Apply clang formatting.
Executed with:
`find . -regextype posix-egrep -regex ".*\.([hc]|fmt|function)" | xargs -L1 clang-format-12 -i`
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Starzyk <mateusz.starzyk@mobica.com>
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index df75e6d..ae9ed93 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -26,185 +26,176 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
-#define mbedtls_free free
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+# include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+# else
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+# define mbedtls_free free
+# endif
-#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
-#include "ssl_misc.h"
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/version.h"
+# include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+# include "ssl_misc.h"
+# include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+# include "mbedtls/error.h"
+# include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+# include "mbedtls/version.h"
-#include "ssl_invasive.h"
+# include "ssl_invasive.h"
-#include <string.h>
+# include <string.h>
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+# include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+# include "psa/crypto.h"
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+# include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+# endif
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl);
/*
* Start a timer.
* Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs )
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs)
{
- if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL )
+ if (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL)
return;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) );
- ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("set_timer to %d ms", (int)millisecs));
+ ssl->f_set_timer(ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs);
}
/*
* Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) );
- return -1 ;
+ if (ssl->f_get_timer(ssl->p_timer) == 2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("timer expired"));
+ return -1;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len,
- mbedtls_record *rec );
+static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ mbedtls_record *rec);
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
{
int ret = 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "record buffer", buf, buflen);
/* We don't support record checking in TLS because
* there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it.
*/
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
- {
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
goto exit;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- else
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ else {
mbedtls_record rec;
- ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret );
+ ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, buf, buflen, &rec);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret);
goto exit;
}
- if( ssl->transform_in != NULL )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
+ if (ssl->transform_in != NULL) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret);
goto exit;
}
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
exit:
/* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make
* sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, buflen);
/* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID
* as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ||
- ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
- {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ||
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
- return ret ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record"));
+ return ret;
}
-#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0
-#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1
+# define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0
+# define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */
-static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- uint8_t slot );
-static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_record const *rec );
-static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t slot);
+static void ssl_free_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_load_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_buffer_future_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_record const *rec);
+static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
- size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl);
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
-#else
+# else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
-#endif
+# endif
- if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len )
- return mtu ;
+ if (mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len)
+ return mtu;
- return out_buf_len ;
+ return out_buf_len;
}
-static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left;
- size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl );
+ size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size(ssl);
/* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone
* past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */
- if( bytes_written > mtu )
- {
+ if (bytes_written > mtu) {
/* Should never happen... */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) );
+ return ((int)(mtu - bytes_written));
}
-static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t remaining, expansion;
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
- const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl);
- if( max_len > mfl )
+ if (max_len > mfl)
max_len = mfl;
/* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension
@@ -216,42 +207,42 @@
* The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never
* write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead.
*/
- if( max_len <= ssl->out_left )
- return 0 ;
+ if (max_len <= ssl->out_left)
+ return 0;
max_len -= ssl->out_left;
-#endif
+# endif
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
- remaining = (size_t) ret;
+ ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ remaining = (size_t)ret;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
- expansion = (size_t) ret;
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ expansion = (size_t)ret;
- if( remaining <= expansion )
- return 0 ;
+ if (remaining <= expansion)
+ return 0;
remaining -= expansion;
- if( remaining >= max_len )
+ if (remaining >= max_len)
remaining = max_len;
- return (int) remaining ;
+ return (int)remaining;
}
/*
* Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range,
* returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached.
*/
-static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
uint32_t new_timeout;
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
- return -1 ;
+ if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max)
+ return -1;
/* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1
* in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first
@@ -259,47 +250,47 @@
* This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be
* delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work
* on most non-IP stacks too. */
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min )
- {
+ if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min) {
ssl->handshake->mtu = 508;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("mtu autoreduction to %d bytes",
+ ssl->handshake->mtu));
}
new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
/* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */
- if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ||
- new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
- {
+ if (new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ||
+ new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max) {
new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max;
}
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
- (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
+ (unsigned long)ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
- (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
+ (unsigned long)ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout));
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Encryption/decryption functions
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
-static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len,
- size_t granularity )
+static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length(size_t len, size_t granularity)
{
- return ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity ;
+ return (granularity - (len + 1) % granularity) % granularity;
}
/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content
@@ -323,68 +314,68 @@
*
* Output:
* - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
- * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
+ * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext
+ * structure.
*
* Returns:
* - `0` on success.
* - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space
* for the expansion.
*/
-static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content,
- size_t *content_size,
- size_t remaining,
- uint8_t rec_type,
- size_t pad )
+static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext(unsigned char *content,
+ size_t *content_size,
+ size_t remaining,
+ uint8_t rec_type,
+ size_t pad)
{
size_t len = *content_size;
/* Write real content type */
- if( remaining == 0 )
- return -1 ;
- content[ len ] = rec_type;
+ if (remaining == 0)
+ return -1;
+ content[len] = rec_type;
len++;
remaining--;
- if( remaining < pad )
- return -1 ;
- memset( content + len, 0, pad );
+ if (remaining < pad)
+ return -1;
+ memset(content + len, 0, pad);
len += pad;
remaining -= pad;
*content_size = len;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */
-static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content,
- size_t *content_size,
- uint8_t *rec_type )
+static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(unsigned char const *content,
+ size_t *content_size,
+ uint8_t *rec_type)
{
size_t remaining = *content_size;
/* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */
- do
- {
- if( remaining == 0 )
- return -1 ;
+ do {
+ if (remaining == 0)
+ return -1;
remaining--;
- } while( content[ remaining ] == 0 );
+ } while (content[remaining] == 0);
*content_size = remaining;
- *rec_type = content[ remaining ];
+ *rec_type = content[remaining];
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ||
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled,
* and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */
-static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
- size_t *add_data_len,
- mbedtls_record *rec,
- unsigned minor_ver )
+static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(unsigned char *add_data,
+ size_t *add_data_len,
+ mbedtls_record *rec,
+ unsigned minor_ver)
{
/* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
*
@@ -407,52 +398,49 @@
unsigned char *cur = add_data;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
- if( minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+ if (minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4)
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
{
- ((void) minor_ver);
- memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
- cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
+ ((void)minor_ver);
+ memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr));
+ cur += sizeof(rec->ctr);
}
*cur = rec->type;
cur++;
- memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) );
- cur += sizeof( rec->ver );
+ memcpy(cur, rec->ver, sizeof(rec->ver));
+ cur += sizeof(rec->ver);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
- {
- memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if (rec->cid_len != 0) {
+ memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len);
cur += rec->cid_len;
*cur = rec->cid_len;
cur++;
- cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
+ cur[0] = (rec->data_len >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ cur[1] = (rec->data_len >> 0) & 0xFF;
cur += 2;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
- cur[0] = ( rec->data_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- cur[1] = ( rec->data_len >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
+ cur[0] = (rec->data_len >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ cur[1] = (rec->data_len >> 0) & 0xFF;
cur += 2;
}
*add_data_len = cur - add_data;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(
- mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform )
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform)
{
- return transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen ;
+ return transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen;
}
/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV )
@@ -478,86 +466,82 @@
* which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition
* violated, the behavior of this function is undefined.
*/
-static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv,
- size_t dst_iv_len,
- unsigned char const *fixed_iv,
- size_t fixed_iv_len,
- unsigned char const *dynamic_iv,
- size_t dynamic_iv_len )
+static void ssl_build_record_nonce(unsigned char *dst_iv,
+ size_t dst_iv_len,
+ unsigned char const *fixed_iv,
+ size_t fixed_iv_len,
+ unsigned char const *dynamic_iv,
+ size_t dynamic_iv_len)
{
size_t i;
/* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */
- memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len );
- memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len );
+ memset(dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len);
+ memcpy(dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len);
dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len;
- for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ )
+ for (i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++)
dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i];
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
-int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
- mbedtls_record *rec,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng )
+int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
+ mbedtls_record *rec,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
{
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int auth_done = 0;
- unsigned char * data;
- unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX];
size_t add_data_len;
size_t post_avail;
/* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
- ((void) ssl);
-#endif
+ ((void)ssl);
+# endif
/* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used
* for CBC transformations in TLS 1.2. */
-#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
- ((void) f_rng);
- ((void) p_rng);
-#endif
+# if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))
+ ((void)f_rng);
+ ((void)p_rng);
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> encrypt buf"));
- if( transform == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (transform == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no transform provided to encrypt_buf"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- if( rec == NULL
- || rec->buf == NULL
- || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset
- || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if (rec == NULL || rec->buf == NULL || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset ||
+ rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|| rec->cid_len != 0
-#endif
- )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+# endif
+ ) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
- post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
- data, rec->data_len );
+ post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before encrypt: output payload", data,
+ rec->data_len);
- mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
+ mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc);
- if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- rec->data_len,
- (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ rec->data_len,
+ (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext
@@ -572,38 +556,30 @@
* since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There
* is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
- if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
- {
- size_t padding =
- ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
- if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
- &rec->data_len,
- post_avail,
- rec->type,
- padding ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+ if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) {
+ size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(
+ rec->data_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY);
+ if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, post_avail,
+ rec->type, padding) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/*
* Add CID information
*/
rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len;
- memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
+ memcpy(rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len);
- if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
- {
- size_t padding =
- ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
+ if (rec->cid_len != 0) {
+ size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(
+ rec->data_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY);
/*
* Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
@@ -611,110 +587,97 @@
* Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
* `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
*/
- if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
- &rec->data_len,
- post_avail,
- rec->type,
- padding ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, post_avail,
+ rec->type, padding) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
+ post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset);
/*
* Add MAC before if needed
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
- ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
-#endif
- ) )
- {
- if( post_avail < transform->maclen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
+# endif
+ )) {
+ if (post_avail < transform->maclen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
- transform->minor_ver );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, add_data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc);
- memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
-#endif
+ memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen);
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len,
- transform->maclen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len,
+ transform->maclen);
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/*
* Encrypt
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
- "including %d bytes of padding",
- rec->data_len, 0 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
+ "including %d bytes of padding",
+ rec->data_len, 0));
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
- transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen,
- data, rec->data_len,
- data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, transform->iv_enc,
+ transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( rec->data_len != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec->data_len != olen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
+ mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char iv[12];
unsigned char *dynamic_iv;
size_t dynamic_iv_len;
int dynamic_iv_is_explicit =
- ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform );
+ ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform);
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
- if( post_avail < transform->taglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (post_avail < transform->taglen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
/*
@@ -729,156 +692,143 @@
* dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the
* record sequence number here in all cases.
*/
- dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
- dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr );
+ dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
+ dynamic_iv_len = sizeof(rec->ctr);
- ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ),
- transform->iv_enc,
- transform->fixed_ivlen,
- dynamic_iv,
- dynamic_iv_len );
+ ssl_build_record_nonce(iv, sizeof(iv), transform->iv_enc,
+ transform->fixed_ivlen, dynamic_iv,
+ dynamic_iv_len);
/*
* Build additional data for AEAD encryption.
* This depends on the TLS version.
*/
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
- transform->minor_ver );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)",
- iv, transform->ivlen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)",
- dynamic_iv,
- dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
- add_data, add_data_len );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
- "including 0 bytes of padding",
- rec->data_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (internal)", iv, transform->ivlen);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (transmitted)", dynamic_iv,
+ dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", add_data,
+ add_data_len);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
+ "including 0 bytes of padding",
+ rec->data_len));
/*
* Encrypt and authenticate
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
- iv, transform->ivlen,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len, /* src */
- data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */
- &rec->data_len,
- transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, iv, transform->ivlen, add_data,
+ add_data_len, data, rec->data_len, /* src */
+ data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */
+ &rec->data_len, transform->taglen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
- data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen,
- transform->taglen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after encrypt: tag",
+ data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen,
+ transform->taglen);
/* Account for authentication tag. */
post_avail -= transform->taglen;
/*
* Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit.
*/
- if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 )
- {
- if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0) {
+ if (rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
- memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len );
+ memcpy(data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len);
rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len;
- rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len;
+ rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len;
}
auth_done++;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
- {
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t padlen, i;
size_t olen;
/* Currently we're always using minimal padding
* (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */
- padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen;
- if( padlen == transform->ivlen )
+ padlen = transform->ivlen - (rec->data_len + 1) % transform->ivlen;
+ if (padlen == transform->ivlen)
padlen = 0;
/* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */
- if( post_avail < padlen + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (post_avail < padlen + 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
- for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ )
- data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen;
+ for (i = 0; i <= padlen; i++)
+ data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char)padlen;
rec->data_len += padlen + 1;
post_avail -= padlen + 1;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 as per
* Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246)
*/
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
/*
* Generate IV
*/
- ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
- memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen);
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
- "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding",
- rec->data_len, transform->ivlen,
- padlen + 1 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
+ "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding",
+ rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, padlen + 1));
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
- transform->iv_enc,
- transform->ivlen,
- data, rec->data_len,
- data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, transform->iv_enc,
+ transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( rec->data_len != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec->data_len != olen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- data -= transform->ivlen;
+ data -= transform->ivlen;
rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen;
- rec->data_len += transform->ivlen;
+ rec->data_len += transform->ivlen;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- if( auth_done == 0 )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ if (auth_done == 0) {
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
/*
@@ -890,54 +840,51 @@
* ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
*/
- if( post_avail < transform->maclen)
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (post_avail < transform->maclen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len,
- rec, transform->minor_ver );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
- add_data_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len);
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
- data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
+ add_data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc);
- memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
+ memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen);
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
- if( auth_done != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (auth_done != 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= encrypt buf"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
/*
* Turn a bit into a mask:
* - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
@@ -949,18 +896,18 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
+static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(size_t bit)
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(push)
+# pragma warning(disable : 4146)
+# endif
return -bit;
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(pop)
+# endif
}
/*
@@ -974,18 +921,18 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt(size_t x, size_t y)
{
/* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
const size_t sub = x - y;
/* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
+ const size_t sub1 = sub >> (sizeof(sub) * 8 - 1);
/* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(sub1);
- return mask ;
+ return mask;
}
/*
@@ -999,9 +946,9 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(size_t x, size_t y)
{
- return ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) ;
+ return ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt(x, y);
}
/*
@@ -1015,29 +962,29 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
+static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq(size_t x, size_t y)
{
/* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
const size_t diff = x ^ y;
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(push)
+# pragma warning(disable : 4146)
+# endif
/* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
- const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
+ const size_t diff_msb = (diff | -diff);
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(pop)
+# endif
/* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
+ const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> (sizeof(diff_msb) * 8 - 1);
- return 1 ^ diff1 ;
+ return 1 ^ diff1;
}
/*
@@ -1049,18 +996,20 @@
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
-static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src,
- size_t len,
- size_t c1, size_t c2 )
+static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t c1,
+ size_t c2)
{
/* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
- const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq(c1, c2);
+ const unsigned char mask =
+ (unsigned char)mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(equal);
/* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
- for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
- dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask );
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ dst[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dst[i] & ~mask);
}
/*
@@ -1069,12 +1018,14 @@
* Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
* (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
*/
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
- mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
- size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
- unsigned char *output )
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add_data,
+ size_t add_data_len,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_len_secret,
+ size_t min_data_len,
+ size_t max_data_len,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
/*
* This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
@@ -1090,65 +1041,64 @@
*
* Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
*/
- const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
+ const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info);
/* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
* all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
- const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
- const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
- const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
+ const unsigned char *const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
+ const unsigned char *const okey = ikey + block_size;
+ const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info);
unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
size_t offset;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
+ mbedtls_md_init(&aux);
-#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
- do { \
- ret = (func_call); \
- if( ret != 0 ) \
- goto cleanup; \
- } while( 0 )
+# define MD_CHK(func_call) \
+ do { \
+ ret = (func_call); \
+ if (ret != 0) \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ } while (0)
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0));
/* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
* so we can start directly with the message */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len));
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len));
/* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
- for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
- {
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
+ for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) {
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx));
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out));
/* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
- offset, data_len_secret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq(output, aux_out, hash_size, offset,
+ data_len_secret);
- if( offset < max_data_len )
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
+ if (offset < max_data_len)
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1));
}
/* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out));
/* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx));
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size));
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size));
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output));
/* Done, get ready for next time */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
+ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx));
-#undef MD_CHK
+# undef MD_CHK
cleanup:
- mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
- return ret ;
+ mbedtls_md_free(&aux);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -1156,95 +1106,83 @@
* - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
* - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
*/
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
- unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
- size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
- size_t len )
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void
+mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src_base,
+ size_t offset_secret,
+ size_t offset_min,
+ size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len)
{
size_t offset;
- for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
- offset, offset_secret );
+ for (offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq(dst, src_base + offset, len, offset,
+ offset_secret);
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
- mbedtls_record *rec )
+int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
+ mbedtls_record *rec)
{
size_t olen;
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int ret, auth_done = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
-#endif
- unsigned char* data;
- unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ];
+# endif
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
size_t add_data_len;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
- ((void) ssl);
-#endif
+ ((void)ssl);
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) );
- if( rec == NULL ||
- rec->buf == NULL ||
- rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset ||
- rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> decrypt buf"));
+ if (rec == NULL || rec->buf == NULL || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset ||
+ rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
- mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
+ mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/*
* Match record's CID with incoming CID.
*/
- if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len ||
- memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ;
+ if (rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len ||
+ memcmp(rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) {
padlen = 0;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
- transform->iv_dec,
- transform->ivlen,
- data, rec->data_len,
- data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, transform->iv_dec,
+ transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( rec->data_len != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec->data_len != olen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
- mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
- {
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
+ mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) {
unsigned char iv[12];
unsigned char *dynamic_iv;
size_t dynamic_iv_len;
@@ -1257,56 +1195,48 @@
* can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not
* agree with the record sequence number.
*/
- dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr );
- if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 )
- {
- if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
- rec->data_len,
- dynamic_iv_len ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ dynamic_iv_len = sizeof(rec->ctr);
+ if (ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform) == 1) {
+ if (rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
+ rec->data_len, dynamic_iv_len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
dynamic_iv = data;
data += dynamic_iv_len;
rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len;
- rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len;
- }
- else
- {
+ rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len;
+ } else {
dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
}
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
- if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
- rec->data_len,
- transform->taglen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (rec->data_len < transform->taglen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
+ rec->data_len, transform->taglen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
rec->data_len -= transform->taglen;
/*
* Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts.
*/
- ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ),
- transform->iv_dec,
- transform->fixed_ivlen,
- dynamic_iv,
- dynamic_iv_len );
+ ssl_build_record_nonce(iv, sizeof(iv), transform->iv_dec,
+ transform->fixed_ivlen, dynamic_iv,
+ dynamic_iv_len);
/*
* Build additional data for AEAD encryption.
* This depends on the TLS version.
*/
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
- transform->minor_ver );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
- add_data, add_data_len );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", add_data,
+ add_data_len);
/* Because of the check above, we know that there are
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
@@ -1314,50 +1244,46 @@
* the debug message and the invocation of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
- transform->taglen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
+ transform->taglen);
/*
* Decrypt and authenticate
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
- iv, transform->ivlen,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */
- data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
- transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret );
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, iv, transform->ivlen, add_data,
+ add_data_len, data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src
+ */
+ data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
+ transform->taglen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret);
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
auth_done++;
/* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */
- if( olen != rec->data_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (olen != rec->data_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
- if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
- {
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
size_t minlen = 0;
/*
* Check immediate ciphertext sanity
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */
minlen += transform->ivlen;
-#endif
+# endif
/* Size considerations:
*
@@ -1380,27 +1306,25 @@
* lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which
* we test for in the second check below.
*/
- if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen ||
- rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") "
- "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len,
- transform->ivlen,
- transform->maclen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen ||
+ rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") "
+ "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )",
+ rec->data_len, transform->ivlen,
+ transform->maclen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
/*
* Authenticate before decrypt if enabled
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ if (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) {
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac"));
/* Update data_len in tandem with add_data.
*
@@ -1413,34 +1337,31 @@
*
* Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
- transform->minor_ver );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
/* Calculate expected MAC. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
- add_data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- data, rec->data_len );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
+ add_data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, data, rec->data_len);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect);
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_dec);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len,
- transform->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
- transform->maclen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len,
+ transform->maclen);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen);
/* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
auth_done++;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
/*
* Check length sanity
@@ -1449,41 +1370,39 @@
/* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0,
* so the following check in particular implies that
* data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */
- if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0",
- rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") != 0",
+ rec->data_len, transform->ivlen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2
*/
/* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */
- memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen );
+ memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen);
data += transform->ivlen;
rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen;
rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
- transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen,
- data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(
+ &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, transform->iv_dec,
+ transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret);
+ return ret;
}
/* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */
- if( rec->data_len != olen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec->data_len != olen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having
@@ -1492,33 +1411,26 @@
* >= ivlen ). */
padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1];
- if( auth_done == 1 )
- {
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
- rec->data_len,
- padlen + 1 );
+ if (auth_done == 1) {
+ const size_t mask =
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(rec->data_len, padlen + 1);
correct &= mask;
- padlen &= mask;
- }
- else
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")",
- rec->data_len,
- transform->maclen,
- padlen + 1 ) );
+ padlen &= mask;
+ } else {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")",
+ rec->data_len, transform->maclen, padlen + 1));
}
-#endif
+# endif
const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
- rec->data_len,
- transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
+ rec->data_len, transform->maclen + padlen + 1);
correct &= mask;
- padlen &= mask;
+ padlen &= mask;
}
padlen++;
@@ -1526,68 +1438,64 @@
/* Regardless of the validity of the padding,
* we have data_len >= padlen here. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The padding check involves a series of up to 256
- * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record
- * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and
- * validity of the padding, always perform exactly
- * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account
- * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */
+ * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record
+ * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and
+ * validity of the padding, always perform exactly
+ * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account
+ * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */
size_t pad_count = 0;
- volatile unsigned char* const check = data;
+ volatile unsigned char *const check = data;
/* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above
- * that the subtraction is safe. */
+ * that the subtraction is safe. */
size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen;
size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256;
size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks;
size_t idx;
- for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ )
- {
+ for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) {
/* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
- * (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
- */
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
- padlen - 1 );
+ * (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
+ */
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(idx, padding_idx);
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq(check[idx], padlen - 1);
pad_count += mask & equal;
}
- correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
+ correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq(pad_count, padlen);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
-#endif
- padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ if (padlen > 0 && correct == 0)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected"));
+# endif
+ padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit(correct);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0
* and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid,
* padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion
* data_len >= padlen still holds. */
rec->data_len -= padlen;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption",
- data, rec->data_len );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "raw buffer after decryption", data,
+ rec->data_len);
+# endif
/*
* Authenticate if not done yet.
* Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME).
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
- if( auth_done == 0 )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+ if (auth_done == 0) {
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
@@ -1605,50 +1513,45 @@
* hence data_len >= maclen in any case.
*/
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
- ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
- transform->minor_ver );
+ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
+ transform->minor_ver);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
- * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
- * data_len over all padlen values.
- *
- * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
- * data_len -= padlen.
- *
- * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
- * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
- */
+ * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
+ * data_len over all padlen values.
+ *
+ * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
+ * data_len -= padlen.
+ *
+ * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
+ * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
+ */
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
- const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
+ const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
- mac_expect );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
- return ret ;
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
+ add_data_len, data, rec->data_len, min_len,
+ max_len, mac_expect);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
- rec->data_len,
- min_len, max_len,
- transform->maclen );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, rec->data_len, min_len,
+ max_len, transform->maclen);
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen);
+# endif
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
-#endif
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(mac_peer, mac_expect, transform->maclen) !=
+ 0) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match"));
+# endif
correct = 0;
}
auth_done++;
@@ -1657,47 +1560,42 @@
/*
* Finally check the correct flag
*/
- if( correct == 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
+ if (correct == 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
- if( auth_done != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (auth_done != 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
- if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+ if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) {
/* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */
- ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len,
- &rec->type );
+ ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, &rec->type);
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
- {
- ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len,
- &rec->type );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if (rec->cid_len != 0) {
+ ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, &rec->type);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= decrypt buf"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#undef MAC_NONE
-#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT
-#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT
+# undef MAC_NONE
+# undef MAC_PLAINTEXT
+# undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT
/*
* Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it.
@@ -1714,34 +1612,31 @@
* For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when
* they're done reading a record.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
+int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
-#else
+# else
size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
-#endif
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input"));
- if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
- "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
+ "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)(ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
uint32_t timeout;
/*
@@ -1754,40 +1649,36 @@
/*
* Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable
*/
- if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 )
- {
- if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (ssl->next_record_offset != 0) {
+ if (ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset;
- if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %"
- MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->next_record_offset ) );
- memmove( ssl->in_hdr,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset,
- ssl->in_left );
+ if (ssl->in_left != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("next record in same datagram, offset: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->next_record_offset));
+ memmove(ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset,
+ ssl->in_left);
}
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_left, nb_want));
/*
* Done if we already have enough data.
*/
- if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left)
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (nb_want <= ssl->in_left) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= fetch input"));
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1795,10 +1686,9 @@
* are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something
* wrong.
*/
- if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (ssl->in_left != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
@@ -1806,263 +1696,246 @@
* This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages
* that will end up being dropped.
*/
- if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) );
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(ssl) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timer has expired"));
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
- }
- else
- {
- len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf );
+ } else {
+ len = in_buf_len - (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf);
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER)
timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
else
timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("f_recv_timeout: %lu ms",
+ (unsigned long)timeout));
- if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
- ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len,
- timeout );
+ if (ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL)
+ ret =
+ ssl->f_recv_timeout(ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, timeout);
else
- ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len );
+ ret = ssl->f_recv(ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret);
- if( ret == 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF;
}
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timeout"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0);
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ;
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) {
+ if (ssl_double_retransmit_timeout(ssl) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake timeout"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
}
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
- ret );
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ else if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
+ ret);
+ return ret;
}
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
}
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
ssl->in_left = ret;
- }
- else
-#endif
+ } else
+# endif
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_left, nb_want));
- while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
- {
+ while (ssl->in_left < nb_want) {
len = nb_want - ssl->in_left;
- if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(ssl) != 0)
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
- else
- {
- if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
- {
- ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len,
- ssl->conf->read_timeout );
- }
- else
- {
- ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio,
- ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len );
+ else {
+ if (ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL) {
+ ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout(ssl->p_bio,
+ ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len,
+ ssl->conf->read_timeout);
+ } else {
+ ret = ssl->f_recv(ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left,
+ len);
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_left, nb_want));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret);
- if( ret == 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF;
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
- if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested",
- ret, len ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if ((size_t)ret > len ||
+ (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " were requested",
+ ret, len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssl->in_left += ret;
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= fetch input"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Flush any data not yet written
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> flush output"));
- if( ssl->f_send == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
- "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl->f_send == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
+ "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */
- if( ssl->out_left == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (ssl->out_left == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= flush output"));
+ return 0;
}
- while( ssl->out_left > 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) );
+ while (ssl->out_left > 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left));
buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left;
- ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left );
+ ret = ssl->f_send(ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_send", ret);
- if( ret <= 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
- if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent",
- ret, ssl->out_left ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if ((size_t)ret > ssl->out_left ||
+ (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes were sent",
+ ret, ssl->out_left));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssl->out_left -= ret;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
- }
- else
-#endif
+ } else
+# endif
{
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
}
- mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= flush output"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/*
* Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight
*/
-static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_flight_append(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight",
- ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_flight_append"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message appended to flight", ssl->out_msg,
+ ssl->out_msglen);
/* Allocate space for current message */
- if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
- sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+ if ((msg = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item))) == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
+ sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
- if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
- ssl->out_msglen ) );
- mbedtls_free( msg );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+ if ((msg->p = mbedtls_calloc(1, ssl->out_msglen)) == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
+ ssl->out_msglen));
+ mbedtls_free(msg);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
/* Copy current handshake message with headers */
- memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
+ memcpy(msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen);
msg->len = ssl->out_msglen;
msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype;
msg->next = NULL;
/* Append to the current flight */
- if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL )
+ if (ssl->handshake->flight == NULL)
ssl->handshake->flight = msg;
- else
- {
+ else {
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight;
- while( cur->next != NULL )
+ while (cur->next != NULL)
cur = cur->next;
cur->next = msg;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_flight_append"));
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Free the current flight of handshake messages
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight )
+void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight)
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight;
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next;
- while( cur != NULL )
- {
+ while (cur != NULL) {
next = cur->next;
- mbedtls_free( cur->p );
- mbedtls_free( cur );
+ mbedtls_free(cur->p);
+ mbedtls_free(cur);
cur = next;
}
@@ -2071,49 +1944,48 @@
/*
* Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones
*/
-static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8];
- if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip swap epochs"));
+ return 0;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("swap epochs"));
/* Swap transforms */
- tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out;
- ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out;
+ tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out;
+ ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out;
ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform;
/* Swap epoch + sequence_number */
- memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 );
- memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 );
+ memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8);
+ memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8);
+ memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8);
/* Adjust to the newly activated transform */
- mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out);
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Retransmit the current flight of messages.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_resend"));
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_resend"));
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -2123,121 +1995,111 @@
* WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later.
* This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit"));
- if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) );
+ if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("initialise flight transmission"));
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12;
- ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING;
}
- while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL )
- {
+ while (ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL) {
size_t max_frag_len;
- const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg;
- int const is_finished =
- ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED );
+ int const is_finished = (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED);
uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ?
- SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH;
+ SSL_FORCE_FLUSH :
+ SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH;
/* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after
* sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ.
* Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */
- if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) );
- ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == (cur->p + 12)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("swap epochs to send finished message"));
+ ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
}
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
- max_frag_len = (size_t) ret;
+ ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ max_frag_len = (size_t)ret;
/* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */
- if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( max_frag_len == 0 )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (max_frag_len == 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0)
+ return ret;
continue;
}
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len );
- ssl->out_msglen = cur->len;
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len);
+ ssl->out_msglen = cur->len;
ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
/* Update position inside current message */
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len;
- }
- else
- {
- const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p;
const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12;
- const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 );
+ const size_t frag_off = p - (cur->p + 12);
const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off;
size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len;
- if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) )
- {
- if( is_finished )
- {
- ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if ((max_frag_len < 12) || (max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0)) {
+ if (is_finished) {
+ ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
}
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0)
+ return ret;
continue;
}
max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12;
- cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ?
- max_hs_frag_len : rem_len;
+ cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? max_hs_frag_len :
+ rem_len;
- if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)",
- (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len,
- (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) );
+ if (frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)",
+ (unsigned)cur_hs_frag_len, (unsigned)max_hs_frag_len));
}
/* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented,
* copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields.
* Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 );
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6);
- ssl->out_msg[6] = ( ( frag_off >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[7] = ( ( frag_off >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[8] = ( ( frag_off ) & 0xff );
+ ssl->out_msg[6] = ((frag_off >> 16) & 0xff);
+ ssl->out_msg[7] = ((frag_off >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ssl->out_msg[8] = ((frag_off)&0xff);
- ssl->out_msg[ 9] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 16 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[10] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len >> 8 ) & 0xff );
- ssl->out_msg[11] = ( ( cur_hs_frag_len ) & 0xff );
+ ssl->out_msg[9] = ((cur_hs_frag_len >> 16) & 0xff);
+ ssl->out_msg[10] = ((cur_hs_frag_len >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ssl->out_msg[11] = ((cur_hs_frag_len)&0xff);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12);
/* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len );
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len);
ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12;
ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
@@ -2246,52 +2108,46 @@
}
/* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */
- if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len )
- {
- if( cur->next != NULL )
- {
+ if (ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len) {
+ if (cur->next != NULL) {
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12;
- }
- else
- {
+ } else {
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL;
}
}
/* Actually send the message out */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, force_flush)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0)
+ return ret;
/* Update state and set timer */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
+ if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER)
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- else
- {
+ else {
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout);
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/* We won't need to resend that one any more */
- mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight );
+ mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(ssl->handshake->flight);
ssl->handshake->flight = NULL;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
@@ -2302,37 +2158,33 @@
ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
/* Clear future message buffering structure. */
- mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl);
/* Cancel timer */
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0);
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) {
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- }
- else
+ } else
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING;
}
/*
* To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl );
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
+ ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout);
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) {
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
- }
- else
+ } else
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Handshake layer functions
@@ -2360,43 +2212,40 @@
* (including handshake headers but excluding record headers)
* - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content)
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4;
const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0];
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write handshake message"));
/*
* Sanity checks
*/
- if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Whenever we send anything different from a
* HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */
- if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) &&
- ssl->handshake == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (!(ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ ssl->handshake == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-#endif
+# endif
/* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds
* of the outgoing record buffer.
@@ -2406,24 +2255,22 @@
*
* Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here.
*/
- if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: "
- "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->out_msglen,
- (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record too large: "
+ "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->out_msglen,
+ (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
* Fill handshake headers
*/
- if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 16 );
- ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)( hs_len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)( hs_len );
+ if (ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ssl->out_msg[1] = (unsigned char)(hs_len >> 16);
+ ssl->out_msg[2] = (unsigned char)(hs_len >> 8);
+ ssl->out_msg[3] = (unsigned char)(hs_len);
/*
* DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer,
@@ -2432,72 +2279,64 @@
* uint24 fragment_offset;
* uint24 fragment_length;
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */
- if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
- "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- hs_len,
- (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("DTLS handshake message too large: "
+ "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ hs_len, (size_t)(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len );
+ memmove(ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len);
ssl->out_msglen += 8;
/* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */
- if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
- {
- ssl->out_msg[4] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
- ssl->out_msg[5] = ( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ) & 0xFF;
- ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq );
- }
- else
- {
+ if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ ssl->out_msg[4] = (ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ ssl->out_msg[5] = (ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq) & 0xFF;
+ ++(ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq);
+ } else {
ssl->out_msg[4] = 0;
ssl->out_msg[5] = 0;
}
/* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation,
* so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */
- memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 );
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 );
+ memset(ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3);
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */
- if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
- ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
+ if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen);
}
/* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) )
- {
- if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret );
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ !(ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST)) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_flight_append(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_flight_append", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- }
- else
-#endif
+ } else
+# endif
{
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write handshake message"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -2512,222 +2351,205 @@
* - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers)
* - ssl->out_msg: record content
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush )
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush)
{
int ret, done = 0;
size_t len = ssl->out_msglen;
uint8_t flush = force_flush;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write record"));
- if( !done )
- {
+ if (!done) {
unsigned i;
size_t protected_record_size;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
-#else
+# else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
-#endif
+# endif
/* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption,
* as it may change when using the CID extension. */
- mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
+ ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1);
- memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( len );
+ memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8);
+ ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
+ ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)(len);
- if( ssl->transform_out != NULL )
- {
+ if (ssl->transform_out != NULL) {
mbedtls_record rec;
- rec.buf = ssl->out_iv;
- rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf );
- rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen;
+ rec.buf = ssl->out_iv;
+ rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf);
+ rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen;
rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf;
- memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
- mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver );
+ memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8);
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
+ ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver);
rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */
rec.cid_len = 0;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec,
- ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng,
+ ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( rec.data_offset != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec.data_offset != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Update the record content type and CID. */
ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID )
- memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ memcpy(ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len);
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len;
- ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 );
- ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len );
+ ssl->out_len[0] = (unsigned char)(rec.data_len >> 8);
+ ssl->out_len[1] = (unsigned char)(rec.data_len);
}
- protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl );
+ protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed
* the remaining space in the datagram. */
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
- if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret )
- {
+ if (protected_record_size > (size_t)ret) {
/* Should never happen */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */
- ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype;
+ ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char)ssl->out_msgtype;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, "
- "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1],
- ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("output record: msgtype = %u, "
+ "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], ssl->out_hdr[2], len));
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
- ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "output record sent to network", ssl->out_hdr,
+ protected_record_size);
ssl->out_left += protected_record_size;
- ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size;
- mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
+ ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size;
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out);
- for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
- if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
+ for (i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--)
+ if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0)
break;
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
- if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ;
+ if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("outgoing message counter would wrap"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING;
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH) {
size_t remaining;
- ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
- if( ret < 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram",
- ret );
- return ret ;
+ ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram",
+ ret);
+ return ret;
}
- remaining = (size_t) ret;
- if( remaining == 0 )
- {
+ remaining = (size_t)ret;
+ if (remaining == 0) {
flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) );
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Still %u bytes available in current datagram",
+ (unsigned)remaining));
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) &&
- ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH) &&
+ (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write record"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
- memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
- {
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
+ memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3) != 0) {
+ return 1;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[11] );
+ return ((ssl->in_msg[9] << 16) | (ssl->in_msg[10] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[11]);
}
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[8] );
+ return ((ssl->in_msg[6] << 16) | (ssl->in_msg[7] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[8]);
}
-static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static int ssl_check_hs_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len;
- msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
- frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
- frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
+ msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl);
+ frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off(ssl);
+ frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len(ssl);
- if( frag_off > msg_len )
- return -1 ;
+ if (frag_off > msg_len)
+ return -1;
- if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off )
- return -1 ;
+ if (frag_len > msg_len - frag_off)
+ return -1;
- if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen )
- return -1 ;
+ if (frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen)
+ return -1;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly)
*/
-static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len )
+static void ssl_bitmask_set(unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
unsigned int start_bits, end_bits;
- start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 );
- if( start_bits != 8 )
- {
+ start_bits = 8 - (offset % 8);
+ if (start_bits != 8) {
size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8;
/* Special case */
- if( len <= start_bits )
- {
- for( ; len != 0; len-- )
- mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len );
+ if (len <= start_bits) {
+ for (; len != 0; len--)
+ mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << (start_bits - len);
/* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */
return;
@@ -2736,133 +2558,124 @@
offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */
len -= start_bits;
- for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- )
- mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 );
+ for (; start_bits != 0; start_bits--)
+ mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << (start_bits - 1);
}
end_bits = len % 8;
- if( end_bits != 0 )
- {
- size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8;
+ if (end_bits != 0) {
+ size_t last_byte_idx = (offset + len) / 8;
len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */
- for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- )
- mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits );
+ for (; end_bits != 0; end_bits--)
+ mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << (8 - end_bits);
}
- memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 );
+ memset(mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8);
}
/*
* Check that bitmask is full
*/
-static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
+static int ssl_bitmask_check(unsigned char *mask, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
- for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ )
- if( mask[i] != 0xFF )
- return -1 ;
+ for (i = 0; i < len / 8; i++)
+ if (mask[i] != 0xFF)
+ return -1;
- for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ )
- if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 )
- return -1 ;
+ for (i = 0; i < len % 8; i++)
+ if ((mask[len / 8] & (1 << (7 - i))) == 0)
+ return -1;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */
-static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len,
- unsigned add_bitmap )
+static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(size_t msg_len,
+ unsigned add_bitmap)
{
size_t alloc_len;
- alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */
- alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */
+ alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */
+ alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */
- if( add_bitmap )
- alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */
+ if (add_bitmap)
+ alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + (msg_len % 8 != 0); /* Bitmap */
- return alloc_len ;
+ return alloc_len;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
- return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) |
- ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) |
- ssl->in_msg[3] );
+ return ((ssl->in_msg[1] << 16) | (ssl->in_msg[2] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[3]);
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_msglen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
+ ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen ="
- " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake message: msglen ="
+ " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen));
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
+ unsigned int recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5];
- if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl_check_hs_header(ssl) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid handshake header"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ||
- ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) )
- {
- if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ;
+ if (ssl->handshake != NULL &&
+ ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
+ recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) ||
+ (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO))) {
+ if (recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)",
+ recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE;
}
/* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid
* too many retransmissions.
* Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */
- if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, "
- "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) );
+ if (recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("received message from last flight, "
+ "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u",
+ recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq));
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: "
- "message_seq = %u, expected = %u",
- recv_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("dropping out-of-sequence message: "
+ "message_seq = %u, expected = %u",
+ recv_msg_seq,
+ ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq));
}
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
/* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */
@@ -2870,38 +2683,34 @@
* messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
* future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
* handshake logic layer. */
- if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ;
+ if (ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(ssl) == 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+ ("found fragmented DTLS handshake message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
- if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ;
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
+ if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS handshake fragmentation not supported"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL )
- {
- ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen );
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL) {
+ ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen);
}
/* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->handshake != NULL )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->handshake != NULL) {
unsigned offset;
mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
@@ -2913,20 +2722,18 @@
*/
/* Free first entry */
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 );
+ ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, 0);
/* Shift all other entries */
- for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
- offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS;
- offset++, hs_buf++ )
- {
+ for (offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
+ offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++, hs_buf++) {
*hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1);
}
/* Create a fresh last entry */
- memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
+ memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer));
}
-#endif
+# endif
}
/*
@@ -2939,24 +2746,22 @@
* in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0
* not seen yet).
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
-void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
ssl->in_window_top = 0;
ssl->in_window = 0;
}
-static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf )
+static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes(unsigned char *buf)
{
- return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
- ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) );
+ return (((uint64_t)buf[0] << 40) | ((uint64_t)buf[1] << 32) |
+ ((uint64_t)buf[2] << 24) | ((uint64_t)buf[3] << 16) |
+ ((uint64_t)buf[4] << 8) | ((uint64_t)buf[5]));
}
-static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr )
+static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ uint8_t *record_in_ctr)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *original_in_ctr;
@@ -2967,7 +2772,7 @@
// use counter from record
ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check((mbedtls_ssl_context const *)ssl);
// restore the counter
ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr;
@@ -2978,65 +2783,62 @@
/*
* Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl)
{
- uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
+ uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes(ssl->in_ctr + 2);
uint64_t bit;
- if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
- return 0 ;
+ if (ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED)
+ return 0;
- if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
- return 0 ;
+ if (rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top)
+ return 0;
bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
- if( bit >= 64 )
- return -1 ;
+ if (bit >= 64)
+ return -1;
- if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 )
- return -1 ;
+ if ((ssl->in_window & ((uint64_t)1 << bit)) != 0)
+ return -1;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Update replay window on new validated record
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
+ uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes(ssl->in_ctr + 2);
- if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
+ if (ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED)
return;
- if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
- {
+ if (rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top) {
/* Update window_top and the contents of the window */
uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top;
- if( shift >= 64 )
+ if (shift >= 64)
ssl->in_window = 1;
- else
- {
+ else {
ssl->in_window <<= shift;
ssl->in_window |= 1;
}
ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum;
- }
- else
- {
+ } else {
/* Mark that number as seen in the current window */
uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
- if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */
- ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit;
+ if (bit < 64) /* Always true, but be extra sure */
+ ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t)1 << bit;
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
* Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with
* a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
@@ -3048,13 +2850,17 @@
* return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
* - otherwise return a specific error code
*/
-static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
- mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
- void *p_cookie,
- const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
- unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen )
+static int
+ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
+ void *p_cookie,
+ const unsigned char *cli_id,
+ size_t cli_id_len,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char *obuf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen)
{
size_t sid_len, cookie_len;
unsigned char *p;
@@ -3085,27 +2891,23 @@
*
* Minimum length is 61 bytes.
*/
- if( in_len < 61 ||
- in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
- in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 ||
- in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ;
+ if (in_len < 61 || in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || in[3] != 0 ||
+ in[4] != 0 || in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
}
sid_len = in[59];
- if( sid_len > in_len - 61 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ;
+ if (sid_len > in_len - 61)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len];
- if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ;
+ if (cookie_len > in_len - 60)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
- if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
- cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
- {
+ if (f_cookie_check(p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, cli_id,
+ cli_id_len) == 0) {
/* Valid cookie */
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -3128,36 +2930,34 @@
*
* Minimum length is 28.
*/
- if( buf_len < 28 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ;
+ if (buf_len < 28)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
/* Copy most fields and adapt others */
- memcpy( obuf, in, 25 );
+ memcpy(obuf, in, 25);
obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
obuf[25] = 0xfe;
obuf[26] = 0xff;
/* Generate and write actual cookie */
p = obuf + 28;
- if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie,
- &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (f_cookie_write(p_cookie, &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
*olen = p - obuf;
/* Go back and fill length fields */
- obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 );
+ obuf[27] = (unsigned char)(*olen - 28);
- obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 );
- obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) );
+ obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)((*olen - 25) >> 16);
+ obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)((*olen - 25) >> 8);
+ obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)((*olen - 25));
- obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >> 8 );
- obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) );
+ obuf[11] = (unsigned char)((*olen - 13) >> 8);
+ obuf[12] = (unsigned char)((*olen - 13));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
}
/*
@@ -3180,74 +2980,66 @@
* includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected
* errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases).
*/
-static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
- if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ||
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL )
- {
+ if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ||
+ ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL) {
/* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer,
* drop the record. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, "
- "can't check reconnect validity" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no cookie callbacks, "
+ "can't check reconnect validity"));
+ return 0;
}
ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
- ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
- ssl->conf->p_cookie,
- ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
- ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
- ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
+ ssl->conf->f_cookie_write, ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
+ ssl->conf->p_cookie, ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, ssl->in_buf,
+ ssl->in_left, ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret);
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
- {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
int send_ret;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
- ssl->out_buf, len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sending HelloVerifyRequest"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "output record sent to network", ssl->out_buf,
+ len);
/* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here.
* If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
* if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
- send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret );
- (void) send_ret;
+ send_ret = ssl->f_send(ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret);
+ (void)send_ret;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
- if( ret == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cookie is valid, resetting context"));
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "reset", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT;
}
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type )
+static int ssl_check_record_type(uint8_t record_type)
{
- if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ if (record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
- record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -3269,73 +3061,68 @@
* Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received
* the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others.
*/
-static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len,
- mbedtls_record *rec )
+static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ mbedtls_record *rec)
{
int major_ver, minor_ver;
- size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0;
- size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1;
- size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset +
- rec_hdr_type_len;
- size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset =
+ rec_hdr_type_offset + rec_hdr_type_len;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2;
- size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- uint32_t rec_epoch;
- size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset +
- rec_hdr_version_len;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ uint32_t rec_epoch;
+ size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset =
+ rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset +
- rec_hdr_ctr_len;
- size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len;
+ size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0;
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */
- size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2;
+ size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */
+ size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2;
/*
* Check minimum lengths for record header.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len;
}
- if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u",
- (unsigned) len,
- (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u",
+ (unsigned)len, (unsigned)(rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
/*
* Parse and validate record content type
*/
- rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ];
+ rec->type = buf[rec_hdr_type_offset];
/* Check record content type */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
rec->cid_len = 0;
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 &&
- rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID )
- {
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID) {
/* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID
* struct {
* ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
@@ -3354,27 +3141,26 @@
rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len;
rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len;
- if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u",
- (unsigned) len,
- (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u",
+ (unsigned)len,
+ (unsigned)(rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
/* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */
- rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len;
- memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ rec->cid_len = (uint8_t)rec_hdr_cid_len;
+ memcpy(rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len);
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
- if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u",
- (unsigned) rec->type ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl_check_record_type(rec->type)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unknown record type %u",
+ (unsigned)rec->type));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
}
@@ -3382,40 +3168,34 @@
* Parse and validate record version
*/
- rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ];
- rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ];
- mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
- ssl->conf->transport,
- &rec->ver[0] );
+ rec->ver[0] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 0];
+ rec->ver[1] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 1];
+ mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport,
+ &rec->ver[0]);
- if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (major_ver != ssl->major_ver) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("major version mismatch"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("minor version mismatch"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
/*
* Parse/Copy record sequence number.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */
- memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset,
- rec_hdr_ctr_len );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ memcpy(&rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, rec_hdr_ctr_len);
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
/* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */
- memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len );
+ memcpy(&rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len);
}
/*
@@ -3423,88 +3203,84 @@
*/
rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len;
- rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) |
- ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset );
+ rec->data_len = ((size_t)buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 0] << 8) |
+ ((size_t)buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 1] << 0);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, "
- "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- rec->type,
- major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("input record: msgtype = %u, "
+ "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ rec->type, major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len));
- rec->buf = buf;
+ rec->buf = buf;
rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len;
- if( rec->data_len == 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (rec->data_len == 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
- /*
- * DTLS-related tests.
- * Check epoch before checking length constraint because
- * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec
- * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message,
- * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs
- * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than
- * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform.
- * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently,
- * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid
- * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1];
+ /*
+ * DTLS-related tests.
+ * Check epoch before checking length constraint because
+ * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec
+ * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message,
+ * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs
+ * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than
+ * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform.
+ * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently,
+ * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid
+ * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped.
+ */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ rec_epoch = (rec->ctr[0] << 8) | rec->ctr[1];
/* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record
* of the advertised length. */
- if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.",
- (unsigned) len,
- (unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.",
+ (unsigned)len, (unsigned)(rec->data_offset + rec->data_len)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
/* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded.
* (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in
* the caller). */
- if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
- "expected %u, received %lu",
- ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) );
+ if (rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("record from another epoch: "
+ "expected %u, received %lu",
+ ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long)rec_epoch));
/* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering
* (concretely: early Finished messages). */
- if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ;
+ if (rec_epoch == (unsigned)ssl->in_epoch + 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Consider record for buffering"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE;
}
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
/* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their
* sequence number has been seen before. */
- else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl,
- &rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ;
+ else if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check(
+ (mbedtls_ssl_context *)ssl, &rec->ctr[0]) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
-#endif
+# endif
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
+ unsigned int rec_epoch = (ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
/*
* Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
@@ -3512,65 +3288,58 @@
* have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
* fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
*/
- if( rec_epoch == 0 &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ if (rec_epoch == 0 && ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- ssl->in_left > 13 &&
- ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
- "from the same port" ) );
- return ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ;
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && ssl->in_left > 13 &&
+ ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("possible client reconnect "
+ "from the same port"));
+ return ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(ssl);
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/*
* If applicable, decrypt record content
*/
-static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_record *rec )
+static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_record *rec)
{
int ret, done = 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network",
- rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record from network", rec->buf,
+ rec->buf_len);
- if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL )
- {
+ if (!done && ssl->transform_in != NULL) {
unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in,
- rec ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_in, rec)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID &&
- ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid
- == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID &&
+ ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ignoring unexpected CID"));
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
- if( old_msg_type != rec->type )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d",
- old_msg_type, rec->type ) );
+ if (old_msg_type != rec->type) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4,
+ ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d",
+ old_msg_type, rec->type));
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt",
- rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input payload after decrypt",
+ rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* We have already checked the record content type
* in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently
* dropping the record in the case of an unknown type.
@@ -3578,24 +3347,24 @@
* Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type
* might change during decryption, re-check the record
* content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */
- if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl_check_record_type(rec->type)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unknown record type"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- if( rec->data_len == 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
- && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (rec->data_len == 0) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
+ rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are
+ * not application data */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("invalid zero-length message type: %d",
+ ssl->in_msgtype));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
ssl->nb_zero++;
@@ -3603,58 +3372,51 @@
* Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
* (excessive CPU consumption).
*/
- if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
- "messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
+ if (ssl->nb_zero > 3) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received four consecutive empty "
+ "messages, possible DoS attack"));
/* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated,
* thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed
* by the configured bad MAC threshold. */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
- }
- else
+ } else
ssl->nb_zero = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */
- }
- else
-#endif
+ } else
+# endif
{
unsigned i;
- for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
- if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
+ for (i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--)
+ if (++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0)
break;
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
- if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ;
+ if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+ ("incoming message counter would wrap"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING;
}
}
-
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl);
}
-#endif
+# endif
/* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against
* configured maximum. */
- if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad message length"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -3666,434 +3428,419 @@
*/
/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */
-static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+static int ssl_record_is_in_progress(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned update_hs_digest )
+int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned update_hs_digest)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read record"));
- if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 )
- {
+ if (ssl->keep_current_message == 0) {
do {
+ ret = ssl_consume_current_message(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
- ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
-
- if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl_record_is_in_progress(ssl) == 0) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
int have_buffered = 0;
/* We only check for buffered messages if the
* current datagram is fully consumed. */
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
- {
- if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 )
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(ssl) == 0) {
+ if (ssl_load_buffered_message(ssl) == 0)
have_buffered = 1;
}
- if( have_buffered == 0 )
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ if (have_buffered == 0)
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
- ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl );
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING )
+ ret = ssl_get_next_record(ssl);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING)
continue;
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_get_next_record"), ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
}
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(ssl);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) {
/* Buffer future message */
- ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ ret = ssl_buffer_message(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ||
- MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret );
+ } while (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ||
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret);
- if( 0 != ret )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type"), ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
- update_hs_digest == 1 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+ update_hs_digest == 1) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
}
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) );
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("reuse previously read message"));
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read record"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset)
+ return 1;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
int ret = 0;
- if( hs == NULL )
- return -1 ;
+ if (hs == NULL)
+ return -1;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage"));
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
+ if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
+ ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before.
* If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */
- if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) );
+ if (!hs->buffering.seen_ccs) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CCS not seen in the current flight"));
ret = -1;
goto exit;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Injecting buffered CCS message"));
ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
ssl->in_msglen = 1;
ssl->in_msg[0] = 1;
/* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */
- ssl->in_left = 0;
+ ssl->in_left = 0;
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
goto exit;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
/* Debug only */
{
unsigned offset;
- for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
- {
+ for (offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++) {
hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset];
- if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.",
- hs->in_msg_seq + offset,
- hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) );
+ if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.",
+ hs->in_msg_seq + offset,
+ hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially"));
}
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
/* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the
* next handshake message. */
hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
- if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) )
- {
+ if ((hs_buf->is_valid == 1) && (hs_buf->is_complete == 1)) {
/* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */
- size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) |
- ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) |
- hs_buf->data[3];
+ size_t msg_len = (hs_buf->data[1] << 16) | (hs_buf->data[2] << 8) |
+ hs_buf->data[3];
/* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered
* a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */
- if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)",
- hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Next handshake message has been buffered - load"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)",
+ hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12);
ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
- ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12;
- ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12;
- memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen );
+ ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12;
+ ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12;
+ memcpy(ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen);
ret = 0;
goto exit;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered",
- hs->in_msg_seq ) );
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered",
+ hs->in_msg_seq));
}
ret = -1;
exit:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) );
- return ret ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_load_buffered_message"));
+ return ret;
}
-static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- size_t desired )
+static int ssl_buffer_make_space(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t desired)
{
int offset;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available",
- (unsigned) desired ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available",
+ (unsigned)desired));
/* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
+ ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl);
/* Check if we have enough space available now. */
- if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (desired <=
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Enough space available after freeing future epoch record"));
+ return 0;
}
/* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake
* message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space,
* starting with the most distant one. */
- for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1;
- offset >= 0; offset-- )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message",
- offset ) );
+ for (offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; offset >= 0; offset--) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message",
+ offset));
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset );
+ ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, (uint8_t)offset);
/* Check if we have enough space available now. */
- if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (desired <= (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages"));
+ return 0;
}
}
- return -1 ;
+ return -1;
}
-static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = 0;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
- if( hs == NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (hs == NULL)
+ return 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_buffer_message"));
- switch( ssl->in_msgtype )
- {
+ switch (ssl->in_msgtype) {
case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Remember CCS message"));
hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1;
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE:
- {
- unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset;
- unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
- size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12;
-
- /* We should never receive an old handshake
- * message - double-check nonetheless. */
- if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
- }
+ unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset;
+ unsigned recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5];
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
+ size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12;
- recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
- if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
- {
- /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
- ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, "
- "buffering window %u - %u",
- recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq,
- ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) );
+ /* We should never receive an old handshake
+ * message - double-check nonetheless. */
+ if (recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
- goto exit;
- }
+ recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
+ if (recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS) {
+ /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, "
+ "buffering window %u - %u",
+ recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq,
+ ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq +
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1));
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ",
- recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) );
-
- hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ];
-
- /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */
- if( !hs_buf->is_valid )
- {
- size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
-
- hs_buf->is_fragmented =
- ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 );
-
- /* We copy the message back into the input buffer
- * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
- * This is an implementation-specific limitation
- * and not one from the standard, hence it is not
- * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */
- if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
- {
- /* Ignore message */
goto exit;
}
- /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */
- if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered >
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
- }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ",
+ recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset));
- reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len,
- hs_buf->is_fragmented );
+ hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[recv_msg_seq_offset];
- if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 )
- {
- /* If we can't buffer a future message because
- * of space limitations -- ignore. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- goto exit;
- }
- else
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
- msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- }
-
- if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed"
- " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
- msg_len,
- reassembly_buf_sz,
- (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto exit;
- }
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- msg_len ) );
-
- hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz );
- if( hs_buf->data == NULL )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
- goto exit;
- }
- hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz;
-
- /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq,
- * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */
- memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 );
- memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 );
- memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 );
-
- hs_buf->is_valid = 1;
-
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */
- if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) );
- /* Ignore */
- goto exit;
- }
- }
-
- if( !hs_buf->is_complete )
- {
- size_t frag_len, frag_off;
- unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12;
-
- /*
- * Check and copy current fragment
+ /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced.
*/
+ if (!hs_buf->is_valid) {
+ size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
- /* Validation of header fields already done in
- * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */
- frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
- frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
+ hs_buf->is_fragmented =
+ (ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(ssl) == 1);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- frag_off, frag_len ) );
- memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len );
+ /* We copy the message back into the input buffer
+ * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
+ * This is an implementation-specific limitation
+ * and not one from the standard, hence it is not
+ * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */
+ if (msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ /* Ignore message */
+ goto exit;
+ }
- if( hs_buf->is_fragmented )
- {
- unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len;
- ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len );
- hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask,
- msg_len ) == 0 );
- }
- else
- {
- hs_buf->is_complete = 1;
+ /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */
+ if (hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered >
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(
+ msg_len, hs_buf->is_fragmented);
+
+ if (reassembly_buf_sz >
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) {
+ if (recv_msg_seq_offset > 0) {
+ /* If we can't buffer a future message because
+ * of space limitations -- ignore. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
+ msg_len,
+ (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered));
+ goto exit;
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
+ msg_len,
+ (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered));
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_buffer_make_space(ssl, reassembly_buf_sz) !=
+ 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " with bitmap) would exceed"
+ " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
+ msg_len, reassembly_buf_sz,
+ (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered));
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ msg_len));
+
+ hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc(1, reassembly_buf_sz);
+ if (hs_buf->data == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz;
+
+ /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and
+ * message_seq, then add standardised fragment_offset and
+ * fragment_length */
+ memcpy(hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6);
+ memset(hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3);
+ memcpy(hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3);
+
+ hs_buf->is_valid = 1;
+
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz;
+ } else {
+ /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */
+ if (memcmp(hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Fragment header mismatch - ignore"));
+ /* Ignore */
+ goto exit;
+ }
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete",
- hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) );
+ if (!hs_buf->is_complete) {
+ size_t frag_len, frag_off;
+ unsigned char *const msg = hs_buf->data + 12;
+
+ /*
+ * Check and copy current fragment
+ */
+
+ /* Validation of header fields already done in
+ * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */
+ frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off(ssl);
+ frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len(ssl);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ frag_off, frag_len));
+ memcpy(msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len);
+
+ if (hs_buf->is_fragmented) {
+ unsigned char *const bitmask = msg + msg_len;
+ ssl_bitmask_set(bitmask, frag_off, frag_len);
+ hs_buf->is_complete =
+ (ssl_bitmask_check(bitmask, msg_len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ hs_buf->is_complete = 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("message %scomplete",
+ hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet "));
+ }
+
+ break;
}
- break;
- }
-
default:
/* We don't buffer other types of messages. */
break;
@@ -4101,12 +3848,12 @@
exit:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) );
- return ret ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_buffer_message"));
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/*
* Consume last content-layer message and potentially
@@ -4131,15 +3878,13 @@
*/
/* Case (1): Handshake messages */
- if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_hslen != 0) {
/* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data
* is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during
* ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */
- if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
@@ -4163,289 +3908,268 @@
* bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected
* sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record.
*/
- if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen) {
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen;
- memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen,
- ssl->in_msglen );
+ memmove(ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, ssl->in_msglen);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record",
- ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
- }
- else
- {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "remaining content in record", ssl->in_msg,
+ ssl->in_msglen);
+ } else {
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
}
- ssl->in_hslen = 0;
+ ssl->in_hslen = 0;
}
/* Case (4): Application data */
- else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- return 0 ;
+ else if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) {
+ return 0;
}
/* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */
- else
- {
+ else {
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_record_is_in_progress(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 )
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->in_msglen > 0)
+ return 1;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static void ssl_free_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- if( hs == NULL )
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ if (hs == NULL)
return;
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
- {
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -=
- hs->buffering.future_record.len;
+ if (hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL) {
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs->buffering.future_record.len;
- mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data );
+ mbedtls_free(hs->buffering.future_record.data);
hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL;
}
}
-static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_load_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- unsigned char * rec;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ unsigned char *rec;
size_t rec_len;
unsigned rec_epoch;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
-#else
+# else
size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
-#endif
- if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- return 0 ;
+# endif
+ if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
+ return 0;
- if( hs == NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (hs == NULL)
+ return 0;
- rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data;
- rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len;
+ rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data;
+ rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len;
rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch;
- if( rec == NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (rec == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Only consider loading future records if the
* input buffer is empty. */
- if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 )
- return 0 ;
+ if (ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(ssl) == 1)
+ return 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_load_buffered_record"));
- if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) );
+ if (rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Buffered record not from current epoch."));
goto exit;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+ ("Found buffered record from current epoch - load"));
/* Double-check that the record is not too large */
- if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ if (rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)(ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len );
+ memcpy(ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len);
ssl->in_left = rec_len;
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
+ ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl);
exit:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_load_buffered_record"));
+ return 0;
}
-static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_record const *rec )
+static int ssl_buffer_future_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_record const *rec)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
/* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */
- if( hs == NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (hs == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested
* in Finished messages). */
- if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- return 0 ;
+ if (rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE)
+ return 0;
/* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
- return 0 ;
+ if (hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */
- if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
- rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
- hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
- return 0 ;
+ if (rec->buf_len >
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2,
+ ("Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
+ rec->buf_len, (size_t)MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
+ hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered));
+ return 0;
}
/* Buffer record */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u",
- ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+ ("Buffer record from epoch %u", ssl->in_epoch + 1U));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len);
/* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records
* of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */
hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1;
- hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len;
+ hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len;
hs->buffering.future_record.data =
- mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len );
- if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL )
- {
+ mbedtls_calloc(1, hs->buffering.future_record.len);
+ if (hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL) {
/* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a
* record from the next epoch, just ignore. */
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
- memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
+ memcpy(hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len);
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_record rec;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* We might have buffered a future record; if so,
* and if the epoch matches now, load it.
* On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to
* the length of the buffered record, so that
* the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will
* essentially be no-ops. */
- ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ ret = ssl_load_buffered_record(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form
* of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS,
* with no space for CIDs counted in). */
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
- return ret ;
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
- {
- ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) {
+ ret = ssl_buffer_future_record(ssl, &rec);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
/* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records,
* assuming no CID and no offset between record content and
* record plaintext. */
- mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
/* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */
ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2;
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2;
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
- ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
-#endif
+ ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect(ssl);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+# endif
/* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */
ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record "
- "(header)" ) );
- }
- else
- {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding unexpected record "
+ "(header)"));
+ } else {
/* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_left = 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record "
- "(header)" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding invalid record "
+ "(header)"));
}
/* Get next record */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ;
- }
- else
-#endif
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ } else
+# endif
{
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */
ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len;
- if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) );
+ if (ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("more than one record within datagram"));
}
- }
- else
-#endif
+ } else
+# endif
{
/*
* Fetch record contents from underlying transport.
*/
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
- return ret ;
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, rec.buf_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
+ return ret;
}
ssl->in_left = 0;
@@ -4455,36 +4179,30 @@
* Decrypt record contents.
*/
- if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+ if ((ret = ssl_prepare_record_content(ssl, &rec)) != 0) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* Silently discard invalid records */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
/* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here
* probably means something went wrong in the handshake
* (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ||
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
+ if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ||
+ ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
}
-#endif
- return ret ;
+# endif
+ return ret;
}
- if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
- ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ;
+ if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
+ ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
/* As above, invalid records cause
@@ -4493,37 +4211,34 @@
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_left = 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding invalid record (mac)"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
- return ret ;
- }
- else
-#endif
+ return ret;
+ } else
+# endif
{
/* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
}
-#endif
- return ret ;
+# endif
+ return ret;
}
}
-
/* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records,
* assuming no CID and no offset between record content and
* record plaintext. */
- mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
/* The record content type may change during decryption,
* so re-read it. */
@@ -4533,210 +4248,197 @@
* record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating
* a renegotiation. */
ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type;
- ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset;
+ ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset;
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
- ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 );
- ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len );
+ ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)(rec.data_len >> 8);
+ ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)(rec.data_len);
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* Handle particular types of records
*/
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(ssl)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
}
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (ssl->in_msglen != 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_msglen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x",
- ssl->in_msg[0] ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ if (ssl->in_msg[0] != 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid CCS message, content: %02x",
+ ssl->in_msg[0]));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
- ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- if( ssl->handshake == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+ ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (ssl->handshake == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE;
}
-#endif
+# endif
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
- {
- if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) {
+ if (ssl->in_msglen != 2) {
/* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert
to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't
currently support this. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- ssl->in_msglen ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ssl->in_msglen));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]",
- ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]",
+ ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1]));
/*
* Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation
*/
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)",
- ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ;
+ if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("is a fatal alert message (msg %d)",
+ ssl->in_msg[1]));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE;
}
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ;
+ if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
+ ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a close notify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED)
- if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
- ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a no renegotiation alert" ) );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED)
+ if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
+ ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a no renegotiation alert"));
/* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
+# endif
/* Silently ignore: fetch new message */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records,
* except at the beginning of renegotiations */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO )
-#endif
- )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ && !(ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)
+# endif
+ ) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("dropping unexpected ApplicationData"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL;
}
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
+ if (ssl->handshake != NULL &&
+ ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl);
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) );
+ return (mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE));
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char level,
- unsigned char message )
+int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char level,
+ unsigned char message)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message ));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> send alert message"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message));
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT;
ssl->out_msglen = 2;
ssl->out_msg[0] = level;
ssl->out_msg[1] = message;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= send alert message"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write change cipher spec"));
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- ssl->out_msglen = 1;
- ssl->out_msg[0] = 1;
+ ssl->out_msglen = 1;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = 1;
ssl->state++;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse change cipher spec"));
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad change cipher spec message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
/* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1',
@@ -4746,37 +4448,35 @@
* Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound
* data.
*/
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+ ("switching to new transform spec for inbound data"));
ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate;
ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
- mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl);
+# endif
/* Increment epoch */
- if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) );
+ if (++ssl->in_epoch == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap"));
/* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so
treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
- memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 );
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8);
- mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
ssl->state++;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse change cipher spec"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
@@ -4787,46 +4487,44 @@
* and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
*/
-static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len(
- mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform )
+static size_t
+ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len(mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform)
{
- if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
- return 0 ;
+ if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3)
+ return 0;
- return transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen ;
+ return transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
}
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
+void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform)
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid;
- if( transform != NULL )
+ if (transform != NULL)
ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len;
-#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2;
- }
- else
-#endif
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2;
+ } else
+# endif
{
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len;
-#endif
- ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5;
+# endif
+ ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5;
}
ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv;
/* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */
- if( transform != NULL )
- ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform );
+ if (transform != NULL)
+ ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len(transform);
}
/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
@@ -4837,7 +4535,7 @@
* and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/* This function sets the pointers to match the case
* of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv
@@ -4849,31 +4547,29 @@
* record plaintext.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
/* This sets the header pointers to match records
* without CID. When we receive a record containing
* a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in
* ssl_parse_record_header(). */
- ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
+ ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */
-#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
- }
- else
-#endif
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
+ } else
+# endif
{
ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len;
-#endif
- ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5;
+# endif
+ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5;
}
/* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */
@@ -4884,79 +4580,79 @@
* Setup an SSL context
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf;
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
- ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
+ ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
}
/* Derive other internal pointers. */
- mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ );
- mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl );
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */);
+ mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl);
}
/*
* SSL get accessors
*/
-size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- return ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ;
+ return ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
/*
* Case A: We're currently holding back
* a message for further processing.
*/
- if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) );
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->keep_current_message == 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing"));
+ return 1;
}
/*
* Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) );
- return 1 ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram"));
+ return 1;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Case C: A handshake message is being processed.
*/
- if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) );
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3,
+ ("ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record"));
+ return 1;
}
/*
* Case D: An application data message is being processed
*/
- if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) );
- return 1 ;
+ if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3,
+ ("ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed"));
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -4965,24 +4661,22 @@
* we implement support for multiple alerts in single records.
*/
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) );
- return 0 ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_check_pending: nothing pending"));
+ return 0;
}
-
-int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
size_t transform_expansion = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out;
unsigned block_size;
- size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl );
+ size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl);
- if( transform == NULL )
- return (int) out_hdr_len ;
+ if (transform == NULL)
+ return (int)out_hdr_len;
- switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) )
- {
+ switch (mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc)) {
case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY:
@@ -4992,8 +4686,8 @@
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
- block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
- &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
+ block_size =
+ mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc);
/* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */
transform_expansion += transform->maclen;
@@ -5005,56 +4699,55 @@
/* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added
* after the record header. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
transform_expansion += block_size;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
break;
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
- if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if (transform->out_cid_len != 0)
transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
- return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) );
+ return ((int)(out_hdr_len + transform_expansion));
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/*
* Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit.
*/
-static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
- size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl );
+ size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl);
int in_ctr_cmp;
int out_ctr_cmp;
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ||
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ||
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ||
- ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED )
- {
- return 0 ;
+ ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) {
+ return 0;
}
- in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len,
- ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
- out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len,
- ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
+ in_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len,
+ 8 - ep_len);
+ out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len,
+ ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len);
- if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 )
- {
- return 0 ;
+ if (in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0) {
+ return 0;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) );
- return mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("record counter limit reached: renegotiate"));
+ return mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(ssl);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is
* received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages
@@ -5065,7 +4758,7 @@
* and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and
* TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read().
*/
-static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -5075,118 +4768,106 @@
* - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
- ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
+ ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)"));
/* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- return 0 ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ;
+# endif
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)"));
/* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- return 0 ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ;
+# endif
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
- if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
- ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
- ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
- MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) )
- {
+ if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
+ (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) {
/*
* Accept renegotiation request
*/
/* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING;
}
-#endif
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation",
- ret );
- return ret ;
+# endif
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl);
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+ } else
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
/*
* Refuse renegotiation
*/
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert"));
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read"));
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0)
+ return ret;
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
- ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->handshake != NULL &&
+ ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0)
+ return ret;
}
}
-#endif
+# endif
/*
* Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is
@@ -5200,82 +4881,68 @@
* after a renegotiation request.)
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl);
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
+# endif
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
/* Loop as long as no application data record is available */
- while( ssl->in_offt == NULL )
- {
+ while (ssl->in_offt == NULL) {
/* Start timer if not already running */
- if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL &&
- ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout );
+ if (ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && ssl->f_get_timer(ssl->p_timer) == -1) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout);
}
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
- return 0 ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF)
+ return 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 &&
- ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_msglen == 0 &&
+ ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
/*
* OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
- return 0 ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF)
+ return 0;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
- {
- ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( ssl );
- if( ret != 0)
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake",
- ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake",
+ ret);
+ return ret;
}
/* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered
- * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases
- * to consider are the following:
- * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record
- * has been read yet.
- * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
- * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello.
- * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
- * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting
- * the ServerHello.
+ * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The
+ * cases to consider are the following: 1) The renegotiation is
+ * complete. In this case, no new record has been read yet. 2) The
+ * renegotiation is incomplete because the client received an
+ * application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. 3) The
+ * renegotiation is incomplete because the client received a
+ * non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting the
+ * ServerHello.
*
* In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action:
* - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check
@@ -5289,85 +4956,75 @@
continue;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 )
- {
- if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
- "but not honored by client" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) {
+ if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0) {
+ if (++ssl->renego_records_seen >
+ ssl->conf->renego_max_records) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation requested, "
+ "but not honored by client"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
- if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
}
- if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ;
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad application data message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
/* We're going to return something now, cancel timer,
* except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
+ if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER)
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest.
- * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch
- * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
- ret );
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest.
+ * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch
+ * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
+ ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
}
- n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen )
- ? len : ssl->in_msglen;
+ n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) ? len : ssl->in_msglen;
- memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n );
+ memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n);
ssl->in_msglen -= n;
/* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data
from the memory. */
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n);
- if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
- {
+ if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) {
/* all bytes consumed */
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
- }
- else
- {
+ } else {
/* more data available */
ssl->in_offt += n;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read"));
- return (int) n ;
+ return (int)n;
}
/*
@@ -5382,187 +5039,174 @@
* Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the
* corresponding return code is 0 on success.
*/
-static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+static int
+ssl_write_real(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
- int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl );
- const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret;
+ int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(ssl);
+ const size_t max_len = (size_t)ret;
- if( ret < 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- if( len > max_len )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) "
- "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
- " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
- len, max_len ) );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
- }
- else
-#endif
+ if (len > max_len) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("fragment larger than the (negotiated) "
+ "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ len, max_len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ } else
+# endif
len = max_len;
}
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- {
+ if (ssl->out_left != 0) {
/*
* The user has previously tried to send the data and
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially
* written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function
* (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret);
+ return ret;
}
- }
- else
- {
+ } else {
/*
* The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to
* copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure
* to keep track of partial writes
*/
- ssl->out_msglen = len;
+ ssl->out_msglen = len;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
- memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len );
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg, buf, len);
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- return (int) len ;
+ return (int)len;
}
/*
* Write application data (public-facing wrapper)
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write"));
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
- return ret ;
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
+# endif
- if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len );
+ ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write"));
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
/*
* Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write close notify"));
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ;
+ if (ssl->out_left != 0)
+ return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl);
- if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret );
- return ret ;
+ if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret);
+ return ret;
}
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write close notify"));
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
+void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform)
{
- if( transform == NULL )
+ if (transform == NULL)
return;
- mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
- mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc);
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
- mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
- mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+ mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_enc);
+ mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_dec);
+# endif
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transform, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform));
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
unsigned offset;
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
- if( hs == NULL )
+ if (hs == NULL)
return;
- ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
+ ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl);
- for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
- ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset );
+ for (offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++)
+ ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, offset);
}
-static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- uint8_t slot )
+static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t slot)
{
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
- mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot];
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *const hs = ssl->handshake;
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot];
- if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
+ if (slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS)
return;
- if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
- {
+ if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) {
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len );
- mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data );
- memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len);
+ mbedtls_free(hs_buf->data);
+ memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer));
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Convert version numbers to/from wire format
@@ -5572,44 +5216,44 @@
* For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows:
* 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2)
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
- unsigned char ver[2] )
+void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(int major,
+ int minor,
+ int transport,
+ unsigned char ver[2])
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ if (minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2)
--minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
- ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) );
- ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) );
- }
- else
-#else
- ((void) transport);
-#endif
+ ver[0] = (unsigned char)(255 - (major - 2));
+ ver[1] = (unsigned char)(255 - (minor - 1));
+ } else
+# else
+ ((void)transport);
+# endif
{
- ver[0] = (unsigned char) major;
- ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor;
+ ver[0] = (unsigned char)major;
+ ver[1] = (unsigned char)minor;
}
}
-void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
- const unsigned char ver[2] )
+void mbedtls_ssl_read_version(int *major,
+ int *minor,
+ int transport,
+ const unsigned char ver[2])
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
*major = 255 - ver[0] + 2;
*minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1;
- if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
+ if (*minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1)
++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
- }
- else
-#else
- ((void) transport);
-#endif
+ } else
+# else
+ ((void)transport);
+# endif
{
*major = ver[0];
*minor = ver[1];