Merge pull request #3017 from jack-fortanix/jack/parse-rsa-crt-2.7
Backport 2.7: Parse RSA parameters DP, DQ and QP from PKCS1 private keys
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2a993b9..0dac497 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@
= mbed TLS 2.7.X branch released XXXX-XX-XX
+Security
+ * To avoid a side channel vulnerability when parsing an RSA private key,
+ read all the CRT parameters from the DER structure rather than
+ reconstructing them. Found by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob
+ Brumley. Reported and fix contributed by Jack Lloyd.
+ ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#352
+
Bugfix
* Allow loading symlinked certificates. Fixes #3005. Reported and fixed
by Jonathan Bennett <JBennett@incomsystems.biz> via #3008.
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index ec9b55f..3bad0ce 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -754,14 +754,40 @@
goto cleanup;
p += len;
- /* Complete the RSA private key */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
- goto cleanup;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ /*
+ * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
+ * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
+ * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
+ * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
+ * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
+ * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
+ * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
+ * description of one such attack.
+ */
- /* Check optional parameters */
+ /* Import DP */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rsa->DP ) ) != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Import DQ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rsa->DQ ) ) != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Import QP */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rsa->QP ) ) != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+#else
+ /* Verify existance of the CRT params */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+#endif
+
+ /* Complete the RSA private key */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
if( p != end )
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 4b3cc02..98c529f 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -251,6 +251,12 @@
const int have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
const int have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+ const int have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
+ const int have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
+ const int have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
+#endif
+
/*
* Check whether provided parameters are enough
* to deduce all others. The following incomplete
@@ -316,7 +322,7 @@
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- if( is_priv )
+ if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
{
ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );