Apply clang formatting.
Executed with:
`find . -regextype posix-egrep -regex ".*\.([hc]|fmt|function)" | xargs -L1 clang-format-12 -i`
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Starzyk <mateusz.starzyk@mobica.com>
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 5cded9c..9aa87ec 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -39,112 +39,117 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+# include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+# include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
+# include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+# include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+# include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include <string.h>
+# include <string.h>
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# include "mbedtls/md.h"
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && \
+ !defined(__NetBSD__)
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdio.h>
-#define mbedtls_printf printf
-#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
-#define mbedtls_free free
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+# include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+# else
+# include <stdio.h>
+# define mbedtls_printf printf
+# define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+# define mbedtls_free free
+# endif
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
/* Parameter validation macros */
-#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
- MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
-#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \
- MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
+# define RSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
+ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
+# define RSA_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
+static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t n)
{
size_t i;
- const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
- const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
+ const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *)a;
+ const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *)b;
unsigned char diff = 0;
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
- return diff ;
+ return diff;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- const mbedtls_mpi *N,
- const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
- const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E )
+int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *D,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
- if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q, Q ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) ||
+ (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) ||
+ (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->Q, Q)) != 0) ||
+ (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->D, D)) != 0) ||
+ (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->E, E)) != 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
- if( N != NULL )
- ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+ if (N != NULL)
+ ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len,
- unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len,
- unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len,
- unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len,
- unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char const *N,
+ size_t N_len,
+ unsigned char const *P,
+ size_t P_len,
+ unsigned char const *Q,
+ size_t Q_len,
+ unsigned char const *D,
+ size_t D_len,
+ unsigned char const *E,
+ size_t E_len)
{
int ret = 0;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
- if( N != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) );
- ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+ if (N != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
+ ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
}
- if( P != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) );
+ if (P != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
- if( Q != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) );
+ if (Q != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
- if( D != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) );
+ if (D != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
- if( E != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) );
+ if (E != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
cleanup:
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -152,19 +157,19 @@
* that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error.
* It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters.
*/
-static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv,
- int blinding_needed )
+static int rsa_check_context(mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx,
+ int is_priv,
+ int blinding_needed)
{
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether
* P,Q need to be present or not. */
- ((void) blinding_needed);
-#endif
+ ((void)blinding_needed);
+# endif
- if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) ||
- ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N) ||
+ ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/*
@@ -173,95 +178,87 @@
/* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for
* RSA public key operations. */
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) <= 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) <= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->N, 0) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only
* used for private key operations and if CRT
* is used. */
- if( is_priv &&
- ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (is_priv && (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->P, 0) == 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->Q, 0) == 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
/*
* 2. Exponents must be positive
*/
/* Always need E for public key operations */
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) <= 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) <= 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ
* as (unblinded) exponents. */
- if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) <= 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-#else
- if( is_priv &&
- ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) <= 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) <= 0 ) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) <= 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+# else
+ if (is_priv && (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) <= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) <= 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
- /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
- * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
- * done as part of 1. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- if( is_priv && blinding_needed &&
- ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
+ * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
+ * done as part of 1. */
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ if (is_priv && blinding_needed &&
+ (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#endif
+# endif
/* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied,
* but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- if( is_priv &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) <= 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#endif
+# endif
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
-#endif
+# endif
int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
- have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
+ have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0);
+ have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0);
+ have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0);
+ have_D = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0);
+ have_E = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0);
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
- have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
-#endif
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ have_DP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) != 0);
+ have_DQ = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) != 0);
+ have_QP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) != 0);
+# endif
/*
* Check whether provided parameters are enough
@@ -273,52 +270,43 @@
*
*/
- n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E;
- pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E;
- d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
- is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
+ n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E;
+ pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E;
+ d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
+ is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
/* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */
is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing;
- if( !is_priv && !is_pub )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (!is_priv && !is_pub)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/*
* Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided.
*/
- if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P,
- &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ if (!have_N && have_P && have_Q) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
- ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+ ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
}
/*
* Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters.
*/
- if( pq_missing )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D,
- &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ if (pq_missing) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(&ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, &ctx->P,
+ &ctx->Q);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
- }
- else if( d_missing )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P,
- &ctx->Q,
- &ctx->E,
- &ctx->D ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ } else if (d_missing) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(
+ &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->E, &ctx->D)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
}
@@ -327,108 +315,108 @@
* to our current RSA implementation.
*/
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
- &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ if (is_priv && !(have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+ &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
/*
* Step 3: Basic sanity checks
*/
- return rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ;
+ return rsa_check_context(ctx, is_priv, 1);
}
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- unsigned char *N, size_t N_len,
- unsigned char *P, size_t P_len,
- unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len,
- unsigned char *D, size_t D_len,
- unsigned char *E, size_t E_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *N,
+ size_t N_len,
+ unsigned char *P,
+ size_t P_len,
+ unsigned char *Q,
+ size_t Q_len,
+ unsigned char *D,
+ size_t D_len,
+ unsigned char *E,
+ size_t E_len)
{
int ret = 0;
int is_priv;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
/* Check if key is private or public */
- is_priv =
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+ is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
- if( !is_priv )
- {
+ if (!is_priv) {
/* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
* something must be wrong. */
- if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-
+ if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- if( N != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) );
+ if (N != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
- if( P != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) );
+ if (P != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
- if( Q != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) );
+ if (Q != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
- if( D != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) );
+ if (D != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
- if( E != NULL )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) );
+ if (E != NULL)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
cleanup:
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q,
- mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi *P,
+ mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+ mbedtls_mpi *D,
+ mbedtls_mpi *E)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int is_priv;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
/* Check if key is private or public */
- is_priv =
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+ is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
- if( !is_priv )
- {
+ if (!is_priv) {
/* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
* something must be wrong. */
- if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-
+ if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/* Export all requested core parameters. */
- if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) )
- {
- return ret ;
+ if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(N, &ctx->N)) != 0) ||
+ (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(P, &ctx->P)) != 0) ||
+ (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &ctx->Q)) != 0) ||
+ (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(D, &ctx->D)) != 0) ||
+ (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(E, &ctx->E)) != 0)) {
+ return ret;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -437,111 +425,107 @@
* write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt
* can be used in this case.
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_mpi *DP,
+ mbedtls_mpi *DQ,
+ mbedtls_mpi *QP)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int is_priv;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
/* Check if key is private or public */
- is_priv =
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+ is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
- if( !is_priv )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (!is_priv)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/* Export all requested blinding parameters. */
- if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) ||
- ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+ if ((DP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DP, &ctx->DP)) != 0) ||
+ (DQ != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DQ, &ctx->DQ)) != 0) ||
+ (QP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(QP, &ctx->QP)) != 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
-#else
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
- DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+# else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, DP, DQ, QP)) !=
+ 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
}
-#endif
+# endif
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize an RSA context
*/
-void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL);
- memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) );
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15;
ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
/* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been
* initialized and will need to be freed. */
ctx->ver = 1;
- mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
-#endif
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+# endif
}
/*
* Set padding for an existing RSA context
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
- mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id )
+int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int padding,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id)
{
- switch( padding )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ switch (padding) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
break;
-#endif
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
break;
-#endif
+# endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
- if( ( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) &&
- ( hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) )
- {
+ if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
ctx->padding = padding;
ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Get length in bytes of RSA modulus
*/
-size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
- return ctx->len ;
+ return ctx->len;
}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
/*
* Generate an RSA keypair
@@ -549,31 +533,31 @@
* This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of
* FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072.
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- unsigned int nbits, int exponent )
+int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ unsigned int nbits,
+ int exponent)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
int prime_quality = 0;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
/*
* If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
* the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
* rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
*/
- if( nbits > 1024 )
+ if (nbits > 1024)
prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &H );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &G );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &L );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
- if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 )
- {
+ if (nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -584,215 +568,210 @@
* 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
* 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 )
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent));
- do
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
- prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ do {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
+ prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
- prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
+ prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
- /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
- if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &H ) <= ( ( nbits >= 200 ) ? ( ( nbits >> 1 ) - 99 ) : 0 ) )
+ /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4
+ * §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&H) <=
+ ((nbits >= 200) ? ((nbits >> 1) - 99) : 0))
continue;
- /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */
- if( H.s < 0 )
- mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
+ /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P
+ * > Q */
+ if (H.s < 0)
+ mbedtls_mpi_swap(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
/* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
- /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 )
+ /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a))
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0)
continue;
- /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &L, NULL, &H, &G ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L ) );
+ /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4
+ * §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L, NULL, &H, &G));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L));
- if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->D ) <= ( ( nbits + 1 ) / 2 ) ) // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a))
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->D) <= ((nbits + 1) / 2)) // (FIPS 186-4
+ // §B.3.1
+ // criterion 3(a))
continue;
break;
- }
- while( 1 );
+ } while (1);
/* Restore P,Q */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
- ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+ ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/*
* DP = D mod (P - 1)
* DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
* QP = Q^-1 mod P
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
- &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+ &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP));
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
/* Double-check */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(ctx));
cleanup:
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &H );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &G );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &L );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx );
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
- if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret );
- return ret ;
+ if ((-ret & ~0x7f) == 0)
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret);
+ return ret;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
/*
* Check a public RSA key
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
- if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
- if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
- if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E ) < 2 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->E, 0) == 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E) < 2 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
- if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 ||
- rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 ||
+ rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
- if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q,
- &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->E,
+ NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
- &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ else if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+ &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
-#endif
+# endif
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
- const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL);
- if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 ||
- mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 ||
- mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Do an RSA public key operation
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
mbedtls_mpi T;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
- if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &T );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
- {
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
olen = ctx->len;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ;
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+# endif
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
- if( ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -801,63 +780,64 @@
* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
* Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
*/
-static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
{
int ret, count = 0;
mbedtls_mpi R;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
- if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
- {
+ if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) {
/* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
goto cleanup;
}
/* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
do {
- if( count++ > 10 )
- {
+ if (count++ > 10) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
/* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
/* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R
* are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know
* which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them.
* (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */
- ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N );
- if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N);
+ if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)
goto cleanup;
- } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
+ } while (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE);
/* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
/* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N
* (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
cleanup:
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -879,16 +859,16 @@
* This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a
* single trace.
*/
-#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
+# define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
/*
* Do an RSA private key operation
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
@@ -900,7 +880,7 @@
* exponent blinding factor, respectively. */
mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */
mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ;
@@ -912,121 +892,118 @@
* or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP;
mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ;
-#else
+# else
/* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */
mbedtls_mpi D_blind;
/* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded
* or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
/* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double
* checked result; should be the same in the end. */
mbedtls_mpi I, C;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (f_rng == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
- 1 /* blinding on */ ) != 0 )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
+ 1 /* blinding on */) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+# endif
/* MPI Initialization */
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &T );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind );
-#else
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind);
+# else
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind);
+# endif
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ );
-#endif
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ);
+# endif
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &I );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &C );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&I);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&C);
/* End of MPI initialization */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
- {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T));
/*
* Blinding
* T = T * Vi mod N
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
/*
* Exponent blinding
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
/*
* D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D));
D = &D_blind;
-#else
+# else
/*
* DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind,
- &ctx->DP ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, &ctx->DP));
DP = &DP_blind;
/*
* DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
- &ctx->DQ ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, &ctx->DQ));
DQ = &DQ_blind;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-#else
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+# else
/*
* Faster decryption using the CRT
*
@@ -1034,75 +1011,74 @@
* TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ));
/*
* T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &TP, &TQ ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->QP ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &TP, &ctx->P ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &TP, &TQ));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->QP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &TP, &ctx->P));
/*
* T = TQ + T * Q
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->Q ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->Q));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP));
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
/*
* Unblind
* T = T * Vf mod N
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
/* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E,
- &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
- if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 )
- {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
olen = ctx->len;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ;
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+# endif
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind );
-#else
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind );
-#endif
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind);
+# else
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind);
+# endif
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TQ );
-#endif
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ);
+# endif
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &C );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &I );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&C);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&I);
- if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ;
+ if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret);
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
/**
* Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
*
@@ -1112,8 +1088,11 @@
* \param slen length of the source buffer
* \param md_ctx message digest context to use
*/
-static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
- size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx )
+static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst,
+ size_t dlen,
+ unsigned char *src,
+ size_t slen,
+ mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx)
{
unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char counter[4];
@@ -1122,30 +1101,29 @@
size_t i, use_len;
int ret = 0;
- memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE );
- memset( counter, 0, 4 );
+ memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE);
+ memset(counter, 0, 4);
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info );
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info);
/* Generate and apply dbMask */
p = dst;
- while( dlen > 0 )
- {
+ while (dlen > 0) {
use_len = hlen;
- if( dlen < hlen )
+ if (dlen < hlen)
use_len = dlen;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask)) != 0)
goto exit;
- for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i )
+ for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i)
*p++ ^= mask[i];
counter[3]++;
@@ -1154,23 +1132,24 @@
}
exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask));
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
- size_t ilen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *label,
+ size_t label_len,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
size_t olen;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -1179,169 +1158,171 @@
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL);
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (f_rng == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
olen = ctx->len;
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
- if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- memset( output, 0, olen );
+ memset(output, 0, olen);
*p++ = 0;
/* Generate a random octet string seed */
- if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+ if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
p += hlen;
/* Construct DB */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p)) != 0)
+ return ret;
p += hlen;
p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
*p++ = 1;
- if( ilen != 0 )
- memcpy( p, input, ilen );
+ if (ilen != 0)
+ memcpy(p, input, ilen);
- mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
goto exit;
/* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
- if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
- &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
+ &md_ctx)) != 0)
goto exit;
/* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */
- if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
- &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
+ &md_ctx)) != 0)
goto exit;
exit:
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
- return mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ;
+ return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng, size_t ilen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
size_t nb_pad, olen;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = output;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
olen = ctx->len;
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
- if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
*p++ = 0;
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (f_rng == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
- while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
- {
+ while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
int rng_dl = 100;
do {
- ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
- } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
+ ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1);
+ } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0);
/* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
- if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+ if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
p++;
}
*p++ = 0;
- if( ilen != 0 )
- memcpy( p, input, ilen );
+ if (ilen != 0)
+ memcpy(p, input, ilen);
- return mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ;
+ return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
/*
* Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- size_t ilen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
- switch( ctx->padding )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ switch (ctx->padding) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
- ilen, input, output );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, ilen,
+ input, output);
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
- ilen, input, output );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
+ ilen, input, output);
+# endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
- size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_max_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *label,
+ size_t label_len,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
@@ -1352,66 +1333,64 @@
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
/*
* Parameters sanity checks
*/
- if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
ilen = ctx->len;
- if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
// checking for integer underflow
- if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/*
* RSA operation
*/
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
- if( ret != 0 )
+ if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Unmask data and generate lHash
*/
- mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
goto cleanup;
}
/* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
- if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
- &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ||
- /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
- ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
- &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
+ &md_ctx)) != 0 ||
+ /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
+ (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
+ &md_ctx)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
goto cleanup;
}
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
/* Generate lHash */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
/*
@@ -1425,15 +1404,14 @@
p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
/* Check lHash */
- for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ )
+ for (i = 0; i < hlen; i++)
bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
/* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
* (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
pad_len = 0;
pad_done = 0;
- for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ )
- {
+ for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
pad_done |= p[i];
pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
@@ -1447,49 +1425,47 @@
* recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
* the different error conditions.
*/
- if( bad != 0 )
- {
+ if (bad != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len )
- {
+ if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
goto cleanup;
}
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
- if( *olen != 0 )
- memcpy( output, p, *olen );
+ if (*olen != 0)
+ memcpy(output, p, *olen);
ret = 0;
cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(lhash, sizeof(lhash));
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
*
* \param value The value to analyze.
* \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
*/
-static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
+static unsigned all_or_nothing_int(unsigned value)
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
- return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(push)
+# pragma warning(disable : 4146)
+# endif
+ return (-((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)));
+# if defined(_MSC_VER)
+# pragma warning(pop)
+# endif
}
/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches.
@@ -1502,10 +1478,10 @@
* \return \c 0 if `size <= max`.
* \return \c 1 if `size > max`.
*/
-static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
+static unsigned size_greater_than(size_t size, size_t max)
{
/* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
- return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
+ return ((max - size) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1));
}
/** Choose between two integer values, without branches.
@@ -1518,10 +1494,10 @@
* \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero.
* \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
*/
-static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
+static unsigned if_int(unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0)
{
- unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
- return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
+ unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int(cond);
+ return ((mask & if1) | (~mask & if0));
}
/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
@@ -1540,40 +1516,38 @@
* \param total Total size of the buffer.
* \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
*/
-static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
- size_t total,
- size_t offset )
+static void mem_move_to_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)
{
volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
size_t i, n;
- if( total == 0 )
+ if (total == 0)
return;
- for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
- {
- unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
+ for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+ unsigned no_op = size_greater_than(total - offset, i);
/* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
* `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
* zero out the last byte. */
- for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
- {
+ for (n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) {
unsigned char current = buf[n];
- unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
- buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
+ unsigned char next = buf[n + 1];
+ buf[n] = if_int(no_op, current, next);
}
- buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
+ buf[total - 1] = if_int(no_op, buf[total - 1], 0);
}
}
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_max_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size;
@@ -1594,50 +1568,46 @@
size_t plaintext_size = 0;
unsigned output_too_large;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
ilen = ctx->len;
- plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ?
- ilen - 11 :
- output_max_len );
+ plaintext_max_size =
+ (output_max_len > ilen - 11 ? ilen - 11 : output_max_len);
- if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
- if( ret != 0 )
+ if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
* memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
bad |= buf[0];
-
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
- * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+ * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
- * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
- for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
- {
- pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+ * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+ for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
+ pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
-
/* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
- bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+ bad |= if_int(pad_done, 0, 1);
/* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
- bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
+ bad |= size_greater_than(8, pad_count);
/* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
* remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
@@ -1646,23 +1616,21 @@
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
+ plaintext_size = if_int(bad, (unsigned)plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned)(ilen - pad_count - 3));
/* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
* buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
- output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
- plaintext_max_size );
+ output_too_large = size_greater_than(plaintext_size, plaintext_max_size);
/* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
* - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
- ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
- if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
- 0 ) );
+ ret = -(int)if_int(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+ if_int(output_too_large,
+ -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, 0));
/* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
* data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
@@ -1670,17 +1638,16 @@
* from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
* avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
- bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
- for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
+ bad = all_or_nothing_int(bad | output_too_large);
+ for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++)
buf[i] &= ~bad;
/* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) plaintext_size );
+ plaintext_size = if_int(output_too_large, (unsigned)plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned)plaintext_size);
/* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
* the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
@@ -1688,9 +1655,8 @@
* does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
* starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
* information. */
- mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
+ mem_move_to_left(buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size,
+ plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
* buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
@@ -1699,8 +1665,8 @@
* user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
* length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
* secrets. */
- if( output_max_len != 0 )
- memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+ if (output_max_len != 0)
+ memcpy(output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
/* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
* of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
@@ -1709,57 +1675,56 @@
*olen = plaintext_size;
cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
/*
* Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *input,
- unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_max_len)
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
- switch( ctx->padding )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ switch (ctx->padding) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
- input, output, output_max_len );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(
+ ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len);
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
- olen, input, output,
- output_max_len );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
+ olen, input, output,
+ output_max_len);
+# endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- int saltlen,
- unsigned char *sig )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ int saltlen,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
size_t olen;
unsigned char *p = sig;
@@ -1769,152 +1734,146 @@
size_t msb;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
- if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (f_rng == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
olen = ctx->len;
- if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- {
+ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
- if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY)
- {
- /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
- * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
- * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
- * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
- * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
- * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
- * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
+ if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) {
+ /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
+ * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
+ * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
+ * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
+ * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at
+ * most the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC
+ * 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
min_slen = hlen - 2;
- if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
- else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 )
+ if (olen < hlen + min_slen + 2)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ else if (olen >= hlen + hlen + 2)
slen = hlen;
else
slen = olen - hlen - 2;
- }
- else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) )
- {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
- }
- else
- {
- slen = (size_t) saltlen;
+ } else if ((saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ } else {
+ slen = (size_t)saltlen;
}
- memset( sig, 0, olen );
+ memset(sig, 0, olen);
/* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
- msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
+ msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
*p++ = 0x01;
/* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */
salt = p;
- if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+ if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
p += slen;
- mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
goto exit;
/* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0)
goto exit;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p)) != 0)
goto exit;
/* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
- if( msb % 8 == 0 )
+ if (msb % 8 == 0)
offset = 1;
/* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
- if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
- &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
+ &md_ctx)) != 0)
goto exit;
- msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
- sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
+ msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
+ sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb);
p += hlen;
*p++ = 0xBC;
exit:
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
- return mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig );
+ return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig);
}
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with
* the option to pass in the salt length.
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- int saltlen,
- unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ int saltlen,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
- return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
- hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig );
+ return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+ saltlen, sig);
}
-
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
- return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
- hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig );
+ return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
*/
@@ -1936,61 +1895,58 @@
* - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len.
*
*/
-static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- size_t dst_len,
- unsigned char *dst )
+static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ size_t dst_len,
+ unsigned char *dst)
{
- size_t oid_size = 0;
- size_t nb_pad = dst_len;
+ size_t oid_size = 0;
+ size_t nb_pad = dst_len;
unsigned char *p = dst;
- const char *oid = NULL;
+ const char *oid = NULL;
/* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */
- if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- {
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a
* 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */
- if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 ||
- 10 + hashlen < hashlen ||
- 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || 10 + hashlen < hashlen ||
+ 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/*
* Static bounds check:
* - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs.
* (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of
- * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification)
+ * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5
+ * verification)
* - Need hashlen bytes for hash
* - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID.
*/
- if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size;
- }
- else
- {
- if( nb_pad < hashlen )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ } else {
+ if (nb_pad < hashlen)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
nb_pad -= hashlen;
}
/* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes),
* and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */
- if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (nb_pad < 3 + 8)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
nb_pad -= 3;
/* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled
@@ -1999,15 +1955,14 @@
/* Write signature header and padding */
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
- memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad );
+ memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad);
p += nb_pad;
*p++ = 0;
/* Are we signing raw data? */
- if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- {
- memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
- return 0 ;
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
+ return 0;
}
/* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure
@@ -2024,61 +1979,61 @@
* TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ]
*/
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)(0x08 + oid_size + hashlen);
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)(0x04 + oid_size);
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size;
- memcpy( p, oid, oid_size );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)oid_size;
+ memcpy(p, oid, oid_size);
p += oid_size;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen;
- memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)hashlen;
+ memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
p += hashlen;
/* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic
* after the initial bounds check. */
- if( p != dst + dst_len )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( dst, dst_len );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (p != dst + dst_len) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dst, dst_len);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- return 0 ;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
- if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/*
* Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier)
*/
- if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash,
- ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, ctx->len,
+ sig)) != 0)
+ return ret;
/* Private key operation
*
@@ -2086,83 +2041,79 @@
* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
*/
- sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
- if( sig_try == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+ sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
+ if (sig_try == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
- verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
- if( verif == NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_free( sig_try );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+ verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
+ if (verif == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_free(sig_try);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif));
- if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
- {
+ if (mbedtls_safer_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
- memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
+ memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len);
cleanup:
- mbedtls_free( sig_try );
- mbedtls_free( verif );
+ mbedtls_free(sig_try);
+ mbedtls_free(verif);
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
/*
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
- switch( ctx->padding )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ switch (ctx->padding) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
- md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+ hashlen, hash, sig);
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
- hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+ hashlen, hash, sig);
+# endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
- int expected_salt_len,
- const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
+ int expected_salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t siglen;
@@ -2176,89 +2127,84 @@
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
siglen = ctx->len;
- if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf);
- if( ret != 0 )
- return ret ;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
p = buf;
- if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
- if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- {
+ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id );
- if( md_info == NULL )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id);
+ if (md_info == NULL)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
- memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
+ memset(zeros, 0, 8);
/*
* Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
*/
- msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
+ msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
- if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
/* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
- if( msb % 8 == 0 )
- {
+ if (msb % 8 == 0) {
p++;
siglen -= 1;
}
- if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+ if (siglen < hlen + 2)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
- mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
goto exit;
- ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx );
- if( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
+ buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb);
- while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 )
+ while (p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0)
p++;
- if( *p++ != 0x01 )
- {
+ if (*p++ != 0x01) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
goto exit;
}
observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
- if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
- observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
- {
+ if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
+ observed_salt_len != (size_t)expected_salt_len) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
goto exit;
}
@@ -2266,82 +2212,76 @@
/*
* Generate H = Hash( M' )
*/
- ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx );
- if ( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
- if ( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
- if ( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len );
- if ( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
- if ( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto exit;
- if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 )
- {
+ if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
exit:
- mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
/*
* Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig)
{
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
- mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
- : md_alg;
+ mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) ?
+ (mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id :
+ md_alg;
- return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx,
- md_alg, hashlen, hash,
- mgf1_hash_id,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
- sig ) );
-
+ return (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+ mgf1_hash_id,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig));
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t sig_len;
unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
sig_len = ctx->len;
@@ -2349,372 +2289,359 @@
* Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash.
*/
- if( ( encoded = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ||
- ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL )
- {
+ if ((encoded = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL ||
+ (encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
- encoded_expected ) ) != 0 )
+ if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
+ encoded_expected)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash.
*/
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded );
- if( ret != 0 )
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded);
+ if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Compare
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
- sig_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected, sig_len)) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
- if( encoded != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded, sig_len );
- mbedtls_free( encoded );
+ if (encoded != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded, sig_len);
+ mbedtls_free(encoded);
}
- if( encoded_expected != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len );
- mbedtls_free( encoded_expected );
+ if (encoded_expected != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded_expected, sig_len);
+ mbedtls_free(encoded_expected);
}
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
/*
* Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig)
{
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
- hashlen == 0 ) ||
- hash != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+ hash != NULL);
- switch( ctx->padding )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ switch (ctx->padding) {
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, md_alg,
- hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen,
+ hash, sig);
+# endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
- return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, md_alg,
- hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+ return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+ sig);
+# endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
}
}
/*
* Copy the components of an RSA key
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src )
+int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL );
- RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL );
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL);
+ RSA_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL);
dst->len = src->len;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q));
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) );
-#endif
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ));
+# endif
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf));
dst->padding = src->padding;
dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
cleanup:
- if( ret != 0 )
- mbedtls_rsa_free( dst );
+ if (ret != 0)
+ mbedtls_rsa_free(dst);
- return ret ;
+ return ret;
}
/*
* Free the components of an RSA key
*/
-void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
{
- if( ctx == NULL )
+ if (ctx == NULL)
return;
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N);
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+# if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP);
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
/* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */
- if( ctx->ver != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
+ if (ctx->ver != 0) {
+ mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
ctx->ver = 0;
}
-#endif
+# endif
}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+# endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+# include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
/*
* Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
*/
-#define KEY_LEN 128
+# define KEY_LEN 128
-#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
- "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
- "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
- "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
- "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
- "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
- "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
- "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
+# define RSA_N \
+ "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
+ "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
+ "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
+ "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
+ "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
+ "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
+ "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
+ "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
-#define RSA_E "10001"
+# define RSA_E "10001"
-#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
- "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
- "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
- "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
- "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
- "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
- "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
- "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
+# define RSA_D \
+ "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
+ "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
+ "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
+ "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
+ "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
+ "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
+ "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
+ "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
-#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
- "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
- "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
- "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
+# define RSA_P \
+ "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
+ "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
+ "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
+ "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
-#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
- "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
- "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
- "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
+# define RSA_Q \
+ "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
+ "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
+ "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
+ "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
-#define PT_LEN 24
-#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
- "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
+# define PT_LEN 24
+# define RSA_PT \
+ "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
{
-#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
+# if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
size_t i;
- if( rng_state != NULL )
- rng_state = NULL;
-
- for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
- output[i] = rand();
-#else
- if( rng_state != NULL )
+ if (rng_state != NULL)
rng_state = NULL;
- arc4random_buf( output, len );
-#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+ output[i] = rand();
+# else
+ if (rng_state != NULL)
+ rng_state = NULL;
- return 0 ;
+ arc4random_buf(output, len);
+# endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
+
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
/*
* Checkup routine
*/
-int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
+int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose)
{
int ret = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
size_t len;
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
unsigned char sha1sum[20];
-#endif
+# endif
mbedtls_mpi K;
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &K );
- mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
+ mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_Q));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_D));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_E));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa));
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " RSA key validation: " );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf(" RSA key validation: ");
- if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 ||
- mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : ");
- memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
+ memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN);
- if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
- PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
- rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
+ rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : ");
- if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
- &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
- sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext,
+ rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " );
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : ");
- if( mbedtls_sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_sha1(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
- return 1 ;
+ return 1;
}
- if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
- sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum,
+ rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: ");
- if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
- sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum,
+ rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+ if (verbose != 0)
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
cleanup:
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &K );
- mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa );
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
- ((void) verbose);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
- return ret ;
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
+ mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
+# else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+ ((void)verbose);
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+ return ret;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+# endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */