PK: support for opaque keys
Add a new key pair object type: MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, intended for
implementations of asymmetric cryptography operations that call an
external cryptographic module.
External cryptographic module engines must implement the API described
by a mbedtls_pk_info_t structure and, usually, a custom setup function.
Document the fields of the mbedtls_pk_info_t structure and the
requirements on a PK engine. Also document non-obvious aspects of the
behavior of the pk interface functions on opaque keys.
Change the interface of check_pair_func to take a pointer to a full
mbedtls_pk_context as its pub argument, and not just the data part of
the context. This is necessary because when prv is opaque, pub may
legitimately be of a different type (typically prv would be opaque and
pub would be transparent).
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index 4eb7b78..301b73d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
* X509 2 20
* PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top)
* DHM 3 9
- * PK 3 14 (Started from top)
+ * PK 3 17 (Started from top)
* RSA 4 10
* ECP 4 8 (Started from top)
* MD 5 4
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index 92f43ac..0fd5ec8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* \brief Public Key cryptography abstraction layer
*
- * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
+ * Copyright (C) 2006-2017, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 /**< Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 /**< The signature is valid but its length is less than expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x3880 /**< Invalid signature */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x3800 /**< Output buffer too small */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_NOT_PERMITTED -0x3780 /**< Operation not permitted */
/**@}*/
@@ -87,6 +90,10 @@
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, /**< ECC key pair with ECDSA context */
MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, /**< RSA (alternative implementation) */
MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, /**< RSA key pair; same context as MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, but used to represent keys with the algorithm identifier id-RSASSA-PSS */
+ /** Opaque key pair (cryptographic material held in an external module).
+ * This may be an RSA or ECC key or a key of an unrecognized type. Call
+ * \c mbedtls_pk_can_do() to check whether a key is of a recognized type. */
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
} mbedtls_pk_type_t;
/**
@@ -216,6 +223,12 @@
* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure.
*
+ * \note Engines that implement of opaque keys may offer an
+ * alternative setup function that take engine-dependent
+ * parameters. If such a function exists, call it
+ * instead of mbedtls_pk_setup. The implementation-specific
+ * setup function should call mbedtls_pk_setup internally.
+ *
* \note For contexts holding an RSA-alt key pair, use
* \c mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() instead.
*/
@@ -448,7 +461,13 @@
* is ill-formed.
* * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the contexts cannot
* represent keys of the same type.
+ * * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if it is impossible
+ * to determine whether the keys match. This is guaranteed
+ * not to happen if \c prv is a transparent key pair.
* * Or a type-specific error code.
+ *
+ * \note Opaque key types may not implement this function.
+ * An opaque \c pub never matches a transparent \c prv.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv );
@@ -481,6 +500,12 @@
* \param ctx Context to use
*
* \return Type on success, or MBEDTLS_PK_NONE
+ *
+ * \note This function returns the type of the key pair object. The
+ * type encodes the representation of the object as well as
+ * the operations that it can be used for. To test whether
+ * the object represents a key of a recognized type such
+ * as RSA or ECDSA, call \c mbedtls_pk_can_do().
*/
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk_info.h b/include/mbedtls/pk_info.h
index fe2dbdf..a90e489 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk_info.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk_info.h
@@ -32,58 +32,196 @@
#include "pk.h"
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Methods that opaque key pair objects must implement.
+ *
+ * Engines that interface with external cryptographic processors must
+ * implement this interface. Platform-specific hardware accelerators
+ * that can be used for all keys of a given type should use alternative
+ * ("xxx_alt") interfaces instead. This interface allows using different
+ * engines for each key.
+ *
+ * An engine for asymmetric cryptography must implement the interface
+ * described in this structure. The interface for the engine may be
+ * exposed in one of two ways:
+ *
+ * - Declare the mbedtls_pk_info_t structure and instruct users to call
+ * mbedtls_pk_setup with that structure.
+ * - Keep the mbedtls_pk_info_t structure hidden and declare a function
+ * to call instead of mbedtls_pk_setup. This function should have an
+ * interface of the form
+ * `int mbedtls_pk_setup_myengine(mbedtls_pk_context *, ...)`
+ * where the extra parameters depend on the engine, e.g. handles to keys
+ * stored in an external cryptographic module.
+ *
+ * Unless otherwise indicated, functions returning int must return an
+ * Mbed TLS status code, either 0 for success or a negative value to indicate
+ * an error. It is recommended to use the MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_XXX error codes
+ * defined in pk.h.
+ *
+ * Some methods are optional; this is clearly indicated in their description.
+ * If a method is optional, then an opaque key implementation may put NULL
+ * in the corresponding field. The corresponding function in pk.h will
+ * return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH in this case.
+ *
+ * \note If you are using the PK interface to perform operations on
+ * keys, call the functions in pk.h. The interface in this file should only
+ * be used by implementers of opaque key engines.
+ */
struct mbedtls_pk_info_t
{
- /** Key pair type with indication of supported algorithms */
+ /** Key pair type.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_get_type() returns this value.
+ *
+ * For transparent keys, this contains an indication of supported
+ * algorithms. For opaque keys, this is \c MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE. */
mbedtls_pk_type_t type;
- /** Type name */
+ /** Type name.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_get_name() returns this value. It must be a
+ * null-terminated string.
+ *
+ * For transparent keys, this reflects the key type. For opaque keys,
+ * this reflects the cryptographic module driver. */
const char *name;
- /** Get key size in bits */
+ /** Get key size in bits.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen() returns this value.
+ *
+ * This function cannot fail. */
size_t (*get_bitlen)( const void *ctx );
- /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */
+ /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g.\ ECKEY can do ECDSA).
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_can_do() calls this function.
+ *
+ * This function is only based on the key type. It does not take any
+ * usage restrictions into account. */
int (*can_do)( const void * ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
- /** Verify signature */
+ /** Verify signature
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_verify() calls this function.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method if they do not support
+ * signature verification. */
int (*verify_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
- /** Make signature */
+ /** Make signature
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_sign() calls this function.
+ *
+ * Assume that the buffer \c sig has room for
+ * \c signature_size_func(ctx) bytes.
+ *
+ * The arguments \c f_rng and \c p_rng are provided in case the
+ * algorithm requires randomization. Implementations are not
+ * required to use it if they have their own random source. If \c
+ * f_rng is null, the implementation should operate if it can, and
+ * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method if they do not support
+ * signature. */
int (*sign_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
- /** Decrypt message */
+ /** Decrypt message
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_decrypt() calls this function.
+ *
+ * The arguments \c f_rng and \c p_rng are provided in case the
+ * algorithm requires randomization. Implementations are not
+ * required to use it if they have their own random source. If \c
+ * f_rng is null, the implementation should operate if it can, and
+ * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method if they do not support
+ * decryption. */
int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
- /** Encrypt message */
+ /** Encrypt message
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_decrypt() calls this function.
+ *
+ * The arguments \c f_rng and \c p_rng are provided in case the
+ * algorithm requires randomization. Implementations are not
+ * required to use it if they have their own random source. If \c
+ * f_rng is null, the implementation should operate if it can, and
+ * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method if they do not support
+ * encryption. */
int (*encrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
- /** Check public-private key pair */
- int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv );
+ /** Check public-private key pair
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_check_pair() calls this function on the private key pair
+ * object \c prv. The other argument \c pub may be of any type, but it
+ * is guaranteed to be initialized.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method. */
+ int (*check_pair_func)( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const void *prv );
- /** Allocate a new context */
+ /** Allocate a new context
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_setup() calls this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns NULL, the allocation is considered to
+ * have failed and the the object remains uninitialized.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method. In this case,
+ * mbedtls_pk_setup will set the \c pk_ctx field of the mbedtls_pk_context
+ * object to NULL, and it is up to an engine-specific setup function to
+ * initialize the \c pk_ctx field. This is useful if the size of the
+ * memory depends on extra parameters passed to the engine-specific setup
+ * function. */
void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void );
- /** Free the given context */
+ /** Free the given context
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_free() calls this function. It must free the data allocated
+ * by \b ctx_alloc_func as well as any other resource that belongs to
+ * the object.
+ * */
void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx );
- /** Interface with the debug module */
+ /** Interface with the debug module
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_debug() calls this function.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method. */
void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items );
- /** Signature size */
+ /** Signature size
+ *
+ * mbedtls_pk_signature_size() returns this value.
+ *
+ * Opaque implementations may omit this method. In this case, the value
+ * returned by \c get_bitlen (rounded up to a whole number of bytes)
+ * is used instead. */
size_t (*signature_size_func)( const void *ctx );
};
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INFO_H */
diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index 151ca4e..d60f652 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -288,6 +288,12 @@
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The signature is valid but its length is less than expected" );
+ if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_SIGNATURE) )
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Invalid signature" );
+ if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Output buffer too small" );
+ if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_NOT_PERMITTED) )
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Operation not permitted" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index d080c75..d8801b5 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
return( &mbedtls_ecdsa_info );
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */
+ /* MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE omitted on purpose: they can't be built by parsing */
default:
return( NULL );
}
@@ -107,8 +108,11 @@
if( ctx == NULL || info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ if( info->ctx_alloc_func != NULL )
+ {
+ if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func( ) ) == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
ctx->pk_info = info;
@@ -312,24 +316,31 @@
int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv )
{
if( pub == NULL || pub->pk_info == NULL ||
- prv == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL ||
- prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
+ prv == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
+ if( pub->pk_info == prv->pk_info && pub->pk_ctx == prv->pk_ctx )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ }
+
if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT )
{
if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
- else
+ else if( prv->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
{
if( pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
- return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx ) );
+ return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub, prv->pk_ctx ) );
}
/*
@@ -384,7 +395,9 @@
}
/*
- * Access the PK type
+ * Access the PK type.
+ * For an opaque key pair object, this does not give any information on the
+ * underlying cryptographic material.
*/
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx )
{
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index dafd7a4..393fdeb 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -148,10 +148,9 @@
ilen, input, output ) );
}
-static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const void *prv )
{
- return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub,
- (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) );
+ return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( pub->pk_ctx, prv ) );
}
static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void )
@@ -272,10 +271,9 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int eckey_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const void *prv )
{
- return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub,
- (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( pub->pk_ctx, prv ) );
}
static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void )
@@ -472,14 +470,14 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const void *prv )
{
unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char hash[32];
size_t sig_len = 0;
int ret;
- if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) )
+ if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub->pk_ctx ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) );
@@ -491,7 +489,7 @@
return( ret );
}
- if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ if( rsa_verify_wrap( pub->pk_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
index cfb4281..bf1bcc7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
@@ -153,3 +153,16 @@
RSA hash_len overflow (size_t vs unsigned int)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
pk_rsa_overflow:
+
+PK opaque mock
+pk_opaque_mock:
+
+PK opaque with failed allocation
+pk_opaque_fail_allocation:
+
+PK opaque minimal
+pk_opaque_minimal:
+
+PK opaque wrapper (RSA)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pk_opaque_wrapper:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index b8b222b..f73022c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/pk_info.h"
/* For error codes */
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
@@ -39,14 +42,15 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen,
+
+static int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len )
{
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, NULL, NULL, mode, olen,
input, output, output_max_len ) );
}
-int mbedtls_rsa_sign_func( void *ctx,
+static int mbedtls_rsa_sign_func( void *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig )
@@ -54,11 +58,269 @@
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ) );
}
-size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx )
+static size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx )
{
return( ((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->len );
}
+
+/* Prepare a raw RSA context with a small random key. */
+static void pk_rsa_prepare( mbedtls_rsa_context *raw )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_init( raw, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
+ mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( raw, rnd_std_rand, NULL, RSA_KEY_SIZE, 3 );
+}
+
+/* Test the RSA context tested_ctx by comparing its operation with a
+ generic RSA context which is initialized with the key in raw. */
+static void pk_rsa_match( mbedtls_rsa_context *raw,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *tested_ctx,
+ int sign_ret, int verify_ret,
+ int encrypt_ret, int decrypt_ret,
+ int debug_ret )
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_context basic_ctx;
+ mbedtls_pk_debug_item dbg_items[10];
+ unsigned char hash[50], sig[1000];
+ unsigned char msg[50], ciph[1000], test[1000];
+ size_t sig_len, ciph_len, test_len;
+
+ memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash );
+ memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig );
+ memset( msg, 0x2a, sizeof msg );
+ memset( ciph, 0, sizeof ciph );
+ memset( test, 0, sizeof test );
+
+ /* Initiliaze basic PK RSA context with raw key */
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &basic_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &basic_ctx,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_pk_rsa( basic_ctx ), raw ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Test administrative functions */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( tested_ctx ) == RSA_KEY_SIZE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( tested_ctx ) == RSA_KEY_LEN );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_signature_size( tested_ctx ) == RSA_KEY_LEN );
+
+ /* Test signature */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof hash,
+ sig, &sig_len, rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == sign_ret );
+ if( sign_ret == 0 )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, (size_t)-1,
+ NULL, NULL, rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+ TEST_ASSERT( sig_len == RSA_KEY_LEN );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &basic_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* Test verification */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &basic_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof hash,
+ sig, &sig_len, rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == verify_ret );
+ if( verify_ret == 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len - 1 ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
+ sig[sig_len-1] ^= 1;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( tested_ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
+ }
+
+ /* Test encryption */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( tested_ctx, msg, sizeof msg,
+ ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == encrypt_ret );
+ if( encrypt_ret == 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &basic_ctx, ciph, ciph_len,
+ test, &test_len, sizeof test,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( test_len == sizeof msg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( test, msg, test_len ) == 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* Test decryption */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &basic_ctx, msg, sizeof msg,
+ ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( tested_ctx, ciph, ciph_len,
+ test, &test_len, sizeof test,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == decrypt_ret );
+ if( decrypt_ret == 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( test_len == sizeof msg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( test, msg, test_len ) == 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* Test debug */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( tested_ctx, dbg_items ) == debug_ret );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &basic_ctx );
+}
+
+#define OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO MBEDTLS_PK_RSA
+#define OPAQUE_MOCK_BITLEN 'b'
+#define OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+#define OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE 4
+#define OPAQUE_MOCK_GOOD_SIGNATURE "good"
+static const unsigned char opaque_mock_hash[8] = "HASHhash";
+static const unsigned char opaque_mock_reference_input[10] = "INPUTinput";
+static const unsigned char opaque_mock_input[10] = "INPUTinput";
+static const unsigned char opaque_mock_reference_encrypted[12] = "C:JOQVUjoqvu";
+static const unsigned char opaque_mock_reference_decrypted[12] = "P:HMOTShmots";
+static char opaque_mock_fake_ctx = 'c';
+static mbedtls_pk_debug_item opaque_mock_pk_debug_item;
+static int opaque_mock_debug_called_correctly = 0;
+static int opaque_mock_free_called_correctly = 0;
+
+static size_t opaque_mock_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ return( OPAQUE_MOCK_BITLEN );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_can_do( const void *ctx,
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ return( type == OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_verify_func( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( md_alg == OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hash_len == sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hash == opaque_mock_hash );
+ if( sig_len != OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
+ if( memcmp( sig, OPAQUE_MOCK_GOOD_SIGNATURE, OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+ return( 0 );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_sign_func( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( md_alg == OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hash_len == sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( hash == opaque_mock_hash );
+ memcpy( sig, OPAQUE_MOCK_GOOD_SIGNATURE, OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
+ *sig_len = OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ return( 0 );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_decrypt_func( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( ilen == sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( !memcmp( input, opaque_mock_reference_input,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) ) );
+ if( osize < sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ *olen = sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted );
+ memcpy( output, opaque_mock_reference_decrypted, sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted ) );
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ return( 0 );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_encrypt_func( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( ilen == sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( !memcmp( input, opaque_mock_reference_input,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) ) );
+ if( osize < sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ *olen = sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted );
+ memcpy( output, opaque_mock_reference_encrypted, sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted ) );
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ return( 0 );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static int opaque_mock_check_pair_func( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ const void *prv )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( prv == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pub ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ return( 0 );
+exit:
+ return( INT_MIN );
+}
+
+static void *opaque_mock_ctx_alloc_func( void )
+{
+ return( &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+}
+static void *opaque_mock_ctx_alloc_fail( void )
+{
+ return( NULL );
+}
+
+static void opaque_mock_ctx_free_func( void *ctx )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ opaque_mock_free_called_correctly = 1;
+exit:
+ return;
+}
+
+static void opaque_mock_debug_func( const void *ctx,
+ mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( items == &opaque_mock_pk_debug_item );
+ opaque_mock_debug_called_correctly = 1;
+exit:
+ return;
+}
+
+static size_t opaque_mock_signature_size_func( const void *ctx )
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx == &opaque_mock_fake_ctx );
+ return( OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
+exit:
+ return( -1 );
+}
+
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -451,74 +713,292 @@
* Test it against the public operations (encrypt, verify) of a
* corresponding rsa context.
*/
+ mbedtls_pk_context alt;
mbedtls_rsa_context raw;
- mbedtls_pk_context rsa, alt;
- mbedtls_pk_debug_item dbg_items[10];
- unsigned char hash[50], sig[1000];
- unsigned char msg[50], ciph[1000], test[1000];
- size_t sig_len, ciph_len, test_len;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- mbedtls_rsa_init( &raw, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
- mbedtls_pk_init( &rsa ); mbedtls_pk_init( &alt );
+ /* Generate an RSA key to use in both contexts */
+ pk_rsa_prepare( &raw );
- memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash );
- memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig );
- memset( msg, 0x2a, sizeof msg );
- memset( ciph, 0, sizeof ciph );
- memset( test, 0, sizeof test );
-
- /* Initiliaze PK RSA context with random key */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &rsa,
- mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( pk_genkey( &rsa ) == 0 );
-
- /* Extract key to the raw rsa context */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_copy( &raw, mbedtls_pk_rsa( rsa ) ) == 0 );
-
- /* Initialize PK RSA_ALT context */
+ /* Set up the alt context with the generated key */
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &alt );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( &alt, (void *) &raw,
- mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func, mbedtls_rsa_sign_func, mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_sign_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 );
- /* Test administrative functions */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &alt, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &alt ) == RSA_KEY_SIZE );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( &alt ) == RSA_KEY_LEN );
+ /* Check the metadata in the alt context */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &alt ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT );
TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &alt ), "RSA-alt" ) == 0 );
- /* Test signature */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof hash,
- sig, &sig_len, rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, (size_t)-1,
- NULL, NULL, rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ==
- MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
- TEST_ASSERT( sig_len == RSA_KEY_LEN );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == 0 );
-
- /* Test decrypt */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &rsa, msg, sizeof msg,
- ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
- rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &alt, ciph, ciph_len,
- test, &test_len, sizeof test,
- rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( test_len == sizeof msg );
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( test, msg, test_len ) == 0 );
-
- /* Test forbidden operations */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &alt, msg, sizeof msg,
- ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
- rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == ret );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == ret );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &alt, dbg_items ) == ret );
+ /* Exercise the alt context */
+ pk_rsa_match( &raw, &alt,
+ 0, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH, 0,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
exit:
mbedtls_rsa_free( &raw );
- mbedtls_pk_free( &rsa ); mbedtls_pk_free( &alt );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &alt );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void pk_opaque_mock( )
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t info =
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ "mock",
+ opaque_mock_get_bitlen,
+ opaque_mock_can_do,
+ opaque_mock_verify_func,
+ opaque_mock_sign_func,
+ opaque_mock_decrypt_func,
+ opaque_mock_encrypt_func,
+ opaque_mock_check_pair_func,
+ opaque_mock_ctx_alloc_func,
+ opaque_mock_ctx_free_func,
+ opaque_mock_debug_func,
+ opaque_mock_signature_size_func,
+ };
+ mbedtls_pk_context ctx;
+ unsigned char sig[OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE] = OPAQUE_MOCK_GOOD_SIGNATURE;
+ unsigned char input[sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input )];
+ unsigned char output[sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted )] = "garbage";
+ size_t len;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &ctx, &info ) == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &ctx ) == info.name );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &ctx ) == OPAQUE_MOCK_BITLEN );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO ) == 1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO ^ 1 ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_signature_size( &ctx ) == OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG,
+ opaque_mock_hash, sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ),
+ sig, OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG,
+ opaque_mock_hash, sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ),
+ sig, OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE - 1 ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
+ sig[0] ^= 1;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG,
+ opaque_mock_hash, sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ),
+ sig, OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+ len = -42;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG,
+ opaque_mock_hash, sizeof( opaque_mock_hash ),
+ sig, &len, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( len == OPAQUE_MOCK_SIGNATURE_SIZE );
+
+ memcpy( input, opaque_mock_reference_input,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) );
+ len = -42;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ctx, input, sizeof( input ),
+ output, &len,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted ),
+ NULL, NULL ) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input, opaque_mock_reference_input,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, opaque_mock_reference_encrypted,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_encrypted ) ) == 0 );
+ len = -42;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &ctx, input, sizeof( input ),
+ output, &len,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted ),
+ NULL, NULL ) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input, opaque_mock_reference_input,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_input ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, opaque_mock_reference_decrypted,
+ sizeof( opaque_mock_reference_decrypted ) ) == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( NULL, &ctx ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &ctx, &ctx ) == 0 );
+ {
+ mbedtls_pk_context pub;
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &pub );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &ctx ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pub,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &ctx ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &pub );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pub,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &ctx ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &pub );
+}
+
+ opaque_mock_debug_called_correctly = 0;
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &ctx, &opaque_mock_pk_debug_item ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( opaque_mock_debug_called_correctly );
+
+ opaque_mock_free_called_correctly = 0;
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( opaque_mock_free_called_correctly );
+ return;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void pk_opaque_minimal( )
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t info =
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ "mock",
+ opaque_mock_get_bitlen,
+ opaque_mock_can_do,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ opaque_mock_ctx_free_func,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ };
+ mbedtls_pk_context ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &ctx, &info ) == 0 );
+ ctx.pk_ctx = &opaque_mock_fake_ctx;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &ctx ) == info.name );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &ctx ) == OPAQUE_MOCK_BITLEN );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO ) == 1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_CAN_DO ^ 1 ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_signature_size( &ctx ) ==
+ ( OPAQUE_MOCK_BITLEN + 7 ) / 8 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &ctx, OPAQUE_MOCK_MD_ALG, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( NULL, &ctx ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &ctx, &ctx ) == 0 );
+ {
+ mbedtls_pk_context pub;
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &pub );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pub,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &ctx ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &pub );
+}
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &ctx, &opaque_mock_pk_debug_item ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+
+ opaque_mock_free_called_correctly = 0;
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( opaque_mock_free_called_correctly );
+ return;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void pk_opaque_fail_allocation( )
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t info =
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ "mock",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ opaque_mock_ctx_alloc_fail,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ };
+ mbedtls_pk_context ctx;
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &ctx, &info ) ==
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx.pk_info == NULL );
+ TEST_ASSERT( ctx.pk_ctx == NULL );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+void pk_opaque_wrapper( )
+{
+ /* Test an opaque context that's a wrapper around the usual RSA
+ implementation against an independent raw RSA context. */
+ mbedtls_pk_context opaque;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context raw;
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_rsa_info =
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_rsa_opaque_info =
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ "RSA-opaque-wrapper",
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->get_bitlen,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->can_do,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->verify_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->sign_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->decrypt_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->encrypt_func,
+ NULL, // we don't test check_pair here
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->ctx_alloc_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->ctx_free_func,
+ mbedtls_rsa_info->debug_func,
+ NULL, // signature_size_func: the fallback implementation is fine
+ };
+
+ /* Generate an RSA key to use in both contexts */
+ pk_rsa_prepare( &raw );
+
+ /* Set up the opaque context with the generated key */
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &opaque );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &opaque, &pk_rsa_opaque_info ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_rsa_copy( opaque.pk_ctx, &raw );
+
+ /* Check the metadata in the opaque context */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &opaque ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE );
+ TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &opaque ),
+ "RSA-opaque-wrapper" ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Exercise the opaque context */
+ pk_rsa_match( &raw, &opaque, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( &raw );
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &opaque );
}
/* END_CASE */