The Great Renaming
A simple execution of tmp/invoke-rename.pl
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index b4cdfca..0e864fc 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -26,20 +26,20 @@
* SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg
*/
-#if !defined(POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
-#include POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
-#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#include <string.h>
-#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#endif
@@ -47,20 +47,20 @@
* Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
* SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
*/
-static int derive_mpi( const ecp_group *grp, mpi *x,
+static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
{
int ret;
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen;
- MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) );
if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits )
- MPI_CHK( mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) );
/* While at it, reduce modulo N */
- if( mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
- MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) );
+ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
@@ -70,20 +70,20 @@
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
-int ecdsa_sign( ecp_group *grp, mpi *r, mpi *s,
- const mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
- ecp_point R;
- mpi k, e, t;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R;
+ mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- ecp_point_init( &R );
- mpi_init( &k ); mpi_init( &e ); mpi_init( &t );
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
sign_tries = 0;
do
@@ -95,21 +95,21 @@
key_tries = 0;
do
{
- MPI_CHK( ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
- while( mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
+ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
- MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
@@ -119,143 +119,143 @@
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
- /* See ecp_gen_keypair() */
+ /* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
- while( mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
- mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
+ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
- while( mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
+ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
cleanup:
- ecp_point_free( &R );
- mpi_free( &k ); mpi_free( &e ); mpi_free( &t );
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
return( ret );
}
-#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
-int ecdsa_sign_det( ecp_group *grp, mpi *r, mpi *s,
- const mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- md_type_t md_alg )
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
int ret;
- hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
- unsigned char data[2 * POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
+ unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- const md_info_t *md_info;
- mpi h;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+ mbedtls_mpi h;
- if( ( md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- mpi_init( &h );
- memset( &rng_ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
+ memset( &rng_ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
- MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
- MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
- hmac_drbg_init_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
- ret = ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
cleanup:
- hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
- mpi_free( &h );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/*
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
*/
-int ecdsa_verify( ecp_group *grp,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- const ecp_point *Q, const mpi *r, const mpi *s)
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
{
int ret;
- mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
- ecp_point R, P;
+ mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R, P;
- ecp_point_init( &R ); ecp_point_init( &P );
- mpi_init( &e ); mpi_init( &s_inv ); mpi_init( &u1 ); mpi_init( &u2 );
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
- return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
*/
- if( mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 ||
- mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
*/
- MPI_CHK( ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
/*
* Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
- MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
*/
- MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );
/*
* Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
*
* Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
- * ecp_mul() for countermesures.
+ * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
*/
- MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, NULL, NULL ) );
- MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &P, &u2, Q, NULL, NULL ) );
- MPI_CHK( ecp_add( grp, &R, &R, &P ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &P, &u2, Q, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_add( grp, &R, &R, &P ) );
- if( ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
+ if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -263,20 +263,20 @@
* Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
* Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
*/
- MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
/*
* Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
*/
- if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
- ecp_point_free( &R ); ecp_point_free( &P );
- mpi_free( &e ); mpi_free( &s_inv ); mpi_free( &u1 ); mpi_free( &u2 );
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
return( ret );
}
@@ -284,20 +284,20 @@
/*
* Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
*/
-static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mpi *r, const mpi *s,
+static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen )
{
int ret;
- unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf );
size_t len = 0;
- ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) );
- ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) );
- ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) );
- ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_tag( &p, buf,
- ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
memcpy( sig, p, len );
*slen = len;
@@ -308,48 +308,48 @@
/*
* Compute and write signature
*/
-int ecdsa_write_signature( ecdsa_context *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
- mpi r, s;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- mpi_init( &r );
- mpi_init( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
-#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
- MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
- MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
- MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
- mpi_free( &r );
- mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
-#if ! defined(POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
- defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-int ecdsa_write_signature_det( ecdsa_context *ctx,
+#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
- md_type_t md_alg )
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
- return( ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
+ return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
NULL, NULL ) );
}
#endif
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@
/*
* Read and check signature
*/
-int ecdsa_read_signature( ecdsa_context *ctx,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
{
@@ -365,42 +365,42 @@
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
const unsigned char *end = sig + slen;
size_t len;
- mpi r, s;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- mpi_init( &r );
- mpi_init( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
- if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
- ret += POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
if( p + len != end )
{
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +
- POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( ( ret = asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
{
- ret += POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
- if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
if( p != end )
- ret = POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
cleanup:
- mpi_free( &r );
- mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
@@ -408,25 +408,25 @@
/*
* Generate key pair
*/
-int ecdsa_genkey( ecdsa_context *ctx, ecp_group_id gid,
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
- return( ecp_use_known_dp( &ctx->grp, gid ) ||
- ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ecp_use_known_dp( &ctx->grp, gid ) ||
+ mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
/*
- * Set context from an ecp_keypair
+ * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
*/
-int ecdsa_from_keypair( ecdsa_context *ctx, const ecp_keypair *key )
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key )
{
int ret;
- if( ( ret = ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ||
+ ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 )
{
- ecdsa_free( ctx );
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx );
}
return( ret );
@@ -435,17 +435,17 @@
/*
* Initialize context
*/
-void ecdsa_init( ecdsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
{
- ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
}
/*
* Free context
*/
-void ecdsa_free( ecdsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
{
- ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
}
-#endif /* POLARSSL_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */