Merge pull request #7147 from paul-elliott-arm/interruptible_sign_hash_codestyle_drivers

Remove driver entry points for psa_{get|set}_max_ops()
diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index 54df776..cdb79d1 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@
         - programs/test/selftest
         - tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
         - tests/ssl-opt.sh
-        # Modern OpenSSL does not support fixed ECDH or null ciphers.
-        - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH_'
+        # Modern OpenSSL does not support null ciphers.
+        - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL'
         - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
         # GnuTLS supports CAMELLIA but compat.sh doesn't properly enable it.
         - tests/compat.sh -p GnuTLS -e 'CAMELLIA'
@@ -80,6 +80,58 @@
         - sleep 5
         - scripts/windows_msbuild.bat v141 # Visual Studio 2017
 
+    - name: full configuration on arm64
+      os: linux
+      dist: focal
+      arch: arm64
+      addons:
+        apt:
+          packages:
+          - gcc
+      script:
+        # Do a manual build+test sequence rather than using all.sh, because
+        # there's no all.sh component that does what we want. We should set
+        # CFLAGS for arm64 host CC.
+        - scripts/config.py full
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+        - make generated_files
+        - make CFLAGS='-march=armv8-a+crypto -O3 -Werror -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all' LDFLAGS='-Werror -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all'
+        - make test
+        - programs/test/selftest
+        - tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
+        # Modern OpenSSL does not support fixed ECDH or null ciphers.
+        - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH_'
+        - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
+        - tests/context-info.sh
+
+    - name: full configuration(GnuTLS compat tests) on arm64
+      os: linux
+      dist: focal
+      arch: arm64
+      addons:
+        apt:
+          packages:
+          - clang
+          - gnutls-bin
+      script:
+        # Do a manual build+test sequence rather than using all.sh, because
+        # there's no all.sh component that does what we want. We should set
+        # CFLAGS for arm64 host CC.
+        - scripts/config.py full
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+        - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+        - make generated_files
+        - make CC=clang CFLAGS='-march=armv8-a+crypto -O3 -Werror -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all' LDFLAGS='-Werror -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all'
+        # GnuTLS supports CAMELLIA but compat.sh doesn't properly enable it.
+        - tests/compat.sh -p GnuTLS -e 'CAMELLIA'
+        - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
+        - tests/context-info.sh
+
 after_failure:
 - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
 
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-uri-san.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-uri-san.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5184e8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-uri-san.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+   * Add parsing of uniformResourceIdentifier subtype for subjectAltName
+     extension in x509 certificates.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt b/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..491adf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Silence warnings from clang -Wdocumentation about empty \retval
+     descriptions, which started appearing with Clang 15. Fixes #6960.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..799f444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix bug in conversion from OID to string in
+     mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(). OIDs such as 2.40.0.25 are now printed
+     correctly.
+   * Reject OIDs with overlong-encoded subidentifiers when converting
+     OID-to-string.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f75d6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Changes
+   * Changed the default MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE from 6 to 2.
+     As tested in issue 6790, the correlation between this define and
+     RSA decryption performance has changed lately due to security fixes.
+     To fix the performance degradation when using default values the
+     window was reduced from 6 to 2, a value that gives the best or close
+     to best results when tested on Cortex-M4 and Intel i7.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/san_rfc822Name.txt b/ChangeLog.d/san_rfc822Name.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9720e52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/san_rfc822Name.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+   * Add parsing of rfc822Name subtype for subjectAltName
+     extension in x509 certificates.
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 0c744da..c33c7e3 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -27,3 +27,18 @@
 DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES    = 200
 MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH    = 1000
 DOT_TRANSPARENT        = YES
+
+# We mostly use \retval declarations to document which error codes a function
+# can return. The reader can follow the hyperlink to the definition of the
+# constant to get the generic documentation of that error code. If we don't
+# have anything to say about the specific error code for the specific
+# function, we can leave the description part of the \retval command blank.
+# This is perfectly valid as far as Doxygen is concerned. However, with
+# Clang >=15, the -Wdocumentation option emits a warning for empty
+# descriptions.
+#   https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6960
+#   https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60315
+# As a workaround, you can write something like
+#     \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+# This avoids writing redundant text and keeps Clang happy.
+ALIASES += emptydescription=""
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index e8fb2de..b1d4b88 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE)
 /*
- * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6
+ * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 2
  * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6.
  *
  * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
  *
  * Reduction in size, reduces speed.
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE                           6        /**< Maximum window size used. */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE                           2        /**< Maximum window size used. */
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
index bbfd5d4..b10b1ad 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
@@ -82,24 +82,13 @@
 
 /* The PK wrappers need pk_write functions to format RSA key objects
  * when they are dispatching to the PSA API. This happens under USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
- * and also even without USE_PSA_CRYPTO for mbedtls_pk_sign_ext().
- * PSA crypto also needs pk_write to export RSA keys (otherwise the build
- * goes through but psa_export_key() and psa_export_public_key() fail on
- * RSA keys), and pk_parse to work with RSA keys in almost any way.
- */
+ * and also even without USE_PSA_CRYPTO for mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(). */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
 #define MBEDTLS_PK_C
 #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
 #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
 #endif
 
-/* Under MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, the pk module needs pk_write functions
- * to pass ECC keys to PSA. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) &&                                    \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-#endif
-
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
 #undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 1efabdc..ac374d2 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#error "MBEDTLS_AESCE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
 #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 1590ef2..b6144d9 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -141,6 +141,15 @@
     MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY,           /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x    */
 } mbedtls_ecp_curve_type;
 
+/*
+ * Curve modulus types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE = 0,
+    MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE,
+    MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR
+} mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type;
+
 /**
  * Curve information, for use by other modules.
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index 9ae51c9..5aff9c5 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -2066,6 +2066,34 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+ *
+ * Enable AES crypto extension support on Arm64.
+ *
+ * Module:  library/aesce.c
+ * Caller:  library/aes.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM, MBEDTLS_AES_C
+ *
+ * \note The code uses Neon intrinsics, so \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum
+ * of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto .
+ *
+ * \warning If the target architecture is set to something that includes the
+ *          SHA3 feature (e.g. `-march=armv8.2-a+sha3`), for example because
+ *          `MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT` is desired, compilers
+ *          generate code for `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` that includes instructions
+ *          only present with the (optional) SHA3 feature. This will lead to an
+ *          undefined instruction exception if the code is run on a CPU without
+ *          that feature.
+ *
+ * \warning Runtime detection only works on linux. For non-linux operation
+ *          system, crypto extension MUST be supported by CPU.
+ *
+ * This module adds support for the AES crypto instructions on Arm64
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+
+/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C
  *
  * Enable the AES block cipher.
@@ -3559,7 +3587,7 @@
  * comment in the specific module. */
 
 /* MPI / BIGNUM options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE            6 /**< Maximum window size used. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE            2 /**< Maximum window size used. */
 //#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE            1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */
 
 /* CTR_DRBG options */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
index 5ddd5a3..126eac4 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
@@ -136,21 +136,11 @@
 mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info;
 
 /**
- * Structure holding attached data as part of PKCS7 signed data format
- */
-typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_data {
-    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid);
-    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data);
-}
-mbedtls_pkcs7_data;
-
-/**
  * Structure holding the signed data section
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data {
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
     mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(digest_alg_identifiers);
-    struct mbedtls_pkcs7_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(content);
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_certs);
     mbedtls_x509_crt MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certs);
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_crls);
@@ -165,7 +155,6 @@
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7 {
     mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);
-    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(content_type_oid);
     mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signed_data);
 }
 mbedtls_pkcs7;
@@ -178,7 +167,7 @@
 void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7);
 
 /**
- * \brief          Parse a single DER formatted pkcs7 content.
+ * \brief          Parse a single DER formatted pkcs7 detached signature.
  *
  * \param pkcs7    The pkcs7 structure to be filled by parser for the output.
  * \param buf      The buffer holding only the DER encoded pkcs7.
@@ -188,6 +177,7 @@
  * \note           This function makes an internal copy of the PKCS7 buffer
  *                 \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
  *                 after this call returns.
+ * \note           Signatures with internal data are not supported.
  *
  * \return         The \c mbedtls_pkcs7_type of \p buf, if successful.
  * \return         A negative error code on failure.
@@ -207,7 +197,8 @@
  *                 matches.
  *
  *                 This function does not use the certificates held within the
- *                 PKCS7 structure itself.
+ *                 PKCS7 structure itself, and does not check that the
+ *                 certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority.
  *
  * \param pkcs7    PKCS7 structure containing signature.
  * \param cert     Certificate containing key to verify signature.
@@ -228,15 +219,15 @@
  * \brief          Verification of PKCS7 signature against a caller-supplied
  *                 certificate.
  *
- *                 For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes
- *                 a signature over the supplied hash, using the supplied
- *                 certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the
- *                 signer. It then compares this signature against the
- *                 signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison
- *                 matches.
+ *                 For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function
+ *                 validates a signature over the supplied hash, using the
+ *                 supplied certificate and the same digest algorithm as
+ *                 specified by the signer. Verification succeeds if any
+ *                 signature is good.
  *
  *                 This function does not use the certificates held within the
- *                 PKCS7 structure itself.
+ *                 PKCS7 structure itself, and does not check that the
+ *                 certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority.
  *
  * \param pkcs7    PKCS7 structure containing signature.
  * \param cert     Certificate containing key to verify signature.
@@ -244,7 +235,7 @@
  * \param hashlen  Length of the hash.
  *
  * \note           This function is different from mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify()
- *                 in a way that it directly receives the hash of the data.
+ *                 in that it is directly passed the hash of the data.
  *
  * \return         0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
index dc74ac6..f6070dc 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH \
     PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
 
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH \
+    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+
 /* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the
  * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be
  * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
index aa1cd08..bd1947e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
     int type;                              /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
     union {
         mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
-        mbedtls_x509_buf   unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
+        mbedtls_x509_buf   unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the unconstructed types. Only rfc822Name, dnsName and uniformResourceIdentifier are currently supported */
     }
     san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
 }
@@ -385,8 +385,9 @@
  * \param san      The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
  *                 of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
  *
- * \note           Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name
- *                 as defined in RFC 4180 is supported.
+ * \note           Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280:
+ *                 "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name"
+ *                 of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108.
  *
  * \note           This function should be called on a single raw data of
  *                 subject alternative name. For example, after successful
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index 187e60a..036282f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
     mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id;         /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
     mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id;        /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
     mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext;            /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions.  */
-    mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names;    /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
+    mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names;    /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName, uniformResourceIdentifier and OtherName are listed). */
 
     mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
 
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index 48c45df..5b448a5 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@
  * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper
  * seeding of the random number generator.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);
 
@@ -368,14 +368,14 @@
  *                              On failure, equivalent to a
  *                              freshly-initialized structure.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@
  *                          identifier defined in \p attributes.
  *                          \c 0 on failure.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
  *         \p source_key is invalid.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
@@ -502,14 +502,14 @@
  *         The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or
  *         the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not
  *         allow copying it to the target's lifetime.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -631,14 +631,14 @@
  *         the key data is not correctly formatted, or
  *         the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size
  *         of the key data.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -718,22 +718,22 @@
  * \param[out] data_length  On success, the number of bytes
  *                          that make up the key data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits)
  *         where \c type is the key type
  *         and \c bits is the key size in bits.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -793,22 +793,22 @@
  * \param[out] data_length  On success, the number of bytes
  *                          that make up the key data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key is neither a public key nor a key pair.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits)
  *         where \c type is the key type
  *         and \c bits is the key size in bits.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -846,13 +846,13 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p hash_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -884,10 +884,10 @@
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -977,10 +977,10 @@
  *         \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p alg is not a hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@
  *         The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg)
  *         where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1090,10 +1090,10 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected hash.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1120,10 +1120,10 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized hash operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -1146,11 +1146,11 @@
  * \param[in,out] target_operation  The operation object to set up.
  *                                  It must be initialized but not active.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
@@ -1190,18 +1190,18 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p mac_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -1233,16 +1233,16 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected value.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -1338,16 +1338,16 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -1400,16 +1400,16 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -1437,11 +1437,11 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1485,11 +1485,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign
  *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
@@ -1528,11 +1528,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected MAC.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
  *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
@@ -1560,10 +1560,10 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -1599,18 +1599,18 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -1646,18 +1646,18 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -1753,17 +1753,17 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1816,17 +1816,17 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1859,11 +1859,11 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set),
  *         or the library has not been previously initialized
@@ -1900,11 +1900,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
  *         or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher
  *         encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been
@@ -1941,11 +1941,11 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
  *         if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
@@ -1993,11 +1993,11 @@
  *         padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
  *         if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
@@ -2026,10 +2026,10 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized cipher operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2082,23 +2082,23 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p ciphertext_size is too small.
  *         #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
  *         \p plaintext_length) or
  *         #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to
  *         determine the required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2153,25 +2153,25 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The ciphertext is not authentic.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p plaintext_size is too small.
  *         #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
  *         \p ciphertext_length) or
  *         #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used
  *         to determine the required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2280,16 +2280,16 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2344,17 +2344,17 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the
  *         library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -2388,11 +2388,11 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt
  *         operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been
@@ -2428,11 +2428,11 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce
  *         set), or the library has not been previously initialized
@@ -2473,10 +2473,10 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen
  *         algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and
  *         psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been
@@ -2520,11 +2520,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The total input length overflows the additional data length that
  *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
  *         set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and
@@ -2605,11 +2605,11 @@
  *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
  *         the total input length overflows the plaintext length that
  *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
  *         set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the
@@ -2691,11 +2691,11 @@
  *         the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
  *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
  *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption
  *         operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
@@ -2774,11 +2774,11 @@
  *         the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
  *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
  *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption
  *         operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
@@ -2809,10 +2809,10 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized AEAD operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2858,8 +2858,8 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
  *                              the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
  *         or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
@@ -2869,16 +2869,16 @@
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2914,23 +2914,23 @@
  * \param[out] signature        Buffer containing the signature to verify.
  * \param[in]  signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
  *         or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature
  *         is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -2967,23 +2967,23 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3023,18 +3023,18 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The signature is valid.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3076,23 +3076,23 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3136,24 +3136,24 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3263,11 +3263,11 @@
  *         \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3287,10 +3287,10 @@
  * \param[in] operation     The operation to query.
  * \param[out] capacity     On success, the capacity of the operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3311,14 +3311,14 @@
  *                          It must be less or equal to the operation's
  *                          current capacity.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity.
  *         In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity
  *         remains unchanged.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the
  *         library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3367,11 +3367,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
  *         \c step does not allow direct inputs.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3410,11 +3410,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
  *         \c step does not allow numeric inputs.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor
  *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this
@@ -3477,11 +3477,11 @@
  *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
  *         \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type
  *         or does not allow key inputs at all.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3536,8 +3536,8 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg,
  *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with
@@ -3545,11 +3545,11 @@
  *         from a key agreement.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step,
  *         or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -3580,7 +3580,7 @@
  * \param[out] output       Buffer where the output will be written.
  * \param output_length     Number of bytes to output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
  *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
@@ -3591,11 +3591,11 @@
  *                          The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
  *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
  *                          succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
  *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
@@ -3738,14 +3738,14 @@
  *         #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
  *         key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
  *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
  *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
@@ -3786,7 +3786,7 @@
  * \param output_length     Length of the expected output; this is also the
  *                          number of bytes that will be read.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected
  *         output.
@@ -3799,11 +3799,11 @@
  *                          the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
  *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
  *                          succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
  *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
@@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@
  *                          computed by a previous call to
  *                          psa_key_derivation_output_key().
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected
  *         output.
@@ -3863,11 +3863,11 @@
  *                          the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
  *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
  *                          succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
  *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
@@ -3893,10 +3893,10 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    The operation to abort.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3934,8 +3934,8 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
  *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
@@ -3945,11 +3945,11 @@
  *         \p output_size is too small
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -3981,13 +3981,13 @@
  * \param[out] output       Output buffer for the generated data.
  * \param output_size       Number of bytes to generate and output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -4024,17 +4024,17 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
  *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
  *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -4313,23 +4313,23 @@
  *         The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
  *         with the same context to complete the operation
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does
  *         not permit the requested algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         An operation has previously been started on this context, and is
  *         still in progress.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -4411,19 +4411,19 @@
  *         An operation was not previously started on this context via
  *         \c psa_sign_hash_start().
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has either not been previously initialized by
- *         psa_crypto_init()  or you did not previously call
+ *         psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
  *         psa_sign_hash_start() with this operation object. It is
  *         implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in
  *         this error code.
@@ -4464,7 +4464,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The operation was aborted successfully.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -4533,15 +4533,15 @@
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does
  *         not permit the requested algorithm.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -4600,23 +4600,23 @@
  *         psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done.
  *         Call this function again with the same operation object.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- *\retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         An operation was not previously started on this context via
  *         \c psa_verify_hash_start().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has either not been previously initialized by
  *         psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The operation was aborted successfully.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
index 97e6584..3544f96 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
@@ -105,11 +105,11 @@
  *         permission to access it. Note that this specification does not
  *         define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible
  *         through implementation-specific means.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@
  *         \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
  *         \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index bd1b5af..582d942 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -189,12 +189,12 @@
  *         or the specified slot number is not valid.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -491,10 +491,10 @@
  *                              according to \p type as described above.
  * \param data_length           Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
                                            psa_key_type_t type,
@@ -521,8 +521,8 @@
  * \param[out] data_length      On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the key domain parameters data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -1352,8 +1352,8 @@
  *         compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in
  *         \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE
  *         algorithm and primitive.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1397,11 +1397,11 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the
  *         \p operation's cipher suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1439,9 +1439,9 @@
  *         suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1480,9 +1480,9 @@
  *         suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's
  *         algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not
@@ -1524,8 +1524,8 @@
  *         The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -1575,13 +1575,13 @@
  *         \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
  *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
@@ -1631,12 +1631,12 @@
  *         \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the
  *         \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher
  *         suite or \p step.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
  *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
@@ -1691,12 +1691,12 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output
  *         key derivation operation.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond
  *         that validity is specific to the algorithm), or
@@ -1728,8 +1728,8 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
index a052789..9ae631f 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
@@ -385,8 +385,8 @@
  * \param[in] direction         Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt
  *                              or decrypt
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                   void *op_context,
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@
  * \param[in] p_iv              A buffer containing the initialization vector
  * \param[in] iv_length         The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context,
                                                    const uint8_t *p_iv,
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_output_length      After completion, will contain the number
  *                                  of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context,
                                                    const uint8_t *p_input,
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_output_length  After completion, will contain the number of
  *                              bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context,
                                                    uint8_t *p_output,
@@ -485,8 +485,8 @@
  * \param[in] output_size       The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output`
  *                              buffer
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                 psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_signature_length   On success, the number of bytes
  *                                  that make up the returned signature value
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                      psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_output_length  On success, the number of bytes that make up
  *                              the returned output
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                         psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_output_length  On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                         psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
@@ -904,8 +904,8 @@
  *         Success.
  *         The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key
  *         is stored and will update the persistent data in storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)(
     psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
@@ -1043,13 +1043,13 @@
  * \param[out] p_data_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the key data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                 psa_key_slot_number_t key,
@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@
  * \param[in] source_key        The key to be used as the source material for
  *                              the key derivation
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
                                                           void *op_context,
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@
  * \param[in] p_collateral      A buffer containing the collateral data
  * \param[in] collateral_size   The size in bytes of the collateral
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context,
                                                                uint32_t collateral_id,
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@
  * \param[in] dest_key          The slot where the generated key material
  *                              should be placed
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context,
                                                            psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key);
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@
  * \param[out] p_output_length  Upon success, contains the number of bytes of
  *                              key material placed in `p_output`
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context,
                                                            uint8_t *p_output,
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index c9714bb..bef2e1c 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 set(src_crypto
     aes.c
     aesni.c
+    aesce.c
     aria.c
     asn1parse.c
     asn1write.c
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index dd16d06..ed5e1e1 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 OBJS_CRYPTO= \
 	     aes.o \
 	     aesni.o \
+	     aesce.o \
 	     aria.o \
 	     asn1parse.o \
 	     asn1write.o \
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 566e747..64392fc 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
 #include "aesni.h"
 #endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)
+#include "aesce.h"
+#endif
 
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 
@@ -544,6 +547,12 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+    if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support()) {
+        return mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits);
+    }
+#endif
+
     for (i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) {
         RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, i << 2);
     }
@@ -652,6 +661,16 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+    if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support()) {
+        mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(
+            (unsigned char *) RK,
+            (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset),
+            ctx->nr);
+        goto exit;
+    }
+#endif
+
     SK = cty.buf + cty.rk_offset + cty.nr * 4;
 
     *RK++ = *SK++;
@@ -944,6 +963,12 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+    if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support()) {
+        return mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+    }
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
     if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) {
         if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output) == 0) {
diff --git a/library/aesce.c b/library/aesce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee0c8e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/aesce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/*
+ *  Arm64 crypto extension support functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)
+
+#include "aesce.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#   if __clang_major__ < 4
+#       error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C"
+#   endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#   if __GNUC__ < 6
+#       error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C"
+#   endif
+#else
+#    error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO)
+#   error "`crypto` feature moddifier MUST be enabled for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C."
+#   error "Typical option for GCC and Clang is `-march=armv8-a+crypto`."
+#endif /* !__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO */
+
+#include <arm_neon.h>
+
+#if defined(__linux__)
+#include <asm/hwcap.h>
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * AES instruction support detection routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_has_support(void)
+{
+#if defined(__linux__)
+    unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP);
+    return (auxval & (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) ==
+           (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES);
+#else
+    /* Assume AES instructions are supported. */
+    return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static uint8x16_t aesce_encrypt_block(uint8x16_t block,
+                                      unsigned char *keys,
+                                      int rounds)
+{
+    for (int i = 0; i < rounds - 1; i++) {
+        /* AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows (in this order).
+         * AddRoundKey adds the round key for the previous round. */
+        block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + i * 16));
+        /* AES mix columns */
+        block = vaesmcq_u8(block);
+    }
+
+    /* AES AddRoundKey for the previous round.
+     * SubBytes, ShiftRows for the final round.  */
+    block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + (rounds -1) * 16));
+
+    /* Final round: no MixColumns */
+
+    /* Final AddRoundKey */
+    block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + rounds  * 16));
+
+    return block;
+}
+
+static uint8x16_t aesce_decrypt_block(uint8x16_t block,
+                                      unsigned char *keys,
+                                      int rounds)
+{
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < rounds - 1; i++) {
+        /* AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows */
+        block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + i * 16));
+        /* AES inverse MixColumns for the next round.
+         *
+         * This means that we switch the order of the inverse AddRoundKey and
+         * inverse MixColumns operations. We have to do this as AddRoundKey is
+         * done in an atomic instruction together with the inverses of SubBytes
+         * and ShiftRows.
+         *
+         * It works because MixColumns is a linear operation over GF(2^8) and
+         * AddRoundKey is an exclusive or, which is equivalent to addition over
+         * GF(2^8). (The inverse of MixColumns needs to be applied to the
+         * affected round keys separately which has been done when the
+         * decryption round keys were calculated.) */
+        block = vaesimcq_u8(block);
+    }
+
+    /* The inverses of AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows finishing up the
+     * last full round. */
+    block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + (rounds - 1) * 16));
+
+    /* Inverse AddRoundKey for inverting the initial round key addition. */
+    block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys + rounds * 16));
+
+    return block;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+                            int mode,
+                            const unsigned char input[16],
+                            unsigned char output[16])
+{
+    uint8x16_t block = vld1q_u8(&input[0]);
+    unsigned char *keys = (unsigned char *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset);
+
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) {
+        block = aesce_encrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr);
+    } else {
+        block = aesce_decrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr);
+    }
+    vst1q_u8(&output[0], block);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+                               const unsigned char *fwdkey,
+                               int nr)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    j = nr;
+    vst1q_u8(invkey, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16));
+    for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--) {
+        vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16,
+                 vaesimcq_u8(vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)));
+    }
+    vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16));
+
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t aes_rot_word(uint32_t word)
+{
+    return (word << (32 - 8)) | (word >> 8);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t aes_sub_word(uint32_t in)
+{
+    uint8x16_t v = vreinterpretq_u8_u32(vdupq_n_u32(in));
+    uint8x16_t zero = vdupq_n_u8(0);
+
+    /* vaeseq_u8 does both SubBytes and ShiftRows. Taking the first row yields
+     * the correct result as ShiftRows doesn't change the first row. */
+    v = vaeseq_u8(zero, v);
+    return vgetq_lane_u32(vreinterpretq_u32_u8(v), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion function
+ */
+static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+                             const unsigned char *key,
+                             const size_t key_bit_length)
+{
+    static uint8_t const rcon[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10,
+                                    0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36 };
+    /* See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf
+     *   - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6
+     *   - Section 5.2, the key expansion size is Nb*(Nr+1)
+     */
+    const uint32_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32;  /* Nk */
+    const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4;                /* Nb */
+    const size_t round_keys_needed = key_len_in_words + 6;  /* Nr */
+    const size_t key_expansion_size_in_words =
+        round_key_len_in_words * (round_keys_needed + 1);   /* Nb*(Nr+1) */
+    const uint32_t *rko_end = (uint32_t *) rk + key_expansion_size_in_words;
+
+    memcpy(rk, key, key_len_in_words * 4);
+
+    for (uint32_t *rki = (uint32_t *) rk;
+         rki + key_len_in_words < rko_end;
+         rki += key_len_in_words) {
+
+        size_t iteration = (rki - (uint32_t *) rk) / key_len_in_words;
+        uint32_t *rko;
+        rko = rki + key_len_in_words;
+        rko[0] = aes_rot_word(aes_sub_word(rki[key_len_in_words - 1]));
+        rko[0] ^= rcon[iteration] ^ rki[0];
+        rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1];
+        rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2];
+        rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3];
+        if (rko + key_len_in_words > rko_end) {
+            /* Do not write overflow words.*/
+            continue;
+        }
+        switch (key_bit_length) {
+            case 128:
+                break;
+            case 192:
+                rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4];
+                rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
+                break;
+            case 256:
+                rko[4] = aes_sub_word(rko[3]) ^ rki[4];
+                rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
+                rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6];
+                rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7];
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, wrapper
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+                             const unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t bits)
+{
+    switch (bits) {
+        case 128:
+        case 192:
+        case 256:
+            aesce_setkey_enc(rk, key, bits);
+            break;
+        default:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */
diff --git a/library/aesce.h b/library/aesce.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da42446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/aesce.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/**
+ * \file aesce.h
+ *
+ * \brief AES-CE for hardware AES acceleration on ARMv8 processors with crypto
+ *        extension.
+ *
+ * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library
+ *          functions; you must not call them directly.
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESCE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \
+    defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Internal function to detect the crypto extension in CPUs.
+ *
+ * \return         1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_has_support(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Internal AES-ECB block encryption and decryption
+ *
+ * \param ctx      AES context
+ * \param mode     MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param input    16-byte input block
+ * \param output   16-byte output block
+ *
+ * \return         0 on success (cannot fail)
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+                            int mode,
+                            const unsigned char input[16],
+                            unsigned char output[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief           Internal round key inversion. This function computes
+ *                  decryption round keys from the encryption round keys.
+ *
+ * \param invkey    Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher
+ * \param fwdkey    Original round keys (for encryption)
+ * \param nr        Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one)
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+                               const unsigned char *fwdkey,
+                               int nr);
+
+/**
+ * \brief           Internal key expansion for encryption
+ *
+ * \param rk        Destination buffer where the round keys are written
+ * \param key       Encryption key
+ * \param bits      Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256)
+ *
+ * \return          0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+                             const unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t bits);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ARM64 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 7987c3f..b352e76 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -4570,6 +4570,8 @@
 /* Forward declarations */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
 static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn);
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
 static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *);
@@ -4582,6 +4584,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
 static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *N_p, size_t N_n);
 #endif
 
 #define NIST_MODP(P)      grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P;
@@ -4884,10 +4888,12 @@
 }
 
 #define WIDTH       8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)
-#define A(i)      N->p + (i) * WIDTH
-#define ADD(i)    add64(p, A(i), &c)
+#define A(i)        Np + (i) * WIDTH
+#define ADD(i)      add64(p, A(i), &c)
 #define NEXT        p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c)
 #define LAST        p += WIDTH; *p = c; while (++p < end) *p = 0
+#define RESET       last_carry[0] = c; c = 0; p = Np
+#define ADD_LAST    add64(p, last_carry, &c)
 
 /*
  * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1)
@@ -4895,28 +4901,51 @@
 static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end;
-
-    /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, 6 * WIDTH));
-
-    p = N->p;
-    end = p + N->n;
-
-    ADD(3); ADD(5);             NEXT;     // A0 += A3 + A5
-    ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5);   NEXT;       // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5
-    ADD(4); ADD(5);             LAST;     // A2 += A4 + A5
+    size_t expected_width = 2 * ((192 + biL - 1) / biL);
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(N->p, expected_width);
 
 cleanup:
     return ret;
 }
 
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, last_carry[WIDTH] = { 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end;
+
+    if (Nn != 2*((192 + biL - 1)/biL)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    p = Np;
+    end = p + Nn;
+
+    ADD(3); ADD(5);         NEXT;   // A0 += A3 + A5
+    ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT;   // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5
+    ADD(4); ADD(5);                 // A2 += A4 + A5
+
+    RESET;
+
+    /* Use the reduction for the carry as well:
+     * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192
+     */
+    ADD_LAST; NEXT;                 // A0 += last_carry
+    ADD_LAST; NEXT;                 // A1 += last_carry
+
+    LAST;                           // A2 += carry
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #undef WIDTH
 #undef A
 #undef ADD
 #undef NEXT
 #undef LAST
+#undef RESET
+#undef ADD_LAST
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) ||   \
@@ -5162,11 +5191,6 @@
           MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
-/*
- * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward.
- * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits).
- */
-
 /* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
 #define P521_WIDTH      (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1)
 
@@ -5174,48 +5198,81 @@
 #define P521_MASK       0x01FF
 
 /*
- * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
- * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
  */
 static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t i;
-    mbedtls_mpi M;
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1];
-    /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits:
-     * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is
-     * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */
-
-    if (N->n < P521_WIDTH) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* M = A1 */
-    M.s = 1;
-    M.n = N->n - (P521_WIDTH - 1);
-    if (M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1) {
-        M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1;
-    }
-    M.p = Mp;
-    memcpy(Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, 521 % (8 * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))));
-
-    /* N = A0 */
-    N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK;
-    for (i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) {
-        N->p[i] = 0;
-    }
-
-    /* N = A0 + A1 */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M));
-
+    size_t expected_width = 2 * P521_WIDTH;
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(N->p, expected_width);
 cleanup:
     return ret;
 }
 
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = 0;
+
+    if (X_limbs != 2 * P521_WIDTH || X[2 * P521_WIDTH - 1] != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    /* Step 1: Reduction to P521_WIDTH limbs */
+    /* Helper references for bottom part of X */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X0 = X;
+    size_t X0_limbs = P521_WIDTH;
+    /* Helper references for top part of X */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X1 = X + X0_limbs;
+    size_t X1_limbs = X_limbs - X0_limbs;
+    /* Split X as X0 + 2^P521_WIDTH X1 and compute X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1.
+     * (We are using that 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and that
+     * 2^(512 + biL) X1 = 2^(biL - 9) X1 mod P521.)
+     * The high order limb of the result will be held in carry and the rest
+     * in X0 (that is the result will be represented as
+     * 2^P521_WIDTH carry + X0).
+     *
+     * Also, note that the resulting carry is either 0 or 1:
+     * X0 < 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and X1 < 2^(P521_WIDTH-biL) = 2^512
+     * therefore
+     * X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1 < 2^(512 + biL) + 2^(512 + biL - 9)
+     * which in turn is less than 2 * 2^(512 + biL).
+     */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint shift = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1u) << (biL - 9);
+    carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X0, X0_limbs, X1, X1_limbs, shift);
+    /* Set X to X0 (by clearing the top part). */
+    memset(X1, 0, X1_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+
+    /* Step 2: Reduction modulo P521
+     *
+     * At this point X is reduced to P521_WIDTH limbs. What remains is to add
+     * the carry (that is 2^P521_WIDTH carry) and to reduce mod P521. */
+
+    /* 2^P521_WIDTH carry = 2^(512 + biL) carry = 2^(biL - 9) carry mod P521.
+     * Also, recall that carry is either 0 or 1. */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint addend = carry << (biL - 9);
+    /* Keep the top 9 bits and reduce the rest, using 2^521 = 1 mod P521. */
+    addend += (X[P521_WIDTH - 1] >> 9);
+    X[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK;
+
+    /* Resuse the top part of X (already zeroed) as a helper array for
+     * carrying out the addition. */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *addend_arr = X + P521_WIDTH;
+    addend_arr[0] = addend;
+    (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, addend_arr, P521_WIDTH);
+    /* Both addends were less than P521 therefore X < 2 * P521. (This also means
+     * that the result fit in P521_WIDTH limbs and there won't be any carry.) */
+
+    /* Clear the reused part of X. */
+    addend_arr[0] = 0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #undef P521_WIDTH
 #undef P521_MASK
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
@@ -5477,6 +5534,188 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
 
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+                              const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id,
+                              const mbedtls_ecp_curve_type ctype)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL;
+    size_t p_limbs;
 
+    if (!(ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE || \
+          ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    switch (id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+            if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_curve_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_p;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_p));
+            } else {
+                p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_n;
+                p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_n));
+            }
+            break;
+#endif
+
+        default:
+        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs,
+                                      MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
diff --git a/library/ecp_invasive.h b/library/ecp_invasive.h
index 18815be..aba7cca 100644
--- a/library/ecp_invasive.h
+++ b/library/ecp_invasive.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
@@ -76,6 +77,69 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1)
+ *
+ * This operation expects a 384 bit MPI and the result of the reduction
+ * is a 192 bit MPI.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out]   Np  The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ *                      Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ *                      Upon return this holds the reduced value. The bitlength
+ *                      of the reduced value is the same as that of the modulus
+ *                      (192 bits).
+ * \param[in]       Nn  The length of \p Np in limbs.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
+ *
+ * \param[in,out]   X       The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ *                          Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus
+ *                          (the modulus is 521 bits long). Upon return this
+ *                          holds the reduced value. The reduced value is
+ *                          in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ *                          and its the bitlength is one plus the bitlength
+ *                          of the modulus.
+ * \param[in]       X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs does not have
+ *                  twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+/** Initialise a modulus with hard-coded const curve data.
+ *
+ * \note            The caller is responsible for the \p N modulus' memory.
+ *                  mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&N) should be invoked at the
+ *                  end of its lifecycle.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate.
+ *                  Must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] id    The mbedtls_ecp_group_id for which to initialise the modulus.
+ * \param[in] ctype The mbedtls_ecp_curve_type identifier for a coordinate modulus (P)
+ *                  or a scalar modulus (N).
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not
+ *                  have the correct number of limbs.
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+                              const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id,
+                              const mbedtls_ecp_curve_type ctype);
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/oid.c b/library/oid.c
index e7c1224..86214b2 100644
--- a/library/oid.c
+++ b/library/oid.c
@@ -834,21 +834,55 @@
     p = buf;
     n = size;
 
-    /* First byte contains first two dots */
-    if (oid->len > 0) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%d.%d", oid->p[0] / 40, oid->p[0] % 40);
-        OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+    /* First subidentifier contains first two OID components */
+    i = 0;
+    value = 0;
+    if ((oid->p[0]) == 0x80) {
+        /* Overlong encoding is not allowed */
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
     }
 
-    value = 0;
-    for (i = 1; i < oid->len; i++) {
+    while (i < oid->len && ((oid->p[i] & 0x80) != 0)) {
         /* Prevent overflow in value. */
-        if (((value << 7) >> 7) != value) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+        if (value > (UINT_MAX >> 7)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+        }
+
+        value |= oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
+        value <<= 7;
+        i++;
+    }
+    if (i >= oid->len) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+    }
+    /* Last byte of first subidentifier */
+    value |= oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
+    i++;
+
+    unsigned int component1 = value / 40;
+    if (component1 > 2) {
+        /* The first component can only be 0, 1 or 2.
+         * If oid->p[0] / 40 is greater than 2, the leftover belongs to
+         * the second component. */
+        component1 = 2;
+    }
+    unsigned int component2 = value - (40 * component1);
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%u.%u", component1, component2);
+    OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    value = 0;
+    for (; i < oid->len; i++) {
+        /* Prevent overflow in value. */
+        if (value > (UINT_MAX >> 7)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+        }
+        if ((value == 0) && ((oid->p[i]) == 0x80)) {
+            /* Overlong encoding is not allowed */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
         }
 
         value <<= 7;
-        value += oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
+        value |= oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
 
         if (!(oid->p[i] & 0x80)) {
             /* Last byte */
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index dc7a27f..45cf807 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
 #include "pk_wrap.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
@@ -26,39 +28,34 @@
 /* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
 #include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
 
-#include <string.h>
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-#include "pkwrite.h"
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
 #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#include "pkwrite.h"
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
 #include "hash_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
 #endif
+#endif  /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
 int mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
@@ -685,11 +682,14 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     psa_status_t status;
-    mbedtls_pk_context key;
-    int key_len;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+    size_t key_len;
+    /* This buffer will initially contain the public key and then the signature
+     * but at different points in time. For all curves except secp224k1, which
+     * is not currently supported in PSA, the public key is one byte longer
+     * (header byte + 2 numbers, while the signature is only 2 numbers),
+     * so use that as the buffer size. */
+    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
     unsigned char *p;
-    mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
     psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
     size_t curve_bits;
     psa_ecc_family_t curve =
@@ -701,22 +701,19 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
-     * re-construct one to make it happy */
-    key.pk_info = &pk_info;
-    key.pk_ctx = ctx;
-    p = buf + sizeof(buf);
-    key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key);
-    if (key_len <= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
     psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve));
     psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
 
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q,
+                                         MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+                                         &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf));
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
     status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
-                            buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+                            buf, key_len,
                             &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
@@ -864,54 +861,6 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
-/* Locate an ECDSA privateKey in a RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 ASN.1 buffer
- *
- * [in/out] buf: ASN.1 buffer start as input - ECDSA privateKey start as output
- * [in] end: ASN.1 buffer end
- * [out] key_len: the ECDSA privateKey length in bytes
- */
-static int find_ecdsa_private_key(unsigned char **buf, unsigned char *end,
-                                  size_t *key_len)
-{
-    size_t len;
-    int ret;
-
-    /*
-     * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4
-     *
-     * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
-     *      version        INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
-     *      privateKey     OCTET STRING,
-     *      parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
-     *      publicKey  [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
-     *    }
-     */
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /* version */
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    *buf += len;
-
-    /* privateKey */
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    *key_len = len;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
 static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
                            const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
                            unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
@@ -922,19 +871,18 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     psa_status_t status;
-    mbedtls_pk_context key;
-    size_t key_len;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES];
-    unsigned char *p;
-    psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg);
+    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH];
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-    psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(psa_hash);
+    psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md =
+        PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg));
 #else
-    psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash);
+    psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md =
+        PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg));
 #endif
     size_t curve_bits;
     psa_ecc_family_t curve =
         mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+    size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits);
 
     /* PSA has its own RNG */
     ((void) f_rng);
@@ -944,17 +892,10 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    /* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context;
-     * re-construct one to make it happy */
-    key.pk_info = &mbedtls_eckey_info;
-    key.pk_ctx = ctx;
-    key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
-    if (key_len <= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    if (key_len > sizeof(buf)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     }
-
-    p = buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len;
-    ret = find_ecdsa_private_key(&p, buf + sizeof(buf), &key_len);
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buf, key_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -964,7 +905,7 @@
     psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
 
     status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
-                            p, key_len,
+                            buf, key_len,
                             &key_id);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
@@ -1003,8 +944,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
 /* Forward declarations */
 static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
                                 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@@ -1110,8 +1050,7 @@
 cleanup:
     return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
 
 static int eckey_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv,
                             int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
diff --git a/library/pkcs7.c b/library/pkcs7.c
index 4fdbe36..010d706 100644
--- a/library/pkcs7.c
+++ b/library/pkcs7.c
@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@
     ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
                                | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
     if (ret != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+    } else if ((size_t) (end - *p) != *len) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO,
+                                MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
     }
 
     return ret;
@@ -184,13 +187,13 @@
     size_t len2 = 0;
     unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start;
 
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
-                                    | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != 0) {
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
-            return 0;
-        } else {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-        }
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                               | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
     }
     start = *p;
     end_set = *p + len1;
@@ -213,12 +216,11 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
     }
 
-    *p = start;
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, *p, len1)) < 0) {
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, start, len1)) < 0) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT;
     }
 
-    *p = *p + len1;
+    *p = end_cert;
 
     /*
      * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching
@@ -285,7 +287,8 @@
  * and unauthenticatedAttributes.
  **/
 static int pkcs7_get_signer_info(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
-                                 mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer)
+                                 mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer,
+                                 mbedtls_x509_buf *alg)
 {
     unsigned char *end_signer, *end_issuer_and_sn;
     int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -343,8 +346,15 @@
         goto out;
     }
 
-    /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */
+    /* Check that the digest algorithm used matches the one provided earlier */
+    if (signer->alg_identifier.tag != alg->tag ||
+        signer->alg_identifier.len != alg->len ||
+        memcmp(signer->alg_identifier.p, alg->p, alg->len) != 0) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+        goto out;
+    }
 
+    /* Asssume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */
     ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier);
     if (ret != 0) {
         goto out;
@@ -377,7 +387,8 @@
  * Return negative error code for failure.
  **/
 static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
-                                      mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set)
+                                      mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set,
+                                      mbedtls_x509_buf *digest_alg)
 {
     unsigned char *end_set;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -397,7 +408,7 @@
 
     end_set = *p + len;
 
-    ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set);
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set, digest_alg);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
     }
@@ -412,7 +423,7 @@
             goto cleanup;
         }
 
-        ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer);
+        ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer, digest_alg);
         if (ret != 0) {
             mbedtls_free(signer);
             goto cleanup;
@@ -454,7 +465,7 @@
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
     unsigned char *end = buf + buflen;
-    unsigned char *end_set, *end_content_info;
+    unsigned char *end_content_info = NULL;
     size_t len = 0;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
@@ -465,16 +476,19 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
     }
 
-    end_set = p + len;
+    if (p + len != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
 
     /* Get version of signed data */
-    ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end_set, &signed_data->version);
+    ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end, &signed_data->version);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
     }
 
     /* Get digest algorithm */
-    ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end_set,
+    ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end,
                                          &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
@@ -485,12 +499,15 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG;
     }
 
-    /* Do not expect any content */
-    ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end_set, &end_content_info,
-                                      &signed_data->content.oid);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf content_type;
+    memset(&content_type, 0, sizeof(content_type));
+    ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info, &content_type);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
     }
+    if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &content_type)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO;
+    }
 
     if (p != end_content_info) {
         /* Determine if valid content is present */
@@ -509,13 +526,9 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
     }
 
-    if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &signed_data->content.oid)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO;
-    }
-
     /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */
     mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&signed_data->certs);
-    ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end_set, &signed_data->certs);
+    ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end, &signed_data->certs);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
     }
@@ -531,7 +544,10 @@
     signed_data->no_of_crls = 0;
 
     /* Get signers info */
-    ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p, end_set, &signed_data->signers);
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p,
+                                     end,
+                                     &signed_data->signers,
+                                     &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers);
     if (ret < 0) {
         return ret;
     }
@@ -550,10 +566,9 @@
                             const size_t buflen)
 {
     unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *end, *end_content_info;
+    unsigned char *end;
     size_t len = 0;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    int isoidset = 0;
 
     if (pkcs7 == NULL) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -569,34 +584,45 @@
     pkcs7->raw.len = buflen;
     end = p + buflen;
 
-    ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info,
-                                      &pkcs7->content_type_oid);
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                               | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
     if (ret != 0) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if ((size_t) (end - p) != len) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT,
+                                MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+        if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+            goto out;
+        }
+        p = pkcs7->raw.p;
         len = buflen;
         goto try_data;
     }
 
-    /* Ensure PKCS7 data uses the exact number of bytes specified in buflen */
-    if (end_content_info != end) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, p, len)) {
+        /* OID is not MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, which is the only supported feature */
+        if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, p, len)
+            || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, p, len)
+            || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len)
+            || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len)
+            || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, p, len)) {
+            /* OID is valid according to the spec, but unsupported */
+            ret =  MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        } else {
+            /* OID is invalid according to the spec */
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        }
         goto out;
     }
 
-    if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)
-        || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)
-        || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)
-        || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)
-        || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)) {
-        ret =  MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid)) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    isoidset = 1;
+    p += len;
 
     ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len(&p, end, &len);
     if (ret != 0) {
@@ -615,12 +641,6 @@
         goto out;
     }
 
-    if (!isoidset) {
-        pkcs7->content_type_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
-        pkcs7->content_type_oid.len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
-        pkcs7->content_type_oid.p = (unsigned char *) MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
-    }
-
     ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
 
 out:
@@ -653,6 +673,39 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
     }
 
+    ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&pkcs7->signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+    if (md_info == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1);
+    if (hash == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */
+    if (is_data_hash) {
+        if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+        } else {
+            memcpy(hash, data, datalen);
+        }
+    } else {
+        ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash);
+    }
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        mbedtls_free(hash);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* assume failure */
+    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+
     /*
      * Potential TODOs
      * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them
@@ -662,61 +715,30 @@
      * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow
      * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key
      * failed to validate'.
-     *
-     * We could also cache hashes by md, so if there are several sigs all using
-     * the same algo we don't recalculate the hash each time.
      */
     for (signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next) {
-        ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&signer->alg_identifier, &md_alg);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
-        if (md_info == NULL) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1);
-        if (hash == NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
-        }
-        /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */
-        if (is_data_hash) {
-            if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) {
-                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
-            } else {
-                memcpy(hash, data, datalen);
-            }
-        } else {
-            ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash);
-        }
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
-            mbedtls_free(hash);
-            continue;
-        }
-
         ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_cxt, md_alg, hash,
                                 mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info),
                                 signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len);
-        mbedtls_free(hash);
-        /* END must free hash before jumping out */
 
         if (ret == 0) {
             break;
         }
     }
 
+    mbedtls_free(hash);
+    /* END must free hash before jumping out */
     return ret;
 }
+
 int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
                                      const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
                                      const unsigned char *data,
                                      size_t datalen)
 {
+    if (data == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
     return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0);
 }
 
@@ -725,6 +747,9 @@
                                      const unsigned char *hash,
                                      size_t hashlen)
 {
+    if (hash == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
     return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1);
 }
 
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 8e2cecc..0efebb4 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -322,6 +322,44 @@
     }
 }
 
+/**
+ * \brief                       For output buffers which contain "tags"
+ *                              (outputs that may be checked for validity like
+ *                              hashes, MACs and signatures), fill the unused
+ *                              part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on
+ *                              error, the trailing part on success) with
+ *                              something that isn't a valid tag (barring an
+ *                              attack on the tag and deliberately-crafted
+ *                              input), in case the caller doesn't check the
+ *                              return status properly.
+ *
+ * \param output_buffer         Pointer to buffer to wipe. May not be NULL
+ *                              unless \p output_buffer_size is zero.
+ * \param status                Status of function called to generate
+ *                              output_buffer originally
+ * \param output_buffer_size    Size of output buffer. If zero, \p output_buffer
+ *                              could be NULL.
+ * \param output_buffer_length  Length of data written to output_buffer, must be
+ *                              less than \p output_buffer_size
+ */
+static void psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(uint8_t *output_buffer, psa_status_t status,
+                                       size_t output_buffer_size, size_t output_buffer_length)
+{
+    size_t offset = 0;
+
+    if (output_buffer_size == 0) {
+        /* If output_buffer_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not
+           call memset because output_buffer may be NULL in this case */
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        offset = output_buffer_length;
+    }
+
+    memset(output_buffer + offset, '!', output_buffer_size - offset);
+}
+
 
 
 
@@ -1677,12 +1715,12 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The key was successfully created.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  *
  * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state.
  *         You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot.
@@ -2504,10 +2542,7 @@
         operation->mac_size = 0;
     }
 
-    if (mac_size > operation->mac_size) {
-        memset(&mac[operation->mac_size], '!',
-               mac_size - operation->mac_size);
-    }
+    psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length);
 
     abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation);
 
@@ -2601,9 +2636,8 @@
         *mac_length = mac_size;
         operation_mac_size = 0;
     }
-    if (mac_size > operation_mac_size) {
-        memset(&mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size);
-    }
+
+    psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length);
 
     unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
 
@@ -2683,37 +2717,6 @@
     return PSA_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-/**
- * \brief                       Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the
- *                              whole buffer on error, the trailing part on
- *                              success) with something that isn't a valid
- *                              signature (barring an attack on the signature
- *                              and deliberately-crafted input), in case the
- *                              caller doesn't check the return status properly.
- *
- * \param output_buffer         pointer to buffer to wipe. May not be NULL
- *                              unless \p output_buffer_size is zero.
- * \param status                status of function called to generate
- *                              output_buffer originally
- * \param output_buffer_size    Size of output buffer. If zero, \p output_buffer
- *                              could be NULL
- * \param output_buffer_length  Length of data written to output_buffer, must be
- *                              less than \p output_buffer_size
- */
-static void psa_wipe_output_buffer(uint8_t *output_buffer, psa_status_t status,
-                                   size_t output_buffer_size, size_t output_buffer_length)
-{
-    if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        memset(output_buffer + output_buffer_length, '!',
-               output_buffer_size - output_buffer_length);
-    } else if (output_buffer_size > 0) {
-        memset(output_buffer, '!', output_buffer_size);
-    }
-    /* If output_buffer_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must
-     * not call memset because output_buffer may be NULL in this
-     * case.*/
-}
-
 static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
                                       int input_is_message,
                                       psa_algorithm_t alg,
@@ -2776,8 +2779,8 @@
 
 
 exit:
-    psa_wipe_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size,
-                           *signature_length);
+    psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size,
+                               *signature_length);
 
     unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
 
@@ -3294,8 +3297,8 @@
 
 exit:
 
-    psa_wipe_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size,
-                           *signature_length);
+    psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size,
+                               *signature_length);
 
     if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) {
         if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
@@ -4900,18 +4903,14 @@
                                             tag, tag_size, tag_length);
 
 exit:
+
+
     /* In case the operation fails and the user fails to check for failure or
      * the zero tag size, make sure the tag is set to something implausible.
      * Even if the operation succeeds, make sure we clear the rest of the
      * buffer to prevent potential leakage of anything previously placed in
      * the same buffer.*/
-    if (tag != NULL) {
-        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-            memset(tag, '!', tag_size);
-        } else if (*tag_length < tag_size) {
-            memset(tag + *tag_length, '!', (tag_size - *tag_length));
-        }
-    }
+    psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(tag, status, tag_size, *tag_length);
 
     psa_aead_abort(operation);
 
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
index 2ae8fe8..4b24b0f 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         ciphertext_size is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -134,10 +134,10 @@
  *         The cipher is not authentic.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         plaintext_size is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h
index 6cc6bf6..bf43ff0 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h
@@ -59,10 +59,10 @@
  *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
  *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@
  *                              the core to be less or equal to
  *                              PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
  *         or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for
  *         this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
  *         padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish(
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized cipher operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation);
 
@@ -224,10 +224,10 @@
  *                              the returned output. Initialized to zero
  *                              by the core.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@
  *                              the returned output. Initialized to zero
  *                              by the core.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index b1817e2..5260cf7 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was
  *         already fully wiped.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
 
@@ -285,9 +285,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The key was imported successfully.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key data is not correctly formatted.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -310,12 +310,12 @@
  *                              \p data
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The key was exported successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@
  *                              \p data
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The public key was exported successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The key was generated successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         Key size in bits or type not supported.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
@@ -399,18 +399,18 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of the key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -445,9 +445,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -475,18 +475,18 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of the key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -519,9 +519,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -577,8 +577,8 @@
  *                                  up the returned shared secret.
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success. Shared secret successfully calculated.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
  *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
@@ -588,12 +588,12 @@
  *         \p shared_secret_size is too small
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -752,11 +752,11 @@
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete(
     mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
@@ -849,9 +849,9 @@
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete(
     mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
index c7ef534..f4ad3d2 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The ECP key was imported successfully.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key data is not correctly formatted.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -120,12 +120,12 @@
  *                              \p data
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The ECP public key was exported successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -175,17 +175,17 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits,
  *         \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -218,9 +218,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@
  *                                  up the returned shared secret.
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success. Shared secret successfully calculated.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
  *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
@@ -267,8 +267,8 @@
  *         \p shared_secret_size is too small
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/library/psa_crypto_hash.h
index 63874e8..d6bbd3f 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_hash.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_hash.h
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
  *         \p alg is not supported
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p hash_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute(
     psa_algorithm_t alg,
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@
  *         \p alg is not supported
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(
     mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
@@ -115,13 +115,13 @@
  * \param[in,out] target_operation  The operation object to set up.
  *                                  It must be initialized but not active.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone(
     const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active).
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update(
     mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@
  *         The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg)
  *         where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish(
     mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
@@ -216,8 +216,8 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized hash operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(
     mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h
index 21c4de6..4f8024a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_mac.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@
  *         \p alg is not supported.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         \p mac_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
  */
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
  */
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active).
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update(
     mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size
  *         can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish(
     mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
@@ -241,8 +241,8 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
  *         operation).
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish(
     mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
@@ -267,8 +267,8 @@
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(
     mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
index c3acdd0..bc24ef5 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The RSA key was imported successfully.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key data is not correctly formatted.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -102,12 +102,12 @@
  *                              \p data.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS  The RSA public key was exported successfully.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -158,17 +158,17 @@
  * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned signature value.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits,
  *         \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
  *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@@ -237,20 +237,20 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
@@ -294,21 +294,21 @@
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
  *                              that make up the returned output.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
  *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
  *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
index ff8ccde..c8366ab 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@
  *         due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
  *         There is no key with key identifier \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
                                        psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@
  *                               associated to the returned slot.
  * \param[out] p_slot            On success, a pointer to the slot.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
                                     psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@
  *                          storage, returns a pointer to the driver table
  *                          associated with the key's storage location.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime,
                                        psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv);
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
  *
  * \param[in] lifetime  The key lifetime attribute.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys
  *             are not supported.
  */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
index 8225014..a8ed937 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@
  * \param[out] data         Buffer where the data is to be written.
  * \param data_size         Size of the \c data buffer in bytes.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription
  */
 static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load(
     const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size)
@@ -131,11 +131,11 @@
  * \param data_length   The number of bytes
  *                      that make up the data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  */
 static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
                                              const uint8_t *data,
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@
  *                          is to be obtained.
  * \param[out] data_length  The number of bytes that make up the data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  */
 static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length(
     const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/library/psa_crypto_storage.h
index 8e108c5..04768f8 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_storage.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage.h
@@ -96,14 +96,14 @@
  * \param[in] data          Buffer containing the key data.
  * \param data_length       The number of bytes that make up the key data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr,
                                      const uint8_t *data,
@@ -129,11 +129,11 @@
  * \param[out] data         Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return.
  * \param[out] data_length  The number of bytes that make up the key data.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr,
                                      uint8_t **data,
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The key was successfully removed,
  *         or the key did not exist.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
 
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@
  * \param[out] attr            On success, the attribute structure is filled
  *                             with the loaded key metadata.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data,
                                              size_t storage_data_length,
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@
  * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to
  * atomically update the transaction state.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction(void);
 
@@ -339,9 +339,9 @@
  *         #psa_crypto_transaction.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
  *         There is no ongoing transaction.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction(void);
 
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The entropy seed file already exists.
  */
diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c
index 963f8bb..ea64b21 100644
--- a/library/ssl_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_client.c
@@ -945,16 +945,29 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
     {
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
-                                           msg_len);
-        ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len - binders_len);
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                 MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                                 msg_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+        ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len - binders_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
         if (binders_len > 0) {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
                 mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
                     ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, buf + msg_len));
-            ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len,
-                                            binders_len);
+            ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len,
+                                                  binders_len);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
         }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 2668a05..7385c6e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -705,9 +705,12 @@
 
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
 
-    void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
-    void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-    void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+    MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+    int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+    MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+    int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+    MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+    int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
     mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
 
     /*
@@ -1317,7 +1320,8 @@
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
@@ -1328,7 +1332,8 @@
 int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 
 /**
  * \brief       Update record layer
@@ -1461,14 +1466,16 @@
 /*
  * Update checksum of handshake messages.
  */
-void mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        unsigned hs_type,
-                                        unsigned char const *msg,
-                                        size_t msg_len);
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                       unsigned hs_type,
+                                       unsigned char const *msg,
+                                       size_t msg_len);
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        unsigned hs_type,
-                                        size_t total_hs_len);
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                       unsigned hs_type,
+                                       size_t total_hs_len);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 9bedc25..d26d950 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -2639,7 +2639,12 @@
 
         /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */
         if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST && update_checksum != 0) {
-            ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen);
+            ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg,
+                                                  ssl->out_msglen);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -3067,12 +3072,17 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
 
     if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && hs != NULL) {
-        ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen);
+        ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
     }
 
     /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */
@@ -3103,6 +3113,7 @@
         memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer));
     }
 #endif
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3928,7 +3939,11 @@
 
         if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
             update_hs_digest == 1) {
-            mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+            if (0 != ret) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
         }
     } else {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("reuse previously read message"));
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 86f5c0b..441089f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -418,8 +418,8 @@
                           const char *label,
                           const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
                           unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
-static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
@@ -430,8 +430,8 @@
                           const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
                           unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
 
-static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
+static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
 static size_t ssl_tls12_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
@@ -444,14 +444,14 @@
                                   size_t len);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
-static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
 int  mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
@@ -788,9 +788,9 @@
     }
 }
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        unsigned hs_type,
-                                        size_t total_hs_len)
+int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                       unsigned hs_type,
+                                       size_t total_hs_len)
 {
     unsigned char hs_hdr[4];
 
@@ -800,84 +800,137 @@
     hs_hdr[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(total_hs_len);
     hs_hdr[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_hs_len);
 
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof(hs_hdr));
+    return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof(hs_hdr));
 }
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        unsigned hs_type,
-                                        unsigned char const *msg,
-                                        size_t msg_len)
+int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                       unsigned hs_type,
+                                       unsigned char const *msg,
+                                       size_t msg_len)
 {
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, hs_type, msg_len);
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, msg, msg_len);
+    int ret;
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, hs_type, msg_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+    return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, msg, msg_len);
 }
 
-void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_status_t status;
+#else
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#endif
+#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */
     ((void) ssl);
+#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa);
-    psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+    status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
+    status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
 #else
-    mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0);
+    ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
 #endif
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa);
-    psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
+    status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
+    status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
 #else
-    mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, 1);
+    ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, 1);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
 #endif
 #endif
+    return 0;
 }
 
-static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                      const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
 {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len);
+    psa_status_t status;
 #else
-    mbedtls_sha256_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len);
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 #endif
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len);
-#else
-    mbedtls_sha512_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len);
-#endif
-#endif
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA) && \
-    !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-    (void) ssl;
+#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */
+    ((void) ssl);
     (void) buf;
     (void) len;
+#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
+#else
+    ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
 #endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+    }
+#else
+    ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif
+#endif
+    return 0;
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update(
+                                         &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len));
 #else
-    mbedtls_sha256_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len);
+    return mbedtls_sha256_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len);
 #endif
 }
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update(
+                                         &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len));
 #else
-    mbedtls_sha512_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len);
+    return mbedtls_sha512_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len);
 #endif
 }
 #endif
@@ -889,19 +942,15 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
-    psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
 #else
     mbedtls_sha256_init(&handshake->fin_sha256);
-    mbedtls_sha256_starts(&handshake->fin_sha256, 0);
 #endif
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init();
-    psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
 #else
     mbedtls_sha512_init(&handshake->fin_sha384);
-    mbedtls_sha512_starts(&handshake->fin_sha384, 1);
 #endif
 #endif
 
@@ -971,6 +1020,8 @@
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
     /* Clear old handshake information if present */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
     if (ssl->transform_negotiate) {
@@ -1038,6 +1089,13 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate);
 #endif
 
+    /* Setup handshake checksums */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
@@ -6285,7 +6343,10 @@
     if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) {
         lbl  = "extended master secret";
         seed = session_hash;
-        handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &seed_len);
+        ret = handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &seed_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_verify", ret);
+        }
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret",
                               session_hash, seed_len);
@@ -6513,9 +6574,9 @@
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                unsigned char *hash,
-                                size_t *hlen)
+int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                               unsigned char *hash,
+                               size_t *hlen)
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     size_t hash_size;
@@ -6525,20 +6586,23 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha256"));
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     *hlen = 32;
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen);
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify"));
+
+exit:
+    psa_hash_abort(&sha256_psa);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
 #else
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
 
     mbedtls_sha256_init(&sha256);
@@ -6546,23 +6610,28 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha256"));
 
     mbedtls_sha256_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256);
-    mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sha256, hash);
+
+    ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sha256, hash);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     *hlen = 32;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen);
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify"));
 
+exit:
     mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256);
+    return ret;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-    return;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                unsigned char *hash,
-                                size_t *hlen)
+int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                               unsigned char *hash,
+                               size_t *hlen)
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     size_t hash_size;
@@ -6572,20 +6641,23 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha384"));
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     *hlen = 48;
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen);
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify"));
+
+exit:
+    psa_hash_abort(&sha384_psa);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
 #else
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
 
     mbedtls_sha512_init(&sha512);
@@ -6593,16 +6665,21 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha384"));
 
     mbedtls_sha512_clone(&sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384);
-    mbedtls_sha512_finish(&sha512, hash);
+
+    ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&sha512, hash);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     *hlen = 48;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen);
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify"));
 
+exit:
     mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512);
+    return ret;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-    return;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
 
@@ -7545,7 +7622,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     int len = 12;
@@ -7556,6 +7633,7 @@
     psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
     psa_status_t status;
 #else
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
 #endif
 
@@ -7575,14 +7653,12 @@
 
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32);
 #else
@@ -7604,8 +7680,10 @@
                           sha256.state, sizeof(sha256.state));
 #endif
 
-    mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sha256, padbuf);
-    mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256);
+    ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sha256, padbuf);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
     ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender,
@@ -7616,12 +7694,21 @@
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_hash_abort(&sha256_psa);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+#else
+    mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256);
+    return ret;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
+static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(
     mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from)
 {
     int len = 12;
@@ -7632,6 +7719,7 @@
     psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
     psa_status_t status;
 #else
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
 #endif
 
@@ -7651,14 +7739,12 @@
 
     status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed"));
-        return;
+        goto exit;
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48);
 #else
@@ -7678,9 +7764,10 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *)
                           sha512.state, sizeof(sha512.state));
 #endif
-    mbedtls_sha512_finish(&sha512, padbuf);
-
-    mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512);
+    ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&sha512, padbuf);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
 #endif
 
     ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender,
@@ -7691,6 +7778,15 @@
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc  finished"));
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_hash_abort(&sha384_psa);
+    return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+#else
+    mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512);
+    return ret;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA*/
 
@@ -7787,7 +7883,10 @@
 
     mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate);
 
-    ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
+    }
 
     /*
      * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites
@@ -7897,7 +7996,10 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished"));
 
-    ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret);
+    }
 
     if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index b427ae9..fc99fde 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -1090,6 +1090,7 @@
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
     const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
     uint16_t dtls_legacy_version;
 
@@ -1160,7 +1161,11 @@
 
     /* Start over at ClientHello */
     ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
-    mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
 
@@ -3283,7 +3288,11 @@
 sign:
 #endif
 
-    ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     /*
      * digitally-signed struct {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 9298292..d5c8b7c 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -1020,7 +1020,11 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len);
 
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     /*
      * Handshake layer:
@@ -4129,7 +4133,11 @@
     /* Calculate hash and verify signature */
     {
         size_t dummy_hlen;
-        ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen);
+        ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen);
+        if (0 != ret) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
     }
 
     if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk,
@@ -4139,7 +4147,11 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify"));
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index 1e79afa..0dd762e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -1489,8 +1489,9 @@
 
         ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
         ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
-        mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                                           buf, (size_t) (end - buf));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                                MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                                                                buf, (size_t) (end - buf)));
 
         if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
             ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl);
@@ -2056,8 +2057,9 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl));
     }
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
-                                       buf, buf_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf,
+                                                            buf_len));
 
     if (is_hrr) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(ssl));
@@ -2214,8 +2216,9 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
-                                       buf, buf_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                                                            buf, buf_len));
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
     if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) {
@@ -2259,8 +2262,8 @@
                              ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
                              &buf, &buf_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
-        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
         mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0));
@@ -2458,8 +2461,9 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(ssl,
                                                                  buf, buf + buf_len));
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-                                           buf, buf_len);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                                MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                                                                buf, buf_len));
     } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) {
         ret = 0;
     } else {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 4fb73f9..f607e36 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -322,8 +322,9 @@
                                                             buf + buf_len, verify_buffer,
                                                             verify_buffer_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
-                                       buf, buf_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+                                                            buf, buf_len));
 
 cleanup:
 
@@ -752,8 +753,9 @@
     /* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(ssl));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
-                                       buf, buf_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf,
+                                                            buf_len));
 
 cleanup:
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
@@ -868,8 +870,9 @@
                                                           buf + buf_len,
                                                           &msg_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
-                                       buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf,
+                                                            msg_len));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                              ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
@@ -1070,8 +1073,9 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body(
                              ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
-                                       buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, buf,
+                                                            msg_len));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                              ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
@@ -1171,8 +1175,8 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
-                                       buf, buf_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, buf_len));
 
 cleanup:
 
@@ -1248,8 +1252,8 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(
                              ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
-                                       buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, msg_len));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                              ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
@@ -1388,7 +1392,7 @@
                                                PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE,
                                                &hash_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(4, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret);
         return ret;
     }
 
@@ -1399,37 +1403,20 @@
 
     hash_len += 4;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-    if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated SHA-256 handshake transcript",
-                              hash_transcript, hash_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated handshake transcript",
+                          hash_transcript, hash_len);
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-        psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa);
-        psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
-#else
-        mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0);
-#endif
+    /* Reset running hash and replace it with a hash of the transcript */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret);
+        return ret;
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-    if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated SHA-384 handshake transcript",
-                              hash_transcript, hash_len);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-        psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa);
-        psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
-#else
-        mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, 1);
-#endif
+    ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret);
+        return ret;
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA) || \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len);
-#endif \
-    /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA || MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
 
     return ret;
 }
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 81c289a..6b1c4c5 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@
                                               const unsigned char *ciphersuites,
                                               const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end)
 {
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext;
     const unsigned char *p_identity_len;
     size_t identities_len;
@@ -521,8 +522,12 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, binders_len);
     binders_end = p_binder_len + binders_len;
 
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, pre_shared_key_ext,
-                                    identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext);
+    ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, pre_shared_key_ext,
+                                          identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     while (p_identity_len < identities_end && p_binder_len < binders_end) {
         const unsigned char *identity;
@@ -530,7 +535,6 @@
         uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age;
         const unsigned char *binder;
         size_t binder_len;
-        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
         int psk_type;
         uint16_t cipher_suite;
         const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
@@ -642,9 +646,13 @@
     }
 
     /* Update the handshake transcript with the binder list. */
-    ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl,
-                                    identities_end,
-                                    (size_t) (binders_end - identities_end));
+    ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl,
+                                          identities_end,
+                                          (size_t) (binders_end - identities_end));
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
     if (matched_identity == -1) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No matched PSK or ticket."));
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
@@ -1590,9 +1598,13 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
                            handshake->received_extensions);
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl,
-                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
-                                       p - buf);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl,
+                                             MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                             p - buf);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
     /* Update checksum with either
@@ -1603,8 +1615,12 @@
     if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
         (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY))) {
-        handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf,
-                                   pre_shared_key_ext - buf);
+        ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf,
+                                         pre_shared_key_ext - buf);
+        if (0 != ret) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
         ret = ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl,
                                                  pre_shared_key_ext,
                                                  pre_shared_key_ext_end,
@@ -1620,7 +1636,11 @@
     } else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
     {
-        handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, p - buf);
+        ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, p - buf);
+        if (0 != ret) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
     }
 
     ret = ssl_tls13_determine_key_exchange_mode(ssl);
@@ -2134,8 +2154,8 @@
                                                            &msg_len,
                                                            0));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
-        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                              ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
@@ -2207,8 +2227,8 @@
                                                            buf + buf_len,
                                                            &msg_len,
                                                            1));
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
-        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len));
 
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len,
@@ -2306,8 +2326,8 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(
                              ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len));
 
-    mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
-        ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, buf, msg_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, buf, msg_len));
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                              ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
@@ -2439,8 +2459,8 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body(
                                  ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len));
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
-            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, buf, msg_len);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                                 ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, buf, msg_len));
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
                                  ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c
index 2865c2e..fc13b92 100644
--- a/library/x509.c
+++ b/library/x509.c
@@ -1227,8 +1227,9 @@
  *      nameAssigner            [0]     DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
  *      partyName               [1]     DirectoryString }
  *
- * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName
- * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.
+ * We list all types, but use the following GeneralName types from RFC 5280:
+ * "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name"
+ * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108.
  */
 int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p,
                                       const unsigned char *end,
@@ -1397,7 +1398,19 @@
 
         }
         break;
+        /*
+         * uniformResourceIdentifier
+         */
+        case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER):
+        {
+            memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
+            san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER;
 
+            memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name,
+                   san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf));
+
+        }
+        break;
         /*
          * dNSName
          */
@@ -1408,7 +1421,17 @@
 
             memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name,
                    san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf));
+        }
+        break;
 
+        /*
+         * RFC822 Name
+         */
+        case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME):
+        {
+            memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
+            san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME;
+            memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf));
         }
         break;
 
@@ -1488,13 +1511,38 @@
                 }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */
             }
             break;
+            /*
+             * uniformResourceIdentifier
+             */
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER:
+            {
+                ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s    uniformResourceIdentifier : ", prefix);
+                MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+                if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) {
+                    *p = '\0';
+                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+                }
 
+                memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len);
+                p += san.san.unstructured_name.len;
+                n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len;
+            }
+            break;
             /*
              * dNSName
+             * RFC822 Name
              */
             case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME:
             {
-                ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s    dNSName : ", prefix);
+                const char *dns_name = "dNSName";
+                const char *rfc822_name = "rfc822Name";
+
+                ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n,
+                                       "\n%s    %s : ",
+                                       prefix,
+                                       san.type ==
+                                       MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ? dns_name : rfc822_name);
                 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
                 if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) {
                     *p = '\0';
diff --git a/scripts/code_style.py b/scripts/code_style.py
index dd8305f..c31fb29 100755
--- a/scripts/code_style.py
+++ b/scripts/code_style.py
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@
 def print_err(*args):
     print("Error: ", *args, file=sys.stderr)
 
+# Print the file names that will be skipped and the help message
+def print_skip(files_to_skip):
+    print()
+    print(*files_to_skip, sep=", SKIP\n", end=", SKIP\n")
+    print("Warning: The listed files will be skipped because\n"
+          "they are not known to git.")
+    print()
+
 # Match FILENAME(s) in "check SCRIPT (FILENAME...)"
 CHECK_CALL_RE = re.compile(r"\n\s*check\s+[^\s#$&*?;|]+([^\n#$&*?;|]+)",
                            re.ASCII)
@@ -174,22 +182,27 @@
     parser.add_argument('-f', '--fix', action='store_true',
                         help=('modify source files to fix the code style '
                               '(default: print diff, do not modify files)'))
-    # --files is almost useless: it only matters if there are no files
+    # --subset is almost useless: it only matters if there are no files
     # ('code_style.py' without arguments checks all files known to Git,
-    # 'code_style.py --files' does nothing). In particular,
-    # 'code_style.py --fix --files ...' is intended as a stable ("porcelain")
+    # 'code_style.py --subset' does nothing). In particular,
+    # 'code_style.py --fix --subset ...' is intended as a stable ("porcelain")
     # way to restyle a possibly empty set of files.
-    parser.add_argument('--files', action='store_true',
+    parser.add_argument('--subset', action='store_true',
                         help='only check the specified files (default with non-option arguments)')
     parser.add_argument('operands', nargs='*', metavar='FILE',
-                        help='files to check (if none: check files that are known to git)')
+                        help='files to check (files MUST be known to git, if none: check all)')
 
     args = parser.parse_args()
 
-    if args.files or args.operands:
-        src_files = args.operands
+    covered = frozenset(get_src_files())
+    # We only check files that are known to git
+    if args.subset or args.operands:
+        src_files = [f for f in args.operands if f in covered]
+        skip_src_files = [f for f in args.operands if f not in covered]
+        if skip_src_files:
+            print_skip(skip_src_files)
     else:
-        src_files = get_src_files()
+        src_files = list(covered)
 
     if args.fix:
         # Fix mode
diff --git a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
index e1a2078..aa11d4e 100644
--- a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
+++ b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
@@ -686,9 +686,9 @@
  * \param[in] data_length       The input data length.
  * \param[out] key_buffer_size  Minimum buffer size to contain the key material.
  *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
  */
 psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
diff --git a/scripts/make_generated_files.bat b/scripts/make_generated_files.bat
index e9d9275..9cf34f6 100644
--- a/scripts/make_generated_files.bat
+++ b/scripts/make_generated_files.bat
@@ -11,4 +11,5 @@
 perl scripts\generate_visualc_files.pl || exit /b 1

 python scripts\generate_psa_constants.py || exit /b 1

 python tests\scripts\generate_bignum_tests.py || exit /b 1

+python tests\scripts\generate_ecp_tests.py || exit /b 1

 python tests\scripts\generate_psa_tests.py || exit /b 1

diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/ecp.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/ecp.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6370d25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/ecp.py
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""Framework classes for generation of ecp test cases."""
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+from typing import List
+
+from . import test_data_generation
+from . import bignum_common
+
+class EcpTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget):
+    #pylint: disable=abstract-method, too-few-public-methods
+    """Target for ecp test case generation."""
+    target_basename = 'test_suite_ecp.generated'
+
+class EcpP192R1Raw(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                   EcpTarget):
+    """Test cases for ecp quasi_reduction()."""
+    symbol = "-"
+    test_function = "ecp_mod_p192_raw"
+    test_name = "ecp_mod_p192_raw"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+    arity = 1
+
+    moduli = ["fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffff"] # type: List[str]
+
+    input_values = [
+        "0", "1",
+
+        # Modulus - 1
+        "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffffffffffffe",
+
+        # First 8 number generated by random.getrandbits(384) - seed(2,2)
+        ("cf1822ffbc6887782b491044d5e341245c6e433715ba2bdd"
+         "177219d30e7a269fd95bafc8f2a4d27bdcf4bb99f4bea973"),
+        ("ffed9235288bc781ae66267594c9c9500925e4749b575bd1"
+         "3653f8dd9b1f282e4067c3584ee207f8da94e3e8ab73738f"),
+        ("ef8acd128b4f2fc15f3f57ebf30b94fa82523e86feac7eb7"
+         "dc38f519b91751dacdbd47d364be8049a372db8f6e405d93"),
+        ("e8624fab5186ee32ee8d7ee9770348a05d300cb90706a045"
+         "defc044a09325626e6b58de744ab6cce80877b6f71e1f6d2"),
+        ("2d3d854e061b90303b08c6e33c7295782d6c797f8f7d9b78"
+         "2a1be9cd8697bbd0e2520e33e44c50556c71c4a66148a86f"),
+        ("fec3f6b32e8d4b8a8f54f8ceacaab39e83844b40ffa9b9f1"
+         "5c14bc4a829e07b0829a48d422fe99a22c70501e533c9135"),
+        ("97eeab64ca2ce6bc5d3fd983c34c769fe89204e2e8168561"
+         "867e5e15bc01bfce6a27e0dfcbf8754472154e76e4c11ab2"),
+        ("bd143fa9b714210c665d7435c1066932f4767f26294365b2"
+         "721dea3bf63f23d0dbe53fcafb2147df5ca495fa5a91c89b"),
+
+        # Next 2 number generated by random.getrandbits(192)
+        "47733e847d718d733ff98ff387c56473a7a83ee0761ebfd2",
+        "cbd4d3e2d4dec9ef83f0be4e80371eb97f81375eecc1cb63"
+    ]
+
+    @property
+    def arg_a(self) -> str:
+        return super().format_arg('{:x}'.format(self.int_a)).zfill(2 * self.hex_digits)
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = self.int_a % self.int_n
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+class EcpP521R1Raw(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                   EcpTarget):
+    """Test cases for ecp quasi_reduction()."""
+    test_function = "ecp_mod_p521_raw"
+    test_name = "ecp_mod_p521_raw"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+    arity = 1
+
+    moduli = [("01ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+               "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff")
+             ] # type: List[str]
+
+    input_values = [
+        "0", "1",
+
+        # Corner case: maximum canonical P521 multiplication result
+        ("0003ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+         "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+         "fffff800"
+         "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+         "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004"),
+
+        # Test case for overflow during addition
+        ("0001efffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+         "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+         "000001ef"
+         "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+         "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f000000"),
+
+        # First 8 number generated by random.getrandbits(1042) - seed(2,2)
+        ("0003cc2e82523e86feac7eb7dc38f519b91751dacdbd47d364be8049a372db8f"
+         "6e405d93ffed9235288bc781ae66267594c9c9500925e4749b575bd13653f8dd"
+         "9b1f282e"
+         "4067c3584ee207f8da94e3e8ab73738fcf1822ffbc6887782b491044d5e34124"
+         "5c6e433715ba2bdd177219d30e7a269fd95bafc8f2a4d27bdcf4bb99f4bea973"),
+        ("00017052829e07b0829a48d422fe99a22c70501e533c91352d3d854e061b9030"
+         "3b08c6e33c7295782d6c797f8f7d9b782a1be9cd8697bbd0e2520e33e44c5055"
+         "6c71c4a6"
+         "6148a86fe8624fab5186ee32ee8d7ee9770348a05d300cb90706a045defc044a"
+         "09325626e6b58de744ab6cce80877b6f71e1f6d2ef8acd128b4f2fc15f3f57eb"),
+        ("00021f15a7a83ee0761ebfd2bd143fa9b714210c665d7435c1066932f4767f26"
+         "294365b2721dea3bf63f23d0dbe53fcafb2147df5ca495fa5a91c89b97eeab64"
+         "ca2ce6bc"
+         "5d3fd983c34c769fe89204e2e8168561867e5e15bc01bfce6a27e0dfcbf87544"
+         "72154e76e4c11ab2fec3f6b32e8d4b8a8f54f8ceacaab39e83844b40ffa9b9f1"),
+        ("000381bc2a838af8d5c44a4eb3172062d08f1bb2531d6460f0caeef038c89b38"
+         "a8acb5137c9260dc74e088a9b9492f258ebdbfe3eb9ac688b9d39cca91551e82"
+         "59cc60b1"
+         "7604e4b4e73695c3e652c71a74667bffe202849da9643a295a9ac6decbd4d3e2"
+         "d4dec9ef83f0be4e80371eb97f81375eecc1cb6347733e847d718d733ff98ff3"),
+        ("00034816c8c69069134bccd3e1cf4f589f8e4ce0af29d115ef24bd625dd961e6"
+         "830b54fa7d28f93435339774bb1e386c4fd5079e681b8f5896838b769da59b74"
+         "a6c3181c"
+         "81e220df848b1df78feb994a81167346d4c0dca8b4c9e755cc9c3adcf515a823"
+         "4da4daeb4f3f87777ad1f45ae9500ec9c5e2486c44a4a8f69dc8db48e86ec9c6"),
+        ("000397846c4454b90f756132e16dce72f18e859835e1f291d322a7353ead4efe"
+         "440e2b4fda9c025a22f1a83185b98f5fc11e60de1b343f52ea748db9e020307a"
+         "aeb6db2c"
+         "3a038a709779ac1f45e9dd320c855fdfa7251af0930cdbd30f0ad2a81b2d19a2"
+         "beaa14a7ff3fe32a30ffc4eed0a7bd04e85bfcdd0227eeb7b9d7d01f5769da05"),
+        ("00002c3296e6bc4d62b47204007ee4fab105d83e85e951862f0981aebc1b00d9"
+         "2838e766ef9b6bf2d037fe2e20b6a8464174e75a5f834da70569c018eb2b5693"
+         "babb7fbb"
+         "0a76c196067cfdcb11457d9cf45e2fa01d7f4275153924800600571fac3a5b26"
+         "3fdf57cd2c0064975c3747465cc36c270e8a35b10828d569c268a20eb78ac332"),
+        ("00009d23b4917fc09f20dbb0dcc93f0e66dfe717c17313394391b6e2e6eacb0f"
+         "0bb7be72bd6d25009aeb7fa0c4169b148d2f527e72daf0a54ef25c0707e33868"
+         "7d1f7157"
+         "5653a45c49390aa51cf5192bbf67da14be11d56ba0b4a2969d8055a9f03f2d71"
+         "581d8e830112ff0f0948eccaf8877acf26c377c13f719726fd70bddacb4deeec"),
+
+        # Next 2 number generated by random.getrandbits(521)
+        ("12b84ae65e920a63ac1f2b64df6dff07870c9d531ae72a47403063238da1a1fe"
+         "3f9d6a179fa50f96cd4aff9261aa92c0e6f17ec940639bc2ccdf572df00790813e3"),
+        ("166049dd332a73fa0b26b75196cf87eb8a09b27ec714307c68c425424a1574f1"
+         "eedf5b0f16cdfdb839424d201e653f53d6883ca1c107ca6e706649889c0c7f38608")
+    ]
+
+    @property
+    def arg_a(self) -> str:
+        # Number of limbs: 2 * N
+        return super().format_arg('{:x}'.format(self.int_a)).zfill(2 * self.hex_digits)
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = self.int_a % self.int_n
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        return True
diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 4a7de82..4549a7a 100644
--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -32,6 +32,18 @@
 execute_process(
     COMMAND
         ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+        ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
+        --list-for-cmake
+    WORKING_DIRECTORY
+        ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
+    OUTPUT_VARIABLE
+        base_ecp_generated_data_files)
+string(REGEX REPLACE "[^;]*/" ""
+       base_ecp_generated_data_files "${base_ecp_generated_data_files}")
+
+execute_process(
+    COMMAND
+        ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
         ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
         --list-for-cmake
     WORKING_DIRECTORY
@@ -44,14 +56,18 @@
 # Derive generated file paths in the build directory. The generated data
 # files go into the suites/ subdirectory.
 set(base_generated_data_files
-    ${base_bignum_generated_data_files} ${base_psa_generated_data_files})
+    ${base_bignum_generated_data_files} ${base_ecp_generated_data_files} ${base_psa_generated_data_files})
 string(REGEX REPLACE "([^;]+)" "suites/\\1"
        all_generated_data_files "${base_generated_data_files}")
 set(bignum_generated_data_files "")
+set(ecp_generated_data_files "")
 set(psa_generated_data_files "")
 foreach(file ${base_bignum_generated_data_files})
     list(APPEND bignum_generated_data_files ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/${file})
 endforeach()
+foreach(file ${base_ecp_generated_data_files})
+    list(APPEND ecp_generated_data_files ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/${file})
+endforeach()
 foreach(file ${base_psa_generated_data_files})
     list(APPEND psa_generated_data_files ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/${file})
 endforeach()
@@ -77,6 +93,22 @@
     )
     add_custom_command(
         OUTPUT
+            ${ecp_generated_data_files}
+        WORKING_DIRECTORY
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
+        COMMAND
+            ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
+            --directory ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites
+        DEPENDS
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/ecp.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
+    )
+    add_custom_command(
+        OUTPUT
             ${psa_generated_data_files}
         WORKING_DIRECTORY
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
@@ -107,6 +139,7 @@
 # With this line, only 4 sub-makefiles include the above command, that reduces
 # the risk of a race.
 add_custom_target(test_suite_bignum_generated_data DEPENDS ${bignum_generated_data_files})
+add_custom_target(test_suite_ecp_generated_data DEPENDS ${ecp_generated_data_files})
 add_custom_target(test_suite_psa_generated_data DEPENDS ${psa_generated_data_files})
 # If SKIP_TEST_SUITES is not defined with -D, get it from the environment.
 if((NOT DEFINED SKIP_TEST_SUITES) AND (DEFINED ENV{SKIP_TEST_SUITES}))
@@ -129,6 +162,7 @@
     # Get the test names of the tests with generated .data files
     # from the generated_data_files list in parent scope.
     set(bignum_generated_data_names "")
+    set(ecp_generated_data_names "")
     set(psa_generated_data_names "")
     foreach(generated_data_file ${bignum_generated_data_files})
         # Get the plain filename
@@ -139,6 +173,15 @@
         string(SUBSTRING ${generated_data_name} 11 -1 generated_data_name)
         list(APPEND bignum_generated_data_names ${generated_data_name})
     endforeach()
+    foreach(generated_data_file ${ecp_generated_data_files})
+        # Get the plain filename
+        get_filename_component(generated_data_name ${generated_data_file} NAME)
+        # Remove the ".data" extension
+        get_name_without_last_ext(generated_data_name ${generated_data_name})
+        # Remove leading "test_suite_"
+        string(SUBSTRING ${generated_data_name} 11 -1 generated_data_name)
+        list(APPEND ecp_generated_data_names ${generated_data_name})
+    endforeach()
     foreach(generated_data_file ${psa_generated_data_files})
         # Get the plain filename
         get_filename_component(generated_data_name ${generated_data_file} NAME)
@@ -153,6 +196,10 @@
         set(data_file
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
         set(dependency test_suite_bignum_generated_data)
+    elseif(";${ecp_generated_data_names};" MATCHES ";${data_name};")
+        set(data_file
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
+        set(dependency test_suite_ecp_generated_data)
     elseif(";${psa_generated_data_names};" MATCHES ";${data_name};")
         set(data_file
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
@@ -160,7 +207,7 @@
     else()
         set(data_file
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data)
-        set(dependency test_suite_bignum_generated_data test_suite_psa_generated_data)
+        set(dependency test_suite_bignum_generated_data test_suite_ecp_generated_data test_suite_psa_generated_data)
     endif()
 
     add_custom_command(
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index 312607e..c9283c9 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@
 ifeq ($(GENERATED_BIGNUM_DATA_FILES),FAILED)
 $(error "$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py --list" failed)
 endif
+GENERATED_ECP_DATA_FILES := $(patsubst tests/%,%,$(shell \
+	$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py --list || \
+	echo FAILED \
+))
+ifeq ($(GENERATED_ECP_DATA_FILES),FAILED)
+$(error "$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py --list" failed)
+endif
 GENERATED_PSA_DATA_FILES := $(patsubst tests/%,%,$(shell \
 	$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_psa_tests.py --list || \
 	echo FAILED \
@@ -80,7 +87,7 @@
 ifeq ($(GENERATED_PSA_DATA_FILES),FAILED)
 $(error "$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_psa_tests.py --list" failed)
 endif
-GENERATED_FILES := $(GENERATED_PSA_DATA_FILES) $(GENERATED_BIGNUM_DATA_FILES)
+GENERATED_FILES := $(GENERATED_PSA_DATA_FILES) $(GENERATED_ECP_DATA_FILES) $(GENERATED_BIGNUM_DATA_FILES)
 generated_files: $(GENERATED_FILES)
 
 # generate_bignum_tests.py and generate_psa_tests.py spend more time analyzing
@@ -89,7 +96,7 @@
 # It's rare not to want all the outputs. So always generate all of its outputs.
 # Use an intermediate phony dependency so that parallel builds don't run
 # a separate instance of the recipe for each output file.
-.SECONDARY: generated_bignum_test_data generated_psa_test_data
+.SECONDARY: generated_bignum_test_data generated_ecp_test_data generated_psa_test_data
 $(GENERATED_BIGNUM_DATA_FILES): generated_bignum_test_data
 generated_bignum_test_data: scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
 generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
@@ -102,6 +109,16 @@
 	echo "  Gen   $(GENERATED_BIGNUM_DATA_FILES)"
 	$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
 
+$(GENERATED_ECP_DATA_FILES): generated_ecp_test_data
+generated_ecp_test_data: scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
+generated_ecp_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
+generated_ecp_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/ecp.py
+generated_ecp_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
+generated_ecp_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
+generated_ecp_test_data:
+	echo "  Gen   $(GENERATED_ECP_DATA_FILES)"
+	$(PYTHON) scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
+
 $(GENERATED_PSA_DATA_FILES): generated_psa_test_data
 generated_psa_test_data: scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
 generated_psa_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py
diff --git a/tests/compat.sh b/tests/compat.sh
index 8f7d72c..12613bf 100755
--- a/tests/compat.sh
+++ b/tests/compat.sh
@@ -534,6 +534,16 @@
     esac
 }
 
+# o_check_ciphersuite STANDARD_CIPHER_SUITE
+o_check_ciphersuite()
+{
+    if [ "${O_SUPPORT_ECDH}" = "NO" ]; then
+        case "$1" in
+            *ECDH_*) SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+        esac
+    fi
+}
+
 setup_arguments()
 {
     O_MODE=""
@@ -603,6 +613,11 @@
             ;;
     esac
 
+    case $($OPENSSL ciphers ALL) in
+        *ECDH-ECDSA*|*ECDH-RSA*) O_SUPPORT_ECDH="YES";;
+        *) O_SUPPORT_ECDH="NO";;
+    esac
+
     if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ];
     then
         M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required"
@@ -819,7 +834,7 @@
             if [ $EXIT -eq 0 ]; then
                 RESULT=0
             else
-                # If the cipher isn't supported...
+                # If it is NULL cipher ...
                 if grep 'Cipher is (NONE)' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then
                     RESULT=1
                 else
@@ -1033,6 +1048,7 @@
                         start_server "OpenSSL"
                         translate_ciphers m $M_CIPHERS
                         for i in $ciphers; do
+                            o_check_ciphersuite "${i%%=*}"
                             run_client mbedTLS ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
                         done
                         stop_server
@@ -1042,6 +1058,7 @@
                         start_server "mbedTLS"
                         translate_ciphers o $O_CIPHERS
                         for i in $ciphers; do
+                            o_check_ciphersuite "${i%%=*}"
                             run_client OpenSSL ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
                         done
                         stop_server
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index 97b26dc..db16ab7 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@
 test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len2.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
 	(hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/3051300B0603551D0F04/3050300B0603551D0F04/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
 
+test_cert_rfc822name.crt.der: cert_example_multi.csr
+	$(OPENSSL) x509 -req -CA $(test_ca_crt) -CAkey $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -extfile $(test_ca_config_file) -outform DER -extensions rfc822name_names -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 17 -days 3653 -sha256 -in $< > $@
+
 $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt):test-ca.opensslconf
 	$(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 2048
 test-ca-alt.csr: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) $(test_ca_config_file)
@@ -336,6 +339,12 @@
 	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS Tricky IP SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions tricky_ip_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key server5.key -out $@
 all_final += server5-tricky-ip-san.crt
 
+rsa_single_san_uri.crt.der: rsa_single_san_uri.key
+	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -outform der -nodes -days 7300 -newkey rsa:2048 -key $< -out $@ -addext "subjectAltName = URI:urn:example.com:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-c2c082f0609c" -extensions 'v3_req' -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN"
+
+rsa_multiple_san_uri.crt.der: rsa_multiple_san_uri.key
+	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -outform der -nodes -days 7300 -newkey rsa:2048 -key $< -out $@ -addext "subjectAltName = URI:urn:example.com:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-c2c082f0609c, URI:urn:example.com:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-abcde1234567" -extensions 'v3_req' -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN"
+
 server10-badsign.crt: server10.crt
 	{ head -n-2 $<; tail -n-2 $< | sed -e '1s/0\(=*\)$$/_\1/' -e '1s/[^_=]\(=*\)$$/0\1/' -e '1s/_/1/'; } > $@
 all_final += server10-badsign.crt
@@ -1269,6 +1278,10 @@
 	echo -e "Hello\xd" > $@
 all_final += $(pkcs7_test_file)
 
+pkcs7_zerolendata.bin:
+	printf '' > $@
+all_final += pkcs7_zerolendata.bin
+
 pkcs7_data_1.bin:
 	echo -e "2\xd" > $@
 all_final += pkcs7_data_1.bin
@@ -1302,6 +1315,11 @@
 	$(OPENSSL) x509 -in pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt -out $@ -outform DER
 all_final += pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der
 
+# pkcs7 signature file over zero-len data
+pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der: pkcs7_zerolendata.bin pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -md sha256 -nocerts -noattr -in pkcs7_zerolendata.bin -inkey pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key -outform DER -binary -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt -out pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der
+all_final += pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der
+
 # pkcs7 signature file with CERT
 pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
 	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha256 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -noattr -outform DER -out $@
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata.bin b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata.bin
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata.bin
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a389ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.crt.der b/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.crt.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac5fab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.crt.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.key b/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8c3492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.key
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.crt.der b/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.crt.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22308c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.crt.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.key b/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb6c0ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.key
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
index bd12760..8f8385a 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 [dns_alt_names]
 subjectAltName=DNS:example.com, DNS:example.net, DNS:*.example.org
 
+[rfc822name_names]
+subjectAltName=email:my@other.address,email:second@other.address
+
 [alt_names]
 DNS.1=example.com
 otherName.1=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hw_module_name
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_cert_rfc822name.crt.der b/tests/data_files/test_cert_rfc822name.crt.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdc8189
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_cert_rfc822name.crt.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 7d91fa2..353ec69 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1972,6 +1972,7 @@
     # aesni.c and padlock.c reference mbedtls_aes_context fields directly.
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
     # MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE is documented as incompatible.
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
     # You can only have one threading implementation: alt or pthread, not both.
@@ -3341,6 +3342,7 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -DMBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32'
 
     msg "test: gcc, force 32-bit bignum limbs"
@@ -3352,6 +3354,7 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -DMBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64'
 
     msg "test: gcc, force 64-bit bignum limbs"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
index 2bb9fea..4d6f930 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
@@ -137,4 +137,5 @@
 check scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl visualc/VS2013
 check scripts/generate_psa_constants.py programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
 check tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py $(tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py --list)
+check tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py $(tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py --list)
 check tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py $(tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py --list)
diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py b/tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..abbfda5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_ecp_tests.py
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Generate test data for ecp functions.
+
+The command line usage, class structure and available methods are the same
+as in generate_bignum_tests.py.
+"""
+
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+import sys
+
+import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import
+from mbedtls_dev import test_data_generation
+# Import modules containing additional test classes
+# Test function classes in these modules will be registered by
+# the framework
+from mbedtls_dev import ecp # pylint: disable=unused-import
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    # Use the section of the docstring relevant to the CLI as description
+    test_data_generation.main(sys.argv[1:], "\n".join(__doc__.splitlines()[:4]))
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
index 14dc8ae..a2bf396 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_ct_memcmp_null()
 {
-    uint32_t x;
+    uint32_t x = 0;
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(&x, NULL, 0) == 0);
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NULL, &x, 0) == 0);
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NULL, NULL, 0) == 0);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
index 9a13793..3fbad92 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
@@ -1038,3 +1038,115 @@
 ECP check order for CURVE448
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
 ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7cca23e9c44edb49aed63690216cc2728dc58f552378c292ab5844f3"
+
+ecp_setup #1 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #2 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"00000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #3 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #4 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffff0000000000000000ffffffff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #5 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"1ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #6 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"a9fb57dba1eea9bc3e660a909d838d726e3bf623d52620282013481d1f6e5377":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #7 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"8cb91e82a3386d280f5d6f7e50e641df152f7109ed5456b412b1da197fb71123acd3a729901d1a71874700133107ec53":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #8 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"aadd9db8dbe9c48b3fd4e6ae33c9fc07cb308db3b3c9d20ed6639cca703308717d4d9b009bc66842aecda12ae6a380e62881ff2f2d82c68528aa6056583a48f3":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #9 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #10 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffee37":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #11 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffe56d":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #12 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffc2f":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #13 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"000000000000000fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #14 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"ffffffffffffffffffffffff99def836146bc9b1b4d22831":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #15 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffff16a2e0b8f03e13dd29455c5c2a3d":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #16 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #17 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #18 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386409":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #19 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"a9fb57dba1eea9bc3e660a909d838d718c397aa3b561a6f7901e0e82974856a7":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #20 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"8cb91e82a3386d280f5d6f7e50e641df152f7109ed5456b412b1da197fb71123acd3a729901d1a71874700133107ec53":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE:0
+
+ecp_setup #21 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"aadd9db8dbe9c48b3fd4e6ae33c9fc07cb308db3b3c9d20ed6639cca70330870553e5c414ca92619418661197fac10471db1d381085ddaddb58796829ca90069":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #22 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #23 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffe26f2fc170f69466a74defd8d":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #24 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"000000010000000000000000000000000001dce8d2ec6184caf0a971769fb1f7":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #25 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup #26 MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"0000000000000003fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7cca23e9c44edb49aed63690216cc2728dc58f552378c292ab5844f3":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:0
+
+ecp_setup_negative_test #27 Invalid Moduli Type
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffe26f2fc17f69466a74defd8d":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+ecp_setup_negative_test #28 Invalid Curve Type
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecp_mod_setup:"fffffffffffffffffffffffe26f2fc17f69466a74defd8d":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index c8a0a82..96537c2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "ecp_invasive.h"
 #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
 #include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
 
+#include "bignum_core.h"
 #include "ecp_invasive.h"
+#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) &&                  \
     (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) ||  \
@@ -1299,3 +1302,129 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_free(&expected_n);
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void ecp_mod_p192_raw(char *input_N,
+                      char *input_X,
+                      char *result)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *res = NULL;
+    size_t limbs_X;
+    size_t limbs_N;
+    size_t limbs_res;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&m);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&X,   &limbs_X,   input_X), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&N,   &limbs_N,   input_N), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&res, &limbs_res, result),  0);
+
+    size_t limbs = limbs_N;
+    size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(limbs_X, 2 * limbs);
+    TEST_EQUAL(limbs_res, limbs);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
+                   &m, N, limbs,
+                   MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY), 0);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(X, limbs_X), 0);
+    TEST_LE_U(mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X, limbs_X), 192);
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(X, &m);
+    ASSERT_COMPARE(X, bytes, res, bytes);
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(X);
+    mbedtls_free(res);
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&m);
+    mbedtls_free(N);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void ecp_mod_p521_raw(char *input_N,
+                      char *input_X,
+                      char *result)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *res = NULL;
+    size_t limbs_X;
+    size_t limbs_N;
+    size_t limbs_res;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&m);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&X,   &limbs_X,   input_X), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&N,   &limbs_N,   input_N), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&res, &limbs_res, result),  0);
+
+    size_t limbs = limbs_N;
+    size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(limbs_X, 2 * limbs);
+    TEST_EQUAL(limbs_res, limbs);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
+                   &m, N, limbs,
+                   MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY), 0);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(X, limbs_X), 0);
+    TEST_LE_U(mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X, limbs_X), 522);
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(X, &m);
+    ASSERT_COMPARE(X, bytes, res, bytes);
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(X);
+    mbedtls_free(res);
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&m);
+    mbedtls_free(N);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void ecp_mod_setup(char *input_A, int id, int ctype, int iret)
+{
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&m);
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL;
+    size_t p_limbs;
+    size_t bytes;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&p, &p_limbs, input_A), 0);
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(&m, id, ctype);
+    TEST_EQUAL(ret, iret);
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+
+        /* Test for limb sizes */
+        TEST_EQUAL(m.limbs, p_limbs);
+        bytes = p_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+
+        /* Test for validity of moduli by the presence of Montgomery consts */
+
+        TEST_ASSERT(m.rep.mont.mm != 0);
+        TEST_ASSERT(m.rep.mont.rr != NULL);
+
+
+        /* Compare output byte-by-byte */
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(p, bytes, m.p, bytes);
+
+        /* Test for user free-ing allocated memory */
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&m);
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&m);
+    mbedtls_free(p);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data
index 1738841..b9fa654 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data
@@ -89,3 +89,33 @@
 OID hash id - invalid oid
 oid_get_md_alg_id:"2B864886f70d0204":-1
 
+OID get numeric string - hardware module name
+oid_get_numeric_string:"2B06010505070804":0:"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4"
+
+OID get numeric string - multi-byte subidentifier
+oid_get_numeric_string:"29903C":0:"1.1.2108"
+
+OID get numeric string - second component greater than 39
+oid_get_numeric_string:"81010000863A00":0:"2.49.0.0.826.0"
+
+OID get numeric string - multi-byte first subidentifier
+oid_get_numeric_string:"8837":0:"2.999"
+
+OID get numeric string - empty oid buffer
+oid_get_numeric_string:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+
+OID get numeric string - no final / all bytes have top bit set
+oid_get_numeric_string:"818181":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+
+# Encodes the number 0x0400000000 as a subidentifier which overflows 32-bits
+OID get numeric string - 32-bit overflow
+oid_get_numeric_string:"C080808000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA:""
+
+OID get numeric string - 32-bit overflow, second subidentifier
+oid_get_numeric_string:"2BC080808000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA:""
+
+OID get numeric string - overlong encoding
+oid_get_numeric_string:"8001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA:""
+
+OID get numeric string - overlong encoding, second subidentifier
+oid_get_numeric_string:"2B8001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA:""
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function
index 687b216..3004b65 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function
@@ -96,3 +96,24 @@
     }
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void oid_get_numeric_string(data_t *oid, int error_ret, char *result_str)
+{
+    char buf[256];
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf input_oid = { 0, 0, NULL };
+    int ret;
+
+    input_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+    input_oid.p = oid->x;
+    input_oid.len = oid->len;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(buf, sizeof(buf), &input_oid);
+
+    if (error_ret == 0) {
+        TEST_ASSERT(strcmp(buf, result_str) == 0);
+    } else {
+        TEST_EQUAL(ret, error_ret);
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
index 531a2f1..01d8d2d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@
 pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512
 
 PSA wrapped sign: RSA PKCS1 v1.5
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
 pk_psa_sign:1024:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024
 
 PK Sign ext:RSA2048,PK_RSA,MD_SHA256
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index a99b6c0..8b4b675 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -1238,12 +1238,22 @@
     }
 
     /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a legacy context. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
     ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&pk, pkey_legacy,
                                       sizeof(pkey_legacy));
     TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0);
     klen_legacy = (size_t) ret;
     /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() writes backwards in the data buffer. */
     pkey_legacy_start = pkey_legacy + sizeof(pkey_legacy) - klen_legacy;
+#else
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk)->grp),
+                                         &(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk)->Q),
+                                         MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+                                         &klen_legacy, pkey_legacy,
+                                         sizeof(pkey_legacy));
+    TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+    pkey_legacy_start = pkey_legacy;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
 
     /* Turn PK context into an opaque one. */
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque(&pk, &key_id, alg_psa,
@@ -1264,12 +1274,21 @@
                                 NULL, NULL) == 0);
 
     /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a psa context. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
     ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&pk, pkey_psa,
                                       sizeof(pkey_psa));
     TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0);
     klen_psa = (size_t) ret;
     /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() writes backwards in the data buffer. */
     pkey_psa_start = pkey_psa + sizeof(pkey_psa) - klen_psa;
+#else
+    psa_status_t status;
+
+    status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pkey_psa, sizeof(pkey_psa),
+                                   &klen_psa);
+    TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_SUCCESS);
+    pkey_psa_start = pkey_psa;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
 
     TEST_ASSERT(klen_psa == klen_legacy);
     TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(pkey_psa_start, pkey_legacy_start, klen_psa) == 0);
@@ -1278,8 +1297,24 @@
     TEST_ASSERT(PSA_SUCCESS == psa_destroy_key(key_id));
 
     mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
-    TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pk, pkey_legacy_start,
-                                            klen_legacy) == 0);
+
+    /* If we used "pk_write" previously, then we go for a "pk_parse" here;
+     * otherwise if we went for "ecp_point_write_binary" then we'll go
+     * for a "ecp_point_read_binary" here. This allows to drop dependencies
+     * on "PK_WRITE" and "PK_PARSE" if required */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pk, pkey_legacy_start,
+                                           klen_legacy), 0);
+#else
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk,
+                                mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(
+                   &(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk)->grp),
+                   (mbedtls_ecp_group_id) parameter_arg), 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk)->grp),
+                                             &(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk)->Q),
+                                             pkey_legacy_start, klen_legacy), 0);
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
                                   hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) == 0);
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data
index 840a24b..9948537 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
 
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass zero-len data
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata.bin":0:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Fail zero-len data
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata_detached.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der":"data_files/pkcs7_zerolendata.bin":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED
+
 PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass SHA256 #9
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function
index 62f9f66..91fe47b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@
     TEST_ASSERT(file != NULL);
 
     datalen = st.st_size;
-    ASSERT_ALLOC(data, datalen);
+    /* Special-case for zero-length input so that data will be non-NULL */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC(data, datalen == 0 ? 1 : datalen);
     buflen = fread((void *) data, sizeof(unsigned char), datalen, file);
     TEST_EQUAL(buflen, datalen);
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index 697cdd7..f340a7f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -4151,7 +4151,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":1
+sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=inf) det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
@@ -4159,7 +4159,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
-sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca":1
+sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca":0
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
@@ -4167,7 +4167,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":"52d92aac1fcc0fea3ecce01a9ed4bc9ac342f92470fd3f54d0d6d2fa5d2940405057a9d49a817c2b193322f05fc93ac1c7a055edac93bec0ade6814ab27b86b5295ac1ddb323818200f00c3d94d959f714f128b64a2e19628037ac009b14774f":1
+sign_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":"52d92aac1fcc0fea3ecce01a9ed4bc9ac342f92470fd3f54d0d6d2fa5d2940405057a9d49a817c2b193322f05fc93ac1c7a055edac93bec0ade6814ab27b86b5295ac1ddb323818200f00c3d94d959f714f128b64a2e19628037ac009b14774f":0
 
 PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash size
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
@@ -4239,7 +4239,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, out buf too small
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:0
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty out buf
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
@@ -4247,7 +4247,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty out buf
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:0
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP256R1, invld hash alg (0)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
@@ -4255,7 +4255,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1, invld hash alg (0)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( 0 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:1
+sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( 0 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0
 
 PSA sign hash int: det ECDSA SECP256R1, invld hash alg (wildcard)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
@@ -4275,7 +4275,7 @@
 
 PSA sign hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA not supported
 depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1
+sign_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0
 
 PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
@@ -4323,7 +4323,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): rand ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
@@ -4331,7 +4331,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=inf): rand ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA
@@ -4339,7 +4339,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): rand ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":0
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA
@@ -4347,7 +4347,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":0
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=inf): rand ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
@@ -4355,7 +4355,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): rand ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=inf): det ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
@@ -4363,7 +4363,7 @@
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int (ops=min): det ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":1
+sign_verify_hash_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0
 
 PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
@@ -4531,7 +4531,7 @@
 
 PSA vrfy hash int (ops=min): ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong sig of correct size
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-verify_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE:1
+verify_hash_fail_interruptible:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE:0
 
 PSA vrfy hash int: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong sig (empty)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
@@ -4557,9 +4557,9 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 interruptible_signverify_hash_state_test:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
 
-PSA sign/vrfy hash int neg tests: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign/vrfy hash int edge case tests: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-interruptible_signverify_hash_negative_tests:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
+interruptible_signverify_hash_edgecase_tests:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
 
 PSA sign/vrfy hash int max ops tests: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 20e43c6..ab39fba 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -6473,6 +6473,24 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * sign_hash_interruptible() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test interruptible sign hash with known outcomes (deterministic ECDSA
+ *    only).
+ *
+ * 2. Test the number of calls to psa_sign_hash_complete() required are as
+ *    expected for different max_ops values.
+ *
+ * 3. Test that the number of ops done prior to start and after abort is zero
+ *    and that each successful stage completes some ops (this is not mandated by
+ *    the PSA specification, but is currently the case).
+ *
+ * 4. Test that calling psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops() multiple times between
+ *    complete() calls does not alter the number of ops returned.
+ */
 void sign_hash_interruptible(int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
                              int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
                              data_t *output_data, int max_ops_arg)
@@ -6629,6 +6647,22 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * sign_hash_fail_interruptible() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test that various failure cases for interruptible sign hash fail with the
+ *    correct error codes, and at the correct point (at start or during
+ *    complete).
+ *
+ * 2. Test the number of calls to psa_sign_hash_complete() required are as
+ *    expected for different max_ops values.
+ *
+ * 3. Test that the number of ops done prior to start and after abort is zero
+ *    and that each successful stage completes some ops (this is not mandated by
+ *    the PSA specification, but is currently the case).
+ */
 void sign_hash_fail_interruptible(int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
                                   int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
                                   int signature_size_arg,
@@ -6816,6 +6850,21 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * sign_verify_hash_interruptible() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test that we can sign an input hash with the given key and then afterwards
+ *    verify that signature. This is currently the only way to test non
+ *    deterministic ECDSA, but this test can also handle deterministic.
+ *
+ * 2. Test that after corrupting the hash, the verification detects an invalid
+ *    signature.
+ *
+ * 3. Test the number of calls to psa_sign_hash_complete() required are as
+ *    expected for different max_ops values.
+ */
 void sign_verify_hash_interruptible(int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
                                     int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
                                     int max_ops_arg)
@@ -6979,6 +7028,21 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * verify_hash_interruptible() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test interruptible verify hash with known outcomes (deterministic ECDSA
+ *    only).
+ *
+ * 2. Test the number of calls to psa_verify_hash_complete() required are as
+ *    expected for different max_ops values.
+ *
+ * 3. Test that the number of ops done prior to start and after abort is zero
+ *    and that each successful stage completes some ops (this is not mandated by
+ *    the PSA specification, but is currently the case).
+ */
 void verify_hash_interruptible(int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
                                int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
                                data_t *signature_data, int max_ops_arg)
@@ -7104,6 +7168,22 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * verify_hash_fail_interruptible() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test that various failure cases for interruptible verify hash fail with
+ *    the correct error codes, and at the correct point (at start or during
+ *    complete).
+ *
+ * 2. Test the number of calls to psa_verify_hash_complete() required are as
+ *    expected for different max_ops values.
+ *
+ * 3. Test that the number of ops done prior to start and after abort is zero
+ *    and that each successful stage completes some ops (this is not mandated by
+ *    the PSA specification, but is currently the case).
+ */
 void verify_hash_fail_interruptible(int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
                                     int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
                                     data_t *signature_data,
@@ -7207,6 +7287,14 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * interruptible_signverify_hash_state_test() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test that calling the various interruptible sign and verify hash functions
+ *    in incorrect orders returns BAD_STATE errors.
+ */
 void interruptible_signverify_hash_state_test(int key_type_arg,
                                               data_t *key_data, int alg_arg, data_t *input_data)
 {
@@ -7354,7 +7442,15 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-void interruptible_signverify_hash_negative_tests(int key_type_arg,
+/**
+ * interruptible_signverify_hash_edgecase_tests() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test various edge cases in the interruptible sign and verify hash
+ *    interfaces.
+ */
+void interruptible_signverify_hash_edgecase_tests(int key_type_arg,
                                                   data_t *key_data, int alg_arg, data_t *input_data)
 {
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
@@ -7505,6 +7601,14 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/**
+ * interruptible_signverify_hash_maxops_tests() test intentions:
+ *
+ * Note: This test can currently only handle ECDSA.
+ *
+ * 1. Test that setting max ops is reflected in both interruptible sign and
+ *    verify hash
+ */
 void interruptible_signverify_hash_maxops_tests(int key_type_arg,
                                                 data_t *key_data, int alg_arg, data_t *input_data)
 {
@@ -7853,7 +7957,11 @@
                                            output, output_size,
                                            &output_length);
     TEST_EQUAL(actual_status, expected_status);
-    TEST_EQUAL(output_length, expected_output_length);
+    if (actual_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        TEST_EQUAL(output_length, expected_output_length);
+    } else {
+        TEST_LE_U(output_length, output_size);
+    }
 
     /* If the label is empty, the test framework puts a non-null pointer
      * in label->x. Test that a null pointer works as well. */
@@ -7868,7 +7976,11 @@
                                                output, output_size,
                                                &output_length);
         TEST_EQUAL(actual_status, expected_status);
-        TEST_EQUAL(output_length, expected_output_length);
+        if (actual_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            TEST_EQUAL(output_length, expected_output_length);
+        } else {
+            TEST_LE_U(output_length, output_size);
+        }
     }
 
 exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index 01da08b..54080a7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
 x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: F7\:C6\:7F\:F8\:E9\:A9\:63\:F9\nissuer name       \: C=NL\nsubject name      \: C=NL\nissued  on        \: 2014-01-22 10\:04\:33\nexpires on        \: 2024-01-22 10\:04\:33\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size      \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name  \:\n    dNSName \: www.shotokan-braunschweig.de\n    dNSName \: www.massimo-abate.eu\n    <unsupported>\n    <unsupported>\nkey usage         \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
 
+X509 CRT information, Subject Alt Name with uniformResourceIdentifier
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/rsa_single_san_uri.crt.der":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 6F\:75\:EB\:E9\:6D\:25\:BC\:88\:82\:62\:A3\:E0\:68\:A7\:37\:3B\:EC\:75\:8F\:9C\nissuer name       \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN\nsubject name      \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN\nissued  on        \: 2023-02-14 10\:38\:05\nexpires on        \: 2043-02-09 10\:38\:05\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name  \:\n    uniformResourceIdentifier \: urn\:example.com\:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-c2c082f0609c\nkey usage         \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
+
+X509 CRT information, Subject Alt Name with two uniformResourceIdentifiers
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/rsa_multiple_san_uri.crt.der":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 08\:E2\:93\:18\:91\:26\:D8\:46\:88\:90\:10\:4F\:B5\:86\:CB\:C4\:78\:E6\:EA\:0D\nissuer name       \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN\nsubject name      \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS URI SAN\nissued  on        \: 2023-02-14 10\:37\:50\nexpires on        \: 2043-02-09 10\:37\:50\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name  \:\n    uniformResourceIdentifier \: urn\:example.com\:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-c2c082f0609c\n    uniformResourceIdentifier \: urn\:example.com\:5ff40f78-9210-494f-8206-abcde1234567\nkey usage         \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
+
 X509 CRT information, RSA Certificate Policy any
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
 x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-any_policy.crt":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 00\nissuer name       \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name      \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued  on        \: 2019-03-21 16\:40\:59\nexpires on        \: 2029-03-21 16\:40\:59\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: Any Policy\n"
@@ -168,7 +176,7 @@
 
 X509 CRT information Bitstring in subject name
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_cert_info:"data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 02\nissuer name       \: CN=Test CA 01, ST=Ecnivorp, C=XX, emailAddress=tca@example.com, O=Test CA Authority\nsubject name      \: C=XX, O=tca, ST=Ecnivorp, OU=TCA, CN=Client, emailAddress=client@example.com, serialNumber=7101012255, uniqueIdentifier=?7101012255\nissued  on        \: 2015-03-11 12\:06\:51\nexpires on        \: 2025-03-08 12\:06\:51\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name  \:\n    <unsupported>\next key usage     \: TLS Web Client Authentication\n"
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 02\nissuer name       \: CN=Test CA 01, ST=Ecnivorp, C=XX, emailAddress=tca@example.com, O=Test CA Authority\nsubject name      \: C=XX, O=tca, ST=Ecnivorp, OU=TCA, CN=Client, emailAddress=client@example.com, serialNumber=7101012255, uniqueIdentifier=?7101012255\nissued  on        \: 2015-03-11 12\:06\:51\nexpires on        \: 2025-03-08 12\:06\:51\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name  \:\n    rfc822Name \: client@example.com\next key usage     \: TLS Web Client Authentication\n"
 
 X509 CRT information Non-ASCII string in issuer name and subject name
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
@@ -198,6 +206,10 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
 x509_parse_san:"data_files/server5-unsupported_othername.crt":""
 
+X509 SAN parsing rfc822Name
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_parse_san:"data_files/test_cert_rfc822name.crt.der":"type \: 1\nrfc822Name \: my@other.address\ntype \: 1\nrfc822Name \: second@other.address\n"
+
 X509 CRL information #1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
 mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"CRL version   \: 1\nissuer name   \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update   \: 2011-02-20 10\:24\:19\nnext update   \: 2011-02-20 11\:24\:19\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using  \: RSA with SHA1\n"
@@ -2550,7 +2562,7 @@
 x509_oid_numstr:"2a864886f70d":"1.2.840.113549":15:14
 
 X509 OID numstring #5 (arithmetic overflow)
-x509_oid_numstr:"2a8648f9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f001":"":100:MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+x509_oid_numstr:"2a8648f9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f001":"":100:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA
 
 X509 CRT keyUsage #1 (no extension, expected KU)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index 3454da3..f6e4a06 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -279,7 +279,18 @@
                 *p++ = san->san.unstructured_name.p[i];
             }
             break;/* MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME */
-
+        case (MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME):
+            ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\nrfc822Name : ");
+            MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+            if (san->san.unstructured_name.len >= n) {
+                *p = '\0';
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+            }
+            n -= san->san.unstructured_name.len;
+            for (i = 0; i < san->san.unstructured_name.len; i++) {
+                *p++ = san->san.unstructured_name.p[i];
+            }
+            break;/* MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME */
         default:
             /*
              * Should not happen.