PK: RSA verification PSA wrap implementation
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index 2569b9c..b3db3d7 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -164,10 +164,71 @@
return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_pk_context key;
+ int key_len;
+ /* see RSA_PUR_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */
+ unsigned char buf[38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_rsa_info;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) );
+ size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
+
+ if( sig_len < rsa_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
+
+ /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
+ * re-construct one to make it happy */
+ key.pk_info = &pk_info;
+ key.pk_ctx = ctx;
+ key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &key, buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+ if( key_len <= 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_alg_md );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY );
+
+ status = psa_import_key( &attributes,
+ buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_alg_md, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ psa_destroy_key( key_id );
+ return( ret );
+}
+#else
+static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
@@ -195,6 +256,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext( psa_algorithm_t alg,