Add hard assertion to ssl_read_record
This commit adds a hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record
triggering if both ssl->in_hslen and ssl->in_offt are not 0. This
should never happen, and if it does, there's no sensible way of
telling whether the previous message was a handshake or an application
data message.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 8d49be4..f81a5e2 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -2180,6 +2180,12 @@
if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
{
+ if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
+ {
+ SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
/*
* Get next Handshake message in the current record
*/