| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # (Minimal) ClientHello breakdown: | 
|  | 2 | # 160303rlrl - record header, 2-byte record contents len | 
|  | 3 | # 01hlhlhl - handshake header, 3-byte handshake message len | 
|  | 4 | # 0303 - protocol version: 1.2 | 
|  | 5 | # 0123456789abcdef (repeated, 4 times total) - 32-byte "random" | 
|  | 6 | # 00 - session ID (empty) | 
|  | 7 | # 0002cvcv - ciphersuite list: 2-byte len + list of 2-byte values (see below) | 
|  | 8 | # 0100 - compression methods: 1-byte len then "null" (only legal value now) | 
|  | 9 | # [then end, or extensions, see notes below] | 
|  | 10 | # elel - 2-byte extensions length | 
|  | 11 | # ... | 
|  | 12 | # 000a - elliptic_curves aka supported_groups | 
|  | 13 | # 0004 - extension length | 
|  | 14 | # 0002 - length of named_curve_list / named_group_list | 
|  | 15 | # 0017 - secp256r1 aka NIST P-256 | 
|  | 16 | # ... | 
|  | 17 | # 002b - supported version (for TLS 1.3) | 
|  | 18 | # 0003 - extension length | 
|  | 19 | # 02   - length of versions | 
|  | 20 | # 0304 - TLS 1.3 ("SSL 3.4") | 
|  | 21 | # ... | 
|  | 22 | # 000d - signature algorithms | 
|  | 23 | # 0004 - extension length | 
|  | 24 | # 0002 - SignatureSchemeList length | 
|  | 25 | # 0403 - ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 | 
|  | 26 | # ... | 
|  | 27 | # 0033 - key share | 
|  | 28 | # 0002 - extension length | 
|  | 29 | # 0000 - length of client_shares (empty is valid) | 
|  | 30 | # | 
|  | 31 | # Note: currently our TLS "1.3 or 1.2" code requires extension length to be | 
|  | 32 | # present even it it's 0. This is not strictly compliant but doesn't matter | 
|  | 33 | # much in practice as these days everyone wants to use signature_algorithms | 
|  | 34 | # (for hashes better than SHA-1), secure_renego (even if you have renego | 
|  | 35 | # disabled), and most people want either ECC or PSK related extensions. | 
|  | 36 | # See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9963 | 
|  | 37 | # | 
|  | 38 | # Also, currently we won't negotiate ECC ciphersuites unless at least the | 
|  | 39 | # supported_groups extension is present, see | 
|  | 40 | # https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7458 | 
|  | 41 | # | 
|  | 42 | # For TLS 1.3 with ephemeral key exchange, mandatory extensions are: | 
|  | 43 | # - supported versions (as for all of TLS 1.3) | 
|  | 44 | # - supported groups | 
|  | 45 | # - key share | 
|  | 46 | # - signature algorithms | 
|  | 47 | # (see ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange()). | 
|  | 48 | # | 
|  | 49 | # Note: cccc is currently not assigned, so can be used get a consistent | 
|  | 50 | # "no matching ciphersuite" behaviour regardless of the configuration. | 
|  | 51 | # c02b is MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (1.2) | 
|  | 52 | # 1301 is MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (1.3) | 
|  | 53 |  | 
|  | 54 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 55 | # MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 with secp256r1 | 
|  | 56 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.2 good (for reference) | 
|  | 57 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 | 
|  | 58 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300370100003303030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002c02b01000008000a000400020017":"<= parse client hello":0 | 
|  | 59 |  | 
|  | 60 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 61 | # Same as the above test with s/c02b/cccc/ as the ciphersuite | 
|  | 62 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.2 unknown ciphersuite (for reference) | 
|  | 63 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 | 
|  | 64 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303002f0100002b03030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002cccc01000000":"got no ciphersuites in common":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE | 
|  | 65 |  | 
|  | 66 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 67 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 68 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 good (for reference) | 
|  | 69 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 70 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"key exchange mode\: ephemeral":0 | 
|  | 71 |  | 
|  | 72 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 73 | # Same as the above test with s/1301/cccc/ as the ciphersuite | 
|  | 74 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 unknown ciphersuite (for reference) | 
|  | 75 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 76 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef000002cccc0100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"No matched ciphersuite":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE | 
|  | 77 |  | 
|  | 78 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 79 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 80 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + 72 OK | 
|  | 81 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 82 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000401000048160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"reassembled record":0 | 
|  | 83 |  | 
|  | 84 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 85 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 86 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 3 + 73 rejected | 
|  | 87 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 88 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000301000016030300494803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD | 
|  | 89 |  | 
|  | 90 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 91 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 92 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 2 + 74 rejected | 
|  | 93 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 94 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300020100160303004a004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD | 
|  | 95 |  | 
|  | 96 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 97 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 98 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 1 + 75 rejected | 
|  | 99 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 100 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000101160303004b00004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"handshake message too short":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD | 
|  | 101 |  | 
|  | 102 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 103 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 104 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 0 + 76 rejected | 
|  | 105 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 106 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030000160303004c0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"ssl_get_next_record() returned":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD | 
|  | 107 |  | 
|  | 108 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 109 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 110 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 72 + 4 OK | 
|  | 111 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 112 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300480100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033160303000400020000":"reassembled record":0 | 
|  | 113 |  | 
|  | 114 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 115 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 116 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 73 + 3 OK | 
|  | 117 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 118 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300490100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033001603030003020000":"reassembled record":0 | 
|  | 119 |  | 
|  | 120 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 121 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 122 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 74 + 2 OK | 
|  | 123 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 124 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004a0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033000216030300020000":"reassembled record":0 | 
|  | 125 |  | 
|  | 126 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 127 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 128 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 73 + 1 OK | 
|  | 129 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 130 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303004b0100004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d0004000204030033000200160303000100":"reassembled record":0 | 
|  | 131 |  | 
|  | 132 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 133 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 134 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + appdata + 72 rejected | 
|  | 135 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 757040c | 2025-03-05 12:52:18 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 136 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"16030300040100004817030300020102160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 137 |  | 
|  | 138 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 139 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 757040c | 2025-03-05 12:52:18 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 140 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + alert(warn) + 72 rejected | 
|  | 141 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 142 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481503030002015a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 143 |  | 
|  | 144 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 145 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 146 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + alert(fatal) + 72 rejected | 
|  | 147 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 757040c | 2025-03-05 12:52:18 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 148 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481503030002025a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 149 |  | 
|  | 150 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 151 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 757040c | 2025-03-05 12:52:18 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 152 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + CCS + 72 rejected | 
|  | 153 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 154 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"160303000401000048140303000101160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"non-handshake message in the middle of a fragmented handshake message":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 155 |  | 
|  | 156 | # See "ClientHello breakdown" above | 
|  | 157 | # ephemeral with secp256r1 + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 
|  | 158 | Inject ClientHello - TLS 1.3 fragmented 4 + invalid type + 72 rejected | 
|  | 159 | depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY | 
|  | 160 | inject_client_content_on_the_wire:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:"1603030004010000481003030002015a160303004803030123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef00000213010100001d000a000400020017002b0003020304000d000400020403003300020000":"unknown record type":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD | 
|  | 161 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 162 | # The buffer is actually larger than IN_CONTENT_LEN as we leave room for | 
|  | 163 | # record protection overhead (IV, MAC/tag, padding (up to 256 bytes)), CID... | 
|  | 164 | # The maximum size for an unencrypted (and without CID with is DTLS only) | 
|  | 165 | # handshake message we can hold in the buffer is | 
|  | 166 | #   MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 4 | 
|  | 167 | # (the 4 is for the handshake header). | 
|  | 168 | # However, due to overhead, fragmented messages need to be 5 bytes shorter in | 
|  | 169 | # order to actually fit (leave room for an extra record header). | 
|  | 170 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: reassembled 1 byte larger than the buffer | 
|  | 171 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 3:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 172 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 173 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: would just fit except for overhead | 
|  | 174 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 4:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 175 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 176 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (1) | 
|  | 177 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 5:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 178 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 179 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (2) | 
|  | 180 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 6:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 181 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 182 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (3) | 
|  | 183 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 7:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 184 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 185 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: would fit except for overhead (4) | 
|  | 186 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 8:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 55d9124 | 2025-03-04 10:18:30 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 187 |  | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 4f1b38a | 2025-03-07 12:36:08 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 188 | # Since we're sending dummy contents (all 0x2a) for the ClientHello, | 
|  | 189 | # the first thing that's going to fail is the version check. The fact that we | 
|  | 190 | # got around to checking it confirms reassembly completed sucessfully. | 
|  | 191 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: just fits | 
|  | 192 | send_large_fragmented_hello:MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN - MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN - 9:0:"Unsupported version of TLS":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION | 
| Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | 2285d61 | 2025-03-07 12:53:43 +0100 | [diff] [blame^] | 193 |  | 
|  | 194 | # We're generating a virtual record header for the reassembled HS message, | 
|  | 195 | # which requires that the length fits in two bytes. Of course we won't get | 
|  | 196 | # there because if the length doesn't fit in two bytes then the message won't | 
|  | 197 | # fit in the buffer, but still add a test just in case. | 
|  | 198 | Send large fragmented ClientHello: length doesn't fit in two bytes | 
|  | 199 | send_large_fragmented_hello:0x10000:0:"requesting more data than fits":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA |