Add ECDSA verify
Add tests for external verification when signing is done both internally and externally
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index c0088db..ed88c8a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -236,6 +236,27 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/**
+ * \brief Convert a signature from ASN.1 to a raw concatenation
+ * of {r,s}
+ *
+ * \param sig Signature to be converted
+ * \param ssize Size of the passed buffer
+ * \param byte_len Length of a single number of the signature
+ * \param buf Buffer pointer
+ * \param slen Size of the written signature
+ *
+ * \note The size of the buffer \c ssize should be at least
+ * 2*byte_len bytes long, otherwise this function will
+ * return an error.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH error code
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_raw( const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t ssize, uint16_t byte_len,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t* slen );
+/**
* \brief Convert a signature from numbers to ASN.1
*
* \param r First number of the signature
@@ -253,9 +274,9 @@
* or a MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code
*
*/
-int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
- size_t ssize );
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s, unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t *slen, size_t ssize );
/**
* \brief Read and verify an ECDSA signature
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index fdd0afb..645fbb5 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -287,9 +287,70 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/*
+ * Convert a signature to a raw concatenation of {r, s}
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_raw( const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t ssize, uint16_t byte_len,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t* slen )
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
+ const unsigned char *end = sig + ssize;
+ size_t len;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+
+ if( 2 * byte_len > ssize )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( p + len != end )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *) buf;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, p, byte_len) ) )
+ {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ p += byte_len;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, p, byte_len) ) )
+ {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ *slen = 2*byte_len;
+ cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
* Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
*/
-int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, size_t ssize )
{
int ret;
@@ -339,7 +400,7 @@
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen, ssize ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen, ssize ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
diff --git a/library/pkcs11_client.c b/library/pkcs11_client.c
index 92120c6..70cc0de 100644
--- a/library/pkcs11_client.c
+++ b/library/pkcs11_client.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
}
/* The signature buffer is guaranteed to have enough room for
the encoded signature by the pk_sign interface. */
- if( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, sig_len, sig_size ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, sig_len, sig_size ) != 0 )
{
rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
goto ecdsa_exit;
@@ -231,12 +231,88 @@
return( pkcs11_err_to_mbedtls_pk_err( rv ) );
}
+static int pkcs11_verify( void *ctx_arg,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_pkcs11_context_t *ctx = ctx_arg;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {0, NULL_PTR, 0};
+ unsigned char *decoded_sig = NULL_PTR;
+ size_t decoded_sig_len;
+
+ /* This function takes size_t arguments but the underlying layer
+ takes unsigned long. Either type may be smaller than the other.
+ Legitimate values won't overflow either type but we still need
+ to check for overflow for robustness. */
+ if( hash_len > (CK_ULONG)( -1 ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ switch( ctx->key_type )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ switch( md_alg )
+ {
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG );
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+ default:
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG );
+ }
+ if( mechanism.mechanism == CKM_ECDSA )
+ {
+ uint16_t byte_len = ( ( ctx->bit_length + 7 ) / 8 );
+ decoded_sig = malloc( 2 * byte_len );
+ if( mbedtls_ecdsa_signature_to_raw( sig, sig_len, byte_len,
+ decoded_sig, &decoded_sig_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ rv = C_VerifyInit( ctx->hSession, &mechanism, ctx->hPublicKey );
+ if( rv != CKR_OK )
+ goto exit;
+ rv = C_Verify( ctx->hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR) hash, hash_len,
+ decoded_sig, decoded_sig_len );
+ if( rv != CKR_OK )
+ goto exit;
+
+exit:
+ free(decoded_sig);
+ return( pkcs11_err_to_mbedtls_pk_err( rv ) );
+}
+
static const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_pkcs11_info =
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE_INFO_1( "pkcs11"
, pkcs11_pk_get_bitlen
, pkcs11_pk_can_do //can_do
, pkcs11_pk_signature_size
- , NULL //pkcs11_verify
+ , pkcs11_verify
, pkcs11_sign
, NULL //pkcs11_decrypt
, NULL //pkcs11_encrypt
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.data
index fb47f51..33a75c3 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.data
@@ -5,3 +5,11 @@
PKCS#11 ECDSA generate and sign
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
pk_generate_sign:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
+
+PKCS#11 ECDSA generate, sign and verify with Cryptoki
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+pk_signX_verifyX:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
+
+PKCS#11 ECDSA import, sign with MbedTLS and verify with Cryptoki
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+pk_import_signI_verifyX:"data_files/server3.key"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.function
index 1dfe70d..e14996b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs11_client.function
@@ -323,3 +323,194 @@
mbedtls_pk_free( &transparent_ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void pk_signX_verifyX( int key_type )
+{
+ /* Sign with cryptoki, convert to mbedTLS format and save,
+ verify by cryptoki with a conversion to a raw, concatenated
+ format by the engine. */
+ mbedtls_pk_context pkcs11_ctx;
+ mbedtls_pk_context transparent_ctx;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ unsigned char hash_value[32] = "Fake hash, it doesn't matter....";
+ unsigned char sig_buffer[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+ size_t sig_length = sizeof( sig_buffer );
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &pkcs11_ctx );
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &transparent_ctx );
+
+ /* Initialize cryptoki and generate a key in the token */
+ hSession = pkcs11_init( );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hSession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+
+ CK_ASSERT( pkcs11_generate_key( key_type,
+ hSession,
+ &hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hPublicKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hPrivateKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+
+ /* Prepare the mbed TLS contexts */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &transparent_ctx,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( key_type ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_pkcs11( &pkcs11_ctx,
+ hSession,
+ hPublicKey,
+ hPrivateKey ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Retrieve the public key from the token */
+ switch( key_type )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ {
+ unsigned char n_buffer[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+ unsigned char e_buffer[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE public_attributes[] = {
+ {CKA_MODULUS, n_buffer, sizeof( n_buffer )},
+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, e_buffer, sizeof( e_buffer )},
+ };
+ CK_ULONG *n_length = &public_attributes[0].ulValueLen;
+ CK_ULONG *e_length = &public_attributes[1].ulValueLen;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa( transparent_ctx );
+
+ CK_ASSERT( C_GetAttributeValue( hSession, hPublicKey,
+ public_attributes, ARRAY_LENGTH( public_attributes ) ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &rsa_ctx->N,
+ n_buffer, *n_length ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &rsa_ctx->E,
+ e_buffer, *e_length ) == 0 );
+ rsa_ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &rsa_ctx->N );
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ {
+ unsigned char ecParams[16];
+ unsigned char ecPoint[128];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE public_attributes[] = {
+ {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof( ecParams )},
+ {CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint, sizeof( ecPoint )},
+ };
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp_ctx = mbedtls_pk_ec( transparent_ctx );
+
+ CK_ASSERT( C_GetAttributeValue( hSession, hPublicKey,
+ public_attributes, ARRAY_LENGTH( public_attributes ) ) );
+ // TODO: lift out a function or two from pkparse.c
+ // * pk_get_ecparams followed by pk_use_ecparams for ecParams?
+ // * Some code from pk_group_from_specified to read an octet string for ecPoint?
+ {
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf params_asn1;
+ CK_ULONG ecParams_length = public_attributes[0].ulValueLen;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+ params_asn1.tag = ecParams[0];
+ params_asn1.len = ecParams[1];
+ params_asn1.p = ecParams + 2;
+ TEST_ASSERT( ecParams_length == 2 + params_asn1.len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( ¶ms_asn1, &grp_id ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp_ctx->grp, grp_id ) == 0 );
+ }
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = ecPoint;
+ size_t len;
+ CK_ULONG ecPoint_length = public_attributes[1].ulValueLen;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p,
+ ecPoint + ecPoint_length,
+ &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp_ctx->grp,
+ &ecp_ctx->Q,
+ p, len ) == 0 );
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+ default:
+ TEST_ASSERT( !"Unsupported key type in test data" );
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign with the token and verify in software */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pkcs11_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ hash_value, 32,
+ sig_buffer, &sig_length,
+ NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pkcs11_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ hash_value, 32,
+ sig_buffer, sig_length ) == 0 );
+
+exit:
+ if( hPublicKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE )
+ C_DestroyObject( hSession, hPublicKey );
+ if( hPrivateKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE )
+ C_DestroyObject( hSession, hPrivateKey );
+ C_CloseSession( hSession );
+ C_Finalize( NULL_PTR );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &pkcs11_ctx );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &transparent_ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void pk_import_signI_verifyX( char *file )
+{
+ /* Sign with mbedTLS, verify by cryptoki with a conversion
+ to a raw, concatenated format by the engine. */
+ mbedtls_pk_context pkcs11_ctx;
+ mbedtls_pk_context transparent_ctx;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ unsigned char hash_value[32] = "Fake hash, it doesn't matter....";
+ unsigned char sig_buffer[4096];
+ size_t sig_length = sizeof( sig_buffer );
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &pkcs11_ctx );
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &transparent_ctx );
+
+ /* Read a transparent key */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &transparent_ctx, file, NULL ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Initialize cryptoki and import the key into the token */
+ hSession = pkcs11_init( );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hSession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_import_to_pkcs11( &transparent_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_FLAG_SIGN |
+ MBEDTLS_PK_FLAG_VERIFY,
+ hSession,
+ &hPublicKey,
+ &hPrivateKey ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hPublicKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hPrivateKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_pkcs11( &pkcs11_ctx,
+ hSession,
+ hPublicKey,
+ hPrivateKey ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Sign with the token and verify with cryptoki */
+ TEST_ASSERT( sizeof( sig_buffer ) >= mbedtls_pk_signature_size( &pkcs11_ctx ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &transparent_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ hash_value, 32,
+ sig_buffer, &sig_length,
+ NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pkcs11_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ hash_value, 32,
+ sig_buffer, sig_length ) == 0 );
+
+exit:
+ if( hPublicKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE )
+ C_DestroyObject( hSession, hPublicKey );
+ if( hPrivateKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE )
+ C_DestroyObject( hSession, hPrivateKey );
+ C_CloseSession( hSession );
+ C_Finalize( NULL_PTR );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &pkcs11_ctx );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &transparent_ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */