diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 5b92932..d559c9e 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -900,6 +900,8 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t j;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint c;
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
@@ -933,9 +935,9 @@
 
     /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = X->p;
+    p = X->p;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j);
+    c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j);
 
     p += j;
 
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 3d3ec60..e3b3376 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -5658,6 +5658,7 @@
     size_t shift   = bits % biL;
     size_t adjust  = (shift + biL - 1) / biL;
     size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL);
     if (A1 == NULL) {
@@ -5673,7 +5674,6 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0;
     if (adjust != 0) {
         mask  = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1;
     }
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index a2a6755..5e8d0d0 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1535,6 +1535,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a
      * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid
@@ -1560,7 +1561,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key(
@@ -2509,6 +2510,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -2525,7 +2527,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2695,6 +2697,7 @@
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
     uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
         key,
@@ -2705,7 +2708,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2831,6 +2834,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     *signature_length = 0;
 
@@ -2862,7 +2866,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3165,6 +3169,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3189,7 +3194,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3216,6 +3221,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3239,7 +3245,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3313,6 +3319,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not
      * previously errored. */
@@ -3339,7 +3346,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4020,6 +4027,7 @@
     psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ?
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT :
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -4049,7 +4057,7 @@
     }
     operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg);
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4275,6 +4283,7 @@
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t default_iv_length = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4288,7 +4297,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4345,6 +4354,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4358,7 +4368,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4612,6 +4622,7 @@
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
@@ -4641,7 +4652,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -5789,6 +5800,8 @@
     mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t m;
+    size_t m_bytes;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&k);
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2);
@@ -5810,9 +5823,9 @@
 
     /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */
     /* Let m be the bit size of N. */
-    size_t m = ecp_group.nbits;
+    m = ecp_group.nbits;
 
-    size_t m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
+    m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
 
     /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2));
@@ -5965,6 +5978,7 @@
     size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
     size_t storage_size = bytes;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) {
         return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -6013,7 +6027,7 @@
     }
 
     slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -7114,6 +7128,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    size_t expected_length;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -7133,7 +7148,7 @@
      * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot.
      * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily
      * be exact for it as well. */
-    size_t expected_length =
+    expected_length =
         PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits);
     if (output_size < expected_length) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
@@ -7789,6 +7804,8 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
+    psa_key_type_t type;
 
     if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
@@ -7802,11 +7819,11 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
-    psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+    type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
 
     if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
         type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) {
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index 5f203ab..761d877 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -930,13 +930,14 @@
                                int *written,
                                const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
     if (ret > 0) {
         *written += ret;
     }
@@ -976,13 +977,14 @@
                               int *read, int *fragments,
                               const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
     if (ret > 0) {
         (*fragments)++;
         *read += ret;