Zeroize sensitive data in aescrypt2 and crypt_and_hash examples
This commit replaces multiple `memset()` calls in the example
programs aes/aescrypt2.c and aes/crypt_and_hash.c by calls to
the reliable zeroization function `mbedtls_zeroize()`.
While not a security issue because the code is in the example
programs, it's bad practice and should be fixed.
diff --git a/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c b/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
index bc95eb9..88b852b 100644
--- a/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
+++ b/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -547,13 +548,13 @@
the case when the user has missed or reordered some,
in which case the key might not be in argv[6]. */
for( i = 0; i < argc; i++ )
- memset( argv[i], 0, strlen( argv[i] ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( argv[i], strlen( argv[i] ) );
- memset( IV, 0, sizeof( IV ) );
- memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) );
- memset( buffer, 0, sizeof( buffer ) );
- memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) );
- memset( digest, 0, sizeof( digest ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( IV, sizeof( IV ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, sizeof( buffer ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, sizeof( output ) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( digest, sizeof( digest ) );
mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx );
mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );