Rename function to have suitable name
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 3643326..d15bc1a 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
*
* \return The selected sign value.
*/
-static int mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second )
+static int mbedtls_cf_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second )
{
/* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonnably assume about
* the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned
@@ -304,10 +304,10 @@
* dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
* assign must be 0 or 1.
*/
-static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n,
- mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
- const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
- unsigned char assign )
+void mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
+ unsigned char assign )
{
size_t i;
@@ -360,9 +360,9 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
- X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign );
+ X->s = mbedtls_cf_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign );
- mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
+ mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask;
@@ -409,8 +409,8 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) );
s = X->s;
- X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap );
- Y->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap );
+ X->s = mbedtls_cf_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap );
+ Y->s = mbedtls_cf_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap );
for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ )
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@
*
* \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, 0 otherwise
*/
-static unsigned ct_lt_mpi_uint( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
+static unsigned mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint y )
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint ret;
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@
* Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
* the fact that we are done and continue looping.
*/
- cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
+ cond = mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
*ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative;
done |= cond;
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@
* Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
* the fact that we are done and continue looping.
*/
- cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
+ cond = mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
*ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative );
done |= cond;
}
@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@
* so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction
* which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d.
* This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */
- mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
+ mbedtls_cf_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
}
/*
@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
{
/* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
const size_t diff = x ^ y;
@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@
for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i],
- (unsigned char) mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
+ (unsigned char) mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
}
cleanup:
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 268d025..02b40d0 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@
* \param value The value to analyze.
* \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
*/
-static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
+static unsigned mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( unsigned value )
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
@@ -1523,7 +1523,7 @@
* \return \c 0 if `size <= max`.
* \return \c 1 if `size > max`.
*/
-static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
+static unsigned mbedtls_cf_size_gt( size_t size, size_t max )
{
/* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
@@ -1539,16 +1539,17 @@
* \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero.
* \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
*/
-static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
+static unsigned mbedtls_cf_uint_if( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
{
- unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
+ unsigned mask = mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( cond );
return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
}
/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
* the length of the data through side channels.
*
- * `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to
+ * `mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally
+ * equivalent to
* ```
* memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
* memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
@@ -1561,9 +1562,9 @@
* \param total Total size of the buffer.
* \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
*/
-static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
- size_t total,
- size_t offset )
+static void mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( void *start,
+ size_t total,
+ size_t offset )
{
volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
size_t i, n;
@@ -1571,7 +1572,7 @@
return;
for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
{
- unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
+ unsigned no_op = mbedtls_cf_size_gt( total - offset, i );
/* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
* `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
* zero out the last byte. */
@@ -1579,9 +1580,9 @@
{
unsigned char current = buf[n];
unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
- buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
+ buf[n] = mbedtls_cf_uint_if( no_op, current, next );
}
- buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
+ buf[total-1] = mbedtls_cf_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
}
}
@@ -1669,17 +1670,17 @@
* If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
- pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 );
- pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
- bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
+ pad_done |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( buf[i], 0, 1 );
+ pad_count += mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+ bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
}
}
/* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
- bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+ bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
/* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
- bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
+ bad |= mbedtls_cf_size_gt( 8, pad_count );
/* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
* remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
@@ -1688,23 +1689,25 @@
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_cf_uint_if(
+ bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
/* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
* buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
- output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
- plaintext_max_size );
+ output_too_large = mbedtls_cf_size_gt( plaintext_size,
+ plaintext_max_size );
/* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
* - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
- ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
- if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
- 0 ) );
+ ret = - (int) mbedtls_cf_uint_if(
+ bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+ mbedtls_cf_uint_if( output_too_large,
+ - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
+ 0 ) );
/* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
* data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
@@ -1712,7 +1715,7 @@
* from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
* avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
- bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
+ bad = mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large );
for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
buf[i] &= ~bad;
@@ -1720,9 +1723,9 @@
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) plaintext_size );
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_cf_uint_if( output_too_large,
+ (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned) plaintext_size );
/* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
* the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
@@ -1730,9 +1733,9 @@
* does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
* starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
* information. */
- mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
+ mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+ plaintext_max_size,
+ plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
* buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
diff --git a/library/ssl_invasive.h b/library/ssl_invasive.h
index babbc27..5cb29cb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_invasive.h
+++ b/library/ssl_invasive.h
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
* \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
* The hardware accelerator failed.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
+int mbedtls_cf_hmac(
mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
@@ -90,11 +90,11 @@
* \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset_secret.
* \param len The number of bytes to copy.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
- size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
- size_t len );
+void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src_base,
+ size_t offset_secret,
+ size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 7da5674..916456f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
+static size_t mbedtls_cf_size_mask( size_t bit )
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_cf_size_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
{
/* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
const size_t sub = x - y;
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@
const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
/* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_cf_size_mask( sub1 );
return( mask );
}
@@ -1105,9 +1105,9 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_cf_size_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
{
- return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) );
+ return( ~mbedtls_cf_size_mask_lt( x, y ) );
}
/*
@@ -1116,12 +1116,12 @@
*
* This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
* with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
+ * mbedtls_cf_size_mask().
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
{
/* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
const size_t diff = x ^ y;
@@ -1155,14 +1155,14 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src,
- size_t len,
- size_t c1, size_t c2 )
+static void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t c1, size_t c2 )
{
/* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
- const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
+ const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_cf_size_mask( equal );
/* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
@@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@
* Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
* (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
*/
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_cf_hmac(
mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
@@ -1231,8 +1231,8 @@
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
/* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
- offset, data_len_secret );
+ mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
+ offset, data_len_secret );
if( offset < max_data_len )
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@
* - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
* - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
*/
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset(
unsigned char *dst,
const unsigned char *src_base,
size_t offset_secret,
@@ -1273,8 +1273,8 @@
for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
{
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
- offset, offset_secret );
+ mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
+ offset, offset_secret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@
if( auth_done == 1 )
{
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_cf_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@
}
#endif
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_cf_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1696,18 +1696,18 @@
/* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
* (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
*/
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
- padlen - 1 );
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_cf_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( check[idx],
+ padlen - 1 );
pad_count += mask & equal;
}
- correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
+ correct &= mbedtls_cf_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
#endif
- padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
+ padlen &= mbedtls_cf_size_mask( correct );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@@ -1791,20 +1791,20 @@
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
- mac_expect );
+ ret = mbedtls_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+ add_data, add_data_len,
+ data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
+ mac_expect );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
return( ret );
}
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
- rec->data_len,
- min_len, max_len,
- transform->maclen );
+ mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
+ rec->data_len,
+ min_len, max_len,
+ transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 3eeea44..83a5e2c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -4428,7 +4428,7 @@
void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
{
/*
- * Test the function mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac() against a reference
+ * Test the function mbedtls_cf_hmac() against a reference
* implementation.
*/
mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
@@ -4487,10 +4487,10 @@
/* Get the function's result */
TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
- TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
- data, in_len,
- min_in_len, max_in_len,
- out ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_cf_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+ data, in_len,
+ min_in_len, max_in_len,
+ out ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
@@ -4537,8 +4537,8 @@
mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret );
TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
- offset_min, offset_max, len );
+ mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
+ offset_min, offset_max, len );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );