1622,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 
 /**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
- *
- * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret.
- * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for key export
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
-
-/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
  *
  * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL.
@@ -1718,15 +1731,13 @@
  * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not
  * break backwards compatibility.
  *
- * \warning The PSA Crypto API is in beta stage. While you're welcome to
- * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some
- * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet.
+ * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this
+ * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far.
  *
- * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs that are dependent on the
- * PSA Crypto API, so can't come with the same stability guarantees as the
- * rest of the Mbed TLS APIs. You're welcome to experiment with them, but for
- * now, access to these APIs is opt-in (via enabling the present option), in
- * order to clearly differentiate them from the stable Mbed TLS APIs.
+ * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently
+ * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time.
+ * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual
+ * promises of API stability.
  *
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
  *
@@ -2592,10 +2603,6 @@
  *
  * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
  *
- * \warning The PSA Crypto API is still beta status. While you're welcome to
- * experiment using it, incompatible API changes are still possible, and some
- * parts may not have reached the same quality as the rest of Mbed TLS yet.
- *
  * Module:  library/psa_crypto.c
  *
  * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
@@ -3073,6 +3080,29 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO   mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
 //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO  mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
 
+/** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+ *
+ * This macro is used at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * to indicate that its return value should be checked. It should
+ * instruct the compiler to emit a warning or an error if the function
+ * is called without checking its return value.
+ *
+ * There is a default implementation for popular compilers in platform_util.h.
+ * You can override the default implementation by defining your own here.
+ *
+ * If the implementation here is empty, this will effectively disable the
+ * checking of functions' return values.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN
+ *
+ * This macro requires one argument, which should be a C function call.
+ * If that function call would cause a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN warning, this
+ * warning is suppressed.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( result ) ((void) !(result))
+
 /* PSA options */
 /**
  * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the
@@ -3179,7 +3209,7 @@
  * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
  * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
  *
- * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
+ * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
  * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size,
  * together with its reassembly bitmap.
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
index c8214a2..0c754b1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
@@ -94,7 +94,13 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_net_context
 {
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fd);             /**< The underlying file descriptor                 */
+    /** The underlying file descriptor.
+     *
+     * This field is only guaranteed to be present on POSIX/Unix-like platforms.
+     * On other platforms, it may have a different type, have a different
+     * meaning, or be absent altogether.
+     */
+    int fd;
 }
 mbedtls_net_context;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index ded5222..5f9f29f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief           Public key information and operations
+ *
+ * \note        The library does not support custom pk info structures,
+ *              only built-in structures returned by
+ *              mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type().
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
index 1a0a135..5d2fefc 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
@@ -42,10 +42,6 @@
 /* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here
- * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use
- * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at
- * some point for uniformity. */
 #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
 MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t;
 #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL )       \
@@ -53,13 +49,102 @@
 MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t;
 #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL )       \
     ( (mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) ( VAL ) )
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
 #else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
 #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL
 #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
 
+/* Implementation of the check-return facility.
+ * See the user documentation in mbedtls_config.h.
+ *
+ * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead,
+ * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+ * depending on how important it is to check the return value.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN)
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1700
+#include <sal.h>
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN _Check_return_
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/** Critical-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that its return value should be checked in all applications.
+ * Omitting the check is very likely to indicate a bug in the application
+ * and will result in a compile-time warning if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+ * is implemented for the compiler in use.
+ *
+ * \note  The use of this macro is a work in progress.
+ *        This macro may be added to more functions in the future.
+ *        Such an extension is not considered an API break, provided that
+ *        there are near-unavoidable circumstances under which the function
+ *        can fail. For example, signature/MAC/AEAD verification functions,
+ *        and functions that require a random generator, are considered
+ *        return-check-critical.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+
+/** Ordinary-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that its return value should be generally be checked in portable
+ * applications. Omitting the check will result in a compile-time warning if
+ * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is implemented for the compiler in use and
+ * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING is enabled in the compile-time configuration.
+ *
+ * You can use #MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN to explicitly ignore the return value
+ * of a function that is annotated with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN.
+ *
+ * \note  The use of this macro is a work in progress.
+ *        This macro will be added to more functions in the future.
+ *        Eventually this should appear before most functions returning
+ *        an error code (as \c int in the \c mbedtls_xxx API or
+ *        as ::psa_status_t in the \c psa_xxx API).
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING)
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+#endif
+
+/** Benign-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that it is rarely useful to check its return value.
+ *
+ * This macro has an empty expansion. It exists for documentation purposes:
+ * a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL annotation indicates that the function
+ * has been analyzed for return-check usefuless, whereas the lack of
+ * an annotation indicates that the function has not been analyzed and its
+ * return-check usefulness is unknown.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN
+ *
+ * Call this macro with one argument, a function call, to suppress a warning
+ * from #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN due to that function call.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN)
+/* GCC doesn't silence the warning with just (void)(result).
+ * (void)!(result) is known to work up at least up to GCC 10, as well
+ * as with Clang and MSVC.
+ *
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-3.4.6/gcc/Non_002dbugs.html
+ * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/40576003/ignoring-warning-wunused-result
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66425#c34
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(result) ( (void) !( result ) )
+#endif
+
 /**
  * \brief       Securely zeroize a buffer
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
index f6f2e58..c54c035 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
@@ -51,18 +51,27 @@
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:
         case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:
+        case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:
             return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES );
 
         /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */
         /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM:
            case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM:
            case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM:
+           case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+           case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+           case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
            case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM:
            case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM:
            case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM:
@@ -87,6 +96,8 @@
             return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) );
         case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
             return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) );
+        case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+            return PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG;
         case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
             if( taglen == 0 )
                 return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING );
@@ -369,7 +380,7 @@
     if( curve_info == NULL )
         return( 0 );
     return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(
-                mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id), bits ) ) );
+                mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->grp_id, bits ) ) );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
index 9e6f59d..0cbbac1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@
  *                 for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
  * \param is224    Determines which function to use. This must be
  *                 either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224.
+ *
+ * \return         \c 0 on success.
+ * \return         A negative error code on failure.
  */
 int mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input,
                     size_t ilen,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 3cb896c..45e0544 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_H
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
 
 #include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
@@ -170,6 +171,76 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG                        -0x5E80
 
 /*
+ * TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values
+ *
+ * From RF 8446
+ *    enum {
+ *         // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE)
+ *         secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
+ *         x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
+ *         // Finite Field Groups (DHE)
+ *         ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
+ *         ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
+ *         // Reserved Code Points
+ *         ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
+ *         ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ *         (0xFFFF)
+ *     } NamedGroup;
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE               0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1     0x0012
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1     0x0013
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1     0x0014
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1     0x0015
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1     0x0016
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1     0x0017
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1     0x0018
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1     0x0019
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1       0x001A
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1       0x001B
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1       0x001C
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519        0x001D
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448          0x001E
+/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048     0x0100
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072     0x0101
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096     0x0102
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144     0x0103
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192     0x0104
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes().
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK            ( 1u << 0 ) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange,
+                                                                        *   encompassing both externally agreed PSKs
+                                                                        *   as well as resumption PSKs. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL      ( 1u << 1 ) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
+                                                                        *   including for example ECDHE and DHE
+                                                                        *   key exchanges. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL  ( 1u << 2 ) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
+                                                                        *   using both a PSK and an ephemeral
+                                                                        *   key exchange. */
+
+/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL                         \
+    ( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK              |            \
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL    |            \
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL )        /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges           */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL                     \
+    ( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK              |            \
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL    ) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL               \
+    ( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL        |            \
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL    ) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
+
+/*
  * Various constants
  */
 
@@ -426,6 +497,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO             2
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST     3
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET       4
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS     8 // NEW IN TLS 1.3
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE             11
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE     12
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST     13
@@ -443,21 +515,38 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH          1
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC               4
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST               5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES   10
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS            10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS     11
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG                     13
-
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG                     13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP                    14
-
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT                   15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN                        16
 
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT                         18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE               19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE              20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING                     21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC            22 /* 0x16 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET  0x0017 /* 23 */
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET              35
 
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY              41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA                  42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS          43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE                      44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES      45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH                   47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS                 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH         49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT                50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE                   51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+
 /* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of
  * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
  * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05).
@@ -516,6 +605,11 @@
 
 #define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE     sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret )
 
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE         MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE
+
+/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
@@ -544,6 +638,10 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 }
 mbedtls_ssl_states;
 
@@ -954,6 +1052,14 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED &&
           !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
 
+typedef struct
+{
+    unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char exporter_master_secret             [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char resumption_master_secret           [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets;
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH             255
@@ -1044,6 +1150,10 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac);       /*!< flag for EtM activation                */
 #endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets);
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
@@ -1059,7 +1169,6 @@
 }
 mbedtls_tls_prf_types;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 typedef enum
 {
     MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0,
@@ -1095,7 +1204,6 @@
                                         const unsigned char client_random[32],
                                         const unsigned char server_random[32],
                                         mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 /**
  * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
@@ -1111,6 +1219,11 @@
     /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated)                  */
     const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    /** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes.                                 */
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
     /** Callback for printing debug output                                  */
     void (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
     void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg);                    /*!< context for the debug function     */
@@ -1195,10 +1308,12 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
     const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves             */
 #endif
 
+    const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list);     /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
     mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P);              /*!< prime modulus for DHM              */
     mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G);              /*!< generator for DHM                  */
@@ -1441,6 +1556,19 @@
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message);   /*!< drop or reuse current message
                                      on next call to record layer? */
 
+    /* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes,
+     * what kind of alert is pending to be sent.
+     */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert);   /*!< Determines if a fatal alert
+                                                should be sent. Values:
+                                                - \c 0 , no alert is to be sent.
+                                                - \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type);   /*!< Type of alert if send_alert
+                                                 != 0 */
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason);           /*!< The error code to be returned
+                                                 to the user once the fatal alert
+                                                 has been sent. */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing);  /*!< Disable packing multiple records
                                         *   within a single datagram.  */
@@ -1467,7 +1595,7 @@
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len);         /*!< length of output buffer          */
 #endif
 
-    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[8]; /*!<  Outgoing record sequence  number. */
+    unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!<  Outgoing record sequence  number. */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
     uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu);               /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
@@ -1532,11 +1660,9 @@
                             *   and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     /** Callback to export key block and master secret                      */
     mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys);
     void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys);            /*!< context for key export callback    */
-#endif
 };
 
 /**
@@ -2109,7 +2235,6 @@
         void *p_ticket );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 /**
  * \brief   Configure a key export callback.
  *          (Default: none.)
@@ -2131,7 +2256,6 @@
 void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                      mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys,
                                      void *p_export_keys );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
 /**
@@ -2579,23 +2703,93 @@
 /**
  * \brief               Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference
  *                      order. First in the list has the highest preference.
- *                      (Overrides all version-specific lists)
  *
- *                      The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain
- *                      valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config.
+ *                      For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both
+ *                      the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric
+ *                      algorithms to be used during and after the handshake.
  *
- *                      Note: By default, the server chooses its preferred
+ *                      For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite
+ *                      only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be
+ *                      used during and after the handshake, while key exchange
+ *                      mechanisms are configured separately.
+ *
+ *                      In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
+ *                      are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3,
+ *                      there will be separate API for the configuration of key
+ *                      exchange mechanisms.
+ *
+ *                      The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may
+ *                      contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite
+ *                      identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3
+ *                      should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would
+ *                      be tolerated.
+ *
+ * \note                By default, the server chooses its preferred
  *                      ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If
  *                      mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer
  *                      the client's preferences, the server instead chooses
  *                      the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that
  *                      the server supports.
  *
- * \param conf          SSL configuration
- * \param ciphersuites  0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites
+ * \warning             The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied.
+ *                      It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL
+ *                      configuration \p conf.
+ *
+ * \param conf          The SSL configuration to modify.
+ * \param ciphersuites  A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported
+ *                      ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX
+ *                      and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in
+ *                      ssl_ciphersuites.h.
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
-                                   const int *ciphersuites );
+                                    const int *ciphersuites );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections.
+ *
+ *        In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not
+ *        include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not
+ *        covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the
+ *        documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more
+ *        information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ *        The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to
+ *        configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * \param conf       The SSL configuration the change should apply to.
+ * \param kex_modes  A bitwise combination of one or more of the following:
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK
+ *                     This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges.
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL
+ *                     This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL
+ *                     This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ *                   For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are
+ *                   available for combinations of the above:
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
+ *                     Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral.
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL
+ *                     Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral
+ *                     key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ *                   - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL
+ *                     Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral
+ *                     key exchanges.
+ *
+ * \note  If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications
+ *        must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
+ *        mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
+ *        to configure the PSKs to be used.
+ *
+ * \note  If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported,
+ *        server-side applications must also provide a certificate via
+ *        mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert().
+ *
+ */
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes( mbedtls_ssl_config* conf,
+                                                const int kex_modes );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0
@@ -2976,6 +3170,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /**
  * \brief          Set the allowed curves in order of preference.
  *
@@ -2989,6 +3184,8 @@
  *                 Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
  *                 ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
  *
+ * \deprecated     Superseeded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
+ *
  * \note           This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
  *                 certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
  *                 for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key
@@ -3015,10 +3212,51 @@
  * \param curves   Ordered list of allowed curves,
  *                 terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
  */
-void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
-                              const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves );
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+                                                 const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
+/**
+ * \brief          Set the allowed groups in order of preference.
+ *
+ *                 On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism
+ *
+ *                 On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any
+ *                 use. The server can override our preference order.
+ *
+ *                 Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in
+ *                 key sharing.
+ *
+ * \note           This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(),
+ *                 which only allows ECP curves to be configured.
+ *
+ * \note           The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
+ *                 or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations
+ *                 of both.
+ *
+ * \note           This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
+ *                 (preferred group first).
+ *
+ * \note           When this function is not called, a default list is used,
+ *                 consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above,
+ *                 and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above.
+ *                 The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage.
+ *
+ * \note           New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
+ *                 from the default list unless serious security concerns require it.
+ *                 New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
+ *                 keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
+ *                 resource usage.
+ *
+ * \param conf     SSL configuration
+ * \param groups   List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0.
+ *                 Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer
+ *                 or using MBEDTLS_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros).
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+                              const uint16_t *groups );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
 /**
  * \brief          Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
index 812560c..18e7c98 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
@@ -256,6 +256,13 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */
 
+/* RFC 8446, Appendix B.4 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                     0x1301 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                     0x1302 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256               0x1303 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256                     0x1304 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256                   0x1305 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+
 /* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange.
  * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below
  */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
index df187cb..9a4be95 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@
 /** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time
 {
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(year), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mon), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(day);         /**< Date. */
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hour), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min), MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sec);         /**< Time. */
+    int year, mon, day;         /**< Date. */
+    int hour, min, sec;         /**< Time. */
 }
 mbedtls_x509_time;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
index 9331827..52bd43c 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
@@ -43,18 +43,30 @@
 /**
  * Certificate revocation list entry.
  * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry
 {
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);
+    /** Direct access to the whole entry inside the containing buffer. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf raw;
+    /** The serial number of the revoked certificate. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf serial;
+    /** The revocation date of this entry. */
+    mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date;
+    /** Direct access to the list of CRL entry extensions
+     * (an ASN.1 constructed sequence).
+     *
+     * If there are no extensions, `entry_ext.len == 0` and
+     * `entry_ext.p == NULL`. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext;
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial);
-
-    mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(revocation_date);
-
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entry_ext);
-
-    struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);
+    /** Next element in the linked list of entries.
+     * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+     * Do not modify this field directly. */
+    struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next;
 }
 mbedtls_x509_crl_entry;
 
@@ -64,22 +76,22 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl
 {
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);           /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tbs);           /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf raw;           /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf tbs;           /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
 
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);            /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid);       /**< CRL signature type identifier */
+    int version;            /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid;       /**< CRL signature type identifier */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw);    /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw;    /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer);       /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
+    mbedtls_x509_name issuer;       /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(this_update);
-    mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_update);
+    mbedtls_x509_time this_update;
+    mbedtls_x509_time next_update;
 
-    mbedtls_x509_crl_entry MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entry);   /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */
+    mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry;   /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl_ext);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext;
 
     mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid2);
     mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
@@ -87,7 +99,10 @@
     mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk);           /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
     void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts);             /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
 
-    struct mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);
+    /** Next element in the linked list of CRL.
+     * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+     * Do not modify this field directly. */
+    struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next;
 }
 mbedtls_x509_crl;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index 49211a9..3c11a99 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -45,36 +45,40 @@
 
 /**
  * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
 {
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_buffer);                     /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
                                          *   by the structure or not.        */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);               /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tbs);               /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf raw;               /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf tbs;               /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
 
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);                /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial);            /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid);           /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */
+    int version;                /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf serial;            /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid;           /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw);        /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_raw);       /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw;        /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw;       /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer);           /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
-    mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject);          /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
+    mbedtls_x509_name issuer;           /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
+    mbedtls_x509_name subject;          /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(valid_from);       /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
-    mbedtls_x509_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(valid_to);         /**< End time of certificate validity. */
+    mbedtls_x509_time valid_from;       /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
+    mbedtls_x509_time valid_to;         /**< End time of certificate validity. */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_raw);
-    mbedtls_pk_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk);              /**< Container for the public key context. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw;
+    mbedtls_pk_context pk;              /**< Container for the public key context. */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_id);         /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_id);        /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(v3_ext);            /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions.  */
-    mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_alt_names);    /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id;         /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id;        /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext;            /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions.  */
+    mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names;    /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certificate_policies); /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
+    mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
 
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types);              /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue);              /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */
@@ -82,7 +86,7 @@
 
     unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_usage);     /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_sequence MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_key_usage); /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */
+    mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */
 
     unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ns_cert_type); /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
 
@@ -91,7 +95,10 @@
     mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk);           /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
     void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts);             /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
 
-    struct mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);     /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */
+    /** Next certificate in the linked list that constitutes the CA chain.
+     * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+     * Do not modify this field directly. */
+    struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next;
 }
 mbedtls_x509_crt;
 
@@ -100,6 +107,9 @@
  * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
  *      type-id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  *      value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name
 {
@@ -108,7 +118,7 @@
      * To check the value of the type id, you should use
      * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
      */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type_id);                   /**< The type id. */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf type_id;                   /**< The type id. */
     union
     {
         /**
@@ -119,26 +129,30 @@
          */
         struct
         {
-            mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid);               /**< The object identifier. */
-            mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(val);               /**< The named value. */
+            mbedtls_x509_buf oid;               /**< The object identifier. */
+            mbedtls_x509_buf val;               /**< The named value. */
         }
-        MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hardware_module_name);
+        hardware_module_name;
     }
-    MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value);
+    value;
 }
 mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
 
 /**
- * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type
+ * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name,
+ * according to type.
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
 {
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);                              /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
+    int type;                              /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
     union {
-        mbedtls_x509_san_other_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_name); /**< The otherName supported type. */
-        mbedtls_x509_buf   MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unstructured_name); /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
+        mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
+        mbedtls_x509_buf   unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
     }
-    MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(san); /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
+    san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
 }
 mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
index 674f9ce..f80a1a1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
@@ -42,20 +42,24 @@
 
 /**
  * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields point to is unspecified.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr
 {
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);           /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cri);           /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf raw;           /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf cri;           /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */
 
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);            /**< CSR version (1=v1). */
+    int version;            /**< CSR version (1=v1). */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf  MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_raw);  /**< The raw subject data (DER). */
-    mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject);      /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
+    mbedtls_x509_buf  subject_raw;  /**< The raw subject data (DER). */
+    mbedtls_x509_name subject;      /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
 
-    mbedtls_pk_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk);          /**< Container for the public key context. */
+    mbedtls_pk_context pk;          /**< Container for the public key context. */
 
-    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid;
     mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
     mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md);       /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
     mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk);       /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index b3ef363..ee4b54c 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -2990,7 +2990,9 @@
  * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
  *                              It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
  *                              allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
- * \param alg                   A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * \param alg                   A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ *                              is true), that is compatible with
  *                              the type of \p key.
  * \param[in] hash              The hash or message to sign.
  * \param hash_length           Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
@@ -3043,7 +3045,9 @@
  *                          must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The
  *                          key must allow the usage
  *                          #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.
- * \param alg               A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * \param alg               A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ *                          value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ *                          is true), that is compatible with
  *                          the type of \p key.
  * \param[in] hash          The hash or message whose signature is to be
  *                          verified.
@@ -3682,6 +3686,7 @@
  *   The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme:
  *
  *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
+ *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
  *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
  *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE;
  *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC;
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
index b05660f..8075caf 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
@@ -77,6 +77,41 @@
 
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}}
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD  1
+#endif
+
+/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS AEAD implementation. */
+typedef struct
+{
+    psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+    psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type);
+
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1;
+
+    uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_length);
+
+    union
+    {
+        unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+        mbedtls_ccm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ccm);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+        mbedtls_gcm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(gcm);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+        mbedtls_chachapoly_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chachapoly);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+
+    } ctx;
+
+} mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, {0}}
+
 /*
  * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER DECLARATIONS ONLY.
  */
@@ -88,6 +123,10 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
 #define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
 
+typedef mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
 
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
index 64d8c58..6476e3c 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_config.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE                1
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC                  1
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES                   1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA                  1
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA              1
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20              1
 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES                   1
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
index 239fdcb..957986c2 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
@@ -58,5 +58,13 @@
 #endif
 } psa_driver_mac_context_t;
 
+typedef union {
+    unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_aead_context_t;
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */
 /* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
index 4c67f10..af8a4a6 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
@@ -79,6 +79,38 @@
         PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 :       \
         0)
 
+/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will
+ * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or
+ * until the operation is finished.
+ * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend().
+ *
+ * \param alg   A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *              PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return      The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm.
+ *              If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
+ *              An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a
+ *              hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
+ */
+#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg)                                  \
+    (                                                               \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64 :            \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64 :      \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64 :          \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64 :        \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64 :        \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128 :       \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128 :       \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128 :   \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128 :   \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144 :      \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136 :      \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104 :      \
+        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72 :       \
+        0)
+
 /** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
  *
  * Maximum size of a hash.
@@ -959,7 +991,8 @@
          (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
      (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
          (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \
-     0)
+         (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ? 13 : \
+         0)
 
 /** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes.
  *
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
index 381abf9..2689415 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
 #include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
 
 /* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive
  * algorithms. */
@@ -148,19 +150,31 @@
 
 struct psa_aead_operation_s
 {
+
+    /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+     * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+     * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+     * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+     * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+     * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+
     psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
-    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_set) : 1;
-    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1;
-    uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size);
-    uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size);
-    union
-    {
-        unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */
-        mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher);
-    } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+    psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type);
+
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_remaining);
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_remaining);
+
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nonce_set) : 1;
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lengths_set) : 1;
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_started) : 1;
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_started) : 1;
+    unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1;
+
+    psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
 };
 
-#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}}
 static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void )
 {
     const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
index daef941..5a903f8 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -466,6 +466,10 @@
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES                            ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400)
 
+/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
+ * ARIA block cipher. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA                           ((psa_key_type_t)0x2406)
+
 /** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
  *
  * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or
@@ -843,6 +847,9 @@
     (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) &&              \
      (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
 
+/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */
+#define PSA_ALG_NONE                            ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
+
 #define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff)
 /** MD5 */
 #define PSA_ALG_MD5                             ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003)
@@ -886,7 +893,7 @@
  * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
  *
  * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
- * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS,
+ * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT,
  * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
  * Then you may create and use a key as follows:
  * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
@@ -1195,6 +1202,17 @@
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CCM                             ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100)
 
+/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.
+ *
+ * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0.
+ * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ *
+ * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG                 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01300)
+
 /** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
@@ -1341,6 +1359,7 @@
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE               ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000300)
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE      ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06001300)
 /** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
@@ -1361,9 +1380,72 @@
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)                               \
     (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)                                 \
+
+/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification.
+ *
+ * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing,
+ * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return              The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
+ * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ *                      hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg)                      \
+    (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt.
+ *
+ * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg),
+ *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg)                   \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
 
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt.
+ *
+ * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
+ *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)                                \
+    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS.
+ *
+ * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the
+ * constraints on salt length.
+ *
+ * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
+ *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)                                 \
+    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) ||                   \
+     PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg))
+
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE                      ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000600)
 /** ECDSA signature with hashing.
  *
@@ -1521,20 +1603,24 @@
  * file. */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0
 
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
+ * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
  *
- * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
- * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
- * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
- * hash value and the key.
+ * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by
+ * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the
+ * paradigm more loosely:
+ * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash)
+ * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is)
  *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t).
  *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
+ * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
+ *         hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
+ *         to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm.
+ *         This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a
+ *         supported algorithm identifier.
  */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)                                   \
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)                                       \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) ||    \
      PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) ||             \
      PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
@@ -1551,7 +1637,37 @@
  *         supported algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)                                    \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA )
+    (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA )
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
+ *
+ * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
+ * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
+ * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
+ * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash
+ * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH
+ * to extract this algorithm.
+ *
+ * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm,
+ * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to
+ * ```
+ * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...);
+ * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...);
+ * ```
+ * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash
+ * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
+ * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to
+ * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash().
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ *         algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)                                   \
+    (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) &&                                       \
+     ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0)
 
 /** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
  *
@@ -1573,7 +1689,6 @@
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg)                                     \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                                   \
-     ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == 0 ? /*"raw" algorithm*/ 0 :        \
      ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :             \
      0)
 
@@ -2064,6 +2179,9 @@
 
 #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG            ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000)
 
+/** The null key identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL                         ((psa_key_id_t)0)
 /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN                     ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 5adc128..caac2d5 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
     chachapoly.c
     cipher.c
     cipher_wrap.c
+    constant_time.c
     cmac.c
     ctr_drbg.c
     des.c
@@ -106,8 +107,47 @@
     ssl_tls13_keys.c
     ssl_tls13_server.c
     ssl_tls13_client.c
+    ssl_tls13_generic.c
 )
 
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    find_package(Perl REQUIRED)
+
+    file(GLOB error_headers ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/*.h)
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c
+        COMMAND
+            ${PERL_EXECUTABLE}
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+            ${error_headers}
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/error.fmt
+    )
+
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c
+        COMMAND
+            ${PERL_EXECUTABLE}
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt
+    )
+else()
+    link_to_source(error.c)
+    link_to_source(version_features.c)
+endif()
+
 if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC)
     set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes")
 endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC)
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index 8c58fb8..bd116be 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 	     cipher.o \
 	     cipher_wrap.o \
 	     cmac.o \
+	     constant_time.o \
 	     ctr_drbg.o \
 	     des.o \
 	     dhm.o \
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@
 	  ssl_tls13_keys.o \
 	  ssl_tls13_client.o \
 	  ssl_tls13_server.o \
+	  ssl_tls13_generic.o \
 	  # This line is intentionally left blank
 
 .SILENT:
@@ -185,6 +187,14 @@
 
 shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT)
 
+# Windows builds under Mingw can fail if make tries to create archives in the same
+# directory at the same time - see https://bugs.launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/+bug/1848002.
+# This forces builds of the .a files to be serialised.
+ifdef WINDOWS
+libmbedtls.a: | libmbedx509.a
+libmbedx509.a: | libmbedcrypto.a
+endif
+
 # tls
 libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS)
 	echo "  AR    $@"
@@ -198,7 +208,7 @@
 
 libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS)
+	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS)
 	echo "  LN    $@ -> $<"
@@ -206,11 +216,11 @@
 
 libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -dynamiclib -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS)
+	$(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -lmbedx509 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 # x509
 libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509)
@@ -225,7 +235,7 @@
 
 libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_X509)
+	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509)
 	echo "  LN    $@ -> $<"
@@ -233,7 +243,7 @@
 
 libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -dynamiclib -L. -lmbedcrypto  $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_X509)
+	$(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto  $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll
 	echo "  LD    $@"
@@ -252,7 +262,7 @@
 
 libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+	$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO)
 	echo "  LN    $@ -> $<"
@@ -260,7 +270,7 @@
 
 libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
 	echo "  LD    $@"
-	$(CC) -dynamiclib $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+	$(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
 	echo "  LD    $@"
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 8e3358c..4afc3c4 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@
                     unsigned char *output )
 {
     int i;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[16];
 
     AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -1040,7 +1041,9 @@
         while( length > 0 )
         {
             memcpy( temp, input, 16 );
-            mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
 
             for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
@@ -1059,7 +1062,9 @@
             for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
 
-            mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
             memcpy( iv, output, 16 );
 
             input  += 16;
@@ -1067,8 +1072,10 @@
             length -= 16;
         }
     }
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
 
@@ -1222,6 +1229,7 @@
                        unsigned char *output )
 {
     int c;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t n;
 
     AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -1242,7 +1250,11 @@
         while( length-- )
         {
             if( n == 0 )
-                mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+            {
+                ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+                if( ret != 0 )
+                    goto exit;
+            }
 
             c = *input++;
             *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] );
@@ -1256,7 +1268,11 @@
         while( length-- )
         {
             if( n == 0 )
-                mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+            {
+                ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+                if( ret != 0 )
+                    goto exit;
+            }
 
             iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ );
 
@@ -1265,8 +1281,10 @@
     }
 
     *iv_off = n;
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1279,6 +1297,7 @@
                             const unsigned char *input,
                             unsigned char *output )
 {
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char c;
     unsigned char ov[17];
 
@@ -1291,7 +1310,9 @@
     while( length-- )
     {
         memcpy( ov, iv, 16 );
-        mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+        ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            goto exit;
 
         if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT )
             ov[16] = *input;
@@ -1303,8 +1324,10 @@
 
         memcpy( iv, ov + 1, 16 );
     }
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
 
@@ -1366,6 +1389,7 @@
                        unsigned char *output )
 {
     int c, i;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t n;
 
     AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -1383,7 +1407,9 @@
     while( length-- )
     {
         if( n == 0 ) {
-            mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block );
+            ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
 
             for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- )
                 if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 )
@@ -1396,8 +1422,10 @@
     }
 
     *nc_off = n;
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
 
diff --git a/library/base64.c b/library/base64.c
index 9cf5dd4..a516c1d 100644
--- a/library/base64.c
+++ b/library/base64.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
 
 #include "mbedtls/base64.h"
+#include "base64_invasive.h"
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 
@@ -35,127 +36,41 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 
-static const unsigned char base64_enc_map[64] =
-{
-    'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J',
-    'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T',
-    'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd',
-    'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'i', 'j', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n',
-    'o', 'p', 'q', 'r', 's', 't', 'u', 'v', 'w', 'x',
-    'y', 'z', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-    '8', '9', '+', '/'
-};
-
-static const unsigned char base64_dec_map[128] =
-{
-    127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127,
-    127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127,
-    127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127,
-    127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127,
-    127, 127, 127,  62, 127, 127, 127,  63,  52,  53,
-     54,  55,  56,  57,  58,  59,  60,  61, 127, 127,
-    127,  64, 127, 127, 127,   0,   1,   2,   3,   4,
-      5,   6,   7,   8,   9,  10,  11,  12,  13,  14,
-     15,  16,  17,  18,  19,  20,  21,  22,  23,  24,
-     25, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127,  26,  27,  28,
-     29,  30,  31,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36,  37,  38,
-     39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,
-     49,  50,  51, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127
-};
-
 #define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX   ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */
 
-/*
- * Constant flow conditional assignment to unsigned char
+/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * Constant flow with respect to c.
  */
-static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( unsigned char * dest, const unsigned char * const src,
-                                       unsigned char condition )
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+unsigned char mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( unsigned char low,
+                                            unsigned char high,
+                                            unsigned char c )
 {
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFF or 0 */
-    unsigned char mask = ( condition | -condition );
-    mask >>= 7;
-    mask = -mask;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    *dest = ( ( *src ) & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
+    /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */
+    unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8;
+    /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */
+    unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8;
+    return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff );
 }
 
-/*
- * Constant flow conditional assignment to uint_32
+/* Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit.
+ * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII
+ * but not EBCDIC).
  */
-static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( uint32_t * dest, const uint32_t src,
-                                       uint32_t condition )
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+unsigned char mbedtls_base64_enc_char( unsigned char val )
 {
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFFFFFFFF or 0 */
-    uint32_t mask = ( condition | -condition );
-    mask >>= 31;
-    mask = -mask;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    *dest = ( src & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant flow check for equality
- */
-static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_eq( size_t in_a, size_t in_b )
-{
-    size_t difference = in_a ^ in_b;
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    difference |= -difference;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    /* cope with the varying size of size_t per platform */
-    difference >>= ( sizeof( difference ) * 8 - 1 );
-
-    return (unsigned char) ( 1 ^ difference );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant flow lookup into table.
- */
-static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( const unsigned char * const table,
-                                                 const size_t table_size, const size_t table_index )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned char result = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < table_size; ++i )
-    {
-        mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( &result, &table[i], mbedtls_base64_eq( i, table_index ) );
-    }
-
-    return result;
+    unsigned char digit = 0;
+    /* For each range of values, if val is in that range, mask digit with
+     * the corresponding value. Since val can only be in a single range,
+     * only at most one masking will change digit. */
+    digit |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range(  0, 25, val ) & ( 'A' + val );
+    digit |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 26, 51, val ) & ( 'a' + val - 26 );
+    digit |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 52, 61, val ) & ( '0' + val - 52 );
+    digit |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 62, 62, val ) & '+';
+    digit |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 63, 63, val ) & '/';
+    return( digit );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -198,17 +113,12 @@
         C2 = *src++;
         C3 = *src++;
 
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
-
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( ( ( ( C1 &  3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
-
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
-
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( C3 & 0x3F ) );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 &  3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) )
+                                        & 0x3F );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) )
+                                        & 0x3F );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( C3 & 0x3F );
     }
 
     if( i < slen )
@@ -216,15 +126,12 @@
         C1 = *src++;
         C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0;
 
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
-
-        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                            ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F );
+        *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) )
+                                        & 0x3F );
 
         if( ( i + 1 ) < slen )
-             *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
-                                                 ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
+             *p++ = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F );
         else *p++ = '=';
 
         *p++ = '=';
@@ -236,26 +143,58 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+/* Given a Base64 digit, return its value.
+ * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'),
+ * return -1.
+ *
+ * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII
+ * but not EBCDIC).
+ *
+ * The implementation is constant-flow (no branch or memory access depending
+ * on the value of c) unless the compiler inlines and optimizes a specific
+ * access.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+signed char mbedtls_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c )
+{
+    unsigned char val = 0;
+    /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with
+     * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range,
+     * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus
+     * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */
+    val |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' +  0 + 1 );
+    val |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 );
+    val |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 );
+    val |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 );
+    val |= mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 );
+    /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is
+     * a digit with the value v. */
+    return( val - 1 );
+}
+
 /*
  * Decode a base64-formatted buffer
  */
 int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
                    const unsigned char *src, size_t slen )
 {
-    size_t i, n;
-    uint32_t j, x;
+    size_t i; /* index in source */
+    size_t n; /* number of digits or trailing = in source */
+    uint32_t x; /* value accumulator */
+    unsigned accumulated_digits = 0;
+    unsigned equals = 0;
+    int spaces_present = 0;
     unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char dec_map_lookup;
 
     /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */
-    for( i = n = j = 0; i < slen; i++ )
+    for( i = n = 0; i < slen; i++ )
     {
         /* Skip spaces before checking for EOL */
-        x = 0;
+        spaces_present = 0;
         while( i < slen && src[i] == ' ' )
         {
             ++i;
-            ++x;
+            spaces_present = 1;
         }
 
         /* Spaces at end of buffer are OK */
@@ -270,20 +209,24 @@
             continue;
 
         /* Space inside a line is an error */
-        if( x != 0 )
+        if( spaces_present )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
 
-        if( src[i] == '=' && ++j > 2 )
+        if( src[i] > 127 )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
 
-        dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), src[i] );
-
-        if( src[i] > 127 || dec_map_lookup == 127 )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
-
-        if( dec_map_lookup < 64 && j != 0 )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
-
+        if( src[i] == '=' )
+        {
+            if( ++equals > 2 )
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            if( equals != 0 )
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
+            if( mbedtls_base64_dec_value( src[i] ) < 0 )
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
+        }
         n++;
     }
 
@@ -298,7 +241,7 @@
      *     n = ( ( n * 6 ) + 7 ) >> 3;
      */
     n = ( 6 * ( n >> 3 ) ) + ( ( 6 * ( n & 0x7 ) + 7 ) >> 3 );
-    n -= j;
+    n -= equals;
 
     if( dst == NULL || dlen < n )
     {
@@ -306,22 +249,24 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     }
 
-   for( j = 3, n = x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++ )
-   {
+    equals = 0;
+    for( x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++ )
+    {
         if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' )
             continue;
 
-        dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), *src );
+        x = x << 6;
+        if( *src == '=' )
+            ++equals;
+        else
+            x |= mbedtls_base64_dec_value( *src );
 
-        mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( &j, j - 1, mbedtls_base64_eq( dec_map_lookup, 64 ) );
-        x  = ( x << 6 ) | ( dec_map_lookup & 0x3F );
-
-        if( ++n == 4 )
+        if( ++accumulated_digits == 4 )
         {
-            n = 0;
-            if( j > 0 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x );
-            if( j > 1 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x );
-            if( j > 2 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x );
+            accumulated_digits = 0;
+            *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x );
+            if( equals <= 1 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x );
+            if( equals <= 0 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x );
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/library/base64_invasive.h b/library/base64_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed5f7cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/base64_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * \file base_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Base64 module: interfaces for invasive testing only.
+ *
+ * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
+ * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when
+ * building the library for testing.
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * Constant flow with respect to c.
+ */
+unsigned char mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( unsigned char low,
+                                            unsigned char high,
+                                            unsigned char c );
+
+/* Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit.
+ *
+ * Operates in constant time (no branches or memory access depending on val).
+ */
+unsigned char mbedtls_base64_enc_char( unsigned char val );
+
+/* Given a Base64 digit, return its value.
+ * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'),
+ * return -1.
+ *
+ * Operates in constant time (no branches or memory access depending on c).
+ */
+signed char mbedtls_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 42ec7ac..fdf8c9a 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include "bn_mul.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -268,162 +269,6 @@
     memcpy(  Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) );
 }
 
-/**
- * Select between two sign values in constant-time.
- *
- * This is functionally equivalent to second ? a : b but uses only bit
- * operations in order to avoid branches.
- *
- * \param[in] a         The first sign; must be either +1 or -1.
- * \param[in] b         The second sign; must be either +1 or -1.
- * \param[in] second    Must be either 1 (return b) or 0 (return a).
- *
- * \return The selected sign value.
- */
-static int mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second )
-{
-    /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonnably assume about
-     * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned
-     * by taking advantage of the fact that a and b are either +1 or -1. */
-    unsigned ua = a + 1;
-    unsigned ub = b + 1;
-
-    /* second was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are ua and ub */
-    const unsigned mask = second << 1;
-
-    /* select ua or ub */
-    unsigned ur = ( ua & ~mask ) | ( ub & mask );
-
-    /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */
-    return( (int) ur - 1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information
- * about whether the assignment was made or not.
- * dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
- * assign must be 0 or 1.
- */
-static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n,
-                                  mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
-                                  const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
-                                  unsigned char assign )
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
-    const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -assign;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-        dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
- * about whether the assignment was made or not.
- * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign )
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    size_t i;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* make sure assign is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */
-    assign = (assign | (unsigned char)-assign) >> (sizeof( assign ) * 8 - 1);
-    /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
-    limb_mask = -assign;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
-
-    X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign );
-
-    mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
-
-    for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
-        X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask;
-
-cleanup:
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
- * about whether the swap was made or not.
- * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
- * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap )
-{
-    int ret, s;
-    size_t i;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
-
-    if( X == Y )
-        return( 0 );
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* make sure swap is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */
-    swap = (swap | (unsigned char)-swap) >> (sizeof( swap ) * 8 - 1);
-    /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */
-    limb_mask = -swap;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) );
-
-    s = X->s;
-    X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap );
-    Y->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap );
-
-
-    for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ )
-    {
-        tmp = X->p[i];
-        X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask );
-        Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | (     tmp & limb_mask );
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    return( ret );
-}
-
 /*
  * Set value from integer
  */
@@ -1246,107 +1091,6 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches.
- *
- * \param x         First integer.
- * \param y         Second integer.
- *
- * \return          1 if \p x is less than \p y, 0 otherwise
- */
-static unsigned ct_lt_mpi_uint( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
-        const mbedtls_mpi_uint y )
-{
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint ret;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint cond;
-
-    /*
-     * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different.
-     */
-    cond = ( x ^ y );
-    /*
-     * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and
-     * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y.
-     */
-    ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond;
-    /*
-     * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the
-     * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if
-     * the MSB of y is 0.)
-     */
-    ret |= y & cond;
-
-
-    ret = ret >> ( biL - 1 );
-
-    return (unsigned) ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare signed values in constant time
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
-        unsigned *ret )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */
-    unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative;
-
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
-    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL );
-
-    if( X->n != Y->n )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-
-    /*
-     * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0.
-     * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0.
-     */
-    X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1;
-    Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1;
-
-    /*
-     * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger.
-     * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
-     * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
-     */
-    cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative );
-    *ret = cond & X_is_negative;
-
-    /*
-     * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still
-     * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already.
-     */
-    done = cond;
-
-    for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- )
-    {
-        /*
-         * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
-         * X and Y are negative.
-         *
-         * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
-         * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
-         */
-        cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
-        *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative;
-        done |= cond;
-
-        /*
-         * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
-         * X and Y are positive.
-         *
-         * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
-         * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
-         */
-        cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
-        *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative );
-        done |= cond;
-    }
-
-    return( 0 );
-}
-
 /*
  * Compare signed values
  */
@@ -2207,7 +1951,7 @@
      * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction
      * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d.
      * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */
-    mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
+    mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2227,42 +1971,6 @@
     mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T );
 }
 
-/*
- * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
- * return x == y
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
-    /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
-    const size_t diff = x ^ y;
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
-    const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff );
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
-    const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
-
-    return( 1 ^ diff1 );
-}
-
 /**
  * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index.
  *
@@ -2285,7 +1993,7 @@
     for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ )
     {
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i],
-                        (unsigned char) mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
+                        (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
     }
 
 cleanup:
diff --git a/library/bn_mul.h b/library/bn_mul.h
index 6ddffc4..b71ddd8 100644
--- a/library/bn_mul.h
+++ b/library/bn_mul.h
@@ -224,10 +224,10 @@
         "adcq   %%rdx, %%rcx\n"             \
         "addq   $8, %%rdi\n"
 
-#define MULADDC_STOP                        \
-        : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s)      \
-        : "b" (b)                           \
-        : "rax", "rdx", "r8"                \
+#define MULADDC_STOP                                                 \
+        : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \
+        : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s)                 \
+        : "rax", "rdx", "r8"                                         \
     );
 
 #endif /* AMD64 */
@@ -240,18 +240,18 @@
 #define MULADDC_CORE                \
         "ldr x4, [%2], #8   \n\t"   \
         "ldr x5, [%1]       \n\t"   \
-        "mul x6, x4, %3     \n\t"   \
-        "umulh x7, x4, %3   \n\t"   \
+        "mul x6, x4, %4     \n\t"   \
+        "umulh x7, x4, %4   \n\t"   \
         "adds x5, x5, x6    \n\t"   \
         "adc x7, x7, xzr    \n\t"   \
         "adds x5, x5, %0    \n\t"   \
         "adc %0, x7, xzr    \n\t"   \
         "str x5, [%1], #8   \n\t"
 
-#define MULADDC_STOP                        \
-         : "+r" (c),  "+r" (d), "+r" (s)    \
-         : "r" (b)                          \
-         : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc"     \
+#define MULADDC_STOP                                                    \
+         : "+r" (c),  "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d)  \
+         : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s)                   \
+         : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc"                                 \
     );
 
 #endif /* Aarch64 */
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index a21a37f..e062678 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -36,31 +36,23 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 #else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
 #include <stdio.h>
 #define mbedtls_printf printf
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
 
-#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT )
-#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
-
-#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0
-#define CCM_DECRYPT 1
 
 /*
  * Initialize context
  */
 void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx )
 {
-    CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
     memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
 }
 
@@ -72,9 +64,6 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
 
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
-
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits,
                                                    MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB );
     if( cipher_info == NULL )
@@ -108,82 +97,78 @@
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
 }
 
-/*
- * Macros for common operations.
- * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions.
- */
-
-/*
- * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b
- * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.)
- */
-#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC                                                      \
-    for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )                                               \
-        y[i] ^= b[i];                                                       \
-                                                                            \
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \
-        return( ret );
+#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR                0
+#define CCM_STATE__STARTED              (1 << 0)
+#define CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET          (1 << 1)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED    (1 << 2)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED   (1 << 3)
+#define CCM_STATE__ERROR                (1 << 4)
 
 /*
  * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR
- * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b!
- * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst.
  */
-#define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len  )                                            \
-    do                                                                  \
-    {                                                                   \
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr,       \
-                                           16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 )      \
-        {                                                               \
-            return( ret );                                              \
-        }                                                               \
-                                                                        \
-        for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ )                                    \
-            (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i];                                 \
-    } while( 0 )
+static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                              size_t offset, size_t use_len,
+                              const unsigned char *input,
+                              unsigned char *output )
+{
+    size_t i;
+    size_t olen = 0;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = {0};
 
-/*
- * Authenticated encryption or decryption
- */
-static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
-                           const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                           const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
-                           const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
-                           unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf,
+                                       &olen ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+        output[i] = input[i] ^ tmp_buf[offset + i];
+
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) {
+    ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR;
+    memset( ctx->y, 0, 16);
+    memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+}
+
+static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char i;
-    unsigned char q;
     size_t len_left, olen;
-    unsigned char b[16];
-    unsigned char y[16];
-    unsigned char ctr[16];
-    const unsigned char *src;
-    unsigned char *dst;
 
-    /*
-     * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
-     * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
-     * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
-     *
-     * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
+    /* length calulcation can be done only after both
+     * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed
      */
-    if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+    if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET) )
+        return 0;
 
-    /* Also implies q is within bounds */
-    if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
-    if( add_len >= 0xFF00 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
-    q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
+    /* CCM expects non-empty tag.
+     * CCM* allows empty tag. For CCM* without tag, ignore plaintext length.
+     */
+    if( ctx->tag_len == 0 )
+    {
+        if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT )
+        {
+            ctx->plaintext_len = 0;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+        }
+    }
 
     /*
-     * First block B_0:
+     * First block:
      * 0        .. 0        flags
-     * 1        .. iv_len   nonce (aka iv)
+     * 1        .. iv_len   nonce (aka iv)  - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts()
      * iv_len+1 .. 15       length
      *
      * With flags as (bits):
@@ -192,56 +177,40 @@
      * 5 .. 3   (t - 2) / 2
      * 2 .. 0   q - 1
      */
-    b[0] = 0;
-    b[0] |= ( add_len > 0 ) << 6;
-    b[0] |= ( ( tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
-    b[0] |= q - 1;
+    ctx->y[0] |= ( ctx->add_len > 0 ) << 6;
+    ctx->y[0] |= ( ( ctx->tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
+    ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1;
 
-    memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len );
-
-    for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
-        b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
+    for( i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
+        ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
 
     if( len_left > 0 )
+    {
+        ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+    }
+
+    /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        int mode,
+                        const unsigned char *iv,
+                        size_t iv_len )
+{
+    /* Also implies q is within bounds */
+    if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
 
-
-    /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */
-    memset( y, 0, 16 );
-    UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
-    /*
-     * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with
-     * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary)
-     */
-    if( add_len > 0 )
-    {
-        size_t use_len;
-        len_left = add_len;
-        src = add;
-
-        memset( b, 0, 16 );
-        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 );
-
-        use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2;
-        memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len );
-        len_left -= use_len;
-        src += use_len;
-
-        UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
-        while( len_left > 0 )
-        {
-            use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
-
-            memset( b, 0, 16 );
-            memcpy( b, src, use_len );
-            UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
-            len_left -= use_len;
-            src += use_len;
-        }
-    }
+    ctx->mode = mode;
+    ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
 
     /*
      * Prepare counter block for encryption:
@@ -253,62 +222,293 @@
      * 7 .. 3   0
      * 2 .. 0   q - 1
      */
-    ctr[0] = q - 1;
-    memcpy( ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
-    memset( ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q );
-    ctr[15] = 1;
+    memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+    ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1;
+    memcpy( ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
+    memset( ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q );
+    ctx->ctr[15] = 1;
 
     /*
-     * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message.
-     *
-     * The only difference between encryption and decryption is
-     * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption.
+     * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description
      */
-    len_left = length;
-    src = input;
-    dst = output;
+    memcpy( ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len );
 
-    while( len_left > 0 )
+    ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED;
+    return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                             size_t total_ad_len,
+                             size_t plaintext_len,
+                             size_t tag_len )
+{
+    /*
+     * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
+     * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
+     * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
+     *
+     * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
+     */
+    if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+
+    if( total_ad_len >= 0xFF00 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+
+    ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len;
+    ctx->add_len = total_ad_len;
+    ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+    ctx->processed = 0;
+
+    ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET;
+    return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *add,
+                           size_t add_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char i;
+    size_t olen, use_len, offset;
+
+    if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
     {
-        size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+    }
 
-        if( mode == CCM_ENCRYPT )
+    if( add_len > 0 )
+    {
+        if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED )
         {
-            memset( b, 0, 16 );
-            memcpy( b, src, use_len );
-            UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
         }
 
-        CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, use_len );
-
-        if( mode == CCM_DECRYPT )
+        if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED) )
         {
-            memset( b, 0, 16 );
-            memcpy( b, dst, use_len );
-            UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
+            if ( add_len > ctx->add_len )
+            {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+            }
+
+            ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+            ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len      ) & 0xFF );
+
+            ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED;
+        }
+        else if ( ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len )
+        {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
         }
 
-        dst += use_len;
-        src += use_len;
-        len_left -= use_len;
+        while( add_len > 0 )
+        {
+            offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1]
+                                                 * holding total auth data length */
+            use_len = 16 - offset;
 
-        /*
-         * Increment counter.
-         * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above.
-         */
-        for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
-            if( ++ctr[15-i] != 0 )
+            if( use_len > add_len )
+                use_len = add_len;
+
+            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= add[i];
+
+            ctx->processed += use_len;
+            add_len -= use_len;
+            add += use_len;
+
+            if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
+            {
+                if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+                {
+                    ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+                    return( ret );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if( ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
+        {
+            ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED;
+            ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update()
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+                        unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                        size_t *output_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char i;
+    size_t use_len, offset, olen;
+
+    unsigned char local_output[16];
+
+    if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+    }
+
+    /* Check against plaintext length only if performing operation with
+     * authentication
+     */
+    if( ctx->tag_len != 0 && ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len )
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+    }
+
+    if( output_size < input_len )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+    *output_len = input_len;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+    while ( input_len > 0 )
+    {
+        offset = ctx->processed % 16;
+
+        use_len = 16 - offset;
+
+        if( use_len > input_len )
+            use_len = input_len;
+
+        ctx->processed += use_len;
+
+        if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
+            ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT )
+        {
+            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= input[i];
+
+            if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+            {
+                if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+                {
+                    ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+                    goto exit;
+                }
+            }
+
+            ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
+        }
+
+        if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \
+            ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT )
+        {
+            /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that
+             * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using
+             * it as input to any operations.
+             * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as
+             * input in the XOR operation for Y.
+             */
+            ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
+
+            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= local_output[i];
+
+            memcpy( output, local_output, use_len );
+            mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
+
+            if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+            {
+                if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+                {
+                    ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+                    goto exit;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+        {
+            for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
+            if( ++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0 )
                 break;
+        }
+
+        input_len -= use_len;
+        input += use_len;
+        output += use_len;
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char i;
+
+    if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    }
+
+    if( ctx->add_len > 0 && !( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED ) )
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+    }
+
+    if( ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len )
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
     }
 
     /*
      * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag
      */
-    for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
-        ctr[15-i] = 0;
+    for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
+        ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0;
 
-    CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
-    memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
+    ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return ret;
+    if( tag != NULL )
+        memcpy( tag, ctx->y, tag_len );
+    mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx);
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated encryption or decryption
+ */
+static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+                           const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+                           const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                           const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                           unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add_len, length, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input, length,
+                                    output, length, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( 0 );
 }
@@ -322,13 +522,7 @@
                          const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                          unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
 {
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-    return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+    return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
                             add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
 }
 
@@ -338,78 +532,75 @@
                          const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                          unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
 {
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-    if( tag_len == 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
-    return( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
-                add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
+    return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+                            add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
 }
 
 /*
  * Authenticated decryption
  */
-int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
-                      const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                      const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
-                      const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
-                      const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, const unsigned char *tag2, size_t tag_len)
 {
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char check_tag[16];
     unsigned char i;
     int diff;
 
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
+    /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+    for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
+        diff |= tag1[i] ^ tag2[i];
 
-    if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length,
+    if( diff != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+                             const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+                             const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                             const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                             const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char check_tag[16];
+
+    if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, mode, length,
                                 iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
                                 input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
     {
         return( ret );
     }
 
-    /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
-    for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
-        diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
-
-    if( diff != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
+        return( ret );
     }
 
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+                      const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+                      const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                      const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+                      const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+    return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length,
+                             iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+                             input, output, tag, tag_len );
+}
+
 int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
                       const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
                       const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
                       const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                       const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
 {
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
-    CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
-    if( tag_len == 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
-    return( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
-                add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
+    return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length,
+                             iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+                             input, output, tag, tag_len );
 }
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
 
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index 546cace..0d9d710 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "cipher_wrap.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -74,27 +75,6 @@
 #define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond )        \
     MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-/* Compare the contents of two buffers in constant time.
- * Returns 0 if the contents are bitwise identical, otherwise returns
- * a non-zero value.
- * This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
- */
-static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2,
-                                         size_t len )
-{
-    const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1;
-    const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2;
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned char diff;
-
-    for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < len; i++ )
-        diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i];
-
-    return( (int)diff );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
-
 static int supported_init = 0;
 
 const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void )
@@ -424,6 +404,31 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+    if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
+    {
+        int set_lengths_result;
+        int ccm_star_mode;
+
+        set_lengths_result = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(
+                                (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+                                0, 0, 0 );
+        if( set_lengths_result != 0 )
+            return set_lengths_result;
+
+        if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT )
+            ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT;
+        else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT )
+            ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT;
+        else
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+        return( mbedtls_ccm_starts( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+                                    ccm_star_mode,
+                                    iv, iv_len ) );
+    }
+#endif
+
     if ( actual_iv_size != 0 )
     {
         memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
@@ -560,6 +565,15 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+    if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG )
+    {
+        return( mbedtls_ccm_update( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+                                    input, ilen,
+                                    output, ilen, olen ) );
+    }
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
     if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
     {
@@ -947,6 +961,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
+        MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
     {
@@ -1179,7 +1194,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
-        if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
 
         return( 0 );
@@ -1201,7 +1216,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
-        if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
 
         return( 0 );
@@ -1266,9 +1281,12 @@
         if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
 
-        status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len );
-        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+        if( ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB )
+        {
+            status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+        }
 
         status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op,
                                     input, ilen,
diff --git a/library/cipher_wrap.c b/library/cipher_wrap.c
index 5776d5e..7da7d9d 100644
--- a/library/cipher_wrap.c
+++ b/library/cipher_wrap.c
@@ -639,6 +639,39 @@
     16,
     &ccm_aes_info
 };
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    128,
+    "AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aes_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    192,
+    "AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aes_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    256,
+    "AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aes_info
+};
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
@@ -1014,6 +1047,39 @@
     16,
     &ccm_camellia_info
 };
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    128,
+    "CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_camellia_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    192,
+    "CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_camellia_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    256,
+    "CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_camellia_info
+};
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@@ -1390,6 +1456,39 @@
     16,
     &ccm_aria_info
 };
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    128,
+    "ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aria_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    192,
+    "ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aria_info
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+    256,
+    "ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+    12,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+    16,
+    &ccm_aria_info
+};
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
@@ -2055,6 +2154,9 @@
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM,          &aes_128_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM,          &aes_192_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM,          &aes_256_ccm_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,          &aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,          &aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,          &aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
 #endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
 
@@ -2086,6 +2188,9 @@
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM,     &camellia_128_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM,     &camellia_192_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM,     &camellia_256_ccm_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
 #endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
@@ -2117,6 +2222,9 @@
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM,     &aria_128_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM,     &aria_192_ccm_info },
     { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM,     &aria_256_ccm_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+    { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,     &aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
 #endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
 
diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h
index 780ce37..a630fcc 100644
--- a/library/common.h
+++ b/library/common.h
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
  * big-endian order (MSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
  *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
  * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
  *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
  * little-endian order (LSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
  *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
  * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
  *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
  * little-endian order (LSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
  *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
  * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
  *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
  * big-endian order (MSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
  *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
  * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
  *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE
@@ -227,11 +227,83 @@
 #endif
 
 /**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( data , offset )                  \
+    (                                                           \
+          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 16 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8  )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2]       )         \
+    )
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( n, data, offset )                \
+{                                                               \
+    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE( data, offset )                   \
+    (                                                           \
+          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 )         \
+    )
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE( n, data, offset )                \
+{                                                               \
+    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
  * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
  * big-endian order (MSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
  *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -255,7 +327,7 @@
  * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the most significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
  *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE
@@ -277,7 +349,7 @@
  * little-endian order (LSB first).
  *
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base of the first and least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
  *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
  *                  integer from.
  */
@@ -301,7 +373,7 @@
  * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
  * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
  *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p base where to put the least significant
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
  *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE
@@ -318,4 +390,12 @@
 }
 #endif
 
+/* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue
+ *      MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 )
+ *      Use MSVC predefine macro to avoid name check fail.
+ */
+#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && ( _MSC_VER <= 1900 ))
+#define /*no-check-names*/ __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bb275c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
+/**
+ *  Constant-time functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those
+ * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a,
+                       const void *b,
+                       size_t n )
+{
+    size_t i;
+    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
+
+    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
+         * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
+         * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
+        unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
+        diff |= x ^ y;
+    }
+
+    return( (int)diff );
+}
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value )
+{
+    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
+     * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+    return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value )
+{
+    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+    return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value )
+{
+    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
+     * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+    return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
+ * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
+ * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param x     The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y     The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return      All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero.
+ */
+static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x,
+                                       size_t y )
+{
+    /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
+    const size_t sub = x - y;
+
+    /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
+    const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+    /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
+    const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 );
+
+    return( mask );
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x,
+                                size_t y )
+{
+    return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x,
+                                  size_t y )
+{
+    /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
+    const size_t diff = x ^ y;
+
+    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+    /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
+    const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff );
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+    /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
+    const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+    return( 1 ^ diff1 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison:
+ * return x > y
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x     The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y     The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return      1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x,
+                                    size_t y )
+{
+    /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */
+    return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
+                                 const mbedtls_mpi_uint y )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint ret;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint cond;
+
+    /*
+     * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different.
+     */
+    cond = ( x ^ y );
+    /*
+     * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and
+     * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y.
+     */
+    ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond;
+    /*
+     * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the
+     * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if
+     * the MSB of y is 0.)
+     */
+    ret |= y & cond;
+
+
+    ret = ret >> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+    return (unsigned) ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition,
+                             unsigned if1,
+                             unsigned if0 )
+{
+    unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition );
+    return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Select between two sign values without branches.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit
+ * operations in order to avoid branches.
+ *
+ * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result
+ *       is undefined.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           The first sign; must be either +1 or -1.
+ * \param if0           The second sign; must be either +1 or -1.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
+ * */
+static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition,
+                                        int if1,
+                                        int if0 )
+{
+    /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about
+     * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned
+     * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */
+    unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1;
+    unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1;
+
+    /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */
+    const unsigned mask = condition << 1;
+
+    /* select uif1 or uif0 */
+    unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask );
+
+    /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */
+    return( (int) ur - 1 );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n,
+                                      mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+                                      const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
+                                      unsigned char condition )
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+    /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */
+    const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+        dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer.
+ *
+ * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally
+ * equivalent to
+ * ```
+ * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
+ * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
+ * ```
+ * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing)
+ * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at
+ * the expense of performance.
+ *
+ * \param start     Pointer to the start of the buffer.
+ * \param total     Total size of the buffer.
+ * \param offset    Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
+ */
+static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start,
+                                         size_t total,
+                                         size_t offset )
+{
+    volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
+    size_t i, n;
+    if( total == 0 )
+        return;
+    for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
+    {
+        unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i );
+        /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
+         * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
+         * zero out the last byte. */
+        for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
+        {
+            unsigned char current = buf[n];
+            unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
+            buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next );
+        }
+        buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
+    }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest,
+                              const unsigned char *src,
+                              size_t len,
+                              size_t c1,
+                              size_t c2 )
+{
+    /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
+    const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
+    const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal );
+
+    /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */
+    for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
+        dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+                               const unsigned char *src,
+                               size_t offset,
+                               size_t offset_min,
+                               size_t offset_max,
+                               size_t len )
+{
+    size_t offsetval;
+
+    for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len,
+                                 offsetval, offset );
+    }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+                     const unsigned char *add_data,
+                     size_t add_data_len,
+                     const unsigned char *data,
+                     size_t data_len_secret,
+                     size_t min_data_len,
+                     size_t max_data_len,
+                     unsigned char *output )
+{
+    /*
+     * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
+     * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
+     *
+     * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
+     * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
+     * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
+     *
+     * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
+     * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
+     * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
+     *
+     * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
+     */
+    const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
+    /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
+     * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
+    const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
+    const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
+    const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
+    const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
+
+    unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
+    size_t offset;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
+
+#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
+    do {                    \
+        ret = (func_call);  \
+        if( ret != 0 )      \
+            goto cleanup;   \
+    } while( 0 )
+
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
+
+    /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
+     * so we can start directly with the message */
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
+
+    /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
+    for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
+    {
+        MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
+        MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
+        /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
+        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
+                                 offset, data_len_secret );
+
+        if( offset < max_data_len )
+            MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
+    }
+
+    /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
+
+    /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
+
+    /* Done, get ready for next time */
+    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
+
+#undef MD_CHK
+
+cleanup:
+    mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond )                                       \
+    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the assignment was made or not.
+ * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+                                  const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+                                  unsigned char assign )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t i;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+
+    /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
+    limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );;
+
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
+
+    X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s );
+
+    mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
+
+    for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
+        X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask;
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the swap was made or not.
+ * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
+ * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+                                unsigned char swap )
+{
+    int ret, s;
+    size_t i;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+
+    if( X == Y )
+        return( 0 );
+
+    /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */
+    limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap );
+
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) );
+
+    s = X->s;
+    X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s );
+    Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s );
+
+
+    for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ )
+    {
+        tmp = X->p[i];
+        X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask );
+        Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | (     tmp & limb_mask );
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare signed values in constant time
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+                           const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+                           unsigned *ret )
+{
+    size_t i;
+    /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */
+    unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative;
+
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+    MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL );
+
+    if( X->n != Y->n )
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+    /*
+     * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0.
+     * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0.
+     */
+    X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1;
+    Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1;
+
+    /*
+     * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger.
+     * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
+     * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
+     */
+    cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative );
+    *ret = cond & X_is_negative;
+
+    /*
+     * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still
+     * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already.
+     */
+    done = cond;
+
+    for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- )
+    {
+        /*
+         * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
+         * X and Y are negative.
+         *
+         * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+         * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+         */
+        cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
+        *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative;
+        done |= cond;
+
+        /*
+         * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
+         * X and Y are positive.
+         *
+         * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+         * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+         */
+        cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
+        *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative );
+        done |= cond;
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input,
+                                          size_t ilen,
+                                          unsigned char *output,
+                                          size_t output_max_len,
+                                          size_t *olen )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
+
+    /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
+     * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
+     * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
+     * this would open the execution of the function to
+     * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+     * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
+     * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
+     * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
+     * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
+     * branch predictor). */
+    size_t pad_count = 0;
+    unsigned bad = 0;
+    unsigned char pad_done = 0;
+    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
+    unsigned output_too_large;
+
+    plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11
+                                                        : output_max_len;
+
+    /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
+     * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
+    bad |= input[0];
+
+
+    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
+     * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+    bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
+
+    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
+     * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+    for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
+    {
+        pad_done  |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+        pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
+    }
+
+
+    /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
+    bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+
+    /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
+    bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count );
+
+    /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
+     * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
+     * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
+     * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
+     * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
+     * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
+     * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+                        bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+                        (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
+
+    /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
+     * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
+    output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size,
+                                           plaintext_max_size );
+
+    /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
+     * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
+     * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
+     *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
+     * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
+    ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+                    bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+                    mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large,
+                                        - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
+                                        0 ) );
+
+    /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
+     * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
+     * We need to copy the same amount of data
+     * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
+     * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
+     * through memory or cache access patterns. */
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large );
+    for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
+        input[i] &= ~bad;
+
+    /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
+     * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
+     * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
+     * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large,
+                                         (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+                                         (unsigned) plaintext_size );
+
+    /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
+     * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
+     * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
+     * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
+     * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
+     * information. */
+    mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+                                 plaintext_max_size,
+                                 plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
+
+    /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
+     * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
+     * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
+     * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
+     * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
+     * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
+     * secrets. */
+    if( output_max_len != 0 )
+        memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+
+    /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
+     * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
+     * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
+     * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
+    *olen = plaintext_size;
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac18b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/**
+ *  Constant-time functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value     The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return          Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value     The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return          Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value     The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return          Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
+ * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
+ * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param x     The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y     The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return      All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y,
+ *              otherwise zero.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x,
+                                size_t y );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
+ * return x == y
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x     The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y     The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return      1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x,
+                                  size_t y );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x     The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y     The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return      1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
+                                 const mbedtls_mpi_uint y );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+/** Choose between two integer values without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           Value to use if \p condition is nonzero.
+ * \param if0           Value to use if \p condition is zero.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition,
+                             unsigned if1,
+                             unsigned if0 );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Conditionally assign a value without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely
+ * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param n             \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
+ * \param dest          The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point
+ *                      to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param src           The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an
+ *                      initialized MPI.
+ * \param condition     Condition to test, must be 0 or 1.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n,
+                                      mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+                                      const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
+                                      unsigned char condition );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Conditional memcpy without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely
+ * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param dest      The pointer to conditionally copy to.
+ * \param src       The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest.
+ * \param len       The number of bytes to copy.
+ * \param c1        The first value to analyze in the condition.
+ * \param c2        The second value to analyze in the condition.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest,
+                              const unsigned char *src,
+                              size_t len,
+                              size_t c1, size_t c2 );
+
+/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
+ * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
+ * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
+ * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`.
+ *
+ * \param dest          The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
+ *                      buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param src           The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
+ *                      readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
+ *                      bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest.
+ * \param offset        The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
+ *                      This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
+ *                      than \p offset_max.
+ * \param offset_min    The minimal value of \p offset.
+ * \param offset_max    The maximal value of \p offset.
+ * \param len           The number of bytes to copy.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+                               const unsigned char *src,
+                               size_t offset,
+                               size_t offset_min,
+                               size_t offset_max,
+                               size_t len );
+
+/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
+ * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
+ * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
+ * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
+ * max_data_len bytes from \p data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx               The HMAC context. It must have keys configured
+ *                          with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the
+ *                          following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
+ *                          It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after
+ *                          the computation is complete to prepare for the
+ *                          next computation.
+ * \param add_data          The first part of the message whose HMAC is being
+ *                          calculated. This must point to a readable buffer
+ *                          of \p add_data_len bytes.
+ * \param add_data_len      The length of \p add_data in bytes.
+ * \param data              The buffer containing the second part of the
+ *                          message. This must point to a readable buffer
+ *                          of \p max_data_len bytes.
+ * \param data_len_secret   The length of the data to process in \p data.
+ *                          This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
+ *                          greater than \p max_data_len.
+ * \param min_data_len      The minimal length of the second part of the
+ *                          message, read from \p data.
+ * \param max_data_len      The maximal length of the second part of the
+ *                          message, read from \p data.
+ * \param output            The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
+ *                          a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
+ *                          HMAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval 0 on success.
+ * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
+ *         The hardware accelerator failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+                     const unsigned char *add_data,
+                     size_t add_data_len,
+                     const unsigned char *data,
+                     size_t data_len_secret,
+                     size_t min_data_len,
+                     size_t max_data_len,
+                     unsigned char *output );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
+ *  operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
+ *
+ * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
+ *       (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
+ *       in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ *       is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
+ *       one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
+ *
+ * \param input          The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
+ *                       encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
+ *                       by the terminology.
+ * \param ilen           The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
+ * \param output         The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
+ *                       PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
+ *                       length \p output_max_len bytes.
+ * \param olen           The address at which to store the length of
+ *                       the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return      \c 0 on success.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
+ *              The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ *              The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input,
+                                          size_t ilen,
+                                          unsigned char *output,
+                                          size_t output_max_len,
+                                          size_t *olen );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/library/des.c b/library/des.c
index 7f90faa..91d22b5 100644
--- a/library/des.c
+++ b/library/des.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
 
 #include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
@@ -642,6 +643,7 @@
                     unsigned char *output )
 {
     int i;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[8];
 
     if( length % 8 )
@@ -654,7 +656,9 @@
             for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
 
-            mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
             memcpy( iv, output, 8 );
 
             input  += 8;
@@ -667,7 +671,9 @@
         while( length > 0 )
         {
             memcpy( temp, input, 8 );
-            mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
 
             for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
@@ -679,8 +685,10 @@
             length -= 8;
         }
     }
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
 
@@ -741,6 +749,7 @@
                      unsigned char *output )
 {
     int i;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[8];
 
     if( length % 8 )
@@ -753,7 +762,9 @@
             for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
 
-            mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
             memcpy( iv, output, 8 );
 
             input  += 8;
@@ -766,7 +777,9 @@
         while( length > 0 )
         {
             memcpy( temp, input, 8 );
-            mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
 
             for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
                 output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
@@ -778,8 +791,10 @@
             length -= 8;
         }
     }
+    ret = 0;
 
-    return( 0 );
+exit:
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
 
@@ -872,39 +887,43 @@
         switch( i )
         {
         case 0:
-            mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 1:
-            mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 2:
-            mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 3:
-            mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 4:
-            mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 5:
-            mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         default:
             return( 1 );
         }
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            goto exit;
 
         for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ )
         {
             if( u == 0 )
-                mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf );
+                ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf );
             else
-                mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx3, buf, buf );
+                ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx3, buf, buf );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+                goto exit;
         }
 
         if( ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT &&
@@ -947,41 +966,45 @@
         switch( i )
         {
         case 0:
-            mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 1:
-            mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 2:
-            mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 3:
-            mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 4:
-            mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         case 5:
-            mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
+            ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys );
             break;
 
         default:
             return( 1 );
         }
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            goto exit;
 
         if( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT )
         {
             for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ )
             {
                 if( u == 0 )
-                    mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                    ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
                 else
-                    mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                    ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                if( ret != 0 )
+                    goto exit;
             }
         }
         else
@@ -991,9 +1014,11 @@
                 unsigned char tmp[8];
 
                 if( u == 0 )
-                    mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                    ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
                 else
-                    mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                    ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf );
+                if( ret != 0 )
+                    goto exit;
 
                 memcpy( tmp, prv, 8 );
                 memcpy( prv, buf, 8 );
@@ -1027,6 +1052,8 @@
     mbedtls_des_free( &ctx );
     mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx3 );
 
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        ret = 1;
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/ecdh.c b/library/ecdh.c
index 9dfa868..ddd4ef5 100644
--- a/library/ecdh.c
+++ b/library/ecdh.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 
+#include "ecdh_misc.h"
+
 #include <string.h>
 
 /* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */
@@ -726,4 +728,138 @@
 #endif
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+static int ecdh_tls13_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+                size_t *olen, int point_format, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                int ( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
+                                         f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format,
+                                          olen, buf, blen );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+                            unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                            int ( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ),
+                            void *p_rng )
+{
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL );
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    if( ctx-> restart_enabled )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+    return( ecdh_tls13_make_params_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format,
+                                             buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+#else
+    switch( ctx->var )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+#endif
+        case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+            return( ecdh_tls13_make_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen,
+                                               ctx->point_format, buf, blen,
+                                               f_rng, p_rng ) );
+        default:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup context without Everest
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_setup_no_everest( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+                                   mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id )
+{
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+    return( ecdh_setup_internal( ctx, grp_id ) );
+#else
+    ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+    ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0;
+    ctx->grp_id = grp_id;
+    ecdh_init_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh );
+    return( ecdh_setup_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id ) );
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_tls13_read_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+                                            const unsigned char *buf,
+                                            size_t buf_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t data_len;
+
+    if( buf_len < 3 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    if( data_len < 1 || data_len != ( buf_len - 2 ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx->grp,
+                                               &ctx->Qp, p, data_len ) ) != 0)
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and import the client's TLS 1.3 public value
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t buf_len )
+{
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+    return( ecdh_tls13_read_public_internal( ctx, buf, buf_len ) );
+#else
+    switch( ctx->var )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+#endif
+        case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+            return( ecdh_tls13_read_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh,
+                                                     buf, buf_len ) );
+        default:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
diff --git a/library/ecdh_misc.h b/library/ecdh_misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0f338a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/ecdh_misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecdh_misc.h
+ *
+ * \brief Internal functions shared by the ECDH module
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_MISC_H)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_MISC_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+/*
+ * Setup context without Everest
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_setup_no_everest( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+                                   mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 version of mbedtls_ecdh_make_params
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+                                    unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+                                    int ( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ),
+                                    void *p_rng );
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 version of mbedtls_ecdh_read_public
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t buf_len );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_MISC_H */
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index 910646b..8505cf4 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@
     size_t i;
     const unsigned char *p;
     size_t use_len, olen = 0;
+    uint64_t iv_bits;
 
     GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
@@ -278,7 +279,8 @@
     else
     {
         memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 );
-        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( iv_len * 8, work_buf, 12 );
+        iv_bits = (uint64_t)iv_len * 8;
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 );
 
         p = iv;
         while( iv_len > 0 )
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@
     unsigned char ectr[16];
 
     if( output_size < input_length )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output_length != NULL );
     *output_length = input_length;
 
diff --git a/library/nist_kw.c b/library/nist_kw.c
index e2ab256..1aea0b6 100644
--- a/library/nist_kw.c
+++ b/library/nist_kw.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -52,26 +53,6 @@
 #define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH    8
 #define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT   3
 
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline unsigned char mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
-    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
-    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-    {
-        /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
-         * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
-         * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
-        unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
-        diff |= x ^ y;
-    }
-
-    return( diff );
-}
-
 /*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */
 static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = {0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6};
 /*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */
@@ -398,7 +379,7 @@
             goto cleanup;
 
         /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
-        diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
+        diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
 
         if( diff != 0 )
         {
@@ -447,7 +428,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
-        diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
+        diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
 
         if( diff != 0 )
         {
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index fe6aaca..b2d3bb0 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -1370,8 +1370,8 @@
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
 
-    if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
-                    pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 )
+    ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng );
+    if( ret == 0 )
     {
         return( 0 );
     }
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 3a6c5e2..0a04ba1 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@
 
         case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED:
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+        case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
         case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT:
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
@@ -430,8 +432,8 @@
         * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) ||
         * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */
 
-static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type,
-                                                        size_t bits )
+psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type,
+                                                     size_t bits )
 {
     /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */
     switch( type )
@@ -446,6 +448,12 @@
                 return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
             break;
 #endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+        case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:
+            if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 )
+                return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            break;
+#endif
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
         case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:
             if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 )
@@ -558,16 +566,8 @@
     {
         *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length );
 
-        /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */
-        if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 )
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-
-        /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit
-         * size fits in its representation type. */
-        if( ( *bits ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-
-        status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, *bits );
+        status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( attributes->core.type,
+                                                         *bits );
         if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
             return( status );
 
@@ -623,8 +623,8 @@
         return( alg1 );
     /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check
      * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */
-    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg1 ) &&
-        PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg2 ) &&
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg1 ) &&
+        PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg2 ) &&
         ( alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) )
     {
         if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg1 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@
     /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash,
      * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash,
      * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */
-    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( requested_alg ) &&
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( requested_alg ) &&
         PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( policy_alg ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
     {
         return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ==
@@ -1891,6 +1891,7 @@
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL;
     size_t bits;
+    size_t storage_size = data_length;
 
     *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
 
@@ -1900,18 +1901,29 @@
     if( data_length == 0 )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
+    /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion cannot overflow. */
+    if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
     status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes,
                                      &slot, &driver );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
     /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local
-     * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element
-     * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to
-     * hold the generated key material. */
+     * storage ( thus not in the case of importing a key in a secure element
+     * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a
+     * buffer to hold the imported key material. */
     if( slot->key.data == NULL )
     {
-        status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, data_length );
+        if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( attributes->core.lifetime ) )
+        {
+            status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data(
+                         attributes, data, data_length, &storage_size );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                goto exit;
+        }
+        status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, storage_size );
         if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
             goto exit;
     }
@@ -1933,6 +1945,13 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
+    /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit
+     * size fits in its representation type.*/
+    if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+        goto exit;
+    }
     status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( slot, attributes );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
@@ -1980,21 +1999,6 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
-static psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material( const psa_key_slot_t *source,
-                                           psa_key_slot_t *target )
-{
-    psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target,
-                                                           source->key.data,
-                                                           source->key.bytes );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        return( status );
-
-    target->attr.type = source->attr.type;
-    target->attr.bits = source->attr.bits;
-
-    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-}
-
 psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key,
                            const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes,
                            mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key )
@@ -2005,10 +2009,11 @@
     psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL;
     psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes;
     psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL;
+    size_t storage_size = 0;
 
     *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
 
-    status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
+    status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
                  source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0 );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
@@ -2018,6 +2023,15 @@
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
+    /* The target key type and number of bits have been validated by
+     * psa_validate_optional_attributes() to be either equal to zero or
+     * equal to the ones of the source key. So it is safe to inherit
+     * them from the source key now."
+     * */
+    actual_attributes.core.bits = source_slot->attr.bits;
+    actual_attributes.core.type = source_slot->attr.type;
+
+
     status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type,
                                       &actual_attributes.core.policy,
                                       &source_slot->attr.policy );
@@ -2028,31 +2042,53 @@
                                      &target_slot, &driver );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
-    if( driver != NULL )
+    if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( target_slot->attr.lifetime ) !=
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( source_slot->attr.lifetime ) )
     {
-        /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */
+        /*
+         * If the source and target keys are stored in different locations,
+         * the source key would need to be exported as plaintext and re-imported
+         * in the other location. This has security implications which have not
+         * been fully mapped. For now, this can be achieved through
+         * appropriate API invocations from the application, if needed.
+         * */
         status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
         goto exit;
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
-
+    /*
+     * When the source and target keys are within the same location,
+     * - For transparent keys it is a blind copy without any driver invocation,
+     * - For opaque keys this translates to an invocation of the drivers'
+     *   copy_key entry point through the dispatch layer.
+     * */
     if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( actual_attributes.core.lifetime ) )
     {
-        /*
-         * Copying through an opaque driver is not implemented yet, consider
-         * a lifetime with an external location as an invalid parameter for
-         * now.
-         */
-        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-        goto exit;
+        status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &actual_attributes,
+                                                         &storage_size );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
+
+        status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( target_slot, storage_size );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
+
+        status = psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key( &actual_attributes,
+                                              source_slot->key.data,
+                                              source_slot->key.bytes,
+                                              target_slot->key.data,
+                                              target_slot->key.bytes,
+                                              &target_slot->key.bytes );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
     }
-
-    status = psa_copy_key_material( source_slot, target_slot );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-
+    else
+    {
+       status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target_slot,
+                                                 source_slot->key.data,
+                                                 source_slot->key.bytes );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
+    }
     status = psa_finish_key_creation( target_slot, driver, target_key );
 exit:
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
@@ -2314,7 +2350,7 @@
     status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
                  key,
                  &slot,
-                 is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
+                 is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
                  alg );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
@@ -2499,8 +2535,9 @@
     uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0;
 
     status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
-                 key, &slot,
-                 is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
+                 key,
+                 &slot,
+                 is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
                  alg );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
@@ -2607,7 +2644,7 @@
         if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
-        if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+        if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) )
         {
             if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
                 return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
@@ -2615,7 +2652,7 @@
     }
     else
     {
-        if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+        if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) )
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
 
@@ -2765,7 +2802,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
-    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) )
     {
         size_t hash_length;
         uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -2812,7 +2849,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
-    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) )
     {
         size_t hash_length;
         uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -3558,7 +3595,12 @@
       .core = slot->attr
     };
 
-    if( input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ) )
+    if( alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG && input_length < PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( slot->attr.type ) )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    else if ( input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ) )
     {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
         goto exit;
@@ -3580,6 +3622,53 @@
 /* AEAD */
 /****************************************************************/
 
+/* Helper function to get the base algorithm from its variants. */
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_aead_get_base_algorithm( psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( alg );
+}
+
+/* Helper function to perform common nonce length checks. */
+static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_nonce_length( psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                                 size_t nonce_length )
+{
+    psa_algorithm_t base_alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm( alg );
+
+    switch(base_alg)
+    {
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_GCM:
+            /* Not checking max nonce size here as GCM spec allows almost
+            * arbitrarily large nonces. Please note that we do not generally
+            * recommend the usage of nonces of greater length than
+            * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, as large nonces are hashed to a shorter
+            * size, which can then lead to collisions if you encrypt a very
+            * large number of messages.*/
+            if( nonce_length != 0 )
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_CCM:
+            if( nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13 )
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+        case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            if( nonce_length == 12 )
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+            else if( nonce_length == 8 )
+                return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+        default:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
 psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                const uint8_t *nonce,
@@ -3609,6 +3698,10 @@
       .core = slot->attr
     };
 
+    status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length( alg, nonce_length );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt(
         &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
         alg,
@@ -3620,6 +3713,7 @@
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0 )
         memset( ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size );
 
+exit:
     psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
 
     return( status );
@@ -3654,6 +3748,10 @@
       .core = slot->attr
     };
 
+    status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length( alg, nonce_length );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt(
         &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
         alg,
@@ -3665,11 +3763,474 @@
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0 )
         memset( plaintext, 0, plaintext_size );
 
+exit:
     psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
 
     return( status );
 }
 
+/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated operation. */
+static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                    int is_encrypt,
+                                    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                    psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0;
+
+    if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->id != 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->nonce_set || operation->lengths_set ||
+        operation->ad_started || operation->body_started )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+        key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT;
+    else
+        key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
+
+    status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, key_usage,
+                                                    alg );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+        .core = slot->attr
+    };
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+        status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup( operation,
+                                                        &attributes,
+                                                        slot->key.data,
+                                                        slot->key.bytes,
+                                                        alg );
+    else
+        status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup( operation,
+                                                        &attributes,
+                                                        slot->key.data,
+                                                        slot->key.bytes,
+                                                        alg );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes );
+
+exit:
+    unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        status = unlock_status;
+        operation->alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm( alg );
+        operation->is_encrypt = is_encrypt;
+    }
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                     psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    return( psa_aead_setup( operation, 1, key, alg ) );
+}
+
+/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                     psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    return( psa_aead_setup( operation, 0, key, alg ) );
+}
+
+/* Generate a random nonce / IV for multipart AEAD operation */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                      uint8_t *nonce,
+                                      size_t nonce_size,
+                                      size_t *nonce_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t required_nonce_size;
+
+    *nonce_length = 0;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->nonce_set || !operation->is_encrypt )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    required_nonce_size = PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH( operation->key_type,
+                                                 operation->alg );
+    if( nonce_size < required_nonce_size )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_generate_random( nonce, required_nonce_size );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    status = psa_aead_set_nonce( operation, nonce, required_nonce_size );
+
+exit:
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        *nonce_length = required_nonce_size;
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Set the nonce for a multipart authenticated encryption or decryption
+   operation.*/
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                 const uint8_t *nonce,
+                                 size_t nonce_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->nonce_set )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length( operation->alg, nonce_length );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce( operation, nonce,
+                                                nonce_length );
+
+exit:
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        operation->nonce_set = 1;
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for multipart AEAD. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                   size_t ad_length,
+                                   size_t plaintext_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->lengths_set || operation->ad_started ||
+        operation->body_started )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    switch(operation->alg)
+    {
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_GCM:
+            /* Lengths can only be too large for GCM if size_t is bigger than 32
+            * bits. Without the guard this code will generate warnings on 32bit
+            * builds. */
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX
+            if( (( uint64_t ) ad_length ) >> 61 != 0 ||
+                (( uint64_t ) plaintext_length ) > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull )
+            {
+                status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+                goto exit;
+            }
+#endif
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_CCM:
+            if( ad_length > 0xFF00 )
+            {
+                status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+                goto exit;
+            }
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+        case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            /* No length restrictions for ChaChaPoly. */
+            break;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths( operation, ad_length,
+                                                  plaintext_length );
+
+exit:
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        operation->ad_remaining = ad_length;
+        operation->body_remaining = plaintext_length;
+        operation->lengths_set = 1;
+    }
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                 const uint8_t *input,
+                                 size_t input_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( !operation->nonce_set || operation->body_started )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->lengths_set )
+    {
+        if( operation->ad_remaining < input_length )
+        {
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        operation->ad_remaining -= input_length;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad( operation, input,
+                                                input_length );
+
+exit:
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        operation->ad_started = 1;
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD
+   operation.*/
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                              const uint8_t *input,
+                              size_t input_length,
+                              uint8_t *output,
+                              size_t output_size,
+                              size_t *output_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    *output_length = 0;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( !operation->nonce_set )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( operation->lengths_set )
+    {
+        /* Additional data length was supplied, but not all the additional
+           data was supplied.*/
+        if( operation->ad_remaining != 0 )
+        {
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        /* Too much data provided. */
+        if( operation->body_remaining < input_length )
+        {
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        operation->body_remaining -= input_length;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update( operation, input, input_length,
+                                             output, output_size,
+                                             output_length );
+
+exit:
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        operation->body_started = 1;
+    else
+        psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_aead_final_checks( const psa_aead_operation_t *operation )
+{
+    if( operation->id == 0 || !operation->nonce_set )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    if( operation->lengths_set && ( operation->ad_remaining != 0 ||
+                                   operation->body_remaining != 0 ) )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_finish( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                              uint8_t *ciphertext,
+                              size_t ciphertext_size,
+                              size_t *ciphertext_length,
+                              uint8_t *tag,
+                              size_t tag_size,
+                              size_t *tag_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    *ciphertext_length = 0;
+    *tag_length = tag_size;
+
+    status = psa_aead_final_checks( operation );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    if( !operation->is_encrypt )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish( operation, ciphertext,
+                                             ciphertext_size,
+                                             ciphertext_length,
+                                             tag, tag_size, tag_length );
+
+exit:
+    /* In case the operation fails and the user fails to check for failure or
+     * the zero tag size, make sure the tag is set to something implausible.
+     * Even if the operation succeeds, make sure we clear the rest of the
+     * buffer to prevent potential leakage of anything previously placed in
+     * the same buffer.*/
+    if( tag != NULL )
+    {
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            memset( tag, '!', tag_size );
+        else if( *tag_length < tag_size )
+            memset( tag + *tag_length, '!', ( tag_size - *tag_length ) );
+    }
+
+    psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in a multipart AEAD
+   operation.*/
+psa_status_t psa_aead_verify( psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                              uint8_t *plaintext,
+                              size_t plaintext_size,
+                              size_t *plaintext_length,
+                              const uint8_t *tag,
+                              size_t tag_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    *plaintext_length = 0;
+
+    status = psa_aead_final_checks( operation );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    if( operation->is_encrypt )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify( operation, plaintext,
+                                             plaintext_size,
+                                             plaintext_length,
+                                             tag, tag_length );
+
+exit:
+    psa_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Abort an AEAD operation. */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_abort( psa_aead_operation_t *operation )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( operation->id == 0 )
+    {
+        /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet)
+         * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
+         * nothing to do. */
+        return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+    }
+
+    status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort( operation );
+
+    memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
 /****************************************************************/
 /* Generators */
 /****************************************************************/
@@ -4141,6 +4702,7 @@
 {
     uint8_t *data = NULL;
     size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits );
+    size_t storage_size = bytes;
     psa_status_t status;
 
     if( ! key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) )
@@ -4159,15 +4721,22 @@
         psa_des_set_key_parity( data, bytes );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */
 
-    status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-
     slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
       .core = slot->attr
     };
 
+    if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( attributes.core.lifetime ) )
+    {
+        status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &attributes,
+                                                         &storage_size );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
+    }
+    status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, storage_size );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( &attributes,
                                             data, bytes,
                                             slot->key.data,
@@ -4196,6 +4765,9 @@
     if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
     if( ! operation->can_output_key )
         return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
 
@@ -5046,7 +5618,7 @@
 
     if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) )
     {
-        status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, bits );
+        status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, bits );
         if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
             return( status );
     }
@@ -5150,15 +5722,19 @@
     if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
+    /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */
+    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->core.type) )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
     status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes,
                                      &slot, &driver );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
     /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local
-     * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element
-     * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to
-     * hold the generated key material. */
+     * storage ( thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element
+     * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a
+     * buffer to hold the generated key material. */
     if( slot->key.data == NULL )
     {
         if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ) ==
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/library/psa_crypto_aead.c
index 356679c..c7f7352 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_aead.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.c
@@ -25,58 +25,24 @@
 #include "psa_crypto_aead.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_core.h"
 
+#include <string.h>
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+#define mbedtls_free   free
+#endif
+
 #include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
 #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
 #include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
 #include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
-
-typedef struct
-{
-    union
-    {
-        unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
-        mbedtls_ccm_context ccm;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
-        mbedtls_gcm_context gcm;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
-        mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
-    } ctx;
-    psa_algorithm_t core_alg;
-    uint8_t tag_length;
-} aead_operation_t;
-
-#define AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {{0}, 0, 0}
-
-static void psa_aead_abort_internal( aead_operation_t *operation )
-{
-    switch( operation->core_alg )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
-        case PSA_ALG_CCM:
-            mbedtls_ccm_free( &operation->ctx.ccm );
-            break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
-        case PSA_ALG_GCM:
-            mbedtls_gcm_free( &operation->ctx.gcm );
-            break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
-        case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
-            mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &operation->ctx.chachapoly );
-            break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
-    }
-}
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
 
 static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(
-    aead_operation_t *operation,
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
     psa_algorithm_t alg )
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -85,6 +51,8 @@
     mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id;
     size_t full_tag_length = 0;
 
+    ( void ) key_buffer_size;
+
     key_bits = attributes->core.bits;
 
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg,
@@ -97,7 +65,7 @@
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
         case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ):
-            operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CCM;
+            operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CCM;
             full_tag_length = 16;
             /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.
              * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or
@@ -116,7 +84,7 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
         case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ):
-            operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_GCM;
+            operation->alg = PSA_ALG_GCM;
             full_tag_length = 16;
             /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.
              * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or
@@ -135,7 +103,7 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
         case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ):
-            operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+            operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
             full_tag_length = 16;
             /* We only support the default tag length. */
             if( alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
@@ -159,7 +127,9 @@
         > full_tag_length )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
 
-    operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type,
+    operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes );
+
+    operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( operation->key_type,
                                                  key_bits,
                                                  alg );
 
@@ -176,11 +146,12 @@
     uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
     uint8_t *tag;
-    (void) key_buffer_size;
 
-    status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg );
+    status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                             key_buffer_size, alg );
+
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
@@ -194,7 +165,7 @@
     tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
     {
         status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
             mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.ccm,
@@ -208,7 +179,7 @@
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
     {
         status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
             mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.gcm,
@@ -222,9 +193,9 @@
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
     {
-        if( nonce_length != 12 || operation.tag_length != 16 )
+        if( operation.tag_length != 16 )
         {
             status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
             goto exit;
@@ -250,7 +221,7 @@
         *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length;
 
 exit:
-    psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation );
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation );
 
     return( status );
 }
@@ -286,11 +257,12 @@
     uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
     const uint8_t *tag = NULL;
-    (void) key_buffer_size;
 
-    status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg );
+    status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                             key_buffer_size, alg );
+
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
@@ -301,7 +273,7 @@
         goto exit;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
     {
         status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
             mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.ccm,
@@ -315,7 +287,7 @@
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
     {
         status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
             mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.gcm,
@@ -329,9 +301,9 @@
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
-    if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    if( operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
     {
-        if( nonce_length != 12 || operation.tag_length != 16 )
+        if( operation.tag_length != 16 )
         {
             status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
             goto exit;
@@ -356,12 +328,314 @@
         *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length;
 
 exit:
-    psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation );
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation );
 
     if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
         *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length;
     return( status );
 }
 
+/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated encryption
+ * operation. */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
+    {
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
+
+    status = psa_aead_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                             key_buffer_size, alg );
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        operation->is_encrypt = 1;
+
+    return ( status );
+}
+
+/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated decryption
+ * operation. */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM )
+    {
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
+
+    status = psa_aead_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                             key_buffer_size, alg );
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        operation->is_encrypt = 0;
+
+    return ( status );
+}
+
+/* Set a nonce for the multipart AEAD operation*/
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    {
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+                 mbedtls_gcm_starts( &operation->ctx.gcm,
+                                     operation->is_encrypt ?
+                                     MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT,
+                                     nonce,
+                                     nonce_length ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    {
+        /* Note - ChaChaPoly allows an 8 byte nonce, but we would have to
+         * allocate a buffer in the operation, copy the nonce to it and pad
+         * it, so for now check the nonce is 12 bytes, as
+         * mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() assumes it can read 12 bytes from the
+         * passed in buffer. */
+        if( nonce_length != 12 )
+        {
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        }
+
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+           mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( &operation->ctx.chachapoly,
+                                      nonce,
+                                      operation->is_encrypt ?
+                                      MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT :
+                                      MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+    {
+        ( void ) nonce;
+
+        return ( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+ /* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    size_t ad_length,
+    size_t plaintext_length )
+{
+    /* Nothing here yet, work is currently done in PSA Core, however support
+     * for CCM will require this function. */
+    ( void ) operation;
+    ( void ) ad_length;
+    ( void ) plaintext_length;
+
+    return ( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    {
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( &operation->ctx.gcm, input, input_length ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    {
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+           mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &operation->ctx.chachapoly,
+                                          input,
+                                          input_length ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+    {
+        ( void ) operation;
+        ( void ) input;
+        ( void ) input_length;
+
+        return ( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    return ( status );
+}
+
+/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD
+ * operation.*/
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length,
+    uint8_t *output,
+    size_t output_size,
+    size_t *output_length )
+{
+    size_t update_output_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    update_output_length = input_length;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    {
+        status =  mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_gcm_update( &operation->ctx.gcm,
+                                input, input_length,
+                                output, output_size,
+                                &update_output_length ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    {
+        if( output_size < input_length )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+           mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &operation->ctx.chachapoly,
+                                      input_length,
+                                      input,
+                                      output ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+    {
+        ( void ) input;
+        ( void ) input_length;
+
+        return ( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        *output_length = update_output_length;
+
+    return( status );
+}
+
+/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    uint8_t *ciphertext,
+    size_t ciphertext_size,
+    size_t *ciphertext_length,
+    uint8_t *tag,
+    size_t tag_size,
+    size_t *tag_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t finish_output_size = 0;
+
+    if( tag_size < operation->tag_length )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM )
+    {
+        status =  mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_gcm_finish( &operation->ctx.gcm,
+                                ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length,
+                                tag, operation->tag_length ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+    if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )
+    {
+        /* Belt and braces. Although the above tag_size check should have
+         * already done this, if we later start supporting smaller tag sizes
+         * for chachapoly, then passing a tag buffer smaller than 16 into here
+         * could cause a buffer overflow, so better safe than sorry. */
+        if( tag_size < 16 )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &operation->ctx.chachapoly,
+                                       tag ) );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+    {
+        ( void ) ciphertext;
+        ( void ) ciphertext_size;
+        ( void ) ciphertext_length;
+        ( void ) tag;
+        ( void ) tag_size;
+        ( void ) tag_length;
+
+        return ( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        /* This will be zero for all supported algorithms currently, but left
+         * here for future support. */
+        *ciphertext_length = finish_output_size;
+        *tag_length = operation->tag_length;
+    }
+
+    return ( status );
+}
+
+/* Abort an AEAD operation */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(
+   mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation )
+{
+    switch( operation->alg )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_CCM:
+            mbedtls_ccm_free( &operation->ctx.ccm );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+        case PSA_ALG_GCM:
+            mbedtls_gcm_free( &operation->ctx.gcm );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+        case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &operation->ctx.chachapoly );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+    }
+
+    operation->is_encrypt = 0;
+
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
 
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
index aab0f83..e82e1cc 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
@@ -148,4 +148,364 @@
     const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
     uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length );
 
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ *  \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an
+ *       aead_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface
+ *       specification for transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the operation is reset by the PSA core by a
+ * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been
+ * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                              #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in
+ *                              use.
+ * \param[in]  attributes       The attributes of the key to use for the
+ *                              operation.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer       The buffer containing the key context.
+ * \param      key_buffer_size  Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+                                It must be consistent with the size in bits
+                                recorded in \p attributes.
+ * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         An invalid block length was supplied.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ *         Failed to allocate memory for key material
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an
+ *       aead_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface
+ *       specification for transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the PSA core resets the operation by a
+ * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been
+ * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                              #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in
+ *                              use.
+ * \param[in]  attributes       The attributes of the key to use for the
+ *                              operation.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer       The buffer containing the key context.
+ * \param      key_buffer_size  Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+                                It must be consistent with the size in bits
+                                recorded in \p attributes.
+ * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         An invalid block length was supplied.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ *         Failed to allocate memory for key material
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_nonce
+ *       entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_nonce entry point as
+ *       defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ *       drivers.
+ *
+ * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] nonce             Buffer containing the nonce to use.
+ * \param nonce_length          Size of the nonce in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of
+ *         the library.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_length );
+
+/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_lengths
+ *       entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_lengths entry point
+ *       as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ *       drivers.
+ *
+ * The PSA core calls this function before calling mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad()
+ * or mbedtls_psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for the operation requires it.
+ * If the algorithm does not require it, calling this function is optional, but
+ * if this function is called then the implementation must enforce the lengths.
+ *
+ * The PSA core may call this function before or after setting the nonce with
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ *
+ * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
+ * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling
+ *   this function is not required.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core calls
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param ad_length             Size of the non-encrypted additional
+ *                              authenticated data in bytes.
+ * \param plaintext_length      Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen
+ *         algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of
+ *         the library.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    size_t ad_length,
+    size_t plaintext_length );
+
+/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ *  \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_update_ad entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update_ad
+ *       entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted.
+ *
+ * The PSA core can call this function multiple times to pass successive
+ * fragments of the additional data. It will not call this function after
+ * passing data to encrypt or decrypt with mbedtls_psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, the PSA core will:
+ *    1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or
+ *       mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ *    2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the fragment of
+ *                              additional data.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of
+ *         the library.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length );
+
+/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ *  \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_update entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update entry
+ *       point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, the PSA core will:
+ *    1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or
+ *       mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function
+ *       determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input.
+ *    2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ *    3. Call mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any
+ * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process
+ * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but
+ * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent
+ * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(), mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() provides
+ * sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is
+ * bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message fragment to
+ *                              encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
+ *                                algorithm and key:
+ *                                - A sufficient output size is
+ *                                  #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ *                                  \c alg, \p input_length) where
+ *                                  \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is
+ *                                  the algorithm that were used to set up the
+ *                                  operation.
+ *                                - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
+ *                                  input_length) evaluates to the maximum
+ *                                  output size of any supported AEAD
+ *                                  algorithm.
+ * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ *         #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or
+ *         #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to
+ *         determine the required buffer size.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length,
+    uint8_t *output,
+    size_t output_size,
+    size_t *output_length );
+
+/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ *  \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_finish entry point. This function behaves as an aead_finish entry
+ *       point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * The operation must have been set up by the PSA core with
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
+ *
+ * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data
+ * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the
+ * inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * This function has two output buffers:
+ * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from
+ *   preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update().
+ * - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
+ *
+ * Whether or not this function returns successfuly, the PSA core subsequently
+ * calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext       Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext
+ *                              is to be written.
+ * \param ciphertext_size       Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
+ *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
+ *                              algorithm and key:
+ *                              - A sufficient output size is
+ *                                #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ *                                \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key
+ *                                and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to
+ *                                set up the operation.
+ *                              - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to
+ *                                the maximum output size of any supported AEAD
+ *                                algorithm.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of
+ *                              returned ciphertext.
+ * \param[out] tag              Buffer where the authentication tag is
+ *                              to be written.
+ * \param tag_size              Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
+ *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
+ *                              algorithm and key:
+ *                              - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c
+ *                                key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where
+ *                                \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ *                                bit-size of the key, and \c alg are the
+ *                                algorithm that were used in the call to
+ *                                mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
+ *                              - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
+ *                                maximum tag size of any supported AEAD
+ *                                algorithm.
+ * \param[out] tag_length       On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the returned tag.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p tag buffer is too small.
+ *         #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, key_bits, \c alg) or
+ *         #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required \p tag
+ *         buffer size.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    uint8_t *ciphertext,
+    size_t ciphertext_size,
+    size_t *ciphertext_length,
+    uint8_t *tag,
+    size_t tag_size,
+    size_t *tag_length );
+
+/** Abort an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ *  \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       aead_abort entry point. This function behaves as an aead_abort entry
+ *       point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by the PSA core by it calling
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again.
+ *
+ * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized as described in #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() or
+ * mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation );
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
index d8c722b..07c6a00 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@
             case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:
                 mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC;
                 break;
+            case PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+                mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG;
+                break;
             case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ):
                 mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM;
                 break;
@@ -115,6 +118,9 @@
         case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:
             cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
             break;
+        case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:
+            cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA;
+            break;
         case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:
             /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES,
              * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */
@@ -255,16 +261,34 @@
                                        iv, iv_length ) ) );
 }
 
-/* Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. This requires
- * manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being able to process
- * arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, but the
- * underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. */
+/** Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode.
+ *
+ * This requires manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being
+ * able to process arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode,
+ * but the underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks.
+ *
+ * \param ctx           The mbedtls cipher context to use. It must have been
+ *                      set up for ECB.
+ * \param[in] input     The input plaintext or ciphertext to process.
+ * \param input_length  The number of bytes to process from \p input.
+ *                      This does not need to be aligned to a block boundary.
+ *                      If there is a partial block at the end of the input,
+ *                      it is stored in \p ctx for future processing.
+ * \param output        The buffer where the output is written. It must be
+ *                      at least `BS * floor((p + input_length) / BS)` bytes
+ *                      long, where `p` is the number of bytes in the
+ *                      unprocessed partial block in \p ctx (with
+ *                      `0 <= p <= BS - 1`) and `BS` is the block size.
+ * \param output_length On success, the number of bytes written to \p output.
+ *                      \c 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \return #PSA_SUCCESS or an error from a hardware accelerator
+ */
 static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb(
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
     const uint8_t *input,
     size_t input_length,
     uint8_t *output,
-    size_t output_size,
     size_t *output_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -304,7 +328,6 @@
                 goto exit;
 
             output += internal_output_length;
-            output_size -= internal_output_length;
             *output_length += internal_output_length;
             ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
         }
@@ -325,7 +348,6 @@
         input += block_size;
 
         output += internal_output_length;
-        output_size -= internal_output_length;
         *output_length += internal_output_length;
     }
 
@@ -380,7 +402,6 @@
                                         input,
                                         input_length,
                                         output,
-                                        output_size,
                                         output_length );
     }
     else
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index 91757b5..8c91b04 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -528,4 +528,23 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
     const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
 
+/**
+ * \brief Validate the key bit size for unstructured keys.
+ *
+ * \note  Check that the bit size is acceptable for a given key type for
+ *        unstructured keys.
+ *
+ * \param[in]  type  The key type
+ * \param[in]  bits  The number of bits of the key
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         The key type and size are valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The size in bits of the key is not valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of
+ *         the two is not supported.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type,
+                                                     size_t bits );
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
index 38d0e30..cfc77fb 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
@@ -380,8 +380,49 @@
     }
 }
 
+/** Calculate the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key
+ *  associated with an opaque driver from input key data.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes        The key attributes
+ * \param[in] data              The input key data.
+ * \param[in] data_length       The input data length.
+ * \param[out] key_buffer_size  Minimum buffer size to contain the key material.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *data,
+    size_t data_length,
+    size_t *key_buffer_size )
+{
+    psa_key_location_t location =
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type;
+
+    *key_buffer_size = 0;
+    switch( location )
+    {
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+            *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type,
+                                     PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ) );
+            return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ?
+                    PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+        default:
+            (void)key_type;
+            (void)data;
+            (void)data_length;
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+}
+
 /** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key
- *  associated with an opaque driver without storage.
+ *  associated with an opaque driver.
  *
  * \param[in] attributes  The key attributes.
  * \param[out] key_buffer_size  Minimum buffer size to contain the key material
@@ -389,11 +430,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been
  *         returned successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The size in bits of the key is not valid.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of
  *         the two is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The key is declared with a lifetime not known to us.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -418,7 +459,8 @@
                 return( PSA_SUCCESS );
             }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
-            *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_size_function( key_type, key_bits );
+            *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type,
+                                                                  key_bits );
             return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ?
                     PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
@@ -426,7 +468,7 @@
         default:
             (void)key_type;
             (void)key_bits;
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
 }
 
@@ -566,10 +608,18 @@
                                               data, data_length,
                                               key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
                                               key_buffer_length, bits ) );
-
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+            return( mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key(
+                         attributes,
+                         data, data_length,
+                         key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                         key_buffer_length, bits ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
         default:
-            /* Importing a key with external storage in not yet supported.
-             * Return in error indicating that the lifetime is not valid. */
             (void)status;
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
@@ -733,6 +783,50 @@
     }
 }
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key(
+    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length,
+    uint8_t *target_key_buffer, size_t target_key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *target_key_buffer_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_location_t location =
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+    const psa_drv_se_t *drv;
+    psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context;
+
+    if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) )
+    {
+        /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+
+    switch( location )
+    {
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+            return( mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key( attributes, source_key,
+                                                  source_key_length,
+                                                  target_key_buffer,
+                                                  target_key_buffer_size,
+                                                  target_key_buffer_length) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+        default:
+            (void)source_key;
+            (void)source_key_length;
+            (void)target_key_buffer;
+            (void)target_key_buffer_size;
+            (void)target_key_buffer_length;
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    return( status );
+}
+
 /*
  * Cipher functions
  */
@@ -1471,6 +1565,381 @@
     }
 }
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+   const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+   psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_location_t location =
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+    switch( location )
+    {
+        case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+            /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+             * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+            operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+            status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                        alg );
+
+            /* Declared with fallback == true */
+            if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+                return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+
+            /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
+            operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
+            status = mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(
+                        &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, attributes,
+                        key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                        alg );
+
+            return( status );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+        default:
+            /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+            (void)status;
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+   const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+   psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_location_t location =
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+    switch( location )
+    {
+        case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+            /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+             * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+            operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+            status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        attributes,
+                        key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                        alg );
+
+            /* Declared with fallback == true */
+            if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+                return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+
+            /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
+            operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
+            status = mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(
+                        &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                        attributes,
+                        key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                        alg );
+
+            return( status );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+        default:
+            /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+            (void)status;
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const uint8_t *nonce,
+   size_t nonce_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                nonce,
+                                                nonce_length ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce(
+                         &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                         nonce, nonce_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)nonce;
+    (void)nonce_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   size_t ad_length,
+   size_t plaintext_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                  ad_length,
+                                                  plaintext_length ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        ad_length, plaintext_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)ad_length;
+    (void)plaintext_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const uint8_t *input,
+   size_t input_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                input,
+                                                input_length ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        input, input_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)input;
+    (void)input_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const uint8_t *input,
+   size_t input_length,
+   uint8_t *output,
+   size_t output_size,
+   size_t *output_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                             input, input_length,
+                                             output, output_size,
+                                             output_length ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        input, input_length, output, output_size,
+                        output_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)input;
+    (void)input_length;
+    (void)output;
+    (void)output_size;
+    (void)output_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *ciphertext,
+   size_t ciphertext_size,
+   size_t *ciphertext_length,
+   uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_size,
+   size_t *tag_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                             ciphertext,
+                                             ciphertext_size,
+                                             ciphertext_length, tag,
+                                             tag_size, tag_length ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        ciphertext, ciphertext_size,
+                        ciphertext_length, tag, tag_size, tag_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)ciphertext;
+    (void)ciphertext_size;
+    (void)ciphertext_length;
+    (void)tag;
+    (void)tag_size;
+    (void)tag_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *plaintext,
+   size_t plaintext_size,
+   size_t *plaintext_length,
+   const uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_length )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            {
+                psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+                uint8_t check_tag[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+                size_t check_tag_length;
+
+                status = mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                  plaintext,
+                                                  plaintext_size,
+                                                  plaintext_length,
+                                                  check_tag,
+                                                  sizeof( check_tag ),
+                                                  &check_tag_length );
+
+                if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+                {
+                    if( tag_length != check_tag_length ||
+                        mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length )
+                        != 0 )
+                        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+                }
+
+                mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, sizeof( check_tag ) );
+
+                return( status );
+            }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify(
+                        &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+                        plaintext, plaintext_size,
+                        plaintext_length, tag, tag_length ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    (void)plaintext;
+    (void)plaintext_size;
+    (void)plaintext_length;
+    (void)tag;
+    (void)tag_length;
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort(
+   psa_aead_operation_t *operation )
+{
+    switch( operation->id )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+            return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort(
+               &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) );
+
+        /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+    }
+
+    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+}
 
 /*
  * MAC functions
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
index 38a6ee8..0873b73 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
@@ -85,6 +85,12 @@
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     size_t *key_buffer_size );
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *data,
+    size_t data_length,
+    size_t *key_buffer_size );
+
 psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
@@ -94,6 +100,11 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key(
+    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length,
+    uint8_t *target_key_buffer, size_t target_key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *target_key_buffer_length );
 /*
  * Cipher functions
  */
@@ -208,6 +219,61 @@
     const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
     uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length );
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    size_t ad_length,
+    size_t plaintext_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length,
+    uint8_t *output,
+    size_t output_size,
+    size_t *output_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    uint8_t *ciphertext,
+    size_t ciphertext_size,
+    size_t *ciphertext_length,
+    uint8_t *tag,
+    size_t tag_size,
+    size_t *tag_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    uint8_t *plaintext,
+    size_t plaintext_size,
+    size_t *plaintext_length,
+    const uint8_t *tag,
+    size_t tag_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort(
+    psa_aead_operation_t *operation );
+
 /*
  * MAC functions
  */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
index 3ce232c..144ba1c 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@
                             key_buffer_length, bits ) );
 }
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length )
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
index 0c2b928..dc9e887 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
@@ -224,13 +224,13 @@
 
 #if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits );
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c
index 2c079d4..7e0a832 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_mac.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c
@@ -42,29 +42,6 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
-static size_t psa_get_hash_block_size( psa_algorithm_t alg )
-{
-    switch( alg )
-    {
-        case PSA_ALG_MD5:
-            return( 64 );
-        case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
-            return( 64 );
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
-            return( 64 );
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
-            return( 64 );
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
-            return( 64 );
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
-            return( 128 );
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
-            return( 128 );
-        default:
-            return( 0 );
-    }
-}
-
 static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal(
     mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac )
 {
@@ -81,7 +58,7 @@
     uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
     size_t i;
     size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
-    size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
+    size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg );
     psa_status_t status;
 
     hmac->alg = hash_alg;
@@ -153,7 +130,7 @@
     uint8_t tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg;
     size_t hash_size = 0;
-    size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
+    size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg );
     psa_status_t status;
 
     status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index d85b86c..8318ef4 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -453,6 +453,27 @@
     return( status );
 }
 
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+static int rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                      const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
+                                      size_t hash_length )
+{
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( alg ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY );
+    /* Otherwise: standard salt length, i.e. largest possible salt length
+     * up to the hash length. */
+    int klen = (int) mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); // known to fit
+    int hlen = (int) hash_length; // known to fit
+    int room = klen - 2 - hlen;
+    if( room < 0 )
+        return( 0 ); // there is no valid signature in this case anyway
+    else if( room > hlen )
+        return( hlen );
+    else
+        return( room );
+}
+#endif
+
 static psa_status_t rsa_verify_hash(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@@ -503,11 +524,14 @@
         ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
         if( ret == 0 )
         {
-            ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa,
-                                                 md_alg,
-                                                 (unsigned int) hash_length,
-                                                 hash,
-                                                 signature );
+            int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( alg, rsa, hash_length );
+            ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa,
+                                                     md_alg,
+                                                     (unsigned) hash_length,
+                                                     hash,
+                                                     md_alg,
+                                                     slen,
+                                                     signature );
         }
     }
     else
@@ -611,7 +635,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@@ -622,7 +646,7 @@
                             key_buffer_length, bits ) );
 }
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length )
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
index 41a90f7..5540684 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
@@ -218,13 +218,13 @@
 
 #if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits );
 
-psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
index a5c43b1..a18350e 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@
 
 psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle )
 {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
     psa_status_t status;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
 
@@ -497,11 +498,11 @@
 
     return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) );
 
-#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
     (void) key;
     *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT;
     return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_close_key( psa_key_handle_t handle )
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index e818e6d..e3ec056 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
 #include "mbedtls/oid.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -72,22 +74,6 @@
 #define RSA_VALIDATE( cond )                                           \
     MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
-    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
-    unsigned char diff = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-        diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
-
-    return( diff );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
 int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
                         const mbedtls_mpi *N,
                         const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
@@ -1473,97 +1459,6 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
- *
- * \param value     The value to analyze.
- * \return          Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
- */
-static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
-{
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
-     * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-    return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-}
-
-/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches.
- *
- * This is equivalent to `size > max`, but is likely to be compiled to
- * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
- *
- * \param size      Size to check.
- * \param max       Maximum desired value for \p size.
- * \return          \c 0 if `size <= max`.
- * \return          \c 1 if `size > max`.
- */
-static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
-{
-    /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
-    return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
-}
-
-/** Choose between two integer values, without branches.
- *
- * This is equivalent to `cond ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled
- * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
- *
- * \param cond      Condition to test.
- * \param if1       Value to use if \p cond is nonzero.
- * \param if0       Value to use if \p cond is zero.
- * \return          \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
- */
-static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
-{
-    unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
-    return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
-}
-
-/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
- * the length of the data through side channels.
- *
- * `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to
- * ```
- * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
- * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
- * ```
- * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing)
- * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at
- * the expense of performance.
- *
- * \param start     Pointer to the start of the buffer.
- * \param total     Total size of the buffer.
- * \param offset    Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
- */
-static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
-                              size_t total,
-                              size_t offset )
-{
-    volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
-    size_t i, n;
-    if( total == 0 )
-        return;
-    for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
-    {
-        unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
-        /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
-         * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
-         * zero out the last byte. */
-        for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
-        {
-            unsigned char current = buf[n];
-            unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
-            buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
-        }
-        buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
-    }
-}
-
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
  */
@@ -1576,23 +1471,8 @@
                                  size_t output_max_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size;
+    size_t ilen;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
-    /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
-     * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
-     * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
-     * this would open the execution of the function to
-     * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
-     * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
-     * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
-     * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
-     * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
-     * branch predictor). */
-    size_t pad_count = 0;
-    unsigned bad = 0;
-    unsigned char pad_done = 0;
-    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
-    unsigned output_too_large;
 
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
@@ -1600,9 +1480,6 @@
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
 
     ilen = ctx->len;
-    plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ?
-                           ilen - 11 :
-                           output_max_len );
 
     if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -1615,98 +1492,8 @@
     if( ret != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
 
-    /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
-     * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
-    bad |= buf[0];
-
-
-    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
-        * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
-    bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
-
-    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-        * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
-    for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
-    {
-        pad_done  |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
-        pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
-    }
-
-
-    /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
-    bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
-
-    /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
-    bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
-
-    /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
-     * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
-     * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
-     * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
-     * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
-     * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
-     * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
-    plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                             (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
-
-    /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
-     * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
-    output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
-                                          plaintext_max_size );
-
-    /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
-     * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
-     * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
-     *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
-     * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
-                  if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
-                          0 ) );
-
-    /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
-     * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
-     * We need to copy the same amount of data
-     * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
-     * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
-     * through memory or cache access patterns. */
-    bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
-    for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
-        buf[i] &= ~bad;
-
-    /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
-     * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
-     * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
-     * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
-    plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_size );
-
-    /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
-     * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
-     * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
-     * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
-     * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
-     * information. */
-    mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
-                      plaintext_max_size,
-                      plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
-
-    /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
-     * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
-     * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
-     * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
-     * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
-     * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
-     * secrets. */
-    if( output_max_len != 0 )
-        memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
-
-    /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
-     * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
-     * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
-     * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
-    *olen = plaintext_size;
+    ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( buf, ilen,
+                                                output, output_max_len, olen );
 
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
@@ -2100,7 +1887,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
 
-    if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
@@ -2372,8 +2159,8 @@
      * Compare
      */
 
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
-                                      sig_len ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
+                                              sig_len ) ) != 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
index a3ee157..b10a963 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
@@ -52,6 +52,15 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES)
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES,
 #else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    /* TLS 1.3 ciphersuites */
+    MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+    MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
     /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */
     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
@@ -283,6 +292,52 @@
 
 static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+    { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
+    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    0 },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+    { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256",
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    0 },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+    { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256",
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    0 },
+    { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256",
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+    MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+    { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      "TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256",
+      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+      MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4,
+      0 },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 9120aa2..68d3033 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "ssl_misc.h"
 #include "mbedtls/debug.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
@@ -89,10 +90,10 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                   unsigned char *buf,
-                                   const unsigned char *end,
-                                   size_t *olen )
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    unsigned char *buf,
+                                    const unsigned char *end,
+                                    size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
     size_t hostname_len;
@@ -309,27 +310,32 @@
     unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6;
     size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
     const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
-    const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id;
-
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
     *olen = 0;
 
+    /* Check there is room for header */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
+
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
         ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) );
 
-    if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL )
+    if( group_list == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
 
-    for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list;
-         *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
-         grp_id++ )
+    for( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
     {
-        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
+        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( *group_list );
         if( info == NULL )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
                 ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
         }
+
+        /* Check there is room for another curve */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( elliptic_curve_list, end, elliptic_curve_len + 2 );
+
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *group_list, elliptic_curve_list, elliptic_curve_len );
         elliptic_curve_len += 2;
 
         if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN )
@@ -344,19 +350,6 @@
     if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
 
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len );
-
-    elliptic_curve_len = 0;
-
-    for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list;
-         *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
-         grp_id++ )
-    {
-        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
-        elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( info->tls_id );
-        elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( info->tls_id );
-    }
-
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0 );
     p += 2;
 
@@ -1176,10 +1169,10 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-    if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
-                                        end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
+                                                end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
     {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret );
         return( ret );
     }
     ext_len += olen;
@@ -1364,9 +1357,9 @@
         /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
         if( len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
             buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1,
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1,
                           ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
                           ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c
index 986b141..7516786 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cookie.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "ssl_misc.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
         return( -1 );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
diff --git a/library/ssl_invasive.h b/library/ssl_invasive.h
deleted file mode 100644
index babbc27..0000000
--- a/library/ssl_invasive.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * \file ssl_invasive.h
- *
- * \brief SSL module: interfaces for invasive testing only.
- *
- * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
- * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when
- * building the library for testing.
- */
-/*
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- *  limitations under the License.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H
-
-#include "common.h"
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) &&              \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
-/** \brief Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
- *
- * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
- * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
- * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
- * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
- * max_data_len bytes from \p data.
- *
- * \param ctx               The HMAC context. It must have keys configured
- *                          with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the
- *                          following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
- *                          It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after
- *                          the computation is complete to prepare for the
- *                          next computation.
- * \param add_data          The additional data prepended to \p data. This
- *                          must point to a readable buffer of \p add_data_len
- *                          bytes.
- * \param add_data_len      The length of \p add_data in bytes.
- * \param data              The data appended to \p add_data. This must point
- *                          to a readable buffer of \p max_data_len bytes.
- * \param data_len_secret   The length of the data to process in \p data.
- *                          This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
- *                          greater than \p max_data_len.
- * \param min_data_len      The minimal length of \p data in bytes.
- * \param max_data_len      The maximal length of \p data in bytes.
- * \param output            The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
- *                          a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
- *                          HMAC value.
- *
- * \retval 0
- *         Success.
- * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
- *         The hardware accelerator failed.
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
-        mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
-        const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
-        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
-        size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
-        unsigned char *output );
-
-/** \brief Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
- *
- * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
- * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
- * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
- *
- * \param dst           The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
- *                      buffer of at least \p len bytes.
- * \param src_base      The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
- *                      readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
- *                      bytes.
- * \param offset_secret The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
- *                      This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
- *                      than \p offset_max.
- * \param offset_min    The minimal value of \p offset_secret.
- * \param offset_max    The maximal value of \p offset_secret.
- * \param len           The number of bytes to copy.
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
-                                   const unsigned char *src_base,
-                                   size_t offset_secret,
-                                   size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
-                                   size_t len );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index b4f841a..36a0712 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -103,6 +103,61 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING       3   /* Requested (server only) */
 
 /*
+ * Mask of TLS 1.3 handshake extensions used in extensions_present
+ * of mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE                        0
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERVERNAME                  ( 1 <<  0 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH         ( 1 <<  1 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST              ( 1 <<  2 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS            ( 1 <<  3 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG                     ( 1 <<  4 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_USE_SRTP                    ( 1 <<  5 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_HEARTBEAT                   ( 1 <<  6 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ALPN                        ( 1 <<  7 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SCT                         ( 1 <<  8 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE               ( 1 <<  9 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE              ( 1 << 10 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PADDING                     ( 1 << 11 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY              ( 1 << 12 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_EARLY_DATA                  ( 1 << 13 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS          ( 1 << 14 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_COOKIE                      ( 1 << 15 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES      ( 1 << 16 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CERT_AUTH                   ( 1 << 17 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_OID_FILTERS                 ( 1 << 18 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH         ( 1 << 19 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT                ( 1 << 20 )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE                   ( 1 << 21 )
+
+/*
+ * Helper macros for function call with return check.
+ */
+/*
+ * Exit when return non-zero value
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( f )                               \
+    do {                                                        \
+        ret = ( f );                                            \
+        if( ret != 0 )                                          \
+        {                                                       \
+            goto cleanup;                                       \
+        }                                                       \
+    } while( 0 )
+/*
+ * Exit when return negative value
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( f )                           \
+    do {                                                        \
+        ret = ( f );                                            \
+        if( ret < 0 )                                           \
+        {                                                       \
+            goto cleanup;                                       \
+        }                                                       \
+    } while( 0 )
+
+/*
  * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
  *
  * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
@@ -252,6 +307,9 @@
       + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
 #endif
 
+#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32
+#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
 /**
  * \brief          Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
@@ -354,6 +412,32 @@
         }                                                                \
     } while( 0 )
 
+/**
+ * \brief        This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is
+ *               greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it
+ *               returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a
+ *               #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message.
+ *
+ *               This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each
+ *               argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param cur    Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
+ * \param end    Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
+ * \param need   Needed length in bytes.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( cur, end, need )                          \
+    do {                                                                        \
+        if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 )        \
+        {                                                                       \
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,                                           \
+                                   ( "missing input data in %s", __func__ ) );  \
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,   \
+                                          MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );       \
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );                             \
+        }                                                                       \
+    } while( 0 )
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
@@ -423,6 +507,19 @@
 };
 typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set;
 
+typedef struct
+{
+    unsigned char binder_key                  [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_early_secrets;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+    unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets;
+
 /*
  * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
  */
@@ -431,6 +528,14 @@
     /*
      * Handshake specific crypto variables
      */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    int tls1_3_kex_modes; /*!< key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+    const uint16_t *group_list;
+    unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated;
+#endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
@@ -518,8 +623,8 @@
                                               flight being received          */
     mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out;   /*!<  Alternative transform for
                                               resending messages             */
-    unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8];       /*!<  Alternative record epoch/counter
-                                              for resending messages         */
+    unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!<  Alternative record epoch/counter
+                                                                      for resending messages         */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
     /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
@@ -594,11 +699,55 @@
     void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
     mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group
+                                * that is being used for ephemeral
+                                * key exchange.
+                                *
+                                * On the client: Defaults to the first
+                                * entry in the client's group list,
+                                * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+    /*
+     * State-local variables used during the processing
+     * of a specific handshake state.
+     */
+    union
+    {
+        /* Outgoing Finished message */
+        struct
+        {
+            uint8_t preparation_done;
+
+            /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to
+             * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */
+            unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+            size_t digest_len;
+        } finished_out;
+
+        /* Incoming Finished message */
+        struct
+        {
+            uint8_t preparation_done;
+
+            /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but
+             * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */
+            unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+            size_t digest_len;
+        } finished_in;
+
+    } state_local;
+
+    /* End of state-local variables. */
+
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
 
     size_t pmslen;                      /*!<  premaster length        */
 
-    unsigned char randbytes[64];        /*!<  random bytes            */
+    unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN +
+                            MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
+                                        /*!<  random bytes            */
     unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
                                         /*!<  premaster secret        */
 
@@ -606,6 +755,20 @@
     int max_major_ver;                  /*!< max. major version client*/
     int max_minor_ver;                  /*!< max. minor version client*/
     int cli_exts;                       /*!< client extension presence*/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    int extensions_present;             /*!< extension presence; Each bitfield
+                                             represents an extension and defined
+                                             as \c MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_XXX */
+
+    union
+    {
+        unsigned char early    [MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+        unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+        unsigned char app      [MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    } tls1_3_master_secrets;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
     int new_session_ticket;             /*!< use NewSessionTicket?    */
@@ -749,7 +912,9 @@
     /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
      * Master Secret and other session info,
      * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */
-    unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
+    unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN +
+                            MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
+                            /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
 };
 
@@ -796,14 +961,14 @@
 
 typedef struct
 {
-    uint8_t ctr[8];         /* In TLS:  The implicit record sequence number.
-                             * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
-                             *          the 6-byte sequence number.
-                             * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
-                             * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
-                             * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
-                             * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
-                             * MAC computations.                             */
+    uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN];  /* In TLS:  The implicit record sequence number.
+                                                    * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
+                                                    *          the 6-byte sequence number.
+                                                    * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
+                                                    * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
+                                                    * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
+                                                    * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
+                                                    * MAC computations.                             */
     uint8_t type;           /* The record content type.                      */
     uint8_t ver[2];         /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
                              * Convert to internal presentation of versions
@@ -886,13 +1051,24 @@
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
+/* set inbound transform of ssl context */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
+
+/* set outbound transform of ssl context */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    unsigned char *buf,
+                                    const unsigned char *end,
+                                    size_t *olen );
+#endif
+
 int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
-int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step_tls1_3( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step_tls1_3( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-#endif
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
@@ -1193,26 +1369,6 @@
 int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
                               const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
 
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
-    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
-    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-    {
-        /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
-         * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
-         * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
-        unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
-        diff |= x ^ y;
-    }
-
-    return( diff );
-}
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 /* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -1261,6 +1417,22 @@
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
 
+/*
+ * Send pending alert
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/*
+ * Set pending fatal alert flag.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   unsigned char alert_type,
+                                   int alert_reason );
+
+/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( type, user_return_value )         \
+            mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl, type, user_return_value )
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
 void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 #endif
@@ -1323,4 +1495,223 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL*/
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry
+ *
+ * \param ssl       SSL context
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry
+ *
+ * \param ssl       SSL context
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions around key exchange modes.
+ */
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                               int kex_mode_mask )
+{
+    return( ( ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask ) != 0 );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL ) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * \param[in] ssl  SSL context
+ * \param kex_modes_mask  Mask of the key exchange modes to check
+ *
+ * \return 0 if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported,
+ *         !=0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                           int kex_modes_mask )
+{
+    return( ( ssl->handshake->tls1_3_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask ) == 0 );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_psk_ephemeral_enabled(
+                                                    mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_some_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL ) );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_some_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_check_kex_modes( ssl,
+                   MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions for NamedGroup.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( uint16_t named_group )
+{
+    return( named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 ||
+            named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 ||
+            named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 ||
+            named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519    ||
+            named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 );
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( uint16_t named_group )
+{
+    return( named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 &&
+            named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 );
+}
+
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                    mbedtls_ssl_states state )
+{
+    ssl->state = ( int ) state;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                            unsigned hs_type,
+                                            unsigned char **buf,
+                                            size_t *buf_len );
+
+/*
+ * Write TLS 1.3 handshake message header
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           unsigned hs_type,
+                                           unsigned char **buf,
+                                           size_t *buflen );
+
+/*
+ * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/*
+ * Generic handler of Certificate Verify
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/*
+ * Write TLS 1.3 handshake message tail
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                            size_t buf_len,
+                                            size_t msg_len );
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               unsigned hs_type,
+                                               size_t total_hs_len );
+
+/*
+ * Update checksum of handshake messages.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                unsigned hs_type,
+                                                unsigned char const *msg,
+                                                size_t msg_len );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Write TLS 1.3 Signature Algorithm extension
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         unsigned char *buf,
+                                         unsigned char *end,
+                                         size_t *olen);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+/* Get handshake transcript */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
+                                          unsigned char *dst,
+                                          size_t dst_len,
+                                          size_t *olen );
+
+/*
+ * Return supported groups.
+ *
+ * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list
+ * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted.
+ *
+ * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group
+ * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to
+ * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked.
+ *
+ */
+static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+    return( ssl->conf->group_list );
+    #else
+    if( ( ssl->handshake != NULL ) && ( ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL ) )
+        return( ssl->handshake->group_list );
+    else
+        return( ssl->conf->group_list );
+    #endif
+}
+
 #endif /* ssl_misc.h */
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 2fe801a..286294f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/version.h"
-
-#include "ssl_invasive.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -961,242 +961,6 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
-/*
- * Turn a bit into a mask:
- * - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
- * - if bit == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
-{
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-    return -bit;
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
- * - if x < y,  return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
-    /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
-    const size_t sub = x - y;
-
-    /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
-    const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
-
-    /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
-    const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
-
-    return( mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
- * - if x >= y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
-    return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
- * return x == y
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
-    /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
-    const size_t diff = x ^ y;
-
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
-     * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
-    /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
-    const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
-    /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
-    const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
-
-    return( 1 ^ diff1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow conditional memcpy:
- *  - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len),
- *  - otherwise, a no-op,
- * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
-                                         const unsigned char *src,
-                                         size_t len,
-                                         size_t c1, size_t c2 )
-{
-    /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
-    const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
-    const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
-
-    /* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
-    for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
-        dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
- *
- * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
- * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
-        mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
-        const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
-        const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
-        size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
-        unsigned char *output )
-{
-    /*
-     * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
-     * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
-     *
-     * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
-     * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
-     * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
-     *
-     * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
-     * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
-     * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
-     *
-     * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
-     */
-    const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
-    /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
-     * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
-    const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
-    const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
-    const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
-    const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
-
-    unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-    mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
-    size_t offset;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
-
-#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
-    do {                    \
-        ret = (func_call);  \
-        if( ret != 0 )      \
-            goto cleanup;   \
-    } while( 0 )
-
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
-
-    /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
-     * so we can start directly with the message */
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
-
-    /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
-    for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
-    {
-        MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
-        MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
-        /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
-        mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
-                                     offset, data_len_secret );
-
-        if( offset < max_data_len )
-            MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
-    }
-
-    /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
-
-    /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
-
-    /* Done, get ready for next time */
-    MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
-
-#undef MD_CHK
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
- * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
- * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
-                                   unsigned char *dst,
-                                   const unsigned char *src_base,
-                                   size_t offset_secret,
-                                   size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
-                                   size_t len )
-{
-    size_t offset;
-
-    for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
-    {
-        mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
-                                     offset, offset_secret );
-    }
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-
 int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
                              mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
                              mbedtls_record *rec )
@@ -1434,7 +1198,7 @@
              *
              * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
              * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
-             * mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below.
+             * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below.
              *
              * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
             rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
@@ -1458,8 +1222,8 @@
                                    transform->maclen );
 
             /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
-            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
-                                          transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+            if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
+                                              transform->maclen ) != 0 )
             {
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
                 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1520,7 +1284,7 @@
 
         if( auth_done == 1 )
         {
-            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
                                 rec->data_len,
                                 padlen + 1 );
             correct &= mask;
@@ -1540,7 +1304,7 @@
             }
 #endif
 
-            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
                                 rec->data_len,
                                 transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
             correct &= mask;
@@ -1574,18 +1338,18 @@
             /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
                 *              (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
                 */
-            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
-            const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
-                                                            padlen - 1 );
+            const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
+            const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx],
+                                                          padlen - 1 );
             pad_count += mask & equal;
         }
-        correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
+        correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
         if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
 #endif
-        padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
+        padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct );
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
@@ -1649,20 +1413,20 @@
         const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
         const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
 
-        ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
-                                    add_data, add_data_len,
-                                    data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
-                                    mac_expect );
+        ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+                               add_data, add_data_len,
+                               data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
+                               mac_expect );
         if( ret != 0 )
         {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret );
             return( ret );
         }
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
-                                        rec->data_len,
-                                        min_len, max_len,
-                                        transform->maclen );
+        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
+                                  rec->data_len,
+                                  min_len, max_len,
+                                  transform->maclen );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
@@ -1670,8 +1434,8 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
 #endif
 
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
-                                      transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
+                                          transform->maclen ) != 0 )
         {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@@ -2101,7 +1865,7 @@
 static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
-    unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8];
+    unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN];
 
     if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out )
     {
@@ -2117,9 +1881,11 @@
     ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform;
 
     /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */
-    memcpy( tmp_out_ctr,                 ssl->cur_out_ctr,            8 );
-    memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr,            ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 );
-    memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr,                 8 );
+    memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, sizeof( tmp_out_ctr ) );
+    memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr,
+            sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) );
+    memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr,
+            sizeof( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr ) );
 
     /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */
     mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
@@ -2558,11 +2324,17 @@
 #endif
         /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption,
          * as it may change when using the CID extension. */
+        int minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+        /* TLS 1.3 still uses the TLS 1.2 version identifier
+         * for backwards compatibility. */
+        if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
+            minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+        mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, minor_ver,
+                                   ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
-                           ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
-
-        memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
+        memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN );
         MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0);
 
         if( ssl->transform_out != NULL )
@@ -2574,8 +2346,8 @@
             rec.data_len    = ssl->out_msglen;
             rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf;
 
-            memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
-            mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
+            memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, sizeof( rec.ctr ) );
+            mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, minor_ver,
                                        ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver );
             rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype;
 
@@ -3649,9 +3421,12 @@
 #endif
         {
             unsigned i;
-            for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
+            for( i = MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
+                 i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
+            {
                 if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
                     break;
+            }
 
             /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
             if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
@@ -4791,7 +4566,7 @@
     }
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-    memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 );
+    memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN );
 
     mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
 
@@ -4827,12 +4602,12 @@
     {
         ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr +  3;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
-        ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr +  8;
+        ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
         ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid;
         if( transform != NULL )
             ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len;
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-        ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
+        ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
         ssl->out_iv  = ssl->out_len + 2;
     }
@@ -4881,17 +4656,17 @@
          * ssl_parse_record_header(). */
         ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr +  3;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
-        ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr +  8;
+        ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
         ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-        ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
+        ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
         ssl->in_iv  = ssl->in_len + 2;
     }
     else
 #endif
     {
-        ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8;
+        ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
         ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
         ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len;
@@ -5065,9 +4840,11 @@
     }
 
     in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len,
-                        ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
-    out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len,
-                          ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
+                         &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len],
+                         MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN - ep_len );
+    out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( &ssl->cur_out_ctr[ep_len],
+                          &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len],
+                          sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) - ep_len );
 
     if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 )
     {
@@ -5551,6 +5328,20 @@
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
 }
 
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
+{
+    ssl->transform_in = transform;
+    memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
+{
+    ssl->transform_out = transform;
+    memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) );
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
 
 void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -5639,4 +5430,48 @@
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Send pending fatal alert.
+ * 0,   No alert message.
+ * !0,  if mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned in error, the error code it
+ *      returned, ssl->alert_reason otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /* No pending alert, return success*/
+    if( ssl->send_alert == 0 )
+        return( 0 );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+                                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                ssl->alert_type );
+
+    /* If mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+     * do not clear the alert to be able to send it later.
+     */
+    if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+    {
+        ssl->send_alert = 0;
+    }
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    return( ssl->alert_reason );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set pending fatal alert flag.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   unsigned char alert_type,
+                                   int alert_reason )
+{
+    ssl->send_alert = 1;
+    ssl->alert_type = alert_type;
+    ssl->alert_reason = alert_reason;
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index b8c4314..5e2d152 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #include "mbedtls/debug.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@
         /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
         if( len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
             buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
                           ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@@ -1220,7 +1222,8 @@
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
         }
 
-        memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 );
+        memcpy( &ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2,
+                sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) - 2 );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
         if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
@@ -3035,14 +3038,16 @@
          * } ServerECDHParams;
          */
         const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL;
-        const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid;
+        const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
         int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
         size_t len = 0;
 
         /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
-        for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ )
+        if( group_list == NULL )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
+        for( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
             for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ )
-                if( (*curve)->grp_id == *gid )
+                if( (*curve)->tls_id == *group_list )
                     goto curve_matching_done;
 
 curve_matching_done:
@@ -3566,16 +3571,7 @@
     diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
 
     /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
-    /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
-     * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-    mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+    mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff );
 
     /*
      * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
@@ -3658,7 +3654,7 @@
         /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
          * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
         if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
         {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
         }
diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c
index bce9a1c..e998111 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ticket.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c
@@ -138,16 +138,14 @@
     ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
 
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher);
-    if( cipher_info == NULL )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
-    if( cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM &&
-        cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM )
+    if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM &&
+        mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM )
     {
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
     }
 
-    if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES )
+    if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ) > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 5cd47e6..b07d07a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/version.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -587,7 +588,6 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
           MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf )
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@@ -608,7 +608,6 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
     return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE );
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 int  mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
                           const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
@@ -660,8 +659,9 @@
  * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random
  * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version
  * - [in] endpoint: client or server
- * - [in] ssl: optionally used for:
- *        - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys
+ * - [in] ssl: used for:
+ *        - ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys
+ *      [in] optionally used for:
  *        - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg
  */
 static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
@@ -689,15 +689,18 @@
     unsigned char *mac_dec;
     size_t mac_key_len = 0;
     size_t iv_copy_len;
-    unsigned keylen;
+    size_t keylen;
     const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \
-    !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-    ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */
-    (void) ssl;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    if( ssl->f_export_keys == NULL )
+    {
+        ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for these cases */
+        (void) ssl;
+    }
 #endif
 
     /*
@@ -789,14 +792,14 @@
      * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length.
      */
 
-    keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8;
+    keylen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ) / 8;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) ||                           \
     defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) ||                           \
     defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
-        cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
-        cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
+    if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+        mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
+        mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
     {
         size_t explicit_ivlen;
 
@@ -814,7 +817,7 @@
          *   sequence number).
          */
         transform->ivlen = 12;
-        if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
+        if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
             transform->fixed_ivlen = 12;
         else
             transform->fixed_ivlen = 4;
@@ -826,8 +829,8 @@
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
-    if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
-        cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
+    if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
+        mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
     {
         /* Initialize HMAC contexts */
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ||
@@ -845,7 +848,7 @@
         transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size;
 
         /* Minimum length */
-        if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
+        if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
             transform->minlen = transform->maclen;
         else
         {
@@ -960,8 +963,7 @@
     ((void) mac_dec);
     ((void) mac_enc);
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
-    if( ssl->f_export_keys != NULL )
+    if( ssl != NULL && ssl->f_export_keys != NULL )
     {
         ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys,
                             MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET,
@@ -970,42 +972,26 @@
                             randbytes,
                             tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) );
     }
-#endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-
-    /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
-     * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
-     * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
-     * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
-     * implementation currently doesn't. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
-    if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+    ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
+                                    cipher_info, transform->taglen );
+    if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
     {
-        ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
-                                        cipher_info, transform->taglen );
-        if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
-            goto end;
-        }
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
+        goto end;
+    }
 
-        if( ret == 0 )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) );
-            psa_fallthrough = 0;
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
-            psa_fallthrough = 1;
-        }
+    if( ret == 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) );
+        psa_fallthrough = 0;
     }
     else
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
         psa_fallthrough = 1;
-#else
-    psa_fallthrough = 1;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+    }
 
     if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
@@ -1017,38 +1003,24 @@
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
-     * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
-     * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
-     * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
-     * implementation currently doesn't. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
-    if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+    ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
+                                    cipher_info, transform->taglen );
+    if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
     {
-        ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
-                                        cipher_info, transform->taglen );
-        if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
-            goto end;
-        }
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
+        goto end;
+    }
 
-        if( ret == 0 )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) );
-            psa_fallthrough = 0;
-        }
-        else
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
-            psa_fallthrough = 1;
-        }
+    if( ret == 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) );
+        psa_fallthrough = 0;
     }
     else
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
         psa_fallthrough = 1;
-#else
-    psa_fallthrough = 1;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+    }
 
     if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
@@ -1060,7 +1032,7 @@
     }
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1,
-                               cipher_info->key_bitlen,
+                               (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ),
                                MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret );
@@ -1068,7 +1040,7 @@
     }
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2,
-                               cipher_info->key_bitlen,
+                               (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ),
                                MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret );
@@ -1076,7 +1048,7 @@
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-    if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
+    if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
     {
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
                                              MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 )
@@ -2820,10 +2792,12 @@
 
         /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */
         ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out;
-        memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
+        memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr,
+                sizeof( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr ) );
 
         /* Set sequence_number to zero */
-        memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6 );
+        memset( &ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) - 2 );
+
 
         /* Increment epoch */
         for( i = 2; i > 0; i-- )
@@ -2839,7 +2813,7 @@
     }
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-    memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8 );
+    memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) );
 
     ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate;
     ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate;
@@ -2912,7 +2886,7 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
+    if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
                       buf, hash_len ) != 0 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
@@ -3100,6 +3074,52 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * curve_list is translated to IANA TLS group identifiers here because
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves returns void and so can't return
+ * any error codes.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+    /* Heap allocate and translate curve_list from internal to IANA group ids */
+    if ( ssl->conf->curve_list != NULL )
+    {
+        size_t length;
+        const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list = ssl->conf->curve_list;
+
+        for( length = 0;  ( curve_list[length] != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) &&
+                          ( length < MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX ); length++ ) {}
+
+        /* Leave room for zero termination */
+        uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_calloc( length + 1, sizeof(uint16_t) );
+        if ( group_list == NULL )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+        for( size_t i = 0; i < length; i++ )
+        {
+            const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info =
+                        mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( curve_list[i] );
+            if ( info == NULL )
+            {
+                mbedtls_free( group_list );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
+            }
+            group_list[i] = info->tls_id;
+        }
+
+        group_list[length] = 0;
+
+        ssl->handshake->group_list = group_list;
+        ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 1;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        ssl->handshake->group_list = ssl->conf->group_list;
+        ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 0;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
     return( 0 );
 }
 
@@ -3550,6 +3570,14 @@
     conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites;
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+                                                const int kex_modes )
+{
+    conf->tls13_kex_modes = kex_modes & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                     const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile )
@@ -3947,16 +3975,36 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /*
  * Set the allowed elliptic curves
+ *
+ * mbedtls_ssl_setup() takes the provided list
+ * and translates it to a list of IANA TLS group identifiers,
+ * stored in ssl->handshake->group_list.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                              const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list )
 {
     conf->curve_list = curve_list;
+    conf->group_list = NULL;
 }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
+/*
+ * Set the allowed groups
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+                              const uint16_t *group_list )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+    conf->curve_list = NULL;
+#endif
+    conf->group_list = group_list;
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
 int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname )
 {
@@ -4221,7 +4269,6 @@
 #endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                      mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys,
                                      void *p_export_keys )
@@ -4229,7 +4276,6 @@
     ssl->f_export_keys = f_export_keys;
     ssl->p_export_keys = p_export_keys;
 }
-#endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(
@@ -5162,12 +5208,16 @@
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
     if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
         if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only( ssl->conf ) )
-            ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step_tls1_3( ssl );
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( ssl );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@@ -5181,7 +5231,7 @@
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
         if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only( ssl->conf ) )
-            ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step_tls1_3( ssl );
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step( ssl );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@@ -5191,6 +5241,19 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        /* handshake_step return error. And it is same
+         * with alert_reason.
+         */
+        if( ssl->send_alert )
+        {
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert( ssl );
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+
+cleanup:
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -5383,6 +5446,14 @@
     if( handshake == NULL )
         return;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+    if ( ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated )
+        mbedtls_free( (void*) handshake->group_list );
+    handshake->group_list = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
     if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
     {
@@ -5481,8 +5552,13 @@
     psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake,
-                              sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( handshake->transform_earlydata );
+    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_earlydata );
+    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
     /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS
@@ -5493,12 +5569,9 @@
                                     mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) );
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
-    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_earlydata );
-    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
-    handshake->transform_earlydata = NULL;
-    handshake->transform_handshake = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+    /* mbedtls_platform_zeroize MUST be last one in this function */
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake,
+                              sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) );
 }
 
 void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
@@ -5767,11 +5840,11 @@
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
-    used += 8;
+    used += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
     if( used <= buf_len )
     {
-        memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
-        p += 8;
+        memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN );
+        p += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN;
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@@ -6027,11 +6100,10 @@
     ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
-    if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 )
+    if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
-    memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 );
-    p += 8;
+    memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) );
+    p += sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
     if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 )
@@ -6238,41 +6310,39 @@
 };
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
 /* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in
  * x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters:
  * curves with a lower resource usage come first.
  * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise
  * about this list.
  */
-static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_default_curves[] = {
+static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1,
 #endif
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE
 };
-#endif
 
 static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = {
     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
@@ -6301,6 +6371,12 @@
     MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+    /* RSA algorithms */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+    MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif
+
     MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE
 };
 
@@ -6314,22 +6390,26 @@
     MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+    /* RSA algorithms */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+    MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif
+
     MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE
 };
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = {
+static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1,
 #endif
-    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE
 };
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config
@@ -6393,22 +6473,29 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-            if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
-            {
-                const unsigned char dhm_p[] =
-                    MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN;
-                const unsigned char dhm_g[] =
-                    MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN;
+    if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
+    {
+        const unsigned char dhm_p[] =
+            MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN;
+        const unsigned char dhm_g[] =
+            MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN;
 
-                if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf,
-                                               dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ),
-                                               dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 )
-                {
-                    return( ret );
-                }
-            }
+        if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf,
+                                                    dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ),
+                                                    dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            return( ret );
+        }
+    }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    /*
+     * Allow all TLS 1.3 key exchange modes by default.
+     */
+    conf->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
     /*
      * Preset-specific defaults
      */
@@ -6436,9 +6523,10 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-            conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+            conf->curve_list = NULL;
 #endif
+            conf->group_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_groups;
             break;
 
         /*
@@ -6473,9 +6561,10 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-            conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_default_curves;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+            conf->curve_list = NULL;
 #endif
+            conf->group_list = ssl_preset_default_groups;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
             conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024;
@@ -6699,14 +6788,17 @@
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id )
 {
-    const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid;
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
 
-    if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL )
+    if( group_list == NULL )
         return( -1 );
+    uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id)->tls_id;
 
-    for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ )
-        if( *gid == grp_id )
+    for( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
+    {
+        if( *group_list == tls_id )
             return( 0 );
+    }
 
     return( -1 );
 }
@@ -6963,4 +7055,106 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
+                                          unsigned char *dst,
+                                          size_t dst_len,
+                                          size_t *olen )
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) md);
+    ((void) dst);
+    ((void) dst_len);
+    *olen = 0;
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE);
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                unsigned char *dst,
+                                                size_t dst_len,
+                                                size_t *olen )
+{
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
+
+    if( dst_len < 48 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+    mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 );
+    mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &sha512, dst ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha512_finish", ret );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    *olen = 48;
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 );
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                unsigned char *dst,
+                                                size_t dst_len,
+                                                size_t *olen )
+{
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
+
+    if( dst_len < 32 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+    mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 );
+    mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &sha256, dst ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha256_finish", ret );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    *olen = 32;
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 );
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
+                                          unsigned char *dst,
+                                          size_t dst_len,
+                                          size_t *olen )
+{
+    switch( md )
+    {
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+    case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+        return( ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384( ssl, dst, dst_len, olen ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+    case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+        return( ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256( ssl, dst, dst_len, olen ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index 368b557..d848415 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -25,13 +25,1701 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
 
-#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include <string.h>
 
-int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step_tls1_3( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "ecdh_misc.h"
+#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
+
+/* Write extensions */
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext():
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *      ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
+ * } SupportedVersions;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                   unsigned char *buf,
+                                                   unsigned char *end,
+                                                   size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported versions extension" ) );
+
+    /* Check if we have space to write the extension:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - versions_length        (1 byte )
+     * - versions               (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 7 );
+
+    /* Write extension_type */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0 );
+
+    /* Write extension_data_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( 3, p, 2 );
+    p += 4;
+
+    /* Length of versions */
+    *p++ = 0x2;
+
+    /* Write values of supported versions.
+     *
+     * They are defined by the configuration.
+     *
+     * Currently, only one version is advertised.
+     */
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver,
+                               ssl->conf->max_minor_ver,
+                               ssl->conf->transport, p );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "supported version: [%d:%d]",
+                                ssl->conf->max_major_ver,
+                                ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) );
+
+    *olen = 7;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                   const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                   const unsigned char *end )
 {
     ((void) ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, 2);
+    if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
+        buf[1] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unexpected version" ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Functions for writing supported_groups extension.
+ *
+ * Stucture of supported_groups:
+ *      enum {
+ *          secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
+ *          x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
+ *          ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
+ *          ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
+ *          ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
+ *          ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ *          (0xFFFF)
+ *      } NamedGroup;
+ *      struct {
+ *          NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
+ *      } NamedGroupList;
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+/*
+ * In versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3, this extension was named
+ * 'elliptic_curves' and only contained elliptic curve groups.
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_ecdhe( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                   unsigned char *buf,
+                                                   unsigned char *end,
+                                                   size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
+
+    if( group_list == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
+
+    for ( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
+    {
+        const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
+        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( *group_list );
+        if( info == NULL )
+            continue;
+
+        if( !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( *group_list ) )
+            continue;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2);
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *group_list, p, 0 );
+        p += 2;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "NamedGroup: %s ( %x )",
+                                    info->name, *group_list ) );
+    }
+
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#else
+static int ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_ecdhe( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                            unsigned char *buf,
+                                            unsigned char *end,
+                                            size_t *olen )
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) buf);
+    ((void) end);
+    *olen = 0;
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+static int ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_dhe( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char *buf,
+                                        unsigned char *end,
+                                        size_t *olen )
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) buf);
+    ((void) end);
+    *olen = 0;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "write_named_group_dhe is not implemented" ) );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_groups_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                 unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 unsigned char *end,
+                                                 size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf ;
+    unsigned char *named_group_list_ptr; /* Start of named_group_list */
+    size_t named_group_list_len;         /* Length of named_group_list */
+    size_t output_len = 0;
+    int ret_ecdhe, ret_dhe;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if( !mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) )
+        return( 0 );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_groups extension" ) );
+
+    /* Check if we have space for header and length fields:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - named_group_list_length   (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
+    p += 6;
+
+    named_group_list_ptr = p;
+    ret_ecdhe = ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_ecdhe( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret_ecdhe != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_ecdhe", ret_ecdhe );
+    }
+    p += output_len;
+
+    ret_dhe = ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_dhe( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret_dhe != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_write_named_group_list_dhe", ret_dhe );
+    }
+    p += output_len;
+
+    /* Both ECDHE and DHE failed. */
+    if( ret_ecdhe != 0 && ret_dhe != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Both ECDHE and DHE groups are fail. " ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    /* Length of named_group_list*/
+    named_group_list_len = p - named_group_list_ptr;
+    if( named_group_list_len == 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No group available." ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    /* Write extension_type */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, buf, 0 );
+    /* Write extension_data_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( named_group_list_len + 2, buf, 2 );
+    /* Write length of named_group_list */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( named_group_list_len, buf, 4 );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Supported groups extension", buf + 4, named_group_list_len + 2 );
+
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for writing key_share extension.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+static int ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_ecdh_key_exchange(
+                mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                uint16_t named_group,
+                unsigned char *buf,
+                unsigned char *end,
+                size_t *olen )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info =
+        mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( named_group );
+
+    if( curve_info == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "offer curve %s", curve_info->name ) );
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup_no_everest( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                               curve_info->grp_id ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_setup_no_everest", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_make_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, olen,
+                                           buf, end - buf,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_make_params", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                            MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           uint16_t *group_id )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
+    /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */
+    if( group_list == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
+
+    for ( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
+    {
+        const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
+        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( *group_list );
+        if( info != NULL &&
+            mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( *group_list ) )
+        {
+            *group_id = *group_list;
+            return( 0 );
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) group_id);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+    /*
+     * Add DHE named groups here.
+     * Pick first available DHE group compatible with TLS 1.3
+     */
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext
+ *
+ * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello:
+ *
+ *  struct {
+ *          NamedGroup group;
+ *          opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ *      } KeyShareEntry;
+ *  struct {
+ *          KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
+ *      } KeyShareClientHello;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          unsigned char *buf,
+                                          unsigned char *end,
+                                          size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *client_shares_ptr; /* Start of client_shares */
+    size_t client_shares_len;         /* Length of client_shares */
+    uint16_t group_id;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if( !mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) )
+        return( 0 );
+
+    /* Check if we have space for header and length fields:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - client_shares_length   (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
+    p += 6;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello: adding key share extension" ) );
+
+    /* HRR could already have requested something else. */
+    group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id;
+    if( !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group_id ) &&
+        !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( group_id ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id( ssl,
+                                                              &group_id ) );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function.
+     *
+     * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction
+     * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per
+     * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And
+     * only one key share entry is allowed.
+     */
+    client_shares_ptr = p;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group_id ) )
+    {
+        /* Pointer to group */
+        unsigned char *group_ptr = p;
+        /* Length of key_exchange */
+        size_t key_exchange_len;
+
+        /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry
+         * - group                  (2 bytes)
+         * - key_exchange_length    (2 bytes)
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+        p += 4;
+        ret = ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_ecdh_key_exchange( ssl, group_id,
+                                                              p, end,
+                                                              &key_exchange_len );
+        p += key_exchange_len;
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            return( ret );
+
+        /* Write group */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( group_id, group_ptr, 0 );
+        /* Write key_exchange_length */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( key_exchange_len, group_ptr, 2 );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+    if( 0 /* other KEMs? */ )
+    {
+        /* Do something */
+    }
+    else
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+    /* Length of client_shares */
+    client_shares_len = p - client_shares_ptr;
+    if( client_shares_len == 0)
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No key share defined." ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+    /* Write extension_type */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0 );
+    /* Write extension_data_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2 );
+    /* Write client_shares_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( client_shares_len, buf, 4 );
+
+    /* Update offered_group_id field */
+    ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id;
+
+    /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *olen );
+
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE;
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+
+static int ssl_tls13_check_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+    grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
+#else
+    grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
+#endif
+
+    curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
+    if( curve_info == NULL )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
+
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
+        return( -1 );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                            MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_read_public_ecdhe_share( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              const unsigned char *buf,
+                                              size_t buf_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                          buf, buf_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_tls13_read_public" ), ret );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+    if( ssl_tls13_check_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ssl_tls13_check_ecdh_params() failed!" ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext()
+ *      Parse key_share extension in Server Hello
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *        KeyShareEntry server_share;
+ * } KeyShareServerHello;
+ * struct {
+ *        NamedGroup group;
+ *        opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } KeyShareEntry;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                                          const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    uint16_t group, offered_group;
+
+    /* ...
+     * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes)
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */
+    offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id;
+    if( offered_group != group )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+            ( "Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u",
+              (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group ) )
+    {
+        /* Complete ECDHE key agreement */
+        ret = ssl_tls13_read_public_ecdhe_share( ssl, p, end - p );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            return( ret );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+    if( 0 /* other KEMs? */ )
+    {
+        /* Do something */
+    }
+    else
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE;
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+/* Write cipher_suites
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites(
+            mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+            unsigned char *buf,
+            unsigned char *end,
+            size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const int *ciphersuite_list;
+    unsigned char *cipher_suites_ptr; /* Start of the cipher_suites list */
+    size_t cipher_suites_len;
+
+    *olen = 0 ;
+
+    /*
+     * Ciphersuite list
+     *
+     * This is a list of the symmetric cipher options supported by
+     * the client, specifically the record protection algorithm
+     * ( including secret key length ) and a hash to be used with
+     * HKDF, in descending order of client preference.
+     */
+    ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
+
+    /* Check there is space for the cipher suite list length (2 bytes). */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Write cipher_suites */
+    cipher_suites_ptr = p;
+    for ( size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++ )
+    {
+        int cipher_suite = ciphersuite_list[i];
+        const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+        ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( cipher_suite );
+        if( ciphersuite_info == NULL )
+            continue;
+        if( !( MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 >= ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver &&
+               MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 <= ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver ) )
+            continue;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x, %s",
+                                    (unsigned int) cipher_suite,
+                                    ciphersuite_info->name ) );
+
+        /* Check there is space for the cipher suite identifier (2 bytes). */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( cipher_suite, p, 0 );
+        p += 2;
+    }
+
+    /* Write the cipher_suites length in number of bytes */
+    cipher_suites_len = p - cipher_suites_ptr;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( cipher_suites_len, buf, 0 );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+                           ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " cipher suites",
+                             cipher_suites_len/2 ) );
+
+    /* Output the total length of cipher_suites field. */
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Structure of ClientHello message:
+ *
+ *    struct {
+ *        ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    // TLS v1.2
+ *        Random random;
+ *        opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
+ *        CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
+ *        opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
+ *        Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
+ *    } ClientHello;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char *buf,
+                                              unsigned char *end,
+                                              size_t *olen )
+{
+
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *extensions_len_ptr; /* Pointer to extensions length */
+    size_t output_len;                 /* Length of buffer used by function */
+    size_t extensions_len;             /* Length of the list of extensions*/
+
+    /* Buffer management */
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* No validation needed here. It has been done by ssl_conf_check() */
+    ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver;
+    ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver;
+
+    /*
+     * Write legacy_version
+     *    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    // TLS v1.2
+     *
+     *  For TLS 1.3 we use the legacy version number {0x03, 0x03}
+     *  instead of the true version number.
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( 0x0303, p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Write the random bytes ( random ).*/
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN );
+    memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes",
+                           p, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN );
+    p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN;
+
+    /*
+     * Write legacy_session_id
+     *
+     * Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a "session resumption" feature
+     * which has been merged with pre-shared keys in this version. A client
+     * which has a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 server SHOULD set
+     * this field to that value. In compatibility mode, this field MUST be
+     * non-empty, so a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 session MUST generate
+     * a new 32-byte value. This value need not be random but SHOULD be
+     * unpredictable to avoid implementations fixating on a specific value
+     * ( also known as ossification ). Otherwise, it MUST be set as a zero-length
+     * vector ( i.e., a zero-valued single byte length field ).
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 );
+    *p++ = 0; /* session id length set to zero */
+
+    /* Write cipher_suites */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+
+    /* Write legacy_compression_methods
+     *
+     * For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly
+     * one byte set to zero, which corresponds to the 'null' compression
+     * method in prior versions of TLS.
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    *p++ = 1;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
+
+    /* Write extensions */
+
+    /* Keeping track of the included extensions */
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE;
+
+    /* First write extensions, then the total length */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    extensions_len_ptr = p;
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Write supported_versions extension
+     *
+     * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    /* Write supported_groups extension
+     *
+     * It is REQUIRED for ECDHE cipher_suites.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_groups_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+
+    /* Write key_share extension
+     *
+     * We need to send the key shares under three conditions:
+     * 1) A certificate-based ciphersuite is being offered. In this case
+     *    supported_groups and supported_signature extensions have been
+     *    successfully added.
+     * 2) A PSK-based ciphersuite with ECDHE is offered. In this case the
+     *    psk_key_exchange_modes has been added as the last extension.
+     * 3) Or, in case all ciphers are supported ( which includes #1 and #2
+     *    from above )
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+
+    /* Write signature_algorithms extension
+     *
+     * It is REQUIRED for certificate authenticated cipher_suites.
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    /* Write server name extension */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    p += output_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+    /* Add more extensions here */
+
+    /* Write the length of the list of extensions. */
+    extensions_len = p - extensions_len_ptr - 2;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( extensions_len, extensions_len_ptr, 0 );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ,
+                                extensions_len ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", extensions_len_ptr, extensions_len );
+
+    *olen = p - buf;
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_prepare_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided" ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
+    }
+
+    if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng,
+                                  ssl->handshake->randbytes,
+                                  MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write ClientHello handshake message.
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len, msg_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_prepare_client_hello( ssl ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg(
+                                ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_body( ssl, buf,
+                                                             buf + buf_len,
+                                                             &msg_len ) );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( ssl,
+                                              MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                              msg_len );
+    ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello( ssl ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                                                                  buf_len,
+                                                                  msg_len ) );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello
+ */
+/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR
+ * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next. */
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO 0
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR 1
+static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                                    const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    static const unsigned char magic_hrr_string[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN] =
+        { 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
+          0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
+          0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E,
+          0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33 ,0x9C };
+
+    /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message.
+     *
+     * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the
+     * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest".
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
+     *    Random random;
+     *    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+     *    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+     *    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+     *    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+     * } ServerHello;
+     *
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, 2 + sizeof( magic_hrr_string ) );
+
+    if( memcmp( buf + 2, magic_hrr_string, sizeof( magic_hrr_string ) ) == 0 )
+    {
+        return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR );
+    }
+
+    return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO );
+}
+
+/* Fetch and preprocess
+ * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char **buf,
+                                              size_t *buf_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 ) );
+
+    if( ( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) ||
+        ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unexpected message" ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+    }
+
+    *buf = ssl->in_msg + 4;
+    *buf_len = ssl->in_hslen - 4;
+
+    ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( ssl, *buf, *buf + *buf_len );
+    switch( ret )
+    {
+        case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received ServerHello message" ) );
+            break;
+        case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received HelloRetryRequest message" ) );
+            break;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                         const unsigned char **buf,
+                                                         const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *buf;
+    size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 1 );
+    legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++ ;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len );
+
+    /* legacy_session_id_echo */
+    if( ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len ||
+        memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p , legacy_session_id_echo_len ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Expected Session ID",
+                               ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+                               ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Received Session ID", p,
+                               legacy_session_id_echo_len );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+    p += legacy_session_id_echo_len;
+    *buf = p;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+                            ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              int cipher_suite )
+{
+    const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
+
+    /* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */
+    for ( size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++ )
+    {
+        if( ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite )
+        {
+            return( 1 );
+        }
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/* Parse ServerHello message and configure context
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2
+ *    Random random;
+ *    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+ *    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+ *    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+ *    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerHello;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         const unsigned char *buf,
+                                         const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t extensions_len;
+    const unsigned char *extensions_end;
+    uint16_t cipher_suite;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+    /*
+     * Check there is space for minimal fields
+     *
+     * - legacy_version             ( 2 bytes)
+     * - random                     (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes)
+     * - legacy_session_id_echo     ( 1 byte ), minimum size
+     * - cipher_suite               ( 2 bytes)
+     * - legacy_compression_method  ( 1 byte )
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6 );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server hello", p, end - p );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", p, 2 );
+
+    /* ...
+     * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2
+     * ...
+     * with ProtocolVersion defined as:
+     * uint16 ProtocolVersion;
+     */
+    if( !( p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
+           p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Unsupported version of TLS." ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+    }
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* ...
+     * Random random;
+     * ...
+     * with Random defined as:
+     * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
+     */
+    memcpy( &ssl->handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p,
+            MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes",
+                           p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN );
+    p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN;
+
+    /* ...
+     * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+     * ...
+     */
+    if( ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+    /* ...
+     * CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+     * ...
+     * with CipherSuite defined as:
+     * uint8 CipherSuite[2];
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+
+    /*
+     * Check whether this ciphersuite is supported and offered.
+     * Via the force_ciphersuite version we may have instructed the client
+     * to use a different ciphersuite.
+     */
+    ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( cipher_suite );
+    if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ||
+        ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( ssl, cipher_suite ) == 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite(%04x) not found or not offered",
+                                    cipher_suite ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+
+
+    /* Configure ciphersuites */
+    mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ciphersuite_info );
+
+    ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s",
+                                 cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    ssl->session_negotiate->start = time( NULL );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+    /* ...
+     * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 1 );
+    if( p[0] != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad legacy compression method" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+    }
+    p++;
+
+    /* ...
+     * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+     * ...
+     * struct {
+     *      ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes)
+     *      opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+     * } Extension;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len );
+    extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len );
+
+    while( p < extensions_end )
+    {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 );
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 );
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len );
+
+        switch( extension_type )
+        {
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+                            ( "found supported_versions extension" ) );
+
+                ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext( ssl,
+                                                              p,
+                                                              p + extension_data_len );
+                if( ret != 0 )
+                    return( ret );
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found pre_shared_key extension." ) );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pre_shared_key:Not supported yet" ) );
+
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT,
+                    MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found key_shares extension" ) );
+                if( ( ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext( ssl,
+                                            p, p + extension_data_len ) ) != 0 )
+                {
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+                                           "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext",
+                                           ret );
+                    return( ret );
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+                    3,
+                    ( "unknown extension found: %u ( ignoring )",
+                      extension_type ) );
+
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT,
+                    MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+        }
+
+        p += extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* Determine the key exchange mode:
+     * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received
+     *    then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL.
+     * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key
+     *    exchange mode is PSK-only.
+     * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key
+     *    exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only.
+     */
+    switch( handshake->extensions_present &
+            ( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ) )
+    {
+        /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
+            handshake->tls1_3_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+            break;
+
+        /* Only the key_share extension was received */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
+            handshake->tls1_3_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
+            break;
+
+        /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */
+        case ( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ):
+            handshake->tls1_3_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+            break;
+
+        /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Unknown key exchange." ) );
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: Set the PSK and derive early secret.
+     *
+     * TODO: We don't have to do this in case we offered 0-RTT and the
+     *       server accepted it. In this case, we could skip generating
+     *       the early secret. */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early_data",
+                               ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Compute handshake secret */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_master_secret", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and
+     * key material. */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys( ssl, &traffic_keys );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys",
+                               ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
+    if( transform_handshake == NULL )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( transform_handshake,
+                              ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                              ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+                              &traffic_keys,
+                              ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake;
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( ssl, transform_handshake );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" ) );
+    ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+    /*
+     * State machine update
+     */
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &traffic_keys, sizeof( traffic_keys ) );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_free( transform_handshake );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    }
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message.
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> %s", __func__ ) );
+
+    /* Coordination step
+     * - Fetch record
+     * - Make sure it's either a ServerHello or a HRR.
+     * - Switch processing routine in case of HRR
+     */
+    ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3;
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE;
+
+    ret = ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( ssl, &buf, &buf_len );
+    /* Parsing step
+     * We know what message to expect by now and call
+     * the respective parsing function.
+     */
+    if( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello( ssl, buf,
+                                                            buf + buf_len ) );
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl,
+                                                   MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                                                   buf, buf_len );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello( ssl ) );
+    }
+    else if( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "HRR not supported" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= %s", __func__ ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * EncryptedExtensions message
+ *
+ * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which
+ * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish
+ * the cryptographic context.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Overview
+ */
+
+/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions */
+static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                 const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 const unsigned char *end );
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/*
+ * Handler for  MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse encrypted extensions" ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                                             MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                                             &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+    /* Process the message contents */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+        ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, buf, buf_len );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( ssl ) );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse encrypted extensions" ) );
+    return( ret );
+
+}
+
+/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message
+ * struct {
+ *     Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } EncryptedExtensions;
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                 const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t extensions_len;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *extensions_end;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len );
+    extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len );
+
+    while( p < extensions_end )
+    {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+
+        /*
+         * struct {
+         *     ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes)
+         *     opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+         * } Extension;
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 );
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 );
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len );
+
+        /* The client MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the
+         * presence of any forbidden extensions and if any are found MUST abort
+         * the handshake with an "unsupported_extension" alert.
+         */
+        switch( extension_type )
+        {
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extensions supported groups" ) );
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+                    3, ( "unsupported extension found: %u ", extension_type) );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT,
+                    MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+                return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+        }
+
+        p += extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that we consumed all the message. */
+    if( p != end )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_some_psk_enabled( ssl ) )
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED );
+    else
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED );
+#endif
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Handler for  MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    if( ( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) &&
+        ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CertificateRequest not supported" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    }
+
+    ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_process_server_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_process_server_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED
+ */
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_flush_buffers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP
+ */
+static int ssl_tls1_3_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to application keys for inbound traffic" ) );
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform ( ssl, ssl->transform_application );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to application keys for outbound traffic" ) );
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->transform_application );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER );
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "tls1_3 client state: %d", ssl->state ) );
+
+    switch( ssl->state )
+    {
+        /*
+         * ssl->state is initialized as HELLO_REQUEST. It is the same
+         * as CLIENT_HELLO state.
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_hello( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( ssl );
+            break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_process_server_certificate( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_process_certificate_verify( ssl );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_process_server_finished( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_flush_buffers( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+            ret = ssl_tls1_3_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    }
+
+    return( ret );
+}
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dd5c50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1153 @@
+/*
+ *  TLS 1.3 functionality shared between client and server
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                            unsigned hs_type,
+                                            unsigned char **buf,
+                                            size_t *buflen )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
+        ssl->in_msg[0]  != hs_type )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Receive unexpected handshake message." ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Jump handshake header (4 bytes, see Section 4 of RFC 8446).
+     *    ...
+     *    HandshakeType msg_type;
+     *    uint24 length;
+     *    ...
+     */
+    *buf    = ssl->in_msg   + 4;
+    *buflen = ssl->in_hslen - 4;
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           unsigned hs_type,
+                                           unsigned char **buf,
+                                           size_t *buf_len )
+{
+    /*
+     * Reserve 4 bytes for hanshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 )
+     *    ...
+     *    HandshakeType msg_type;
+     *    uint24 length;
+     *    ...
+     */
+    *buf = ssl->out_msg + 4;
+    *buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4;
+
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = hs_type;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                            size_t buf_len,
+                                            size_t msg_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t msg_len_with_header;
+    ((void) buf_len);
+
+    /* Add reserved 4 bytes for handshake header */
+    msg_len_with_header = msg_len + 4;
+    ssl->out_msglen = msg_len_with_header;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext( ssl, 0 ) );
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                unsigned hs_type,
+                                                unsigned char const *msg,
+                                                size_t msg_len )
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( ssl, hs_type, msg_len );
+    ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, msg, msg_len );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               unsigned hs_type,
+                                               size_t total_hs_len )
+{
+    unsigned char hs_hdr[4];
+
+    /* Build HS header for checksum update. */
+    hs_hdr[0] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_type );
+    hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( total_hs_len );
+    hs_hdr[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( total_hs_len );
+    hs_hdr[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_hs_len );
+
+    ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof( hs_hdr ) );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( )
+ *
+ * enum {
+ *    ....
+ *   ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ),
+ *   ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ),
+ *   ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ),
+ *    ....
+ * } SignatureScheme;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *    SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ * } SignatureSchemeList;
+ *
+ * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         unsigned char *buf,
+                                         unsigned char *end,
+                                         size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *supported_sig_alg_ptr; /* Start of supported_signature_algorithms */
+    size_t supported_sig_alg_len = 0;     /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* Skip the extension on the client if all allowed key exchanges
+     * are PSK-based. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+    if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+        !mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
+
+    /* Check if we have space for header and length field:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - supported_signature_algorithms_length   (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
+    p += 6;
+
+    /*
+     * Write supported_signature_algorithms
+     */
+    supported_sig_alg_ptr = p;
+    for( const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->conf->tls13_sig_algs;
+         *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++ )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, 0 );
+        p += 2;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "signature scheme [%x]", *sig_alg ) );
+    }
+
+    /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */
+    supported_sig_alg_len = p - supported_sig_alg_ptr;
+    if( supported_sig_alg_len == 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No signature algorithms defined." ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    /* Write extension_type */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, buf, 0 );
+    /* Write extension_data_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( supported_sig_alg_len + 2, buf, 2 );
+    /* Write length of supported_signature_algorithms */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( supported_sig_alg_len, buf, 4 );
+
+    /* Output the total length of signature algorithms extension. */
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG;
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify
+ */
+/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure.
+ *
+ * The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as:
+ *   - 64 bytes of octet 32,
+ *   - 33 bytes for the context string
+ *        (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"
+ *         or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"),
+ *   - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator,
+ *   - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
+ *     (depending on the size of the transcript_hash)
+ *
+ * This results in a total size of
+ * - 130 bytes for a SHA256-based transcript hash, or
+ *   (64 + 33 + 1 + 32 bytes)
+ * - 146 bytes for a SHA384-based transcript hash.
+ *   (64 + 33 + 1 + 48 bytes)
+ *
+ */
+#define SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE  ( 64 +                          \
+                                      33 +                          \
+                                       1 +                          \
+                                      MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE    \
+                                    )
+
+/*
+ * The ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure() creates the verify structure.
+ * As input, it requires the transcript hash.
+ *
+ * The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least
+ * SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes.
+ */
+static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( const unsigned char *transcript_hash,
+                                               size_t transcript_hash_len,
+                                               unsigned char *verify_buffer,
+                                               size_t *verify_buffer_len,
+                                               int from )
+{
+    size_t idx;
+
+    /* RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3:
+     *
+     * The digital signature [in the CertificateVerify message] is then
+     * computed over the concatenation of:
+     * -  A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times
+     * -  The context string
+     * -  A single 0 byte which serves as the separator
+     * -  The content to be signed
+     */
+    memset( verify_buffer, 0x20, 64 );
+    idx = 64;
+
+    if( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+    {
+        memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( client_cv ) );
+        idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( client_cv );
+    }
+    else
+    { /* from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */
+        memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( server_cv ) );
+        idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( server_cv );
+    }
+
+    verify_buffer[idx++] = 0x0;
+
+    memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, transcript_hash, transcript_hash_len );
+    idx += transcript_hash_len;
+
+    *verify_buffer_len = idx;
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+    const uint16_t *tls13_sig_alg = ssl->conf->tls13_sig_algs;
+
+    for( ; *tls13_sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE ; tls13_sig_alg++ )
+    {
+        if( *tls13_sig_alg == sig_alg )
+            return( 1 );
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               const unsigned char *buf,
+                                               const unsigned char *end,
+                                               const unsigned char *verify_buffer,
+                                               size_t verify_buffer_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    uint16_t algorithm;
+    size_t signature_len;
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+    unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t verify_hash_len;
+
+    void const *opts_ptr = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+    mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options opts;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     SignatureScheme algorithm;
+     *     opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
+     * } CertificateVerify;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    algorithm = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
+     *
+     * If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature algorithm
+     * MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" extension unless
+     * no valid certificate chain can be produced without unsupported algorithms
+     *
+     * RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2
+     *
+     * If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided
+     * certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake
+     * with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate").
+     *
+     * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm.
+     */
+    if( ! ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, algorithm ) )
+    {
+        /* algorithm not in offered signature algorithms list */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Received signature algorithm(%04x) is not "
+                                    "offered.",
+                                    ( unsigned int ) algorithm ) );
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* We currently only support ECDSA-based signatures */
+    switch( algorithm )
+    {
+        case MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+            md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+            sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+            break;
+        case MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+            md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
+            sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+            break;
+        case MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+            md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
+            sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+            break;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+        case MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "Certificate Verify: using RSA" ) );
+            md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+            sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Certificate Verify: Unknown signature algorithm." ) );
+            goto error;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( %04x )",
+                                ( unsigned int ) algorithm ) );
+
+    /*
+     * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
+     */
+    if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, sig_alg ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "signature algorithm doesn't match cert key" ) );
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+    signature_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+    p += 2;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, signature_len );
+
+    /* Hash verify buffer with indicated hash function */
+    switch( md_alg )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+            verify_hash_len = 32;
+            ret = mbedtls_sha256( verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len, verify_hash, 0 );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+            verify_hash_len = 48;
+            ret = mbedtls_sha512( verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len, verify_hash, 1 );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+            verify_hash_len = 64;
+            ret = mbedtls_sha512( verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len, verify_hash, 0 );
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+
+        default:
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "hash computation error", ret );
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+    if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
+    {
+        const mbedtls_md_info_t* md_info;
+        opts.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
+        if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
+        {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+        }
+        opts.expected_salt_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+        opts_ptr = (const void*) &opts;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, opts_ptr,
+                                       &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
+                                       md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
+                                       p, signature_len ) ) == 0 )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret );
+
+error:
+    /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
+     *
+     * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake
+     * with a "decrypt_error" alert.
+    */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR,
+                                  MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t verify_buffer_len;
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+    /* Need to calculate the hash of the transcript first
+     * before reading the message since otherwise it gets
+     * included in the transcript
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl,
+                            ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
+                            transcript, sizeof( transcript ),
+                            &transcript_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len );
+
+    /* Create verify structure */
+    ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( transcript,
+                                       transcript_len,
+                                       verify_buffer,
+                                       &verify_buffer_len,
+                                       ( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ?
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER :
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT );
+
+    /* Process the message contents */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, buf,
+                            buf + buf_len, verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len ) );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl,
+                        MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, buf, buf_len );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify", ret );
+    return( ret );
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Certificate, client-side only currently.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+/*
+ * Structure of Certificate message:
+ *
+ * enum {
+ *     X509(0),
+ *     RawPublicKey(2),
+ *     (255)
+ * } CertificateType;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *     select (certificate_type) {
+ *         case RawPublicKey:
+ *           * From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo *
+ *           opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
+ *         case X509:
+ *           opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
+ *     };
+ *     Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateEntry;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *     opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ *     CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+ * } Certificate;
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Parse certificate chain send by the server. */
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0;
+    size_t certificate_list_len = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *certificate_list_end;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+    certificate_request_context_len = p[0];
+    certificate_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( p, 1 );
+    p += 4;
+
+    /* In theory, the certificate list can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't
+     * support anything beyond 2^16 = 64K.
+     */
+    if( ( certificate_request_context_len != 0 ) ||
+        ( certificate_list_len >= 0x10000 ) )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */
+    if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
+    {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+        mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+    }
+
+    if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert =
+          mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc( %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes ) failed",
+                                    sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+
+    certificate_list_end = p + certificate_list_len;
+    while( p < certificate_list_end )
+    {
+        size_t cert_data_len, extensions_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, 3 );
+        cert_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( p, 0 );
+        p += 3;
+
+        /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't support
+         * anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. Otherwise as in the TLS 1.2 code,
+         * check that we have a minimum of 128 bytes of data, this is not
+         * clear why we need that though.
+         */
+        if( ( cert_data_len < 128 ) || ( cert_data_len >= 0x10000 ) )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad Certificate message" ) );
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                          MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, cert_data_len );
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
+                                          p, cert_data_len );
+
+        switch( ret )
+        {
+            case 0: /*ok*/
+                break;
+            case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
+                /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
+                   prior certificate was already trusted. */
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                              MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
+                return( ret );
+
+            case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT,
+                                              MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
+                return( ret );
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT,
+                                              ret );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
+                return( ret );
+        }
+
+        p += cert_data_len;
+
+        /* Certificate extensions length */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, 2 );
+        extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+        p += 2;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, extensions_len );
+        p += extensions_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that all the message is consumed. */
+    if( p != end )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad Certificate message" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+#else
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) buf);
+    ((void) end);
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+/* Validate certificate chain sent by the server. */
+static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
+    mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
+    uint32_t verify_result = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
+    {
+        ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+        ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+    {
+        ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+        ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Main check: verify certificate
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(
+        ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
+        ca_chain, ca_crl,
+        ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+        ssl->hostname,
+        &verify_result,
+        ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
+     */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+    {
+        const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+
+        /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
+        if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
+            mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
+        {
+            verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate ( EC key curve )" ) );
+            if( ret == 0 )
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
+                                      ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info,
+                                      !ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                      &verify_result ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate ( usage extensions )" ) );
+        if( ret == 0 )
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+
+
+    if( ca_chain == NULL )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
+           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
+           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
+        if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret );
+        else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret );
+        else if( verify_result & ( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE |
+                                   MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE |
+                                   MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE |
+                                   MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK |
+                                   MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret );
+        else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret );
+        else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret );
+        else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret );
+        else
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret );
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    if( verify_result != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x",
+                                    (unsigned int) verify_result ) );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result;
+    return( ret );
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg(
+                          ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
+                          &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+    /* Parse the certificate chain sent by the peer. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
+    /* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( ssl ) );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
+                                               buf, buf_len );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
+#else
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Finished message.
+ */
+/*
+ * Implementation
+ */
+
+static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( ssl,
+                    ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest,
+                    sizeof( ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest ),
+                    &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len,
+                    ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ?
+                        MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             const unsigned char *end )
+{
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
+     * } Finished;
+     */
+    const unsigned char *expected_verify_data =
+        ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest;
+    size_t expected_verify_data_len =
+        ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len;
+    /* Structural validation */
+    if( (size_t)( end - buf ) != expected_verify_data_len )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "verify_data (self-computed):",
+                           expected_verify_data,
+                           expected_verify_data_len );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "verify_data (received message):", buf,
+                           expected_verify_data_len );
+
+    /* Semantic validation */
+    if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf,
+                           expected_verify_data,
+                           expected_verify_data_len ) != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR,
+                                      MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    }
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application( ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+           "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys( ssl, &traffic_keys );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+            "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    transform_application =
+        mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
+    if( transform_application == NULL )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
+                                    transform_application,
+                                    ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+                                    &traffic_keys,
+                                    ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ssl->transform_application = transform_application;
+
+cleanup:
+
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &traffic_keys, sizeof( traffic_keys ) );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_free( transform_application );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+    }
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+    if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+    {
+        return( ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_finished_message( ssl ) );
+    }
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buflen;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished message" ) );
+
+    /* Preprocessing step: Compute handshake digest */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message( ssl ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                                              MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
+                                              &buf, &buflen ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( ssl, buf, buf + buflen ) );
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, buflen );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_finished_message( ssl ) );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished message" ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * STATE HANDLING: Write and send Finished message.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Implement
+ */
+
+static int ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Compute transcript of handshake up to now. */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( ssl,
+                    ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest,
+                    sizeof( ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest ),
+                    &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len,
+                    ssl->conf->endpoint );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "calculate_verify_data failed", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_finalize_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    // TODO: Add back resumption keys calculation after MVP.
+    ((void) ssl);
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                  unsigned char *buf,
+                                                  unsigned char *end,
+                                                  size_t *olen )
+{
+    size_t verify_data_len = ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len;
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
+     * } Finished;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, verify_data_len );
+
+    memcpy( buf, ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest,
+            verify_data_len );
+
+    *olen = verify_data_len;
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/* Main entry point: orchestrates the other functions */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len, msg_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished message" ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message( ssl ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(
+                              ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len ) );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
+                                               buf, msg_len );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_finalize_finished_message( ssl ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( ssl,
+                                              buf_len, msg_len ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished message" ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) );
+
+    /*
+     * Free the previous session and switch to the current one.
+     */
+    if( ssl->session )
+    {
+        mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session );
+        mbedtls_free( ssl->session );
+    }
+    ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+    ssl->session_negotiate = NULL;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index 7aec21d..3ca28d5 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -21,14 +21,16 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
 
-#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
-#include "ssl_misc.h"
-#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
-
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
+
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string )       \
     .name = string,
 
@@ -562,6 +564,35 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
+    size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+    /*
+     * Compute MasterSecret
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( md_type,
+                    handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.handshake,
+                    NULL, 0,
+                    handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.app );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Master secret",
+             handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.app, md_size );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 static int ssl_tls1_3_calc_finished_core( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
                                           unsigned char const *base_key,
                                           unsigned char const *transcript,
@@ -612,6 +643,57 @@
     return( ret );
 }
 
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( mbedtls_ssl_context* ssl,
+                                             unsigned char* dst,
+                                             size_t dst_len,
+                                             size_t *actual_len,
+                                             int from )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len;
+
+    unsigned char const *base_key = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t* const md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
+    size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data" ) );
+
+    if( dst_len < md_size )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,
+                                                transcript, sizeof( transcript ),
+                                                &transcript_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len );
+
+    if( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+        base_key = ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets.client_handshake_traffic_secret;
+    else
+        base_key = ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets.server_handshake_traffic_secret;
+
+    ret = ssl_tls1_3_calc_finished_core( md_type, base_key, transcript, dst );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
+    *actual_len = md_size;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, md_size );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data" ) );
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transcript, sizeof( transcript ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_create_psk_binder( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
                                unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len,
@@ -820,4 +902,331 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    if( handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher suite info not found" ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( md_type, NULL, NULL, 0,
+                                            handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.early );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/* mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for
+ * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of TLS 1.3. */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
+    mbedtls_md_info_t const *md_info;
+    size_t md_size;
+
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len;
+
+    mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info;
+    size_t keylen, ivlen;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys" ) );
+
+    cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher );
+    keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen >> 3;
+    ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size;
+
+    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
+    md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,
+                                                transcript,
+                                                sizeof( transcript ),
+                                                &transcript_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+                               "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript",
+                               ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_handshake_secrets( md_type,
+                                    handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.handshake,
+                                    transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_handshake_secrets",
+                               ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Client handshake traffic secret",
+                    tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                    md_size );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Server handshake traffic secret",
+                    tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                    md_size );
+
+    /*
+     * Export client handshake traffic secret
+     */
+    if( ssl->f_export_keys != NULL )
+    {
+        ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+                tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                md_size,
+                handshake->randbytes + 32,
+                handshake->randbytes,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */ );
+
+        ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+                tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                md_size,
+                handshake->randbytes + 32,
+                handshake->randbytes,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */ );
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( md_type,
+                            tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                            tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
+                            md_size, keylen, ivlen, traffic_keys );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys", ret );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client_handshake write_key",
+                           traffic_keys->client_write_key,
+                           traffic_keys->key_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server_handshake write_key",
+                           traffic_keys->server_write_key,
+                           traffic_keys->key_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client_handshake write_iv",
+                           traffic_keys->client_write_iv,
+                           traffic_keys->iv_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server_handshake write_iv",
+                           traffic_keys->server_write_iv,
+                           traffic_keys->iv_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys" ) );
+
+exit:
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    size_t ephemeral_len = 0;
+    unsigned char ecdhe[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    mbedtls_md_info_t const * const md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
+    size_t const md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+    /*
+     * Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which
+     * client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret
+     * are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage.
+     */
+    if( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) )
+    {
+        if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( handshake->offered_group_id ) )
+        {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+            ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                            &ephemeral_len, ecdhe, sizeof( ecdhe ),
+                                            ssl->conf->f_rng,
+                                            ssl->conf->p_rng );
+            if( ret != 0 )
+            {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
+                return( ret );
+            }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+        }
+        else if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( handshake->offered_group_id ) )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHE not supported." ) );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     * Compute the Handshake Secret
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( md_type,
+                                            handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.early,
+                                            ecdhe, ephemeral_len,
+                                            handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.handshake );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret", ret );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Handshake secret",
+                           handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.handshake, md_size );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ecdhe, sizeof( ecdhe ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/* Generate application traffic keys since any records following a 1-RTT Finished message
+ * MUST be encrypted under the application traffic key.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* Address at which to store the application secrets */
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets * const app_secrets =
+        &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets;
+
+    /* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len;
+
+    /* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
+    mbedtls_md_info_t const *md_info;
+    size_t md_size;
+
+    /* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */
+    mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info;
+    size_t keylen, ivlen;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive application traffic keys" ) );
+
+    /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */
+
+    cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(
+                                  handshake->ciphersuite_info->cipher );
+    keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8;
+    ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size;
+
+    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
+    md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+
+    /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsiblity
+     * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,
+                                      transcript, sizeof( transcript ),
+                                      &transcript_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_application_secrets( md_type,
+                                   handshake->tls1_3_master_secrets.app,
+                                   transcript, transcript_len,
+                                   app_secrets );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+                     "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_application_secrets", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( md_type,
+                             app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N,
+                             app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N,
+                             md_size, keylen, ivlen, traffic_keys );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Client application traffic secret",
+                           app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N,
+                           md_size );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Server application traffic secret",
+                           app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N,
+                           md_size );
+
+    /*
+     * Export client/server application traffic secret 0
+     */
+    if( ssl->f_export_keys != NULL )
+    {
+        ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+                app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, md_size,
+                handshake->randbytes + 32,
+                handshake->randbytes,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by
+                                            a new constant for TLS 1.3! */ );
+
+        ssl->f_export_keys( ssl->p_export_keys,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS13_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+                app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, md_size,
+                handshake->randbytes + 32,
+                handshake->randbytes,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by
+                                            a new constant for TLS 1.3! */ );
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client application_write_key:",
+                              traffic_keys->client_write_key, keylen );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server application write key",
+                              traffic_keys->server_write_key, keylen );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client application write IV",
+                              traffic_keys->client_write_iv, ivlen );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server application write IV",
+                              traffic_keys->server_write_iv, ivlen );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive application traffic keys" ) );
+
+ cleanup:
+
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transcript, sizeof( transcript ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
index ca892b1..d598448 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
@@ -22,25 +22,27 @@
 /* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at
  * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union
  * below. */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST                               \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished    , "finished"     ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption  , "resumption"   ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd"  ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter    , "exporter"     ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key         , "key"          ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv          , "iv"           ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic" ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic" ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic"  ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic" ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic" ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic"  ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master" ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master  , "res master"   ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master  , "exp master"   ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder  , "ext binder"   ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder  , "res binder"   ) \
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived     , "derived"      )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST                                             \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished    , "finished"                          ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption  , "resumption"                        ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd"                       ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter    , "exporter"                          ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key         , "key"                               ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv          , "iv"                                ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic"                      ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic"                      ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic"                       ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic"                      ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic"                      ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic"                       ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master"                      ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master  , "res master"                        ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master  , "exp master"                        ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder  , "ext binder"                        ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder  , "res binder"                        ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived     , "derived"                           ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( client_cv   , "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" ) \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( server_cv   , "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify" )
 
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string )       \
     const unsigned char name    [ sizeof(string) - 1 ];
@@ -57,9 +59,12 @@
 
 extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels;
 
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( LABEL )  \
+    sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL)
+
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( LABEL )  \
     mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL,              \
-    sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL)
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( LABEL )
 
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN  \
     sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union )
@@ -70,27 +75,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN  \
     MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE
 
-typedef struct
-{
-    unsigned char binder_key                  [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_early_secrets;
-
-typedef struct
-{
-    unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_handshake_secrets;
-
-typedef struct
-{
-    unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char exporter_master_secret             [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-    unsigned char resumption_master_secret           [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
-} mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_application_secrets;
-
 /* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated
  * by HKDF-Expand-Label.
  *
@@ -531,4 +515,120 @@
                                           mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys,
                                           mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 key schedule evolutions
+ *
+ *   Early -> Handshake -> Application
+ *
+ * Small wrappers around mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret().
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Begin TLS 1.3 key schedule by calculating early secret.
+ *
+ *        The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
+ *        with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
+ *        this function represents the Initial -> Early transition.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
+ *
+ *        The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
+ *        with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
+ *        this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition.
+ *
+ *        In the handshake stage, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys()
+ *        can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
+ *             stage \c Early.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
+ *             key schedule stage \c Handshake, see
+ *             mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake().
+ * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic key
+ *                     keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
+ *
+ *        The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
+ *        with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
+ *        this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition.
+ *
+ *        In the handshake stage, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys()
+ *        can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
+ *             stage \c Handshake.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
+ *             key schedule stage \c Application, see
+ *             mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application().
+ * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic key
+ *                     keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
+    mbedtls_ssl_context* ssl, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Calculate the verify_data value for the client or server TLS 1.3
+ * Finished message.
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
+ *             key schedule stage \c Handshake, see
+ *             mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application().
+ * \param dst        The address at which to write the verify_data value.
+ * \param dst_len    The size of \p dst in bytes.
+ * \param actual_len The address at which to store the amount of data
+ *                   actually written to \p dst upon success.
+ * \param which      The message to calculate the `verify_data` for:
+ *                   - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT for the Client's Finished message
+ *                   - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER for the Server's Finished message
+ *
+ * \note       Both client and server call this function twice, once to
+ *             generate their own Finished message, and once to verify the
+ *             peer's Finished message.
+
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             unsigned char *dst,
+                                             size_t dst_len,
+                                             size_t *actual_len,
+                                             int which );
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index a567277..86f44cb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -23,11 +23,15 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
 
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+
 #include "ssl_misc.h"
 
-int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step_tls1_3( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     ((void) ssl);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "tls1_3 server state: %d", ssl->state ) );
+
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 }
 
diff --git a/programs/.gitignore b/programs/.gitignore
index 83521a7..deb104a 100644
--- a/programs/.gitignore
+++ b/programs/.gitignore
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 ssl/ssl_server2
 test/benchmark
 test/cpp_dummy_build
+test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
 test/ecp-bench
 test/query_compile_time_config
 test/selftest
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
 x509/cert_req
 x509/cert_write
 x509/crl_app
+x509/load_roots
 x509/req_app
 
 # Generated data files
diff --git a/programs/Makefile b/programs/Makefile
index 55ebd60..7f9d11e 100644
--- a/programs/Makefile
+++ b/programs/Makefile
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
 	x509/cert_req \
 	x509/cert_write \
 	x509/crl_app \
+	x509/load_roots \
 	x509/req_app \
 # End of APPS
 
@@ -335,6 +336,10 @@
 	echo "  CC    test/benchmark.c"
 	$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/benchmark.c   $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
 
+test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp: test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh
+	echo "  Gen   test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp"
+	test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh
+
 test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT): test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp $(DEP)
 	echo "  CXX   test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp"
 	$(CXX) $(LOCAL_CXXFLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp   $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
@@ -383,6 +388,10 @@
 	echo "  CC    x509/cert_req.c"
 	$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/cert_req.c    $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
 
+x509/load_roots$(EXEXT): x509/load_roots.c $(DEP)
+	echo "  CC    x509/load_roots.c"
+	$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/load_roots.c    $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
+
 x509/req_app$(EXEXT): x509/req_app.c $(DEP)
 	echo "  CC    x509/req_app.c"
 	$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/req_app.c    $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
@@ -395,10 +404,11 @@
 ifndef WINDOWS
 	rm -f $(EXES)
 	-rm -f ssl/ssl_pthread_server$(EXEXT)
-	-rm -f test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT)
+	-rm -f test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT)
 else
 	if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o
 	if exist *.exe del /Q /F *.exe
+	if exist test\cpp_dummy_build.cpp del /Q /F test\cpp_dummy_build.cpp
 endif
 	$(MAKE) -C fuzz clean
 
diff --git a/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c b/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
index a8026a3..5ed2ece 100644
--- a/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
+++ b/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
         while( *list )
         {
             cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( *list );
-            mbedtls_printf( "  %s\n", cipher_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) );
+            mbedtls_printf( "  %s\n", mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name( cipher_info ) );
             list++;
         }
 
@@ -309,7 +309,9 @@
 
         }
 
-        if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, digest, cipher_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen),
+        if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx,
+                                   digest,
+                                   (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ),
                            MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) != 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey() returned error\n");
@@ -408,7 +410,7 @@
         /*
          * Check the file size.
          */
-        if( cipher_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM &&
+        if( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( cipher_info ) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM &&
             ( ( filesize - mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) %
                 mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) != 0 )
         {
@@ -448,7 +450,9 @@
             mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, digest );
         }
 
-        if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, digest, cipher_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen),
+        if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx,
+                                   digest,
+                                   (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( cipher_info ),
                            MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) != 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey() returned error\n" );
diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c
index eccb42a..d633e4d 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c
@@ -270,7 +270,9 @@
     mbedtls_printf( "...\n  . Receiving and decrypting the ciphertext" );
     fflush( stdout );
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes, buf, 256 );
+    ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes, buf, 256 );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
 
     memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
 
@@ -280,7 +282,9 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buf, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buf, buf );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
     buf[16] = '\0';
     mbedtls_printf( "\n  . Plaintext is \"%s\"\n\n", (char *) buf );
 
diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c
index 0ddb85c..75713ff 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c
@@ -290,9 +290,13 @@
     mbedtls_printf( "...\n  . Encrypting and sending the ciphertext" );
     fflush( stdout );
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, buf, 256 );
+    ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, buf, 256 );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
     memcpy( buf, PLAINTEXT, 16 );
-    mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, buf, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, buf, buf );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( &client_fd, buf, 16 ) ) != 16 )
     {
diff --git a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
index 6b6e951..550a230 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 #define ECPARAMS    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1
 
 #if !defined(ECPARAMS)
-#define ECPARAMS    mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id)
+#define ECPARAMS    mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id
 #endif
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \
diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
index 4043dfa..7535eee 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-#define DFL_EC_CURVE            mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id)
+#define DFL_EC_CURVE            mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id
 #else
 #define DFL_EC_CURVE            0
 #endif
@@ -219,9 +219,9 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
         mbedtls_printf( " available ec_curve values:\n" );
         curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
-        mbedtls_printf( "    %s (default)\n", curve_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) );
-        while( ( ++curve_info )->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) != NULL )
-            mbedtls_printf( "    %s\n", curve_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) );
+        mbedtls_printf( "    %s (default)\n", curve_info->name );
+        while( ( ++curve_info )->name != NULL )
+            mbedtls_printf( "    %s\n", curve_info->name );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
         goto exit;
     }
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@
         {
             if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) == NULL )
                 goto usage;
-            opt.ec_curve = curve_info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);
+            opt.ec_curve = curve_info->grp_id;
         }
 #endif
         else if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 )
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@
     {
         mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( key );
         mbedtls_printf( "curve: %s\n",
-                mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id )->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name) );
+                mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id )->name );
         mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "X_Q:   ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, NULL );
         mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Y_Q:   ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, NULL );
         mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D:     ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d)  , 16, NULL );
diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
index 8a09af5..ed6addf 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@
 {
     int ret = 1;
     int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE;
-    char buf[1024];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+    char buf[200];
+#endif
     int i;
     char *p, *q;
 
@@ -220,7 +222,9 @@
     mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg );
 
     mbedtls_pk_init( &key );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
     memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
+#endif
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP );
@@ -316,8 +320,7 @@
                                         mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
         if( ret != 0 )
         {
-            mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof(buf) );
-            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf );
+            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret );
             goto exit;
         }
 
@@ -377,8 +380,7 @@
 
         if( ret != 0 )
         {
-            mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof(buf) );
-            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf );
+            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret );
             goto exit;
         }
 
diff --git a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt
index 23e85fe..26ca73c 100644
--- a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
     psa_constant_names
 )
 
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_constant_names_generated.c
+        COMMAND
+            ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/generate_psa_constants.py
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}
+        WORKING_DIRECTORY
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../..
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/generate_psa_constants.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include/psa/crypto_values.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+    )
+else()
+    link_to_source(psa_constant_names_generated.c)
+endif()
+
 foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
     add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
     target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target})
@@ -11,6 +30,11 @@
 endforeach()
 
 target_include_directories(psa_constant_names PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    add_custom_target(generate_psa_constant_names_generated_c
+        DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_constant_names_generated.c)
+    add_dependencies(psa_constant_names generate_psa_constant_names_generated_c)
+endif()
 
 install(TARGETS ${executables}
         DESTINATION "bin"
diff --git a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt
index def9c7c..280bbcf 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -18,23 +18,38 @@
     ssl_server2
 )
 
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    # Inform CMake that the following file will be generated as part of the build
+    # process, so it doesn't complain that it doesn't exist yet. Starting from
+    # CMake 3.20, this will no longer be necessary as CMake will automatically
+    # propagate this information across the tree, for now it's only visible
+    # inside the same directory, so we need to propagate manually.
+    set_source_files_properties(
+        ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/../test/query_config.c
+        PROPERTIES GENERATED TRUE)
+endif()
+
 foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
     set(extra_sources "")
     if(exe STREQUAL "ssl_client2" OR exe STREQUAL "ssl_server2")
         list(APPEND extra_sources
-            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c)
+            ssl_test_lib.c
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/../test/query_config.c)
     endif()
     add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>
         ${extra_sources})
     target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs})
     target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
+    if(exe STREQUAL "ssl_client2" OR exe STREQUAL "ssl_server2")
+        if(GEN_FILES)
+            add_dependencies(${exe} generate_query_config_c)
+        endif()
+        target_include_directories(${exe}
+            PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test)
+    endif()
 endforeach()
 
-set_property(TARGET ssl_client2 APPEND PROPERTY SOURCES
-    ssl_test_lib.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c)
-set_property(TARGET ssl_server2 APPEND PROPERTY SOURCES
-    ssl_test_lib.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c)
-
 if(THREADS_FOUND)
     add_executable(ssl_pthread_server ssl_pthread_server.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
     target_include_directories(ssl_pthread_server PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
diff --git a/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c b/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
index f257049..5d1cccb 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
                                    mbedtls_ssl_cache_set );
 #endif
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next), NULL );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL );
    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 )
     {
         printf( " failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/mini_client.c b/programs/ssl/mini_client.c
index 1e0bef6..97bfe68 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/mini_client.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/mini_client.c
@@ -246,13 +246,13 @@
     addr.sin_addr.s_addr = *((char *) &ret) == ret ? ADDR_LE : ADDR_BE;
     ret = 0;
 
-    if( ( server_fd.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fd) = socket( AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0 ) ) < 0 )
+    if( ( server_fd.fd = socket( AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0 ) ) < 0 )
     {
         ret = socket_failed;
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    if( connect( server_fd.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fd),
+    if( connect( server_fd.fd,
                 (const struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof( addr ) ) < 0 )
     {
         ret = connect_failed;
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 1400961..204b975 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
 
 #include "ssl_test_lib.h"
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h"
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE)
 int main( void )
 {
@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@
 #define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW          NULL
 #define DFL_EC_MAX_OPS          -1
 #define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER        0
+#define DFL_TLS13_KEX_MODES     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATION       MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
 #define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY        -2
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATE         0
@@ -206,7 +211,6 @@
 #define USAGE_TICKETS ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 #define USAGE_EAP_TLS                                       \
     "    eap_tls=%%d          default: 0 (disabled)\n"
 #define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG                                    \
@@ -229,12 +233,6 @@
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
 #define USAGE_SRTP ""
 #endif
-#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
-#define USAGE_EAP_TLS ""
-#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG ""
-#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE ""
-#define USAGE_SRTP ""
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
 #define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN                                      \
@@ -345,6 +343,14 @@
 #define USAGE_SERIALIZATION ""
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+#define USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES \
+    "    tls13_kex_modes=%%s   default: all\n"     \
+    "                          options: psk, psk_ephemeral, ephemeral, ephemeral_all, psk_all, all\n"
+#else
+#define USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ""
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
 /* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal
  * length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */
 #define USAGE1 \
@@ -414,18 +420,19 @@
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
 
 #define USAGE4 \
-    "    allow_sha1=%%d       default: 0\n"                             \
-    "    min_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"       \
-    "    max_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"     \
-    "    force_version=%%s    default: \"\" (none)\n"       \
+    "    allow_sha1=%%d       default: 0\n"                                   \
+    "    min_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"           \
+    "    max_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"           \
+    "    force_version=%%s    default: \"\" (none)\n"                         \
     "                        options: tls1_2, dtls1_2" TLS1_3_VERSION_OPTIONS \
-    "\n\n"                                                    \
-    "    force_ciphersuite=<name>    default: all enabled\n"\
-    "    query_config=<name>         return 0 if the specified\n"       \
+    "\n\n"                                                                    \
+    "    force_ciphersuite=<name>    default: all enabled\n"                  \
+    USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES                                            \
+    "    query_config=<name>         return 0 if the specified\n"             \
     "                                configuration macro is defined and 1\n"  \
     "                                otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \
-    "                                is printed if it is defined\n"     \
-    USAGE_SERIALIZATION                                     \
+    "                                is printed if it is defined\n"           \
+    USAGE_SERIALIZATION                                                       \
     " acceptable ciphersuite names:\n"
 
 #define ALPN_LIST_SIZE    10
@@ -464,6 +471,9 @@
     const char *ecjpake_pw;     /* the EC J-PAKE password                   */
     int ec_max_ops;             /* EC consecutive operations limit          */
     int force_ciphersuite[2];   /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all      */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    int tls13_kex_modes;        /* supported TLS 1.3 key exchange modes     */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
     int renegotiation;          /* enable / disable renegotiation           */
     int allow_legacy;           /* allow legacy renegotiation               */
     int renegotiate;            /* attempt renegotiation?                   */
@@ -672,7 +682,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-    mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
+    uint16_t group_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
     const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_cur;
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
@@ -716,7 +726,6 @@
     unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
     size_t context_buf_len;
 #endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16];
     unsigned char eap_tls_iv[8];
     const char* eap_tls_label = "client EAP encryption";
@@ -734,7 +743,6 @@
         MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET
     };
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
     mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
@@ -832,6 +840,9 @@
     opt.ecjpake_pw          = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
     opt.ec_max_ops          = DFL_EC_MAX_OPS;
     opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    opt.tls13_kex_modes     = DFL_TLS13_KEX_MODES;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
     opt.renegotiation       = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
     opt.allow_legacy        = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
     opt.renegotiate         = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
@@ -1097,6 +1108,24 @@
                 default: goto usage;
             }
         }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+        else if( strcmp( p, "tls13_kex_modes" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            if( strcmp( q, "psk" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "psk_ephemeral" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "ephemeral" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "ephemeral_all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL;
+            else if( strcmp( q, "psk_all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
+            else if( strcmp( q, "all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL;
+            else goto usage;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
         else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 )
         {
             if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
@@ -1427,7 +1456,7 @@
 
         if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 )
         {
-            curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+            group_list[0] = 0;
         }
         else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 )
         {
@@ -1444,7 +1473,7 @@
 
                 if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL )
                 {
-                    curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id;
+                    group_list[i++] = curve_cur->tls_id;
                 }
                 else
                 {
@@ -1470,7 +1499,7 @@
                 goto exit;
             }
 
-            curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+            group_list[i] = 0;
         }
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
@@ -1505,6 +1534,10 @@
             {
                 sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
             }
+            else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" ) == 0 )
+            {
+                sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256;
+            }
             else
             {
                 mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
@@ -1512,6 +1545,7 @@
                 mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
                 mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
                 mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
+                mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
                 mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
                 goto exit;
             }
@@ -1658,7 +1692,7 @@
     if( opt.key_opaque != 0 )
     {
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot,
-                                               PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) != 0 )
+                                               PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  "
                             "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int)  -ret );
@@ -1827,6 +1861,10 @@
     if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes( &conf, opt.tls13_kex_modes );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
     if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
@@ -1860,7 +1898,7 @@
     if( opt.curves != NULL &&
         strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 )
     {
-        mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list );
+        mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups( &conf, group_list );
     }
 #endif
 
@@ -1924,7 +1962,6 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     if( opt.eap_tls != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( &ssl, eap_tls_key_derivation,
@@ -1943,7 +1980,6 @@
                                         &dtls_srtp_keying );
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 )
@@ -2131,7 +2167,6 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     if( opt.eap_tls != 0  )
     {
         size_t j = 0;
@@ -2248,7 +2283,6 @@
         }
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
     if( opt.reconnect != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_printf("  . Saving session for reuse..." );
@@ -2990,6 +3024,19 @@
 
     mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd );
 
+    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session );
+
+    if( session_data != NULL )
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
+    mbedtls_free( session_data );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
+    if( context_buf != NULL )
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
+    mbedtls_free( context_buf );
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
     mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert );
     mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert );
@@ -3020,23 +3067,25 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED &&
           MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session );
-    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
-    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
-    rng_free( &rng );
-    if( session_data != NULL )
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
-    mbedtls_free( session_data );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
-    if( context_buf != NULL )
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
-    mbedtls_free( context_buf );
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    const char* message = mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking();
+    if( message )
+    {
+        if( ret == 0 )
+            ret = 1;
+        mbedtls_printf( "PSA memory leak detected: %s\n",  message);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto
+     * resources are freed by rng_free(). */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG)
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
 #endif
 
+    rng_free( &rng );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
     if( test_hooks_failure_detected( ) )
     {
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
index 542a334..694fc3b 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
     mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout );
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next), NULL );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL );
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_printf( " failed!  mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
index ace657c..95557fb 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
                                    mbedtls_ssl_cache_set );
 #endif
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next), NULL );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL );
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index b9a789e..0e6f78b 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #include <windows.h>
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h"
+#endif
+
 /* Size of memory to be allocated for the heap, when using the library's memory
  * management and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled. */
 #define MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE        120000
@@ -80,6 +84,7 @@
 #define DFL_CA_PATH             ""
 #define DFL_CRT_FILE            ""
 #define DFL_KEY_FILE            ""
+#define DFL_KEY_OPAQUE          0
 #define DFL_KEY_PWD             ""
 #define DFL_CRT_FILE2           ""
 #define DFL_KEY_FILE2           ""
@@ -95,6 +100,7 @@
 #define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW          NULL
 #define DFL_PSK_LIST            NULL
 #define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER        0
+#define DFL_TLS13_KEX_MODES     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATION       MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
 #define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY        -2
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATE         0
@@ -199,6 +205,13 @@
 #else
 #define USAGE_IO ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
+    "    key_opaque=%%d       Handle your private keys as if they were opaque\n" \
+    "                        default: 0 (disabled)\n"
+#else
+#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE ""
+#endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
 #define USAGE_SSL_ASYNC \
@@ -277,7 +290,6 @@
 #define USAGE_TICKETS ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 #define USAGE_EAP_TLS                                       \
     "    eap_tls=%%d          default: 0 (disabled)\n"
 #define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG                                    \
@@ -298,12 +310,6 @@
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
 #define USAGE_SRTP ""
 #endif
-#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
-#define USAGE_EAP_TLS ""
-#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG ""
-#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE ""
-#define USAGE_SRTP ""
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
 #define USAGE_CACHE                                             \
@@ -442,6 +448,15 @@
 #define USAGE_SERIALIZATION ""
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+#define USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES \
+    "    tls13_kex_modes=%%s   default: all\n"     \
+    "                          options: psk, psk_ephemeral, ephemeral, ephemeral_all, psk_all, all\n"
+#else
+#define USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ""
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
+
 /* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal
  * length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */
 #define USAGE1 \
@@ -473,6 +488,7 @@
     "    cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list)\n"  \
     "                        options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send)\n" \
     USAGE_IO                                                \
+    USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE                                        \
     "\n"                                                    \
     USAGE_PSK                                               \
     USAGE_CA_CALLBACK                                       \
@@ -506,18 +522,19 @@
 #define USAGE4 \
     USAGE_SSL_ASYNC                                         \
     USAGE_SNI                                               \
-    "    allow_sha1=%%d       default: 0\n"                             \
-    "    min_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"       \
-    "    max_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"     \
-    "    force_version=%%s    default: \"\" (none)\n"       \
+    "    allow_sha1=%%d       default: 0\n"                                   \
+    "    min_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"           \
+    "    max_version=%%s      default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"           \
+    "    force_version=%%s    default: \"\" (none)\n"                         \
     "                        options: tls1_2, dtls1_2" TLS1_3_VERSION_OPTIONS \
-    "\n\n"                                                                \
-    "    force_ciphersuite=<name>    default: all enabled\n"            \
-    "    query_config=<name>         return 0 if the specified\n"       \
+    "\n\n"                                                                    \
+    "    force_ciphersuite=<name>    default: all enabled\n"                  \
+    USAGE_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES                                            \
+    "    query_config=<name>         return 0 if the specified\n"             \
     "                                configuration macro is defined and 1\n"  \
     "                                otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \
-    "                                is printed if it is defined\n"     \
-    USAGE_SERIALIZATION                                     \
+    "                                is printed if it is defined\n"           \
+    USAGE_SERIALIZATION                                                       \
     " acceptable ciphersuite names:\n"
 
 #define ALPN_LIST_SIZE    10
@@ -556,6 +573,7 @@
     const char *ca_path;        /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */
     const char *crt_file;       /* the file with the server certificate     */
     const char *key_file;       /* the file with the server key             */
+    int key_opaque;             /* handle private key as if it were opaque  */
     const char *key_pwd;        /* the password for the server key          */
     const char *crt_file2;      /* the file with the 2nd server certificate */
     const char *key_file2;      /* the file with the 2nd server key         */
@@ -576,6 +594,9 @@
     char *psk_list;             /* list of PSK id/key pairs for callback    */
     const char *ecjpake_pw;     /* the EC J-PAKE password                   */
     int force_ciphersuite[2];   /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all      */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    int tls13_kex_modes;        /* supported TLS 1.3 key exchange modes     */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
     int renegotiation;          /* enable / disable renegotiation           */
     int allow_legacy;           /* allow legacy renegotiation               */
     int renegotiate;            /* attempt renegotiation?                   */
@@ -1301,6 +1322,10 @@
     mbedtls_pk_context pkey;
     mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert2;
     mbedtls_pk_context pkey2;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_key_id_t key_slot = 0; /* invalid key slot */
+    psa_key_id_t key_slot2 = 0; /* invalid key slot */
+#endif
     int key_cert_init = 0, key_cert_init2 = 0;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
     ssl_async_key_context_t ssl_async_keys;
@@ -1319,7 +1344,7 @@
     sni_entry *sni_info = NULL;
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-    mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
+    uint16_t group_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
     const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info * curve_cur;
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
@@ -1351,7 +1376,6 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     psa_status_t status;
 #endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16];
     unsigned char eap_tls_iv[8];
     const char* eap_tls_label = "client EAP encryption";
@@ -1369,7 +1393,6 @@
          MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET
      };
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
     mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
@@ -1477,6 +1500,7 @@
     opt.ca_path             = DFL_CA_PATH;
     opt.crt_file            = DFL_CRT_FILE;
     opt.key_file            = DFL_KEY_FILE;
+    opt.key_opaque          = DFL_KEY_OPAQUE;
     opt.key_pwd             = DFL_KEY_PWD;
     opt.crt_file2           = DFL_CRT_FILE2;
     opt.key_file2           = DFL_KEY_FILE2;
@@ -1497,6 +1521,9 @@
     opt.psk_list            = DFL_PSK_LIST;
     opt.ecjpake_pw          = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
     opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    opt.tls13_kex_modes     = DFL_TLS13_KEX_MODES;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
     opt.renegotiation       = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
     opt.allow_legacy        = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
     opt.renegotiate         = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
@@ -1605,6 +1632,10 @@
             opt.key_file = q;
         else if( strcmp( p, "key_pwd" ) == 0 )
             opt.key_pwd = q;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+        else if( strcmp( p, "key_opaque" ) == 0 )
+            opt.key_opaque = atoi( q );
+#endif
         else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file2" ) == 0 )
             opt.crt_file2 = q;
         else if( strcmp( p, "key_file2" ) == 0 )
@@ -1740,6 +1771,25 @@
             if( opt.exchanges < 0 )
                 goto usage;
         }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+        else if( strcmp( p, "tls13_kex_modes" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            if( strcmp( q, "psk" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "psk_ephemeral" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "ephemeral" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
+            else if( strcmp(q, "ephemeral_all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL;
+            else if( strcmp( q, "psk_all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
+            else if( strcmp( q, "all" ) == 0 )
+                opt.tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL;
+            else goto usage;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
         else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 )
         {
             if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
@@ -2150,7 +2200,7 @@
 
         if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 )
         {
-            curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+            group_list[0] = 0;
         }
         else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 )
         {
@@ -2167,7 +2217,7 @@
 
                 if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL )
                 {
-                    curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id;
+                    group_list[i++] = curve_cur->tls_id;
                 }
                 else
                 {
@@ -2193,7 +2243,7 @@
                 goto exit;
             }
 
-            curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+            group_list[i] = 0;
         }
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
@@ -2441,7 +2491,34 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
     }
 
-    mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( opt.key_opaque != 0 )
+    {
+        if ( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pkey ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
+        {
+            if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot,
+                                                PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 )
+            {
+                mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  "
+                                "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int)  -ret );
+                goto exit;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pkey2 ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
+        {
+            if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey2, &key_slot2,
+                                                PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 )
+            {
+                mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  "
+                                "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int)  -ret );
+                goto exit;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    mbedtls_printf( " ok (key types: %s - %s)\n", mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey ), mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey2 ) );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
@@ -2690,6 +2767,10 @@
     if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes( &conf, opt.tls13_kex_modes );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+
     if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
@@ -2826,7 +2907,7 @@
     if( opt.curves != NULL &&
         strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 )
     {
-        mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list );
+        mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups( &conf, group_list );
     }
 #endif
 
@@ -2926,7 +3007,6 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     if( opt.eap_tls != 0 )
     {
         mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb( &ssl, eap_tls_key_derivation,
@@ -2945,7 +3025,6 @@
                                         &dtls_srtp_keying );
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
     io_ctx.ssl = &ssl;
     io_ctx.net = &client_fd;
@@ -3211,7 +3290,6 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
     if( opt.eap_tls != 0 )
     {
         size_t j = 0;
@@ -3329,7 +3407,6 @@
         }
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
     ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "initial handshake" );
@@ -3874,16 +3951,51 @@
     mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd );
     mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd );
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-    mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
+    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
+    mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache );
 #endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( &ticket_ctx );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
+    mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
+    if( context_buf != NULL )
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
+    mbedtls_free( context_buf );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
+    sni_free( sni_info );
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+    ret = psk_free( psk_info );
+    if( ( ret != 0 ) && ( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) )
+        mbedtls_printf( "Failed to list of opaque PSKs - error was %d\n", ret );
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
     mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert );
     mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert );
     mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey );
     mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert2 );
     mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey2 );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
+    psa_destroy_key( key_slot2 );
 #endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+    mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
     for( i = 0; (size_t) i < ssl_async_keys.slots_used; i++ )
     {
@@ -3895,17 +4007,6 @@
         }
     }
 #endif
-#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
-    sni_free( sni_info );
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
-    ret = psk_free( psk_info );
-    if( ( ret != 0 ) && ( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) )
-        mbedtls_printf( "Failed to list of opaque PSKs - error was %d\n", ret );
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-    mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
-#endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
@@ -3926,32 +4027,27 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED &&
           MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
-    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
-    rng_free( &rng );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
-    mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache );
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-    mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( &ticket_ctx );
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
-    mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx );
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_free( buf );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
-    if( context_buf != NULL )
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
-    mbedtls_free( context_buf );
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    const char* message = mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking();
+    if( message )
+    {
+        if( ret == 0 )
+            ret = 1;
+        mbedtls_printf( "PSA memory leak detected: %s\n",  message);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto
+     * resources are freed by rng_free(). */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG)
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
 #endif
 
+    rng_free( &rng );
+
+    mbedtls_free( buf );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
     /* Let test hooks detect errors such as resource leaks.
      * Don't do it in query_config mode, because some test code prints
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
index 6ec4171..62cd35d 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
 void eap_tls_key_derivation( void *p_expkey,
                              mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type secret_type,
                              const unsigned char *secret,
@@ -140,8 +139,6 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
 
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
-
 int ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
                       unsigned char const *buf, size_t len )
 {
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h
index f9e031b..6b9e7b8 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@
 
 #include "../test/query_config.h"
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
-
 typedef struct eap_tls_keys
 {
     unsigned char master_secret[48];
@@ -122,8 +120,6 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
 
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
-
 typedef struct
 {
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;
diff --git a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt
index 807d1bc..142a831 100644
--- a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -14,18 +14,57 @@
 )
 
 if(TEST_CPP)
-    list(APPEND executables_mbedcrypto cpp_dummy_build)
+    set(cpp_dummy_build_cpp "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cpp_dummy_build.cpp")
+    set(generate_cpp_dummy_build "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh")
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}"
+        COMMAND "${generate_cpp_dummy_build}" "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}"
+        DEPENDS "${generate_cpp_dummy_build}"
+        WORKING_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}"
+    )
+    add_executable(cpp_dummy_build "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}")
+    target_include_directories(cpp_dummy_build PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include)
+    target_link_libraries(cpp_dummy_build ${mbedcrypto_target})
+endif()
+
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    find_package(Perl REQUIRED)
+
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/query_config.c
+        COMMAND
+            ${PERL}
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/generate_query_config.pl
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt
+                ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/query_config.c
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/generate_query_config.pl
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt
+    )
+    # this file will also be used in another directory, so create a target, see
+    # https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/community/-/wikis/FAQ#how-can-i-add-a-dependency-to-a-source-file-which-is-generated-in-a-subdirectory
+    add_custom_target(generate_query_config_c
+        DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/query_config.c)
+else()
+    link_to_source(query_config.c)
 endif()
 
 foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_libs executables_mbedcrypto)
     set(extra_sources "")
     if(exe STREQUAL "query_compile_time_config")
         list(APPEND extra_sources
-            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/query_config.c)
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/query_config.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/query_config.c)
     endif()
     add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>
         ${extra_sources})
     target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
+    if(exe STREQUAL "query_compile_time_config")
+        target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR})
+    endif()
 
     # This emulates "if ( ... IN_LIST ... )" which becomes available in CMake 3.3
     list(FIND executables_libs ${exe} exe_index)
diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c
index 5985caf..d3faad9 100644
--- a/programs/test/benchmark.c
+++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c
@@ -674,7 +674,8 @@
     {
         mbedtls_des3_context des3;
         mbedtls_des3_init( &des3 );
-        mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &des3, tmp );
+        if( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &des3, tmp ) != 0 )
+            mbedtls_exit( 1 );
         TIME_AND_TSC( "3DES",
                 mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &des3, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
         mbedtls_des3_free( &des3 );
@@ -684,7 +685,8 @@
     {
         mbedtls_des_context des;
         mbedtls_des_init( &des );
-        mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &des, tmp );
+        if( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &des, tmp ) != 0 )
+            mbedtls_exit( 1 );
         TIME_AND_TSC( "DES",
                 mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &des, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
         mbedtls_des_free( &des );
@@ -722,7 +724,7 @@
 
             memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
             memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
-            mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, tmp, keysize );
+            CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, tmp, keysize ) );
 
             TIME_AND_TSC( title,
                 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
@@ -743,7 +745,7 @@
 
             memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
             memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
-            mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx, tmp, keysize * 2 );
+            CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx, tmp, keysize * 2 ) );
 
             TIME_AND_TSC( title,
                     mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE,
diff --git a/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp b/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f1efe8..0000000
--- a/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  This program is a dummy C++ program to ensure Mbed TLS library header files
- *  can be included and built with a C++ compiler.
- *
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- *  limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
-
-#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
-#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
-#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
-#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
-#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
-#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
-#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
-#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
-#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
-#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"
-#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
-#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
-#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
-#include "mbedtls/des.h"
-#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
-#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
-#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
-#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
-#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
-#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
-#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
-#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
-#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h"
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
-#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
-#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h"
-#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
-#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
-#include "mbedtls/version.h"
-#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
-#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
-#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
-#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
-#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h"
-#endif
-
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h"
-
-int main()
-{
-    mbedtls_platform_context *ctx = NULL;
-    mbedtls_platform_setup(ctx);
-    mbedtls_printf("CPP Build test\n");
-    mbedtls_platform_teardown(ctx);
-}
diff --git a/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh b/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..94e9115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FILE=programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
+
+if [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
+    cat <<EOF
+Usage: $0 [OUTPUT]
+Generate a C++ dummy build program that includes all the headers.
+OUTPUT defaults to "programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp".
+Run this program from the root of an Mbed TLS directory tree or from
+its "programs" or "programs/test" subdirectory.
+EOF
+    exit
+fi
+
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+set -e
+
+# Ensure a reproducible order for *.h
+export LC_ALL=C
+
+print_cpp () {
+    cat <<'EOF'
+/* Automatically generated file. Do not edit.
+ *
+ *  This program is a dummy C++ program to ensure Mbed TLS library header files
+ *  can be included and built with a C++ compiler.
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+EOF
+
+    for header in include/mbedtls/*.h include/psa/*.h; do
+        case ${header#include/} in
+            mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h) :;; # not meant for direct inclusion
+            psa/crypto_config.h) :;; # not meant for direct inclusion
+            # Some of the psa/crypto_*.h headers are not meant to be included
+            # directly. They do have include guards that make them no-ops if
+            # psa/crypto.h has been included before. Since psa/crypto.h comes
+            # before psa/crypto_*.h in the wildcard enumeration, we don't need
+            # to skip those headers.
+            *) echo "#include \"${header#include/}\"";;
+        esac
+    done
+
+    cat <<'EOF'
+
+int main()
+{
+    mbedtls_platform_context *ctx = NULL;
+    mbedtls_platform_setup(ctx);
+    mbedtls_printf("CPP Build test passed\n");
+    mbedtls_platform_teardown(ctx);
+}
+EOF
+}
+
+if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then
+    :
+elif [ -d ../include/mbedtls ]; then
+    cd ..
+elif [ -d ../../include/mbedtls ]; then
+    cd ../..
+else
+    echo >&2 "This script must be run from an Mbed TLS source tree."
+    exit 3
+fi
+
+print_cpp >"${1:-$DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FILE}"
diff --git a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
index a04fa8b..5876b8d 100644
--- a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
     cert_req
     cert_write
     crl_app
+    load_roots
     req_app
 )
 
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_app.c b/programs/x509/cert_app.c
index aab15db..3d8f37b 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_app.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_app.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
 
             mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf );
 
-            cur = cur->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);
+            cur = cur->next;
         }
 
         /*
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
index 9a20d63..763f868 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_write.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
         }
 
         ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( issuer_name, sizeof(issuer_name),
-                                 &issuer_crt.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject) );
+                                 &issuer_crt.subject );
         if( ret < 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 );
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@
         }
 
         ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( subject_name, sizeof(subject_name),
-                                 &csr.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject) );
+                                 &csr.subject );
         if( ret < 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 );
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
         }
 
         opt.subject_name = subject_name;
-        subject_key = &csr.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk);
+        subject_key = &csr.pk;
 
         mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
     }
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@
     //
     if( strlen( opt.issuer_crt ) )
     {
-        if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &issuer_crt.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk), issuer_key,
+        if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &issuer_crt.pk, issuer_key,
                                    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) != 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  issuer_key does not match "
diff --git a/programs/x509/load_roots.c b/programs/x509/load_roots.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e07bed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/programs/x509/load_roots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*
+ *  Root CA reading application
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ *
+ *  This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the
+ *  GNU General Public License v2.0 or later.
+ *
+ *  **********
+ *  Apache License 2.0:
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ *
+ *  **********
+ *
+ *  **********
+ *  GNU General Public License v2.0 or later:
+ *
+ *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ *  with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ *  51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ *  **********
+ */
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#else
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#define mbedtls_time            time
+#define mbedtls_time_t          time_t
+#define mbedtls_fprintf         fprintf
+#define mbedtls_printf          printf
+#define mbedtls_exit            exit
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS    EXIT_SUCCESS
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE    EXIT_FAILURE
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) ||  \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
+int main( void )
+{
+    mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or "
+           "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C not defined.\n");
+    mbedtls_exit( 0 );
+}
+#else
+
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define DFL_ITERATIONS          1
+#define DFL_PRIME_CACHE         1
+
+#define USAGE \
+    "\n usage: load_roots param=<>... [--] FILE...\n"   \
+    "\n acceptable parameters:\n"                       \
+    "    iterations=%%d        Iteration count (not including cache priming); default: 1\n"  \
+    "    prime=%%d             Prime the disk read cache? Default: 1 (yes)\n"  \
+    "\n"
+
+
+/*
+ * global options
+ */
+struct options
+{
+    const char **filenames;     /* NULL-terminated list of file names */
+    unsigned iterations;        /* Number of iterations to time */
+    int prime_cache;            /* Prime the disk read cache? */
+} opt;
+
+
+int read_certificates( const char *const *filenames )
+{
+    mbedtls_x509_crt cas;
+    int ret = 0;
+    const char *const *cur;
+
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cas );
+
+    for( cur = filenames; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cas, *cur );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+        {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
+            char error_message[200];
+            mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_message, sizeof( error_message ) );
+            printf( "\n%s: -0x%04x (%s)\n",
+                    *cur, (unsigned) -ret, error_message );
+#else
+            printf( "\n%s: -0x%04x\n",
+                    *cur, (unsigned) -ret );
+#endif
+            goto exit;
+        }
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cas );
+    return( ret == 0 );
+}
+
+int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
+{
+    int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE;
+    unsigned i, j;
+    struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer;
+    unsigned long ms;
+
+    if( argc <= 1 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_printf( USAGE );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    opt.filenames = NULL;
+    opt.iterations = DFL_ITERATIONS;
+    opt.prime_cache = DFL_PRIME_CACHE;
+
+    for( i = 1; i < (unsigned) argc; i++ )
+    {
+        char *p = argv[i];
+        char *q = NULL;
+
+        if( strcmp( p, "--" ) == 0 )
+            break;
+        if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL )
+            break;
+        *q++ = '\0';
+
+        for( j = 0; p + j < q; j++ )
+        {
+            if( argv[i][j] >= 'A' && argv[i][j] <= 'Z' )
+                argv[i][j] |= 0x20;
+        }
+
+        if( strcmp( p, "iterations" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            opt.iterations = atoi( q );
+        }
+        else if( strcmp( p, "prime" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            opt.iterations = atoi( q ) != 0;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            mbedtls_printf( "Unknown option: %s\n", p );
+            mbedtls_printf( USAGE );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+    }
+
+    opt.filenames = (const char**) argv + i;
+    if( *opt.filenames == 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_printf( "Missing list of certificate files to parse\n" );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_printf( "Parsing %u certificates", argc - i );
+    if( opt.prime_cache )
+    {
+        if( ! read_certificates( opt.filenames ) )
+            goto exit;
+        mbedtls_printf( " " );
+    }
+
+    (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &timer, 1 );
+    for( i = 1; i <= opt.iterations; i++ )
+    {
+        if( ! read_certificates( opt.filenames ) )
+            goto exit;
+        mbedtls_printf( "." );
+    }
+    ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &timer, 0 );
+    mbedtls_printf( "\n%u iterations -> %lu ms\n", opt.iterations, ms );
+    exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_exit( exit_code );
+}
+#endif /* necessary configuration */
diff --git a/scripts/code_size_compare.py b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..85393d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
+"""
+Purpose
+
+This script is for comparing the size of the library files from two
+different Git revisions within an Mbed TLS repository.
+The results of the comparison is formatted as csv and stored at a
+configurable location.
+Note: must be run from Mbed TLS root.
+"""
+
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+import argparse
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+class CodeSizeComparison:
+    """Compare code size between two Git revisions."""
+
+    def __init__(self, old_revision, new_revision, result_dir):
+        """
+        old_revision: revision to compare against
+        new_revision:
+        result_dir: directory for comparision result
+        """
+        self.repo_path = "."
+        self.result_dir = os.path.abspath(result_dir)
+        os.makedirs(self.result_dir, exist_ok=True)
+
+        self.csv_dir = os.path.abspath("code_size_records/")
+        os.makedirs(self.csv_dir, exist_ok=True)
+
+        self.old_rev = old_revision
+        self.new_rev = new_revision
+        self.git_command = "git"
+        self.make_command = "make"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def check_repo_path():
+        if not all(os.path.isdir(d) for d in ["include", "library", "tests"]):
+            raise Exception("Must be run from Mbed TLS root")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_revision(revision):
+        result = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "--verify",
+                                          revision + "^{commit}"], shell=False)
+        return result
+
+    def _create_git_worktree(self, revision):
+        """Make a separate worktree for revision.
+        Do not modify the current worktree."""
+
+        if revision == "current":
+            print("Using current work directory.")
+            git_worktree_path = self.repo_path
+        else:
+            print("Creating git worktree for", revision)
+            git_worktree_path = os.path.join(self.repo_path, "temp-" + revision)
+            subprocess.check_output(
+                [self.git_command, "worktree", "add", "--detach",
+                 git_worktree_path, revision], cwd=self.repo_path,
+                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT
+            )
+        return git_worktree_path
+
+    def _build_libraries(self, git_worktree_path):
+        """Build libraries in the specified worktree."""
+
+        my_environment = os.environ.copy()
+        subprocess.check_output(
+            [self.make_command, "-j", "lib"], env=my_environment,
+            cwd=git_worktree_path, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+        )
+
+    def _gen_code_size_csv(self, revision, git_worktree_path):
+        """Generate code size csv file."""
+
+        csv_fname = revision + ".csv"
+        if revision == "current":
+            print("Measuring code size in current work directory.")
+        else:
+            print("Measuring code size for", revision)
+        result = subprocess.check_output(
+            ["size library/*.o"], cwd=git_worktree_path, shell=True
+        )
+        size_text = result.decode()
+        csv_file = open(os.path.join(self.csv_dir, csv_fname), "w")
+        for line in size_text.splitlines()[1:]:
+            data = line.split()
+            csv_file.write("{}, {}\n".format(data[5], data[3]))
+
+    def _remove_worktree(self, git_worktree_path):
+        """Remove temporary worktree."""
+        if git_worktree_path != self.repo_path:
+            print("Removing temporary worktree", git_worktree_path)
+            subprocess.check_output(
+                [self.git_command, "worktree", "remove", "--force",
+                 git_worktree_path], cwd=self.repo_path,
+                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT
+            )
+
+    def _get_code_size_for_rev(self, revision):
+        """Generate code size csv file for the specified git revision."""
+
+        # Check if the corresponding record exists
+        csv_fname = revision + ".csv"
+        if (revision != "current") and \
+           os.path.exists(os.path.join(self.csv_dir, csv_fname)):
+            print("Code size csv file for", revision, "already exists.")
+        else:
+            git_worktree_path = self._create_git_worktree(revision)
+            self._build_libraries(git_worktree_path)
+            self._gen_code_size_csv(revision, git_worktree_path)
+            self._remove_worktree(git_worktree_path)
+
+    def compare_code_size(self):
+        """Generate results of the size changes between two revisions,
+        old and new. Measured code size results of these two revisions
+        must be available."""
+
+        old_file = open(os.path.join(self.csv_dir, self.old_rev + ".csv"), "r")
+        new_file = open(os.path.join(self.csv_dir, self.new_rev + ".csv"), "r")
+        res_file = open(os.path.join(self.result_dir, "compare-" + self.old_rev
+                                     + "-" + self.new_rev + ".csv"), "w")
+
+        res_file.write("file_name, this_size, old_size, change, change %\n")
+        print("Generating comparision results.")
+
+        old_ds = {}
+        for line in old_file.readlines()[1:]:
+            cols = line.split(", ")
+            fname = cols[0]
+            size = int(cols[1])
+            if size != 0:
+                old_ds[fname] = size
+
+        new_ds = {}
+        for line in new_file.readlines()[1:]:
+            cols = line.split(", ")
+            fname = cols[0]
+            size = int(cols[1])
+            new_ds[fname] = size
+
+        for fname in new_ds:
+            this_size = new_ds[fname]
+            if fname in old_ds:
+                old_size = old_ds[fname]
+                change = this_size - old_size
+                change_pct = change / old_size
+                res_file.write("{}, {}, {}, {}, {:.2%}\n".format(fname, \
+                               this_size, old_size, change, float(change_pct)))
+            else:
+                res_file.write("{}, {}\n".format(fname, this_size))
+        return 0
+
+    def get_comparision_results(self):
+        """Compare size of library/*.o between self.old_rev and self.new_rev,
+        and generate the result file."""
+        self.check_repo_path()
+        self._get_code_size_for_rev(self.old_rev)
+        self._get_code_size_for_rev(self.new_rev)
+        return self.compare_code_size()
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description=(
+            """This script is for comparing the size of the library files
+            from two different Git revisions within an Mbed TLS repository.
+            The results of the comparison is formatted as csv, and stored at
+            a configurable location.
+            Note: must be run from Mbed TLS root."""
+        )
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-r", "--result-dir", type=str, default="comparison",
+        help="directory where comparison result is stored, \
+              default is comparison",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-o", "--old-rev", type=str, help="old revision for comparison.",
+        required=True,
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-n", "--new-rev", type=str, default=None,
+        help="new revision for comparison, default is the current work \
+              directory, including uncommited changes."
+    )
+    comp_args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    if os.path.isfile(comp_args.result_dir):
+        print("Error: {} is not a directory".format(comp_args.result_dir))
+        parser.exit()
+
+    validate_res = CodeSizeComparison.validate_revision(comp_args.old_rev)
+    old_revision = validate_res.decode().replace("\n", "")
+
+    if comp_args.new_rev is not None:
+        validate_res = CodeSizeComparison.validate_revision(comp_args.new_rev)
+        new_revision = validate_res.decode().replace("\n", "")
+    else:
+        new_revision = "current"
+
+    result_dir = comp_args.result_dir
+    size_compare = CodeSizeComparison(old_revision, new_revision, result_dir)
+    return_code = size_compare.get_comparision_results()
+    sys.exit(return_code)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/scripts/generate_query_config.pl b/scripts/generate_query_config.pl
index e3bbaa0..7855c7c 100755
--- a/scripts/generate_query_config.pl
+++ b/scripts/generate_query_config.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
 # information is used to automatically generate the body of the query_config()
 # function by using the template in scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt.
 #
-# Usage: ./scripts/generate_query_config.pl without arguments
+# Usage: scripts/generate_query_config.pl without arguments, or
+# generate_query_config.pl config_file template_file output_file
 #
 # Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
@@ -33,15 +34,24 @@
 
 use strict;
 
-my $config_file = "./include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h";
+my ($config_file, $query_config_format_file, $query_config_file);
 
-my $query_config_format_file = "./scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt";
-my $query_config_file = "./programs/test/query_config.c";
+if( @ARGV ) {
+    die "Invalid number of arguments - usage: $0 [CONFIG_FILE TEMPLATE_FILE OUTPUT_FILE]" if scalar @ARGV != 3;
+    ($config_file, $query_config_format_file, $query_config_file) = @ARGV;
 
-unless( -f $config_file && -f $query_config_format_file ) {
-    chdir '..' or die;
-    -f $config_file && -f $query_config_format_file
-      or die "Without arguments, must be run from root or a subdirectory\n";
+    -f $config_file or die "No such file: $config_file";
+    -f $query_config_format_file or die "No such file: $query_config_format_file";
+} else {
+    $config_file = "./include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h";
+    $query_config_format_file = "./scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt";
+    $query_config_file = "./programs/test/query_config.c";
+
+    unless( -f $config_file && -f $query_config_format_file ) {
+        chdir '..' or die;
+        -f $config_file && -f $query_config_format_file
+          or die "No arguments supplied, must be run from project root or a first-level subdirectory\n";
+    }
 }
 
 # Excluded macros from the generated query_config.c. For example, macros that
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py
index f9ef5f9..bf82f13 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py
@@ -233,6 +233,27 @@
         self.key_types_from_group = {} #type: Dict[str, str]
         self.algorithms_from_hash = {} #type: Dict[str, str]
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def algorithm_tester(name: str) -> str:
+        """The predicate for whether an algorithm is built from the given constructor.
+
+        The given name must be the name of an algorithm constructor of the
+        form ``PSA_ALG_xxx`` which is used as ``PSA_ALG_xxx(yyy)`` to build
+        an algorithm value. Return the corresponding predicate macro which
+        is used as ``predicate(alg)`` to test whether ``alg`` can be built
+        as ``PSA_ALG_xxx(yyy)``. The predicate is usually called
+        ``PSA_ALG_IS_xxx``.
+        """
+        prefix = 'PSA_ALG_'
+        assert name.startswith(prefix)
+        midfix = 'IS_'
+        suffix = name[len(prefix):]
+        if suffix in ['DSA', 'ECDSA']:
+            midfix += 'RANDOMIZED_'
+        elif suffix == 'RSA_PSS':
+            suffix += '_STANDARD_SALT'
+        return prefix + midfix + suffix
+
     def record_algorithm_subtype(self, name: str, expansion: str) -> None:
         """Record the subtype of an algorithm constructor.
 
@@ -308,12 +329,7 @@
             self.algorithms.add(name)
             self.record_algorithm_subtype(name, expansion)
         elif name.startswith('PSA_ALG_') and parameter == 'hash_alg':
-            if name in ['PSA_ALG_DSA', 'PSA_ALG_ECDSA']:
-                # A naming irregularity
-                tester = name[:8] + 'IS_RANDOMIZED_' + name[8:]
-            else:
-                tester = name[:8] + 'IS_' + name[8:]
-            self.algorithms_from_hash[name] = tester
+            self.algorithms_from_hash[name] = self.algorithm_tester(name)
         elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_USAGE_') and not parameter:
             self.key_usage_flags.add(name)
         else:
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
index d01e143..6a46e42 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
@@ -83,8 +83,6 @@
             out.write('depends_on:' + ':'.join(self.dependencies) + '\n')
         out.write(self.function + ':' + ':'.join(self.arguments) + '\n')
 
-
-
 def write_data_file(filename: str,
                     test_cases: Iterable[TestCase],
                     caller: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index fbd746e..41dceed 100644
--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -13,10 +13,48 @@
     message(FATAL_ERROR "Cannot build test suites without Python 3")
 endif()
 
-# Enable definition of various functions used throughout the testsuite
-# (gethostname, strdup, fileno...) even when compiling with -std=c99. Harmless
-# on non-POSIX platforms.
-add_definitions("-D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L")
+# generated .data files will go there
+file(MAKE_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites)
+
+# Get base names for generated files (starting at "suites/")
+execute_process(
+    COMMAND
+        ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+        ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+        --list-for-cmake
+        --directory suites
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY
+        ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE
+        base_generated_data_files)
+
+# Derive generated file paths in the build directory
+set(generated_data_files "")
+foreach(file ${base_generated_data_files})
+    list(APPEND generated_data_files ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${file})
+endforeach()
+
+if(GEN_FILES)
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
+            ${generated_data_files}
+        WORKING_DIRECTORY
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
+        COMMAND
+            ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+            --directory ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/psa/crypto_config.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/psa/crypto_values.h
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+    )
+else()
+    foreach(file ${base_generated_data_files})
+        link_to_source(${file})
+    endforeach()
+endif()
 
 # Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed.
 # "foo" as a skip pattern skips "test_suite_foo" and "test_suite_foo.bar"
@@ -32,10 +70,52 @@
         set(data_name ${suite_name})
     endif()
 
+    # Get the test names of the tests with generated .data files
+    # from the generated_data_files list in parent scope.
+    set(generated_data_names "")
+    foreach(generated_data_file ${generated_data_files})
+        # Get the plain filename
+        get_filename_component(generated_data_name ${generated_data_file} NAME)
+        # Remove the ".data" extension
+        get_name_without_last_ext(generated_data_name ${generated_data_name})
+        # Remove leading "test_suite_"
+        string(SUBSTRING ${generated_data_name} 11 -1 generated_data_name)
+        list(APPEND generated_data_names ${generated_data_name})
+    endforeach()
+
+    if(";${generated_data_names};" MATCHES ";${data_name};")
+        set(data_file
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
+    else()
+        set(data_file
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
+    endif()
+
     add_custom_command(
-        OUTPUT test_suite_${data_name}.c
-        COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function -d ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data -t ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function -p ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function -s ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites --helpers-file ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function -o .
-        DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py ${mbedtls_target} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data
+        OUTPUT
+            # The output filename of generate_test_code.py is derived from the -d
+            # input argument.
+            test_suite_${data_name}.c
+        COMMAND
+            ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py
+            -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function
+            -d ${data_file}
+            -t ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function
+            -p ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function
+            -s ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites
+            --helpers-file ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function
+            -o .
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function
+            ${data_file}
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function
+            ${mbedtls_target}
+        BYPRODUCTS
+            test_suite_${data_name}.datax
     )
 
     add_executable(test_suite_${data_name} test_suite_${data_name}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
@@ -55,6 +135,11 @@
     endif()
 endfunction(add_test_suite)
 
+# Enable definition of various functions used throughout the testsuite
+# (gethostname, strdup, fileno...) even when compiling with -std=c99. Harmless
+# on non-POSIX platforms.
+add_definitions("-D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L")
+
 if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
     set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wno-unused-function")
 endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
@@ -170,5 +255,4 @@
     link_to_source(data_files)
     link_to_source(scripts)
     link_to_source(ssl-opt.sh)
-    link_to_source(suites)
 endif()
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index 449fca2..77a3172 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
 WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
 LDFLAGS ?=
 
+# Set this to -v to see the details of failing test cases
+TEST_FLAGS ?= $(if $(filter-out 0 OFF Off off NO No no FALSE False false N n,$(CTEST_OUTPUT_ON_FAILURE)),-v,)
+
 default: all
 
 # Include public header files from ../include, test-specific header files
@@ -170,7 +173,7 @@
 
 clean:
 ifndef WINDOWS
-	rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax TESTS
+	rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax
 	rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/libmbed*
 	rm -f include/test/instrument_record_status.h
 else
@@ -181,9 +184,6 @@
 	if exist src/drivers/*.o del /Q /F src/drivers/*.o
 	if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmed*
 	if exist include/test/instrument_record_status.h del /Q /F include/test/instrument_record_status.h
-ifneq ($(wildcard TESTS/.*),)
-	rmdir /Q /S TESTS
-endif
 endif
 
 neat: clean
@@ -195,44 +195,10 @@
 
 # Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed.
 check: $(BINARIES)
-	perl scripts/run-test-suites.pl --skip=$(SKIP_TEST_SUITES)
+	perl scripts/run-test-suites.pl $(TEST_FLAGS) --skip=$(SKIP_TEST_SUITES)
 
 test: check
 
-# Create separate targets for generating embedded tests.
-EMBEDDED_TESTS := $(addprefix embedded_,$(APPS))
-
-# Generate test code for target.
-
-.SECONDEXPANSION:
-$(EMBEDDED_TESTS): embedded_%: suites/$$(firstword $$(subst ., ,$$*)).function suites/%.data scripts/generate_test_code.py suites/helpers.function suites/main_test.function suites/target_test.function
-	echo "  Gen  ./TESTS/mbedtls/$*/$*.c"
-	$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_test_code.py -f suites/$(firstword $(subst ., ,$*)).function \
-		-d suites/$*.data \
-		-t suites/main_test.function \
-		-p suites/target_test.function \
-		-s suites  \
-		--helpers-file suites/helpers.function \
-		-o ./TESTS/mbedtls/$*
-
-generate-target-tests: $(EMBEDDED_TESTS)
-
-define copy_header_to_target
-TESTS/mbedtls/$(1)/$(2): include/test/$(2)
-	echo "  Copy ./$$@"
-ifndef WINDOWS
-	mkdir -p $$(@D)
-	cp $$< $$@
-else
-	mkdir $$(@D)
-	copy $$< $$@
-endif
-
-endef
-$(foreach app, $(APPS), $(foreach file, $(notdir $(wildcard include/test/*.h)), \
-	$(eval $(call copy_header_to_target,$(app),$(file)))))
-$(addprefix embedded_,$(filter test_suite_psa_%, $(APPS))): embedded_%: $(patsubst TESTS/mbedtls/%, include/test/%, $(wildcard include/test/*. include/test/*/*.h))
-
 ifdef RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG
 include/test/instrument_record_status.h: ../include/psa/crypto.h Makefile
 	echo "  Gen  $@"
diff --git a/tests/compat-in-docker.sh b/tests/compat-in-docker.sh
index aef0a07..3a1cd21 100755
--- a/tests/compat-in-docker.sh
+++ b/tests/compat-in-docker.sh
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@
 
 case "${GNUTLS_CLI:-default}" in
     "legacy")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-cli";;
-    "next")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli";;
+    "next")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-cli";;
     *) ;;
 esac
 
 case "${GNUTLS_SERV:-default}" in
     "legacy")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-serv";;
-    "next")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv";;
+    "next")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-serv";;
     *) ;;
 esac
 
diff --git a/tests/compat.sh b/tests/compat.sh
index c2bef26..f4c611a 100755
--- a/tests/compat.sh
+++ b/tests/compat.sh
@@ -236,60 +236,46 @@
     G_CIPHERS=""
 }
 
+check_translation()
+{
+    if [ $1 -ne 0 ]; then
+        echo "translate_ciphers.py failed with exit code $1" >&2
+        echo "$2" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
 # Ciphersuites that can be used with all peers.
 # Since we currently have three possible peers, each ciphersuite should appear
 # three times: in each peer's list (with the name that this peer uses).
 add_common_ciphersuites()
 {
+    CIPHERS=""
     case $TYPE in
 
         "ECDSA")
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA           \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA   \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA    \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA    \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                       \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+NULL:+SHA1                \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1            \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1         \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1         \
-                    "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA            \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA        \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA          \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA          \
-                    "
             fi
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                                   \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256         \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384         \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256         \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384         \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                               \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256               \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384               \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256       \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384       \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256   \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384   \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "RSA")
-            M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
+            CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
                 TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA        \
                 TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA        \
                 TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA   \
@@ -303,58 +289,18 @@
                 TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5                   \
                 TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA                   \
                 "
-            G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                       \
-                +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1             \
-                +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1             \
-                +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA1        \
-                +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA1        \
-                +DHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                \
-                +RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA1            \
-                +RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA1            \
-                +RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                    \
-                +RSA:+NULL:+MD5                         \
-                +RSA:+NULL:+SHA1                        \
-                "
-            O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              \
-                DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              \
-                DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA         \
-                DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA         \
-                EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA            \
-                AES256-SHA                      \
-                CAMELLIA256-SHA                 \
-                AES128-SHA                      \
-                CAMELLIA128-SHA                 \
-                DES-CBC3-SHA                    \
-                NULL-MD5                        \
-                NULL-SHA                        \
-                "
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA      \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA      \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA     \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA             \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                       \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1           \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1           \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1              \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+NULL:+SHA1                  \
-                    "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA            \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA            \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA          \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA              \
-                    "
             fi
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
                     TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256         \
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256     \
                     TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256         \
@@ -367,62 +313,36 @@
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384     \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256   \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384   \
-                    "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                       \
-                    +RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256               \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256           \
-                    +RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA256               \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA256           \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256         \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384         \
-                    +RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD             \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD             \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD           \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD           \
-                    "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS           \
-                    NULL-SHA256                 \
-                    AES128-SHA256               \
-                    DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256       \
-                    AES256-SHA256               \
-                    DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256       \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256     \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384     \
-                    AES128-GCM-SHA256           \
-                    DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256   \
-                    AES256-GCM-SHA384           \
-                    DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384   \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 \
+                    TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256                \
                     "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "PSK")
-            M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
+            CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
                 TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA           \
                 TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA            \
                 TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA            \
                 "
-            G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                       \
-                +PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                    \
-                +PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                +PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                "
-            O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA            \
-                PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA              \
-                PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA              \
-                "
             ;;
     esac
+
+    M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
+
+    T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py g $CIPHERS)
+    check_translation $? "$T"
+    G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $T"
+
+    T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py o $CIPHERS)
+    check_translation $? "$T"
+    O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $T"
 }
 
 # Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and OpenSSL
-# Each ciphersuite should appear two times, once with its OpenSSL name, once
-# with its Mbed TLS name.
+# A list of ciphersuites in the Mbed TLS convention is compiled and
+# appended to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS. The same list
+# is translated to the OpenSSL naming convention and appended to the list of
+# OpenSSL ciphersuites $O_CIPHERS.
 #
 # NOTE: for some reason RSA-PSK doesn't work with OpenSSL,
 # so RSA-PSK ciphersuites need to go in other sections, see
@@ -432,28 +352,23 @@
 # GnuTLS in 3.5.0 and the CI only has 3.4.x so far.
 add_openssl_ciphersuites()
 {
+    CIPHERS=""
     case $TYPE in
 
         "ECDSA")
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
-                    TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA            \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                    TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA       \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA    \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA     \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA     \
                     "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA             \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA         \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA           \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA           \
-                    "
             fi
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
-                    TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256          \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                    TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256     \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384          \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256          \
                     TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384          \
@@ -461,31 +376,18 @@
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256        \
                     TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256   \
                     "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256        \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384        \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256    \
-                    ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384    \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384  \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256  \
-                    ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305   \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "RSA")
-            M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                       \
-                TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA                \
+            CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA           \
                 TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA            \
                 "
-            O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                DES-CBC-SHA                     \
-                EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA             \
-                "
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384          \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384     \
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384            \
                     TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384                \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256          \
@@ -494,24 +396,14 @@
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256       \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256     \
                     "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384        \
-                    DHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384      \
-                    ARIA256-GCM-SHA384              \
-                    ECDHE-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256        \
-                    DHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256      \
-                    ARIA128-GCM-SHA256              \
-                    DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       \
-                    ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305     \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "PSK")
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
-                    TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384            \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                    TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384       \
                     TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256            \
                     TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384                \
                     TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256                \
@@ -519,66 +411,47 @@
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256     \
                     TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256       \
                     "
-                O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS               \
-                    DHE-PSK-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384      \
-                    DHE-PSK-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256      \
-                    PSK-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384          \
-                    PSK-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256          \
-                    DHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305       \
-                    ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305     \
-                    PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305           \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
     esac
+
+    M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
+
+    T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py o $CIPHERS)
+    check_translation $? "$T"
+    O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $T"
 }
 
 # Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and GnuTLS
-# Each ciphersuite should appear two times, once with its GnuTLS name, once
-# with its Mbed TLS name.
+# A list of ciphersuites in the Mbed TLS convention is compiled and
+# appended to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS. The same list
+# is translated to the GnuTLS naming convention and appended to the list of
+# GnuTLS ciphersuites $G_CIPHERS.
 add_gnutls_ciphersuites()
 {
+    CIPHERS=""
     case $TYPE in
 
         "ECDSA")
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256    \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384    \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256    \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384    \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM                \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM                \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8              \
-                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8              \
-                   "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                               \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256          \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384          \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
-                    +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                           \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256   \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384        \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256        \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384        \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM                    \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM                    \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8                  \
+                    TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8                  \
                    "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "RSA")
-            if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ]
-            then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                           \
-                    TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256                    \
-                    "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                           \
-                    +RSA:+NULL:+SHA256                          \
-                    "
-            fi
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                           \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                               \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256  \
                     TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384  \
                     TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256        \
@@ -600,45 +473,18 @@
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8              \
                     TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8              \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                           \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256        \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384        \
-                    +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256              \
-                    +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA256              \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256          \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA256          \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD          \
-                    +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD          \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD                \
-                    +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD                \
-                    +RSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +RSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +RSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD                   \
-                    +RSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD                   \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
-                    +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
 
         "PSK")
-            M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                               \
-                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA               \
-                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA                \
-                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA                \
-                "
-            G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                               \
-                +DHE-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                        \
-                +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1                     \
-                +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1                     \
+            CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                                 \
+                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA             \
+                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA              \
+                TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA              \
                 "
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                           \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                               \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA          \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA          \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA         \
@@ -646,18 +492,10 @@
                     TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA            \
                     TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA            \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                           \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                  \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1               \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1               \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1                    \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1                 \
-                    "
             fi
             if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ]
             then
-                M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS                           \
+                CIPHERS="$CIPHERS                               \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384       \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384  \
                     TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256       \
@@ -703,55 +541,15 @@
                     TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384         \
                     TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256         \
                     "
-                G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS                           \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384             \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384        \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256             \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256        \
-                    +PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256                   \
-                    +PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384                   \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256               \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384               \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384               \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256               \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256          \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384          \
-                    +PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256              \
-                    +PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384              \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384          \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256          \
-                    +PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +PSK:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +PSK:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD                     \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +PSK:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD                   \
-                    +PSK:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD                   \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD               \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD                \
-                    +PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD                \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD            \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD                 \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384                    \
-                    +ECDHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256                    \
-                    +PSK:+NULL:+SHA256                          \
-                    +PSK:+NULL:+SHA384                          \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256                      \
-                    +DHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384                      \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256                      \
-                    +RSA-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384                      \
-                    "
             fi
             ;;
     esac
+
+    M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
+
+    T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py g $CIPHERS)
+    check_translation $? "$T"
+    G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $T"
 }
 
 # Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS (not currently supported by another
diff --git a/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h b/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..444a4bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE for testing.
+ * Only used for a few test configurations.
+ *
+ * Typical usage (note multiple levels of quoting):
+ *     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h\"'"
+ */
+
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL)
+
+/* Enable the use of the test driver in the library, and build the generic
+ * part of the test driver. */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+
+/* Use the accelerator driver for all cryptographic mechanisms for which
+ * the test driver implemented. */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC
+
+#endif  /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL */
diff --git a/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile b/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile
index 1d24aa3..41789c6 100644
--- a/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile
+++ b/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile
@@ -137,29 +137,29 @@
 ENV GNUTLS_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10/bin/gnutls-cli
 ENV GNUTLS_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10/bin/gnutls-serv
 
-# Build libnettle 3.4 (needed by gnutls next)
+# Build libnettle 3.7.3 (needed by gnutls next)
 RUN cd /tmp \
-    && wget https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-3.4.1.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \
-    && cd nettle-3.4.1 \
+    && wget https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-3.7.3.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \
+    && cd nettle-3.7.3 \
     && ./configure --disable-documentation \
     && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \
     && make install \
     && /sbin/ldconfig \
     && rm -rf /tmp/nettle*
 
-# Build gnutls next (3.6.5)
+# Build gnutls next (3.7.2)
 RUN cd /tmp \
-    && wget https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.6/gnutls-3.6.5.tar.xz -qO- | tar xJ \
-    && cd gnutls-3.6.5 \
-    && ./configure --prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5 --exec_prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5 \
+    && wget https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.7/gnutls-3.7.2.tar.xz -qO- | tar xJ \
+    && cd gnutls-3.7.2 \
+    && ./configure --prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2 --exec_prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2 \
         --with-included-libtasn1 --with-included-unistring --without-p11-kit \
         --disable-shared --disable-guile --disable-doc \
     && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \
     && make install \
     && rm -rf /tmp/gnutls*
 
-ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli
-ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv
+ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-cli
+ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-serv
 
 RUN pip3 install --no-cache-dir \
     mbed-host-tests \
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h
index 0830229..2421560 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h
@@ -30,12 +30,23 @@
      * function call. */
     psa_status_t forced_status;
     /* Count the amount of times AEAD driver functions are called. */
-    unsigned long hits;
+    unsigned long hits_encrypt;
+    unsigned long hits_decrypt;
+    unsigned long hits_encrypt_setup;
+    unsigned long hits_decrypt_setup;
+    unsigned long hits_set_nonce;
+    unsigned long hits_set_lengths;
+    unsigned long hits_update_ad;
+    unsigned long hits_update;
+    unsigned long hits_finish;
+    unsigned long hits_verify;
+    unsigned long hits_abort;
+
     /* Status returned by the last AEAD driver function call. */
     psa_status_t driver_status;
 } mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t;
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_INIT { 0, 0, 0 }
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 static inline mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t
     mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init( void )
 {
@@ -63,5 +74,60 @@
     const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
     uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length );
 
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    size_t ad_length,
+    size_t plaintext_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad(
+    mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update(
+   mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const uint8_t *input,
+   size_t input_length,
+   uint8_t *output,
+   size_t output_size,
+   size_t *output_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish(
+   mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *ciphertext,
+   size_t ciphertext_size,
+   size_t *ciphertext_length,
+   uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_size,
+   size_t *tag_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify(
+   mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *plaintext,
+   size_t plaintext_size,
+   size_t *plaintext_length,
+   const uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort(
+   mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation );
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_AEAD_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h
index 16e1f75..d147568 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h
@@ -49,6 +49,20 @@
     return( v );
 }
 
+/*
+ * In order to convert the plain text keys to Opaque, the size of the key is
+ * padded up by PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX_SIZE in addition to
+ * xor mangling the key. The pad prefix needs to be accounted for while
+ * sizing for the key.
+ */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX           0xBEEFED00U
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX_SIZE      sizeof( \
+                                  PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX )
+
+size_t mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function(
+    const psa_key_type_t key_type,
+    const size_t key_bits );
+
 extern mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t
     mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks;
 
@@ -84,10 +98,28 @@
     size_t *key_buffer_length,
     size_t *bits);
 
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *data,
+    size_t data_length,
+    uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *key_buffer_length,
+    size_t *bits);
+
 psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key(
     psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number,
     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length );
 
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key(
+    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *source_key,
+    size_t source_key_length,
+    uint8_t *target_key_buffer,
+    size_t target_key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *target_key_buffer_length);
+
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_MANAGEMENT_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e3301c..0000000
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Test driver for context size functions
- */
-/*  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- *  limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H
-
-#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
-
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
-#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
-
-size_t mbedtls_test_size_function(
-    const psa_key_type_t key_type,
-    const size_t key_bits );
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
index 5b60932..47e92b7 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
@@ -28,6 +28,5 @@
 #include "test/drivers/mac.h"
 #include "test/drivers/key_management.h"
 #include "test/drivers/signature.h"
-#include "test/drivers/size.h"
 
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h
index 27e5599..ef32cdf 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
     const char *filename;
     int line_no;
     unsigned long step;
+    char line1[76];
+    char line2[76];
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE)
     const char *mutex_usage_error;
 #endif
@@ -132,6 +134,27 @@
 void mbedtls_test_info_reset( void );
 
 /**
+ * \brief           Record the current test case as a failure if two integers
+ *                  have a different value.
+ *
+ *                  This function is usually called via the macro
+ *                  #TEST_EQUAL.
+ *
+ * \param test      Description of the failure or assertion that failed. This
+ *                  MUST be a string literal. This normally has the form
+ *                  "EXPR1 == EXPR2" where EXPR1 has the value \p value1
+ *                  and EXPR2 has the value \p value2.
+ * \param line_no   Line number where the failure originated.
+ * \param filename  Filename where the failure originated.
+ * \param value1    The first value to compare.
+ * \param value2    The second value to compare.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 1 if the values are equal, otherwise \c 0.
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_equal( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename,
+                        unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 );
+
+/**
  * \brief          This function decodes the hexadecimal representation of
  *                 data.
  *
diff --git a/tests/include/test/macros.h b/tests/include/test/macros.h
index 9b3fc9c..a88b2e8 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/macros.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/macros.h
@@ -73,15 +73,21 @@
        }                                                    \
     } while( 0 )
 
-/** Evaluate two expressions and fail the test case if they have different
- * values.
+/** Evaluate two integer expressions and fail the test case if they have
+ * different values.
  *
- * \param expr1     An expression to evaluate.
- * \param expr2     The expected value of \p expr1. This can be any
- *                  expression, but it is typically a constant.
+ * The two expressions should have the same signedness, otherwise the
+ * comparison is not meaningful if the signed value is negative.
+ *
+ * \param expr1     An integral-typed expression to evaluate.
+ * \param expr2     Another integral-typed expression to evaluate.
  */
-#define TEST_EQUAL( expr1, expr2 )              \
-    TEST_ASSERT( ( expr1 ) == ( expr2 ) )
+#define TEST_EQUAL( expr1, expr2 )                                      \
+    do {                                                                \
+        if( ! mbedtls_test_equal( #expr1 " == " #expr2, __LINE__, __FILE__, \
+                                  expr1, expr2 ) )                      \
+            goto exit;                                                  \
+    } while( 0 )
 
 /** Allocate memory dynamically and fail the test case if this fails.
  * The allocated memory will be filled with zeros.
diff --git a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
index 8a8c37e..f5622e2 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
 #include "test/psa_helpers.h"
 
 #include <psa/crypto.h>
-#include <psa_crypto_slot_management.h>
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index af05dd9..241b1b6 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#! /usr/bin/env sh
+#! /usr/bin/env bash
 
 # all.sh
 #
@@ -59,6 +59,15 @@
 # This script must be invoked from the toplevel directory of a git
 # working copy of Mbed TLS.
 #
+# The behavior on an error depends on whether --keep-going (alias -k)
+# is in effect.
+#  * Without --keep-going: the script stops on the first error without
+#    cleaning up. This lets you work in the configuration of the failing
+#    component.
+#  * With --keep-going: the script runs all requested components and
+#    reports failures at the end. In particular the script always cleans
+#    up on exit.
+#
 # Note that the output is not saved. You may want to run
 #   script -c tests/scripts/all.sh
 # or
@@ -81,6 +90,12 @@
 #
 # Each component must start by invoking `msg` with a short informative message.
 #
+# Warning: due to the way bash detects errors, the failure of a command
+# inside 'if' or '!' is not detected. Use the 'not' function instead of '!'.
+#
+# Each component is executed in a separate shell process. The component
+# fails if any command in it returns a non-zero status.
+#
 # The framework performs some cleanup tasks after each component. This
 # means that components can assume that the working directory is in a
 # cleaned-up state, and don't need to perform the cleanup themselves.
@@ -91,19 +106,6 @@
 #   `tests/Makefile` and `programs/fuzz/Makefile` from git.
 #   This cleans up after an in-tree use of CMake.
 #
-# Any command that is expected to fail must be protected so that the
-# script keeps running in --keep-going mode despite `set -e`. In keep-going
-# mode, if a protected command fails, this is logged as a failure and the
-# script will exit with a failure status once it has run all components.
-# Commands can be protected in any of the following ways:
-# * `make` is a function which runs the `make` command with protection.
-#   Note that you must write `make VAR=value`, not `VAR=value make`,
-#   because the `VAR=value make` syntax doesn't work with functions.
-# * Put `report_status` before the command to protect it.
-# * Put `if_build_successful` before a command. This protects it, and
-#   additionally skips it if a prior invocation of `make` in the same
-#   component failed.
-#
 # The tests are roughly in order from fastest to slowest. This doesn't
 # have to be exact, but in general you should add slower tests towards
 # the end and fast checks near the beginning.
@@ -114,8 +116,9 @@
 #### Initialization and command line parsing
 ################################################################
 
-# Abort on errors (and uninitialised variables)
-set -eu
+# Abort on errors (even on the left-hand side of a pipe).
+# Treat uninitialised variables as errors.
+set -e -o pipefail -u
 
 pre_check_environment () {
     if [ -d library -a -d include -a -d tests ]; then :; else
@@ -126,9 +129,16 @@
 
 pre_initialize_variables () {
     CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h'
-    CONFIG_BAK="$CONFIG_H.bak"
     CRYPTO_CONFIG_H='include/psa/crypto_config.h'
-    CRYPTO_CONFIG_BAK="$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H.bak"
+
+    # Files that are clobbered by some jobs will be backed up. Use a different
+    # suffix from auxiliary scripts so that all.sh and auxiliary scripts can
+    # independently decide when to remove the backup file.
+    backup_suffix='.all.bak'
+    # Files clobbered by config.py
+    files_to_back_up="$CONFIG_H $CRYPTO_CONFIG_H"
+    # Files clobbered by in-tree cmake
+    files_to_back_up="$files_to_back_up Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile"
 
     append_outcome=0
     MEMORY=0
@@ -165,10 +175,10 @@
 
     # if MAKEFLAGS is not set add the -j option to speed up invocations of make
     if [ -z "${MAKEFLAGS+set}" ]; then
-        export MAKEFLAGS="-j"
+        export MAKEFLAGS="-j$(all_sh_nproc)"
     fi
 
-    # Include more verbose output for failing tests run by CMake
+    # Include more verbose output for failing tests run by CMake or make
     export CTEST_OUTPUT_ON_FAILURE=1
 
     # CFLAGS and LDFLAGS for Asan builds that don't use CMake
@@ -176,8 +186,8 @@
 
     # Gather the list of available components. These are the functions
     # defined in this script whose name starts with "component_".
-    # Parse the script with sed, because in sh there is no way to list
-    # defined functions.
+    # Parse the script with sed. This way we get the functions in the order
+    # they are defined.
     ALL_COMPONENTS=$(sed -n 's/^ *component_\([0-9A-Z_a-z]*\) *().*/\1/p' <"$0")
 
     # Exclude components that are not supported on this platform.
@@ -194,6 +204,8 @@
 # Test whether the component $1 is included in the command line patterns.
 is_component_included()
 {
+    # Temporarily disable wildcard expansion so that $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS
+    # only does word splitting.
     set -f
     for pattern in $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS; do
         set +f
@@ -235,6 +247,11 @@
                         Prefix for a cross-compiler for arm-linux-gnueabi
                         (default: "${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}")
      --armcc            Run ARM Compiler builds (on by default).
+     --restore          First clean up the build tree, restoring backed up
+                        files. Do not run any components unless they are
+                        explicitly specified.
+     --error-test       Error test mode: run a failing function in addition
+                        to any specified component. May be repeated.
      --except           Exclude the COMPONENTs listed on the command line,
                         instead of running only those.
      --no-append-outcome    Write a new outcome file and analyze it (default).
@@ -263,13 +280,11 @@
 EOF
 }
 
-# remove built files as well as the cmake cache/config
+# Cleanup before/after running a component.
+# Remove built files as well as the cmake cache/config.
+# Does not remove generated source files.
 cleanup()
 {
-    if [ -n "${MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR+set}" ]; then
-        cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
-    fi
-
     command make clean
 
     # Remove CMake artefacts
@@ -277,11 +292,10 @@
            -iname CMakeFiles -exec rm -rf {} \+ -o \
            \( -iname cmake_install.cmake -o \
               -iname CTestTestfile.cmake -o \
-              -iname CMakeCache.txt \) -exec rm -f {} \+
+              -iname CMakeCache.txt -o \
+              -path './cmake/*.cmake' \) -exec rm -f {} \+
     # Recover files overwritten by in-tree CMake builds
     rm -f include/Makefile include/mbedtls/Makefile programs/*/Makefile
-    git update-index --no-skip-worktree Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile
-    git checkout -- Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile
 
     # Remove any artifacts from the component_test_cmake_as_subdirectory test.
     rm -rf programs/test/cmake_subproject/build
@@ -298,13 +312,20 @@
     rm -f programs/test/cmake_package_install/Makefile
     rm -f programs/test/cmake_package_install/cmake_package_install
 
-    if [ -f "$CONFIG_BAK" ]; then
-        mv "$CONFIG_BAK" "$CONFIG_H"
-    fi
+    # Restore files that may have been clobbered by the job
+    for x in $files_to_back_up; do
+        cp -p "$x$backup_suffix" "$x"
+    done
+}
 
-    if [ -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_BAK" ]; then
-        mv "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_BAK" "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H"
-    fi
+# Final cleanup when this script exits (except when exiting on a failure
+# in non-keep-going mode).
+final_cleanup () {
+    cleanup
+
+    for x in $files_to_back_up; do
+        rm -f "$x$backup_suffix"
+    done
 }
 
 # Executed on exit. May be redefined depending on command line options.
@@ -313,7 +334,7 @@
 }
 
 fatal_signal () {
-    cleanup
+    final_cleanup
     final_report $1
     trap - $1
     kill -$1 $$
@@ -323,6 +344,18 @@
 trap 'fatal_signal INT' INT
 trap 'fatal_signal TERM' TERM
 
+# Number of processors on this machine. Used as the default setting
+# for parallel make.
+all_sh_nproc ()
+{
+    {
+        nproc || # Linux
+        sysctl -n hw.ncpuonline || # NetBSD, OpenBSD
+        sysctl -n hw.ncpu || # FreeBSD
+        echo 1
+    } 2>/dev/null
+}
+
 msg()
 {
     if [ -n "${current_component:-}" ]; then
@@ -371,17 +404,11 @@
     done
 }
 
-check_headers_in_cpp () {
-    ls include/mbedtls | grep "\.h$" >headers.txt
-    <programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp sed -n 's/"$//; s!^#include "mbedtls/!!p' |
-    sort |
-    diff headers.txt -
-    rm headers.txt
-}
-
 pre_parse_command_line () {
     COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS=
     all_except=0
+    error_test=0
+    restore_first=0
     no_armcc=
 
     # Note that legacy options are ignored instead of being omitted from this
@@ -395,6 +422,7 @@
             --armcc) no_armcc=;;
             --armc5-bin-dir) shift; ARMC5_BIN_DIR="$1";;
             --armc6-bin-dir) shift; ARMC6_BIN_DIR="$1";;
+            --error-test) error_test=$((error_test + 1));;
             --except) all_except=1;;
             --force|-f) FORCE=1;;
             --gnutls-cli) shift; GNUTLS_CLI="$1";;
@@ -420,6 +448,7 @@
             --quiet|-q) QUIET=1;;
             --random-seed) unset SEED;;
             --release-test|-r) SEED=$RELEASE_SEED;;
+            --restore) restore_first=1;;
             --seed|-s) shift; SEED="$1";;
             -*)
                 echo >&2 "Unknown option: $1"
@@ -432,7 +461,7 @@
     done
 
     # With no list of components, run everything.
-    if [ -z "$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS" ]; then
+    if [ -z "$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS" ] && [ $restore_first -eq 0 ]; then
         all_except=1
     fi
 
@@ -442,6 +471,32 @@
         COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS="$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS *_armcc*"
     fi
 
+    # Error out if an explicitly requested component doesn't exist.
+    if [ $all_except -eq 0 ]; then
+        unsupported=0
+        # Temporarily disable wildcard expansion so that $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS
+        # only does word splitting.
+        set -f
+        for component in $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS; do
+            set +f
+            # If the requested name includes a wildcard character, don't
+            # check it. Accept wildcard patterns that don't match anything.
+            case $component in
+                *[*?\[]*) continue;;
+            esac
+            case " $SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS " in
+                *" $component "*) :;;
+                *)
+                    echo >&2 "Component $component was explicitly requested, but is not known or not supported."
+                    unsupported=$((unsupported + 1));;
+            esac
+        done
+        set +f
+        if [ $unsupported -ne 0 ]; then
+            exit 2
+        fi
+    fi
+
     # Build the list of components to run.
     RUN_COMPONENTS=
     for component in $SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS; do
@@ -477,9 +532,36 @@
     fi
 }
 
+pre_restore_files () {
+    # If the makefiles have been generated by a framework such as cmake,
+    # restore them from git. If the makefiles look like modifications from
+    # the ones checked into git, take care not to modify them. Whatever
+    # this function leaves behind is what the script will restore before
+    # each component.
+    case "$(head -n1 Makefile)" in
+        *[Gg]enerated*)
+            git update-index --no-skip-worktree Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile
+            git checkout -- Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile
+            ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+pre_back_up () {
+    for x in $files_to_back_up; do
+        cp -p "$x" "$x$backup_suffix"
+    done
+}
+
 pre_setup_keep_going () {
-    failure_summary=
-    failure_count=0
+    failure_count=0 # Number of failed components
+    last_failure_status=0 # Last failure status in this component
+
+    # See err_trap
+    previous_failure_status=0
+    previous_failed_command=
+    previous_failure_funcall_depth=0
+    unset report_failed_command
+
     start_red=
     end_color=
     if [ -t 1 ]; then
@@ -490,76 +572,106 @@
                 ;;
         esac
     fi
-    record_status () {
-        if "$@"; then
-            last_status=0
-        else
-            last_status=$?
-            text="$current_section: $* -> $last_status"
-            failure_summary="$failure_summary
-$text"
-            failure_count=$((failure_count + 1))
-            echo "${start_red}^^^^$text^^^^${end_color}" >&2
-        fi
-    }
-    make () {
-        case "$*" in
-            *test|*check)
-                if [ $build_status -eq 0 ]; then
-                    record_status command make "$@"
-                else
-                    echo "(skipped because the build failed)"
-                fi
-                ;;
-            *)
-                record_status command make "$@"
-                build_status=$last_status
-                ;;
+
+    # Keep a summary of failures in a file. We'll print it out at the end.
+    failure_summary_file=$PWD/all-sh-failures-$$.log
+    : >"$failure_summary_file"
+
+    # Whether it makes sense to keep a component going after the specified
+    # command fails (test command) or not (configure or build).
+    # This function normally receives the failing simple command
+    # ($BASH_COMMAND) as an argument, but if $report_failed_command is set,
+    # this is passed instead.
+    # This doesn't have to be 100% accurate: all failures are recorded anyway.
+    # False positives result in running things that can't be expected to
+    # work. False negatives result in things not running after something else
+    # failed even though they might have given useful feedback.
+    can_keep_going_after_failure () {
+        case "$1" in
+            "msg "*) false;;
+            "cd "*) false;;
+            *make*[\ /]tests*) false;; # make tests, make CFLAGS=-I../tests, ...
+            *test*) true;; # make test, tests/stuff, env V=v tests/stuff, ...
+            *make*check*) true;;
+            "grep "*) true;;
+            "[ "*) true;;
+            "! "*) true;;
+            *) false;;
         esac
     }
+
+    # This function runs if there is any error in a component.
+    # It must either exit with a nonzero status, or set
+    # last_failure_status to a nonzero value.
+    err_trap () {
+        # Save $? (status of the failing command). This must be the very
+        # first thing, before $? is overridden.
+        last_failure_status=$?
+        failed_command=${report_failed_command-$BASH_COMMAND}
+
+        if [[ $last_failure_status -eq $previous_failure_status &&
+              "$failed_command" == "$previous_failed_command" &&
+              ${#FUNCNAME[@]} == $((previous_failure_funcall_depth - 1)) ]]
+        then
+            # The same command failed twice in a row, but this time one level
+            # less deep in the function call stack. This happens when the last
+            # command of a function returns a nonzero status, and the function
+            # returns that same status. Ignore the second failure.
+            previous_failure_funcall_depth=${#FUNCNAME[@]}
+            return
+        fi
+        previous_failure_status=$last_failure_status
+        previous_failed_command=$failed_command
+        previous_failure_funcall_depth=${#FUNCNAME[@]}
+
+        text="$current_section: $failed_command -> $last_failure_status"
+        echo "${start_red}^^^^$text^^^^${end_color}" >&2
+        echo "$text" >>"$failure_summary_file"
+
+        # If the command is fatal (configure or build command), stop this
+        # component. Otherwise (test command) keep the component running
+        # (run more tests from the same build).
+        if ! can_keep_going_after_failure "$failed_command"; then
+            exit $last_failure_status
+        fi
+    }
+
     final_report () {
         if [ $failure_count -gt 0 ]; then
             echo
             echo "!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
-            echo "${start_red}FAILED: $failure_count${end_color}$failure_summary"
+            echo "${start_red}FAILED: $failure_count components${end_color}"
+            cat "$failure_summary_file"
             echo "!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
-            exit 1
         elif [ -z "${1-}" ]; then
             echo "SUCCESS :)"
         fi
         if [ -n "${1-}" ]; then
             echo "Killed by SIG$1."
         fi
+        rm -f "$failure_summary_file"
+        if [ $failure_count -gt 0 ]; then
+            exit 1
+        fi
     }
 }
 
+# record_status() and if_build_succeeded() are kept temporarily for backward
+# compatibility. Don't use them in new components.
+record_status () {
+    "$@"
+}
 if_build_succeeded () {
-    if [ $build_status -eq 0 ]; then
-        record_status "$@"
-    fi
+    "$@"
 }
 
-# to be used instead of ! for commands run with
-# record_status or if_build_succeeded
-not() {
-    ! "$@"
-}
-
-pre_setup_quiet_redirect () {
-    if [ $QUIET -ne 1 ]; then
-        redirect_out () {
-            "$@"
-        }
-        redirect_err () {
-            "$@"
-        }
-    else
-        redirect_out () {
-            "$@" >/dev/null
-        }
-        redirect_err () {
-            "$@" 2>/dev/null
-        }
+# '! true' does not trigger the ERR trap. Arrange to trigger it, with
+# a reasonably informative error message (not just "$@").
+not () {
+    if "$@"; then
+        report_failed_command="! $*"
+        false
+        unset report_failed_command
     fi
 }
 
@@ -669,7 +781,11 @@
     # since make doesn't have proper dependencies, remove any possibly outdate
     # file that might be around before generating fresh ones
     make neat
-    make generated_files
+    if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then
+        make generated_files >/dev/null
+    else
+        make generated_files
+    fi
 }
 
 
@@ -691,24 +807,24 @@
 
 component_check_recursion () {
     msg "Check: recursion.pl" # < 1s
-    record_status tests/scripts/recursion.pl library/*.c
+    tests/scripts/recursion.pl library/*.c
 }
 
 component_check_generated_files () {
     msg "Check: check-generated-files, files generated with make" # 2s
     make generated_files
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+    tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
 
     msg "Check: check-generated-files -u, files present" # 2s
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u
+    tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u
     # Check that the generated files are considered up to date.
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+    tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
 
     msg "Check: check-generated-files -u, files absent" # 2s
     command make neat
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u
+    tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u
     # Check that the generated files are considered up to date.
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+    tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
 
     # This component ends with the generated files present in the source tree.
     # This is necessary for subsequent components!
@@ -716,18 +832,18 @@
 
 component_check_doxy_blocks () {
     msg "Check: doxygen markup outside doxygen blocks" # < 1s
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl
+    tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl
 }
 
 component_check_files () {
     msg "Check: file sanity checks (permissions, encodings)" # < 1s
-    record_status tests/scripts/check_files.py
+    tests/scripts/check_files.py
 }
 
 component_check_changelog () {
     msg "Check: changelog entries" # < 1s
     rm -f ChangeLog.new
-    record_status scripts/assemble_changelog.py -o ChangeLog.new
+    scripts/assemble_changelog.py -o ChangeLog.new
     if [ -e ChangeLog.new ]; then
         # Show the diff for information. It isn't an error if the diff is
         # non-empty.
@@ -738,7 +854,7 @@
 
 component_check_names () {
     msg "Check: declared and exported names (builds the library)" # < 3s
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-names.sh -v
+    tests/scripts/check_names.py -v
 }
 
 component_check_test_cases () {
@@ -748,13 +864,13 @@
     else
         opt=''
     fi
-    record_status tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py $opt
+    tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py $opt
     unset opt
 }
 
 component_check_doxygen_warnings () {
     msg "Check: doxygen warnings (builds the documentation)" # ~ 3s
-    record_status tests/scripts/doxygen.sh
+    tests/scripts/doxygen.sh
 }
 
 
@@ -774,7 +890,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "selftest: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~10s
-    if_build_succeeded programs/test/selftest
+    programs/test/selftest
 
     export MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE="$SAVE_MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE"
     unset SAVE_MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE
@@ -789,16 +905,16 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: selftest (ASan build)" # ~ 10s
-    if_build_succeeded programs/test/selftest
+    programs/test/selftest
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 1 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
 
     msg "test: context-info.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec
-    if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh
+    tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
 component_test_full_cmake_gcc_asan () {
@@ -811,16 +927,16 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: selftest (ASan build)" # ~ 10s
-    if_build_succeeded programs/test/selftest
+    programs/test/selftest
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full config, ASan build)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh (full config, ASan build)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
 
     msg "test: context-info.sh (full config, ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec
-    if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh
+    tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
 component_test_psa_crypto_key_id_encodes_owner () {
@@ -858,7 +974,7 @@
     # Check that if a symbol is renamed by crypto_spe.h, the non-renamed
     # version is not present.
     echo "Checking for renamed symbols in the library"
-    if_build_succeeded check_renamed_symbols tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h library/libmbedcrypto.a
+    check_renamed_symbols tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h library/libmbedcrypto.a
 }
 
 component_test_psa_crypto_client () {
@@ -883,8 +999,17 @@
 
 component_test_ref_configs () {
     msg "test/build: ref-configs (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min 20s
-    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
-    record_status tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
+    # test-ref-configs works by overwriting mbedtls_config.h; this makes cmake
+    # want to re-generate generated files that depend on it, quite correctly.
+    # However this doesn't work as the generation script expects a specific
+    # format for mbedtls_config.h, which the other files don't follow. Also,
+    # cmake can't know this, but re-generation is actually not necessary as
+    # the generated files only depend on the list of available options, not
+    # whether they're on or off. So, disable cmake's (over-sensitive here)
+    # dependency resolution for generated files and just rely on them being
+    # present (thanks to pre_generate_files) by turning GEN_FILES off.
+    CC=gcc cmake -D GEN_FILES=Off -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+    tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
 }
 
 component_test_no_renegotiation () {
@@ -897,7 +1022,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 component_test_no_pem_no_fs () {
@@ -913,7 +1038,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: !MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C !MBEDTLS_FS_IO - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 component_test_rsa_no_crt () {
@@ -926,13 +1051,13 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f RSA
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f RSA
 
     msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -t RSA
+    tests/compat.sh -t RSA
 
     msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of context-info.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec
-    if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh
+    tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
 component_test_no_ctr_drbg_classic () {
@@ -951,10 +1076,10 @@
     # The SSL tests are slow, so run a small subset, just enough to get
     # confidence that the SSL code copes with HMAC_DRBG.
     msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server'
 
     msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto - compat.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL
+    tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL
 }
 
 component_test_no_ctr_drbg_use_psa () {
@@ -973,10 +1098,10 @@
     # The SSL tests are slow, so run a small subset, just enough to get
     # confidence that the SSL code copes with HMAC_DRBG.
     msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server'
 
     msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - compat.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL
+    tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL
 }
 
 component_test_no_hmac_drbg_classic () {
@@ -998,12 +1123,12 @@
     # Test SSL with non-deterministic ECDSA. Only test features that
     # might be affected by how ECDSA signature is performed.
     msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign'
 
     # To save time, only test one protocol version, since this part of
     # the protocol is identical in (D)TLS up to 1.2.
     msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto - compat.sh (ECDSA)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA'
+    tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA'
 }
 
 component_test_no_hmac_drbg_use_psa () {
@@ -1025,12 +1150,12 @@
     # Test SSL with non-deterministic ECDSA. Only test features that
     # might be affected by how ECDSA signature is performed.
     msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign'
 
     # To save time, only test one protocol version, since this part of
     # the protocol is identical in (D)TLS up to 1.2.
     msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - compat.sh (ECDSA)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA'
+    tests/compat.sh -m tls1_2 -t 'ECDSA'
 }
 
 component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_classic () {
@@ -1053,7 +1178,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default'
 }
 
 component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_use_psa () {
@@ -1072,7 +1197,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, PSA crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque'
 }
 
 component_test_psa_external_rng_use_psa_crypto () {
@@ -1087,7 +1212,7 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: full + PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + USE_PSA_CRYPTO minus CTR_DRBG"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque'
 }
 
 component_test_everest () {
@@ -1100,11 +1225,11 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: Everest ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH
 
     msg "test: Everest ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min
     # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time.
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES'
+    tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES'
 }
 
 component_test_everest_curve25519_only () {
@@ -1134,7 +1259,7 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: small SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl-opt.sh MFL and large packet tests"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment\|Large packet"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment\|Large packet"
 }
 
 component_test_small_ssl_in_content_len () {
@@ -1145,7 +1270,7 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: small SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN - ssl-opt.sh MFL tests"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment"
 }
 
 component_test_small_ssl_dtls_max_buffering () {
@@ -1155,7 +1280,7 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #0 - ssl-opt.sh specific reordering test"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order hs msg before reassembling next, free buffered msg"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order hs msg before reassembling next, free buffered msg"
 }
 
 component_test_small_mbedtls_ssl_dtls_max_buffering () {
@@ -1165,38 +1290,38 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #1 - ssl-opt.sh specific reordering test"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message, drop for fragmented NewSessionTicket"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message, drop for fragmented NewSessionTicket"
 }
 
 component_test_psa_collect_statuses () {
   msg "build+test: psa_collect_statuses" # ~30s
   scripts/config.py full
-  record_status tests/scripts/psa_collect_statuses.py
+  tests/scripts/psa_collect_statuses.py
   # Check that psa_crypto_init() succeeded at least once
-  record_status grep -q '^0:psa_crypto_init:' tests/statuses.log
+  grep -q '^0:psa_crypto_init:' tests/statuses.log
   rm -f tests/statuses.log
 }
 
 component_test_full_cmake_clang () {
     msg "build: cmake, full config, clang" # ~ 50s
     scripts/config.py full
-    CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check -D ENABLE_TESTING=On .
+    CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release -D ENABLE_TESTING=On .
     make
 
     msg "test: main suites (full config, clang)" # ~ 5s
     make test
 
     msg "test: psa_constant_names (full config, clang)" # ~ 1s
-    record_status tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
+    tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh default, ECJPAKE, SSL async (full config)" # ~ 1s
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|ECJPAKE\|SSL async private'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|ECJPAKE\|SSL async private'
 
     msg "test: compat.sh DES, 3DES & NULL (full config)" # ~ 2 min
-    if_build_succeeded env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'NULL\|DES'
+    env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'NULL\|DES'
 
     msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly"
-    if_build_succeeded env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
+    env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
 }
 
 component_test_memsan_constant_flow () {
@@ -1303,70 +1428,68 @@
   msg "build: make, crypto only"
   scripts/config.py crypto
   make CFLAGS='-O1 -Werror'
-  if_build_succeeded are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
+  are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
 }
 
 component_build_crypto_full () {
   msg "build: make, crypto only, full config"
   scripts/config.py crypto_full
   make CFLAGS='-O1 -Werror'
-  if_build_succeeded are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
+  are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
 }
 
 component_build_crypto_baremetal () {
   msg "build: make, crypto only, baremetal config"
   scripts/config.py crypto_baremetal
   make CFLAGS='-O1 -Werror'
-  if_build_succeeded are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
+  are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.*
 }
 
 component_test_depends_curves () {
     msg "test/build: curves.pl (gcc)" # ~ 4 min
-    record_status tests/scripts/curves.pl
+    tests/scripts/curves.pl
 }
 
 component_test_depends_curves_psa () {
     msg "test/build: curves.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)"
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-    record_status tests/scripts/curves.pl
+    tests/scripts/curves.pl
 }
 
 component_test_depends_hashes () {
     msg "test/build: depends-hashes.pl (gcc)" # ~ 2 min
-    record_status tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
+    tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
 }
 
 component_test_depends_hashes_psa () {
     msg "test/build: depends-hashes.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)"
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-    record_status tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
+    tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
 }
 
 component_test_depends_pkalgs () {
     msg "test/build: depends-pkalgs.pl (gcc)" # ~ 2 min
-    record_status tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
+    tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
 }
 
 component_test_depends_pkalgs_psa () {
     msg "test/build: depends-pkalgs.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)"
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-    record_status tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
+    tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
 }
 
 component_build_key_exchanges () {
     msg "test/build: key-exchanges (gcc)" # ~ 1 min
-    record_status tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl
+    tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl
 }
 
-component_build_default_make_gcc_and_cxx () {
-    msg "build: Unix make, -Os (gcc)" # ~ 30s
-    make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -Os'
+component_test_make_cxx () {
+    msg "build: Unix make, full, gcc + g++"
+    scripts/config.py full
+    make TEST_CPP=1 lib programs
 
-    msg "test: verify header list in cpp_dummy_build.cpp"
-    record_status check_headers_in_cpp
-
-    msg "build: Unix make, incremental g++"
-    make TEST_CPP=1
+    msg "test: cpp_dummy_build"
+    programs/test/cpp_dummy_build
 }
 
 component_build_module_alt () {
@@ -1418,16 +1541,16 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh default (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh DES & NULL (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)"
-    if_build_succeeded env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '3DES\|DES-CBC3' -f 'NULL\|DES'
+    env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '3DES\|DES-CBC3' -f 'NULL\|DES'
 
     msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)"
-    if_build_succeeded env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
+    env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
 }
 
 component_test_psa_crypto_config_basic() {
@@ -1459,31 +1582,8 @@
     scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DES_C
 
-    # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver
-    loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC"
+    loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL"
+    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} '-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h\"'"
     loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
 
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$loc_cflags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
@@ -1506,6 +1606,19 @@
     make test
 }
 
+component_test_psa_crypto_config_chachapoly_disabled() {
+    # full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+    msg "build: full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305"
+    scripts/config.py full
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+    scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
+    scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+    make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+    msg "test: full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305"
+    make test
+}
+
 # This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator ECDSA code is in place and ready to test.
 component_build_psa_accel_alg_ecdsa() {
     # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
@@ -1848,7 +1961,8 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT
-    make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -Os'
+    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check .
+    make
 }
 
 component_build_no_ssl_srv () {
@@ -1881,7 +1995,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
-    CC=gcc cmake .
+    CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE"
@@ -1892,7 +2006,7 @@
     msg "build: default config with memory buffer allocator"
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
-    CC=gcc cmake .
+    CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C"
@@ -1900,7 +2014,7 @@
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C"
     # MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC is slow. Skip tests that tend to time out.
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '^DTLS proxy'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '^DTLS proxy'
 }
 
 component_test_no_max_fragment_length () {
@@ -1911,7 +2025,7 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MFL-related tests"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length"
 }
 
 component_test_asan_remove_peer_certificate () {
@@ -1924,13 +2038,13 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
 
     msg "test: context-info.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh
+    tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
 component_test_no_max_fragment_length_small_ssl_out_content_len () {
@@ -1942,10 +2056,10 @@
     make
 
     msg "test: MFL tests (disabled MFL extension case) & large packet tests"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length\|Large buffer"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length\|Large buffer"
 
     msg "test: context-info.sh (disabled MFL extension case)"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh
+    tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
 component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len () {
@@ -1958,10 +2072,10 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
 }
 
 component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len_CID () {
@@ -1976,10 +2090,22 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+    tests/compat.sh
+}
+
+component_test_CID_no_debug() {
+    msg "build: Connection ID enabled, debug disabled"
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+
+    CC=gcc cmake .
+    make
+
+    msg "test: Connection ID enabled, debug disabled"
+    make test
 }
 
 component_test_ssl_alloc_buffer_and_mfl () {
@@ -1989,14 +2115,14 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH
-    CC=gcc cmake .
+    CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG and MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH"
     make test
 
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG and MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Handshake memory usage"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Handshake memory usage"
 }
 
 component_test_when_no_ciphersuites_have_mac () {
@@ -2010,13 +2136,13 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test ssl-opt.sh: !MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|EtM' -e 'without EtM'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|EtM' -e 'without EtM'
 }
 
 component_test_no_date_time () {
     msg "build: default config without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE"
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
-    CC=gcc cmake
+    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check .
     make
 
     msg "test: !MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE - main suites"
@@ -2046,7 +2172,7 @@
     msg "selftest: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)"
     # Just the calloc selftest. "make test" ran the others as part of the
     # test suites.
-    if_build_succeeded programs/test/selftest calloc
+    programs/test/selftest calloc
 
     msg "test ssl-opt.sh: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)"
     # Run a subset of the tests. The choice is a balance between coverage
@@ -2054,7 +2180,7 @@
     # The current choice is to skip tests whose description includes
     # "proxy", which is an approximation of skipping tests that use the
     # UDP proxy, which tend to be slower and flakier.
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -e 'proxy'
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -e 'proxy'
 }
 
 component_test_aes_fewer_tables () {
@@ -2136,31 +2262,8 @@
     scripts/config.py full
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS
-    # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver
-    loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC"
-    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC"
+    loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL"
+    loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} '-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h\"'"
     loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
 
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS="${loc_cflags}" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
@@ -2220,7 +2323,8 @@
 }
 
 component_test_m32_o0 () {
-    # Build once with -O0, to compile out the i386 specific inline assembly
+    # Build without optimization, so as to use portable C code (in a 32-bit
+    # build) and not the i386-specific inline assembly.
     msg "build: i386, make, gcc -O0 (ASan build)" # ~ 30s
     scripts/config.py full
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O0" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS"
@@ -2235,19 +2339,20 @@
     esac
 }
 
-component_test_m32_o1 () {
-    # Build again with -O1, to compile in the i386 specific inline assembly
-    msg "build: i386, make, gcc -O1 (ASan build)" # ~ 30s
+component_test_m32_o2 () {
+    # Build with optimization, to use the i386 specific inline assembly
+    # and go faster for tests.
+    msg "build: i386, make, gcc -O2 (ASan build)" # ~ 30s
     scripts/config.py full
-    make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O1" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS"
+    make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O2" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS"
 
-    msg "test: i386, make, gcc -O1 (ASan build)"
+    msg "test: i386, make, gcc -O2 (ASan build)"
     make test
 
-    msg "test ssl-opt.sh, i386, make, gcc-O1"
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    msg "test ssl-opt.sh, i386, make, gcc-O2"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
-support_test_m32_o1 () {
+support_test_m32_o2 () {
     support_test_m32_o0 "$@"
 }
 
@@ -2260,11 +2365,11 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: i386, Everest ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH
 
     msg "test: i386, Everest ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min
     # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time.
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES'
+    tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES'
 }
 support_test_m32_everest () {
     support_test_m32_o0 "$@"
@@ -2356,13 +2461,13 @@
     scripts/config.pl full
     scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE # too slow for tests
     scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-    make CFLAGS='-Werror -O1'
+    make CFLAGS='-Werror -O2'
 
     msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO" # ~ 10s
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, full + MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO" # ~ 1 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc () {
@@ -2418,7 +2523,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
     make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -Wall -Wextra' lib
     echo "Checking that software 64-bit division is not required"
-    if_build_succeeded not grep __aeabi_uldiv library/*.o
+    not grep __aeabi_uldiv library/*.o
 }
 
 component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication () {
@@ -2427,7 +2532,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
     make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -O1 -march=armv6-m -mthumb' lib
     echo "Checking that software 64-bit multiplication is not required"
-    if_build_succeeded not grep __aeabi_lmul library/*.o
+    not grep __aeabi_lmul library/*.o
 }
 
 component_build_armcc () {
@@ -2464,6 +2569,8 @@
     make
     msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, without padding"
     make test
+    msg "ssl-opt.sh (TLS 1.3 experimental)"
+    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 component_test_tls13_experimental_with_padding () {
@@ -2474,6 +2581,33 @@
     make
     msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, with padding"
     make test
+    msg "ssl-opt.sh (TLS 1.3 experimental)"
+    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+}
+
+component_test_tls13_experimental_with_ecp_restartable () {
+    msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, with ecp_restartable"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
+    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+    make
+    msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, with ecp_restartable"
+    make test
+    msg "ssl-opt.sh (TLS 1.3 experimental)"
+    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+}
+
+component_test_tls13_experimental_with_everest () {
+    msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, with Everest"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
+    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+    make
+    msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled, with Everest"
+    make test
+    msg "ssl-opt.sh (TLS 1.3 experimental)"
+    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 component_build_mingw () {
@@ -2506,13 +2640,13 @@
     make test
 
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (MSan)" # ~ 1 min
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
     # Optional part(s)
 
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then
         msg "test: compat.sh (MSan)" # ~ 6 min 20s
-        if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh
+        tests/compat.sh
     fi
 }
 
@@ -2528,17 +2662,17 @@
     # seem to receive signals under valgrind on OS X).
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then
         msg "test: ssl-opt.sh --memcheck (Release)"
-        if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh --memcheck
+        tests/ssl-opt.sh --memcheck
     fi
 
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 1 ]; then
         msg "test: compat.sh --memcheck (Release)"
-        if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh --memcheck
+        tests/compat.sh --memcheck
     fi
 
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then
         msg "test: context-info.sh --memcheck (Release)"
-        if_build_succeeded tests/context-info.sh --memcheck
+        tests/context-info.sh --memcheck
     fi
 }
 
@@ -2547,7 +2681,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR="$PWD"
     mkdir "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR"
     cd "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR"
-    cmake "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
+    cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
     make
 
     msg "test: cmake 'out-of-source' build"
@@ -2557,15 +2691,13 @@
     # "No such file or directory", which would indicate that some required
     # file is missing (ssl-opt.sh tolerates the absence of some files so
     # may exit with status 0 but emit errors).
-    if_build_succeeded ./tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Fallback SCSV: beginning of list' 2>ssl-opt.err
-    if [ -s ssl-opt.err ]; then
-        cat ssl-opt.err >&2
-        record_status [ ! -s ssl-opt.err ]
-        rm ssl-opt.err
-    fi
+    ./tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Fallback SCSV: beginning of list' 2>ssl-opt.err
+    cat ssl-opt.err >&2
+    # If ssl-opt.err is non-empty, record an error and keep going.
+    [ ! -s ssl-opt.err ]
+    rm ssl-opt.err
     cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
     rm -rf "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR"
-    unset MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR
 }
 
 component_test_cmake_as_subdirectory () {
@@ -2575,7 +2707,7 @@
     cd programs/test/cmake_subproject
     cmake .
     make
-    if_build_succeeded ./cmake_subproject
+    ./cmake_subproject
 
     cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
     unset MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR
@@ -2588,7 +2720,7 @@
     cd programs/test/cmake_package
     cmake .
     make
-    if_build_succeeded ./cmake_package
+    ./cmake_package
 
     cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
     unset MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR
@@ -2601,7 +2733,7 @@
     cd programs/test/cmake_package_install
     cmake .
     make
-    if_build_succeeded ./cmake_package_install
+    ./cmake_package_install
 
     cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR"
     unset MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR
@@ -2626,9 +2758,9 @@
         for compiler in clang gcc; do
             msg "test: $compiler $optimization_flag, mbedtls_platform_zeroize()"
             make programs CC="$compiler" DEBUG=1 CFLAGS="$optimization_flag"
-            if_build_succeeded gdb -ex "$gdb_disable_aslr" -x tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb -nw -batch -nx 2>&1 | tee test_zeroize.log
-            if_build_succeeded grep "The buffer was correctly zeroized" test_zeroize.log
-            if_build_succeeded not grep -i "error" test_zeroize.log
+            gdb -ex "$gdb_disable_aslr" -x tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb -nw -batch -nx 2>&1 | tee test_zeroize.log
+            grep "The buffer was correctly zeroized" test_zeroize.log
+            not grep -i "error" test_zeroize.log
             rm -f test_zeroize.log
             make clean
         done
@@ -2637,17 +2769,40 @@
     unset gdb_disable_aslr
 }
 
-component_check_python_files () {
-    msg "Lint: Python scripts"
-    record_status tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh
+component_test_psa_compliance () {
+    msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box), libmbedcrypto.a only"
+    make -C library libmbedcrypto.a
+
+    msg "unit test: test_psa_compliance.py"
+    ./tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
 }
 
-component_check_generate_test_code () {
-    msg "uint test: generate_test_code.py"
+support_test_psa_compliance () {
+    # psa-compliance-tests only supports CMake >= 3.10.0
+    ver="$(cmake --version)"
+    ver="${ver#cmake version }"
+    ver_major="${ver%%.*}"
+
+    ver="${ver#*.}"
+    ver_minor="${ver%%.*}"
+
+    [ "$ver_major" -eq 3 ] && [ "$ver_minor" -ge 10 ]
+}
+
+component_check_python_files () {
+    msg "Lint: Python scripts"
+    tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh
+}
+
+component_check_test_helpers () {
+    msg "unit test: generate_test_code.py"
     # unittest writes out mundane stuff like number or tests run on stderr.
     # Our convention is to reserve stderr for actual errors, and write
     # harmless info on stdout so it can be suppress with --quiet.
-    record_status ./tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py 2>&1
+    ./tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py 2>&1
+
+    msg "unit test: translate_ciphers.py"
+    python3 -m unittest tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py 2>&1
 }
 
 ################################################################
@@ -2656,7 +2811,7 @@
 
 post_report () {
     msg "Done, cleaning up"
-    cleanup
+    final_cleanup
 
     final_report
 }
@@ -2667,26 +2822,71 @@
 #### Run all the things
 ################################################################
 
+# Function invoked by --error-test to test error reporting.
+pseudo_component_error_test () {
+    msg "Testing error reporting $error_test_i"
+    if [ $KEEP_GOING -ne 0 ]; then
+        echo "Expect three failing commands."
+    fi
+    # If the component doesn't run in a subshell, changing error_test_i to an
+    # invalid integer will cause an error in the loop that runs this function.
+    error_test_i=this_should_not_be_used_since_the_component_runs_in_a_subshell
+    # Expected error: 'grep non_existent /dev/null -> 1'
+    grep non_existent /dev/null
+    # Expected error: '! grep -q . tests/scripts/all.sh -> 1'
+    not grep -q . "$0"
+    # Expected error: 'make unknown_target -> 2'
+    make unknown_target
+    false "this should not be executed"
+}
+
 # Run one component and clean up afterwards.
 run_component () {
-    # Back up the configuration in case the component modifies it.
-    # The cleanup function will restore it.
-    cp -p "$CONFIG_H" "$CONFIG_BAK"
-    cp -p "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_BAK"
     current_component="$1"
     export MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION="$current_component"
 
     # Unconditionally create a seedfile that's sufficiently long.
     # Do this before each component, because a previous component may
     # have messed it up or shortened it.
-    redirect_err dd if=/dev/urandom of=./tests/seedfile bs=64 count=1
+    local dd_cmd
+    dd_cmd=(dd if=/dev/urandom of=./tests/seedfile bs=64 count=1)
+    case $OSTYPE in
+        linux*|freebsd*|openbsd*|darwin*) dd_cmd+=(status=none)
+    esac
+    "${dd_cmd[@]}"
 
-    # Run the component code.
-    if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then
-        # msg() is silenced, so just print the component name here
-        echo "${current_component#component_}"
+    # Run the component in a subshell, with error trapping and output
+    # redirection set up based on the relevant options.
+    if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then
+        # We want to keep running if the subshell fails, so 'set -e' must
+        # be off when the subshell runs.
+        set +e
     fi
-    redirect_out "$@"
+    (
+        if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then
+            # msg() will be silenced, so just print the component name here.
+            echo "${current_component#component_}"
+            exec >/dev/null
+        fi
+        if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then
+            # Keep "set -e" off, and run an ERR trap instead to record failures.
+            set -E
+            trap err_trap ERR
+        fi
+        # The next line is what runs the component
+        "$@"
+        if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then
+            trap - ERR
+            exit $last_failure_status
+        fi
+    )
+    component_status=$?
+    if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then
+        set -e
+        if [ $component_status -ne 0 ]; then
+            failure_count=$((failure_count + 1))
+        fi
+    fi
 
     # Restore the build tree to a clean state.
     cleanup
@@ -2699,16 +2899,13 @@
 pre_parse_command_line "$@"
 
 pre_check_git
+pre_restore_files
+pre_back_up
 
 build_status=0
 if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then
     pre_setup_keep_going
-else
-    record_status () {
-        "$@"
-    }
 fi
-pre_setup_quiet_redirect
 pre_prepare_outcome_file
 pre_print_configuration
 pre_check_tools
@@ -2716,6 +2913,10 @@
 pre_generate_files
 
 # Run the requested tests.
+for ((error_test_i=1; error_test_i <= error_test; error_test_i++)); do
+    run_component pseudo_component_error_test
+done
+unset error_test_i
 for component in $RUN_COMPONENTS; do
     run_component "component_$component"
 done
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check-names.sh b/tests/scripts/check-names.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 2a06adc..0000000
--- a/tests/scripts/check-names.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
-# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
-# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-
-set -eu
-
-if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
-    cat <<EOF
-$0 [-v]
-This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers in mbed
-TLS are consistent with the house style and are also self-consistent.
-
-  -v    If the script fails unexpectedly, print a command trace.
-EOF
-    exit
-fi
-
-trace=
-if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "-v" ]; then
-  shift
-  trace='-x'
-  exec 2>check-names.err
-  trap 'echo "FAILED UNEXPECTEDLY, status=$?";
-        cat check-names.err' EXIT
-  set -x
-fi
-
-printf "Analysing source code...\n"
-
-sh $trace tests/scripts/list-macros.sh
-tests/scripts/list-enum-consts.pl
-sh $trace tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh
-sh $trace tests/scripts/list-symbols.sh
-
-FAIL=0
-
-printf "\nExported symbols declared in header: "
-UNDECLARED=$( diff exported-symbols identifiers | sed -n -e 's/^< //p' )
-if [ "x$UNDECLARED" = "x" ]; then
-    echo "PASS"
-else
-    echo "FAIL"
-    echo "$UNDECLARED"
-    FAIL=1
-fi
-
-diff macros identifiers | sed -n -e 's/< //p' > actual-macros
-
-for THING in actual-macros enum-consts; do
-    printf 'Names of %s: ' "$THING"
-    test -r $THING
-    BAD=$( grep -E -v '^(MBEDTLS|PSA)_[0-9A-Z_]*[0-9A-Z]$' $THING || true )
-    UNDERSCORES=$( grep -E '.*__.*' $THING || true )
-
-    if [ "x$BAD" = "x" ] && [ "x$UNDERSCORES" = "x" ]; then
-        echo "PASS"
-    else
-        echo "FAIL"
-        echo "$BAD"
-        echo "$UNDERSCORES"
-        FAIL=1
-    fi
-done
-
-for THING in identifiers; do
-    printf 'Names of %s: ' "$THING"
-    test -r $THING
-    BAD=$( grep -E -v '^(mbedtls|psa)_[0-9a-z_]*[0-9a-z]$' $THING || true )
-    if [ "x$BAD" = "x" ]; then
-        echo "PASS"
-    else
-        echo "FAIL"
-        echo "$BAD"
-        FAIL=1
-    fi
-done
-
-printf "Likely typos: "
-sort -u actual-macros enum-consts > _caps
-HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*.h include/psa/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-2\.x\.h' )
-HEADERS="$HEADERS library/*.h"
-HEADERS="$HEADERS 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
-LIBRARY="$( ls library/*.c )"
-LIBRARY="$LIBRARY 3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c 3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c"
-NL='
-'
-cat $HEADERS $LIBRARY \
-    | grep -v -e '//no-check-names' -e '#error' \
-    | sed -n 's/MBED..._[A-Z0-9_]*/\'"$NL"'&\'"$NL"/gp \
-    | grep MBEDTLS | sort -u > _MBEDTLS_XXX
-TYPOS=$( diff _caps _MBEDTLS_XXX | sed -n 's/^> //p' \
-            | egrep -v 'XXX|__|_$|^MBEDTLS_.*CONFIG_FILE$' || true )
-rm _MBEDTLS_XXX _caps
-if [ "x$TYPOS" = "x" ]; then
-    echo "PASS"
-else
-    echo "FAIL"
-    echo "$TYPOS"
-    FAIL=1
-fi
-
-if [ -n "$trace" ]; then
-  set +x
-  trap - EXIT
-  rm check-names.err
-fi
-
-printf "\nOverall: "
-if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then
-    rm macros actual-macros enum-consts identifiers exported-symbols
-    echo "PASSED"
-    exit 0
-else
-    echo "FAILED"
-    exit 1
-fi
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ac2490f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@@ -0,0 +1,862 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""
+This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers in Mbed TLS
+are consistent with the house style and are also self-consistent. It only runs
+on Linux and macOS since it depends on nm.
+
+It contains two major Python classes, CodeParser and NameChecker. They both have
+a comprehensive "run-all" function (comprehensive_parse() and perform_checks())
+but the individual functions can also be used for specific needs.
+
+CodeParser makes heavy use of regular expressions to parse the code, and is
+dependent on the current code formatting. Many Python C parser libraries require
+preprocessed C code, which means no macro parsing. Compiler tools are also not
+very helpful when we want the exact location in the original source (which
+becomes impossible when e.g. comments are stripped).
+
+NameChecker performs the following checks:
+
+- All exported and available symbols in the library object files, are explicitly
+  declared in the header files. This uses the nm command.
+- All macros, constants, and identifiers (function names, struct names, etc)
+  follow the required regex pattern.
+- Typo checking: All words that begin with MBED exist as macros or constants.
+
+The script returns 0 on success, 1 on test failure, and 2 if there is a script
+error. It must be run from Mbed TLS root.
+"""
+
+import abc
+import argparse
+import fnmatch
+import glob
+import textwrap
+import os
+import sys
+import traceback
+import re
+import enum
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import logging
+
+# Naming patterns to check against. These are defined outside the NameCheck
+# class for ease of modification.
+MACRO_PATTERN = r"^(MBEDTLS|PSA)_[0-9A-Z_]*[0-9A-Z]$"
+CONSTANTS_PATTERN = MACRO_PATTERN
+IDENTIFIER_PATTERN = r"^(mbedtls|psa)_[0-9a-z_]*[0-9a-z]$"
+
+class Match(): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """
+    A class representing a match, together with its found position.
+
+    Fields:
+    * filename: the file that the match was in.
+    * line: the full line containing the match.
+    * line_no: the line number.
+    * pos: a tuple of (start, end) positions on the line where the match is.
+    * name: the match itself.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, filename, line, line_no, pos, name):
+        # pylint: disable=too-many-arguments
+        self.filename = filename
+        self.line = line
+        self.line_no = line_no
+        self.pos = pos
+        self.name = name
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        """
+        Return a formatted code listing representation of the erroneous line.
+        """
+        gutter = format(self.line_no, "4d")
+        underline = self.pos[0] * " " + (self.pos[1] - self.pos[0]) * "^"
+
+        return (
+            " {0} |\n".format(" " * len(gutter)) +
+            " {0} | {1}".format(gutter, self.line) +
+            " {0} | {1}\n".format(" " * len(gutter), underline)
+        )
+
+class Problem(abc.ABC): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """
+    An abstract parent class representing a form of static analysis error.
+    It extends an Abstract Base Class, which means it is not instantiable, and
+    it also mandates certain abstract methods to be implemented in subclasses.
+    """
+    # Class variable to control the quietness of all problems
+    quiet = False
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.textwrapper = textwrap.TextWrapper()
+        self.textwrapper.width = 80
+        self.textwrapper.initial_indent = "    > "
+        self.textwrapper.subsequent_indent = "      "
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        """
+        Unified string representation method for all Problems.
+        """
+        if self.__class__.quiet:
+            return self.quiet_output()
+        return self.verbose_output()
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def quiet_output(self):
+        """
+        The output when --quiet is enabled.
+        """
+        pass
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def verbose_output(self):
+        """
+        The default output with explanation and code snippet if appropriate.
+        """
+        pass
+
+class SymbolNotInHeader(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """
+    A problem that occurs when an exported/available symbol in the object file
+    is not explicitly declared in header files. Created with
+    NameCheck.check_symbols_declared_in_header()
+
+    Fields:
+    * symbol_name: the name of the symbol.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, symbol_name):
+        self.symbol_name = symbol_name
+        Problem.__init__(self)
+
+    def quiet_output(self):
+        return "{0}".format(self.symbol_name)
+
+    def verbose_output(self):
+        return self.textwrapper.fill(
+            "'{0}' was found as an available symbol in the output of nm, "
+            "however it was not declared in any header files."
+            .format(self.symbol_name))
+
+class PatternMismatch(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """
+    A problem that occurs when something doesn't match the expected pattern.
+    Created with NameCheck.check_match_pattern()
+
+    Fields:
+    * pattern: the expected regex pattern
+    * match: the Match object in question
+    """
+    def __init__(self, pattern, match):
+        self.pattern = pattern
+        self.match = match
+        Problem.__init__(self)
+
+
+    def quiet_output(self):
+        return (
+            "{0}:{1}:{2}"
+            .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name)
+        )
+
+    def verbose_output(self):
+        return self.textwrapper.fill(
+            "{0}:{1}: '{2}' does not match the required pattern '{3}'."
+            .format(
+                self.match.filename,
+                self.match.line_no,
+                self.match.name,
+                self.pattern
+            )
+        ) + "\n" + str(self.match)
+
+class Typo(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """
+    A problem that occurs when a word using MBED doesn't appear to be defined as
+    constants nor enum values. Created with NameCheck.check_for_typos()
+
+    Fields:
+    * match: the Match object of the MBED name in question.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, match):
+        self.match = match
+        Problem.__init__(self)
+
+    def quiet_output(self):
+        return (
+            "{0}:{1}:{2}"
+            .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name)
+        )
+
+    def verbose_output(self):
+        return self.textwrapper.fill(
+            "{0}:{1}: '{2}' looks like a typo. It was not found in any "
+            "macros or any enums. If this is not a typo, put "
+            "//no-check-names after it."
+            .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name)
+        ) + "\n" + str(self.match)
+
+class CodeParser():
+    """
+    Class for retrieving files and parsing the code. This can be used
+    independently of the checks that NameChecker performs, for example for
+    list_internal_identifiers.py.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, log):
+        self.log = log
+        self.check_repo_path()
+
+        # Memo for storing "glob expression": set(filepaths)
+        self.files = {}
+
+        # Globally excluded filenames.
+        # Note that "*" can match directory separators in exclude lists.
+        self.excluded_files = ["*/bn_mul", "*/compat-2.x.h"]
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def check_repo_path():
+        """
+        Check that the current working directory is the project root, and throw
+        an exception if not.
+        """
+        if not all(os.path.isdir(d) for d in ["include", "library", "tests"]):
+            raise Exception("This script must be run from Mbed TLS root")
+
+    def comprehensive_parse(self):
+        """
+        Comprehensive ("default") function to call each parsing function and
+        retrieve various elements of the code, together with the source location.
+
+        Returns a dict of parsed item key to the corresponding List of Matches.
+        """
+        self.log.info("Parsing source code...")
+        self.log.debug(
+            "The following files are excluded from the search: {}"
+            .format(str(self.excluded_files))
+        )
+
+        all_macros = self.parse_macros([
+            "include/mbedtls/*.h",
+            "include/psa/*.h",
+            "library/*.h",
+            "tests/include/test/drivers/*.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
+        ])
+        enum_consts = self.parse_enum_consts([
+            "include/mbedtls/*.h",
+            "library/*.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
+        ])
+        identifiers = self.parse_identifiers([
+            "include/mbedtls/*.h",
+            "include/psa/*.h",
+            "library/*.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
+        ])
+        mbed_words = self.parse_mbed_words([
+            "include/mbedtls/*.h",
+            "include/psa/*.h",
+            "library/*.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
+            "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h",
+            "library/*.c",
+            "3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c",
+            "3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c"
+        ])
+        symbols = self.parse_symbols()
+
+        # Remove identifier macros like mbedtls_printf or mbedtls_calloc
+        identifiers_justname = [x.name for x in identifiers]
+        actual_macros = []
+        for macro in all_macros:
+            if macro.name not in identifiers_justname:
+                actual_macros.append(macro)
+
+        self.log.debug("Found:")
+        # Aligns the counts on the assumption that none exceeds 4 digits
+        self.log.debug("  {:4} Total Macros".format(len(all_macros)))
+        self.log.debug("  {:4} Non-identifier Macros".format(len(actual_macros)))
+        self.log.debug("  {:4} Enum Constants".format(len(enum_consts)))
+        self.log.debug("  {:4} Identifiers".format(len(identifiers)))
+        self.log.debug("  {:4} Exported Symbols".format(len(symbols)))
+        return {
+            "macros": actual_macros,
+            "enum_consts": enum_consts,
+            "identifiers": identifiers,
+            "symbols": symbols,
+            "mbed_words": mbed_words
+        }
+
+    def is_file_excluded(self, path, exclude_wildcards):
+        """Whether the given file path is excluded."""
+        # exclude_wildcards may be None. Also, consider the global exclusions.
+        exclude_wildcards = (exclude_wildcards or []) + self.excluded_files
+        for pattern in exclude_wildcards:
+            if fnmatch.fnmatch(path, pattern):
+                return True
+        return False
+
+    def get_files(self, include_wildcards, exclude_wildcards):
+        """
+        Get all files that match any of the UNIX-style wildcards. While the
+        check_names script is designed only for use on UNIX/macOS (due to nm),
+        this function alone would work fine on Windows even with forward slashes
+        in the wildcard.
+
+        Args:
+        * include_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to match filepaths.
+        * exclude_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to exclude.
+
+        Returns a List of relative filepaths.
+        """
+        accumulator = set()
+
+        for include_wildcard in include_wildcards:
+            accumulator = accumulator.union(glob.iglob(include_wildcard))
+
+        return list(path for path in accumulator
+                    if not self.is_file_excluded(path, exclude_wildcards))
+
+    def parse_macros(self, include, exclude=None):
+        """
+        Parse all macros defined by #define preprocessor directives.
+
+        Args:
+        * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
+        * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
+
+        Returns a List of Match objects for the found macros.
+        """
+        macro_regex = re.compile(r"# *define +(?P<macro>\w+)")
+        exclusions = (
+            "asm", "inline", "EMIT", "_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE", "MULADDC_"
+        )
+
+        files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+        self.log.debug("Looking for macros in {} files".format(len(files)))
+
+        macros = []
+        for header_file in files:
+            with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header:
+                for line_no, line in enumerate(header):
+                    for macro in macro_regex.finditer(line):
+                        if macro.group("macro").startswith(exclusions):
+                            continue
+
+                        macros.append(Match(
+                            header_file,
+                            line,
+                            line_no,
+                            macro.span("macro"),
+                            macro.group("macro")))
+
+        return macros
+
+    def parse_mbed_words(self, include, exclude=None):
+        """
+        Parse all words in the file that begin with MBED, in and out of macros,
+        comments, anything.
+
+        Args:
+        * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
+        * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
+
+        Returns a List of Match objects for words beginning with MBED.
+        """
+        # Typos of TLS are common, hence the broader check below than MBEDTLS.
+        mbed_regex = re.compile(r"\bMBED.+?_[A-Z0-9_]*")
+        exclusions = re.compile(r"// *no-check-names|#error")
+
+        files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+        self.log.debug("Looking for MBED words in {} files".format(len(files)))
+
+        mbed_words = []
+        for filename in files:
+            with open(filename, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fp:
+                for line_no, line in enumerate(fp):
+                    if exclusions.search(line):
+                        continue
+
+                    for name in mbed_regex.finditer(line):
+                        mbed_words.append(Match(
+                            filename,
+                            line,
+                            line_no,
+                            name.span(0),
+                            name.group(0)))
+
+        return mbed_words
+
+    def parse_enum_consts(self, include, exclude=None):
+        """
+        Parse all enum value constants that are declared.
+
+        Args:
+        * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
+        * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
+
+        Returns a List of Match objects for the findings.
+        """
+        files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+        self.log.debug("Looking for enum consts in {} files".format(len(files)))
+
+        # Emulate a finite state machine to parse enum declarations.
+        # OUTSIDE_KEYWORD = outside the enum keyword
+        # IN_BRACES = inside enum opening braces
+        # IN_BETWEEN = between enum keyword and opening braces
+        states = enum.Enum("FSM", ["OUTSIDE_KEYWORD", "IN_BRACES", "IN_BETWEEN"])
+        enum_consts = []
+        for header_file in files:
+            state = states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD
+            with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header:
+                for line_no, line in enumerate(header):
+                    # Match typedefs and brackets only when they are at the
+                    # beginning of the line -- if they are indented, they might
+                    # be sub-structures within structs, etc.
+                    if (state == states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD and
+                            re.search(r"^(typedef +)?enum +{", line)):
+                        state = states.IN_BRACES
+                    elif (state == states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD and
+                          re.search(r"^(typedef +)?enum", line)):
+                        state = states.IN_BETWEEN
+                    elif (state == states.IN_BETWEEN and
+                          re.search(r"^{", line)):
+                        state = states.IN_BRACES
+                    elif (state == states.IN_BRACES and
+                          re.search(r"^}", line)):
+                        state = states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD
+                    elif (state == states.IN_BRACES and
+                          not re.search(r"^ *#", line)):
+                        enum_const = re.search(r"^ *(?P<enum_const>\w+)", line)
+                        if not enum_const:
+                            continue
+
+                        enum_consts.append(Match(
+                            header_file,
+                            line,
+                            line_no,
+                            enum_const.span("enum_const"),
+                            enum_const.group("enum_const")))
+
+        return enum_consts
+
+    def parse_identifiers(self, include, exclude=None):
+        """
+        Parse all lines of a header where a function/enum/struct/union/typedef
+        identifier is declared, based on some regex and heuristics. Highly
+        dependent on formatting style.
+
+        Args:
+        * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
+        * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
+
+        Returns a List of Match objects with identifiers.
+        """
+        identifier_regex = re.compile(
+            # Match " something(a" or " *something(a". Functions.
+            # Assumptions:
+            # - function definition from return type to one of its arguments is
+            #   all on one line
+            # - function definition line only contains alphanumeric, asterisk,
+            #   underscore, and open bracket
+            r".* \**(\w+) *\( *\w|"
+            # Match "(*something)(".
+            r".*\( *\* *(\w+) *\) *\(|"
+            # Match names of named data structures.
+            r"(?:typedef +)?(?:struct|union|enum) +(\w+)(?: *{)?$|"
+            # Match names of typedef instances, after closing bracket.
+            r"}? *(\w+)[;[].*"
+        )
+        # The regex below is indented for clarity.
+        exclusion_lines = re.compile(
+            r"^("
+                r"extern +\"C\"|" # pylint: disable=bad-continuation
+                r"(typedef +)?(struct|union|enum)( *{)?$|"
+                r"} *;?$|"
+                r"$|"
+                r"//|"
+                r"#"
+            r")"
+        )
+
+        files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+        self.log.debug("Looking for identifiers in {} files".format(len(files)))
+
+        identifiers = []
+        for header_file in files:
+            with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header:
+                in_block_comment = False
+                # The previous line variable is used for concatenating lines
+                # when identifiers are formatted and spread across multiple
+                # lines.
+                previous_line = ""
+
+                for line_no, line in enumerate(header):
+                    # Skip parsing this line if a block comment ends on it,
+                    # but don't skip if it has just started -- there is a chance
+                    # it ends on the same line.
+                    if re.search(r"/\*", line):
+                        in_block_comment = not in_block_comment
+                    if re.search(r"\*/", line):
+                        in_block_comment = not in_block_comment
+                        continue
+
+                    if in_block_comment:
+                        previous_line = ""
+                        continue
+
+                    if exclusion_lines.search(line):
+                        previous_line = ""
+                        continue
+
+                    # If the line contains only space-separated alphanumeric
+                    # characters (or underscore, asterisk, or, open bracket),
+                    # and nothing else, high chance it's a declaration that
+                    # continues on the next line
+                    if re.search(r"^([\w\*\(]+\s+)+$", line):
+                        previous_line += line
+                        continue
+
+                    # If previous line seemed to start an unfinished declaration
+                    # (as above), concat and treat them as one.
+                    if previous_line:
+                        line = previous_line.strip() + " " + line.strip() + "\n"
+                        previous_line = ""
+
+                    # Skip parsing if line has a space in front = heuristic to
+                    # skip function argument lines (highly subject to formatting
+                    # changes)
+                    if line[0] == " ":
+                        continue
+
+                    identifier = identifier_regex.search(line)
+
+                    if not identifier:
+                        continue
+
+                    # Find the group that matched, and append it
+                    for group in identifier.groups():
+                        if not group:
+                            continue
+
+                        identifiers.append(Match(
+                            header_file,
+                            line,
+                            line_no,
+                            identifier.span(),
+                            group))
+
+        return identifiers
+
+    def parse_symbols(self):
+        """
+        Compile the Mbed TLS libraries, and parse the TLS, Crypto, and x509
+        object files using nm to retrieve the list of referenced symbols.
+        Exceptions thrown here are rethrown because they would be critical
+        errors that void several tests, and thus needs to halt the program. This
+        is explicitly done for clarity.
+
+        Returns a List of unique symbols defined and used in the libraries.
+        """
+        self.log.info("Compiling...")
+        symbols = []
+
+        # Back up the config and atomically compile with the full configratuion.
+        shutil.copy(
+            "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h",
+            "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h.bak"
+        )
+        try:
+            # Use check=True in all subprocess calls so that failures are raised
+            # as exceptions and logged.
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["python3", "scripts/config.py", "full"],
+                universal_newlines=True,
+                check=True
+            )
+            my_environment = os.environ.copy()
+            my_environment["CFLAGS"] = "-fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables"
+            # Run make clean separately to lib to prevent unwanted behavior when
+            # make is invoked with parallelism.
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["make", "clean"],
+                universal_newlines=True,
+                check=True
+            )
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["make", "lib"],
+                env=my_environment,
+                universal_newlines=True,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+                check=True
+            )
+
+            # Perform object file analysis using nm
+            symbols = self.parse_symbols_from_nm([
+                "library/libmbedcrypto.a",
+                "library/libmbedtls.a",
+                "library/libmbedx509.a"
+            ])
+
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["make", "clean"],
+                universal_newlines=True,
+                check=True
+            )
+        except subprocess.CalledProcessError as error:
+            self.log.debug(error.output)
+            raise error
+        finally:
+            # Put back the original config regardless of there being errors.
+            # Works also for keyboard interrupts.
+            shutil.move(
+                "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h.bak",
+                "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
+            )
+
+        return symbols
+
+    def parse_symbols_from_nm(self, object_files):
+        """
+        Run nm to retrieve the list of referenced symbols in each object file.
+        Does not return the position data since it is of no use.
+
+        Args:
+        * object_files: a List of compiled object filepaths to search through.
+
+        Returns a List of unique symbols defined and used in any of the object
+        files.
+        """
+        nm_undefined_regex = re.compile(r"^\S+: +U |^$|^\S+:$")
+        nm_valid_regex = re.compile(r"^\S+( [0-9A-Fa-f]+)* . _*(?P<symbol>\w+)")
+        exclusions = ("FStar", "Hacl")
+
+        symbols = []
+
+        # Gather all outputs of nm
+        nm_output = ""
+        for lib in object_files:
+            nm_output += subprocess.run(
+                ["nm", "-og", lib],
+                universal_newlines=True,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+                check=True
+            ).stdout
+
+        for line in nm_output.splitlines():
+            if not nm_undefined_regex.search(line):
+                symbol = nm_valid_regex.search(line)
+                if (symbol and not symbol.group("symbol").startswith(exclusions)):
+                    symbols.append(symbol.group("symbol"))
+                else:
+                    self.log.error(line)
+
+        return symbols
+
+class NameChecker():
+    """
+    Representation of the core name checking operation performed by this script.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, parse_result, log):
+        self.parse_result = parse_result
+        self.log = log
+
+    def perform_checks(self, quiet=False):
+        """
+        A comprehensive checker that performs each check in order, and outputs
+        a final verdict.
+
+        Args:
+        * quiet: whether to hide detailed problem explanation.
+        """
+        self.log.info("=============")
+        Problem.quiet = quiet
+        problems = 0
+        problems += self.check_symbols_declared_in_header()
+
+        pattern_checks = [
+            ("macros", MACRO_PATTERN),
+            ("enum_consts", CONSTANTS_PATTERN),
+            ("identifiers", IDENTIFIER_PATTERN)
+        ]
+        for group, check_pattern in pattern_checks:
+            problems += self.check_match_pattern(group, check_pattern)
+
+        problems += self.check_for_typos()
+
+        self.log.info("=============")
+        if problems > 0:
+            self.log.info("FAIL: {0} problem(s) to fix".format(str(problems)))
+            if quiet:
+                self.log.info("Remove --quiet to see explanations.")
+            else:
+                self.log.info("Use --quiet for minimal output.")
+            return 1
+        else:
+            self.log.info("PASS")
+            return 0
+
+    def check_symbols_declared_in_header(self):
+        """
+        Perform a check that all detected symbols in the library object files
+        are properly declared in headers.
+        Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this.
+
+        Returns the number of problems that need fixing.
+        """
+        problems = []
+
+        for symbol in self.parse_result["symbols"]:
+            found_symbol_declared = False
+            for identifier_match in self.parse_result["identifiers"]:
+                if symbol == identifier_match.name:
+                    found_symbol_declared = True
+                    break
+
+            if not found_symbol_declared:
+                problems.append(SymbolNotInHeader(symbol))
+
+        self.output_check_result("All symbols in header", problems)
+        return len(problems)
+
+    def check_match_pattern(self, group_to_check, check_pattern):
+        """
+        Perform a check that all items of a group conform to a regex pattern.
+        Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this.
+
+        Args:
+        * group_to_check: string key to index into self.parse_result.
+        * check_pattern: the regex to check against.
+
+        Returns the number of problems that need fixing.
+        """
+        problems = []
+
+        for item_match in self.parse_result[group_to_check]:
+            if not re.search(check_pattern, item_match.name):
+                problems.append(PatternMismatch(check_pattern, item_match))
+            # Double underscore should not be used for names
+            if re.search(r".*__.*", item_match.name):
+                problems.append(
+                    PatternMismatch("no double underscore allowed", item_match))
+
+        self.output_check_result(
+            "Naming patterns of {}".format(group_to_check),
+            problems)
+        return len(problems)
+
+    def check_for_typos(self):
+        """
+        Perform a check that all words in the soure code beginning with MBED are
+        either defined as macros, or as enum constants.
+        Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this.
+
+        Returns the number of problems that need fixing.
+        """
+        problems = []
+
+        # Set comprehension, equivalent to a list comprehension wrapped by set()
+        all_caps_names = {
+            match.name
+            for match
+            in self.parse_result["macros"] + self.parse_result["enum_consts"]}
+        typo_exclusion = re.compile(r"XXX|__|_$|^MBEDTLS_.*CONFIG_FILE$")
+
+        for name_match in self.parse_result["mbed_words"]:
+            found = name_match.name in all_caps_names
+
+            # Since MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_XXX defines are defined by the
+            # PSA driver, they will not exist as macros. However, they
+            # should still be checked for typos using the equivalent
+            # BUILTINs that exist.
+            if "MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_" in name_match.name:
+                found = name_match.name.replace(
+                    "MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_",
+                    "MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_") in all_caps_names
+
+            if not found and not typo_exclusion.search(name_match.name):
+                problems.append(Typo(name_match))
+
+        self.output_check_result("Likely typos", problems)
+        return len(problems)
+
+    def output_check_result(self, name, problems):
+        """
+        Write out the PASS/FAIL status of a performed check depending on whether
+        there were problems.
+
+        Args:
+        * name: the name of the test
+        * problems: a List of encountered Problems
+        """
+        if problems:
+            self.log.info("{}: FAIL\n".format(name))
+            for problem in problems:
+                self.log.warning(str(problem))
+        else:
+            self.log.info("{}: PASS".format(name))
+
+def main():
+    """
+    Perform argument parsing, and create an instance of CodeParser and
+    NameChecker to begin the core operation.
+    """
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
+        description=(
+            "This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers "
+            "in Mbed TLS are consistent with the house style and are also "
+            "self-consistent.\n\n"
+            "Expected to be run from the MbedTLS root directory.")
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-v", "--verbose",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="show parse results"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-q", "--quiet",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="hide unnecessary text, explanations, and highlighs"
+    )
+
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    # Configure the global logger, which is then passed to the classes below
+    log = logging.getLogger()
+    log.setLevel(logging.DEBUG if args.verbose else logging.INFO)
+    log.addHandler(logging.StreamHandler())
+
+    try:
+        code_parser = CodeParser(log)
+        parse_result = code_parser.comprehensive_parse()
+    except Exception: # pylint: disable=broad-except
+        traceback.print_exc()
+        sys.exit(2)
+
+    name_checker = NameChecker(parse_result, log)
+    return_code = name_checker.perform_checks(quiet=args.quiet)
+
+    sys.exit(return_code)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py b/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
index c788ce6..0d9cb36 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
     if _implemented_dependencies is None:
         _implemented_dependencies = \
             read_implemented_dependencies('include/psa/crypto_config.h')
-    if not all(dep.lstrip('!') in _implemented_dependencies
+    if not all((dep.lstrip('!') in _implemented_dependencies or 'PSA_WANT' not in dep)
                for dep in dependencies):
         dependencies.append('DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET')
 
@@ -203,12 +203,15 @@
                 # supported or not depending on implementation capabilities,
                 # only generate the test case once.
                 continue
-            yield test_case_for_key_type_not_supported(
-                'generate', kt.expression, bits,
-                finish_family_dependencies(generate_dependencies, bits),
-                str(bits),
-                param_descr=param_descr,
-            )
+                # For public key we expect that key generation fails with
+                # INVALID_ARGUMENT. It is handled by KeyGenerate class.
+            if not kt.name.endswith('_PUBLIC_KEY'):
+                yield test_case_for_key_type_not_supported(
+                    'generate', kt.expression, bits,
+                    finish_family_dependencies(generate_dependencies, bits),
+                    str(bits),
+                    param_descr=param_descr,
+                )
             # To be added: derive
 
     ECC_KEY_TYPES = ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR',
@@ -229,6 +232,78 @@
                 yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported(
                     kt, 0, param_descr='curve')
 
+def test_case_for_key_generation(
+        key_type: str, bits: int,
+        dependencies: List[str],
+        *args: str,
+        result: str = ''
+) -> test_case.TestCase:
+    """Return one test case exercising a key generation.
+    """
+    hack_dependencies_not_implemented(dependencies)
+    tc = test_case.TestCase()
+    short_key_type = re.sub(r'PSA_(KEY_TYPE|ECC_FAMILY)_', r'', key_type)
+    tc.set_description('PSA {} {}-bit'
+                       .format(short_key_type, bits))
+    tc.set_dependencies(dependencies)
+    tc.set_function('generate_key')
+    tc.set_arguments([key_type] + list(args) + [result])
+
+    return tc
+
+class KeyGenerate:
+    """Generate positive and negative (invalid argument) test cases for key generation."""
+
+    def __init__(self, info: Information) -> None:
+        self.constructors = info.constructors
+
+    ECC_KEY_TYPES = ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR',
+                     'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY')
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation(
+            kt: crypto_knowledge.KeyType
+    ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
+        """Return test cases exercising key generation.
+
+        All key types can be generated except for public keys. For public key
+        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT status is expected.
+        """
+        result = 'PSA_SUCCESS'
+
+        import_dependencies = [psa_want_symbol(kt.name)]
+        if kt.params is not None:
+            import_dependencies += [psa_want_symbol(sym)
+                                    for i, sym in enumerate(kt.params)]
+        if kt.name.endswith('_PUBLIC_KEY'):
+            # The library checks whether the key type is a public key generically,
+            # before it reaches a point where it needs support for the specific key
+            # type, so it returns INVALID_ARGUMENT for unsupported public key types.
+            generate_dependencies = []
+            result = 'PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT'
+        else:
+            generate_dependencies = import_dependencies
+            if kt.name == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR':
+                generate_dependencies.append("MBEDTLS_GENPRIME")
+        for bits in kt.sizes_to_test():
+            yield test_case_for_key_generation(
+                kt.expression, bits,
+                finish_family_dependencies(generate_dependencies, bits),
+                str(bits),
+                result
+            )
+
+    def test_cases_for_key_generation(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
+        """Generate test cases that exercise the generation of keys."""
+        for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types):
+            if key_type in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES:
+                continue
+            kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type)
+            yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation(kt)
+        for curve_family in sorted(self.constructors.ecc_curves):
+            for constr in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES:
+                kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(constr, [curve_family])
+                yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation(kt)
 
 class StorageKey(psa_storage.Key):
     """Representation of a key for storage format testing."""
@@ -651,6 +726,8 @@
         test_case.write_data_file(filename, test_cases)
 
     TARGETS = {
+        'test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated':
+        lambda info: KeyGenerate(info).test_cases_for_key_generation(),
         'test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated':
         lambda info: NotSupported(info).test_cases_for_not_supported(),
         'test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current':
@@ -668,6 +745,10 @@
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
     parser.add_argument('--list', action='store_true',
                         help='List available targets and exit')
+    parser.add_argument('--list-for-cmake', action='store_true',
+                        help='Print \';\'-separated list of available targets and exit')
+    parser.add_argument('--directory', metavar='DIR',
+                        help='Output directory (default: tests/suites)')
     parser.add_argument('targets', nargs='*', metavar='TARGET',
                         help='Target file to generate (default: all; "-": none)')
     options = parser.parse_args(args)
@@ -677,6 +758,11 @@
         for name in sorted(generator.TARGETS):
             print(generator.filename_for(name))
         return
+    # List in a cmake list format (i.e. ';'-separated)
+    if options.list_for_cmake:
+        print(';'.join(generator.filename_for(name)
+                       for name in sorted(generator.TARGETS)), end='')
+        return
     if options.targets:
         # Allow "-" as a special case so you can run
         # ``generate_psa_tests.py - $targets`` and it works uniformly whether
diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py b/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py
index 7382fb6..f5750aa 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
 Platform file contains platform specific setup code and test case
 dispatch code. For example, host_test.function reads test data
 file from host's file system and dispatches tests.
-In case of on-target target_test.function tests are not dispatched
-on target. Target code is kept minimum and only test functions are
-dispatched. Test case dispatch is done on the host using tools like
-Greentea.
 
 Template file:
 ---------
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list-enum-consts.pl b/tests/scripts/list-enum-consts.pl
deleted file mode 100755
index 6d93693..0000000
--- a/tests/scripts/list-enum-consts.pl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
-# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
-# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-
-use warnings;
-use strict;
-
-use utf8;
-use open qw(:std utf8);
-
--d 'include/mbedtls' or die "$0: must be run from root\n";
-
-@ARGV = grep { ! /compat-2\.x\.h/ } <include/mbedtls/*.h>;
-push @ARGV, "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h";
-push @ARGV, "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h";
-push @ARGV, glob("library/*.h");
-
-my @consts;
-my $state = 'out';
-while (<>)
-{
-    if( $state eq 'out' and /^(typedef )?enum \{/ ) {
-        $state = 'in';
-    } elsif( $state eq 'out' and /^(typedef )?enum/ ) {
-        $state = 'start';
-    } elsif( $state eq 'start' and /{/ ) {
-        $state = 'in';
-    } elsif( $state eq 'in' and /}/ ) {
-        $state = 'out';
-    } elsif( $state eq 'in' and not /^#/) {
-        s/=.*//; s!/\*.*!!; s/,.*//; s/\s+//g; chomp;
-        push @consts, $_ if $_;
-    }
-}
-
-open my $fh, '>', 'enum-consts' or die;
-print $fh "$_\n" for sort @consts;
-close $fh or die;
-
-printf "%8d enum-consts\n", scalar @consts;
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh b/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh
index 9698fc8..9b93080 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 #
 # Create a file named identifiers containing identifiers from internal header
-# files or all header files, based on --internal flag.
+# files, based on the --internal flag.
 # Outputs the line count of the file to stdout.
+# A very thin wrapper around list_internal_identifiers.py for backwards
+# compatibility.
+# Must be run from Mbed TLS root.
 #
 # Usage: list-identifiers.sh [ -i | --internal ]
 #
@@ -24,7 +27,7 @@
 set -eu
 
 if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else
-    echo "$0: must be run from root" >&2
+    echo "$0: Must be run from Mbed TLS root" >&2
     exit 1
 fi
 
@@ -47,32 +50,17 @@
 
 if [ $INTERNAL ]
 then
-    HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*_internal.h library/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-2\.x\.h' )
+    tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
+    wc -l identifiers
 else
-    HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*.h include/psa/*.h library/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-2\.x\.h' )
-    HEADERS="$HEADERS 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
+    cat <<EOF
+Sorry, this script has to be called with --internal.
+
+This script exists solely for backwards compatibility with the previous
+iteration of list-identifiers.sh, of which only the --internal option remains in
+use. It is a thin wrapper around list_internal_identifiers.py.
+
+check-names.sh, which used to depend on this script, has been replaced with
+check_names.py and is now self-complete.
+EOF
 fi
-
-rm -f identifiers
-
-grep '^[^ /#{]' $HEADERS | \
-    sed -e 's/^[^:]*://' | \
-    egrep -v '^(extern "C"|(typedef )?(struct|union|enum)( {)?$|};?$)' \
-    > _decls
-
-if true; then
-sed -n -e 's/.* \**\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)(.*/\1/p' \
-       -e 's/.*(\*\(.*\))(.*/\1/p' _decls
-grep -v '(' _decls | sed -e 's/\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)[;[].*/\1/' -e 's/.* \**//'
-fi > _identifiers
-
-if [ $( wc -l < _identifiers ) -eq $( wc -l < _decls ) ]; then
-    rm _decls
-    egrep -v '^(u?int(16|32|64)_t)$' _identifiers | sort > identifiers
-    rm _identifiers
-else
-    echo "$0: oops, lost some identifiers" 2>&1
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-wc -l identifiers
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list-macros.sh b/tests/scripts/list-macros.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 2e62359..0000000
--- a/tests/scripts/list-macros.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
-# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
-# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-
-set -eu
-
-if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else
-    echo "$0: must be run from root" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*.h include/psa/*.h tests/include/test/drivers/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-2\.x\.h' )
-HEADERS="$HEADERS library/*.h"
-HEADERS="$HEADERS 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
-
-sed -n -e 's/.*#define \([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\).*/\1/p' $HEADERS \
-    | egrep -v '^(asm|inline|EMIT|_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)$|^MULADDC_' \
-    | sort -u > macros
-
-# For include/mbedtls/config_psa.h need to ignore the MBEDTLS_xxx define
-# in that file since they may not be defined in include/psa/crypto_config.h
-# This line renames the potentially missing defines to ones that should
-# be present.
-sed -ne 's/^MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_/MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_/p' <macros >>macros
-
-wc -l macros
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list-symbols.sh b/tests/scripts/list-symbols.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 4a5d035..0000000
--- a/tests/scripts/list-symbols.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
-# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
-# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-
-set -eu
-
-if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else
-    echo "$0: must be run from root" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-if grep -i cmake Makefile >/dev/null; then
-    echo "$0: not compatible with cmake" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-cp include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h.bak
-scripts/config.py full
-make clean
-make_ret=
-CFLAGS=-fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables make lib \
-      >list-symbols.make.log 2>&1 ||
-  {
-    make_ret=$?
-    echo "Build failure: CFLAGS=-fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables make lib"
-    cat list-symbols.make.log >&2
-  }
-rm list-symbols.make.log
-mv include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h.bak include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
-if [ -n "$make_ret" ]; then
-    exit "$make_ret"
-fi
-
-if uname | grep -F Darwin >/dev/null; then
-    nm -gUj library/libmbed*.a 2>/dev/null | sed -n -e 's/^_//p' | grep -v -e ^FStar -e ^Hacl
-elif uname | grep -F Linux >/dev/null; then
-    nm -og library/libmbed*.a | grep -v '^[^ ]*: *U \|^$\|^[^ ]*:$' | sed 's/^[^ ]* . //' | grep -v -e ^FStar -e ^Hacl
-fi | sort > exported-symbols
-make clean
-
-wc -l exported-symbols
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py b/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..779a16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""
+This script generates a file called identifiers that contains all Mbed TLS
+identifiers found on internal headers. This is the equivalent of what was
+previously `list-identifiers.sh --internal`, and is useful for generating an
+exclusion file list for ABI/API checking, since we do not promise compatibility
+for them.
+
+It uses the CodeParser class from check_names.py to perform the parsing.
+
+The script returns 0 on success, 1 if there is a script error.
+Must be run from Mbed TLS root.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import logging
+from check_names import CodeParser
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
+        description=(
+            "This script writes a list of parsed identifiers in internal "
+            "headers to \"identifiers\". This is useful for generating a list "
+            "of names to exclude from API/ABI compatibility checking. "))
+
+    parser.parse_args()
+
+    name_check = CodeParser(logging.getLogger())
+    result = name_check.parse_identifiers([
+        "include/mbedtls/*_internal.h",
+        "library/*.h"
+    ])
+    result.sort(key=lambda x: x.name)
+
+    identifiers = ["{}\n".format(match.name) for match in result]
+    with open("identifiers", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+        f.writelines(identifiers)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py b/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py
deleted file mode 100755
index 64f12bb..0000000
--- a/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-
-# Greentea host test script for Mbed TLS on-target test suite testing.
-#
-# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-#
-# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
-# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-# You may obtain a copy of the License at
-#
-# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
-# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
-
-
-"""
-Mbed TLS on-target test suite tests are implemented as Greentea
-tests. Greentea tests are implemented in two parts: target test and
-host test. Target test is a C application that is built for the
-target platform and executes on the target. Host test is a Python
-class derived from mbed_host_tests.BaseHostTest. Target communicates
-with the host over serial for the test data and sends back the result.
-
-Python tool mbedgt (Greentea) is responsible for flashing the test
-binary on to the target and dynamically loading this host test module.
-
-Greentea documentation can be found here:
-https://github.com/ARMmbed/greentea
-"""
-
-
-import re
-import os
-import binascii
-
-from mbed_host_tests import BaseHostTest, event_callback # type: ignore # pylint: disable=import-error
-
-
-class TestDataParserError(Exception):
-    """Indicates error in test data, read from .data file."""
-    pass
-
-
-class TestDataParser:
-    """
-    Parses test name, dependencies, test function name and test parameters
-    from the data file.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        """
-        Constructor
-        """
-        self.tests = []
-
-    def parse(self, data_file):
-        """
-        Data file parser.
-
-        :param data_file: Data file path
-        """
-        with open(data_file, 'r') as data_f:
-            self.__parse(data_f)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def __escaped_split(inp_str, split_char):
-        """
-        Splits inp_str on split_char except when escaped.
-
-        :param inp_str: String to split
-        :param split_char: Split character
-        :return: List of splits
-        """
-        split_colon_fn = lambda x: re.sub(r'\\' + split_char, split_char, x)
-        if len(split_char) > 1:
-            raise ValueError('Expected split character. Found string!')
-        out = list(map(split_colon_fn, re.split(r'(?<!\\)' + split_char, inp_str)))
-        out = [x for x in out if x]
-        return out
-
-    def __parse(self, data_f):
-        """
-        Parses data file using supplied file object.
-
-        :param data_f: Data file object
-        :return:
-        """
-        for line in data_f:
-            line = line.strip()
-            if not line:
-                continue
-            # Read test name
-            name = line
-
-            # Check dependencies
-            dependencies = []
-            line = next(data_f).strip()
-            match = re.search('depends_on:(.*)', line)
-            if match:
-                dependencies = [int(x) for x in match.group(1).split(':')]
-                line = next(data_f).strip()
-
-            # Read test vectors
-            line = line.replace('\\n', '\n')
-            parts = self.__escaped_split(line, ':')
-            function_name = int(parts[0])
-            args = parts[1:]
-            args_count = len(args)
-            if args_count % 2 != 0:
-                err_str_fmt = "Number of test arguments({}) should be even: {}"
-                raise TestDataParserError(err_str_fmt.format(args_count, line))
-            grouped_args = [(args[i * 2], args[(i * 2) + 1])
-                            for i in range(int(len(args)/2))]
-            self.tests.append((name, function_name, dependencies,
-                               grouped_args))
-
-    def get_test_data(self):
-        """
-        Returns test data.
-        """
-        return self.tests
-
-
-class MbedTlsTest(BaseHostTest):
-    """
-    Host test for Mbed TLS unit tests. This script is loaded at
-    run time by Greentea for executing Mbed TLS test suites. Each
-    communication from the target is received in this object as
-    an event, which is then handled by the event handler method
-    decorated by the associated event. Ex: @event_callback('GO').
-
-    Target test sends requests for dispatching next test. It reads
-    tests from the intermediate data file and sends test function
-    identifier, dependency identifiers, expression identifiers and
-    the test data in binary form. Target test checks dependencies
-    , evaluate integer constant expressions and dispatches the test
-    function with received test parameters. After test function is
-    finished, target sends the result. This class handles the result
-    event and prints verdict in the form that Greentea understands.
-
-    """
-    # status/error codes from suites/helpers.function
-    DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED = 0
-    KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_FOUND = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED
-    DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED
-
-    KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND = -1    # Expression Id not found.
-    DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED = -2       # Dependency not supported.
-    DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND = -3     # Test function not found.
-    DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA = -4     # Invalid parameter type.
-    DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE = -5     # Test suite not supported/enabled.
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        """
-        Constructor initialises test index to 0.
-        """
-        super(MbedTlsTest, self).__init__()
-        self.tests = []
-        self.test_index = -1
-        self.dep_index = 0
-        self.suite_passed = True
-        self.error_str = dict()
-        self.error_str[self.DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED] = \
-            'DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED'
-        self.error_str[self.KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND] = \
-            'KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND'
-        self.error_str[self.DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED] = \
-            'DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED'
-        self.error_str[self.DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND] = \
-            'DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND'
-        self.error_str[self.DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA] = \
-            'DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA'
-        self.error_str[self.DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE] = \
-            'DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE'
-
-    def setup(self):
-        """
-        Setup hook implementation. Reads test suite data file and parses out
-        tests.
-        """
-        binary_path = self.get_config_item('image_path')
-        script_dir = os.path.split(os.path.abspath(__file__))[0]
-        suite_name = os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(binary_path))[0]
-        data_file = ".".join((suite_name, 'datax'))
-        data_file = os.path.join(script_dir, '..', 'mbedtls',
-                                 suite_name, data_file)
-        if os.path.exists(data_file):
-            self.log("Running tests from %s" % data_file)
-            parser = TestDataParser()
-            parser.parse(data_file)
-            self.tests = parser.get_test_data()
-            self.print_test_info()
-        else:
-            self.log("Data file not found: %s" % data_file)
-            self.notify_complete(False)
-
-    def print_test_info(self):
-        """
-        Prints test summary read by Greentea to detect test cases.
-        """
-        self.log('{{__testcase_count;%d}}' % len(self.tests))
-        for name, _, _, _ in self.tests:
-            self.log('{{__testcase_name;%s}}' % name)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def align_32bit(data_bytes):
-        """
-        4 byte aligns input byte array.
-
-        :return:
-        """
-        data_bytes += bytearray((4 - (len(data_bytes))) % 4)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def hex_str_bytes(hex_str):
-        """
-        Converts Hex string representation to byte array
-
-        :param hex_str: Hex in string format.
-        :return: Output Byte array
-        """
-        if hex_str[0] != '"' or hex_str[len(hex_str) - 1] != '"':
-            raise TestDataParserError("HEX test parameter missing '\"':"
-                                      " %s" % hex_str)
-        hex_str = hex_str.strip('"')
-        if len(hex_str) % 2 != 0:
-            raise TestDataParserError("HEX parameter len should be mod of "
-                                      "2: %s" % hex_str)
-
-        data_bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex_str)
-        return data_bytes
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def int32_to_big_endian_bytes(i):
-        """
-        Coverts i to byte array in big endian format.
-
-        :param i: Input integer
-        :return: Output bytes array in big endian or network order
-        """
-        data_bytes = bytearray([((i >> x) & 0xff) for x in [24, 16, 8, 0]])
-        return data_bytes
-
-    def test_vector_to_bytes(self, function_id, dependencies, parameters):
-        """
-        Converts test vector into a byte array that can be sent to the target.
-
-        :param function_id: Test Function Identifier
-        :param dependencies: Dependency list
-        :param parameters: Test function input parameters
-        :return: Byte array and its length
-        """
-        data_bytes = bytearray([len(dependencies)])
-        if dependencies:
-            data_bytes += bytearray(dependencies)
-        data_bytes += bytearray([function_id, len(parameters)])
-        for typ, param in parameters:
-            if typ in ('int', 'exp'):
-                i = int(param, 0)
-                data_bytes += b'I' if typ == 'int' else b'E'
-                self.align_32bit(data_bytes)
-                data_bytes += self.int32_to_big_endian_bytes(i)
-            elif typ == 'char*':
-                param = param.strip('"')
-                i = len(param) + 1  # + 1 for null termination
-                data_bytes += b'S'
-                self.align_32bit(data_bytes)
-                data_bytes += self.int32_to_big_endian_bytes(i)
-                data_bytes += bytearray(param, encoding='ascii')
-                data_bytes += b'\0'   # Null terminate
-            elif typ == 'hex':
-                binary_data = self.hex_str_bytes(param)
-                data_bytes += b'H'
-                self.align_32bit(data_bytes)
-                i = len(binary_data)
-                data_bytes += self.int32_to_big_endian_bytes(i)
-                data_bytes += binary_data
-        length = self.int32_to_big_endian_bytes(len(data_bytes))
-        return data_bytes, length
-
-    def run_next_test(self):
-        """
-        Fetch next test information and execute the test.
-
-        """
-        self.test_index += 1
-        self.dep_index = 0
-        if self.test_index < len(self.tests):
-            name, function_id, dependencies, args = self.tests[self.test_index]
-            self.run_test(name, function_id, dependencies, args)
-        else:
-            self.notify_complete(self.suite_passed)
-
-    def run_test(self, name, function_id, dependencies, args):
-        """
-        Execute the test on target by sending next test information.
-
-        :param name: Test name
-        :param function_id: function identifier
-        :param dependencies: Dependencies list
-        :param args: test parameters
-        :return:
-        """
-        self.log("Running: %s" % name)
-
-        param_bytes, length = self.test_vector_to_bytes(function_id,
-                                                        dependencies, args)
-        self.send_kv(
-            ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in length),
-            ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in param_bytes)
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def get_result(value):
-        """
-        Converts result from string type to integer
-        :param value: Result code in string
-        :return: Integer result code. Value is from the test status
-                 constants defined under the MbedTlsTest class.
-        """
-        try:
-            return int(value)
-        except ValueError:
-            ValueError("Result should return error number. "
-                       "Instead received %s" % value)
-
-    @event_callback('GO')
-    def on_go(self, _key, _value, _timestamp):
-        """
-        Sent by the target to start first test.
-
-        :param _key: Event key
-        :param _value: Value. ignored
-        :param _timestamp: Timestamp ignored.
-        :return:
-        """
-        self.run_next_test()
-
-    @event_callback("R")
-    def on_result(self, _key, value, _timestamp):
-        """
-        Handle result. Prints test start, finish required by Greentea
-        to detect test execution.
-
-        :param _key: Event key
-        :param value: Value. ignored
-        :param _timestamp: Timestamp ignored.
-        :return:
-        """
-        int_val = self.get_result(value)
-        name, _, _, _ = self.tests[self.test_index]
-        self.log('{{__testcase_start;%s}}' % name)
-        self.log('{{__testcase_finish;%s;%d;%d}}' % (name, int_val == 0,
-                                                     int_val != 0))
-        if int_val != 0:
-            self.suite_passed = False
-        self.run_next_test()
-
-    @event_callback("F")
-    def on_failure(self, _key, value, _timestamp):
-        """
-        Handles test execution failure. That means dependency not supported or
-        Test function not supported. Hence marking test as skipped.
-
-        :param _key: Event key
-        :param value: Value. ignored
-        :param _timestamp: Timestamp ignored.
-        :return:
-        """
-        int_val = self.get_result(value)
-        if int_val in self.error_str:
-            err = self.error_str[int_val]
-        else:
-            err = 'Unknown error'
-        # For skip status, do not write {{__testcase_finish;...}}
-        self.log("Error: %s" % err)
-        self.run_next_test()
diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ea52c93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Run the PSA Cryto API compliance test suite.
+Clone the repo and check out the commit specified by PSA_ARCH_TEST_REPO and PSA_ARCH_TEST_REF,
+then complie and run the test suite. The clone is stored at <Mbed TLS root>/psa-arch-tests.
+Known defects in either the test suite or mbedtls - identified by their test number - are ignored,
+while unexpected failures AND successes are reported as errors,
+to help keep the list of known defects as up to date as possible.
+"""
+
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+# PSA Compliance tests we expect to fail due to known defects in Mbed TLS (or the test suite)
+# The test numbers correspond to the numbers used by the console output of the test suite.
+# Test number 2xx corresponds to the files in the folder
+# psa-arch-tests/api-tests/dev_apis/crypto/test_c0xx
+EXPECTED_FAILURES = {
+    # Multipart CCM is not supported.
+    # - Tracked in issue #3721
+    252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261,
+
+    # psa_hash_suspend() and psa_hash_resume() are not supported.
+    # - Tracked in issue #3274
+    262, 263
+}
+
+# We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches
+# that allow it to build with MbedTLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite.
+# These fixes allow the tests numbered 216, 248 and 249 to complete successfully.
+#
+# Once all the fixes are upstreamed, this fork should be replaced with an upstream commit/tag.
+# - Tracked in issue #5145
+#
+# Web URL: https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests/tree/fixes-for-mbedtls-3
+PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO = 'https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests.git'
+PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF = 'fixes-for-mbedtls-3'
+
+#pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements
+def main():
+    mbedtls_dir = os.getcwd()
+
+    if not os.path.exists('library/libmbedcrypto.a'):
+        subprocess.check_call(['make', '-C', 'library', 'libmbedcrypto.a'])
+
+    psa_arch_tests_dir = 'psa-arch-tests'
+    os.makedirs(psa_arch_tests_dir, exist_ok=True)
+    try:
+        os.chdir(psa_arch_tests_dir)
+
+        # Reuse existing local clone
+        subprocess.check_call(['git', 'init'])
+        subprocess.check_call(['git', 'fetch', PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO, PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF])
+        subprocess.check_call(['git', 'checkout', 'FETCH_HEAD'])
+
+        build_dir = 'api-tests/build'
+        try:
+            shutil.rmtree(build_dir)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+        os.mkdir(build_dir)
+        os.chdir(build_dir)
+
+        #pylint: disable=bad-continuation
+        subprocess.check_call([
+            'cmake', '..',
+                     '-GUnix Makefiles',
+                     '-DTARGET=tgt_dev_apis_stdc',
+                     '-DTOOLCHAIN=HOST_GCC',
+                     '-DSUITE=CRYPTO',
+                     '-DPSA_CRYPTO_LIB_FILENAME={}/library/libmbedcrypto.a'.format(mbedtls_dir),
+                     '-DPSA_INCLUDE_PATHS={}/include'.format(mbedtls_dir)
+        ])
+        subprocess.check_call(['cmake', '--build', '.'])
+
+        proc = subprocess.Popen(['./psa-arch-tests-crypto'],
+                                bufsize=1, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True)
+
+        test_re = re.compile(
+            '^TEST: (?P<test_num>[0-9]*)|'
+            '^TEST RESULT: (?P<test_result>FAILED|PASSED)'
+        )
+        test = -1
+        unexpected_successes = set(EXPECTED_FAILURES)
+        expected_failures = []
+        unexpected_failures = []
+        for line in proc.stdout:
+            print(line, end='')
+            match = test_re.match(line)
+            if match is not None:
+                groupdict = match.groupdict()
+                test_num = groupdict['test_num']
+                if test_num is not None:
+                    test = int(test_num)
+                elif groupdict['test_result'] == 'FAILED':
+                    try:
+                        unexpected_successes.remove(test)
+                        expected_failures.append(test)
+                        print('Expected failure, ignoring')
+                    except KeyError:
+                        unexpected_failures.append(test)
+                        print('ERROR: Unexpected failure')
+                elif test in unexpected_successes:
+                    print('ERROR: Unexpected success')
+        proc.wait()
+
+        print()
+        print('***** test_psa_compliance.py report ******')
+        print()
+        print('Expected failures:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in expected_failures))
+        print('Unexpected failures:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in unexpected_failures))
+        print('Unexpected successes:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in sorted(unexpected_successes)))
+        print()
+        if unexpected_successes or unexpected_failures:
+            if unexpected_successes:
+                print('Unexpected successes encountered.')
+                print('Please remove the corresponding tests from '
+                      'EXPECTED_FAILURES in tests/scripts/compliance_test.py')
+                print()
+            print('FAILED')
+            return 1
+        else:
+            print('SUCCESS')
+            return 0
+    finally:
+        os.chdir(mbedtls_dir)
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py b/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d5f847f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
+# translate_ciphers.py
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""
+Translate ciphersuite names in Mbed TLS format to OpenSSL and GNUTLS
+standards.
+
+To test the translation functions run:
+python3 -m unittest translate_cipher.py
+"""
+
+import re
+import argparse
+import unittest
+
+class TestTranslateCiphers(unittest.TestCase):
+    """
+    Ensure translate_ciphers.py translates and formats ciphersuite names
+    correctly
+    """
+    def test_translate_all_cipher_names(self):
+        """
+        Translate MbedTLS ciphersuite names to their OpenSSL and
+        GnuTLS counterpart. Use only a small subset of ciphers
+        that exercise each step of the translate functions
+        """
+        ciphers = [
+            ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
+             "+ECDHE-ECDSA:+NULL:+SHA1",
+             "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"),
+            ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256",
+             "+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD",
+             "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"),
+            ("TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
+             "+DHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1",
+             "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"),
+            ("TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA",
+             "+RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1",
+             "AES256-SHA"),
+            ("TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
+             "+PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1",
+             "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"),
+            ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256",
+             None,
+             "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"),
+            ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM",
+             "+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD",
+             None),
+            ("TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
+             None,
+             "ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384"),
+        ]
+
+        for m, g_exp, o_exp in ciphers:
+
+            if g_exp is not None:
+                g = translate_gnutls(m)
+                self.assertEqual(g, g_exp)
+
+            if o_exp is not None:
+                o = translate_ossl(m)
+                self.assertEqual(o, o_exp)
+
+def translate_gnutls(m_cipher):
+    """
+    Translate m_cipher from Mbed TLS ciphersuite naming convention
+    and return the GnuTLS naming convention
+    """
+
+    m_cipher = re.sub(r'\ATLS-', '+', m_cipher)
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-WITH-", ":+")
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
+
+    # SHA in Mbed TLS == SHA1 GnuTLS,
+    # if the last 3 chars are SHA append 1
+    if m_cipher[-3:] == "SHA":
+        m_cipher = m_cipher+"1"
+
+    # CCM or CCM-8 should be followed by ":+AEAD"
+    # Replace "GCM:+SHAxyz" with "GCM:+AEAD"
+    if "CCM" in m_cipher or "GCM" in m_cipher:
+        m_cipher = re.sub(r"GCM-SHA\d\d\d", "GCM", m_cipher)
+        m_cipher = m_cipher+":+AEAD"
+
+    # Replace the last "-" with ":+"
+    else:
+        index = m_cipher.rindex("-")
+        m_cipher = m_cipher[:index] + ":+" + m_cipher[index+1:]
+
+    return m_cipher
+
+def translate_ossl(m_cipher):
+    """
+    Translate m_cipher from Mbed TLS ciphersuite naming convention
+    and return the OpenSSL naming convention
+    """
+
+    m_cipher = re.sub(r'^TLS-', '', m_cipher)
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-WITH", "")
+
+    # Remove the "-" from "ABC-xyz"
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("AES-", "AES")
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("CAMELLIA-", "CAMELLIA")
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("ARIA-", "ARIA")
+
+    # Remove "RSA" if it is at the beginning
+    m_cipher = re.sub(r'^RSA-', r'', m_cipher)
+
+    # For all circumstances outside of PSK
+    if "PSK" not in m_cipher:
+        m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
+        m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("3DES-CBC", "DES-CBC3")
+
+        # Remove "CBC" if it is not prefixed by DES
+        m_cipher = re.sub(r'(?<!DES-)CBC-', r'', m_cipher)
+
+    # ECDHE-RSA-ARIA does not exist in OpenSSL
+    m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("ECDHE-RSA-ARIA", "ECDHE-ARIA")
+
+    # POLY1305 should not be followed by anything
+    if "POLY1305" in m_cipher:
+        index = m_cipher.rindex("POLY1305")
+        m_cipher = m_cipher[:index+8]
+
+    # If DES is being used, Replace DHE with EDH
+    if "DES" in m_cipher and "DHE" in m_cipher and "ECDHE" not in m_cipher:
+        m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("DHE", "EDH")
+
+    return m_cipher
+
+def format_ciphersuite_names(mode, names):
+    t = {"g": translate_gnutls, "o": translate_ossl}[mode]
+    return " ".join(t(c) for c in names)
+
+def main(target, names):
+    print(format_ciphersuite_names(target, names))
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    PARSER = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    PARSER.add_argument('target', metavar='TARGET', choices=['o', 'g'])
+    PARSER.add_argument('names', metavar='NAMES', nargs='+')
+    ARGS = PARSER.parse_args()
+    main(ARGS.target, ARGS.names)
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c
index ce9ce37..6befe7c 100644
--- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
 #include "psa_crypto_aead.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
 
 #include "test/drivers/aead.h"
 
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@
     const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length,
     uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length )
 {
-    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits++;
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_encrypt++;
 
     if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
     {
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@
     const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
     uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length )
 {
-    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits++;
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_decrypt++;
 
     if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
     {
@@ -89,4 +90,229 @@
     return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
 }
 
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_encrypt_setup++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                                            key_buffer_size, alg );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup(
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_decrypt_setup++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer,
+                                            key_buffer_size, alg );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce(
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_length )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_set_nonce++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( operation, nonce, nonce_length );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths(
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    size_t ad_length,
+    size_t plaintext_length )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_set_lengths++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( operation, ad_length,
+                                          plaintext_length );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad(
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input,
+    size_t input_length )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_update_ad++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( operation, input, input_length );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update(
+   mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   const uint8_t *input,
+   size_t input_length,
+   uint8_t *output,
+   size_t output_size,
+   size_t *output_length )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_update++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_update( operation, input, input_length, output,
+                                    output_size, output_length );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish(
+   mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *ciphertext,
+   size_t ciphertext_size,
+   size_t *ciphertext_length,
+   uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_size,
+   size_t *tag_length )
+{
+   mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_finish++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( operation, ciphertext, ciphertext_size,
+                                     ciphertext_length, tag, tag_size,
+                                     tag_length );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify(
+   mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation,
+   uint8_t *plaintext,
+   size_t plaintext_size,
+   size_t *plaintext_length,
+   const uint8_t *tag,
+   size_t tag_length )
+{
+   mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_verify++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+       uint8_t check_tag[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+       size_t check_tag_length;
+
+       mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+          mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( operation,
+                                   plaintext,
+                                   plaintext_size,
+                                   plaintext_length,
+                                   check_tag,
+                                   sizeof( check_tag ),
+                                   &check_tag_length );
+
+       if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+       {
+          if( tag_length != check_tag_length ||
+              mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length )
+              != 0 )
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+                                                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+       }
+
+       mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, sizeof( check_tag ) );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort(
+   mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t *operation )
+{
+   mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_abort++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+         mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+             mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status =
+            mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( operation );
+    }
+
+    return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c
index afa1fc2..61ebc8a 100644
--- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c
@@ -56,6 +56,103 @@
       0xbc, 0x25, 0x16, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x70, 0x2d, 0x79,
       0x2f, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x92, 0x20, 0x95, 0xfd, 0x6c };
 
+
+/*
+ * This macro returns the base size for the key context when SE does not
+ * support storage. It is the size of the metadata that gets added to the
+ * wrapped key. In its test functionality the metadata is just some padded
+ * prefixing to the key.
+ */
+#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE  \
+                             PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX_SIZE
+
+
+size_t mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function(
+    const psa_key_type_t key_type,
+    const size_t key_bits )
+{
+    size_t key_buffer_size = 0;
+
+    key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits );
+    if( key_buffer_size == 0 )
+        return( 0 );
+    /* Include spacing for base size overhead over the key size
+     * */
+    key_buffer_size += TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE;
+    return( key_buffer_size );
+}
+
+static size_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_base_size()
+{
+    return TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The wrap function mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key pads and wraps the
+ * clear key. It expects the clear and wrap buffers to be passed in.
+ * key_length is the size of the clear key to be wrapped.
+ * wrapped_key_buffer_size is the size of the output buffer wrap_key.
+ * The argument wrapped_key_buffer_length is filled with the wrapped
+ * key_size on success.
+ * */
+static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key(
+    const uint8_t *key,
+    size_t key_length,
+    uint8_t *wrapped_key_buffer,
+    size_t wrapped_key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *wrapped_key_buffer_length )
+{
+    size_t opaque_key_base_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_get_base_size();
+    uint64_t prefix = PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_OPAQUE_PAD_PREFIX;
+
+    if( key_length + opaque_key_base_size > wrapped_key_buffer_size )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+    /* Write in the opaque pad prefix */
+    memcpy( wrapped_key_buffer, &prefix, opaque_key_base_size );
+    wrapped_key_buffer += opaque_key_base_size;
+    *wrapped_key_buffer_length = key_length + opaque_key_base_size;
+
+    while( key_length-- )
+        wrapped_key_buffer[key_length] = key[key_length] ^ 0xFF;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+/*
+ * The unwrap function mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key removes a pad prefix
+ * and unwraps the wrapped key. It expects the clear and wrap buffers to be
+ * passed in.
+ * wrapped_key_length is the size of the wrapped key,
+ * key_buffer_size is the size of the output buffer clear_key.
+ * The argument key_buffer_length is filled with the unwrapped(clear)
+ * key_size on success.
+ * */
+static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key(
+    const uint8_t *wrapped_key,
+    size_t wrapped_key_length,
+    uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *key_buffer_length)
+{
+    /* Remove the pad prefix from the wrapped key */
+    size_t opaque_key_base_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_get_base_size();
+    size_t clear_key_size;
+
+    /* Check for underflow */
+    if( wrapped_key_length < opaque_key_base_size )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT );
+    clear_key_size = wrapped_key_length - opaque_key_base_size;
+
+    wrapped_key += opaque_key_base_size;
+    if( clear_key_size > key_buffer_size )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+    *key_buffer_length = clear_key_size;
+    while( clear_key_size-- )
+        key_buffer[clear_key_size] = wrapped_key[clear_key_size] ^ 0xFF;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
 psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length )
@@ -131,7 +228,7 @@
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
     if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) )
     {
-        status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
                      attributes,
                      data, data_length,
                      key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
@@ -143,7 +240,7 @@
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
     if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) )
     {
-        status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
                      attributes,
                      data, data_length,
                      key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
@@ -165,69 +262,160 @@
     return( status );
 }
 
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *data,
+    size_t data_length,
+    uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    size_t *key_buffer_length,
+    size_t *bits)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type( attributes );
+    /* This buffer will be used as an intermediate placeholder for
+     * the clear key till we wrap it */
+    uint8_t *key_buffer_temp;
+
+    key_buffer_temp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, key_buffer_size );
+    if( key_buffer_temp == NULL )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+
+    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) )
+    {
+        *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length );
+
+        status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type,
+                                                         *bits );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            goto exit;
+
+        if( data_length > key_buffer_size )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+        /* Copy the key material accounting for opaque key padding. */
+        memcpy( key_buffer_temp, data, data_length );
+        *key_buffer_length = data_length;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+    else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) )
+    {
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_import_key(
+                     attributes,
+                     data, data_length,
+                     key_buffer_temp,
+                     key_buffer_size,
+                     key_buffer_length, bits );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+           goto exit;
+    }
+    else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) )
+    {
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_import_key(
+                     attributes,
+                     data, data_length,
+                     key_buffer_temp,
+                     key_buffer_size,
+                     key_buffer_length, bits );
+        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+           goto exit;
+    }
+    else
+#endif
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    status = mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( key_buffer_temp, *key_buffer_length,
+                 key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( key_buffer_temp );
+    return( status );
+}
+
 psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
     uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length )
 {
-    if( key_length != sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) )
+    if( key_length == sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) )
     {
-        /* Test driver does not support generic opaque key handling yet. */
-        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        /* Assume this is a builtin key based on the key material length. */
+        psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = *( ( psa_drv_slot_number_t* ) key );
+
+        switch( slot_number )
+        {
+            case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT:
+                /* This is the ECDSA slot. Verify the key's attributes before
+                 * returning the private key. */
+                if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) !=
+                    PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 256 )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) !=
+                    PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) &
+                      PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+
+                if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+                memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key,
+                        sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) );
+                *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key );
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+            case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT:
+                /* This is the AES slot. Verify the key's attributes before
+                 * returning the key. */
+                if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 128 )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) != PSA_ALG_CTR )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+                if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) &
+                      PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+
+                if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+                memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key,
+                        sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) );
+                *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key );
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+            default:
+                return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST );
+        }
     }
-
-    /* Assume this is a builtin key based on the key material length. */
-    psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = *( ( psa_drv_slot_number_t* ) key );
-
-    switch( slot_number )
+    else
     {
-        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT:
-            /* This is the ECDSA slot. Verify the key's attributes before
-             * returning the private key. */
-            if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) !=
-                PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 256 )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) !=
-                PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) &
-                  PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+        /* This buffer will be used as an intermediate placeholder for
+         * the opaque key till we unwrap the key into key_buffer */
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type( attributes );
 
-            if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
-            memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key,
-                    sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) );
-            *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key );
-            return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-
-        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT:
-            /* This is the AES slot. Verify the key's attributes before
-             * returning the key. */
-            if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 128 )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) != PSA_ALG_CTR )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-            if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) &
-                  PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
-
-            if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
-            memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key,
-                    sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) );
-            *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key );
-            return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-
-        default:
-            return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST );
+        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ||
+            PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type )   ||
+            PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) )
+        {
+            status = mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( key, key_length,
+                                         data, data_size, data_length );
+            return( status );
+        }
     }
+    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
 }
 
 psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key(
@@ -258,7 +446,7 @@
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
     if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( key_type ) )
     {
-        status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
                       attributes,
                       key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
                       data, data_size, data_length );
@@ -269,7 +457,7 @@
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
     if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( key_type ) )
     {
-        status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
+        status = mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
                       attributes,
                       key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
                       data, data_size, data_length );
@@ -293,8 +481,49 @@
 {
     if( key_length != sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) )
     {
-        /* Test driver does not support generic opaque key handling yet. */
-        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes );
+        uint8_t *key_buffer_temp;
+
+        key_buffer_temp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, key_length );
+        if( key_buffer_temp == NULL )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+
+    #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( key_type ) )
+        {
+            status = mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( key, key_length,
+                                         key_buffer_temp, key_length, data_length );
+            if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+                status = mbedtls_test_driver_ecp_export_public_key(
+                              attributes,
+                              key_buffer_temp, *data_length,
+                              data, data_size, data_length );
+        }
+        else
+    #endif
+    #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( key_type ) )
+        {
+            status = mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( key, key_length,
+                                         key_buffer_temp, key_length, data_length );
+            if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+                status = mbedtls_test_driver_rsa_export_public_key(
+                              attributes,
+                              key_buffer_temp, *data_length,
+                              data, data_size, data_length );
+        }
+        else
+    #endif
+        {
+            status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+            (void)key;
+            (void)key_type;
+        }
+        mbedtls_free( key_buffer_temp );
+        return( status );
     }
 
     /* Assume this is a builtin key based on the key material length. */
@@ -385,4 +614,24 @@
     }
 }
 
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key(
+    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length,
+    uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length)
+{
+    /* This is a case where the opaque test driver emulates an SE without storage.
+     * With that all key context is stored in the wrapped buffer.
+     * So no additional house keeping is necessary to reference count the
+     * copied keys. This could change when the opaque test driver is extended
+     * to support SE with storage, or to emulate an SE without storage but
+     * still holding some slot references */
+    if( source_key_length > key_buffer_size )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+    memcpy( key_buffer, source_key, source_key_length );
+    *key_buffer_length = source_key_length;
+    (void)attributes;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 033cf32..0000000
--- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Test driver for retrieving key context size.
- * Only used by opaque drivers.
- */
-/*  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- *  limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <test/helpers.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
-
-#include "test/drivers/size.h"
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-
-typedef struct {
-    unsigned int context;
-} test_driver_key_context_t;
-
-/*
- * This macro returns the base size for the key context. It is the size of the
- * driver specific information stored in each key context.
- */
-#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE sizeof( test_driver_key_context_t )
-
-/*
- * Number of bytes included in every key context for a key pair.
- *
- * This pair size is for an ECC 256-bit private/public key pair.
- * Based on this value, the size of the private key can be derived by
- * subtracting the public key size below from this one.
- */
-#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_KEY_PAIR_SIZE      65
-
-/*
- * Number of bytes included in every key context for a public key.
- *
- * For ECC public keys, it needs 257 bits so 33 bytes.
- */
-#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE    33
-
-/*
- * Every key context for a symmetric key includes this many times the key size.
- */
-#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_SYMMETRIC_FACTOR   0
-
-/*
- * If this is true for a key pair, the key context includes space for the public key.
- * If this is false, no additional space is added for the public key.
- *
- * For this instance, store the public key with the private one.
- */
-#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_STORE_PUBLIC_KEY   1
-
-size_t mbedtls_test_size_function(
-    const psa_key_type_t key_type,
-    const size_t key_bits )
-{
-    size_t key_buffer_size = 0;
-
-    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_type ) )
-    {
-        int public_key_overhead =
-            ( ( TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_STORE_PUBLIC_KEY == 1 )
-              ? PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) : 0 );
-        key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE +
-                          TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE +
-                          public_key_overhead;
-    }
-    else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( key_type ) )
-    {
-        key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE +
-                          TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
-    }
-    else if ( !PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_type ) &&
-              !PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ( key_type ) )
-    {
-        key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE +
-                          ( TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_SYMMETRIC_FACTOR *
-                            ( ( key_bits + 7 ) / 8 ) );
-    }
-
-    return( key_buffer_size );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c
index 4d3d53d..ec4d84e 100644
--- a/tests/src/helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/helpers.c
@@ -95,6 +95,31 @@
     mbedtls_test_info.test = 0;
     mbedtls_test_info.line_no = 0;
     mbedtls_test_info.filename = 0;
+    memset( mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ) );
+    memset( mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_test_equal( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename,
+                        unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 )
+{
+    if( value1 == value2 )
+        return( 1 );
+    if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED )
+    {
+        /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't
+         * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    mbedtls_test_fail( test, line_no, filename );
+    (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line1,
+                             sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ),
+                             "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld",
+                             value1, (long long) value1 );
+    (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line2,
+                             sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ),
+                             "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld",
+                             value2, (long long) value2 );
+    return( 0 );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_test_unhexify( unsigned char *obuf,
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c b/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c
index d9d841a..299b6d1 100644
--- a/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 
 #include <test/helpers.h>
 #include <test/macros.h>
+#include <psa_crypto_slot_management.h>
 #include <test/psa_crypto_helpers.h>
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
index e4e55c9..fc58fbd 100644
--- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <psa/crypto.h>
 
 #include <test/asn1_helpers.h>
+#include <psa_crypto_slot_management.h>
 #include <test/psa_crypto_helpers.h>
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
@@ -306,7 +307,7 @@
         psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
 
         /* If the policy allows signing with any hash, just pick one. */
-        if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
+        if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
         {
     #if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG)
             hash_alg = KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG;
@@ -663,7 +664,7 @@
         TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
                                           MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE |
                                           MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ), 0 );
-        TEST_EQUAL( p + len, end );
+        TEST_EQUAL( len, end - p );
         if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 0, 0, 0 ) )
             goto exit;
         if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits, bits, 1 ) )
@@ -684,7 +685,7 @@
             goto exit;
         if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 1, bits / 2 + 1, 0 ) )
             goto exit;
-        TEST_EQUAL( p, end );
+        TEST_EQUAL( p - end, 0 );
 
         TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE );
     }
@@ -716,12 +717,12 @@
                                           MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE |
                                           MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ),
                     0 );
-        TEST_EQUAL( p + len, end );
+        TEST_EQUAL( len, end - p );
         if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits, bits, 1 ) )
             goto exit;
         if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 2, bits, 1 ) )
             goto exit;
-        TEST_EQUAL( p, end );
+        TEST_EQUAL( p - end, 0 );
 
 
         TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
@@ -925,7 +926,7 @@
 {
     if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) )
     {
-        if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+        if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) )
         {
             if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) )
                 return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ?
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh b/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh
index 401a69c..e7bb01d 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@
 
 case "${GNUTLS_CLI:-default}" in
     "legacy")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-cli";;
-    "next")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli";;
+    "next")  export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-cli";;
     *) ;;
 esac
 
 case "${GNUTLS_SERV:-default}" in
     "legacy")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-serv";;
-    "next")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv";;
+    "next")  export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.7.2/bin/gnutls-serv";;
     *) ;;
 esac
 
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 9ee6b76..d43d662 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -79,16 +79,20 @@
 
 if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then
     O_NEXT_SRV="$OPENSSL_NEXT s_server -www -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key"
+    O_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$OPENSSL_NEXT s_server -www -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key"
     O_NEXT_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $OPENSSL_NEXT s_client"
 else
     O_NEXT_SRV=false
+    O_NEXT_SRV_RSA=false
     O_NEXT_CLI=false
 fi
 
 if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then
     G_NEXT_SRV="$GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key"
+    G_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key"
 else
     G_NEXT_SRV=false
+    G_NEXT_SRV_RSA=false
 fi
 
 if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then
@@ -264,7 +268,7 @@
 # Space-separated list of ciphersuites supported by this build of
 # Mbed TLS.
 P_CIPHERSUITES=" $($P_CLI --help 2>/dev/null |
-                   grep TLS- |
+                   grep 'TLS-\|TLS1-3' |
                    tr -s ' \n' ' ')"
 requires_ciphersuite_enabled() {
     case $P_CIPHERSUITES in
@@ -405,6 +409,44 @@
     fi
 }
 
+# Check %NO_TICKETS option
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket() {
+    requires_gnutls_next
+    if [ "$GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then
+        GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS_AVAILABLE="NO"
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then
+        if $GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI --priority-list 2>&1 | grep NO_TICKETS >/dev/null
+        then
+            GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS_AVAILABLE="YES"
+        else
+            GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS_AVAILABLE="NO"
+        fi
+    fi
+    if [ "$GNUTLS_NO_TICKETS_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then
+        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Check %DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE option
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat() {
+    requires_gnutls_next
+    if [ "$GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then
+        GNUTLS_DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_AVAILABLE="NO"
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${GNUTLS_DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then
+        if $GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI --priority-list 2>&1 | grep DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE >/dev/null
+        then
+            GNUTLS_DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_AVAILABLE="YES"
+        else
+            GNUTLS_DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_AVAILABLE="NO"
+        fi
+    fi
+    if [ "$GNUTLS_DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then
+        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+    fi
+}
+
 # skip next test if IPv6 isn't available on this host
 requires_ipv6() {
     if [ -z "${HAS_IPV6:-}" ]; then
@@ -514,6 +556,32 @@
     fi
 }
 
+# True if the presence of the given pattern in a log definitely indicates
+# that the test has failed. False if the presence is inconclusive.
+#
+# Inputs:
+# * $1: pattern found in the logs
+# * $TIMES_LEFT: >0 if retrying is an option
+#
+# Outputs:
+# * $outcome: set to a retry reason if the pattern is inconclusive,
+#             unchanged otherwise.
+# * Return value: 1 if the pattern is inconclusive,
+#                 0 if the failure is definitive.
+log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive() {
+    # If we've run out of attempts, then don't retry no matter what.
+    if [ $TIMES_LEFT -eq 0 ]; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+    case $1 in
+        "resend")
+            # An undesired resend may have been caused by the OS dropping or
+            # delaying a packet at an inopportune time.
+            outcome="RETRY(resend)"
+            return 1;;
+    esac
+}
+
 # fail <message>
 fail() {
     record_outcome "FAIL" "$1"
@@ -588,6 +656,8 @@
 # Wait for process $2 named $3 to be listening on port $1. Print error to $4.
 if type lsof >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
     wait_app_start() {
+        newline='
+'
         START_TIME=$(date +%s)
         if [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
             proto=UDP
@@ -595,7 +665,15 @@
             proto=TCP
         fi
         # Make a tight loop, server normally takes less than 1s to start.
-        while ! lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -p "$2" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; do
+        while true; do
+              SERVER_PIDS=$(lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -F p)
+              # When we use a proxy, it will be listening on the same port we
+              # are checking for as well as the server and lsof will list both.
+              # If multiple PIDs are returned, each one will be on a separate
+              # line, each prepended with 'p'.
+             case ${newline}${SERVER_PIDS}${newline} in
+                  *${newline}p${2}${newline}*) break;;
+              esac
               if [ $(( $(date +%s) - $START_TIME )) -gt $DOG_DELAY ]; then
                   echo "$3 START TIMEOUT"
                   echo "$3 START TIMEOUT" >> $4
@@ -715,7 +793,7 @@
 # check if the given command uses dtls and sets global variable DTLS
 detect_dtls() {
     case "$1" in
-        *dtls=1*|-dtls|-u) DTLS=1;;
+        *dtls=1*|*-dtls*|*-u*) DTLS=1;;
         *) DTLS=0;;
     esac
 }
@@ -757,6 +835,271 @@
     SKIP_HANDSHAKE_CHECK="YES"
 }
 
+# Analyze the commands that will be used in a test.
+#
+# Analyze and possibly instrument $PXY_CMD, $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD to pass
+# extra arguments or go through wrappers.
+# Set $DTLS (0=TLS, 1=DTLS).
+analyze_test_commands() {
+    # update DTLS variable
+    detect_dtls "$SRV_CMD"
+
+    # if the test uses DTLS but no custom proxy, add a simple proxy
+    # as it provides timing info that's useful to debug failures
+    if [ -z "$PXY_CMD" ] && [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
+        PXY_CMD="$P_PXY"
+        case " $SRV_CMD " in
+            *' server_addr=::1 '*)
+                PXY_CMD="$PXY_CMD server_addr=::1 listen_addr=::1";;
+        esac
+    fi
+
+    # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable
+    is_gnutls "$SRV_CMD"
+
+    # if the server uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly
+    # set the default priority
+    if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
+        case "$SRV_CMD" in
+              *--priority*) :;;
+              *) SRV_CMD="$SRV_CMD --priority=NORMAL";;
+        esac
+    fi
+
+    # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable
+    is_gnutls "$CLI_CMD"
+
+    # if the client uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly
+    # set the default priority
+    if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
+        case "$CLI_CMD" in
+              *--priority*) :;;
+              *) CLI_CMD="$CLI_CMD --priority=NORMAL";;
+        esac
+    fi
+
+    # fix client port
+    if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
+        CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$PXY_PORT/g )
+    else
+        CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$SRV_PORT/g )
+    fi
+
+    # prepend valgrind to our commands if active
+    if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
+        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
+            SRV_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $SRV_CMD"
+        fi
+        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then
+            CLI_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLI_CMD"
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+# Check for failure conditions after a test case.
+#
+# Inputs from run_test:
+# * positional parameters: test options (see run_test documentation)
+# * $CLI_EXIT: client return code
+# * $CLI_EXPECT: expected client return code
+# * $SRV_RET: server return code
+# * $CLI_OUT, $SRV_OUT, $PXY_OUT: files containing client/server/proxy logs
+# * $TIMES_LEFT: if nonzero, a RETRY outcome is allowed
+#
+# Outputs:
+# * $outcome: one of PASS/RETRY*/FAIL
+check_test_failure() {
+    outcome=FAIL
+
+    if [ $TIMES_LEFT -gt 0 ] &&
+       grep '===CLIENT_TIMEOUT===' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null
+    then
+        outcome="RETRY(client-timeout)"
+        return
+    fi
+
+    # check if the client and server went at least to the handshake stage
+    # (useful to avoid tests with only negative assertions and non-zero
+    # expected client exit to incorrectly succeed in case of catastrophic
+    # failure)
+    if [ "X$SKIP_HANDSHAKE_CHECK" != "XYES" ]
+    then
+        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
+            if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $SRV_OUT >/dev/null; then :;
+            else
+                fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage"
+                return
+            fi
+        fi
+        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then
+            if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then :;
+            else
+                fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage"
+                return
+            fi
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    SKIP_HANDSHAKE_CHECK="NO"
+    # Check server exit code (only for Mbed TLS: GnuTLS and OpenSSL don't
+    # exit with status 0 when interrupted by a signal, and we don't really
+    # care anyway), in case e.g. the server reports a memory leak.
+    if [ $SRV_RET != 0 ] && is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
+        fail "Server exited with status $SRV_RET"
+        return
+    fi
+
+    # check client exit code
+    if [ \( "$CLI_EXPECT" = 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" != 0 \) -o \
+         \( "$CLI_EXPECT" != 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" = 0 \) ]
+    then
+        fail "bad client exit code (expected $CLI_EXPECT, got $CLI_EXIT)"
+        return
+    fi
+
+    # check other assertions
+    # lines beginning with == are added by valgrind, ignore them
+    # lines with 'Serious error when reading debug info', are valgrind issues as well
+    while [ $# -gt 0 ]
+    do
+        case $1 in
+            "-s")
+                if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else
+                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Server output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+            "-c")
+                if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else
+                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Client output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+            "-S")
+                if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then
+                    if log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive "$2"; then
+                        fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Server output"
+                    fi
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+            "-C")
+                if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then
+                    if log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive "$2"; then
+                        fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Client output"
+                    fi
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+                # The filtering in the following two options (-u and -U) do the following
+                #   - ignore valgrind output
+                #   - filter out everything but lines right after the pattern occurrences
+                #   - keep one of each non-unique line
+                #   - count how many lines remain
+                # A line with '--' will remain in the result from previous outputs, so the number of lines in the result will be 1
+                # if there were no duplicates.
+            "-U")
+                if [ $(grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then
+                    fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Server output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+            "-u")
+                if [ $(grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then
+                    fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Client output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+            "-F")
+                if ! $2 "$SRV_OUT"; then
+                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+            "-f")
+                if ! $2 "$CLI_OUT"; then
+                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Client output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+            "-g")
+                if ! eval "$2 '$SRV_OUT' '$CLI_OUT'"; then
+                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server and Client output"
+                    return
+                fi
+                ;;
+
+            *)
+                echo "Unknown test: $1" >&2
+                exit 1
+        esac
+        shift 2
+    done
+
+    # check valgrind's results
+    if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
+        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD" && has_mem_err $SRV_OUT; then
+            fail "Server has memory errors"
+            return
+        fi
+        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD" && has_mem_err $CLI_OUT; then
+            fail "Client has memory errors"
+            return
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    # if we're here, everything is ok
+    outcome=PASS
+}
+
+# Run the current test case: start the server and if applicable the proxy, run
+# the client, wait for all processes to finish or time out.
+#
+# Inputs:
+# * $NAME: test case name
+# * $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD, $PXY_CMD: commands to run
+# * $CLI_OUT, $SRV_OUT, $PXY_OUT: files to contain client/server/proxy logs
+#
+# Outputs:
+# * $CLI_EXIT: client return code
+# * $SRV_RET: server return code
+do_run_test_once() {
+    # run the commands
+    if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
+        printf "# %s\n%s\n" "$NAME" "$PXY_CMD" > $PXY_OUT
+        $PXY_CMD >> $PXY_OUT 2>&1 &
+        PXY_PID=$!
+        wait_proxy_start "$PXY_PORT" "$PXY_PID"
+    fi
+
+    check_osrv_dtls
+    printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$SRV_CMD" > $SRV_OUT
+    provide_input | $SRV_CMD >> $SRV_OUT 2>&1 &
+    SRV_PID=$!
+    wait_server_start "$SRV_PORT" "$SRV_PID"
+
+    printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$CLI_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
+    eval "$CLI_CMD" >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
+    wait_client_done
+
+    sleep 0.05
+
+    # terminate the server (and the proxy)
+    kill $SRV_PID
+    wait $SRV_PID
+    SRV_RET=$?
+
+    if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
+        kill $PXY_PID >/dev/null 2>&1
+        wait $PXY_PID
+    fi
+}
+
 # Usage: run_test name [-p proxy_cmd] srv_cmd cli_cmd cli_exit [option [...]]
 # Options:  -s pattern  pattern that must be present in server output
 #           -c pattern  pattern that must be present in client output
@@ -819,234 +1162,23 @@
         return
     fi
 
-    # update DTLS variable
-    detect_dtls "$SRV_CMD"
-
-    # if the test uses DTLS but no custom proxy, add a simple proxy
-    # as it provides timing info that's useful to debug failures
-    if [ -z "$PXY_CMD" ] && [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
-        PXY_CMD="$P_PXY"
-        case " $SRV_CMD " in
-            *' server_addr=::1 '*)
-                PXY_CMD="$PXY_CMD server_addr=::1 listen_addr=::1";;
-        esac
-    fi
-
-    # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable
-    is_gnutls "$SRV_CMD"
-
-    # if the server uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly
-    # set the default priority
-    if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
-        case "$SRV_CMD" in
-              *--priority*) :;;
-              *) SRV_CMD="$SRV_CMD --priority=NORMAL";;
-        esac
-    fi
-
-    # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable
-    is_gnutls "$CLI_CMD"
-
-    # if the client uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly
-    # set the default priority
-    if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
-        case "$CLI_CMD" in
-              *--priority*) :;;
-              *) CLI_CMD="$CLI_CMD --priority=NORMAL";;
-        esac
-    fi
-
-    # fix client port
-    if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
-        CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$PXY_PORT/g )
-    else
-        CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$SRV_PORT/g )
-    fi
-
-    # prepend valgrind to our commands if active
-    if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
-        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
-            SRV_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $SRV_CMD"
-        fi
-        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then
-            CLI_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLI_CMD"
-        fi
-    fi
+    analyze_test_commands "$@"
 
     TIMES_LEFT=2
     while [ $TIMES_LEFT -gt 0 ]; do
         TIMES_LEFT=$(( $TIMES_LEFT - 1 ))
 
-        # run the commands
-        if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
-            printf "# %s\n%s\n" "$NAME" "$PXY_CMD" > $PXY_OUT
-            $PXY_CMD >> $PXY_OUT 2>&1 &
-            PXY_PID=$!
-            wait_proxy_start "$PXY_PORT" "$PXY_PID"
-        fi
+        do_run_test_once
 
-        check_osrv_dtls
-        printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$SRV_CMD" > $SRV_OUT
-        provide_input | $SRV_CMD >> $SRV_OUT 2>&1 &
-        SRV_PID=$!
-        wait_server_start "$SRV_PORT" "$SRV_PID"
-
-        printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$CLI_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
-        eval "$CLI_CMD" >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
-        wait_client_done
-
-        sleep 0.05
-
-        # terminate the server (and the proxy)
-        kill $SRV_PID
-        wait $SRV_PID
-        SRV_RET=$?
-
-        if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
-            kill $PXY_PID >/dev/null 2>&1
-            wait $PXY_PID
-        fi
-
-        # retry only on timeouts
-        if grep '===CLIENT_TIMEOUT===' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then
-            printf "RETRY "
-        else
-            TIMES_LEFT=0
-        fi
-    done
-
-    # check if the client and server went at least to the handshake stage
-    # (useful to avoid tests with only negative assertions and non-zero
-    # expected client exit to incorrectly succeed in case of catastrophic
-    # failure)
-    if [ "X$SKIP_HANDSHAKE_CHECK" != "XYES" ]
-    then
-        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
-            if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $SRV_OUT >/dev/null; then :;
-            else
-                fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage"
-                return
-            fi
-        fi
-        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then
-            if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then :;
-            else
-                fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage"
-                return
-            fi
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    SKIP_HANDSHAKE_CHECK="NO"
-    # Check server exit code (only for Mbed TLS: GnuTLS and OpenSSL don't
-    # exit with status 0 when interrupted by a signal, and we don't really
-    # care anyway), in case e.g. the server reports a memory leak.
-    if [ $SRV_RET != 0 ] && is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then
-        fail "Server exited with status $SRV_RET"
-        return
-    fi
-
-    # check client exit code
-    if [ \( "$CLI_EXPECT" = 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" != 0 \) -o \
-         \( "$CLI_EXPECT" != 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" = 0 \) ]
-    then
-        fail "bad client exit code (expected $CLI_EXPECT, got $CLI_EXIT)"
-        return
-    fi
-
-    # check other assertions
-    # lines beginning with == are added by valgrind, ignore them
-    # lines with 'Serious error when reading debug info', are valgrind issues as well
-    while [ $# -gt 0 ]
-    do
-        case $1 in
-            "-s")
-                if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else
-                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Server output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-            "-c")
-                if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else
-                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Client output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-            "-S")
-                if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then
-                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Server output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-            "-C")
-                if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then
-                    fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Client output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-                # The filtering in the following two options (-u and -U) do the following
-                #   - ignore valgrind output
-                #   - filter out everything but lines right after the pattern occurrences
-                #   - keep one of each non-unique line
-                #   - count how many lines remain
-                # A line with '--' will remain in the result from previous outputs, so the number of lines in the result will be 1
-                # if there were no duplicates.
-            "-U")
-                if [ $(grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then
-                    fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Server output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-            "-u")
-                if [ $(grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then
-                    fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Client output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-            "-F")
-                if ! $2 "$SRV_OUT"; then
-                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-            "-f")
-                if ! $2 "$CLI_OUT"; then
-                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Client output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-            "-g")
-                if ! eval "$2 '$SRV_OUT' '$CLI_OUT'"; then
-                    fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server and Client output"
-                    return
-                fi
-                ;;
-
-            *)
-                echo "Unknown test: $1" >&2
-                exit 1
+        check_test_failure "$@"
+        case $outcome in
+            PASS) break;;
+            RETRY*) printf "$outcome ";;
+            FAIL) return;;
         esac
-        shift 2
     done
 
-    # check valgrind's results
-    if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
-        if is_polar "$SRV_CMD" && has_mem_err $SRV_OUT; then
-            fail "Server has memory errors"
-            return
-        fi
-        if is_polar "$CLI_CMD" && has_mem_err $CLI_OUT; then
-            fail "Client has memory errors"
-            return
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    # if we're here, everything is ok
+    # If we get this far, the test case passed.
     record_outcome "PASS"
     if [ "$PRESERVE_LOGS" -gt 0 ]; then
         mv $SRV_OUT o-srv-${TESTS}.log
@@ -1271,21 +1403,30 @@
 
 # fix commands to use this port, force IPv4 while at it
 # +SRV_PORT will be replaced by either $SRV_PORT or $PXY_PORT later
+# Note: Using 'localhost' rather than 127.0.0.1 here is unwise, as on many
+# machines that will resolve to ::1, and we don't want ipv6 here.
 P_SRV="$P_SRV server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=$SRV_PORT"
 P_CLI="$P_CLI server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=+SRV_PORT"
 P_PXY="$P_PXY server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=$SRV_PORT listen_addr=127.0.0.1 listen_port=$PXY_PORT ${SEED:+"seed=$SEED"}"
 O_SRV="$O_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT"
-O_CLI="$O_CLI -connect localhost:+SRV_PORT"
+O_CLI="$O_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT"
 G_SRV="$G_SRV -p $SRV_PORT"
 G_CLI="$G_CLI -p +SRV_PORT"
 
 if [ -n "${OPENSSL_LEGACY:-}" ]; then
     O_LEGACY_SRV="$O_LEGACY_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT -dhparam data_files/dhparams.pem"
-    O_LEGACY_CLI="$O_LEGACY_CLI -connect localhost:+SRV_PORT"
+    O_LEGACY_CLI="$O_LEGACY_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then
+    O_NEXT_SRV="$O_NEXT_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT"
+    O_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$O_NEXT_SRV_RSA -accept $SRV_PORT"
+    O_NEXT_CLI="$O_NEXT_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT"
 fi
 
 if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then
     G_NEXT_SRV="$G_NEXT_SRV -p $SRV_PORT"
+    G_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$G_NEXT_SRV_RSA -p $SRV_PORT"
 fi
 
 if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then
@@ -1392,12 +1533,53 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 run_test    "Opaque key for client authentication" \
-            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
             "$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
              key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
             0 \
             -c "key type: Opaque" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
             -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+            -S "error" \
+            -C "error"
+
+# Test using an opaque private key for server authentication
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test    "Opaque key for server authentication" \
+            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+            0 \
+            -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+            -s "key types: Opaque - invalid PK" \
+            -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+            -S "error" \
+            -C "error"
+
+# Test using an opaque private key for client/server authentication
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test    "Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+            0 \
+            -c "key type: Opaque" \
+            -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+            -s "key types: Opaque - invalid PK" \
+            -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
             -S "error" \
             -C "error"
 
@@ -1512,6 +1694,40 @@
             "$P_CLI key_file=data_files/cli-rsa.key crt_file=data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt" \
             0
 
+# Dummy TLS 1.3 test
+# Currently only checking that passing TLS 1.3 key exchange modes to
+# ssl_client2/ssl_server2 example programs works.
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: PSK only" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=psk" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk" \
+            0
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: PSK-ephemeral only" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral" \
+            0
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: Pure-ephemeral only" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral" \
+            0
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: All ephemeral" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all" \
+            0
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: All PSK" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=psk_all" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_all" \
+            0
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+run_test    "TLS 1.3, key exchange mode parameter passing: All" \
+            "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=all" \
+            "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=all" \
+            0
+
 # Tests for datagram packing
 run_test    "DTLS: multiple records in same datagram, client and server" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 debug_level=2" \
@@ -2617,10 +2833,13 @@
             -c "parse new session ticket" \
             -c "a session has been resumed"
 
+# For reasons that aren't fully understood, this test randomly fails with high
+# probability with OpenSSL 1.0.2g on the CI, see #5012.
+requires_openssl_next
 run_test    "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: openssl client" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=1" \
-            "( $O_CLI -dtls -sess_out $SESSION; \
-               $O_CLI -dtls -sess_in $SESSION; \
+            "( $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls -sess_out $SESSION; \
+               $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls -sess_in $SESSION; \
                rm -f $SESSION )" \
             0 \
             -s "found session ticket extension" \
@@ -2817,10 +3036,13 @@
             -s "a session has been resumed" \
             -c "a session has been resumed"
 
+# For reasons that aren't fully understood, this test randomly fails with high
+# probability with OpenSSL 1.0.2g on the CI, see #5012.
+requires_openssl_next
 run_test    "Session resume using cache, DTLS: openssl client" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0" \
-            "( $O_CLI -dtls -sess_out $SESSION; \
-               $O_CLI -dtls -sess_in $SESSION; \
+            "( $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls -sess_out $SESSION; \
+               $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls -sess_in $SESSION; \
                rm -f $SESSION )" \
             0 \
             -s "found session ticket extension" \
@@ -8536,7 +8758,6 @@
             -s "Extra-header:" \
             -c "Extra-header:"
 
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
 run_test    "export keys functionality" \
             "$P_SRV eap_tls=1 debug_level=3" \
             "$P_CLI eap_tls=1 debug_level=3" \
@@ -8548,6 +8769,7 @@
 
 # openssl feature tests: check if tls1.3 exists.
 requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
 run_test    "TLS1.3: Test openssl tls1_3 feature" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV -tls1_3 -msg" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI -tls1_3 -msg" \
@@ -8555,11 +8777,14 @@
             -c "TLS 1.3" \
             -s "TLS 1.3"
 
-# gnutls feature tests: check if tls1.3 exists.
+# gnutls feature tests: check if TLS 1.3 is supported as well as the NO_TICKETS and DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE options.
 requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
 run_test    "TLS1.3: Test gnutls tls1_3 feature" \
-            "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3" \
-            "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V" \
+            "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert " \
+            "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
             0 \
             -s "Version: TLS1.3" \
             -c "Version: TLS1.3"
@@ -8581,11 +8806,106 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
 run_test    "TLS1.3: handshake dispatch test: tls1_3 only" \
-            "$P_SRV min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
-            "$P_CLI min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=2 min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=2 min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
             1 \
-            -s "SSL - The requested feature is not available" \
-            -c "SSL - The requested feature is not available"
+            -s "tls1_3 server state: 0"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 0"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+run_test    "TLS1.3: minimal feature sets - openssl" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -no_middlebox -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
+            0 \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 0"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 2"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 19"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 5"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 3"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 9"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 13"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 11"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 14"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 15"    \
+            -c "<= ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello" \
+            -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+            -c "ECDH curve: x25519"         \
+            -c "=> ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello" \
+            -c "<= parse encrypted extensions"      \
+            -c "Certificate verification flags clear" \
+            -c "=> parse certificate verify"          \
+            -c "<= parse certificate verify"          \
+            -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+            -c "<= parse finished message" \
+            -c "HTTP/1.0 200 ok"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->O AES_128_GCM_SHA256      , RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV_RSA -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -tls1_3 -msg -no_middlebox -num_tickets 0" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls1_3 server_name=localhost force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 allow_sha1=0" \
+            0 \
+            -c "ECDH curve: x25519" \
+            -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+            -c "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( 0804 )" \
+            -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+            -c "HTTP/1.0 200 ok"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+run_test    "TLS1.3: minimal feature sets - gnutls" \
+            "$G_NEXT_SRV --debug=4 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_3 max_version=tls1_3" \
+            0 \
+            -s "SERVER HELLO was queued"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 0"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 2"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 19"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 5"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 3"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 9"     \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 13"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 11"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 14"    \
+            -c "tls1_3 client state: 15"    \
+            -c "<= ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello" \
+            -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+            -c "ECDH curve: x25519"         \
+            -c "=> ssl_tls1_3_process_server_hello" \
+            -c "<= parse encrypted extensions"      \
+            -c "Certificate verification flags clear" \
+            -c "=> parse certificate verify"          \
+            -c "<= parse certificate verify"          \
+            -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+            -c "<= parse finished message" \
+            -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_gnutls_next
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G AES_128_GCM_SHA256      , RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256" \
+            "$G_NEXT_SRV_RSA --disable-client-cert --priority=NORMAL:+CIPHER-ALL:+SHA256:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls1_3 server_name=localhost force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 allow_sha1=0" \
+            0 \
+            -c "ECDH curve: x25519"         \
+            -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+            -c "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( 0804 )" \
+            -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+            -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
 
 # Test heap memory usage after handshake
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function
index a5fd717..17926eb 100644
--- a/tests/suites/host_test.function
+++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function
@@ -778,6 +778,12 @@
                     mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "line %d, %s",
                                      mbedtls_test_info.line_no,
                                      mbedtls_test_info.filename );
+                    if( mbedtls_test_info.line1[0] != 0 )
+                        mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n  %s",
+                                         mbedtls_test_info.line1 );
+                    if( mbedtls_test_info.line2[0] != 0 )
+                        mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n  %s",
+                                         mbedtls_test_info.line2 );
                 }
                 fflush( stdout );
             }
diff --git a/tests/suites/target_test.function b/tests/suites/target_test.function
deleted file mode 100644
index 637a79d..0000000
--- a/tests/suites/target_test.function
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,449 +0,0 @@
-#line 2 "suites/target_test.function"
-
-#include "greentea-client/test_env.h"
-
-/**
- * \brief       Increments pointer and asserts that it does not overflow.
- *
- * \param p     Pointer to byte array
- * \param start Pointer to start of byte array
- * \param len   Length of byte array
- * \param step  Increment size
- *
- */
-#define INCR_ASSERT(p, start, len, step) do                     \
-{                                                               \
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( ( p ) >= ( start ) );                               \
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( sizeof( *( p ) ) == sizeof( *( start ) ) );         \
-    /* <= is checked to support use inside a loop where         \
-       pointer is incremented after reading data.       */      \
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( (uint32_t)( ( ( p ) - ( start ) ) + ( step ) ) <= ( len ) );\
-    ( p ) += ( step );                                          \
-}                                                               \
-while( 0 )
-
-
-/**
- * \brief       4 byte align unsigned char pointer
- *
- * \param p     Pointer to byte array
- * \param start Pointer to start of byte array
- * \param len   Length of byte array
- *
- */
-#define ALIGN_32BIT(p, start, len) do               \
-{                                                   \
-    uint32_t align = ( - (uintptr_t)( p ) ) % 4;    \
-    INCR_ASSERT( ( p ), ( start ), ( len ), align );\
-}                                                   \
-while( 0 )
-
-
-/**
- * \brief       Verify dependencies. Dependency identifiers are
- *              encoded in the buffer as 8 bit unsigned integers.
- *
- * \param count     Number of dependencies.
- * \param dep_p     Pointer to buffer.
- *
- * \return          DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED if success else DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED.
- */
-int verify_dependencies( uint8_t count, uint8_t * dep_p )
-{
-    uint8_t i;
-    for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
-    {
-        if ( dep_check( (int)(dep_p[i]) ) != DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED )
-            return( DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-    }
-    return( DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Receives hex string on serial interface, and converts to a byte.
- *
- * \param none
- *
- * \return      unsigned int8
- */
-uint8_t receive_byte()
-{
-    uint8_t byte;
-    uint8_t c[3];
-    size_t len;
-
-    c[0] = greentea_getc();
-    c[1] = greentea_getc();
-    c[2] = '\0';
-
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_unhexify( &byte, sizeof( byte ),
-                                               c, &len ) == 0 );
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( len != 2 );
-
-    return( byte );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Receives unsigned integer on serial interface.
- *              Integers are encoded in network order, and sent as hex ascii string.
- *
- * \param none
- *
- * \return      unsigned int
- */
-uint32_t receive_uint32()
-{
-    uint32_t value;
-    size_t len;
-    const uint8_t c_be[8] = { greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc(),
-                              greentea_getc()
-                             };
-    const uint8_t c[9] = { c_be[6], c_be[7], c_be[4], c_be[5], c_be[2],
-                           c_be[3], c_be[0], c_be[1], '\0' };
-
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_unhexify( (uint8_t*)&value, sizeof( value ),
-                                               c, &len ) == 0 );
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( len != 8 );
-
-    return( value );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Parses out an unsigned 32 int value from the byte array.
- *              Integers are encoded in network order.
- *
- * \param p     Pointer to byte array
- *
- * \return      unsigned int
- */
-uint32_t parse_uint32( uint8_t * p )
-{
-    uint32_t value;
-    value =  *p++ << 24;
-    value |= *p++ << 16;
-    value |= *p++ << 8;
-    value |= *p;
-    return( value );
-}
-
-
-/**
- * \brief       Receives test data on serial as greentea key,value pair:
- *              {{<length>;<byte array>}}
- *
- * \param data_len  Out pointer to hold received data length.
- *
- * \return      Byte array.
- */
-uint8_t * receive_data( uint32_t * data_len )
-{
-    uint32_t i = 0, errors = 0;
-    char c;
-    uint8_t * data = NULL;
-
-    /* Read opening braces */
-    i = 0;
-    while ( i < 2 )
-    {
-        c = greentea_getc();
-        /* Ignore any prevous CR LF characters */
-        if ( c == '\n' || c == '\r' )
-            continue;
-        i++;
-        if ( c != '{' )
-            return( NULL );
-    }
-
-    /* Read data length */
-    *data_len = receive_uint32();
-    data = (uint8_t *)malloc( *data_len );
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( data != NULL );
-
-    greentea_getc(); // read ';' received after key i.e. *data_len
-
-    for( i = 0; i < *data_len; i++ )
-        data[i] = receive_byte();
-
-    /* Read closing braces */
-    for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ )
-    {
-        c = greentea_getc();
-        if ( c != '}' )
-        {
-            errors++;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if ( errors )
-    {
-        free( data );
-        data = NULL;
-        *data_len = 0;
-    }
-
-    return( data );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Parse the received byte array and count the number of arguments
- *              to the test function passed as type hex.
- *
- * \param count     Parameter count
- * \param data      Received Byte array
- * \param data_len  Byte array length
- *
- * \return      count of hex params
- */
-uint32_t find_hex_count( uint8_t count, uint8_t * data, uint32_t data_len )
-{
-    uint32_t i = 0, sz = 0;
-    char c;
-    uint8_t * p = NULL;
-    uint32_t hex_count = 0;
-
-    p = data;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
-    {
-        c = (char)*p;
-        INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, 1 );
-
-        /* Align p to 4 bytes for int, expression, string len or hex length */
-        ALIGN_32BIT( p, data, data_len );
-
-        /* Network to host conversion */
-        sz = (int32_t)parse_uint32( p );
-
-        INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( int32_t ) );
-
-        if ( c == 'H' || c == 'S' )
-        {
-            INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sz );
-            hex_count += ( c == 'H' )?1:0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return( hex_count );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Parses received byte array for test parameters.
- *
- * \param count     Parameter count
- * \param data      Received Byte array
- * \param data_len  Byte array length
- * \param error     Parsing error out variable.
- *
- * \return      Array of parsed parameters allocated on heap.
- *              Note: Caller has the responsibility to delete
- *                    the memory after use.
- */
-void ** parse_parameters( uint8_t count, uint8_t * data, uint32_t data_len,
-                          int * error )
-{
-    uint32_t i = 0, hex_count = 0;
-    char c;
-    void ** params = NULL;
-    void ** cur = NULL;
-    uint8_t * p = NULL;
-
-    hex_count = find_hex_count(count, data, data_len);
-
-    params = (void **)malloc( sizeof( void *) * ( count + hex_count ) );
-    TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( params != NULL );
-    cur = params;
-
-    p = data;
-
-    /* Parameters */
-    for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
-    {
-        c = (char)*p;
-        INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, 1 );
-
-        /* Align p to 4 bytes for int, expression, string len or hex length */
-        ALIGN_32BIT( p, data, data_len );
-
-        /* Network to host conversion */
-        *( (int32_t *)p ) = (int32_t)parse_uint32( p );
-
-        switch( c )
-        {
-            case 'E':
-                {
-                    if ( get_expression( *( (int32_t *)p ), (int32_t *)p ) )
-                    {
-                        *error = KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND;
-                        goto exit;
-                    }
-                } /* Intentional fall through */
-            case 'I':
-                {
-                    *cur++ = (void *)p;
-                    INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( int32_t ) );
-                }
-                break;
-            case 'H': /* Intentional fall through */
-            case 'S':
-                {
-                    uint32_t * sz = (uint32_t *)p;
-                    INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( int32_t ) );
-                    *cur++ = (void *)p;
-                    if ( c == 'H' )
-                        *cur++ = (void *)sz;
-                    INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, ( *sz ) );
-                }
-                break;
-            default:
-                    {
-                        *error = DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA;
-                        goto exit;
-                    }
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-
-exit:
-    if ( *error )
-    {
-        free( params );
-        params = NULL;
-    }
-
-    return( params );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Sends greentea key and int value pair to host.
- *
- * \param key   key string
- * \param value integer value
- *
- * \return      void
- */
-void send_key_integer( char * key, int value )
-{
-    char str[50];
-    snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%d", value );
-    greentea_send_kv( key, str );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Sends test setup failure to the host.
- *
- * \param failure   Test set failure
- *
- * \return      void
- */
-void send_failure( int failure )
-{
-    send_key_integer( "F", failure );
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief       Sends test status to the host.
- *
- * \param status    Test status (PASS=0/FAIL=!0)
- *
- * \return      void
- */
-void send_status( int status )
-{
-    send_key_integer( "R", status );
-}
-
-
-/**
- * \brief       Embedded implementation of execute_tests().
- *              Ignores command line and received test data
- *              on serial.
- *
- * \param argc  not used
- * \param argv  not used
- *
- * \return      Program exit status.
- */
-int execute_tests( int args, const char ** argv )
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    uint32_t data_len = 0;
-    uint8_t count = 0, function_id;
-    void ** params = NULL;
-    uint8_t * data = NULL, * p = NULL;
-
-    GREENTEA_SETUP( 800, "mbedtls_test" );
-    greentea_send_kv( "GO", " " );
-
-    while ( 1 )
-    {
-        ret = 0;
-        mbedtls_test_info_reset( );
-        data_len = 0;
-
-        data = receive_data( &data_len );
-        if ( data == NULL )
-            continue;
-        p = data;
-
-        do
-        {
-            /* Read dependency count */
-            count = *p;
-            TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( count < data_len );
-            INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( uint8_t ) );
-            ret = verify_dependencies( count, p );
-            if ( ret != DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED )
-                break;
-
-            if ( count )
-                INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, count );
-
-            /* Read function id */
-            function_id = *p;
-            INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( uint8_t ) );
-            if ( ( ret = check_test( function_id ) ) != DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS )
-                break;
-
-            /* Read number of parameters */
-            count = *p;
-            INCR_ASSERT( p, data, data_len, sizeof( uint8_t ) );
-
-            /* Parse parameters if present */
-            if ( count )
-            {
-                params = parse_parameters( count, p, data_len - ( p - data ), &ret );
-                if ( ret )
-                    break;
-            }
-
-            ret = dispatch_test( function_id, params );
-        }
-        while ( 0 );
-
-        if ( data )
-        {
-            free( data );
-            data = NULL;
-        }
-
-        if ( params )
-        {
-            free( params );
-            params = NULL;
-        }
-
-        if ( ret )
-            send_failure( ret );
-        else
-            send_status( mbedtls_test_info.result );
-    }
-    return( 0 );
-}
-
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
index 1892c25..52af8e0 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result );
     if( cbc_result == 0 )
     {
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
     memset(output, 0x00, 100);
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result );
     if( cbc_result == 0)
     {
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
     mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
index 3a892f4..5556668 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
@@ -1,3 +1,33 @@
+mask_of_range empty (1..0)
+mask_of_range:1:0
+
+mask_of_range empty (255..0)
+mask_of_range:255:0
+
+mask_of_range empty (42..7)
+mask_of_range:42:7
+
+mask_of_range 0..0
+mask_of_range:0:0
+
+mask_of_range 42..42
+mask_of_range:42:42
+
+mask_of_range 255..255
+mask_of_range:255:255
+
+mask_of_range 0..255
+mask_of_range:0:255
+
+mask_of_range 'A'..'Z'
+mask_of_range:65:90
+
+enc_char (all digits)
+enc_chars:
+
+dec_value (all characters)
+dec_chars:
+
 Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #1 buffer just right
 mbedtls_base64_encode:"":"":0:0
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
index be9b6e8..67fbb67 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/base64.h"
+#include "base64_invasive.h"
 #include <test/constant_flow.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+static const char base64_digits[] =
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -8,6 +15,65 @@
  * END_DEPENDENCIES
  */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void mask_of_range( int low_arg, int high_arg )
+{
+    unsigned char low = low_arg, high = high_arg;
+    unsigned c;
+    for( c = 0; c <= 0xff; c++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( c );
+        TEST_CF_SECRET( &c, sizeof( c ) );
+        unsigned char m = mbedtls_base64_mask_of_range( low, high, c );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &c, sizeof( c ) );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &m, sizeof( m ) );
+        if( low <= c && c <= high )
+            TEST_EQUAL( m, 0xff );
+        else
+            TEST_EQUAL( m, 0 );
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void enc_chars( )
+{
+    for( unsigned value = 0; value < 64; value++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( value );
+        TEST_CF_SECRET( &value, sizeof( value ) );
+        unsigned char digit = mbedtls_base64_enc_char( value );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &value, sizeof( value ) );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &digit, sizeof( digit ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( digit, base64_digits[value] );
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void dec_chars( )
+{
+    char *p;
+    signed char expected;
+
+    for( unsigned c = 0; c <= 0xff; c++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( c );
+        /* base64_digits is 0-terminated. sizeof()-1 excludes the trailing 0. */
+        p = memchr( base64_digits, c, sizeof( base64_digits ) - 1 );
+        if( p == NULL )
+            expected = -1;
+        else
+            expected = p - base64_digits;
+        TEST_CF_SECRET( &c, sizeof( c ) );
+        signed char actual = mbedtls_base64_dec_value( c );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &c, sizeof( c ) );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &actual, sizeof( actual ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( actual, expected );
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_base64_encode( char * src_string, char * dst_string,
                             int dst_buf_size, int result )
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
index a14d4be..61e6e9b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"ABF21C0B02FEB88F856DF4A37381BCE3CC128517D4":"008D493B30AE8B3C9696766CFA":"6E37A6EF546D955D34AB6059":"F32905B88A641B04B9C9FFB58CC390900F3DA12AB16DCE9E82EFA16DA62059"
 
+CCM encrypt and tag AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
 CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"43b1a6bc8d0d22d6d1ca95c18593cca5":"a2b381c7d1545c408fe29817a21dc435a154c87256346b05":"9882578e750b9682c6ca7f8f86":"2084f3861c9ad0ccee7c63a7e05aece5db8b34bd8724cc06b4ca99a7f9c4914f":"cc69ed76985e0ed4c8365a72775e5a19bfccc71aeb116c85a8c74677"
@@ -1517,3 +1521,234 @@
 CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #24
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
 mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
+
+CCM encrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM encrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM decrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM decrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* encrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* encrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* decrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
+
+CCM* decrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM encrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
+
+CCM decrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
+
+CCM* encrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
+
+CCM* decrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
+
+CCM encrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
+
+CCM decrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
+
+CCM* encrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
+
+CCM* decrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
+
+CCM pass unexpected auth data, NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_ad::MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM encrypt, unexpected ciphertext/plaintext data, NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_text:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
+
+CCM* encrypt, no auth NIST VADT AES-256 #1 (P=24, N=13)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_star_no_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886df3ba3e6da3a1389":"30d56ff2a25b83fee791110fcaea48e41db7c7f098a81000":"72a60f345a1978fb40f28a2fa4":"55f068c0bbba8b598013dd1841fd740fda2902322148ab5e"
+
+CCM* decrypt, no auth NIST DVPT AES-128 #15 (P=24, N=13)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_star_no_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
index 840583c..a7ba0de 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
@@ -1,5 +1,64 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+
+/* Use the multipart interface to process the encrypted data in two parts
+ * and check that the output matches the expected output.
+ * The context must have been set up with the key. */
+static int check_multipart( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                            int mode,
+                            const data_t *iv,
+                            const data_t *add,
+                            const data_t *input,
+                            const data_t *expected_output,
+                            const data_t *tag,
+                            size_t n1,
+                            size_t n1_add)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t n2 = input->len - n1;
+    size_t n2_add = add->len - n1_add;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    /* Sanity checks on the test data */
+    TEST_ASSERT( n1 <= input->len );
+    TEST_ASSERT( n1_add <= add->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( input->len, expected_output->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add->len, input->len, tag->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x, n1_add) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x + n1_add, n2_add ) );
+
+    /* Allocate a tight buffer for each update call. This way, if the function
+     * tries to write beyond the advertised required buffer size, this will
+     * count as an overflow for memory sanitizers and static checkers. */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n1 );
+    olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x, n1, output, n1, &olen ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( n1, olen );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x, n1 );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n2 );
+    olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x + n1, n2, output, n2, &olen ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( n2, olen );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x + n1, n2 );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+    ok = 1;
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    return( ok );
+}
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -122,71 +181,140 @@
                                   data_t * add, data_t * result )
 {
     mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
-    size_t tag_len;
-    uint8_t * msg_n_tag = (uint8_t *)malloc( result->len + 2 );
+    size_t n1, n1_add;
+    uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+    uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
+    const size_t expected_tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
+    const uint8_t* expected_tag = result->x + msg->len;
+
+    /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
+    if( msg->len != 0 )
+        memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
+
+    /* Prepare tag buffer */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
 
     mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
-    memset( msg_n_tag, 0, result->len + 2 );
-    memcpy( msg_n_tag, msg->x, msg->len );
-
-    tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
-
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
-
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
     /* Test with input == output */
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
-                 msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag + msg->len, tag_len ) == 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
+                io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len ), 0);
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg_n_tag, result->x, result->len ) == 0 );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, result->x, msg->len );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
 
-    /* Check we didn't write past the end */
-    TEST_ASSERT( msg_n_tag[result->len] == 0 && msg_n_tag[result->len + 1] == 0 );
+    /* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
+    const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = result->x,
+                                        .len = msg->len };
+    const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag, /* cast to conform with data_t x type */
+                                  .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+    for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
+    {
+        for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+        {
+            mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+            if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT,
+                                  iv, add, msg,
+                                  &encrypted_expected,
+                                  &tag_expected,
+                                  n1, n1_add ) )
+                goto exit;
+        }
+    }
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
-    free( msg_n_tag );
+    mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+    mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_star_no_tag( int cipher_id, int mode, data_t * key,
+                              data_t * msg, data_t * iv, data_t * result )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, msg->len, 0 ) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( result->len, olen );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, result->x, result->len );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(output);
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, data_t * key,
                                data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
-                               data_t * add, int tag_len, int result,
+                               data_t * add, int expected_tag_len, int result,
                                data_t * expected_msg )
 {
-    unsigned char tag[16];
     mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    size_t n1, n1_add;
+
+    const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
+    const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
+
+    /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+    uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
+    if( expected_msg_len )
+        memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
 
     mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
-    memset( tag, 0x00, sizeof( tag ) );
-
-    msg->len -= tag_len;
-    memcpy( tag, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len );
-
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
-
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
     /* Test with input == output */
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
-                 msg->x, msg->x, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len ) == result );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
+                io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), result );
 
     if( result == 0 )
     {
-        TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, expected_msg->x, expected_msg->len ) == 0 );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_msg->x, expected_msg_len );
+
+         /* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
+        const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
+                                   .len = expected_msg_len };
+
+        const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
+                                      .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+        for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
+        {
+            for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+            {
+                mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+                if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT,
+                                iv, add, &encrypted,
+                                expected_msg,
+                                &tag_expected,
+                                n1, n1_add ) )
+                    goto exit;
+           }
+        }
     }
     else
     {
         size_t i;
 
-        for( i = 0; i < msg->len; i++ )
-            TEST_ASSERT( msg->x[i] == 0 );
+        for( i = 0; i < expected_msg_len; i++ )
+            TEST_EQUAL( io_msg_buf[i], 0 );
     }
 
-    /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
-    TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x + msg->len, tag, tag_len ) == 0 );
-
 exit:
+    mbedtls_free(io_msg_buf);
     mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
@@ -199,20 +327,32 @@
                             data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
 {
     unsigned char iv[13];
-    unsigned char result[50];
     mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
-    size_t iv_len, tag_len;
-    int ret;
+    size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
+    size_t n1, n1_add;
+    uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+    uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
 
-    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    const uint8_t* expected_tag = expected_result->x + msg->len;
 
-    memset( result, 0x00, sizeof( result ) );
-
+    /* Calculate tag length */
     if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
-        tag_len = 0;
+        expected_tag_len = 0;
     else
-        tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+        expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
 
+    /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
+    if( msg->len )
+        memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
+
+    /* Prepare tag buffer */
+    if( expected_tag_len == 0 )
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, 16 );
+    else
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
+
+    /* Calculate iv */
     TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
     TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
     memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@@ -220,24 +360,46 @@
     iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
     iv_len = sizeof( iv );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
-                                     key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
+                                     key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    /* Test with input == output */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
+                                            add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf,
+                                            io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len), output_ret );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
-                                            add->x, add->len, msg->x,
-                                            result, result + msg->len, tag_len );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, expected_result->x, msg->len );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
+    if( output_ret == 0 )
+    {
+        const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
+                                 .len = iv_len };
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result,
-                         expected_result->x, expected_result->len ) == 0 );
+        const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = expected_result->x,
+                                            .len = msg->len };
+        const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*)expected_tag,
+                                      .len = expected_tag_len };
 
-    /* Check we didn't write past the end */
-    TEST_ASSERT( result[expected_result->len] == 0 &&
-                 result[expected_result->len + 1] == 0 );
+        for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
+        {
+            for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+            {
+                mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+                if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT,
+                                      &iv_data, add, msg,
+                                      &encrypted_expected,
+                                      &tag_expected,
+                                      n1, n1_add ) )
+                    goto exit;
+            }
+        }
+    }
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+    mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+    mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
@@ -249,21 +411,27 @@
                             data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
 {
     unsigned char iv[13];
-    unsigned char result[50];
     mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
-    size_t iv_len, tag_len;
-    int ret;
+    size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
+    size_t n1, n1_add;
 
-    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
-    memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
-    memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) );
-
+    /* Calculate tag length */
     if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
-        tag_len = 0;
+        expected_tag_len = 0;
     else
-        tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+        expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
 
+    const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
+    const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
+
+    /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+    uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
+    if( expected_msg_len )
+        memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
+
+    /* Calculate iv */
+    memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
     TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
     memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@@ -271,23 +439,405 @@
     iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
     iv_len = sizeof( iv );
 
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
+    /* Test with input == output */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv, iv_len,
+                                         add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf,
+                                         expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), output_ret );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len - tag_len, iv, iv_len,
-                                         add->x, add->len, msg->x, result,
-                                         msg->x + msg->len - tag_len, tag_len );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_result->x, expected_msg_len );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
+    if( output_ret == 0 )
+    {
+        const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
+                                 .len = iv_len };
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result, expected_result->x,
-                                 expected_result->len ) == 0 );
+        const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
+                                   .len = expected_msg_len} ;
 
-    /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
-    TEST_ASSERT( ( msg->len + 2 ) <= sizeof( result ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len], '+' );
-    TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len + 1], '+' );
+        const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
+                                      .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+        for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
+        {
+            for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+            {
+                mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+                if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT,
+                                &iv_data, add, &encrypted,
+                                expected_result,
+                                &tag_expected,
+                                n1, n1_add ) )
+                    goto exit;
+           }
+        }
+    }
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+    mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Skip auth data, provide full text */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                            data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                            data_t * result, data_t * tag )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    /* Sanity checks on the test data */
+    TEST_EQUAL( msg->len, result->len );
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, msg->len, tag->len ) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, result->len );
+    olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, result->len, &olen ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( result->len, olen );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, result->x, result->len );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide auth data, skip full text */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_skip_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                              data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add,
+                              data_t * tag )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, tag->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide too much auth data */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                 data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+                                 data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+    // subtract 1 from configured auth data length to provoke an overflow
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len - 1, 16, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide unexpected auth data */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                 data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+                                 data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, 16, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide unexpected plaintext/ciphertext data */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_text( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                  data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                                  data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+    olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete auth data and finish */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len - 1) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide complete auth data on first update_ad.
+ * Provide unexpected auth data on second update_ad */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                       data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+                                       data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 16, 16 ) );
+
+    // pass full auth data
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+    // pass 1 extra byte
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, 1) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete auth data on first update_ad.
+ * Provide too much auth data on second update_ad */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                             data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+                                             data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t add_second_buffer[2];
+
+    add_second_buffer[0] = add->x[ add->len - 1 ];
+    add_second_buffer[1] = 0xAB; // some magic value
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 16, 16 ) );
+
+    // pass incomplete auth data
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len - 1) );
+    // pass 2 extra bytes (1 missing byte from previous incomplete pass, and 1 unexpected byte)
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add_second_buffer, 2) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide too much plaintext/ciphertext */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                  data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                                  data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
+    // subtract 1 from configured msg length to provoke an overflow
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len - 1, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
+                mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete plaintext/ciphertext and finish */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                    data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                                    data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+    olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len - 1, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    output = NULL;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide full plaintext/ciphertext of first update
+ * Provide unexpected plaintext/ciphertext on second update */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                           data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                                           data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+    // pass full text
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+    // pass 1 extra byte
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
+                mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, 1, output, 1, &olen ) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete plaintext/ciphertext of first update
+ * Provide too much plaintext/ciphertext on second update */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                             data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+                                             data_t * add )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen;
+    uint8_t msg_second_buffer[2];
+
+    msg_second_buffer[0] = msg->x[ msg->len - 1 ];
+    msg_second_buffer[1] = 0xAB; // some magic value
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len + 1 );
+    // pass incomplete text
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len - 1, output, msg->len + 1, &olen ) );
+    // pass 2 extra bytes (1 missing byte from previous incomplete pass, and 1 unexpected byte)
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
+                mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg_second_buffer, 2, output +  msg->len - 1, 2, &olen ) );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Finish without passing any auth data or plaintext/ciphertext input */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                 data_t * key, data_t * iv )
+{
+    mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+    // use hardcoded values for add length, msg length and tag length.
+    // They are not a part of this test
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 16, 16, 16 ) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
index 4dbdd52..8c2ba3c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
@@ -790,6 +790,318 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
 enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
 
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:0:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:1:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:2:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:7:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:8:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:9:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:15:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:16:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:17:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:31:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:32:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:33:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:47:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:48:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:49:-1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+AES-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:0:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:1:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:2:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:7:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:8:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:9:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:15:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:16:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:17:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:31:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:32:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:33:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:47:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:48:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:49:-1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:0:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:1:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:2:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:7:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:8:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:9:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:15:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:16:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:17:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:31:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:32:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:33:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:47:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:48:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:49:-1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
 AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:16:-1
@@ -1798,6 +2110,150 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:1
 
+AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
+
+AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:1
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VPT AES-128 #15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"7301c907b9d2aaac355c5416ff25c59b":"7304b65b6dab466273862c88b9":"484300aa3a506afcd313b49ead8d":"928ca58b0d373dc50c52afac787c":0:0
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-128 #15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0:0
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VTT AES-192 #1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"11fd45743d946e6d37341fec49947e8c70482494a8f07fcc":"c6aeebcb146cfafaae66f78aab":"ee7e6075ba52846de5d6254959a18affc4faf59c8ef63489":"137d9da59baf5cbfd46620c5f298fc766de10ac68e774edf":0:0
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-192 #15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0:0
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VADT AES-256 #1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886df3ba3e6da3a1389":"72a60f345a1978fb40f28a2fa4":"30d56ff2a25b83fee791110fcaea48e41db7c7f098a81000":"55f068c0bbba8b598013dd1841fd740fda2902322148ab5e":0:0
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-256 #13
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0:0
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VPT AES-128 #15 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"7301c907b9d2aaac355c5416ff25c59b":"7304b65b6dab466273862c88b9":"484300aa3a506afcd313b49ead8d":"928ca58b0d373dc50c52afac787c":0:1
+
+AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-128 #15 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0:1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VTT AES-192 #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"11fd45743d946e6d37341fec49947e8c70482494a8f07fcc":"c6aeebcb146cfafaae66f78aab":"ee7e6075ba52846de5d6254959a18affc4faf59c8ef63489":"137d9da59baf5cbfd46620c5f298fc766de10ac68e774edf":0:1
+
+AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-192 #15 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0:1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt NIST VADT AES-256 #1 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886df3ba3e6da3a1389":"72a60f345a1978fb40f28a2fa4":"30d56ff2a25b83fee791110fcaea48e41db7c7f098a81000":"55f068c0bbba8b598013dd1841fd740fda2902322148ab5e":0:1
+
+AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt NIST DVPT AES-256 #13 PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0:1
+
 Cipher Corner Case behaviours
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 cipher_special_behaviours:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
index 2c50a21..c1e1990 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
@@ -1,3 +1,339 @@
 Aria CBC Decrypt empty buffer
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:0:0
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:0:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:1:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:2:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:7:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:8:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:9:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:15:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:16:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:17:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:31:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:32:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:33:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:47:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:48:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:49:-1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+ARIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:0:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:1:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:2:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:7:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:8:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:9:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:15:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:16:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:17:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:31:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:32:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:33:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:47:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:48:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:49:-1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:0:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:1:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:2:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:7:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:8:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:9:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:15:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:16:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:17:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:31:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:32:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:33:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:47:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:48:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:49:-1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"6781f39fdf8d1c44165fc40ee2fb11f1d6e2ddc8c6512b":0:0
+
+ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"6781f39fdf8d1c44165fc40ee2fb11f1d6e2ddc8c6512b":0:0
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"993df86214d98ae70582c784903702e349dd64ece488c2":0:0
+
+ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"993df86214d98ae70582c784903702e349dd64ece488c2":0:0
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"5fdd984a6aa77c1d9a204c08f28172c4b4528bee27c41f":0:0
+
+ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"5fdd984a6aa77c1d9a204c08f28172c4b4528bee27c41f":0:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
index 3e7bffa..31fe922 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
@@ -765,3 +765,339 @@
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
 enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:0:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:1:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:2:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:7:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:8:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:9:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:15:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:16:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:17:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:31:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:32:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:33:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:47:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:48:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG":128:49:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:0:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:1:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:2:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:7:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:8:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:9:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:15:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:16:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:17:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:31:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:32:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:33:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:47:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:48:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG":192:49:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:0:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:1:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:2:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:7:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:8:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:9:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:15:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:16:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:17:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:31:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:32:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:33:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:47:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:48:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:"CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG":256:49:-1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
+
+CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0D":0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0D":0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"c3ceaa2a68fb31d8347a83950f25f3a7956b8a284a5b35":0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"c3ceaa2a68fb31d8347a83950f25f3a7956b8a284a5b35":0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Encrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"933f749801d0e1262cd101831defd8366ab2a22e7c03cd":0:0
+
+CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"933f749801d0e1262cd101831defd8366ab2a22e7c03cd":0:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
index 674349f..e496856 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
@@ -13,6 +13,59 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT
 #endif
 
+/* Check the internal consistency of a cipher info structure, and
+ * check it against mbedtls_cipher_info_from_xxx(). */
+static int check_cipher_info( mbedtls_cipher_type_t type,
+                              const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info )
+{
+    size_t key_bitlen;
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( info != NULL );
+    TEST_EQUAL( type, mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type( info ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( type, info->type );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( type ) == info );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( info->mode, mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( info ) );
+
+    /* Insist that get_name() return the string from the structure and
+     * not a copy. A copy would have an unknown storage duration. */
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name( info ) == info->name );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( info->name ) == info );
+
+    key_bitlen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( info );
+    if( info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL )
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 0 );
+    else if( info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS )
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 256 ||
+                     key_bitlen == 384 ||
+                     key_bitlen == 512 );
+    }
+    else if( ! strncmp( info->name, "DES-EDE3-", 9 ) )
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 192 );
+    }
+    else if( ! strncmp( info->name, "DES-EDE-", 8 ) )
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 128 );
+    }
+    else if( ! strncmp( info->name, "DES-", 4 ) )
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 64 );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( key_bitlen == 128 ||
+                     key_bitlen == 192 ||
+                     key_bitlen == 256 );
+    }
+
+    return( 1 );
+
+exit:
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT)
 /* Helper for resetting key/direction
  *
@@ -81,7 +134,13 @@
     const int *cipher_type;
 
     for( cipher_type = mbedtls_cipher_list(); *cipher_type != 0; cipher_type++ )
-        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( *cipher_type ) != NULL );
+    {
+        const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info =
+            mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( *cipher_type );
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( *cipher_type );
+        if( ! check_cipher_info( *cipher_type, info ) )
+            goto exit;
+    }
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
@@ -284,7 +343,7 @@
 void enc_dec_buf( int cipher_id, char * cipher_string, int key_len,
                   int length_val, int pad_mode )
 {
-    size_t length = length_val, outlen, total_len, i, block_size;
+    size_t length = length_val, outlen, total_len, i, block_size, iv_len;
     unsigned char key[64];
     unsigned char iv[16];
     unsigned char ad[13];
@@ -309,6 +368,8 @@
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id );
     TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( cipher_string ) == cipher_info );
+    TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name( cipher_info ),
+                         cipher_string ) == 0 );
 
     /* Initialise enc and dec contexts */
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_dec, cipher_info ) );
@@ -340,8 +401,14 @@
     memset( decbuf, 0, sizeof( decbuf ) );
     memset( tag, 0, sizeof( tag ) );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, sizeof( iv ) ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, sizeof( iv ) ) );
+    if( NULL != strstr( cipher_info->name, "CCM*-NO-TAG") )
+        iv_len = 13; /* For CCM, IV length is expected to be between 7 and 13 bytes.
+                      * For CCM*-NO-TAG, IV length must be exactly 13 bytes long. */
+    else
+        iv_len = sizeof(iv);
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, iv_len ) );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) );
@@ -536,6 +603,7 @@
     size_t second_length = second_length_val;
     size_t length = first_length + second_length;
     size_t block_size;
+    size_t iv_len;
     unsigned char key[32];
     unsigned char iv[16];
 
@@ -580,8 +648,14 @@
     (void) pad_mode;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, 16 ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, 16 ) );
+    if( NULL != strstr( cipher_info->name, "CCM*-NO-TAG") )
+        iv_len = 13; /* For CCM, IV length is expected to be between 7 and 13 bytes.
+                      * For CCM*-NO-TAG, IV length must be exactly 13 bytes long. */
+    else
+        iv_len = sizeof(iv);
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, iv_len ) );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
index 5b24935..7256fb5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
     mbedtls_des_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
     mbedtls_des_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
     mbedtls_des_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result );
     if( cbc_result == 0 )
     {
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
     mbedtls_des_init( &ctx );
 
 
-    mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result );
     if( cbc_result == 0 )
     {
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@
 
 
     if( key_count == 2 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else if( key_count == 3 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else
         TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
 
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@
 
 
     if( key_count == 2 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else if( key_count == 3 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else
         TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
 
@@ -172,9 +172,9 @@
 
 
     if( key_count == 2 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else if( key_count == 3 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else
         TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
 
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@
 
 
     if( key_count == 2 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else if( key_count == 3 )
-        mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 );
     else
         TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data
index 3df31e5..ede6f24 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data
@@ -726,6 +726,10 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"d0194b6ee68f0ed8adc4b22ed15dbf14":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT
 
+AES-GCM, output buffer too small, NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+gcm_update_output_buffer_too_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"0dd358bc3f992f26e81e3a2f3aa2d517":"87cc4fd75788c9d5cc83bae5d764dd249d178ab23224049795d4288b5ed9ea3f317068a39a7574b300c8544226e87b08e008fbe241d094545c211d56ac44437d41491a438272738968c8d371aa7787b5f606c8549a9d868d8a71380e9657d3c0337979feb01de5991fc1470dfc59eb02511efbbff3fcb479a862ba3844a25aaa":"d8c750bb443ee1a169dfe97cfe4d855b"
+
 AES-GCM Selftest
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 gcm_selftest:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data
index d60c458..273642c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data
@@ -726,6 +726,9 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT:"d0194b6ee68f0ed8adc4b22ed15dbf14":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT
 
+AES-GCM, output buffer too small, NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #0
+gcm_update_output_buffer_too_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT:"ce0f8cfe9d64c4f4c045d11b97c2d918":"dfff250d380f363880963b42d6913c1ba11e8edf7c4ab8b76d79ccbaac628f548ee542f48728a9a2620a0d69339c8291e8d398440d740e310908cdee7c273cc91275ce7271ba12f69237998b07b789b3993aaac8dc4ec1914432a30f5172f79ea0539bd1f70b36d437e5170bc63039a5280816c05e1e41760b58e35696cebd55":"ad4c3627a494fc628316dc03faf81db8"
+
 AES-GCM Selftest
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 gcm_selftest:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
index c530e6b..5696679 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
@@ -431,6 +431,29 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void gcm_update_output_buffer_too_small( int cipher_id, int mode,
+                                         data_t * key_str, const data_t *input,
+                                         const data_t *iv )
+{
+    mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *output = NULL;
+    size_t olen = 0;
+    size_t output_len = input->len - 1;
+
+    mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_len );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, input->x, input->len, output, output_len, &olen ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 void gcm_selftest(  )
 {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function
index f429fc9..513b723 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function
@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE)
-#include <sys/fcntl.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #endif
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index e3e9a52..2c5537f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -2,25 +2,49 @@
 static_checks:
 
 PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes
-import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:8:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:8:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes, larger buffer
-import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:8:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:8:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export raw: 2 bytes, buffer too small
-import_export:"2a2b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:16:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+import_export:"2a2b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:16:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
 
 PSA import/export AES-128
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:128:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:128:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export AES-192
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:192:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:192:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export AES-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):8:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes, larger buffer, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):8:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export raw: 2 bytes, buffer too small, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"2a2b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):16:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+
+PSA import/export AES-128, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):128:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export AES-192, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):192:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export AES-256, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import: bad usage flag
 import_with_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0x40000000:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@@ -31,55 +55,107 @@
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (+1 byte)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2-1)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2+1)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: export buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (+1 byte)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2-1)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:609:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:609:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:610:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:610:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2+1)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:611:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:611:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: export buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: trailing garbage ignored
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:-1:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: good, 1024-bit, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (+1 byte), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2-1), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2+1), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: export buffer too small, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (+1 byte), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2-1), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:609:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:610:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2+1), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:611:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: export buffer too small, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: trailing garbage ignored, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:-1:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import RSA keypair: truncated
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
@@ -99,27 +175,51 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA public key: buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+
+PSA import/export-public RSA public key: good, 1024-bit, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+
+PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+
+PSA import/export-public RSA public key: buffer too small, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+
+PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: buffer too small, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: 1016-bit (good)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"30818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: 1016-bit (good)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA public key: 1016-bit (good), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"30818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: 1016-bit (good), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import RSA public key: 1022-bit (not supported)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -139,141 +239,269 @@
 
 PSA import/export EC secp224r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224
-import_export:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:224:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:224:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp224r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224
-import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7"
+import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp256r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-import_export:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp256r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"
+import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp384r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-import_export:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp384r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"
+import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp521r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521
-import_export:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp521r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521
-import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"
+import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool256r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256
-import_export:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool256r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256
-import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"
+import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool384r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384
-import_export:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool384r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384
-import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"
+import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool512r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512
-import_export:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:512:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:512:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool512r1: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512
-import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"
+import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"
 
 PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: good (already properly masked)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
-import_export:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: unmasked input (check export-import-export yields properly masked output)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
-import_export:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept unmasked input
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
-import_export_public_key:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
+import_export_public_key:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
 
 PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept masked input
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
-import_export_public_key:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
+import_export_public_key:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
 
 PSA import/export EC curve448 key pair: good (already properly masked, key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice))
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448
-import_export:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export EC curve448 key pair: unmasked input (check export-import-export yields properly masked output, key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice))
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448
-import_export:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import/export-public EC curve448: accept masked input (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448
-import_export_public_key:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
+import_export_public_key:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
 
 PSA import/export-public EC curve448: accept unmasked input (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448
-import_export_public_key:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
+import_export_public_key:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
 
 PSA import/export-public: cannot export-public a symmetric key
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export_public_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c"
+import_export_public_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp256r1 public key: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-import_export:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export EC secp521r1 public key: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521
-import_export:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpoolP256r1 public key: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256
-import_export:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export curve25519 public key: good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
-import_export:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export curve448 Public Key: good (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448
-import_export:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import/export AES key: policy forbids export
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:128:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:128:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
 
 PSA import/export HMAC key: policy forbids export
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):256:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:256:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (crypt)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (sign)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+
+PSA import/export EC secp224r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):224:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC secp224r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7"
+
+PSA import/export EC secp256r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC secp256r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"
+
+PSA import/export EC secp384r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC secp384r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"
+
+PSA import/export EC secp521r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC secp521r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"
+
+PSA import/export EC brainpool256r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY::PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC brainpool256r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"
+
+PSA import/export EC brainpool384r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC brainpool384r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"
+
+PSA import/export EC brainpool512r1 key pair: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):512:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export-public EC brainpool512r1: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"
+
+PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: good (already properly masked), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: unmasked input (check export-import-export yields properly masked output), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+
+PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept unmasked input, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
+
+PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept masked input, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"
+
+PSA import/export EC curve448 key pair: good (already properly masked, key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice)), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export EC curve448 key pair: unmasked input (check export-import-export yields properly masked output, key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice)), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+
+PSA import/export-public EC curve448: accept masked input (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"988f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a59872eb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
+
+PSA import/export-public EC curve448: accept unmasked input (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_SUCCESS:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0"
+
+PSA import/export-public: cannot export-public a symmetric key, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export_public_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c"
+
+PSA import/export EC secp256r1 public key: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export EC secp521r1 public key: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export EC brainpoolP256r1 public key: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export curve25519 public key: good, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
+PSA import/export curve448 Public Key: good (key from RFC 7748 6.2 Alice), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):448:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+
+PSA import/export AES key: policy forbids export, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):128:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+
+PSA import/export HMAC key: policy forbids export, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):256:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (crypt), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
+
+PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (sign), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
 
 # Test PEM import. Note that this is not a PSA feature, it's an Mbed TLS
 # extension which we may drop in the future.
 PSA import/export RSA public key: import PEM
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: import PEM
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
+import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
 PSA import: reject raw data key of length 0
 # The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED
@@ -418,111 +646,111 @@
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_HASH -> SIGN_HASH+MESSAGE
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_HASH -> VERIFY_HASH+MESSAGE
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_HASH -> {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE}
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE}
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_MESSAGE
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_MESSAGE
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_MESSAGE
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, neither sign nor verify
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, wrong algorithm
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, alg=0 in policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: MAC, ANY_HASH in policy is not meaningful
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 30):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 30):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length > min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 31):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 31):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length = min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 32):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 32):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length < min-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 33):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 33):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different hash base)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different algorithm)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy used as algorithm
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > exact-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = exact-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < exact-length policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 PSA key policy: cipher, encrypt | decrypt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
@@ -684,11 +912,19 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong algorithm family
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS std/any salt)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS any/std salt)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (RSA v15/PSS)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, wrong algorithm family
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, wrong alg family
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
@@ -724,39 +960,47 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:0
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, sign | verify
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, sign | verify
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wrong algorithm family
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS std/any salt)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
+
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS any/std salt)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
+
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (RSA v15/PSS)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, wrong algorithm family
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, wrong alg family
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, ECDSA SHA-256
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, ECDSA SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wrong hash algorithm
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong hash algorithm
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, alg=0 in policy
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, alg=0 in policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, sign but not verify
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, sign but not verify
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE
 
-PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, verify but not sign
+PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, verify but not sign
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
 
@@ -841,225 +1085,365 @@
 key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
 Copy key: raw, 1 byte
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2a":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2a":1:-1:-1:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0
 
 Copy key: AES, copy attributes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":1:-1:-1:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, same usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-EXPORT)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-COPY)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, 1 more usage flag
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, 2 more usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #2
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, same usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, extended usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, fewer usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, more usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #0
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in target
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source and target
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0
 
 Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH, extended usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+0
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=0+ECDH
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 Copy key: source=ECDSA(any)+ECDH, target=ECDSA(SHA256)+ECDH
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 Copy key: source=ECDH+ECDSA(any), target=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA256)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy key: raw, 1 byte, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2a":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0
+
+Copy key: AES, copy attributes, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, same usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-EXPORT), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-COPY), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, 1 more usage flag, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, 2 more usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #1, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #2, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, same usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, extended usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, fewer usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, more usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #0, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #1, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in target, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source and target, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0
+
+Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+
+Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH, extended usage flags, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+
+Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+0, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=0+ECDH, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH
+
+Copy key: source=ECDSA(any)+ECDH, target=ECDSA(SHA256)+ECDH, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+
+Copy key: source=ECDH+ECDSA(any), target=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA256), opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
 Copy fail: raw data, no COPY flag
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 Copy key: AES, no COPY flag
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 
 Copy fail: AES, incompatible target policy
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC extended usage flags
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
 
 Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length > min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
 
 Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length = min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
 
 Copy fail: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length < min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src > tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
 
 Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src = tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
 
 Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src < tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0
 
 Copy fail: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length > length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length = length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
 
 Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length < length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length > min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length = min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0
 
 Copy fail: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length < min-length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src > tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src = tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src < tgt
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+
+Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length = length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+
+Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length < length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length > min-length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length = min-length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src > tgt, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src = tgt, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION )::PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src < tgt, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
 
 Copy fail: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length > length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length = length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
 
 Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length < length
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length = length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0
+
+Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length < length, opaque
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0
 
 Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (source wildcard)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (target wildcard)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (source and target wildcard)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: RSA, ANY_HASH is not meaningful with OAEP
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: incorrect type in attributes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: incorrect size in attributes
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:42:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:42:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: source=ECDSA(SHA224)+ECDH, target=ECDSA(SHA256)+ECDH
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: source=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA224), target=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA256)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: AES, invalid persistent key identifier in attributes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Copy fail: AES, invalid lifetime (unknown location) in attributes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:1:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, 11):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+Copy fail: AES, copy to a readonly lifetime in attributes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
-copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:1:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, 11):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:1:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, 0 ):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+Copy fail: AES, across locations (unsupported) in attributes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST
+copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:1:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, 0):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
 Hash operation object initializers zero properly
 hash_operation_init:
@@ -1527,6 +1911,7 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_encrypt_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":""
 
@@ -1578,6 +1963,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
 cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"eda4011239bc3ac9"
 
+PSA symmetric encrypt validation: CCM*-no-tag, 15 bytes, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317"
+
 PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":0:0:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -1638,6 +2027,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
 cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"c78e2b38139610e3":8:8:0:"817ca7d69b80d86a":PSA_SUCCESS
 
+PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: CCM*-no-tag, AES, 24 bytes, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":10:10:14:"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":PSA_SUCCESS
+
 PSA cipher decrypt: without initialization
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"":"":"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -1670,6 +2063,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA symetric decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, input too short (15 bytes)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":""
@@ -1718,6 +2115,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
 cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"817ca7d69b80d86a":"c78e2b38139610e3"
 
+PSA symmetric decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, NIST DVPT AES-128 #15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
+
 PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":0:0:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -1778,6 +2179,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
 cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"817ca7d69b80d86a":8:8:0:"c78e2b38139610e3":PSA_SUCCESS
 
+PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: CCM*-no-tag, 24 bytes, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":10:10:14:"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":PSA_SUCCESS
+
 PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
@@ -1798,6 +2203,22 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
 
+PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, AES
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
+
+CCM*-no-tag encrypt, iv_length = 14, bad
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_encrypt_validate_iv_length:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":14:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+CCM*-no-tag encrypt, iv_length = 13, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_encrypt_validate_iv_length:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":13:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+CCM*-no-tag encrypt, iv_length = 12, bad
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+cipher_encrypt_validate_iv_length:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":12:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-ECB, 16+16 bytes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -2114,6 +2535,22 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 18 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid nonce length 6
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c090693056":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid nonce length 14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd97200":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM_8, invalid nonce length 6
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c090693056":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM_8, invalid nonce length 14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd97200":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt, AES-GCM, 19 bytes #1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":PSA_ALG_GCM:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"000102030405060708090A0B":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -2266,6 +2703,14 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 2 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, nonce=0 (bad)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, nonce=0 (bad), TAG=12
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, invalid tag length 18
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 18 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@@ -2370,6 +2815,18 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
 aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_SUCCESS
 
+PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=8, not supported)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"0700000040414243":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=11, too short)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"0700000040414243444546":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=13, too long)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"07000000404142434445464700":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: invalid algorithm (CTR)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
 aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CTR:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
@@ -2378,6 +2835,614 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
 aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:"":"":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":0:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":1:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013":0:"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #2 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013":1:"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=4
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":0:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=4 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":1:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":0:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":1:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":0:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=16 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":1:"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"ab2265b4c168955561f04315":"":"":0:"f149e2b5f0adaa9842ca5f45b768a8fc"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"ab2265b4c168955561f04315":"":"":1:"f149e2b5f0adaa9842ca5f45b768a8fc"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"41c5da8667ef725220ffe39ae0ac590ac9fca729ab60ada0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"05ad13a5e2c2ab667e1a6fbc":"8b5c124bef6e2f0fe4d8c95cd5fa4cf1":"":0:"204bdb1bd62154bf08922aaa54eed705"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"41c5da8667ef725220ffe39ae0ac590ac9fca729ab60ada0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"05ad13a5e2c2ab667e1a6fbc":"8b5c124bef6e2f0fe4d8c95cd5fa4cf1":"":1:"204bdb1bd62154bf08922aaa54eed705"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"093ef7551ebbff8eb0c0a8a4a62b198f0c2e838de10eeeee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"e656e93930ed5210ba3f0322":"3da22dacfd11b21b0a713157f60aec0cd22f1add":"":0:"1b2d2764573e20ae640bf29d48e5fe05"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"093ef7551ebbff8eb0c0a8a4a62b198f0c2e838de10eeeee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"e656e93930ed5210ba3f0322":"3da22dacfd11b21b0a713157f60aec0cd22f1add":"":1:"1b2d2764573e20ae640bf29d48e5fe05"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"31389612d244c9792a510eca3f9c94f9f48c97ed67ae965a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"df6b54ec8b58114df5b09279":"0863bec42ee93385efbec665adfc46dafcd793f29e859e3b531c15b168f1888dd13e905cd7d5bc03f9f1f6495717df62":"":0:"77e5682a49243d5b9016eb1adafa2d"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"31389612d244c9792a510eca3f9c94f9f48c97ed67ae965a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"df6b54ec8b58114df5b09279":"0863bec42ee93385efbec665adfc46dafcd793f29e859e3b531c15b168f1888dd13e905cd7d5bc03f9f1f6495717df62":"":1:"77e5682a49243d5b9016eb1adafa2d"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":0:"69482957e6be5c54882d00314e0259cf191e9f29bef63a26860c1e020a21137e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":1:"69482957e6be5c54882d00314e0259cf191e9f29bef63a26860c1e020a21137e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=8,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c50ac59e50556e47b834380018c0dc0380af9df3bf6714e6":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"f303bf4b6cfbba7104cd9436":"":"d3f3f57033df30c22860231334b099cb":0:"2269c72d77f2b6f9d57da1820ec5a5d3d62d4491e3e4e9e7"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=8, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c50ac59e50556e47b834380018c0dc0380af9df3bf6714e6":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"f303bf4b6cfbba7104cd9436":"":"d3f3f57033df30c22860231334b099cb":1:"2269c72d77f2b6f9d57da1820ec5a5d3d62d4491e3e4e9e7"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8ef391e4b7a2fe05b959be27823357080f963ed2f64b9e59":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0080052a2a5bb0e95222a419":"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":0:"88d674044031414af7ba9da8b89dd68e69897d99d8e1706f38c613896c18"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8ef391e4b7a2fe05b959be27823357080f963ed2f64b9e59":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0080052a2a5bb0e95222a419":"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":1:"88d674044031414af7ba9da8b89dd68e69897d99d8e1706f38c613896c18"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=4,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"1cb5a0db778d3eb430b2816ceef9e455f519a8977b074183":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"c1df5e9e2e3165c54242a306":"7134e5ddc396c2a8a7da23906c8f7b40":"636871d4c0aae3da7b55abd8b5f21297":0:"14eb02562aa1d963d0033626cdc8a5c8972f4bdf"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=4, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"1cb5a0db778d3eb430b2816ceef9e455f519a8977b074183":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"c1df5e9e2e3165c54242a306":"7134e5ddc396c2a8a7da23906c8f7b40":"636871d4c0aae3da7b55abd8b5f21297":1:"14eb02562aa1d963d0033626cdc8a5c8972f4bdf"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=13,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"45148f42669f8ab8fad689d9b9180e39d7ea8fc95696297e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"5afcb134acc78b4eb9d11e79":"aec409e5fd82e50b824ebc1f45e75188d80615c6":"3d952be11deb421b56e0ce9d7ce99553":0:"077c0d53869869e191df116fd7baa8a293d2b577a29b0953c91b5d3b9d"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=13, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"45148f42669f8ab8fad689d9b9180e39d7ea8fc95696297e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"5afcb134acc78b4eb9d11e79":"aec409e5fd82e50b824ebc1f45e75188d80615c6":"3d952be11deb421b56e0ce9d7ce99553":1:"077c0d53869869e191df116fd7baa8a293d2b577a29b0953c91b5d3b9d"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5255428457fe75e64447971ec5af0d13c5b60a07ee2d07b0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"40cb6ebafc202f82223db097":"b2da2bd05ab1f3e39613efc8d80c5d0f240ee08f6abad5791649e9c1d0f48fa3dc59c1e535d1db1a4d3fa2263f5a1117":"fdd8a462c86d4365c8bfee0e25fc8a62":0:"9ca4a6d08267038f6f7999c84105bb5eaf8f7b3b9310ec688e033088a03482"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5255428457fe75e64447971ec5af0d13c5b60a07ee2d07b0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"40cb6ebafc202f82223db097":"b2da2bd05ab1f3e39613efc8d80c5d0f240ee08f6abad5791649e9c1d0f48fa3dc59c1e535d1db1a4d3fa2263f5a1117":"fdd8a462c86d4365c8bfee0e25fc8a62":1:"9ca4a6d08267038f6f7999c84105bb5eaf8f7b3b9310ec688e033088a03482"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b52c505a37d78eda5dd34f20c22540ea1b58963cf8e5bf8ffa85f9f2492505b4":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"516c33929df5a3284ff463d7":"":"":0:"bdc1ac884d332457a1d2664f168c76f0"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b52c505a37d78eda5dd34f20c22540ea1b58963cf8e5bf8ffa85f9f2492505b4":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"516c33929df5a3284ff463d7":"":"":1:"bdc1ac884d332457a1d2664f168c76f0"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=12,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"98ebf7a58db8b8371d9069171190063cc1fdc1927e49a3385f890d41a838619c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"3e6db953bd4e641de644e50a":"":"":0:"2fb9c3e41fff24ef07437c47"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=12, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"98ebf7a58db8b8371d9069171190063cc1fdc1927e49a3385f890d41a838619c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"3e6db953bd4e641de644e50a":"":"":1:"2fb9c3e41fff24ef07437c47"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"886cff5f3e6b8d0e1ad0a38fcdb26de97e8acbe79f6bed66959a598fa5047d65":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"3a8efa1cd74bbab5448f9945":"519fee519d25c7a304d6c6aa1897ee1eb8c59655":"":0:"f6d47505ec96c98a42dc3ae719877b87"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"886cff5f3e6b8d0e1ad0a38fcdb26de97e8acbe79f6bed66959a598fa5047d65":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"3a8efa1cd74bbab5448f9945":"519fee519d25c7a304d6c6aa1897ee1eb8c59655":"":1:"f6d47505ec96c98a42dc3ae719877b87"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=13,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7c928738b89c3258b910ac31bc465338b2e133b143fd52d9c9859eb1d01f2a0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"a483a7e94fbb2d694d3c4a8d":"bdb613cd3c2f0edd37b3ed43041bacb949ee51fa":"":0:"5233f95bdcf5d666fb957acdcb"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=13, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7c928738b89c3258b910ac31bc465338b2e133b143fd52d9c9859eb1d01f2a0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"a483a7e94fbb2d694d3c4a8d":"bdb613cd3c2f0edd37b3ed43041bacb949ee51fa":"":1:"5233f95bdcf5d666fb957acdcb"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"16a5b58a1dbb273a8fc6a4af722d46dbb898dd86ab128cb93d8388a8647a80a3":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"59e0c40d6675923cf5e004d5":"5b4b4ffc9c66bd394abeed3f03b695b949b3b69a42198cc3bfad971174915df913b967ccf36ee1f001f54efbcd117b68":"":0:"d57e27914ecb4a764359d3c0f8d4d6"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"16a5b58a1dbb273a8fc6a4af722d46dbb898dd86ab128cb93d8388a8647a80a3":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"59e0c40d6675923cf5e004d5":"5b4b4ffc9c66bd394abeed3f03b695b949b3b69a42198cc3bfad971174915df913b967ccf36ee1f001f54efbcd117b68":"":1:"d57e27914ecb4a764359d3c0f8d4d6"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=4,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5dd13092dd695b90ab835ed6343031c4cdb710d32f4d3804d72b46d921fcfa18":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"1de4bd816c8ec6bffc1e6453":"1b63d6278702abacf8b6c2faf542a808659fd5da03cdc1061a8593ea8ce9fc8ff54ffef6ebf3e15f7a832b4ae750a6ce":"":0:"72901467"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=4, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5dd13092dd695b90ab835ed6343031c4cdb710d32f4d3804d72b46d921fcfa18":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"1de4bd816c8ec6bffc1e6453":"1b63d6278702abacf8b6c2faf542a808659fd5da03cdc1061a8593ea8ce9fc8ff54ffef6ebf3e15f7a832b4ae750a6ce":"":1:"72901467"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"ef9f9284cf599eac3b119905a7d18851e7e374cf63aea04358586b0f757670f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"b6ac8e4963f49207ffd6374c":"":"722ee47da4b77424733546c2d400c4e5":0:"1224dfefb72a20d49e09256908874979882eafea22adf8dbed06a2265f907b"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"ef9f9284cf599eac3b119905a7d18851e7e374cf63aea04358586b0f757670f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"b6ac8e4963f49207ffd6374c":"":"722ee47da4b77424733546c2d400c4e5":1:"1224dfefb72a20d49e09256908874979882eafea22adf8dbed06a2265f907b"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=12,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b33b0e4c5b9f7ef77cec1a29ed5844bda3853238bdf7766e7645029931f169f0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"f226d65e8654fdf5193ed721":"":"bcf48ddcfe9d011a1003973d68d2d78a":0:"d2eb20898a301b5d8e69e9926272021393af01abb6a970047a7fc010"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=12, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b33b0e4c5b9f7ef77cec1a29ed5844bda3853238bdf7766e7645029931f169f0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"f226d65e8654fdf5193ed721":"":"bcf48ddcfe9d011a1003973d68d2d78a":1:"d2eb20898a301b5d8e69e9926272021393af01abb6a970047a7fc010"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c6e126a65faec77ab62318e30d8a50c39a664670039a66ae5a6874201bc68f9f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0ba5193b2d3a8378d67163ce":"5844b289dc74327f9fd93f7aae1c3d39":"c37aada3d4408e880d47e41df77da9b9":0:"b5cd7563989b460a2fe187e90c41fc3179c73d0d1e3a4484909969de93b0"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c6e126a65faec77ab62318e30d8a50c39a664670039a66ae5a6874201bc68f9f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0ba5193b2d3a8378d67163ce":"5844b289dc74327f9fd93f7aae1c3d39":"c37aada3d4408e880d47e41df77da9b9":1:"b5cd7563989b460a2fe187e90c41fc3179c73d0d1e3a4484909969de93b0"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15,
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2e6942d537f1a98444c2f9dbdb5d8db42a503a00a17b57d516399569e044a703":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"7eb67721581ed52cfcfc2c4d":"a96cc73451502c7278b467ac85d5fc14fc1a2f51bc685645b173f0cd9af02d383095de063e6eaa50374ce9bc951e9e61":"e5f410fe939e79b7ad33fbd3aaf5856f":0:"727f5e19a5582e5782bbbe73517f0c04c492319abf12b03b380724ff1483a3"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15, (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2e6942d537f1a98444c2f9dbdb5d8db42a503a00a17b57d516399569e044a703":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"7eb67721581ed52cfcfc2c4d":"a96cc73451502c7278b467ac85d5fc14fc1a2f51bc685645b173f0cd9af02d383095de063e6eaa50374ce9bc951e9e61":"e5f410fe939e79b7ad33fbd3aaf5856f":1:"727f5e19a5582e5782bbbe73517f0c04c492319abf12b03b380724ff1483a3"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes #1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":0:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes #1 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":1:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes #2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56":0:"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes #2 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56":1:"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes, T = 4
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,4):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f":0:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes, T = 4 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,4):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f":1:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes, T = 15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a":0:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES - GCM, 144 bytes, T = 15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a":1:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes, T=16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":0:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes, T=16 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":1:"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"0e5d6e68f82f32bea3f0b69498c1a31ef6d955cd3d27a2a8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"caf72ee1e62e1001e8cfbc63":"":"db1a74ffb5f7de26f5742e0942b1b9cb":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"0e5d6e68f82f32bea3f0b69498c1a31ef6d955cd3d27a2a8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"caf72ee1e62e1001e8cfbc63":"":"db1a74ffb5f7de26f5742e0942b1b9cb":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e79fb7defce4f650402e6b521170686d3eb2a0b9514f3a64":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"40e0d2d836c0519e7042419b":"41c5b5d971c0723bc1b63a259fe7e06c2961de1241bc34c13965f43636e4da3da8c75ed5956abe3a42f3039af005925a":"434ff68f2436f48418fd69f52158":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e79fb7defce4f650402e6b521170686d3eb2a0b9514f3a64":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"40e0d2d836c0519e7042419b":"41c5b5d971c0723bc1b63a259fe7e06c2961de1241bc34c13965f43636e4da3da8c75ed5956abe3a42f3039af005925a":"434ff68f2436f48418fd69f52158":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e41d1f533d5b342ffe434b94b1372683bfd5d9d8cb79f9ee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"5fe11a596dfcd3a305c1d711":"":"1847f64fff986476d1d2f758692f856da4a0ff98c0c1101694c84fd86680c9":0:"b03c2c20f758a93a8d1220232ad87098"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e41d1f533d5b342ffe434b94b1372683bfd5d9d8cb79f9ee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"5fe11a596dfcd3a305c1d711":"":"1847f64fff986476d1d2f758692f856da4a0ff98c0c1101694c84fd86680c9":1:"b03c2c20f758a93a8d1220232ad87098"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8e7da473c057a2a4669a0d22bf9b7c9913fba48930ca0c9b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"f9ff8ef80d76c50f9ca0e9ff":"f141bae18a1b54f065554fd34aa02c91c90f505c":"5deb093b6e7c766a64bb9d5170af1ff8bf130b64eebdce06a9bdb2cf1da15a":0:"b22b2dcdcc18adc30d16297b84b459d8"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8e7da473c057a2a4669a0d22bf9b7c9913fba48930ca0c9b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"f9ff8ef80d76c50f9ca0e9ff":"f141bae18a1b54f065554fd34aa02c91c90f505c":"5deb093b6e7c766a64bb9d5170af1ff8bf130b64eebdce06a9bdb2cf1da15a":1:"b22b2dcdcc18adc30d16297b84b459d8"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=12
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"01bf150add51bb11623e3bfbebd62a7ea81c5b192b8eb6de":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"dfacbc6791b785d324c646b7":"e35412a625324257bef35399a7eacca34fec2d2d24166e6bb3e94d96f5c57599ded45e2a74503f07116caa1692398a07":"77579db3c6da769e17731faac4732d7cce65d960a49f94f6b583e54a":0:"7e5fd8b595ddc4753676107951d900e2"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=12 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"01bf150add51bb11623e3bfbebd62a7ea81c5b192b8eb6de":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"dfacbc6791b785d324c646b7":"e35412a625324257bef35399a7eacca34fec2d2d24166e6bb3e94d96f5c57599ded45e2a74503f07116caa1692398a07":"77579db3c6da769e17731faac4732d7cce65d960a49f94f6b583e54a":1:"7e5fd8b595ddc4753676107951d900e2"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=8
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"551266c4ed166fe1c43761927801ed50cb9c0b3864fc97df":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"e711afbeccd567f866340abb":"562d1697237ebc563941076d459727dfa094eb9ac00d30ed5836825d163dd27517c7660a01056b2d868c7fc5d0343830":"2b54cc27f6ee71882e8b1ead207d2b042d262e87eac97b58":0:"37245449db8f72b1ecdb420f629d3d80"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=8 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"551266c4ed166fe1c43761927801ed50cb9c0b3864fc97df":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"e711afbeccd567f866340abb":"562d1697237ebc563941076d459727dfa094eb9ac00d30ed5836825d163dd27517c7660a01056b2d868c7fc5d0343830":"2b54cc27f6ee71882e8b1ead207d2b042d262e87eac97b58":1:"37245449db8f72b1ecdb420f629d3d80"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"78fa4a2a5b5b1b1d9580ea527f2e1653e9336e15cc5462f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"98b774f7110e0bea624b487f":"":"a642aabed8b99e15e297ee705a40c3e2e506cb889727b327b7e044a8":0:"496909523f574b205d757659c5"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"78fa4a2a5b5b1b1d9580ea527f2e1653e9336e15cc5462f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"98b774f7110e0bea624b487f":"":"a642aabed8b99e15e297ee705a40c3e2e506cb889727b327b7e044a8":1:"496909523f574b205d757659c5"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=16, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"61f4c2e55d729c4657e503dfe2b604e2853675dbdeb0982a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"0c4d5548aa2d8d54964e1e63":"5affdf8886dabb14790aff3dbfcbdd80":"0d4eacc3db304f46cb7a9eba6ec105bf86d9dc0639b7cebbd5260f47":0:"b6e056de521a27266dffbc0d96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=16, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"61f4c2e55d729c4657e503dfe2b604e2853675dbdeb0982a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"0c4d5548aa2d8d54964e1e63":"5affdf8886dabb14790aff3dbfcbdd80":"0d4eacc3db304f46cb7a9eba6ec105bf86d9dc0639b7cebbd5260f47":1:"b6e056de521a27266dffbc0d96"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=13
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"73245c4f115a74fe71d6fefb9094c57c75f28033a3c7372b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"536a82485999b93b0bb7ef24":"64dcad870a42eeec0730fd7a7e4154638a85d739":"29333e87bfe65d0e37da2936f695824d4e3f37fab3b8e2b868f6":0:"f6d56f8c86f27d957fa63aea22"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=13 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"73245c4f115a74fe71d6fefb9094c57c75f28033a3c7372b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"536a82485999b93b0bb7ef24":"64dcad870a42eeec0730fd7a7e4154638a85d739":"29333e87bfe65d0e37da2936f695824d4e3f37fab3b8e2b868f6":1:"f6d56f8c86f27d957fa63aea22"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=48, TAG=4
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"9002e74638e09dd1f091439518e1460cdd5905bd9e1a37ae":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"76c81a95d24be5c8bac63b50":"aa3ae4531aaac8f3eb07f748712c55a680bc8df5cf845edc66d09049500b41688b8023f5746879b45bdd586af29c4ede":"31bf37acbc53ca3fdbc9e5eaaebbb85a7f":0:"bd94b34511bc65ae47684805cb"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=48, TAG=4 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"9002e74638e09dd1f091439518e1460cdd5905bd9e1a37ae":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"76c81a95d24be5c8bac63b50":"aa3ae4531aaac8f3eb07f748712c55a680bc8df5cf845edc66d09049500b41688b8023f5746879b45bdd586af29c4ede":"31bf37acbc53ca3fdbc9e5eaaebbb85a7f":1:"bd94b34511bc65ae47684805cb"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f5a2b27c74355872eb3ef6c5feafaa740e6ae990d9d48c3bd9bb8235e589f010":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"58d2240f580a31c1d24948e9":"":"15e051a5e4a5f5da6cea92e2ebee5bac":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f5a2b27c74355872eb3ef6c5feafaa740e6ae990d9d48c3bd9bb8235e589f010":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"58d2240f580a31c1d24948e9":"":"15e051a5e4a5f5da6cea92e2ebee5bac":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"3395a1485315c5b5e6353acb05ae9499c440a2e9f5c57494662f827235ea314c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"3b7e632571602456b49880f0":"f283f80226dacb69c8af089ec6b59e81":"84c8beff4b0d160ee68ac613097f51":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"3395a1485315c5b5e6353acb05ae9499c440a2e9f5c57494662f827235ea314c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"3b7e632571602456b49880f0":"f283f80226dacb69c8af089ec6b59e81":"84c8beff4b0d160ee68ac613097f51":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4dc46ca55c1c1fcb4720c274c0e675c2ac5bf93d8dd5e951ca9f6b61f884edc9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"6473ab77dc885127422f5594":"e2cf8172ab4cf77eba45cd2c8ff939b938080a90":"8d6351f18d873242204c20144e2b83":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4dc46ca55c1c1fcb4720c274c0e675c2ac5bf93d8dd5e951ca9f6b61f884edc9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"6473ab77dc885127422f5594":"e2cf8172ab4cf77eba45cd2c8ff939b938080a90":"8d6351f18d873242204c20144e2b83":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7f95798434f9a0fe6fd8acd30b8bad96dbdcfacee4594f01cbf26479be7d154":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"9ef5a77b02137b46e8461d09":"5595a16fa12d4dcdba6b128480dce2d39c1211c3fb6068cde6013f6a80dfcda5eb92af8879e40ee9c177fd0e446fc8ca":"3bfd3d99fe2063e8ef8255519fe0":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7f95798434f9a0fe6fd8acd30b8bad96dbdcfacee4594f01cbf26479be7d154":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"9ef5a77b02137b46e8461d09":"5595a16fa12d4dcdba6b128480dce2d39c1211c3fb6068cde6013f6a80dfcda5eb92af8879e40ee9c177fd0e446fc8ca":"3bfd3d99fe2063e8ef8255519fe0":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4c8ebfe1444ec1b2d503c6986659af2c94fafe945f72c1e8486a5acfedb8a0f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"473360e0ad24889959858995":"":"d2c78110ac7e8f107c0df0570bd7c90cc26a379b6d98ef2852ead8ce83a833a7":0:"7789b41cb3ee548814ca0b388c10b343"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4c8ebfe1444ec1b2d503c6986659af2c94fafe945f72c1e8486a5acfedb8a0f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"473360e0ad24889959858995":"":"d2c78110ac7e8f107c0df0570bd7c90cc26a379b6d98ef2852ead8ce83a833a7":1:"7789b41cb3ee548814ca0b388c10b343"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=4
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"57805f98aae1b8b64bb49756529ab8181b3ada674a90c55422e9eb26c48bcd7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"9735945d8ca161777206632a":"":"58375442ab1c0e6a8952c83d128d9fc5f45bb315":0:"4860116a6d2deb9bf794bfd6ac5bbbd6"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=4 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"57805f98aae1b8b64bb49756529ab8181b3ada674a90c55422e9eb26c48bcd7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"9735945d8ca161777206632a":"":"58375442ab1c0e6a8952c83d128d9fc5f45bb315":1:"4860116a6d2deb9bf794bfd6ac5bbbd6"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=8
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f913bb823a1d0c10b0b72d56866907b893f2266f15de1abc17f93600824db55a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"d4fe686a14592b6ca1bd6b42":"e35d880c1c53688eb83869de9dd8a473":"35af9b502ea6b56269f896bf98affdd59c2aa418b38bc7fd":0:"ff426dd751190ff826e8b4a0792d746e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=8 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f913bb823a1d0c10b0b72d56866907b893f2266f15de1abc17f93600824db55a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"d4fe686a14592b6ca1bd6b42":"e35d880c1c53688eb83869de9dd8a473":"35af9b502ea6b56269f896bf98affdd59c2aa418b38bc7fd":1:"ff426dd751190ff826e8b4a0792d746e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"74e9d9d7cd0728cea94e169af485f21f9d2447e022f16008f803dcf5c4f7cc0c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"ecba39edc96667da726122c0":"ae9ab021f86f5b81bb2e0fcbd4b855e1501e9f82":"e5745ce0e02dbba05363b548c3ac7047eacca7e61db6f72fc9b9e5bdb2bb":0:"0a0b284515694188b6b6c15bc8a09036"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=14 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"74e9d9d7cd0728cea94e169af485f21f9d2447e022f16008f803dcf5c4f7cc0c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"ecba39edc96667da726122c0":"ae9ab021f86f5b81bb2e0fcbd4b855e1501e9f82":"e5745ce0e02dbba05363b548c3ac7047eacca7e61db6f72fc9b9e5bdb2bb":1:"0a0b284515694188b6b6c15bc8a09036"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=14
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"60667fce64b8c7169ddf45f335e46951248f69abc4e0f4f292d0ffe3dfd5219f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"1057322a39f08ef761c3c8fc":"":"501b033c841acb430c52d88fe9cb44c751f2f1641d1e801a534ac8":0:"f386b28e7eb4c2fb8eb5dc66a2"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=14 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"60667fce64b8c7169ddf45f335e46951248f69abc4e0f4f292d0ffe3dfd5219f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"1057322a39f08ef761c3c8fc":"":"501b033c841acb430c52d88fe9cb44c751f2f1641d1e801a534ac8":1:"f386b28e7eb4c2fb8eb5dc66a2"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e67590da399cbcdcddcc56110562ade8665b50287a8ab38e8b9ee7520531b560":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"2c36ab6b686a66fba1805196":"823493d42f4f60b2d1433ad75eccaafd7e7c7d12":"cff6b6f03c67152f3ce1030653d9bd9a6559f5b04b48d77c2a1fc364":0:"da1c61fbfcdb73445ad4c7d889"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=15 (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e67590da399cbcdcddcc56110562ade8665b50287a8ab38e8b9ee7520531b560":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"2c36ab6b686a66fba1805196":"823493d42f4f60b2d1433ad75eccaafd7e7c7d12":"cff6b6f03c67152f3ce1030653d9bd9a6559f5b04b48d77c2a1fc364":1:"da1c61fbfcdb73445ad4c7d889"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC7539)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":0:"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC7539) (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":1:"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (zero-length input)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"":0:"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (zero-length input) (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"":1:"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 (RFC7539, good tag)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":0:"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 (RFC7539, good tag) (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":1:"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e"
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 (good tag, zero - length input)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":0:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 (good tag, zero - length input) (lengths set)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":1:""
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify, AES - GCM, invalid signature
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"12195120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f":"6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify, AES - GCM, T = 15 but passing 16 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c87281":"4365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify, AES - GCM, T = 15 but passing 14 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c87281":"4365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df34":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify, AES - GCM, T = 15 but passing 0 bytes (valid buffer)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c87281":"":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify, AES - GCM, T = 15 but passing 0 bytes (NULL buffer)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,15):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c87281":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify: AES - GCM, invalid tag length 0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,0):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify: AES - GCM, invalid tag length 2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,2):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd":"10b6":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart AEAD verify: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 (RFC7539, bad tag)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116":"1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600690":1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation, AES - GCM, NONCE = (Req 12 / Expect 12)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:12:12:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation, AES - GCM, NONCE = (Req 11 / Expect 0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:11:0:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation, AES - GCM, NONCE = (Req 0 / Expect 0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation, AES - GCM, NONCE = (Req 16 / Expect 12)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:16:12:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = (Req 12 / Expect 12)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:12:12:"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = (Req 11 / Expect 0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:11:0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = (Req 0 / Expect 0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA Multipart Nonce Generation: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = (Req 16 / Expect 12)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_generate_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:16:12:"":"":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM, NONCE = 0 (NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM, NONCE = 0 (Non-NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:-1:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM, NONCE = 16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:16:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM, NONCE = 20
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_GCM:20:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM_12, NONCE = 0 (NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,12):0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM_12, NONCE = 0 (Non-NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,12):-1:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM_12, NONCE = 16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,12):16:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce, AES - GCM_12, NONCE = 20
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,12):20:"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = 11
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:11:"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = 12
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:12:"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = 13
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:13:"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = 0 (NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA Multipart Set Nonce: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, NONCE = 0 (Non-NULL)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_set_nonce:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:-1:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD output buffer test: AES - GCM, IN = 16, BUF = 15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_update_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:15:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD output buffer test: AES - GCM, IN = 16, BUF = 0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_update_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD output buffer test: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 IN = 130, BUF = 129
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_update_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:129:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD output buffer test: ChaCha20 - Poly1305 IN = 130, BUF = 0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_update_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: AES - GCM, BUF = 8, TAG = 16
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:8:16:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: AES - GCM, BUF = 15, TAG = 20
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:15:20:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: AES - GCM, BUF = 15, TAG = 15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:15:15:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: AES - GCM, BUF = 15, TAG = 0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_GCM:15:0:"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, BUF = 0, TAG = 20
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:20:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, BUF = 0, TAG = 15
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:15:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD finish buffer test: ChaCha20 - Poly1305, BUF = 0, TAG = 0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:0:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA AEAD setup: invalid algorithm (CTR)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD setup: invalid algorithm (ChaCha20)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA AEAD setup: invalid algorithm (ChaCha20 - Poly1305 with short tag)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
+aead_multipart_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,12):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA Multipart State Checks, AES - GCM
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+aead_multipart_state_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":PSA_ALG_GCM:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"000102030405060708090A0B":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E"
+
 PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:128
@@ -2394,6 +3459,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):128
 
+PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PSS-any-salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):128
+
 PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1023 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1023:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:128
@@ -2410,6 +3479,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 import_and_exercise_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
+PSA import/exercise RSA keypair, PSS-any-salt-SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+import_and_exercise_key:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
 PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
@@ -2418,6 +3491,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
+PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PSS-any-salt-SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
 PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, ECDSA
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
@@ -2478,10 +3555,18 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA sign hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA sign hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA sign hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
@@ -2526,6 +3611,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
 
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, 32 bytes (hash size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
+
 PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
@@ -2582,18 +3671,86 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
 
-PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=0 (bad)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"1967ae568cc071dfebeeca76b11d40bd1ec5af241c50b3dcceff21f4536c0693a7179a8d5d163a7625fefd37c161127800edeebc24fa73ca772096827bd3f75e8ccf2c64f07b7171b5c99022a4d73b760f34a385ccff0bd5ed7997d2a29d2847acb0767f93a2a404bc046c97de66d95dc9f7646fdb216b627b2ea0de8afcefb7"
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=31 (bad)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"797914eadbbe8293a7b0fe29d2db9fb246b519128d46d3ec93142a1a08a2992ba5325ad9b5ce55344b37996dbb81eb89628263cae4e3fc0e947dec0b8b0c7b0ee94bca02dd287f9cc619e2d88fb2279fb2a8f8301271c58009bb1223f3cfa730cb852947685678cfdef2968c82a9b8bffd8c0d518476b1ea2a5ad6c100045d8e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=31
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"797914eadbbe8293a7b0fe29d2db9fb246b519128d46d3ec93142a1a08a2992ba5325ad9b5ce55344b37996dbb81eb89628263cae4e3fc0e947dec0b8b0c7b0ee94bca02dd287f9cc619e2d88fb2279fb2a8f8301271c58009bb1223f3cfa730cb852947685678cfdef2968c82a9b8bffd8c0d518476b1ea2a5ad6c100045d8e"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=32
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=32
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=94 (bad)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"44a09fa66f1b2e790474960e90517e418747cfcd18423dff957516a598569d74f26ef1eae4a200d12d801e16fc6fde375330c79c0d8430825e0a7f69c664faefccfa25e7fbfc68af02af0f67fe4c49f68f6abc68c8f66d3fd77fc838961f4415827340c66e39c79ed7dae0738c08ce8272aebe50c72e31994b9b6db640b51800":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=94
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"44a09fa66f1b2e790474960e90517e418747cfcd18423dff957516a598569d74f26ef1eae4a200d12d801e16fc6fde375330c79c0d8430825e0a7f69c664faefccfa25e7fbfc68af02af0f67fe4c49f68f6abc68c8f66d3fd77fc838961f4415827340c66e39c79ed7dae0738c08ce8272aebe50c72e31994b9b6db640b51800"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-512, slen=61 (bad)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"23f5b30c8d612d8f31206c177ac2023c4f44754d03c7ff67daff99f24fa369b3e5f7c15b228a4417a1ff1c93fb8d645d619c2f4f559ac6c7f7bac20ba9df32353d19941265a4e74261adaf45d48682c0bc86cea6128f11ad172ff461fb1d97bded615861843996e2a98e7b8313b695519d001ae35305d6cbf3c0ee6c7ab06d1a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=61
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"23f5b30c8d612d8f31206c177ac2023c4f44754d03c7ff67daff99f24fa369b3e5f7c15b228a4417a1ff1c93fb8d645d619c2f4f559ac6c7f7bac20ba9df32353d19941265a4e74261adaf45d48682c0bc86cea6128f11ad172ff461fb1d97bded615861843996e2a98e7b8313b695519d001ae35305d6cbf3c0ee6c7ab06d1a"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-512, slen=62
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"6b215d77cf88b2d08be53b4f3ac6e72ebfbf7e0dc6c1e77b238cfb661c247a011b8746709fbefe4bc05d37343391683e9489d720ecbb7df37f4e36967918958996939461703465c2014a4c12faf875f8def70070e55b765b165c7e9c6f2eb05c98351b1e82219c31a2fb3ddce05f8988f552ff92f0b3471f63c0e53824c550a4"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=62
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"6b215d77cf88b2d08be53b4f3ac6e72ebfbf7e0dc6c1e77b238cfb661c247a011b8746709fbefe4bc05d37343391683e9489d720ecbb7df37f4e36967918958996939461703465c2014a4c12faf875f8def70070e55b765b165c7e9c6f2eb05c98351b1e82219c31a2fb3ddce05f8988f552ff92f0b3471f63c0e53824c550a4"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-528 PSS SHA-512, slen=0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"304a024300e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"a14ad0fef77d36c28658a66129ee632e40e1032003eefe7fcda8e52b06675a051c80b2ca1cb99ed0762e90c9a48c434cd1063638eed7895a9c770e5435af750a1955"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-528 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"304a024300e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"a14ad0fef77d36c28658a66129ee632e40e1032003eefe7fcda8e52b06675a051c80b2ca1cb99ed0762e90c9a48c434cd1063638eed7895a9c770e5435af750a1955"
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-520 PSS SHA-512 (hash too large)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"3049024200d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead42":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA verify hash: RSA-520 PSS-any-salt SHA-512 (hash too large)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"3049024200d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead42":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
+PSA verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
 PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
@@ -2710,6 +3867,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
 
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
 PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 0 bytes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):""
@@ -2774,22 +3935,46 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
 
-PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 0 bytes
+PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=0 (bad)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"50c06249deb97228e277b51d3e3542a6e5c140d6f6d1cb8a3dff53b5ce6e6fcb39d0767703174135208adf5d75399dd7525702b275153e7605ec38b65d33337bb9bbeb8c392ee22e3e9c0dafa43074a8205e17df2106bedd7bf6f1ada702aeb2ce04864c0ca9ec31964f9a957d8ebb9abc82454ad37c541e9b4d9842436c14a4"
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=0
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=32
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=32
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df"
 
 PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d"
 
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d"
+
 PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 128 bytes (signature size)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5"
 
+PSA verify message: RSA-any-salt PSS SHA-256, good signature, 128 bytes (signature size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5"
+
 PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"43286cc0fc599603fbb0cd1fd70c3a17b08d2adf4f90202dddfa4b9d74be8c720bbb1c714665466de6452d401ca061b68225785ff387c2615f03c81351cc3838cd3014a031a4f4c9f70bba06f504c6a9942ac2dbfed2329e590d526a9be26b4025a6d7c4151b4e795cfe756c9a8a5e8fa9228a6f5f6f427a5a070e5c0ea69830"
 
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"43286cc0fc599603fbb0cd1fd70c3a17b08d2adf4f90202dddfa4b9d74be8c720bbb1c714665466de6452d401ca061b68225785ff387c2615f03c81351cc3838cd3014a031a4f4c9f70bba06f504c6a9942ac2dbfed2329e590d526a9be26b4025a6d7c4151b4e795cfe756c9a8a5e8fa9228a6f5f6f427a5a070e5c0ea69830"
+
 PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b"
@@ -3077,7 +4262,7 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
 # Whether we get NOT_PERMITTED or BAD_STATE for the output is an implementation
 # detail.
-derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, direct secret, direct output
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
@@ -3410,19 +4595,19 @@
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, request maximum capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * 32:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":""
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":""
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, request maximum capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":255 * 20:"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":""
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":""
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, request too much capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):255 * 32 + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, request too much capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * 20 + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
@@ -3442,19 +4627,19 @@
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * 32 - 1
+derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * 32
+derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
-derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * 32 - 1
+derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1
 
 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
-derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * 32
+derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
 PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
@@ -3693,7 +4878,7 @@
 
 PSA generate key: bad type (RSA public key)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY
-generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0
+generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0
 
 PSA generate key: raw data, 0 bits: invalid argument
 # The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED
@@ -3756,6 +4941,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C
 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0
 
+PSA generate key: RSA, 1024 bits, good, sign (PSS-any-salt SHA-256)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0
+
 PSA generate key: RSA, 512 bits, good, encrypt (PKCS#1 v1.5)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_SUCCESS:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 150a3f4..d28de0c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
 #include "test/asn1_helpers.h"
 #include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h"
 #include "test/psa_exercise_key.h"
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h"
+#define TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION
+#else
+#define TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION 0x7fffff
+#endif
 
 /* If this comes up, it's a bug in the test code or in the test data. */
 #define UNUSED 0xdeadbeef
@@ -272,6 +278,316 @@
     DERIVE_KEY = 2
 } generate_method;
 
+typedef enum
+{
+    DO_NOT_SET_LENGTHS = 0,
+    SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE = 1,
+    SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE = 2
+} set_lengths_method_t;
+
+typedef enum
+{
+    USE_NULL_TAG = 0,
+    USE_GIVEN_TAG = 1,
+} tag_usage_method_t;
+
+/*!
+ * \brief                           Internal Function for AEAD multipart tests.
+ * \param key_type_arg              Type of key passed in
+ * \param key_data                  The encryption / decryption key data
+ * \param alg_arg                   The type of algorithm used
+ * \param nonce                     Nonce data
+ * \param additional_data           Additional data
+ * \param ad_part_len_arg           If not -1, the length of chunks to
+ *                                  feed additional data in to be encrypted /
+ *                                  decrypted. If -1, no chunking.
+ * \param input_data                Data to encrypt / decrypt
+ * \param data_part_len_arg         If not -1, the length of chunks to feed
+ *                                  the data in to be encrypted / decrypted. If
+ *                                  -1, no chunking
+ * \param set_lengths_method        A member of the set_lengths_method_t enum is
+ *                                  expected here, this controls whether or not
+ *                                  to set lengths, and in what order with
+ *                                  respect to set nonce.
+ * \param expected_output           Expected output
+ * \param is_encrypt                If non-zero this is an encryption operation.
+ * \param do_zero_parts             If non-zero, interleave zero length chunks
+ *                                  with normal length chunks.
+ * \return int                      Zero on failure, non-zero on success.
+ */
+static int aead_multipart_internal_func( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                                         int alg_arg,
+                                         data_t *nonce,
+                                         data_t *additional_data,
+                                         int ad_part_len_arg,
+                                         data_t *input_data,
+                                         int data_part_len_arg,
+                                         set_lengths_method_t set_lengths_method,
+                                         data_t *expected_output,
+                                         int is_encrypt,
+                                         int do_zero_parts )
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    unsigned char *output_data = NULL;
+    unsigned char *part_data = NULL;
+    unsigned char *final_data = NULL;
+    size_t data_true_size = 0;
+    size_t part_data_size = 0;
+    size_t output_size = 0;
+    size_t final_output_size = 0;
+    size_t output_length = 0;
+    size_t key_bits = 0;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+    size_t part_offset = 0;
+    size_t part_length = 0;
+    size_t output_part_length = 0;
+    size_t tag_size = 0;
+    size_t ad_part_len = 0;
+    size_t data_part_len = 0;
+    uint8_t tag_buffer[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+
+    int test_ok = 0;
+    size_t part_count = 0;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+        psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT  );
+    else
+        psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT  );
+
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+    key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+    tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+    {
+        /* Tag gets written at end of buffer. */
+        output_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                   ( input_data->len +
+                                                    tag_length ) );
+        data_true_size = input_data->len;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        output_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                   ( input_data->len -
+                                                    tag_length ) );
+
+        /* Do not want to attempt to decrypt tag. */
+        data_true_size = input_data->len - tag_length;
+    }
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size );
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+    {
+        final_output_size = PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+        TEST_ASSERT( final_output_size <= PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        final_output_size = PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+        TEST_ASSERT( final_output_size <= PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    }
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( final_data, final_output_size );
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+        status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+    else
+        status = psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    if( set_lengths_method ==  DO_NOT_SET_LENGTHS )
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+    else if( set_lengths_method == SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE )
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                          data_true_size ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+    }
+    else if( set_lengths_method ==  SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE )
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                          data_true_size ) );
+    }
+
+    if( ad_part_len_arg != -1 )
+    {
+        /* Pass additional data in parts */
+        ad_part_len = (size_t) ad_part_len_arg;
+
+        for( part_offset = 0, part_count = 0;
+             part_offset < additional_data->len;
+             part_offset += part_length, part_count++ )
+        {
+            if( do_zero_parts && ( part_count & 0x01 ) )
+            {
+                part_length = 0;
+            }
+            else if( additional_data->len - part_offset < ad_part_len )
+            {
+                part_length = additional_data->len - part_offset;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                part_length = ad_part_len;
+            }
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation,
+                                            additional_data->x + part_offset,
+                                            part_length ) );
+
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* Pass additional data in one go. */
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                        additional_data->len ) );
+    }
+
+    if( data_part_len_arg != -1 )
+    {
+        /* Pass data in parts */
+        data_part_len = ( size_t ) data_part_len_arg;
+        part_data_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                      ( size_t ) data_part_len );
+
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( part_data, part_data_size );
+
+        for( part_offset = 0, part_count = 0;
+             part_offset < data_true_size;
+             part_offset += part_length, part_count++ )
+        {
+            if( do_zero_parts && ( part_count & 0x01 ) )
+            {
+                part_length = 0;
+            }
+            else if( ( data_true_size - part_offset ) < data_part_len )
+            {
+                part_length = ( data_true_size - part_offset );
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                part_length = data_part_len;
+            }
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation,
+                                         ( input_data->x + part_offset ),
+                                         part_length, part_data,
+                                         part_data_size,
+                                         &output_part_length ) );
+
+            if( output_data && output_part_length )
+            {
+                memcpy( ( output_data + part_offset ), part_data,
+                        output_part_length );
+            }
+
+            output_length += output_part_length;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* Pass all data in one go. */
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                     data_true_size, output_data,
+                                     output_size, &output_length ) );
+    }
+
+    if( is_encrypt )
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                     final_output_size,
+                                     &output_part_length,
+                                     tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                     &tag_size ) );
+    else
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+                                     final_output_size,
+                                     &output_part_length,
+                                     ( input_data->x + data_true_size ),
+                                     tag_length ) );
+    }
+
+    if( output_data && output_part_length )
+        memcpy( ( output_data + output_length ), final_data,
+                output_part_length );
+
+    output_length += output_part_length;
+
+
+    /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_xxx_OUTPUT_SIZE
+     * should be exact.*/
+    if( is_encrypt )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( tag_length, tag_size );
+
+        if( output_data && tag_length )
+            memcpy( ( output_data + output_length ), tag_buffer,
+                    tag_length );
+
+        output_length += tag_length;
+
+        TEST_EQUAL( output_length,
+                      PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                    input_data->len ) );
+        TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+                      PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+       TEST_EQUAL( output_length,
+                      PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                    input_data->len ) );
+       TEST_ASSERT( output_length <=
+                      PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) );
+    }
+
+
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len,
+                    output_data, output_length );
+
+
+    test_ok = 1;
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    mbedtls_free( output_data );
+    mbedtls_free( part_data );
+    mbedtls_free( final_data );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+
+    return( test_ok );
+}
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -484,6 +800,7 @@
 void import_export( data_t *data,
                     int type_arg,
                     int usage_arg, int alg_arg,
+                    int lifetime_arg,
                     int expected_bits,
                     int export_size_delta,
                     int expected_export_status_arg,
@@ -494,6 +811,7 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
     psa_status_t expected_export_status = expected_export_status_arg;
     psa_status_t status;
+    psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg;
     unsigned char *exported = NULL;
     unsigned char *reexported = NULL;
     size_t export_size;
@@ -508,6 +826,7 @@
         ASSERT_ALLOC( reexported, export_size );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
 
+    psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime );
     psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_arg );
     psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
     psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type );
@@ -543,8 +862,11 @@
      * this validates the canonical representations. For canonical inputs,
      * this doesn't directly validate the implementation, but it still helps
      * by cross-validating the test data with the sanity check code. */
-    if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage_arg, 0 ) )
-        goto exit;
+    if( !psa_key_lifetime_is_external( lifetime ) )
+    {
+        if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage_arg, 0 ) )
+            goto exit;
+    }
 
     if( canonical_input )
         ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x, data->len, exported, exported_length );
@@ -558,12 +880,12 @@
                                     export_size,
                                     &reexported_length ) );
         ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length,
-                        reexported, reexported_length );
+                         reexported, reexported_length );
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key2 ) );
     }
     TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <=
-                 PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type,
-                                             psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ) );
+             PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type,
+                                         psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE );
 
 destroy:
@@ -577,7 +899,7 @@
      * thus reset them as required.
      */
     psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes );
-
+    psa_destroy_key( key ) ;
     mbedtls_free( exported );
     mbedtls_free( reexported );
     PSA_DONE( );
@@ -588,6 +910,7 @@
 void import_export_public_key( data_t *data,
                                int type_arg,
                                int alg_arg,
+                               int lifetime_arg,
                                int export_size_delta,
                                int expected_export_status_arg,
                                data_t *expected_public_key )
@@ -597,6 +920,7 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
     psa_status_t expected_export_status = expected_export_status_arg;
     psa_status_t status;
+    psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg;
     unsigned char *exported = NULL;
     size_t export_size = expected_public_key->len + export_size_delta;
     size_t exported_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH;
@@ -604,6 +928,7 @@
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
 
+    psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime );
     psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT );
     psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
     psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type );
@@ -632,7 +957,6 @@
         ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_public_key->x, expected_public_key->len,
                         exported, exported_length );
     }
-
 exit:
     /*
      * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes()
@@ -792,7 +1116,8 @@
                      int key_type_arg,
                      data_t *key_data,
                      int exercise_alg_arg,
-                     int expected_status_arg )
+                     int expected_status_sign_arg,
+                     int expected_status_verify_arg )
 {
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
@@ -802,7 +1127,8 @@
     psa_algorithm_t exercise_alg = exercise_alg_arg;
     psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg;
     psa_status_t status;
-    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_status_sign = expected_status_sign_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_status_verify = expected_status_verify_arg;
     unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -818,19 +1144,30 @@
                 mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) );
 
     status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg );
-    if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) == 0 )
-        TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_sign );
+
+    /* Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. */
+    uint8_t input[128] = {0};
+    size_t mac_len;
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_compute( key, exercise_alg,
+                                 input, 128,
+                                 mac, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, &mac_len ),
+                expected_status_sign );
+
+    /* Verify correct MAC, one-shot case. */
+    status = psa_mac_verify( key, exercise_alg, input, 128,
+                                mac, mac_len );
+
+    if( expected_status_sign != PSA_SUCCESS && expected_status_verify == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
     else
-        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_verify );
 
     psa_mac_abort( &operation );
 
     memset( mac, 0, sizeof( mac ) );
     status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg );
-    if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) == 0 )
-        TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
-    else
-        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_verify );
 
 exit:
     psa_mac_abort( &operation );
@@ -1085,7 +1422,7 @@
     else
         TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
 
-    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( exercise_alg ) &&
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( exercise_alg ) &&
         PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( exercise_alg ) ) )
     {
         status = psa_sign_message( key, exercise_alg,
@@ -1281,10 +1618,12 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void copy_success( int source_usage_arg,
                    int source_alg_arg, int source_alg2_arg,
+                   unsigned int source_lifetime_arg,
                    int type_arg, data_t *material,
                    int copy_attributes,
                    int target_usage_arg,
                    int target_alg_arg, int target_alg2_arg,
+                   unsigned int target_lifetime_arg,
                    int expected_usage_arg,
                    int expected_alg_arg, int expected_alg2_arg )
 {
@@ -1293,6 +1632,8 @@
     psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg;
     psa_algorithm_t expected_alg = expected_alg_arg;
     psa_algorithm_t expected_alg2 = expected_alg2_arg;
+    psa_key_lifetime_t source_lifetime = source_lifetime_arg;
+    psa_key_lifetime_t target_lifetime = target_lifetime_arg;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     uint8_t *export_buffer = NULL;
@@ -1304,6 +1645,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg_arg );
     psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg2_arg );
     psa_set_key_type( &source_attributes, type_arg );
+    psa_set_key_lifetime( &source_attributes, source_lifetime);
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &source_attributes,
                                 material->x, material->len,
                                 &source_key ) );
@@ -1313,9 +1655,8 @@
     if( copy_attributes )
     {
         target_attributes = source_attributes;
-        /* Set volatile lifetime to reset the key identifier to 0. */
-        psa_set_key_lifetime( &target_attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE );
     }
+    psa_set_key_lifetime( &target_attributes, target_lifetime);
 
     if( target_usage_arg != -1 )
         psa_set_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes, target_usage_arg );
@@ -1324,6 +1665,7 @@
     if( target_alg2_arg != -1 )
         psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg2_arg );
 
+
     /* Copy the key. */
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_copy_key( source_key,
                               &target_attributes, &target_key ) );
@@ -1351,10 +1693,13 @@
                         export_buffer, length );
     }
 
-    if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg ) )
-        goto exit;
-    if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg2 ) )
-        goto exit;
+    if( !psa_key_lifetime_is_external( target_lifetime ) )
+    {
+        if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg ) )
+            goto exit;
+        if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg2 ) )
+            goto exit;
+    }
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( target_key ) );
 
@@ -1374,6 +1719,7 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void copy_fail( int source_usage_arg,
                 int source_alg_arg, int source_alg2_arg,
+                int source_lifetime_arg,
                 int type_arg, data_t *material,
                 int target_type_arg, int target_bits_arg,
                 int target_usage_arg,
@@ -1394,6 +1740,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg_arg );
     psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg2_arg );
     psa_set_key_type( &source_attributes, type_arg );
+    psa_set_key_lifetime( &source_attributes, source_lifetime_arg );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &source_attributes,
                                 material->x, material->len,
                                 &source_key ) );
@@ -2517,6 +2864,40 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
+void cipher_encrypt_validate_iv_length( int alg, int key_type, data_t* key_data,
+                               data_t *input, int iv_length,
+                               int expected_result )
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    size_t output_buffer_size = 0;
+    unsigned char *output = NULL;
+
+    output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected_result, psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, output,
+                                                    iv_length ) );
+
+exit:
+    psa_cipher_abort( &operation );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
 void cipher_encrypt_alg_without_iv( int alg_arg,
                                     int key_type_arg,
                                     data_t *key_data,
@@ -3437,6 +3818,1209 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_encrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                             int alg_arg,
+                             data_t *nonce,
+                             data_t *additional_data,
+                             data_t *input_data,
+                             int do_set_lengths,
+                             data_t *expected_output )
+{
+    size_t ad_part_len = 0;
+    size_t data_part_len = 0;
+    set_lengths_method_t set_lengths_method = DO_NOT_SET_LENGTHS;
+
+    for( ad_part_len = 1; ad_part_len <= additional_data->len; ad_part_len++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( ad_part_len );
+
+        if( do_set_lengths )
+        {
+            if( ad_part_len & 0x01 )
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE;
+            else
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE;
+        }
+
+        /* Split ad into length(ad_part_len) parts. */
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data,
+                                           ad_part_len,
+                                           input_data, -1,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           1, 0 ) )
+            break;
+
+        /* length(0) part, length(ad_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000 + ad_part_len );
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data,
+                                           ad_part_len,
+                                           input_data, -1,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           1, 1 ) )
+            break;
+    }
+
+    for( data_part_len = 1; data_part_len <= input_data->len; data_part_len++ )
+    {
+        /* Split data into length(data_part_len) parts. */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 2000 + data_part_len );
+
+        if( do_set_lengths )
+        {
+            if( data_part_len & 0x01 )
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE;
+            else
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE;
+        }
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data, -1,
+                                           input_data, data_part_len,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           1, 0 ) )
+            break;
+
+        /* length(0) part, length(data_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 3000 + data_part_len );
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data, -1,
+                                           input_data, data_part_len,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           1, 1 ) )
+            break;
+    }
+
+    /* Goto is required to silence warnings about unused labels, as we
+     * don't actually do any test assertions in this function. */
+    goto exit;
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                             int alg_arg,
+                             data_t *nonce,
+                             data_t *additional_data,
+                             data_t *input_data,
+                             int do_set_lengths,
+                             data_t *expected_output )
+{
+    size_t ad_part_len = 0;
+    size_t data_part_len = 0;
+    set_lengths_method_t set_lengths_method = DO_NOT_SET_LENGTHS;
+
+    for( ad_part_len = 1; ad_part_len <= additional_data->len; ad_part_len++ )
+    {
+        /* Split ad into length(ad_part_len) parts. */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( ad_part_len );
+
+        if( do_set_lengths )
+        {
+            if( ad_part_len & 0x01 )
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE;
+            else
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE;
+        }
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data,
+                                           ad_part_len,
+                                           input_data, -1,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           0, 0 ) )
+            break;
+
+        /* length(0) part, length(ad_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000 + ad_part_len );
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data,
+                                           ad_part_len,
+                                           input_data, -1,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           0, 1 ) )
+            break;
+    }
+
+    for( data_part_len = 1; data_part_len <= input_data->len; data_part_len++ )
+    {
+        /* Split data into length(data_part_len) parts. */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 2000 + data_part_len );
+
+        if( do_set_lengths )
+        {
+            if( data_part_len & 0x01 )
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_AFTER_NONCE;
+            else
+                set_lengths_method = SET_LENGTHS_BEFORE_NONCE;
+        }
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data, -1,
+                                           input_data, data_part_len,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           0, 0 ) )
+            break;
+
+        /* length(0) part, length(data_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 3000 + data_part_len );
+
+        if( !aead_multipart_internal_func( key_type_arg, key_data,
+                                           alg_arg, nonce,
+                                           additional_data, -1,
+                                           input_data, data_part_len,
+                                           set_lengths_method,
+                                           expected_output,
+                                           0, 1 ) )
+            break;
+    }
+
+    /* Goto is required to silence warnings about unused labels, as we
+     * don't actually do any test assertions in this function. */
+    goto exit;
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_generate_nonce( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                                    int alg_arg,
+                                    int nonce_length,
+                                    int expected_nonce_length_arg,
+                                    data_t *additional_data,
+                                    data_t *input_data,
+                                    int expected_status_arg )
+{
+
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    uint8_t nonce_buffer[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE];
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    size_t actual_nonce_length = 0;
+    size_t expected_nonce_length = expected_nonce_length_arg;
+    unsigned char *output = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL;
+    size_t output_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_length = 0;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+    uint8_t tag_buffer[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( & attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT  );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( & attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( & attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+    output_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
+
+    ciphertext_size = PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( ciphertext_size <= PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( ciphertext, ciphertext_size );
+
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce_length );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    status = psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                      nonce_length,
+                                      &actual_nonce_length );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( actual_nonce_length, expected_nonce_length );
+
+    if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        TEST_EQUAL( actual_nonce_length, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH( key_type,
+                                                                alg ) );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( actual_nonce_length < PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+
+        /* Ensure we can still complete operation. */
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                        additional_data->len ) );
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x, input_data->len,
+                                     output, output_size,
+                                     &ciphertext_length ) );
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_finish( &operation, ciphertext, ciphertext_size,
+                                     &ciphertext_length, tag_buffer,
+                                     PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE, &tag_length ) );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_free( ciphertext );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_set_nonce( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                               int alg_arg,
+                               int nonce_length_arg,
+                               data_t *additional_data,
+                               data_t *input_data,
+                               int expected_status_arg )
+{
+
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    uint8_t *nonce_buffer = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    unsigned char *output = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL;
+    size_t nonce_length;
+    size_t output_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_length = 0;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+    uint8_t tag_buffer[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t index = 0;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT  );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+    output_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
+
+    ciphertext_size = PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( ciphertext_size <= PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( ciphertext, ciphertext_size );
+
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce_length_arg );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    /* -1 == zero length and valid buffer, 0 = zero length and NULL buffer. */
+    if( nonce_length_arg == -1 )
+    {
+         /* Arbitrary size buffer, to test zero length valid buffer. */
+         ASSERT_ALLOC( nonce_buffer, 4 );
+         nonce_length = 0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* If length is zero, then this will return NULL. */
+        nonce_length = ( size_t ) nonce_length_arg;
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( nonce_buffer, nonce_length );
+
+        if( nonce_buffer )
+        {
+            for( index = 0; index < nonce_length - 1; ++index )
+            {
+                nonce_buffer[index] = 'a' + index;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    status = psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer, nonce_length );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+    if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        /* Ensure we can still complete operation. */
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                        additional_data->len ) );
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x, input_data->len,
+                                     output, output_size,
+                                     &ciphertext_length ) );
+
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_finish( &operation, ciphertext, ciphertext_size,
+                                     &ciphertext_length, tag_buffer,
+                                     PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE, &tag_length ) );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_free( ciphertext );
+    mbedtls_free( nonce_buffer );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_update_buffer_test( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                                       int alg_arg,
+                                       int output_size_arg,
+                                       data_t *nonce,
+                                       data_t *additional_data,
+                                       data_t *input_data,
+                                       int expected_status_arg )
+{
+
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    unsigned char *output = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL;
+    size_t output_size = output_size_arg;
+    size_t ciphertext_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_length = 0;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+    uint8_t tag_buffer[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT  );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size );
+
+    ciphertext_size = PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( ciphertext, ciphertext_size );
+
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    status = psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x, input_data->len,
+                              output, output_size, &ciphertext_length );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+    if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        /* Ensure we can still complete operation. */
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_finish( &operation, ciphertext, ciphertext_size,
+                                     &ciphertext_length, tag_buffer,
+                                     PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE, &tag_length ) );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    mbedtls_free( output );
+    mbedtls_free( ciphertext );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_finish_buffer_test( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                                        int alg_arg,
+                                        int finish_ciphertext_size_arg,
+                                        int tag_size_arg,
+                                        data_t *nonce,
+                                        data_t *additional_data,
+                                        data_t *input_data,
+                                        int expected_status_arg )
+{
+
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL;
+    unsigned char *finish_ciphertext = NULL;
+    unsigned char *tag_buffer = NULL;
+    size_t ciphertext_size = 0;
+    size_t ciphertext_length = 0;
+    size_t finish_ciphertext_size = ( size_t ) finish_ciphertext_size_arg;
+    size_t tag_size = ( size_t ) tag_size_arg;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT  );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+    ciphertext_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( ciphertext, ciphertext_size );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( finish_ciphertext, finish_ciphertext_size );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buffer, tag_size );
+
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x, input_data->len,
+                              ciphertext, ciphertext_size, &ciphertext_length ) );
+
+    /* Ensure we can still complete operation. */
+    status = psa_aead_finish( &operation, finish_ciphertext,
+                              finish_ciphertext_size,
+                              &ciphertext_length, tag_buffer,
+                              tag_size, &tag_length );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    mbedtls_free( ciphertext );
+    mbedtls_free( finish_ciphertext );
+    mbedtls_free( tag_buffer );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_verify( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                            int alg_arg,
+                            data_t *nonce,
+                            data_t *additional_data,
+                            data_t *input_data,
+                            data_t *tag,
+                            int tag_usage_arg,
+                            int expected_status_arg )
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    unsigned char *plaintext = NULL;
+    unsigned char *finish_plaintext = NULL;
+    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
+    size_t plaintext_length = 0;
+    size_t verify_plaintext_size = 0;
+    tag_usage_method_t tag_usage = tag_usage_arg;
+    unsigned char *tag_buffer = NULL;
+    size_t tag_size = 0;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT  );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+    plaintext_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+                                                  input_data->len );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( plaintext, plaintext_size );
+
+    verify_plaintext_size = PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( finish_plaintext, verify_plaintext_size );
+
+    status = psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+     * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+     * an alternative implementation. */
+    if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+        MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len,
+                                 plaintext, plaintext_size,
+                                 &plaintext_length ) );
+
+    if( tag_usage == USE_GIVEN_TAG )
+    {
+        tag_buffer = tag->x;
+        tag_size = tag->len;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_aead_verify( &operation, finish_plaintext,
+                              verify_plaintext_size,
+                              &plaintext_length,
+                              tag_buffer, tag_size );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    mbedtls_free( plaintext );
+    mbedtls_free( finish_plaintext );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_setup( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                           int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg )
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes,
+                             PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    status = psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    status = psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(status, expected_status );
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_state_test( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+                                int alg_arg,
+                                data_t *nonce,
+                                data_t *additional_data,
+                                data_t *input_data )
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    unsigned char *output_data = NULL;
+    unsigned char *final_data = NULL;
+    size_t output_size = 0;
+    size_t finish_output_size = 0;
+    size_t output_length = 0;
+    size_t key_bits = 0;
+    size_t tag_length = 0;
+    size_t tag_size = 0;
+    size_t nonce_length = 0;
+    uint8_t nonce_buffer[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE];
+    uint8_t tag_buffer[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t output_part_length = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( & attributes,
+                             PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( & attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( & attributes, key_type );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+                                &key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+    key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+    tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( tag_length <= PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    output_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size );
+
+    finish_output_size = PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( finish_output_size <= PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( final_data, finish_output_size );
+
+    /* Test all operations error without calling setup first. */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                 &tag_size ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer,
+                                 tag_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for double setups. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for not setting a nonce. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                 &tag_size ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer,
+                                 tag_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for double setting nonce. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for double generating nonce. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for generate nonce then set and vice versa */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for generating nonce in decrypt setup. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_generate_nonce( &operation, nonce_buffer,
+                                         PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE,
+                                         &nonce_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for setting lengths twice. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for setting lengths after already starting data. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for not sending any additional data or data after setting non zero
+     * lengths for them. (encrypt) */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                 &tag_size ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for not sending any additional data or data after setting non-zero
+     * lengths for them. (decrypt) */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer,
+                                 tag_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for not sending any additional data after setting a non-zero length
+     * for it. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for not sending any data after setting a non-zero length for it.*/
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                 &tag_size ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for sending too much additional data after setting lengths. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, 0, 0 ) );
+
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    1 ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test for sending too much data after setting lengths. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, 0, 0 ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation, additional_data->len,
+                                      input_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 1, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test sending additional data after data. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+                                 input_data->len, output_data,
+                                 output_size, &output_length ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+                                    additional_data->len ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test calling finish on decryption. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_finish( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer, tag_length,
+                                 &tag_size ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+    /* Test calling verify on encryption. */
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+                                 finish_output_size,
+                                 &output_part_length,
+                                 tag_buffer,
+                                 tag_length ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    mbedtls_free( output_data );
+    mbedtls_free( final_data );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
 void signature_size( int type_arg,
                      int bits,
                      int alg_arg,
@@ -4350,7 +5934,7 @@
     if( output_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE )
     {
         psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
-        psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA );
+        psa_set_key_type( &attributes, output_key_type );
         psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 8 );
         actual_output_status =
             psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
index 6d78ad5..bc6ff34 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@
                                input_data->x, input_data->len,
                                output_data, output_size,
                                &output_length );
-    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_encrypt, 1 );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status, forced_status );
 
     TEST_EQUAL( status, ( forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) ?
@@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@
                                input_data->x, input_data->len,
                                output_data, output_size,
                                &output_length );
-    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits_decrypt, 1 );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status, forced_status );
 
     TEST_EQUAL( status, ( forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) ?
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbe9a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h"
+
+#define INVALID_KEY_ID mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, 0xfedcba98 )
+
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
+ * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ * END_DEPENDENCIES
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void generate_key( int key_type_arg, int bits_arg, int expected_status_arg)
+{
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = INVALID_KEY_ID;
+
+    // key lifetiem, usage flags, algorithm are irrelevant for this test
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+    size_t bits = bits_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+    psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key_id ),
+                expected_status );
+
+    // Verify attributes of the created key on success
+    if ( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), key_type );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+    psa_destroy_key( key_id );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
index a3668fc..83763c5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
@@ -130,6 +130,18 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM
 aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256
 
+AEAD: CCM-ARIA-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128
+
+AEAD: CCM-ARIA-192
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192
+
+AEAD: CCM-ARIA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256
+
 AEAD: CCM-CAMELLIA-128
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM
 aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128
@@ -154,6 +166,18 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
 aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256
 
+AEAD: GCM-ARIA-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128
+
+AEAD: GCM-ARIA-192
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192
+
+AEAD: GCM-ARIA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
+aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256
+
 AEAD: GCM-CAMELLIA-128
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM
 aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128
@@ -172,27 +196,31 @@
 
 Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH
 
 Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+
+Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: randomized ECDSA (no hashing)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH
 
 Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + randomized ECDSA
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + deterministic ECDSA using SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA | ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA | ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: pure EdDSA
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA
@@ -200,11 +228,11 @@
 
 Asymmetric signature: Ed25519ph
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: Ed448ph
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA
-asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
+asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN
 
 Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with wildcard hash
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
@@ -212,7 +240,11 @@
 
 Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS with wildcard hash
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS
-asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS
+asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT
+
+Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS-any-salt with wildcard hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS
+asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT
 
 Asymmetric signature: randomized ECDSA with wildcard hash
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
@@ -295,6 +327,10 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:16
 
+Block cipher key type: ARIA
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
+block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:16
+
 Block cipher key type: DES
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
 block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:8
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
index 9f4fc75..092780c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
@@ -22,25 +22,29 @@
 #define ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER            ( 1u << 3 )
 #define ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN        ( 1u << 4 )
 #define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS                  ( 1u << 5 )
-#define ALG_IS_DSA                      ( 1u << 6 )
-#define ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC        ( 1u << 7 )
-#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA        ( 1u << 8 )
-#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA           ( 1u << 9 )
-#define ALG_IS_ECDSA                    ( 1u << 10 )
-#define ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC      ( 1u << 11 )
-#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA      ( 1u << 12 )
-#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA         ( 1u << 13 )
-#define ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA               ( 1u << 14 )
-#define ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN            ( 1u << 15 )
-#define ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP                 ( 1u << 16 )
-#define ALG_IS_HKDF                     ( 1u << 17 )
-#define ALG_IS_FFDH                     ( 1u << 18 )
-#define ALG_IS_ECDH                     ( 1u << 19 )
-#define ALG_IS_WILDCARD                 ( 1u << 20 )
-#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT        ( 1u << 21 )
-#define ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER     ( 1u << 22 )
-#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF                ( 1u << 23 )
-#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS          ( 1u << 24 )
+#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT         ( 1u << 6 )
+#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT    ( 1u << 7 )
+#define ALG_IS_DSA                      ( 1u << 8 )
+#define ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC        ( 1u << 9 )
+#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA        ( 1u << 10 )
+#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA           ( 1u << 11 )
+#define ALG_IS_ECDSA                    ( 1u << 12 )
+#define ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC      ( 1u << 13 )
+#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA      ( 1u << 14 )
+#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA         ( 1u << 15 )
+#define ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA               ( 1u << 16 )
+#define ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH                ( 1u << 17 )
+#define ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN            ( 1u << 18 )
+#define ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP                 ( 1u << 19 )
+#define ALG_IS_HKDF                     ( 1u << 20 )
+#define ALG_IS_FFDH                     ( 1u << 21 )
+#define ALG_IS_ECDH                     ( 1u << 22 )
+#define ALG_IS_WILDCARD                 ( 1u << 23 )
+#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT        ( 1u << 24 )
+#define ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER     ( 1u << 25 )
+#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF                ( 1u << 26 )
+#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS          ( 1u << 27 )
+#define ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE          ( 1u << 28 ) /* must be last! */
 
 /* Flags for key type classification macros. There is a flag for every
  * key type classification macro PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx except for some that
@@ -49,26 +53,43 @@
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED      ( 1u << 0 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED        ( 1u << 1 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY          ( 1u << 2 )
-#define KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR             ( 1u << 3 )
+#define KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR            ( 1u << 3 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA                 ( 1u << 4 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA                 ( 1u << 5 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC                 ( 1u << 6 )
 #define KEY_TYPE_IS_DH                  ( 1u << 7 )
+#define KEY_TYPE_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE     ( 1u << 8 ) /* must be last! */
 
 /* Flags for lifetime classification macros. There is a flag for every
  * lifetime classification macro PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_xxx. The name of the
  * flag is the name of the classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */
 #define KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE        ( 1u << 0 )
 #define KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY       ( 1u << 1 )
+#define KEY_LIFETIME_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 2 ) /* must be last! */
 
-#define TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( flag, alg, flags ) \
-    do                                                \
-    {                                                 \
-        if( ( flags ) & ( flag ) )                    \
-            TEST_ASSERT( PSA_##flag( alg ) );         \
-        else                                          \
-            TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_##flag( alg ) );       \
-    }                                                 \
+/* Check that in the value of flags, the bit flag (which should be a macro
+ * expanding to a number of the form 1 << k) is set if and only if
+ * PSA_##flag(alg) is true.
+ *
+ * Only perform this check if cond is true. Typically cond is 1, but it can
+ * be different if the value of the flag bit is only specified under specific
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * Unconditionally mask flag into the ambient variable
+ * classification_flags_tested.
+ */
+#define TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( cond, flag, alg, flags )     \
+    do                                                          \
+    {                                                           \
+        if( cond )                                              \
+        {                                                       \
+            if( ( flags ) & ( flag ) )                          \
+                TEST_ASSERT( PSA_##flag( alg ) );               \
+            else                                                \
+                TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_##flag( alg ) );             \
+        }                                                       \
+        classification_flags_tested |= ( flag );                \
+    }                                                           \
     while( 0 )
 
 /* Check the parity of value.
@@ -95,44 +116,55 @@
 
 void algorithm_classification( psa_algorithm_t alg, unsigned flags )
 {
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HMAC, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_PSS, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DSA, alg, flags );
-    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_DSA( alg ) )
-        TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_ECDSA, alg, flags );
-    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
-        TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_WILDCARD, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_ECDH, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_FFDH, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT, alg, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER, alg, flags );
+    unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0;
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HMAC, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( PSA_ALG_IS_DSA( alg ),
+                               ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_ECDSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ),
+                               ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_WILDCARD, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_ECDH, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_FFDH, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS, alg, flags );
+    TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested, ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 );
 exit: ;
 }
 
 void key_type_classification( psa_key_type_t type, unsigned flags )
 {
+    unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0;
+
     /* Macros tested based on the test case parameter */
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC, type, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_DH, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC, type, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_DH, type, flags );
+    TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested, KEY_TYPE_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 );
 
     /* Macros with derived semantics */
     TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ),
@@ -351,6 +383,7 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( hash_alg ) );
     TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ), alg );
 
+    TEST_ASSERT( block_size == PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( block_size <= PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE );
 
     test_mac_algorithm( alg_arg, ALG_IS_HMAC, length,
@@ -487,7 +520,9 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void asymmetric_signature_wildcard( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
 {
-    classification_flags |= ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN | ALG_IS_WILDCARD;
+    classification_flags |= ALG_IS_WILDCARD;
+    classification_flags |= ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH;
+    classification_flags |= ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN;
     test_asymmetric_signature_algorithm( alg_arg, classification_flags );
     /* Any failure of this test function comes from
      * asymmetric_signature_algorithm. Pacify -Werror=unused-label. */
@@ -691,9 +726,12 @@
     psa_key_persistence_t persistence = persistence_arg;
     psa_key_location_t location = location_arg;
     unsigned flags = classification_flags;
+    unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0;
 
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE, lifetime, flags );
-    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY, lifetime, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE, lifetime, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY, lifetime, flags );
+    TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested,
+                KEY_LIFETIME_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 );
 
     TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE( lifetime ), persistence );
     TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ), location );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
index a57e9b3..2bcf4e4 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
@@ -78,6 +78,21 @@
 Key import smoke test: AES-GCM
 import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_GCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
 
+Key import smoke test: ARIA-CTR
+import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CTR:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+Key import smoke test: ARIA-CBC
+import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+Key import smoke test: ARIA-CMAC
+import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+Key import smoke test: ARIA-CCM
+import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+Key import smoke test: ARIA-GCM
+import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_GCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
 Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-CTR
 import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_CTR:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
index 68b196d..1477734 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@
 create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 Open not supported
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
+depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS
 open_fail:1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
 Create not supported
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index 25eefb3..9dabb51 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -6229,3 +6229,9 @@
 # we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384
 Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large
 ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48
+
+Test configuration of groups for DHE through mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
+conf_curve:
+
+Test configuration of groups for DHE through mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups()
+conf_group:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 69d2e00..ee36a66 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <psa/crypto.h>
 
-#include <ssl_invasive.h>
+#include <constant_time_internal.h>
 
 #include <test/constant_flow.h>
 
@@ -2236,8 +2236,8 @@
 void ssl_mock_sanity( )
 {
     enum { MSGLEN = 105 };
-    unsigned char message[MSGLEN];
-    unsigned char received[MSGLEN];
+    unsigned char message[MSGLEN] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char received[MSGLEN] = { 0 };
     mbedtls_mock_socket socket;
 
     mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket );
@@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@
 void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
 {
     /*
-     * Test the function mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac() against a reference
+     * Test the function mbedtls_ct_hmac() against a reference
      * implementation.
      */
     mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
@@ -4712,10 +4712,10 @@
 
             /* Get the function's result */
             TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
-                                                data, in_len,
-                                                min_in_len, max_in_len,
-                                                out ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+                                            data, in_len,
+                                            min_in_len, max_in_len,
+                                            out ) );
             TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
             TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
 
@@ -4762,8 +4762,8 @@
         mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret );
 
         TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
-        mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
-                                      offset_min, offset_max, len );
+        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
+                                  offset_min, offset_max, len );
         TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
         TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );
 
@@ -4881,3 +4881,72 @@
 
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+void conf_curve()
+{
+
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[] = { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1,
+                                          MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1,
+                                          MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+                                          MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE };
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id iana_tls_group_list[] = { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE };
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &conf, 3, 3 );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, 3, 3 );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
+    mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( ssl.handshake != NULL && ssl.handshake->group_list != NULL );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ssl.conf != NULL && ssl.conf->group_list == NULL );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( ssl.handshake->group_list[ARRAY_LENGTH( iana_tls_group_list ) - 1], MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE );
+
+    for( size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( iana_tls_group_list ); i++ )
+        TEST_EQUAL( iana_tls_group_list[i], ssl.handshake->group_list[i] );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+void conf_group()
+{
+    uint16_t iana_tls_group_list[] = { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1,
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1,
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE };
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &conf, 3, 3 );
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, 3, 3 );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups( &conf, iana_tls_group_list );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
+    mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( ssl.conf != NULL && ssl.conf->group_list != NULL );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( ssl.conf->group_list[ARRAY_LENGTH( iana_tls_group_list ) - 1], MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE );
+
+    for( size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( iana_tls_group_list ); i++ )
+         TEST_EQUAL( iana_tls_group_list[i], ssl.conf->group_list[i] );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */