OID functionality moved to a separate module.
A new OID module has been created that contains the main OID searching
functionality based on type-dependent arrays. A base type is used to
contain the basic values (oid_descriptor_t) and that type is extended to
contain type specific information (like a pk_alg_t).
As a result the rsa sign and verify function prototypes have changed. They
now expect a md_type_t identifier instead of the removed RSA_SIG_XXX
defines.
All OID definitions have been moved to oid.h
All OID matching code is in the OID module.
The RSA PKCS#1 functions cleaned up as a result and adapted to use the
MD layer.
The SSL layer cleanup up as a result and adapted to use the MD layer.
The X509 parser cleaned up and matches OIDs in certificates with new
module and adapted to use the MD layer.
The X509 writer cleaned up and adapted to use the MD layer.
Apps and tests modified accordingly
diff --git a/library/x509parse.c b/library/x509parse.c
index bac0e93..3e99bdc 100644
--- a/library/x509parse.c
+++ b/library/x509parse.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include "polarssl/x509.h"
#include "polarssl/asn1.h"
+#include "polarssl/oid.h"
#include "polarssl/pem.h"
#include "polarssl/des.h"
#if defined(POLARSSL_MD2_C)
@@ -438,9 +439,10 @@
x509_buf *pk_alg_oid,
mpi *N, mpi *E )
{
- int ret, can_handle;
+ int ret;
size_t len;
unsigned char *end2;
+ pk_type_t pk_alg = POLARSSL_PK_NONE;
if( ( ret = x509_get_alg( p, end, pk_alg_oid ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -448,27 +450,7 @@
/*
* only RSA public keys handled at this time
*/
- can_handle = 0;
-
- if( pk_alg_oid->len == 9 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid->p, OID_PKCS1_RSA, 9 ) == 0 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if( pk_alg_oid->len == 9 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid->p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) == 0 )
- {
- if( pk_alg_oid->p[8] >= 2 && pk_alg_oid->p[8] <= 5 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if ( pk_alg_oid->p[8] >= 11 && pk_alg_oid->p[8] <= 14 )
- can_handle = 1;
- }
-
- if( pk_alg_oid->len == 5 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid->p, OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, 5 ) == 0 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if( can_handle == 0 )
+ if( oid_get_pk_alg( pk_alg_oid, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG );
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 )
@@ -936,6 +918,7 @@
*/
x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL};
int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
+ int ext_type = 0;
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
@@ -975,52 +958,9 @@
/*
* Detect supported extensions
*/
- if( ( OID_SIZE( OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) == extn_oid.len ) &&
- memcmp( extn_oid.p, OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, extn_oid.len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Parse basic constraints */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )
- return ( ret );
- crt->ext_types |= EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
- }
- else if( ( OID_SIZE( OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ) == extn_oid.len ) &&
- memcmp( extn_oid.p, OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, extn_oid.len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Parse netscape certificate type */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )
- return ( ret );
- crt->ext_types |= EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE;
- }
- else if( ( OID_SIZE( OID_KEY_USAGE ) == extn_oid.len ) &&
- memcmp( extn_oid.p, OID_KEY_USAGE, extn_oid.len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Parse key usage */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return ( ret );
- crt->ext_types |= EXT_KEY_USAGE;
- }
- else if( ( OID_SIZE( OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == extn_oid.len ) &&
- memcmp( extn_oid.p, OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, extn_oid.len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Parse extended key usage */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return ( ret );
- crt->ext_types |= EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE;
- }
- else if( ( OID_SIZE( OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) == extn_oid.len ) &&
- memcmp( extn_oid.p, OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, extn_oid.len ) == 0 )
- {
- /* Parse extended key usage */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 )
- return ( ret );
- crt->ext_types |= EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME;
- }
- else
+ ret = oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type );
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
{
/* No parser found, skip extension */
*p = end_ext_octet;
@@ -1033,6 +973,50 @@
POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG );
}
#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ crt->ext_types |= ext_type;
+
+ switch( ext_type )
+ {
+ case EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
+ /* Parse basic constraints */
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )
+ return ( ret );
+ break;
+
+ case EXT_KEY_USAGE:
+ /* Parse key usage */
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )
+ return ( ret );
+ break;
+
+ case EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
+ /* Parse extended key usage */
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )
+ return ( ret );
+ break;
+
+ case EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
+ /* Parse subject alt name */
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 )
+ return ( ret );
+ break;
+
+ case EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
+ /* Parse netscape certificate type */
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )
+ return ( ret );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
}
@@ -1108,33 +1092,15 @@
return( 0 );
}
-static int x509_get_sig_alg( const x509_buf *sig_oid, int *sig_alg )
+static int x509_get_sig_alg( const x509_buf *sig_oid, md_type_t *md_alg,
+ pk_type_t *pk_alg )
{
- if( sig_oid->len == 9 &&
- memcmp( sig_oid->p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) == 0 )
- {
- if( sig_oid->p[8] >= 2 && sig_oid->p[8] <= 5 )
- {
- *sig_alg = sig_oid->p[8];
- return( 0 );
- }
+ int ret = oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg );
- if ( sig_oid->p[8] >= 11 && sig_oid->p[8] <= 14 )
- {
- *sig_alg = sig_oid->p[8];
- return( 0 );
- }
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + ret );
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
- }
- if( sig_oid->len == 5 &&
- memcmp( sig_oid->p, OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, 5 ) == 0 )
- {
- *sig_alg = SIG_RSA_SHA1;
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
+ return( 0 );
}
/*
@@ -1224,7 +1190,8 @@
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
}
- if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid1, &crt->sig_alg ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid1, &crt->sig_md,
+ &crt->sig_pk ) ) != 0 )
{
x509_free( crt );
return( ret );
@@ -1693,7 +1660,8 @@
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
}
- if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid1, &crl->sig_alg ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid1, &crl->sig_md,
+ &crl->sig_pk ) ) != 0 )
{
x509_crl_free( crl );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
@@ -2160,32 +2128,12 @@
}
else
{
- int can_handle;
+ pk_type_t pk_alg = POLARSSL_PK_NONE;
/*
* only RSA keys handled at this time
*/
- can_handle = 0;
-
- if( pk_alg_oid.len == 9 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid.p, OID_PKCS1_RSA, 9 ) == 0 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if( pk_alg_oid.len == 9 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid.p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) == 0 )
- {
- if( pk_alg_oid.p[8] >= 2 && pk_alg_oid.p[8] <= 5 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if ( pk_alg_oid.p[8] >= 11 && pk_alg_oid.p[8] <= 14 )
- can_handle = 1;
- }
-
- if( pk_alg_oid.len == 5 &&
- memcmp( pk_alg_oid.p, OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, 5 ) == 0 )
- can_handle = 1;
-
- if( can_handle == 0 )
+ if( oid_get_pk_alg( &pk_alg_oid, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG );
/*
@@ -2501,7 +2449,7 @@
* This fuction tries to 'fix' this by at least suggesting enlarging the
* size by 20.
*/
-int compat_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...)
+static int compat_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int res = -1;
@@ -2548,6 +2496,7 @@
size_t i, n;
unsigned char c;
const x509_name *name;
+ const char *short_name = NULL;
char s[128], *p;
memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) );
@@ -2570,56 +2519,13 @@
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
}
- if( name->oid.len == 3 &&
- memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_X520, 2 ) == 0 )
- {
- switch( name->oid.p[2] )
- {
- case X520_COMMON_NAME:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "CN=" ); break;
+ ret = oid_get_attr_short_name( &name->oid, &short_name );
- case X520_COUNTRY:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "C=" ); break;
-
- case X520_LOCALITY:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "L=" ); break;
-
- case X520_STATE:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "ST=" ); break;
-
- case X520_ORGANIZATION:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "O=" ); break;
-
- case X520_ORG_UNIT:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "OU=" ); break;
-
- default:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "0x%02X=",
- name->oid.p[2] );
- break;
- }
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- }
- else if( name->oid.len == 9 &&
- memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_PKCS9, 8 ) == 0 )
- {
- switch( name->oid.p[8] )
- {
- case PKCS9_EMAIL:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "emailAddress=" ); break;
-
- default:
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "0x%02X=",
- name->oid.p[8] );
- break;
- }
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- }
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, "%s=", short_name );
else
- {
ret = snprintf( p, n, "\?\?=" );
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- }
+ SAFE_SNPRINTF();
for( i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++ )
{
@@ -2633,7 +2539,7 @@
}
s[i] = '\0';
ret = snprintf( p, n, "%s", s );
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
+ SAFE_SNPRINTF();
name = name->next;
}
@@ -2684,6 +2590,7 @@
int ret;
size_t n;
char *p;
+ const char *desc = NULL;
p = buf;
n = size;
@@ -2722,21 +2629,14 @@
crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : RSA+", prefix );
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- switch( crt->sig_alg )
- {
- case SIG_RSA_MD2 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD2" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_MD4 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD4" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_MD5 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD5" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA1 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA1" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA224 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA224" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA256 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA256" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA384 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA384" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA512 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA512" ); break;
- default: ret = snprintf( p, n, "???" ); break;
- }
+ ret = oid_get_sig_alg_desc( &crt->sig_oid1, &desc );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, "???" );
+ else
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, desc );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%sRSA key size : %d bits\n", prefix,
@@ -2746,75 +2646,26 @@
return( (int) ( size - n ) );
}
-/* Compare a given OID string with an OID x509_buf * */
-#define OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \
- ( ( OID_SIZE(oid_str) == (oid_buf)->len ) && \
- memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) == 0)
-
/*
* Return an informational string describing the given OID
*/
const char *x509_oid_get_description( x509_buf *oid )
{
- if ( oid == NULL )
- return ( NULL );
+ const char *desc = NULL;
+ int ret;
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_SERVER_AUTH, oid ) )
- return( STRING_SERVER_AUTH );
-
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_CLIENT_AUTH, oid ) )
- return( STRING_CLIENT_AUTH );
-
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_CODE_SIGNING, oid ) )
- return( STRING_CODE_SIGNING );
-
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, oid ) )
- return( STRING_EMAIL_PROTECTION );
-
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_TIME_STAMPING, oid ) )
- return( STRING_TIME_STAMPING );
+ ret = oid_get_extended_key_usage( oid, &desc );
- else if( OID_CMP( OID_OCSP_SIGNING, oid ) )
- return( STRING_OCSP_SIGNING );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( NULL );
- return( NULL );
+ return( desc );
}
/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */
int x509_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, x509_buf *oid )
{
- int ret;
- size_t i, n;
- unsigned int value;
- char *p;
-
- p = buf;
- n = size;
-
- /* First byte contains first two dots */
- if( oid->len > 0 )
- {
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "%d.%d", oid->p[0]/40, oid->p[0]%40 );
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- }
-
- /* TODO: value can overflow in value. */
- value = 0;
- for( i = 1; i < oid->len; i++ )
- {
- value <<= 7;
- value += oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
-
- if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) )
- {
- /* Last byte */
- ret = snprintf( p, n, ".%d", value );
- SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- value = 0;
- }
- }
-
- return( (int) ( size - n ) );
+ return oid_get_numeric_string( buf, size, oid );
}
/*
@@ -2826,6 +2677,7 @@
int ret;
size_t n;
char *p;
+ const char *desc;
const x509_crl_entry *entry;
p = buf;
@@ -2879,21 +2731,14 @@
entry = entry->next;
}
- ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : RSA+", prefix );
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
- switch( crl->sig_alg )
- {
- case SIG_RSA_MD2 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD2" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_MD4 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD4" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_MD5 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD5" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA1 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA1" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA224 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA224" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA256 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA256" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA384 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA384" ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA512 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "SHA512" ); break;
- default: ret = snprintf( p, n, "???" ); break;
- }
+ ret = oid_get_sig_alg_desc( &crl->sig_oid1, &desc );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, "???" );
+ else
+ ret = snprintf( p, n, desc );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n" );
@@ -2995,48 +2840,14 @@
}
/*
- * Wrapper for x509 hashes.
- */
-static void x509_hash( const unsigned char *in, size_t len, int alg,
- unsigned char *out )
-{
- switch( alg )
- {
-#if defined(POLARSSL_MD2_C)
- case SIG_RSA_MD2 : md2( in, len, out ); break;
-#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_MD4_C)
- case SIG_RSA_MD4 : md4( in, len, out ); break;
-#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
- case SIG_RSA_MD5 : md5( in, len, out ); break;
-#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
- case SIG_RSA_SHA1 : sha1( in, len, out ); break;
-#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
- case SIG_RSA_SHA224 : sha2( in, len, out, 1 ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA256 : sha2( in, len, out, 0 ); break;
-#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
- case SIG_RSA_SHA384 : sha4( in, len, out, 1 ); break;
- case SIG_RSA_SHA512 : sha4( in, len, out, 0 ); break;
-#endif
- default:
- memset( out, '\xFF', 64 );
- break;
- }
-}
-
-/*
* Check that the given certificate is valid accoring to the CRL.
*/
static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
x509_crl *crl_list)
{
int flags = 0;
- int hash_id;
- unsigned char hash[64];
+ unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ const md_info_t *md_info;
if( ca == NULL )
return( flags );
@@ -3061,11 +2872,19 @@
/*
* Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
*/
- hash_id = crl_list->sig_alg;
+ md_info = md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md );
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Cannot check 'unknown' hash
+ */
+ flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
+ break;
+ }
- x509_hash( crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
+ md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
- if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id,
+ if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, crl_list->sig_md,
0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) == 0 )
{
/*
@@ -3130,9 +2949,10 @@
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, x509_cert *, int, int *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
- int hash_id, ret;
+ int ret;
int ca_flags = 0, check_path_cnt = path_cnt + 1;
- unsigned char hash[64];
+ unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ const md_info_t *md_info;
if( x509parse_time_expired( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= BADCERT_EXPIRED;
@@ -3171,11 +2991,18 @@
continue;
}
- hash_id = child->sig_alg;
+ md_info = md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Cannot check 'unknown' hash
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
- x509_hash( child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
+ md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
- if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &trust_ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id,
+ if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &trust_ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, child->sig_md,
0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 )
{
trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
@@ -3230,22 +3057,32 @@
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, x509_cert *, int, int *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
- int hash_id, ret;
+ int ret;
int parent_flags = 0;
- unsigned char hash[64];
+ unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
x509_cert *grandparent;
+ const md_info_t *md_info;
if( x509parse_time_expired( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= BADCERT_EXPIRED;
- hash_id = child->sig_alg;
-
- x509_hash( child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
-
- if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &parent->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id, 0, hash,
- child->sig.p ) != 0 )
+ md_info = md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
+ if( md_info == NULL )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Cannot check 'unknown' hash
+ */
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
-
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
+
+ if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &parent->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, child->sig_md, 0, hash,
+ child->sig.p ) != 0 )
+ *flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
+ }
+
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
*flags |= x509parse_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl);
@@ -3340,8 +3177,7 @@
{
while( name != NULL )
{
- if( name->oid.len == 3 &&
- memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_CN, 3 ) == 0 )
+ if( OID_CMP( OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) )
{
if( name->val.len == cn_len &&
memcmp( name->val.p, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )