Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/585' into baremetal
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e769dc2..985c11b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@
mbedtls_ssl_session_load() to allow serializing a session, for example to
store it in non-volatile storage, and later using it for TLS session
resumption.
+ * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`
+ which allows copy-less parsing of DER encoded X.509 CRTs,
+ at the cost of additional lifetime constraints on the input
+ buffer, but at the benefit of reduced RAM consumption.
+
+API Changes
+ * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`.
+ See the Features section for more information.
Bugfix
* Server's RSA certificate in certs.c was SHA-1 signed. In the default
@@ -103,6 +111,8 @@
leading content octet. Fixes #1610.
Changes
+ * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing
+ the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice.
* Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration,
instead of relying on other header files that they include.
Inserted as an enhancement for #1371
diff --git a/configs/baremetal.h b/configs/baremetal.h
index 2fbc359..24cce6b 100644
--- a/configs/baremetal.h
+++ b/configs/baremetal.h
@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_BAREMETAL_CONFIG_H
#define MBEDTLS_BAREMETAL_CONFIG_H
-#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
-#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
-
/* Symmetric crypto: AES-CCM only */
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index 670bd10..62c3c2e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
{
+ int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
+ * by the structure or not. */
mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
@@ -220,16 +222,58 @@
/**
* \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
- * to the chained list.
+ * to the end of the provided chained list.
*
- * \param chain points to the start of the chain
- * \param buf buffer holding the certificate DER data
- * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
*
- * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer
+ * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
+ * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT
+ * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints),
+ * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen );
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a
+ * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes
+ * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT
+ * is destroyed.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded
+ * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be
+ * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the
+ * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed
+ * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free().
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note This call is functionally equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a
+ * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime
+ * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments
+ * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen );
/**
* \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 214ac5e..97aeac4 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -3578,6 +3578,15 @@
if( ticket_len == 0 )
return( 0 );
+ if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
+ ssl->session->ticket_len );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
+ ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
+ ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
+ }
+
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index e3ce590..bab00bb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -6135,6 +6135,23 @@
return( ret );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *crt_buf,
+ size_t crt_buf_len )
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert;
+
+ if( peer_crt == NULL )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
/*
* Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and
* perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller
@@ -6225,43 +6242,40 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */
+ i += 3;
+
/* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL;
}
- if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
- }
-
- mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
-
- i += 3;
-
+ /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */
while( i < ssl->in_hslen )
{
+ /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */
if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support
+ * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */
if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */
n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 )
| (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2];
i += 3;
@@ -6269,72 +6283,101 @@
if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
+ /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ {
+ /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's
+ * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake,
+ * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse
+ * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) );
+ if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl,
+ &ssl->in_msg[i],
+ n ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
+ }
+
+ /* Move CRT chain structure to new session instance. */
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = ssl->session->peer_cert;
+ ssl->session->peer_cert = NULL;
+
+ /* Delete all remaining CRTs from the original CRT chain. */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free(
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->next = NULL;
+
+ i += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+ /* Outside of client-side renegotiation, create a fresh X.509 CRT
+ * instance to parse the end-CRT into. */
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert =
+ mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed",
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
+
+ /* Intentional fall through */
+ }
+
+ /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
- ssl->in_msg + i, n );
+ ssl->in_msg + i, n );
switch( ret )
{
- case 0: /*ok*/
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
- /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
- prior certificate was already trusted. */
- break;
+ case 0: /*ok*/
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
+ /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
+ prior certificate was already trusted. */
+ break;
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto crt_parse_der_failed;
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto crt_parse_der_failed;
- case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
- goto crt_parse_der_failed;
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+ goto crt_parse_der_failed;
- default:
- alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
- crt_parse_der_failed:
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
- return( ret );
+ default:
+ alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+ crt_parse_der_failed:
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
+ return( ret );
}
i += n;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
-
- /*
- * On client, make sure the server cert doesn't change during renego to
- * avoid "triple handshake" attack: https://secure-resumption.com/
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- if( ssl->session->peer_cert == NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
- }
-
- if( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len !=
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.len ||
- memcmp( ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.p,
- ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->raw.p,
- ssl->session->peer_cert->raw.len ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server cert changed during renegotiation" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
- }
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index ebd118d..2c93311 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -829,8 +829,10 @@
/*
* Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
*/
-static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
+static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ int make_copy )
{
int ret;
size_t len;
@@ -847,7 +849,7 @@
if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- // Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length
+ /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
p = (unsigned char*) buf;
len = buflen;
end = p + len;
@@ -865,25 +867,26 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );
}
- if( len > (size_t) ( end - p ) )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
- }
- crt_end = p + len;
-
- // Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field
- crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
- crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
- if( p == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
-
- memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len );
-
- // Direct pointers to the new buffer
- p += crt->raw.len - len;
end = crt_end = p + len;
+ crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
+ if( make_copy != 0 )
+ {
+ /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
+ crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
+ if( crt->raw.p == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
+
+ memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len );
+ crt->own_buffer = 1;
+
+ p += crt->raw.len - len;
+ end = crt_end = p + len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf;
+ crt->own_buffer = 0;
+ }
/*
* TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -1086,8 +1089,10 @@
* Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
* chained list
*/
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
+static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ int make_copy )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
@@ -1119,7 +1124,7 @@
crt = crt->next;
}
- if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy ) ) != 0 )
{
if( prev )
prev->next = NULL;
@@ -1133,11 +1138,27 @@
return( 0 );
}
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0 ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1 ) );
+}
+
/*
* Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
* list
*/
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
@@ -2675,7 +2696,7 @@
mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
}
- if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL )
+ if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len );
mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p );
diff --git a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
index 999c87e..979910e 100644
--- a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
+++ b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
@@ -637,32 +637,17 @@
static unsigned char dropped[2048] = { 0 };
#define DROP_MAX 2
-/*
- * OpenSSL groups packets in a datagram the first time it sends them, but not
- * when it resends them. Count every record as seen the first time.
- */
+/* We only drop packets at the level of entire datagrams, not at the level
+ * of records. In particular, if the peer changes the way it packs multiple
+ * records into a single datagram, we don't necessarily count the number of
+ * times a record has been dropped correctly. However, the only known reason
+ * why a peer would change datagram packing is disabling the latter on
+ * retransmission, in which case we'd drop involved records at most
+ * DROP_MAX + 1 times. */
void update_dropped( const packet *p )
{
size_t id = p->len % sizeof( dropped );
- const unsigned char *end = p->buf + p->len;
- const unsigned char *cur = p->buf;
- size_t len = ( ( cur[11] << 8 ) | cur[12] ) + 13;
-
++dropped[id];
-
- /* Avoid counting single record twice */
- if( len == p->len )
- return;
-
- while( cur < end )
- {
- len = ( ( cur[11] << 8 ) | cur[12] ) + 13;
-
- id = len % sizeof( dropped );
- ++dropped[id];
-
- cur += len;
- }
}
int handle_message( const char *way,
diff --git a/scripts/baremetal.sh b/scripts/baremetal.sh
index 86fac56..4b798b9 100755
--- a/scripts/baremetal.sh
+++ b/scripts/baremetal.sh
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@
echo "ROM statistics written to:"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_FILE"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_SYMS"
+
+ # Print summary
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedtls.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedcrypto.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedx509.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
}
baremetal_build_armc5()
@@ -122,6 +127,11 @@
echo "ROM statistics written to:"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_FILE"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_SYMS"
+
+ # Print summary
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedtls.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedcrypto.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedx509.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
}
baremetal_build_armc6()
@@ -150,6 +160,11 @@
echo "ROM statistics written to:"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_FILE"
echo "* $ROM_OUT_SYMS"
+
+ # Print summary
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedtls.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedcrypto.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
+ cat $ROM_OUT_FILE | grep "libmbedx509.a" | awk '{printf( "%15s: %s Bytes\n", $4, $5)}'
}
# 32-bit host-build of library, tests and example programs,
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index d023c8d..acf8e9b 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
test-ca.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=3 request_file=test-ca.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20110212144400 not_after=20210212144400 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@
-all_final += test-ca.crt
+test-ca.der: test-ca.crt
+ $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += test-ca.crt test-ca.der
test-ca-sha1.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=3 request_file=test-ca.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20110212144400 not_after=20210212144400 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@
@@ -903,7 +905,9 @@
server2.crt: server2.req.sha256
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server2.req.sha256 serial=2 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20110212144406 not_after=20210212144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@
-all_final += server2.crt
+server2.der: server2.crt
+ $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += server2.crt server2.der
server2-sha256.crt: server2.req.sha256
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server2.req.sha256 serial=2 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20110212144406 not_after=20210212144406 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.der b/tests/data_files/server1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcf45cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server2.der b/tests/data_files/server2.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec03190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server2.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.der b/tests/data_files/test-ca.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..039fb9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index 6786c36..042d653 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -2,14 +2,26 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n"
+X509 Certificate information #1 (DER)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n"
+
X509 Certificate information #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
x509_cert_info:"data_files/server2.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 02\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n"
+X509 Certificate information #2 (DER)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/server2.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 02\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n"
+
X509 Certificate information #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 03\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:00\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:00\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n"
+X509 Certificate information #3 (DER)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 03\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:00\nexpires on \: 2021-02-12 14\:44\:00\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n"
+
X509 Certificate information MD2 Digest
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_md2.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 09\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert MD2\nissued on \: 2009-07-12 10\:56\:59\nexpires on \: 2011-07-12 10\:56\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with MD2\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index 552c494..a921310 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -505,8 +505,22 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt );
memset( output, 0, 2000 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &crt, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) );
+ if( ( result ) == 0 )
+ {
+ res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &crt, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt );
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt );
+ memset( output, 0, 2000 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( &crt, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) );
if( ( result ) == 0 )
{
res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt );