diff --git a/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt b/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt
index 14a4674..fa149bd 100644
--- a/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,10 +1,2 @@
-execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h get MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED RESULT_VARIABLE everest_result)
-execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h get MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED RESULT_VARIABLE p256m_result)
-
-if(${everest_result} EQUAL 0)
-    add_subdirectory(everest)
-endif()
-
-if(${p256m_result} EQUAL 0)
-    add_subdirectory(p256-m)
-endif()
+add_subdirectory(everest)
+add_subdirectory(p256-m)
diff --git a/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt b/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
index 4ad367e..e0e5ade 100644
--- a/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-add_library(everest
+set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest")
+
+add_library(${everest_target}
   library/everest.c
   library/x25519.c
   library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c)
 
-target_include_directories(everest
+target_include_directories(${everest_target}
   PUBLIC $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
          $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include>
          $<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>
@@ -11,6 +13,19 @@
           include/everest/kremlib
           ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/)
 
+# Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+# This must be duplicated from library/CMakeLists.txt because
+# everest is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
+# so does not inherit the compile definitions.
+if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+    target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
+        PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
+endif()
+if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
+    target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
+        PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
+endif()
+
 if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
 
   install(DIRECTORY include/everest
@@ -21,7 +36,7 @@
 
 endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
 
-install(TARGETS everest
+install(TARGETS ${everest_target}
   EXPORT MbedTLSTargets
   DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
   PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
diff --git a/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt b/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
index 0001dd2..2ef0d48 100644
--- a/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,14 +1,29 @@
-add_library(p256m
+set(p256m_target ${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m)
+
+add_library(${p256m_target}
     p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c
     p256-m/p256-m.c)
 
-target_include_directories(p256m
+target_include_directories(${p256m_target}
   PUBLIC $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}>
          $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/p256-m>
          $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include>
          $<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>
   PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/)
 
+# Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+# This must be duplicated from library/CMakeLists.txt because
+# p256m is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
+# so does not inherit the compile definitions.
+if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+    target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
+        PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
+endif()
+if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
+    target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
+        PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
+endif()
+
 if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
 
   install(DIRECTORY :${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}
@@ -19,7 +34,7 @@
 
 endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
 
-install(TARGETS p256m
+install(TARGETS ${p256m_target}
 EXPORT MbedTLSTargets
 DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
 PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index 0aaacb0..d3bd75e 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -106,6 +106,6 @@
 - [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
 - [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
  maintained until at least the end of 2024, see
-  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.3>.
+  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.5>.
 
 Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 508f524..cbe5748 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@
     write_basic_package_version_file(
         "cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
             COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
-            VERSION 3.4.1)
+            VERSION 3.5.0)
 
     install(
         FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bc1d32e..85f3665 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,293 @@
 Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
+= Mbed TLS 3.5.0 branch released 2023-10-05
+
+API changes
+   * Mbed TLS 3.4 introduced support for omitting the built-in implementation
+     of ECDSA and/or EC J-PAKE when those are provided by a driver. However,
+     their was a flaw in the logic checking if the built-in implementation, in
+     that if failed to check if all the relevant curves were supported by the
+     accelerator. As a result, it was possible to declare no curves as
+     accelerated and still have the built-in implementation compiled out.
+     Starting with this release, it is necessary to declare which curves are
+     accelerated (using MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx macros), or they will be
+     considered not accelerated, and the built-in implementation of the curves
+     and any algorithm possible using them will be included in the build.
+   * Add new millisecond time type `mbedtls_ms_time_t` and `mbedtls_ms_time()`
+     function, needed for TLS 1.3 ticket lifetimes. Alternative implementations
+     can be created using an ALT interface.
+
+Requirement changes
+   * Officially require Python 3.8 now that earlier versions are out of support.
+   * Minimum required Windows version is now Windows Vista, or
+     Windows Server 2008.
+
+New deprecations
+   * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR, where xxx is either ECC or RSA,
+     are now being deprecated in favor of PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy. Here yyy can be: BASIC,
+     IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE. The goal is to have a finer detail about
+     the capabilities of the PSA side for either key.
+   * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX is deprecated in favor of
+     MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH (if you intended what the name suggests:
+     maximum size of any supported block cipher) or the new name
+     MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE (if you intended the actual semantics:
+     maximum size of a block cipher supported by the CMAC module).
+   * mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() and mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe() functions are now
+     deprecated in favor of mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() and
+     mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() as they offer more security by checking
+     for overflow of the output buffer and reporting the actual length
+     of the output.
+
+Features
+   * All modules that use hashes or HMAC can now take advantage of PSA Crypto
+     drivers when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is enabled and psa_crypto_init() has
+     been called. Previously (in 3.3), this was restricted to a few modules,
+     and only in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C was disabled; in particular the
+     entropy module was not covered which meant an external RNG had to be
+     provided - these limitations are lifted in this version. A new set of
+     feature macros, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx, has been introduced that can be used
+     to check for availability of hash algorithms, regardless of whether
+     they're provided by a built-in implementation, a driver or both. See
+     docs/driver-only-builds.md.
+   * When a PSA driver for ECDH is present, it is now possible to disable
+     MBEDTLS_ECDH_C in the build in order to save code size. For TLS 1.2
+     key exchanges based on ECDH(E) to work, this requires
+     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. Restartable/interruptible ECDHE operations in
+     TLS 1.2 (ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange) are not supported in those builds yet,
+     as PSA does not have an API for restartable ECDH yet.
+   * When all of ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE are either disabled or provided by
+     a driver, it is possible to disable MBEDTLS_ECP_C (and MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+     if not required by another module) and still get support for ECC keys and
+     algorithms in PSA, with some limitations. See docs/driver-only-builds.txt
+     for details.
+   * Add parsing of directoryName subtype for subjectAltName extension in
+     x509 certificates.
+   * Add support for server-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
+     TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled, the TLS server now selects TLS 1.2 or
+     TLS 1.3 depending on the capabilities and preferences of TLS clients.
+     Fixes #6867.
+   * X.509 hostname verification now supports IPAddress Subject Alternate Names.
+   * Add support for reading and writing X25519 and X448
+     public and private keys in RFC 8410 format using the existing PK APIs.
+   * When parsing X.509 certificates, support the extensions
+     SignatureKeyIdentifier and AuthorityKeyIdentifier.
+   * Don't include the PSA dispatch functions for PAKEs (psa_pake_setup() etc)
+     if no PAKE algorithms are requested
+   * Add support for the FFDH algorithm and DH key types in PSA, with
+     parameters from RFC 7919. This includes a built-in implementation based
+     on MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, and a driver dispatch layer enabling alternative
+     implementations of FFDH through the driver entry points.
+   * It is now possible to generate certificates with SubjectAltNames.
+     Currently supported subtypes: DnsName, UniformResourceIdentifier,
+     IP address, OtherName, and DirectoryName, as defined in RFC 5280.
+     See mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name for
+     more information.
+   * X.509 hostname verification now partially supports URI Subject Alternate
+     Names. Only exact matching, without any normalization procedures
+     described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive URI verification.
+   * Add function mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string() to parse an OID from a
+     string to a DER-encoded mbedtls_asn1_buf.
+   * Add SHA-3 family hash functions.
+   * Add support to restrict AES to 128-bit keys in order to save code size.
+     A new configuration option, MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH, can be
+     used to enable this feature.
+   * AES performance improvements. Uplift varies by platform,
+     toolchain, optimisation flags and mode.
+     Aarch64, gcc -Os and CCM, GCM and XTS benefit the most.
+     On Aarch64, uplift is typically around 20 - 110%.
+     When compiling with gcc -Os on Aarch64, AES-XTS improves
+     by 4.5x.
+   * Add support for PBKDF2-HMAC through the PSA API.
+   * New symbols PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy (where xxx is either ECC, RSA
+     or DH) were introduced in order to have finer accuracy in defining the
+     PSA capabilities for each key. These capabilities, named yyy above, can be
+     any of: BASIC, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE.
+     - DERIVE is only available for ECC keys, not for RSA or DH ones.
+     - implementations are free to enable more than what it was strictly
+       requested. For example BASIC internally enables IMPORT and EXPORT
+       (useful for testing purposes), but this might change in the future.
+   * Add support for FFDH key exchange in TLS 1.3.
+     This is automatically enabled as soon as PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
+     and the ephemeral or psk-ephemeral key exchange mode are enabled.
+     By default, all groups are offered; the list of groups can be
+     configured using the existing API function mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
+   * Improve mbedtls_x509_time performance and reduce memory use.
+   * Reduce syscalls to time() during certificate verification.
+   * Allow MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE to be set by
+     setting the CMake variable of the same name at configuration time.
+   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout()) to access
+     `mbedtls_ssl_cache_context.timeout`.
+   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname()) to access
+     `mbedtls_ssl_context.hostname`.
+   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint()) to access
+     `mbedtls_ssl_config.endpoint`.
+   * Support for "opaque" (PSA-held) ECC keys in the PK module has been
+     extended: it is now possible to use mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(),
+     mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(), mbedtls_pk_check_pair(), and
+     mbedtls_pk_verify() with opaque ECC keys (provided the PSA attributes
+     allow it).
+   * The documentation of mbedtls_ecp_group now describes the optimized
+     representation of A for some curves. Fixes #8045.
+   * Add a possibility to generate CSR's with RCF822 and directoryName subtype
+     of subjectAltName extension in x509 certificates.
+   * Add support for PBKDF2-CMAC through the PSA API.
+   * New configuration option MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY introduced. When
+     using CPU-accelerated AES (e.g., Arm Crypto Extensions), this option
+     disables the plain C implementation and the run-time detection for the
+     CPU feature, which reduces code size and avoids the vulnerability of the
+     plain C implementation.
+   * Accept arbitrary AttributeType and AttributeValue in certificate
+     Distinguished Names using RFC 4514 syntax.
+   * Applications using ECC over secp256r1 through the PSA API can use a
+     new implementation with a much smaller footprint, but some minor
+     usage restrictions. See the documentation of the new configuration
+     option MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED for details.
+
+Security
+   * Fix a case where potentially sensitive information held in memory would not
+     be completely zeroized during TLS 1.2 handshake, in both server and client
+     configurations.
+   * In configurations with ARIA or Camellia but not AES, the value of
+     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX was 8, rather than 16 as the name might
+     suggest. This did not affect any library code, because this macro was
+     only used in relation with CMAC which does not support these ciphers.
+     This may affect application code that uses this macro.
+   * Developers using mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() or mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe() should
+     review the size of the output buffer passed to this function, and note
+     that the output after decryption may include CBC padding. Consider moving
+     to the new functions mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() or mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext()
+     which checks for overflow of the output buffer and reports the actual
+     length of the output.
+   * Improve padding calculations in CBC decryption, NIST key unwrapping and
+     RSA OAEP decryption. With the previous implementation, some compilers
+     (notably recent versions of Clang and IAR) could produce non-constant
+     time code, which could allow a padding oracle attack if the attacker
+     has access to precise timing measurements.
+   * Updates to constant-time C code so that compilers are less likely to use
+     conditional instructions, which can have an observable difference in
+     timing. (Clang has been seen to do this.) Also introduce assembly
+     implementations for 32- and 64-bit Arm and for x86 and x86-64, which are
+     guaranteed not to use conditional instructions.
+   * Fix definition of MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, which was too
+     small when MBEDTLS_SHA384_C was defined and MBEDTLS_SHA512_C was
+     undefined. Mbed TLS itself was unaffected by this, but user code
+     which used MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE could be affected. The only
+     release containing this bug was Mbed TLS 3.4.0.
+   * Fix a buffer overread when parsing short TLS application data records in
+     null-cipher cipher suites. Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
+   * Fix a remotely exploitable heap buffer overflow in TLS handshake parsing.
+     In TLS 1.3, all configurations are affected except PSK-only ones, and
+     both clients and servers are affected.
+     In TLS 1.2, the affected configurations are those with
+     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and ECDH enabled but DHM and RSA disabled,
+     and only servers are affected, not clients.
+     Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
+
+Bugfix
+   * Fix proper sizing for PSA_EXPORT_[KEY_PAIR/PUBLIC_KEY]_MAX_SIZE and
+     PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE buffers when at least one accelerated EC is bigger
+     than all built-in ones and RSA is disabled.
+     Resolves #6622.
+   * Add missing md.h includes to some of the external programs from
+     the programs directory. Without this, even though the configuration
+     was sufficient for a particular program to work, it would only print
+     a message that one of the required defines is missing.
+   * Fix declaration of mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() function
+     in the ecdsa.h header file. There was a build warning when the
+     configuration macro MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT was defined.
+     Resolves #7407.
+   * Fix an error when MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT is defined but not
+     MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, causing ecdsa verify to fail. Fixes #7498.
+   * Fix missing PSA initialization in sample programs when
+     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
+   * Fix the J-PAKE driver interface for user and peer to accept any values
+     (previously accepted values were limited to "client" or "server").
+   * Fix clang and armclang compilation error when targeting certain Arm
+     M-class CPUs (Cortex-M0, Cortex-M0+, Cortex-M1, Cortex-M23,
+     SecurCore SC000). Fixes #1077.
+   * Fix "unterminated '#pragma clang attribute push'" in sha256/sha512.c when
+     built with MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT but don't have a
+     way to detect the crypto extensions required. A warning is still issued.
+   * Fixed an issue that caused compile errors when using CMake and the IAR
+     toolchain.
+   * Fix very high stack usage in SSL debug code. Reported by Maximilian
+     Gerhardt in #7804.
+   * Fix a compilation failure in the constant_time module when
+     building for arm64_32 (e.g., for watchos). Reported by Paulo
+     Coutinho in #7787.
+   * Fix crypt_and_hash decryption fail when used with a stream cipher
+     mode of operation due to the input not being multiple of block size.
+     Resolves #7417.
+   * Fix a bug in which mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() would return success
+     when given a invalid name string if it did not contain '=' or ','.
+   * Fix compilation warnings in aes.c, which prevented the
+     example TF-M configuration in configs/ from building cleanly:
+     tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h with
+     crypto_config_profile_medium.h.
+   * In TLS 1.3, fix handshake failure when a client in its ClientHello
+     proposes an handshake based on PSK only key exchange mode or at least
+     one of the key exchange modes using ephemeral keys to a server that
+     supports only the PSK key exchange mode.
+   * Fix CCM* with no tag being not supported in a build with CCM as the only
+     symmetric encryption algorithm and the PSA configuration enabled.
+   * Fix the build with MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY. Fixes #7516.
+   * Fix a compilation error on some platforms when including mbedtls/ssl.h
+     with all TLS support disabled. Fixes #6628.
+   * Fix x509 certificate generation to conform to RFC 5480 / RFC 5758 when
+     using ECC key. The certificate was rejected by some crypto frameworks.
+     Fixes #2924.
+   * Fix a potential corruption of the passed-in IV when mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc()
+     is called with zero length and padlock is not enabled.
+   * Fix compile failure due to empty enum in cipher_wrap.c, when building
+     with a very minimal configuration. Fixes #7625.
+   * Fix some cases where mbedtls_mpi_mod_exp, RSA key construction or ECDSA
+     signature can silently return an incorrect result in low memory conditions.
+   * Don't try to include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE when
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled.
+   * Fix IAR compiler warnings.
+   * Fix an issue when parsing an otherName subject alternative name into a
+     mbedtls_x509_san_other_name struct. The type-id of the otherName was not
+     copied to the struct. This meant that the struct had incomplete
+     information about the otherName SAN and contained uninitialized memory.
+   * Fix the detection of HardwareModuleName otherName SANs. These were being
+     detected by comparing the wrong field and the check was erroneously
+     inverted.
+   * Fix a build error in some configurations with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
+     enabled, where some low-level modules required by requested PSA crypto
+     features were not getting automatically enabled. Fixes #7420.
+   * Fix undefined symbols in some builds using TLS 1.3 with a custom
+     configuration file.
+   * Fix log level for the got supported group message. Fixes #6765
+   * Functions in the ssl_cache module now return a negative MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx
+     error code on failure. Before, they returned 1 to indicate failure in
+     some cases involving a missing entry or a full cache.
+   * mbedtls_pk_parse_key() now rejects trailing garbage in encrypted keys.
+   * Fix the build with CMake when Everest or P256-m is enabled through
+     a user configuration file or the compiler command line. Fixes #8165.
+
+Changes
+   * Enable Arm / Thumb bignum assembly for most Arm platforms when
+     compiling with gcc, clang or armclang and -O0.
+   * Enforce minimum RSA key size when generating a key
+     to avoid accidental misuse.
+   * Use heap memory to allocate DER encoded RSA private key.
+     This reduces stack usage significantly for RSA signature
+     operations when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.
+   * Update Windows code to use BCryptGenRandom and wcslen, and
+     ensure that conversions between size_t, ULONG, and int are
+     always done safely.  Original contribution by Kevin Kane #635, #730
+     followed by Simon Butcher #1453.
+   * Users integrating their own PSA drivers should be aware that
+     the file library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c has been renamed
+     to psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.
+   * When using CBC with the cipher module, the requirement to call
+     mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() is now enforced. Previously, omitting
+     this call accidentally applied a default padding mode chosen at compile
+     time.
+
 = Mbed TLS 3.4.1 branch released 2023-08-04
 
 Bugfix
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/Define-PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy.txt b/ChangeLog.d/Define-PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 014eec6..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/Define-PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-New deprecations
-   * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR, where xxx is either ECC or RSA,
-     are now being deprecated in favor of PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy. Here yyy can be: BASIC,
-     IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE. The goal is to have a finer detail about
-     the capabilities of the PSA side for either key.
-
-Features
-   * New symbols PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy (where xxx is either ECC, RSA
-     or DH) were introduced in order to have finer accuracy in defining the
-     PSA capabilities for each key. These capabilities, named yyy above, can be
-     any of: BASIC, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE.
-     - DERIVE is only available for ECC keys, not for RSA or DH ones.
-     - implementations are free to enable more than what it was strictly
-       requested. For example BASIC internally enables IMPORT and EXPORT
-       (useful for testing purposes), but this might change in the future.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/X509Parse_SignatureKeyId_AuthorityKeyId.txt b/ChangeLog.d/X509Parse_SignatureKeyId_AuthorityKeyId.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9aa3ff9..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/X509Parse_SignatureKeyId_AuthorityKeyId.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * When parsing X.509 certificates, support the extensions
-     SignatureKeyIdentifier and AuthorityKeyIdentifier.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-128bit-only.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-128bit-only.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b080cac..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-128bit-only.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support to restrict AES to 128-bit keys in order to save code size.
-     A new configuration option, MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH, can be
-     used to enable this feature.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-hardware-only-option.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-hardware-only-option.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index a185aff..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-hardware-only-option.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * New configuration option MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY introduced. When
-     using CPU-accelerated AES (e.g., Arm Crypto Extensions), this option
-     disables the plain C implementation and the run-time detection for the
-     CPU feature, which reduces code size and avoids the vulnerability of the
-     plain C implementation.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-directoryname-san.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-directoryname-san.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e116298..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-directoryname-san.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add parsing of directoryName subtype for subjectAltName extension in
-     x509 certificates.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-getters-for-some-fields.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-getters-for-some-fields.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 6a6fbad..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-getters-for-some-fields.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout()) to access
-     `mbedtls_ssl_cache_context.timeout`.
-   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname()) to access
-     `mbedtls_ssl_context.hostname`.
-   * Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint()) to access
-     `mbedtls_ssl_config.endpoint`.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-milliseconds-time-api.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-milliseconds-time-api.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index d9e939f..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-milliseconds-time-api.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-API changes
-   * Add new millisecond time type `mbedtls_ms_time_t` and `mbedtls_ms_time()`
-     function, needed for TLS 1.3 ticket lifetimes. Alternative implementations
-     can be created using an ALT interface.
-
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-missing-md-includes.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-missing-md-includes.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 408c361..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-missing-md-includes.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Add missing md.h includes to some of the external programs from
-     the programs directory. Without this, even though the configuration
-     was sufficient for a particular program to work, it would only print
-     a message that one of the required defines is missing.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-cmac.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-cmac.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ed84ea..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-cmac.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support for PBKDF2-CMAC through the PSA API.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-hmac.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-hmac.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 2708098..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-pbkdf2-hmac.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support for PBKDF2-HMAC through the PSA API.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-psa_want_alg_some_pake.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-psa_want_alg_some_pake.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 00b3002..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-psa_want_alg_some_pake.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Don't include the PSA dispatch functions for PAKEs (psa_pake_setup() etc)
-     if no PAKE algorithms are requested
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-rfc822-directoryname-csr-gen.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-rfc822-directoryname-csr-gen.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ff8693c..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-rfc822-directoryname-csr-gen.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add a possibility to generate CSR's with RCF822 and directoryName subtype
-     of subjectAltName extension in x509 certificates.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-subjectAltName-certs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-subjectAltName-certs.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 487e5c6..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-subjectAltName-certs.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * It is now possible to generate certificates with SubjectAltNames.
-     Currently supported subtypes: DnsName, UniformResourceIdentifier,
-     IP address, OtherName, and DirectoryName, as defined in RFC 5280.
-     See mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name for
-     more information.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/aes-perf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/aes-perf.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ab716bc..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/aes-perf.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * AES performance improvements. Uplift varies by platform,
-     toolchain, optimisation flags and mode.
-     Aarch64, gcc -Os and CCM, GCM and XTS benefit the most.
-     On Aarch64, uplift is typically around 20 - 110%.
-     When compiling with gcc -Os on Aarch64, AES-XTS improves
-     by 4.5x.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/armclang-compile-fix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/armclang-compile-fix.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 59ae1cd..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/armclang-compile-fix.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix clang and armclang compilation error when targeting certain Arm
-     M-class CPUs (Cortex-M0, Cortex-M0+, Cortex-M1, Cortex-M23,
-     SecurCore SC000). Fixes #1077.
-Changes
-   * Enable Arm / Thumb bignum assembly for most Arm platforms when
-     compiling with gcc, clang or armclang and -O0.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/basic-uri-verification.txt b/ChangeLog.d/basic-uri-verification.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index aa039ea..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/basic-uri-verification.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * X.509 hostname verification now partially supports URI Subject Alternate
-     Names. Only exact matching, without any normalization procedures
-     described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive URI verification.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_iar_typo.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_iar_typo.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 95f97b1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_iar_typo.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fixed an issue that caused compile errors when using CMake and the IAR
-     toolchain.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/cmake-pass-through-config-defines.txt b/ChangeLog.d/cmake-pass-through-config-defines.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 6122f37..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/cmake-pass-through-config-defines.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Allow MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE to be set by
-     setting the CMake variable of the same name at configuration time.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/config_psa-include-order.txt b/ChangeLog.d/config_psa-include-order.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 674c286..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/config_psa-include-order.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a build error in some configurations with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
-     enabled, where some low-level modules required by requested PSA crypto
-     features were not getting automatically enabled. Fixes #7420.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/driver-ffdh.txt b/ChangeLog.d/driver-ffdh.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 1185133..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/driver-ffdh.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add a driver dispatch layer for FFDH keys, enabling alternative
-     implementations of FFDH through the driver entry points.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-ecc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-ecc.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8878085..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-ecc.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * When a PSA driver for ECDH is present, it is now possible to disable
-     MBEDTLS_ECDH_C in the build in order to save code size. For TLS 1.2
-     key exchanges based on ECDH(E) to work, this requires
-     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. Restartable/interruptible ECDHE operations in
-     TLS 1.2 (ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange) are not supported in those builds yet,
-     as PSA does not have an API for restartable ECDH yet.
-   * When all of ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE are either disabled or provided by
-     a driver, it is possible to disable MBEDTLS_ECP_C (and MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
-     if not required by another module) and still get support for ECC keys and
-     algorithms in PSA, with some limitations. See docs/driver-only-builds.txt
-     for details.
-API changes
-   * Mbed TLS 3.4 introduced support for omitting the built-in implementation
-     of ECDSA and/or EC J-PAKE when those are provided by a driver. However,
-     their was a flaw in the logic checking if the built-in implementation, in
-     that if failed to check if all the relevant curves were supported by the
-     accelerator. As a result, it was possible to declare no curves as
-     accelerated and still have the built-in implementation compiled out.
-     Starting with this release, it is necessary to declare which curves are
-     accelerated (using MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx macros), or they will be
-     considered not accelerated, and the built-in implementation of the curves
-     and any algorithm possible using them will be included in the build.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt b/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index cd1e030..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * All modules that use hashes or HMAC can now take advantage of PSA Crypto
-     drivers when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is enabled and psa_crypto_init() has
-     been called. Previously (in 3.3), this was restricted to a few modules,
-     and only in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C was disabled; in particular the
-     entropy module was not covered which meant an external RNG had to be
-     provided - these limitations are lifted in this version. A new set of
-     feature macros, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx, has been introduced that can be used
-     to check for availability of hash algorithms, regardless of whether
-     they're provided by a built-in implementation, a driver or both. See
-     docs/driver-only-builds.md.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ec_jpake_user_peer_2.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ec_jpake_user_peer_2.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9572ac7..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/ec_jpake_user_peer_2.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix the J-PAKE driver interface for user and peer to accept any values
-     (previously accepted values were limited to "client" or "server").
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/enforce-min-RSA-key-size.txt b/ChangeLog.d/enforce-min-RSA-key-size.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 06cd2a2..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/enforce-min-RSA-key-size.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Changes
-   * Enforce minimum RSA key size when generating a key
-     to avoid accidental misuse.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/extend-distinguished-names.txt b/ChangeLog.d/extend-distinguished-names.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b148424..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/extend-distinguished-names.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Accept arbitrary AttributeType and AttributeValue in certificate
-     Distinguished Names using RFC 4514 syntax.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/extend-pk-opaque-ecc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/extend-pk-opaque-ecc.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ad5bdc0..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/extend-pk-opaque-ecc.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Support for "opaque" (PSA-held) ECC keys in the PK module has been
-     extended: it is now possible to use mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(),
-     mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(), mbedtls_pk_check_pair(), and
-     mbedtls_pk_verify() with opaque ECC keys (provided the PSA attributes
-     allow it).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ffdh-tls-1-3.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ffdh-tls-1-3.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index c5d07d6..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/ffdh-tls-1-3.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support for FFDH key exchange in TLS 1.3.
-     This is automatically enabled as soon as PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
-     and the ephemeral or psk-ephemeral key exchange mode are enabled.
-     By default, all groups are offered; the list of groups can be
-     configured using the existing API function mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db8ed07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix accidental omission of MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX in 3rdparty modules
+     in CMake.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-a-few-unchecked-return.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-a-few-unchecked-return.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index aadde36..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-a-few-unchecked-return.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix some cases where mbedtls_mpi_mod_exp, RSA key construction or ECDSA
-     signature can silently return an incorrect result in low memory conditions.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-aes-cbc-iv-corruption b/ChangeLog.d/fix-aes-cbc-iv-corruption
deleted file mode 100644
index 11eb946..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-aes-cbc-iv-corruption
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a potential corruption of the passed-in IV when mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc()
-     is called with zero length and padlock is not enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-cmake-3rdparty-custom-config.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-cmake-3rdparty-custom-config.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec543aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-cmake-3rdparty-custom-config.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix the build with CMake when Everest or P256-m is enabled through
+     a user configuration file or the compiler command line. Fixes #8165.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-crypt_and_hash-decrypt-issue.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-crypt_and_hash-decrypt-issue.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ded9b2d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-crypt_and_hash-decrypt-issue.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix crypt_and_hash decryption fail when used with a stream cipher
-     mode of operation due to the input not being multiple of block size.
-     Resolves #7417.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-declaration-of-mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable-function.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-declaration-of-mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable-function.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index c30e074..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-declaration-of-mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable-function.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix declaration of mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() function
-     in the ecdsa.h header file. There was a build warning when the
-     configuration macro MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT was defined.
-     Resolves #7407.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-empty-enum.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-empty-enum.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 458d58f..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-empty-enum.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix compile failure due to empty enum in cipher_wrap.c, when building
-     with a very minimal configuration. Fixes #7625.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-hrr-in-psk-kem.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-hrr-in-psk-kem.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0377711..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-hrr-in-psk-kem.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * In TLS 1.3, fix handshake failure when a client in its ClientHello
-     proposes an handshake based on PSK only key exchange mode or at least
-     one of the key exchange modes using ephemeral keys to a server that
-     supports only the PSK key exchange mode.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-compiler-warnings.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-compiler-warnings.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0dc2623..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-compiler-warnings.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix IAR compiler warnings.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-ilp32.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-ilp32.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f18ac5..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-ilp32.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a compilation failure in the constant_time module when
-     building for arm64_32 (e.g., for watchos). Reported by Paulo
-     Coutinho in #7787.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-log-level-msg.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-log-level-msg.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e82ad1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-log-level-msg.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix log level for the got supported group message. Fixes #6765
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-string-to-names-retcode.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-string-to-names-retcode.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ac4b3d1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-string-to-names-retcode.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a bug in which mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() would return success
-     when given a invalid name string if it did not contain '=' or ','.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tfm-build.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tfm-build.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 64cb837..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tfm-build.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix compilation warnings in aes.c, which prevented the
-     example TF-M configuration in configs/ from building cleanly:
-     tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h with
-     crypto_config_profile_medium.h.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-padbuf-zeroization b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-padbuf-zeroization
deleted file mode 100644
index 36451cb..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-padbuf-zeroization
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Security
-   * Fix a case where potentially sensitive information held in memory would not
-     be completely zeroized during TLS 1.2 handshake, in both server and client
-     configurations.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-unterminated-pragma-clang-attribute-push.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-unterminated-pragma-clang-attribute-push.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7fcb5ec..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-unterminated-pragma-clang-attribute-push.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix "unterminated '#pragma clang attribute push'" in sha256/sha512.c when
-     built with MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT but don't have a
-     way to detect the crypto extensions required. A warning is still issued.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/improve-doc-on-ecp-curve-optimized-representation.txt b/ChangeLog.d/improve-doc-on-ecp-curve-optimized-representation.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8fdc588..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/improve-doc-on-ecp-curve-optimized-representation.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * The documentation of mbedtls_ecp_group now describes the optimized
-     representation of A for some curves. Fixes #8045.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/initialize-struct-get-other-name.txt b/ChangeLog.d/initialize-struct-get-other-name.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index dc8395d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/initialize-struct-get-other-name.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix an issue when parsing an otherName subject alternative name into a
-     mbedtls_x509_san_other_name struct. The type-id of the otherName was not
-     copied to the struct. This meant that the struct had incomplete
-     information about the otherName SAN and contained uninitialized memory.
-   * Fix the detection of HardwareModuleName otherName SANs. These were being
-     detected by comparing the wrong field and the check was erroneously
-     inverted.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/inject-entropy.txt b/ChangeLog.d/inject-entropy.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7626629..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/inject-entropy.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix the build with MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY. Fixes #7516.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do-unconditional-define.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do-unconditional-define.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 22e8adb..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do-unconditional-define.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix an error when MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT is defined but not
-     MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, causing ecdsa verify to fail. Fixes #7498.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_x509_time.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_x509_time.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 557f191..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_x509_time.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Improve mbedtls_x509_time performance and reduce memory use.
-   * Reduce syscalls to time() during certificate verification.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/misc-from-psa-crypto.txt b/ChangeLog.d/misc-from-psa-crypto.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 40a043a..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/misc-from-psa-crypto.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix CCM* with no tag being not supported in a build with CCM as the only
-     symmetric encryption algorithm and the PSA configuration enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/oid-parse-from-numeric-string.txt b/ChangeLog.d/oid-parse-from-numeric-string.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 82ed2fd..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/oid-parse-from-numeric-string.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add function mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string() to parse an OID from a
-     string to a DER-encoded mbedtls_asn1_buf.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/p256-m.txt b/ChangeLog.d/p256-m.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e473580..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/p256-m.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Applications using ECC over secp256r1 through the PSA API can use a
-     new implementation with a much smaller footprint, but some minor
-     usage restrictions. See the documentation of the new configuration
-     option MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED for details.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/programs_psa_fix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/programs_psa_fix.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index fe2099e..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/programs_psa_fix.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix missing PSA initialization in sample programs when
-     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_user_config_file.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_user_config_file.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index f538f47..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_user_config_file.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Don't try to include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE when
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/python3.8.txt b/ChangeLog.d/python3.8.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 32a7c09..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/python3.8.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Requirement changes
-   * Officially require Python 3.8 now that earlier versions are out of support.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rfc8410.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rfc8410.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e2984ee..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/rfc8410.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support for reading and writing X25519 and X448
-     public and private keys in RFC 8410 format using the existing PK APIs.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/sha3.txt b/ChangeLog.d/sha3.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9426f87..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/sha3.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Features
-    * Add SHA-3 family hash functions.
-
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/some-max-size-macro-are-too-small-when-psa-ecc-is-accelerated.txt b/ChangeLog.d/some-max-size-macro-are-too-small-when-psa-ecc-is-accelerated.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8cc6e5e..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/some-max-size-macro-are-too-small-when-psa-ecc-is-accelerated.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix proper sizing for PSA_EXPORT_[KEY_PAIR/PUBLIC_KEY]_MAX_SIZE and
-     PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE buffers when at least one accelerated EC is bigger
-     than all built-in ones and RSA is disabled.
-     Resolves #6622.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ssl_debug_helpers-stack_usage.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ssl_debug_helpers-stack_usage.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e2c2475..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/ssl_debug_helpers-stack_usage.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix very high stack usage in SSL debug code. Reported by Maximilian
-     Gerhardt in #7804.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ssl_premaster_secret-empty.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ssl_premaster_secret-empty.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ce5f36..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/ssl_premaster_secret-empty.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a compilation error on some platforms when including mbedtls/ssl.h
-     with all TLS support disabled. Fixes #6628.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-custom-config.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-custom-config.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index da2e25d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-custom-config.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix undefined symbols in some builds using TLS 1.3 with a custom
-     configuration file.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-server-version-negotiation.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-server-version-negotiation.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 989018b..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-server-version-negotiation.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * Add support for server-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
-     TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled, the TLS server now selects TLS 1.2 or
-     TLS 1.3 depending on the capabilities and preferences of TLS clients.
-     Fixes #6867.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/updated_windows_apis.txt b/ChangeLog.d/updated_windows_apis.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 73b17df..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/updated_windows_apis.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-Requirement changes
-   * Minimum required Windows version is now Windows Vista, or
-     Windows Server 2008.
-
-Changes
-   * Update Windows code to use BCryptGenRandom and wcslen, and
-     ensure that conversions between size_t, ULONG, and int are
-     always done safely.  Original contribution by Kevin Kane #635, #730
-     followed by Simon Butcher #1453.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/use_heap_rsa_signature.txt b/ChangeLog.d/use_heap_rsa_signature.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e6d7b12..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/use_heap_rsa_signature.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Changes
-   * Use heap memory to allocate DER encoded RSA private key.
-     This reduces stack usage significantly for RSA signature
-     operations when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/verify-ip-sans-properly.txt b/ChangeLog.d/verify-ip-sans-properly.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 00203a8..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/verify-ip-sans-properly.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * X.509 hostname verification now supports IPAddress Subject Alternate Names.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/x509-ec-algorithm-identifier-fix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/x509-ec-algorithm-identifier-fix.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index c1de491..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/x509-ec-algorithm-identifier-fix.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix x509 certificate generation to conform to RFC 5480 / RFC 5758 when
-     using ECC key. The certificate was rejected by some crypto frameworks.
-     Fixes #2924.
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 61e3936..7ed72de 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -135,3 +135,12 @@
 - Use cryptographic mechanisms that are not based on block ciphers. In
   particular, for authenticated encryption, use ChaCha20/Poly1305 instead of
   block cipher modes. For random generation, use HMAC\_DRBG instead of CTR\_DRBG.
+
+#### Everest
+
+The HACL* implementation of X25519 taken from the Everest project only protects
+against remote timing attacks. (See their [Security
+Policy](https://github.com/hacl-star/hacl-star/blob/main/SECURITY.md).)
+
+The Everest variant is only used when `MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED`
+configuration option is defined. This option is off by default.
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 837cec5..b67237f 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.4.1 API Documentation
+ * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.0 API Documentation
  *
  * This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS.  It was
  * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index c8a47d9..98b2d79 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.4.1"
+PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.5.0"
 OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = ../apidoc/
 FULL_PATH_NAMES        = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
index 533e076..842f15c 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
@@ -37,17 +37,17 @@
  * Major, Minor, Patchlevel
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  3
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  4
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  1
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  5
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  0
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03040100
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.4.1"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.4.1"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03050000
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.5.0"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.5.0"
 
 /* Macros for build-time platform detection */
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index 53ef2ad..9c8701d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -852,7 +852,6 @@
  * \brief               This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes
  *                      that use padding.
  *
- *                      The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding.
  *
  * \param ctx           The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
  *                      bound to a cipher information structure.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
index 3125e70..b2aca5d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  *
  * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for
  * Authentication is defined in <em>RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm</em>.
+ * It is supported with AES and DES.
  */
 /*
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
@@ -38,12 +39,30 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE          16
 #define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE         8
 
+/* We don't support Camellia or ARIA in this module */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX      16  /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE      16  /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */
 #else
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX      8   /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE      8   /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/** The longest block supported by the cipher module.
+ *
+ * \deprecated
+ * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the CMAC module,
+ * use #MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE.
+ * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the cipher module,
+ * use #MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH.
+ */
+/* Before Mbed TLS 3.5, this was the maximum block size supported by the CMAC
+ * module, so it didn't take Camellia or ARIA into account. Since the name
+ * of the macro doesn't even convey "CMAC", this was misleading. Now the size
+ * is sufficient for any cipher, but the name is defined in cmac.h for
+ * backward compatibility. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT)
 
 /**
@@ -51,11 +70,11 @@
  */
 struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t {
     /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm.  */
-    unsigned char       MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char       MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still
      *  pending processing, or the final block. */
-    unsigned char       MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char       MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     /** The length of data pending processing. */
     size_t              MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len);
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
index 65bea1a..495cd5a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
 #endif
 
-/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in MbedTLS version 3.5, while
+/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while
  * in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long
  * as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward
  * compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions
@@ -184,4 +184,12 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
+/* Historically pkparse did not check the CBC padding when decrypting
+ * a key. This was a bug, which is now fixed. As a consequence, pkparse
+ * now needs PKCS7 padding support, but existing configurations might not
+ * enable it, so we enable it here. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+#endif
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
index eb9e2d9..ba1a2ed 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
@@ -52,10 +52,30 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /**
  * \brief            PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
  *                   for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
  *
+ * \note             When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
+ *                   be enabled at compile time.
+ *
+ * \deprecated       This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ *                   future version of the library.
+ *                   Please use mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * \warning          When decrypting:
+ *                   - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
+ *                     time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ *                     #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ *                     invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ *                     attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ *                     there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ *                     detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ *                     password are about 1/255).
+ *                   - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
+ *                     time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
+ *
  * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
  * \param mode       either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
  *                   #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
@@ -64,17 +84,78 @@
  * \param pwd        Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
  *                   \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
  * \param pwdlen     length of the password (may be 0)
- * \param input      the input data
+ * \param data       the input data
  * \param len        data length
- * \param output     the output buffer
+ * \param output     Output buffer.
+ *                   On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ *                   possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ *                   On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ *                   For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
+ *                   bytes.
+ *                   For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ *                   \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ *                   the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
  *
  * \return           0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
  */
-int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
-                       mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
-                       const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
-                       const unsigned char *input, size_t len,
-                       unsigned char *output);
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                                          mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type,
+                                          mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+                                          const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                                          const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+                                          unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+/**
+ * \brief            PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
+ *                   for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
+ *
+ *
+ * \warning          When decrypting:
+ *                   - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ *                     #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ *                     invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ *                     attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ *                     there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ *                     detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ *                     password are about 1/255).
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
+ * \param mode       either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
+ *                   #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
+ * \param cipher_type the cipher used
+ * \param md_type    the mbedtls_md used
+ * \param pwd        Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
+ *                   \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
+ * \param pwdlen     length of the password (may be 0)
+ * \param data       the input data
+ * \param len        data length
+ * \param output     Output buffer.
+ *                   On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ *                   possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ *                   On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ *                   For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
+ *                   bytes.
+ *                   For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ *                   \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ *                   the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ * \param output_size size of output buffer.
+ *                    This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
+ *                    padding data.
+ * \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return           0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                           mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+                           const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                           const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+                           unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                           size_t *output_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
index 152b45f..8b086aa 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
 
 #include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
 #include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
 #include "mbedtls/md.h"
@@ -50,23 +51,95 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /**
  * \brief          PKCS#5 PBES2 function
  *
+ * \note           When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
+ *                 be enabled at compile time.
+ *
+ * \deprecated     This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ *                 future version of the library.
+ *                 Please use mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * \warning        When decrypting:
+ *                 - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
+ *                   time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ *                   #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ *                   invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ *                   attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ *                   there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ *                   detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ *                   password are about 1/255).
+ *                 - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
+ *                   time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
+ *
  * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
- * \param mode       either MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
+ * \param mode       either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
  * \param pwd        password to use when generating key
  * \param pwdlen     length of password
  * \param data       data to process
  * \param datalen    length of data
- * \param output     output buffer
+ * \param output     Output buffer.
+ *                   On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ *                   possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ *                   On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ *                   For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
+ *                   bytes.
+ *                   For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ *                   \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ *                   the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
  *
  * \returns        0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails.
  */
-int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
-                        const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
-                        const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
-                        unsigned char *output);
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                                           const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                                           const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                           unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+/**
+ * \brief          PKCS#5 PBES2 function
+ *
+ * \warning        When decrypting:
+ *                 - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ *                   #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ *                   invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ *                   attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ *                   there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ *                   detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ *                   password are about 1/255).
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
+ * \param mode       either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
+ * \param pwd        password to use when generating key
+ * \param pwdlen     length of password
+ * \param data       data to process
+ * \param datalen    length of data
+ * \param output     Output buffer.
+ *                   On success, it contains the decrypted data.
+ *                   On failure, the content is indetermidate.
+ *                   For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
+ *                   bytes.
+ *                   For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ *                   \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ *                   the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ * \param output_size size of output buffer.
+ *                    This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
+ *                    padding data.
+ * \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \returns        0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if parsing or decryption fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                            const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                            const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                            unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                            size_t *output_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
 
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 2b1fd43..6a4ce51 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -268,17 +268,20 @@
         ${mbedtls_static_target})
 endif()
 
+set(p256m_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m")
+set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest")
+
 if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
     set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
 
-    if(TARGET everest)
-        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC everest)
+    if(TARGET ${everest_target})
+        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
     endif()
 
-    if(TARGET p256m)
-        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC p256m)
+    if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
+        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
     endif()
 
     add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
@@ -293,23 +296,23 @@
 if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
     add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 14)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 15)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
 
-    if(TARGET everest)
-        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC everest)
+    if(TARGET ${everest_target})
+        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
     endif()
 
-    if(TARGET p256m)
-        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC p256m)
+    if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
+        target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
     endif()
 
     add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 5)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 6)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
 
     add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 19)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 20)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
 endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
 
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index a5b1ef0..9e2d723 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@
 endif
 endif
 
-SOEXT_TLS?=so.19
-SOEXT_X509?=so.5
-SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.14
+SOEXT_TLS?=so.20
+SOEXT_X509?=so.6
+SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.15
 
 # Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept
 # the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar)
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 61353ca..7c265e0 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
      * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
      * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
      */
-    different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign
+    different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign
     result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative);
 
     /*
@@ -131,15 +131,17 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
 
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
+    {
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
 
-    X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
+        X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
+        mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
 
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
-    for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
-        X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
+        for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
+            X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
+        }
     }
 
 cleanup:
@@ -386,7 +388,7 @@
 
 /* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative.
  * This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */
-#define TO_SIGN(x) ((((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
+#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
 
 /*
  * Set value from integer
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index bc61376..237ef9f 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -532,13 +533,8 @@
                                     const unsigned char *tag2,
                                     size_t tag_len)
 {
-    unsigned char i;
-    int diff;
-
     /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
-    for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
-        diff |= tag1[i] ^ tag2[i];
-    }
+    int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len);
 
     if (diff != 0) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED;
diff --git a/library/chachapoly.c b/library/chachapoly.c
index 0124d75..aebc646 100644
--- a/library/chachapoly.c
+++ b/library/chachapoly.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -310,7 +311,6 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char check_tag[16];
-    size_t i;
     int diff;
 
     if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx,
@@ -320,9 +320,7 @@
     }
 
     /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
-    for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < sizeof(check_tag); i++) {
-        diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
-    }
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, sizeof(check_tag));
 
     if (diff != 0) {
         mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index 69ee6d7..9f9f107 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -268,17 +269,6 @@
 
     ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
-    /*
-     * Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding
-     */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
-    (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7);
-#else
-    (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE);
-#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
-
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -848,7 +838,7 @@
                             size_t *data_len)
 {
     size_t i, pad_idx;
-    unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0;
+    unsigned char padding_len;
 
     if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -857,18 +847,19 @@
     padding_len = input[input_len - 1];
     *data_len = input_len - padding_len;
 
-    /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */
-    bad |= padding_len > input_len;
-    bad |= padding_len == 0;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
 
     /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len,
      * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */
     pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
     for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) {
-        bad |= (input[i] ^ padding_len) * (i >= pad_idx);
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t different  = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len);
+        bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different));
     }
 
-    return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
+    return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
 
@@ -891,24 +882,28 @@
 static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
                                      size_t *data_len)
 {
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned char done = 0, prev_done, bad;
-
     if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    bad = 0x80;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
+
     *data_len = 0;
-    for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) {
-        prev_done = done;
-        done |= (input[i - 1] != 0);
-        *data_len |= (i - 1) * (done != prev_done);
-        bad ^= input[i - 1] * (done != prev_done);
+
+    for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]);
+
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding);
+
+        *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len);
+
+        bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad);
+
+        in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero));
     }
 
-    return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
-
+    return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */
 
@@ -932,7 +927,8 @@
                                      size_t *data_len)
 {
     size_t i, pad_idx;
-    unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0;
+    unsigned char padding_len;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad;
 
     if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -942,16 +938,19 @@
     *data_len = input_len - padding_len;
 
     /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */
-    bad |= padding_len > input_len;
-    bad |= padding_len == 0;
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
 
     /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */
     pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
     for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) {
-        bad |= input[i] * (i >= pad_idx);
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte;
+        nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]));
+        bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte);
     }
 
-    return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
+    return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */
 
@@ -962,18 +961,14 @@
 static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output,
                               size_t output_len, size_t data_len)
 {
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = data_len; i < output_len; i++) {
-        output[i] = 0x00;
-    }
+    memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len);
 }
 
 static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
                              size_t *data_len)
 {
     size_t i;
-    unsigned char done = 0, prev_done;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done;
 
     if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -982,8 +977,8 @@
     *data_len = 0;
     for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) {
         prev_done = done;
-        done |= (input[i-1] != 0);
-        *data_len |= i * (done != prev_done);
+        done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0));
+        *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len);
     }
 
     return 0;
@@ -1027,6 +1022,16 @@
 
     *olen = 0;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+    /* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to
+     * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */
+    if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+        if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
     if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
         MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
diff --git a/library/cmac.c b/library/cmac.c
index 333248e..c079686 100644
--- a/library/cmac.c
+++ b/library/cmac.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
                                  unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
     size_t olen, block_size;
 
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L));
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@
  * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for
  * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition.
  */
-static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX],
+static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],
                      size_t padded_block_len,
                      const unsigned char *last_block,
                      size_t last_block_len)
@@ -283,9 +283,9 @@
 {
     mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
     unsigned char *state, *last_block;
-    unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
-    unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
-    unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t olen, block_size;
 
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block,
                              sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block));
 
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX);
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -750,8 +750,8 @@
     int i, ret = 0;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
-    unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
-    unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
     if (cipher_info == NULL) {
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@
 {
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     int i, ret = 0;
-    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
     if (cipher_info == NULL) {
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index d3c69cf..8b41aed 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
  */
 
+#include <stdint.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
@@ -120,9 +121,56 @@
         diff |= x ^ y;
     }
 
+
+#if (INT_MAX < INT32_MAX)
+    /* We don't support int smaller than 32-bits, but if someone tried to build
+     * with this configuration, there is a risk that, for differing data, the
+     * only bits set in diff are in the top 16-bits, and would be lost by a
+     * simple cast from uint32 to int.
+     * This would have significant security implications, so protect against it. */
+#error "mbedtls_ct_memcmp() requires minimum 32-bit ints"
+#else
+    /* The bit-twiddling ensures that when we cast uint32_t to int, we are casting
+     * a value that is in the range 0..INT_MAX - a value larger than this would
+     * result in implementation defined behaviour.
+     *
+     * This ensures that the value returned by the function is non-zero iff
+     * diff is non-zero.
+     */
+    return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16));
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
+                              const void *b,
+                              size_t n,
+                              size_t skip_head,
+                              size_t skip_tail)
+{
+    unsigned int diff = 0;
+
+    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+
+    size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail;
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
+        unsigned int d = x ^ y;
+        mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head),
+                                                           mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end));
+        diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d);
+    }
+
+    /* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the
+     * cast from uint to int is safe. */
     return (int) diff;
 }
 
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
 
 void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)
diff --git a/library/constant_time_impl.h b/library/constant_time_impl.h
index 4290e60..7759ac3 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_impl.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_impl.h
@@ -429,7 +429,6 @@
     return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to;
 }
 
-
 /* ============================================================================
  * Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions
  */
@@ -448,6 +447,14 @@
     return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
 }
 
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0)
+{
+    return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1,
+                                                  (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
 
 static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
@@ -471,6 +478,12 @@
     return (unsigned) (condition & if1);
 }
 
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+                                                               mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1)
+{
+    return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1);
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
 
 static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
@@ -481,6 +494,23 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
 
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0)
+{
+    /* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be
+     * in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types.
+     *
+     * This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for
+     * converting back to int.
+     */
+    return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1),
+                                 (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0)));
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1)
+{
+    return -((int) (condition & (-if1)));
+}
+
 static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
                                                         mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
 {
@@ -505,8 +535,8 @@
     return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y);
 }
 
-static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
-                                                         mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
 {
     return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y);
 }
diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h
index ff7ccc1..cc26edc 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_internal.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -194,11 +194,11 @@
 static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
                                                         mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
 
-/** Boolean "xor" operation.
+/** Boolean not-equals operation.
  *
  * Functionally equivalent to:
  *
- * \p x ^ \p y
+ * \p x != \p y
  *
  * \param x     The first value to analyze.
  * \param y     The second value to analyze.
@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@
  * \note        This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are
  *              mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
  *
- * \return      MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x ^ \p y,
+ * \return      MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y,
  *              otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
  */
-static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
-                                                         mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
 
 /** Boolean "and" operation.
  *
@@ -291,6 +291,22 @@
                                           unsigned if1,
                                           unsigned if0);
 
+/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
+                                                        mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0);
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
 
 /** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values.
@@ -327,6 +343,23 @@
  */
 static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1);
 
+/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+                                                               mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1);
+
 /** Choose between a size_t value and 0.
  *
  * Functionally equivalent to:
@@ -378,6 +411,35 @@
                                                          unsigned char c,
                                                          unsigned char t);
 
+/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0].
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0);
+
+/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0].
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition     Condition to test.
+ * \param if1           Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return  \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1);
 
 /* ============================================================================
  * Block memory operations
@@ -492,6 +554,37 @@
                          size_t n);
  */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
+ *
+ * Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of
+ * the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail)
+ *
+ * Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail .
+ *
+ * Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n.
+ *
+ * \param a         Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param b         Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param n         The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers).
+ * \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer.
+ *                  These bytes will still be read.
+ * \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer.
+ *                  These bytes will still be read.
+ *
+ * \return          Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
+                              const void *b,
+                              size_t n,
+                              size_t skip_head,
+                              size_t skip_tail);
+
+#endif
+
 /* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */
 #include "constant_time_impl.h"
 
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index b06ca4a..c8618be 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -601,7 +602,6 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char check_tag[16];
-    size_t i;
     int diff;
 
     if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length,
@@ -611,9 +611,7 @@
     }
 
     /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
-    for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
-        diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
-    }
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len);
 
     if (diff != 0) {
         mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);
diff --git a/library/nist_kw.c b/library/nist_kw.c
index fbd7221..7bdc807 100644
--- a/library/nist_kw.c
+++ b/library/nist_kw.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -333,9 +334,9 @@
                            unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size)
 {
     int ret = 0;
-    size_t i, olen;
+    size_t olen;
     unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH];
-    unsigned char diff, bad_padding = 0;
+    int diff;
 
     *out_len = 0;
     if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) {
@@ -420,19 +421,15 @@
          * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around.
          */
         padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen;
-        if (padlen > 7) {
-            padlen &= 7;
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
-        }
+        ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7),
+                                  MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret);
+        padlen &= 7;
 
         /* Check padding in "constant-time" */
-        for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++) {
-            if (i >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen) {
-                diff |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i];
-            } else {
-                bad_padding |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i];
-            }
-        }
+        const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 };
+        diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(
+            &output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero,
+            KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0);
 
         if (diff != 0) {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
@@ -454,7 +451,6 @@
         *out_len = 0;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&bad_padding, sizeof(bad_padding));
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&diff, sizeof(diff));
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(A, sizeof(A));
 
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index 03c1e35..96b8ef9 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -514,9 +514,11 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     if (options == NULL) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h
index 67ee5fe..004660e 100644
--- a/library/pk_internal.h
+++ b/library/pk_internal.h
@@ -117,5 +117,14 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
+    mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+    unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+    const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+    int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
+
+#endif
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index e67138b..436876a 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -208,9 +208,11 @@
         PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
     size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
@@ -262,9 +264,11 @@
     mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
     size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
@@ -382,9 +386,11 @@
 {
     mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
     if (sig_size < *sig_len) {
@@ -1565,9 +1571,11 @@
 {
     mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx;
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
     if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
diff --git a/library/pkcs12.c b/library/pkcs12.c
index db31722..4db2a4b 100644
--- a/library/pkcs12.c
+++ b/library/pkcs12.c
@@ -129,18 +129,49 @@
 
 #undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                           mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+                           const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                           const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+                           unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                           size_t *output_len);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
                        mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
                        const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
                        const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
                        unsigned char *output)
 {
+    size_t output_len = 0;
+
+    /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer
+     * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees
+     * for the output size actually being correct.
+     */
+    return mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(pbe_params, mode, cipher_type, md_type,
+                                  pwd, pwdlen, data, len, output, SIZE_MAX,
+                                  &output_len);
+}
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                           mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+                           const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                           const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+                           unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                           size_t *output_len)
+{
     int ret, keylen = 0;
     unsigned char key[32];
     unsigned char iv[16];
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx;
-    size_t olen = 0;
+    size_t iv_len = 0;
+    size_t finish_olen = 0;
+    unsigned int padlen = 0;
 
     if (pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -153,9 +184,23 @@
 
     keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8;
 
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) {
+        if (output_size < len) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT) {
+        padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (len % cipher_info->block_size);
+        if (output_size < (len + padlen)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info);
     if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen,
                                         key, keylen,
-                                        iv, mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info))) != 0) {
+                                        iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
         return ret;
     }
 
@@ -165,31 +210,37 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    if ((ret =
-             mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
-                                   (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
+                                     (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    if ((ret =
-             mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_ctx, iv,
-                                   mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info))) != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+    /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */
+
+    mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when
+     * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this
+     * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a
+     * password mismatch.
+     */
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) {
+        padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE;
+    }
+#endif
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
 
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(&cipher_ctx)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&cipher_ctx, data, len,
-                                     output, &olen)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(&cipher_ctx, output + olen, &olen)) != 0) {
+    ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen);
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
     }
 
+    *output_len += finish_olen;
+
 exit:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key));
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv,  sizeof(iv));
diff --git a/library/pkcs5.c b/library/pkcs5.c
index 5d415ca..2756d05 100644
--- a/library/pkcs5.c
+++ b/library/pkcs5.c
@@ -111,21 +111,47 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                            const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                            const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                            unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                            size_t *output_len);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
                         const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
                         const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
                         unsigned char *output)
 {
+    size_t output_len = 0;
+
+    /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer
+     * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees
+     * for the output size actually being correct.
+     */
+    return mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(pbe_params, mode, pwd, pwdlen, data,
+                                   datalen, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len);
+}
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+                            const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
+                            const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                            unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                            size_t *output_len)
+{
     int ret, iterations = 0, keylen = 0;
     unsigned char *p, *end;
     mbedtls_asn1_buf kdf_alg_oid, enc_scheme_oid, kdf_alg_params, enc_scheme_params;
     mbedtls_asn1_buf salt;
     mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
     unsigned char key[32], iv[32];
-    size_t olen = 0;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx;
+    unsigned int padlen = 0;
 
     p = pbe_params->p;
     end = p + pbe_params->len;
@@ -183,6 +209,19 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT;
     }
 
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT) {
+        if (output_size < datalen) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT) {
+        padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (datalen % cipher_info->block_size);
+        if (output_size < (datalen + padlen)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+    }
+
     mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx);
 
     memcpy(iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len);
@@ -202,8 +241,28 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+    /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as
+     * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5
+     * with 64-bit-block ciphers).
+     */
+    mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when
+     * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this
+     * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a
+     * password mismatch.
+     */
+    if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+        padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE;
+    }
+#endif
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
     if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len,
-                                    data, datalen, output, &olen)) != 0) {
+                                    data, datalen, output, output_len)) != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
     }
 
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 83291c4..e1422df 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -1417,6 +1417,12 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
     return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
 
+    end = p + len;
+    if (end != (key + keylen)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1430,7 +1436,7 @@
  *
  */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
-static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
     mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
     unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
     const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
@@ -1445,6 +1451,7 @@
     mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
 #endif
+    size_t outlen = 0;
 
     p = key;
     end = p + keylen;
@@ -1490,9 +1497,9 @@
      */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
     if (mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(&pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg) == 0) {
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT,
-                                      cipher_alg, md_alg,
-                                      pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf)) != 0) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT,
+                                          cipher_alg, md_alg,
+                                          pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) {
             if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) {
                 return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
             }
@@ -1505,8 +1512,8 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
     if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) {
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen,
-                                       p, len, buf)) != 0) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen,
+                                           p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) {
             if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) {
                 return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
             }
@@ -1524,8 +1531,7 @@
     if (decrypted == 0) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
     }
-
-    return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, len, f_rng, p_rng);
+    return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, outlen, f_rng, p_rng);
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
 
@@ -1644,8 +1650,8 @@
                                       key, NULL, 0, &len);
     }
     if (ret == 0) {
-        if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen,
-                                                    pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen,
+                                                            pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
             mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
         }
 
@@ -1677,8 +1683,8 @@
 
         memcpy(key_copy, key, keylen);
 
-        ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen,
-                                               pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng);
+        ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen,
+                                                       pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng);
 
         mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_copy, keylen);
     }
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
index 7a904d9..db00cbd 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
@@ -304,10 +304,10 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
     /*
-     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
+     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different
      * handling of output sequencing.
      *
-     * The MbedTLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
+     * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
      * at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
      * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be
      * retrieved in sequence.
@@ -423,17 +423,17 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
     /*
-     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
+     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different
      * handling of input sequencing.
      *
-     * The MbedTLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
+     * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
      * at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
      * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be
      * given in sequence.
      *
      * In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data
      * is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the
-     * MbedTLS JPAKE API on the last step.
+     * Mbed TLS JPAKE API on the last step.
      *
      * This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step.
      */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index 508a68b..065e55a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -328,9 +328,11 @@
     /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length
      * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an
      * overflow later. */
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (hash_length > UINT_MAX) {
         return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
+#endif
 
     /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */
     if (alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) {
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index d0782f5..3c538bf 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -158,12 +158,10 @@
      * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
      *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
      * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+    ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(
         bad,
-        (unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)),
-        mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(
-            output_too_large,
-            (unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE)))
+        MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+        mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE)
         );
 
     /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
@@ -1541,7 +1539,8 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
-    unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned int hlen;
@@ -1601,28 +1600,26 @@
      * Check contents, in "constant-time"
      */
     p = buf;
-    bad = 0;
 
-    bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */
 
     p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
 
     /* Check lHash */
-    for (i = 0; i < hlen; i++) {
-        bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
-    }
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen)));
+    p += hlen;
 
     /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
      * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
     pad_len = 0;
-    pad_done = 0;
+    in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
     for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
-        pad_done |= p[i];
-        pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
+        in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0));
+        pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1);
     }
 
     p += pad_len;
-    bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01;
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01));
 
     /*
      * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
@@ -1630,7 +1627,7 @@
      * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
      * the different error conditions.
      */
-    if (bad != 0) {
+    if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
         goto cleanup;
     }
diff --git a/library/sha256.c b/library/sha256.c
index 5375255..223badf 100644
--- a/library/sha256.c
+++ b/library/sha256.c
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     uint32_t used;
     uint32_t high, low;
+    int truncated = 0;
 
     /*
      * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length
@@ -728,7 +729,6 @@
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[5], output, 20);
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[6], output, 24);
 
-    int truncated = 0;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
     truncated = ctx->is224;
 #endif
diff --git a/library/sha512.c b/library/sha512.c
index a91d792..e739af2 100644
--- a/library/sha512.c
+++ b/library/sha512.c
@@ -828,6 +828,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned used;
     uint64_t high, low;
+    int truncated = 0;
 
     /*
      * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length
@@ -874,7 +875,6 @@
     sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[4], output, 32);
     sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[5], output, 40);
 
-    int truncated = 0;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
     truncated = ctx->is384;
 #endif
diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
index 736b142..2368489 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg;
     size_t key_bits;
 
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(info->cipher,
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher,
                                        info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16,
                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits);
 
@@ -1969,10 +1969,10 @@
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
             return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
-                mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(info->mac));
+                mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac));
 
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
-            return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(info->mac));
+            return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac));
 
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 47a206d..c312d81 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -1547,8 +1547,16 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
     if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) {
+        if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("Record too short for MAC:"
+                                   " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                   rec->data_len, transform->maclen));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+        }
+
         /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL",
-         * so there's nothing to do here.*/
+         * so there's no encryption to do here.*/
     } else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
@@ -2011,7 +2019,7 @@
         unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
         unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
 
-        /* If the initial value of padlen was such that
+        /* For CBC+MAC, If the initial value of padlen was such that
          * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen
          * got reset to 1, and the initial check
          * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1
@@ -2023,6 +2031,9 @@
          * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct)
          * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then,
          * hence data_len >= maclen in any case.
+         *
+         * For stream ciphers, we checked above that
+         * data_len >= maclen.
          */
         rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
         ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index fc3fb85..d3a7ddb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -2427,7 +2427,8 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg;
     psa_key_type_t type;
     size_t size;
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(suite->cipher, 0, &alg, &type, &size);
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher,
+                                       0, &alg, &type, &size);
     if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
         base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode(alg);
     }
@@ -6406,7 +6407,7 @@
         mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk;
         psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
             PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
-        mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+        mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion"));
 
@@ -8208,7 +8209,7 @@
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher,
+    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher,
                                             transform->taglen,
                                             &alg,
                                             &key_type,
@@ -8227,7 +8228,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     if (mac_alg == 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type for %u not found",
                                   (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac));
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index cc22a3f..27bbafa 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@
                                         unsigned char *end)
 {
     uint16_t tls_id;
-    uint8_t ecpoint_len;
+    size_t ecpoint_len;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
     size_t ec_bits = 0;
@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
     }
 
-    if (ecpoint_len > PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) {
+    if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
     }
 
@@ -2059,7 +2059,7 @@
     ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q,
                                          MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen,
                                          ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
-                                         MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH);
+                                         sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey));
 
     if (ret != 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index d2143ac..6ebd506 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -3718,22 +3718,32 @@
         psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
 
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Read the peer's public key."));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key."));
 
         /*
          * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data)
          */
         if (buf_len < 2) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length"));
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      buf_len));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         }
 
         if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length"));
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+                                      " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      data_len, buf_len));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         }
 
         /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
+        if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+                                      " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      data_len,
+                                      sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
         memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len);
         handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len;
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index d018bee..c6fa3b3 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
     ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite);
 
     if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
-        return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     }
 
     return PSA_ALG_NONE;
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
+    if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
         != hash_alg) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
             1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk."));
@@ -2858,7 +2858,7 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg);
     if (hash_length == -1 ||
         (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 81fa514..3c8d448 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@
      */
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
         ssl,
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
         transcript, sizeof(transcript),
         &transcript_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg,
                                                    mbedtls_pk_context *key)
 {
-    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key);
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = (mbedtls_pk_type_t) mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key);
     size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(key);
 
     switch (pk_type) {
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@
     }
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
-        ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
+        ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
         handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash), &handshake_hash_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR"));
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, ciphersuite_info->mac,
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac,
                                                hash_transcript + 4,
                                                PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE,
                                                &hash_len);
@@ -1516,7 +1516,13 @@
     /* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, peerkey_len);
 
-    /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
+    /* Store peer's ECDH/FFDH public key. */
+    if (peerkey_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %u > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                  (unsigned) peerkey_len,
+                                  sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
     memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len);
     handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peerkey_len;
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index afd84a9..6905d92 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
 
     /*
      * Compute MasterSecret
@@ -797,10 +797,10 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets =
         &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
 
-    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
     psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data"));
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
     /*
      * Setup psa keys and alg
      */
-    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher,
+    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher,
                                             transform->taglen,
                                             &alg,
                                             &key_type,
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@
         taglen = 16;
     }
 
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
@@ -1168,9 +1168,9 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
     if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) {
         ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len);
@@ -1370,9 +1370,9 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL;
     size_t shared_secret_len = 0;
 
@@ -1617,9 +1617,9 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility
@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
         2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret"));
 
-    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
                                                transcript, sizeof(transcript),
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 89bba04..b8201f0 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -408,7 +408,8 @@
         /* MAC of selected ciphersuite MUST be same with PSK binder if exist.
          * Otherwise, client should reject.
          */
-        if (psk_hash_alg == mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac)) {
+        if (psk_hash_alg ==
+            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac)) {
             *selected_ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
             *selected_ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
             return 0;
@@ -614,7 +615,7 @@
 
         ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(
             ssl, binder, binder_len, psk_type,
-            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac));
+            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac));
         if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH) {
             /* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we
              * fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2
@@ -2793,7 +2794,7 @@
 
     ciphersuite_info =
         (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
-    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg);
     if (hash_length == -1 ||
         (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) {
@@ -3015,7 +3016,7 @@
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("tls13 server state: %s(%d)",
-                              mbedtls_ssl_states_str(ssl->state),
+                              mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state),
                               ssl->state));
 
     switch (ssl->state) {
diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c
index 1c489a3..2583cdd 100644
--- a/library/x509_create.c
+++ b/library/x509_create.c
@@ -185,51 +185,107 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
-static int parse_attribute_value_der_encoded(const char *s,
-                                             int len,
-                                             unsigned char *data,
-                                             size_t *data_len,
-                                             int *tag)
+/** Parse a hexstring containing a DER-encoded string.
+ *
+ * \param s         A string of \p len bytes hexadecimal digits.
+ * \param len       Number of bytes to read from \p s.
+ * \param data      Output buffer of size \p data_size.
+ *                  On success, it contains the payload that's DER-encoded
+ *                  in the input (content without the tag and length).
+ *                  If the DER tag is a string tag, the payload is guaranteed
+ *                  not to contain null bytes.
+ * \param data_size Length of the \p data buffer.
+ * \param data_len  On success, the length of the parsed string.
+ *                  It is guaranteed to be less than
+ *                  #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE.
+ * \param tag       The ASN.1 tag that the payload in \p data is encoded in.
+ *
+ * \retval          0 on success.
+ * \retval          #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME if \p s does not contain
+ *                  a valid hexstring,
+ *                  or if the decoded hexstring is not valid DER,
+ *                  or if the payload does not fit in \p data,
+ *                  or if the payload is more than
+ *                  #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE bytes,
+ *                  of if \p *tag is an ASN.1 string tag and the payload
+ *                  contains a null byte.
+ * \retval          #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED on low memory.
+ */
+static int parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded(const char *s,
+                                                 size_t len,
+                                                 unsigned char *data,
+                                                 size_t data_size,
+                                                 size_t *data_len,
+                                                 int *tag)
 {
-    const char *c = s;
-    const char *end = c + len;
-    unsigned char asn1_der_buf[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
-    unsigned char *asn1_der_end;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *d = data;
-    int n;
+    /* Step 1: preliminary length checks. */
+    /* Each byte is encoded by exactly two hexadecimal digits. */
+    if (len % 2 != 0) {
+        /* Odd number of hex digits */
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+    }
+    size_t const der_length = len / 2;
+    if (der_length > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + 4) {
+        /* The payload would be more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE
+         * (after subtracting the ASN.1 tag and length). Reject this early
+         * to avoid allocating a large intermediate buffer. */
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+    }
+    if (der_length < 1) {
+        /* Avoid empty-buffer shenanigans. A valid DER encoding is never
+         * empty. */
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+    }
 
-    /* Converting from hexstring to raw binary so we can use asn1parse.c */
-    if ((len < 5) || (*c != '#')) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+    /* Step 2: Decode the hex string into an intermediate buffer. */
+    unsigned char *der = mbedtls_calloc(1, der_length);
+    if (der == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
     }
-    c++;
-    if ((*tag = hexpair_to_int(c)) == -1) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
-    }
-    c += 2;
-    p = asn1_der_buf;
-    for (p = asn1_der_buf; c < end; c += 2) {
-        if ((c + 1 >= end) || (n = hexpair_to_int(c)) == -1) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+    /* Beyond this point, der needs to be freed on exit. */
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < der_length; i++) {
+        int c = hexpair_to_int(s + 2 * i);
+        if (c < 0) {
+            goto error;
         }
-        if (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(*tag) && n == 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+        der[i] = c;
+    }
+
+    /* Step 3: decode the DER. */
+    /* We've checked that der_length >= 1 above. */
+    *tag = der[0];
+    unsigned char *p = der + 1;
+    if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, der + der_length, data_len) != 0) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+    /* Now p points to the first byte of the payload inside der,
+     * and *data_len is the length of the payload. */
+
+    /* Step 4: payload validation */
+    if (*data_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) {
+        goto error;
+    }
+    /* Strings must not contain null bytes. */
+    if (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(*tag)) {
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < *data_len; i++) {
+            if (p[i] == 0) {
+                goto error;
+            }
         }
-        *(p++) = n;
-    }
-    asn1_der_end = p;
-
-    p = asn1_der_buf;
-    if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, asn1_der_end, data_len) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
     }
 
-    while (p < asn1_der_end) {
-        *(d++) = *(p++);
+    /* Step 5: output the payload. */
+    if (*data_len > data_size) {
+        goto error;
     }
+    memcpy(data, p, *data_len);
+    mbedtls_free(der);
 
     return 0;
+
+error:
+    mbedtls_free(der);
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
 }
 
 int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name)
@@ -273,11 +329,14 @@
                 mbedtls_free(oid.p);
                 return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
             } else if (*s == '#') {
-                if ((parse_ret =
-                         parse_attribute_value_der_encoded(s, (int) (c - s), data, &data_len,
-                                                           &tag)) != 0) {
+                /* We know that c >= s (loop invariant) and c != s (in this
+                 * else branch), hence c - s - 1 >= 0. */
+                parse_ret = parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded(
+                    s + 1, c - s - 1,
+                    data, sizeof(data), &data_len, &tag);
+                if (parse_ret != 0) {
                     mbedtls_free(oid.p);
-                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME;
+                    return parse_ret;
                 }
             } else {
                 if (numericoid) {
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
index 855b091..9744c58 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  MbedTLS SSL context deserializer from base64 code
+ *  Mbed TLS SSL context deserializer from base64 code
  *
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
diff --git a/scripts/assemble_changelog.py b/scripts/assemble_changelog.py
index f3aca70..e808101 100755
--- a/scripts/assemble_changelog.py
+++ b/scripts/assemble_changelog.py
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
         message = ('Lost content from {}: "{}"'.format(filename, line))
         super().__init__(message)
 
+class FilePathError(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, filenames):
+        message = ('Changelog filenames do not end with .txt: {}'.format(", ".join(filenames)))
+        super().__init__(message)
+
 # The category names we use in the changelog.
 # If you edit this, update ChangeLog.d/README.md.
 STANDARD_CATEGORIES = (
@@ -443,8 +448,21 @@
     """List the entry files to merge, oldest first.
 
     "Oldest" is defined by `EntryFileSortKey`.
+
+    Also check for required .txt extension
     """
-    files_to_merge = glob.glob(os.path.join(options.dir, '*.txt'))
+    files_to_merge = glob.glob(os.path.join(options.dir, '*'))
+
+    # Ignore 00README.md
+    readme = os.path.join(options.dir, "00README.md")
+    if readme in files_to_merge:
+        files_to_merge.remove(readme)
+
+    # Identify files without the required .txt extension
+    bad_files = [x for x in files_to_merge if not x.endswith(".txt")]
+    if bad_files:
+        raise FilePathError(bad_files)
+
     files_to_merge.sort(key=EntryFileSortKey)
     return files_to_merge
 
@@ -452,6 +470,7 @@
     """Merge changelog entries into the changelog file.
 
     Read the changelog file from options.input.
+    Check that all entries have a .txt extension
     Read entries to merge from the directory options.dir.
     Write the new changelog to options.output.
     Remove the merged entries if options.keep_entries is false.
diff --git a/scripts/code_size_compare.py b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
index 53d859e..e764e9d 100755
--- a/scripts/code_size_compare.py
+++ b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@
         '-c', '--config', type=str, default=SupportedConfig.DEFAULT.value,
         choices=list(map(lambda s: s.value, SupportedConfig)),
         help='Specify configuration type for code size comparison. '
-             '(Default is the current MbedTLS configuration.)')
+             '(Default is the current Mbed TLS configuration.)')
     group_optional.add_argument(
         '--markdown', action='store_true', dest='markdown',
         help='Show comparision of code size in a markdown table. '
diff --git a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
index 3d116b3..de16284 100644
--- a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
+++ b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
@@ -492,7 +492,8 @@
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
     }
 
-    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */
+    return 0;
 }
 
 static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops(
@@ -516,7 +517,8 @@
 
     }
 
-    return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */
+    return 0;
 }
 
 static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(
@@ -525,9 +527,7 @@
     size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg,
     const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length )
 {
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    psa_key_location_t location =
-                                  PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
+    psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
                                                     attributes->core.lifetime );
 
     switch( location )
@@ -558,18 +558,8 @@
 
         default:
             /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
-            ( void ) status;
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
-
-    ( void ) operation;
-    ( void ) key_buffer;
-    ( void ) key_buffer_size;
-    ( void ) alg;
-    ( void ) hash;
-    ( void ) hash_length;
-
-        return( status );
 }
 
 static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(
@@ -625,8 +615,6 @@
     const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
     const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
 {
-
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
                                                     attributes->core.lifetime );
 
@@ -660,20 +648,8 @@
 
         default:
             /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
-            ( void ) status;
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
-
-    ( void ) operation;
-    ( void ) key_buffer;
-    ( void ) key_buffer_size;
-    ( void ) alg;
-    ( void ) hash;
-    ( void ) hash_length;
-    ( void ) signature;
-    ( void ) signature_length;
-
-    return( status );
 }
 
 static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(
@@ -2724,6 +2700,7 @@
         case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
             /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
              * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+            status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
 #if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
 #if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
             status = mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_setup(
@@ -2741,15 +2718,12 @@
                         inputs );
             if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
                 operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
-            return status;
 #endif
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+            return status;
         /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
         default:
             /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
             (void)operation;
-            (void)inputs;
-            (void)status;
             return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     }
 }
diff --git a/tests/include/test/macros.h b/tests/include/test/macros.h
index 7edc991..3bfbe33 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/macros.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/macros.h
@@ -143,6 +143,38 @@
         }                                                   \
     } while (0)
 
+/** Allocate memory dynamically and fail the test case if this fails.
+ * The allocated memory will be filled with zeros.
+ *
+ * You must set \p pointer to \c NULL before calling this macro and
+ * put `mbedtls_free(pointer)` in the test's cleanup code.
+ *
+ * If \p item_count is zero, the resulting \p pointer will not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
+ * It may jump to the \c exit label.
+ *
+ * \param pointer    An lvalue where the address of the allocated buffer
+ *                   will be stored.
+ *                   This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ * \param item_count Number of elements to allocate.
+ *                   This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ *
+ * Note: if passing size 0, mbedtls_calloc may return NULL. In this case,
+ * we reattempt to allocate with the smallest possible buffer to assure a
+ * non-NULL pointer.
+ */
+#define TEST_CALLOC_NONNULL(pointer, item_count)            \
+    do {                                                    \
+        TEST_ASSERT((pointer) == NULL);                     \
+        (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(sizeof(*(pointer)),      \
+                                   (item_count));           \
+        if (((pointer) == NULL) && ((item_count) == 0)) {   \
+            (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1);               \
+        }                                                   \
+        TEST_ASSERT((pointer) != NULL);                     \
+    } while (0)
+
 /* For backwards compatibility */
 #define ASSERT_ALLOC(pointer, item_count) TEST_CALLOC(pointer, item_count)
 
diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
index 1f160c7..ddbd6a3 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
@@ -516,6 +516,27 @@
                                       size_t cid0_len,
                                       size_t cid1_len);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+/**
+ * \param[in,out] record        The record to prepare.
+ *                              It must contain the data to MAC at offset
+ *                              `record->data_offset`, of length
+ *                              `record->data_length`.
+ *                              On success, write the MAC immediately
+ *                              after the data and increment
+ *                              `record->data_length` accordingly.
+ * \param[in,out] transform_out The out transform, typically prepared by
+ *                              mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms().
+ *                              Its HMAC context may be used. Other than that
+ *                              it is treated as an input parameter.
+ *
+ * \return                      0 on success, an `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error code
+ *                              or -1 on error.
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(mbedtls_record *record,
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
+
 /*
  * Populate a session structure for serialization tests.
  * Choose dummy values, mostly non-0 to distinguish from the init default.
diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
index 81adb71..1f20734 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@
             'ignored_suites': [
                 'shax', 'mdx', # the software implementations that are being excluded
                 'md.psa',  # purposefully depends on whether drivers are present
+                'psa_crypto_low_hash.generated', # testing the builtins
             ],
             'ignored_tests': {
             }
diff --git a/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py b/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
index 623fd23..5128dc7 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@
 
     @staticmethod
     def find_test_dir():
-        """Get the relative path for the MbedTLS test directory."""
+        """Get the relative path for the Mbed TLS test directory."""
         return os.path.relpath(build_tree.guess_mbedtls_root() + '/tests')
 
 
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
index 9140b4c..d03e5cf 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
 
 check scripts/generate_errors.pl library/error.c
 check scripts/generate_query_config.pl programs/test/query_config.c
-check scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+check scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
 check scripts/generate_features.pl library/version_features.c
 check scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
 # generate_visualc_files enumerates source files (library/*.c). It doesn't
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
index f812929..86a7c09 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_names.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@
             "This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers "
             "in Mbed TLS are consistent with the house style and are also "
             "self-consistent.\n\n"
-            "Expected to be run from the MbedTLS root directory.")
+            "Expected to be run from the Mbed TLS root directory.")
     )
     parser.add_argument(
         "-v", "--verbose",
diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
index 3590436..34b4494 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 }
 
 # We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches
-# that allow it to build with MbedTLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite.
+# that allow it to build with Mbed TLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite.
 # These fixes allow the tests numbered 216, 248 and 249 to complete successfully.
 #
 # Once all the fixes are upstreamed, this fork should be replaced with an upstream commit/tag.
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index 9144d85..5c305cb 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -1467,6 +1467,64 @@
     return ret;
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
+int mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(mbedtls_record *record,
+                                        mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+#endif
+
+    /* Serialized version of record header for MAC purposes */
+    unsigned char add_data[13];
+    memcpy(add_data, record->ctr, 8);
+    add_data[8] = record->type;
+    add_data[9] = record->ver[0];
+    add_data[10] = record->ver[1];
+    add_data[11] = (record->data_len >> 8) & 0xff;
+    add_data[12] = (record->data_len >> 0) & 0xff;
+
+    /* MAC with additional data */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    size_t sign_mac_length = 0;
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation,
+                                               transform_out->psa_mac_enc,
+                                               transform_out->psa_mac_alg));
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, 13));
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation,
+                                           record->buf + record->data_offset,
+                                           record->data_len));
+    /* Use a temporary buffer for the MAC, because with the truncated HMAC
+     * extension, there might not be enough room in the record for the
+     * full-length MAC. */
+    unsigned char mac[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation,
+                                                mac, sizeof(mac),
+                                                &sign_mac_length));
+#else
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc, add_data, 13));
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
+                                         record->buf + record->data_offset,
+                                         record->data_len));
+    /* Use a temporary buffer for the MAC, because with the truncated HMAC
+     * extension, there might not be enough room in the record for the
+     * full-length MAC. */
+    unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac));
+#endif
+    memcpy(record->buf + record->data_offset + record->data_len, mac, transform_out->maclen);
+    record->data_len += transform_out->maclen;
+
+    return 0;
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_mac_abort(&operation);
+#endif
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
+
 int mbedtls_test_ssl_tls12_populate_session(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
                                             int ticket_len,
                                             const char *crt_file)
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
index 134970f..92e9cdd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
@@ -8,63 +8,63 @@
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS
@@ -251,15 +251,15 @@
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding
@@ -1272,107 +1272,107 @@
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:16:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 3
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 4
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32
 
 AES-256 CBC - Decrypt empty buffer
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
@@ -1380,107 +1380,107 @@
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:16:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 3
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 4
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32
 
 AES Decrypt test vector #0
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
@@ -2257,3 +2257,15 @@
 Cipher Corner Case behaviours
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 cipher_special_behaviours:
+
+Check set padding - 128 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 192 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 256 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
index 3f011e8..be1dfb2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data
@@ -337,3 +337,15 @@
 ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
 test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"5fdd984a6aa77c1d9a204c08f28172c4b4528bee27c41f":0:0
+
+Check set padding - 128 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 192 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 256 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
index df4ebcc..18a09ca 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data
@@ -8,63 +8,63 @@
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
-CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2]
+CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS
@@ -251,15 +251,15 @@
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
 enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding
@@ -308,47 +308,47 @@
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
@@ -560,211 +560,211 @@
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#4]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:16:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#7]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:32:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
-CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#8]
+CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#8]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#10]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#11]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#12]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#5]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:16:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#9]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:32:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
-CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#10]
+CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#10]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#13]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#14]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#15]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32
 
 CAMELLIA-128 CCM*-NO-TAG - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
@@ -1101,3 +1101,15 @@
 CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG crypt Decrypt
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
 test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"933f749801d0e1262cd101831defd8366ab2a22e7c03cd":0:0
+
+Check set padding - 128 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 192 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC
+
+Check set padding - 256 bit key
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data
index 77f7515..066ea35 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data
@@ -12,63 +12,63 @@
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
-DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2]
+DES Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS
@@ -312,255 +312,267 @@
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:8:24
 
 DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#1]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:8:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#1]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:16:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1]
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:32:-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
 
-DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2]
+DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:8:24
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:0:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:1:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:2:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:7:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#2]
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
+
+DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes (PKCS7 padding) [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:8:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:9:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:15:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#2]
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
+
+DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes (PKCS7 padding) [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:16:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:17:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:31:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#3]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:32:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
-DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#4]
+DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes (PKCS7 padding) [#3]
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE
+
+DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:33:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:47:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:48:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:49:-1
+enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:8:8:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:8:8
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#6]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0
 
 DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2]
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24
+enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:8:24
 
 DES ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C
@@ -601,3 +613,11 @@
 DES3-EDE ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #2
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C
 test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3000000000000000":"199E9D6DF39AA816":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0
+
+Check set padding - DES
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC
+
+Check set padding - Triple DES
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+check_set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
index 40907ad..fdf22a9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@
                     key_bitlen == 192 ||
                     key_bitlen == 256);
     }
+    TEST_LE_U(key_bitlen, MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH * 8);
+    TEST_LE_U(block_size, MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+    TEST_LE_U(iv_size, MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
 
     if (strstr(info->name, "-ECB") != NULL) {
         TEST_ASSERT(iv_size == 0);
@@ -598,6 +601,13 @@
 
     TEST_ASSERT(0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset(&ctx_dec));
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    if (ctx_dec.cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
+        TEST_ASSERT(0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&ctx_dec,
+                                                         MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7));
+    }
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
     int expected = (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
                     cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ?
@@ -1195,3 +1205,46 @@
     mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx_enc);
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+void check_set_padding(int cipher_id)
+{
+    mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
+    unsigned char *key = NULL;
+    unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char input[16] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char output[32] = { 0 };
+    size_t outlen = 0;
+    const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+    size_t keylen = 0;
+
+    cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_id);
+
+    if (cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
+        TEST_FAIL("Cipher mode must be CBC");
+    }
+
+    keylen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info);
+    TEST_CALLOC(key, keylen/8);
+    memset(key, 0, keylen/8);
+
+    mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx);
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, keylen,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+               mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&ctx, iv, sizeof(iv), input,
+                                    sizeof(input), output, &outlen));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE));
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&ctx, iv, sizeof(iv), input,
+                                       sizeof(input), output, &outlen));
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx);
+    mbedtls_free(key);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data
index 282c4a9..03c799f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data
@@ -29,9 +29,29 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
-CMAC init #7 Camellia: wrong cipher
+CMAC init Camellia-128: wrong cipher
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
-mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+CMAC init Camellia-192: wrong cipher
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB:192:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+CMAC init Camellia-256: wrong cipher
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB:256:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+CMAC init #8 ARIA-128: wrong cipher
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+CMAC init #8 ARIA-192: wrong cipher
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB:192:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+CMAC init #8 ARIA-256: wrong cipher
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB:256:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 CMAC Single Blocks #1 - Empty block, no updates
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function
index 9624e8f..2d7bcd1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@
 {
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
-    unsigned char test_key[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
-    unsigned char test_data[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
-    unsigned char test_output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char test_key[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char test_data[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char test_output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx);
 
@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@
 
     TEST_ASSERT((cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type))
                 != NULL);
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+    TEST_LE_U(mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info),
+              MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+    TEST_LE_U(mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info),
+              MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
     memset(buf, 0x2A, sizeof(buf));
     TEST_ASSERT((result == mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, key, key_size,
@@ -129,7 +135,7 @@
 {
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
-    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     /* Convert the test parameters to binary data */
 
@@ -208,7 +214,7 @@
 {
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
-    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
+    unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     /* Convert the test parameters to binary data */
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data
index 1b0b964..111fef6 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@
 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 17 offset 3
 mbedtls_ct_memcmp:-1:17:3
 
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_single_bit_diff
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_single_bit_diff:
+
 mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if len 1 offset 0
 mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if:1:1:0
 
@@ -643,6 +646,102 @@
 mbedtls_ct_if 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffff
 mbedtls_ct_if:"0xffffffffffffffff":"0xffffffffffffffff":"0xffffffffffffffff"
 
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 0 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:0:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 0 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:0:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 0 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:0:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -1 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-1:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -1 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-1:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -1 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-1:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -1 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-1:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32766 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32766:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32766 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32766:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32766 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32766:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32766 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32766:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32767 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32767:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32767 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32767:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32767 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32767:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 0 -32767 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:0:-32767:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 0 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:0:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 0 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:0:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 0 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:0:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -1 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-1:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -1 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-1:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -1 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-1:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -1 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-1:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32766 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32766:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32766 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32766:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32766 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32766:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32766 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32766:-32767
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32767 0
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32767:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32767 -1
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32767:-1
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32767 -32766
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32767:-32766
+
+mbedtls_ct_error_if 1 -32767 -32767
+mbedtls_ct_error_if:1:-32767:-32767
+
 mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if 0x0 0
 mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if:"0x0":0
 
@@ -699,3 +798,69 @@
 
 mbedtls_ct_memmove_left 16 16
 mbedtls_ct_memmove_left:16:16
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial -1 0 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:-1:0:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 1 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:1:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 1 1 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:1:1:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 1 0 1
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:1:0:1
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial -1 1 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:-1:1:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 2 0 1
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:2:0:1
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 2 1 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:2:1:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 2 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:2:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 3 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:3:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 4 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:4:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 7 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:7:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 11 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:11:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 12 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:12:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 15 16 4 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:15:16:4:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 15 16 4 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:15:16:4:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 15 16 0 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:15:16:0:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 0 16 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:0:16:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial 15 16 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:15:16:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial -1 16 0 0
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:-1:16:0:0
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial -1 16 12 4
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:-1:16:12:4
+
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial -1 16 8 8
+mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial:-1:16:8:8
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
index 0e2cfdc..3127365 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@
     expected = x1 <= y1 ? MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE : MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_uint_le(x, y), expected);
 
-    expected = (!!x1) ^ (!!y1) ? MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE : MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
-    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(mbedtls_ct_bool(x), mbedtls_ct_bool(y)), expected);
+    expected = (!!x1) != (!!y1) ? MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE : MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_bool(x), mbedtls_ct_bool(y)), expected);
 
     expected = (!!x1) && (!!y1) ? MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE : MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_bool(x), mbedtls_ct_bool(y)), expected);
@@ -115,6 +115,27 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ct_error_if(int cond, int t, int f)
+{
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t c = mbedtls_ct_bool(cond);
+
+    int expected = c ? t : f;
+    int expected0 = c ? t : 0;
+
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(&c, sizeof(c));
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(&t, sizeof(t));
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(&f, sizeof(f));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_error_if(c, t, f), expected);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(c, t), expected0);
+
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&c, sizeof(c));
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&t, sizeof(t));
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&f, sizeof(f));
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_ct_if(char *c_str, char *t_str, char *f_str)
 {
     mbedtls_ct_condition_t c = mbedtls_ct_bool(strtoull(c_str, NULL, 16));
@@ -131,12 +152,15 @@
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_if(c, t, f), expected);
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_size_if(c, t, f), (size_t) expected);
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_uint_if(c, t, f), (unsigned) expected);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_bool_if(c, mbedtls_ct_bool(t), mbedtls_ct_bool(f)),
+               mbedtls_ct_bool(expected));
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(c, t, f), (mbedtls_mpi_uint) expected);
 #endif
 
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(c, t), (unsigned) expected0);
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(c, (size_t) t), (size_t) expected0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(c, mbedtls_ct_bool(t)), mbedtls_ct_bool(expected0));
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(c, t), (mbedtls_mpi_uint) expected0);
 #endif
@@ -173,6 +197,49 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcmp_single_bit_diff()
+{
+    uint8_t *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
+    size_t size = 32;
+    TEST_CALLOC(a, size);
+    TEST_CALLOC(b, size);
+
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(a, size);
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(b, size);
+    int result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(a, b, size);
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(a, size);
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(b, size);
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&result, sizeof(result));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(result, 0);
+
+    for (size_t offset = 0; offset < size; offset++) {
+        for (size_t bit_offset = 0; bit_offset < 8; bit_offset++) {
+            /* Set a single bit to be different at given offset, to test that we
+               detect single-bit differences */
+            a[offset] = 1 << bit_offset;
+
+            TEST_CF_SECRET(a, size);
+            TEST_CF_SECRET(b, size);
+            result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(a, b, size);
+            TEST_CF_PUBLIC(a, size);
+            TEST_CF_PUBLIC(b, size);
+            TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&result, sizeof(result));
+
+            TEST_ASSERT(result != 0);
+
+            a[offset] = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(a);
+    mbedtls_free(b);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_ct_memcmp(int same, int size, int offset)
 {
     uint8_t *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
@@ -216,6 +283,55 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+
+/**
+ * Generate two arrays of the given size, and test mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial
+ * over them. The arrays will be identical, except that one byte may be specified
+ * to be different.
+ *
+ * \p diff      Index of byte that differs (if out of range, the arrays will match).
+ * \p size      Size of arrays to compare
+ * \p skip_head Leading bytes to skip, as per mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial
+ * \p skip_tail Trailing bytes to skip, as per mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(int diff, int size, int skip_head, int skip_tail)
+{
+    uint8_t *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
+
+    TEST_CALLOC_NONNULL(a, size);
+    TEST_CALLOC_NONNULL(b, size);
+
+    TEST_ASSERT((skip_head + skip_tail) <= size);
+
+    /* Construct data that matches, except for specified byte (if in range). */
+    for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+        a[i] = i & 0xff;
+        b[i] = a[i];
+        if (i == diff) {
+            // modify the specified byte
+            b[i] ^= 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    int reference = memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail);
+
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(a, size);
+    TEST_CF_SECRET(b, size);
+
+    int actual = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(a, b, size, skip_head, skip_tail);
+
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(a, size);
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(b, size);
+    TEST_CF_PUBLIC(&actual, sizeof(actual));
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(!!reference, !!actual);
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(a);
+    mbedtls_free(b);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(int eq, int size, int offset)
 {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
index d8e41fe..64c9991 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PKCS#12 derive key : MD5: Zero length password and hash
+PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Zero length password and hash
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
 pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b":0
 
@@ -33,3 +33,39 @@
 PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Valid password and salt
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
 pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"46559deeee036836ab1b633ec620178d4c70eacf42f72a2ad7360c812efa09ca3d7567b489a109050345c2dc6a262995":0
+
+PBE Encrypt, pad = 7 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":16:0:"5F2C15056A36F3A78856E9E662DD27CB"
+
+PBE Encrypt, pad = 8 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":16:0:"5F2C15056A36F3A70F70A3D4EC4004A8"
+
+PBE Encrypt, pad = 8 (Invalid output size)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":15:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL:"5F2C15056A36F3A70F70A3D4EC4004A8"
+
+PBE Encrypt, pad = 8 (PKCS7 padding disabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+
+PBE Decrypt, pad = 7 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"5F2C15056A36F3A78856E9E662DD27CB":16:0:"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+
+PBE Decrypt, pad = 8 (Invalid output size)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"5F2C15056A36F3A70F70A3D4EC4004A8":15:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL:"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+
+PBE Decrypt, pad = 8 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"5F2C15056A36F3A70F70A3D4EC4004A8":16:0:"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+
+PBE Decrypt, (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding disabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"5F2C15056A36F3A79F2B90F1428110E2":16:0:"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA07070707070708"
+
+PBE Decrypt, (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pkcs12_pbe_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A":"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB":"5F2C15056A36F3A79F2B90F1428110E2":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA07070707070708"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function
index 2c93c13..1d0c287 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function
@@ -68,3 +68,114 @@
     MD_PSA_DONE();
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+void pkcs12_pbe_encrypt(int params_tag, int cipher, int md, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw,
+                        data_t *data, int outsize, int ref_ret, data_t *ref_out)
+{
+    int my_ret;
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_params;
+    unsigned char *my_out = NULL;
+    mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg = (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) md;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    size_t my_out_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+    MD_PSA_INIT();
+
+    TEST_CALLOC(my_out, outsize);
+
+    pbe_params.tag = params_tag;
+    pbe_params.len = params_hex->len;
+    pbe_params.p = params_hex->x;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED)
+    if (ref_ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) {
+        my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT, cipher_alg,
+                                    md_alg, pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out);
+        TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    }
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, ref_out->len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+    pbe_params.tag = params_tag;
+    pbe_params.len = params_hex->len;
+    pbe_params.p = params_hex->x;
+
+    my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT, cipher_alg,
+                                    md_alg, pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out,
+                                    outsize, &my_out_len);
+    TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, my_out_len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(my_out);
+    MD_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+void pkcs12_pbe_decrypt(int params_tag, int cipher, int md, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw,
+                        data_t *data, int outsize, int ref_ret, data_t *ref_out)
+{
+    int my_ret;
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_params;
+    unsigned char *my_out = NULL;
+    mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg = (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) md;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    size_t my_out_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+    MD_PSA_INIT();
+
+    TEST_CALLOC(my_out, outsize);
+
+    pbe_params.tag = params_tag;
+    pbe_params.len = params_hex->len;
+    pbe_params.p = params_hex->x;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED)
+    if (ref_ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) {
+        my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, cipher_alg,
+                                    md_alg, pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out);
+        TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    }
+
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, ref_out->len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+    pbe_params.tag = params_tag;
+    pbe_params.len = params_hex->len;
+    pbe_params.p = params_hex->x;
+
+    my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, cipher_alg,
+                                    md_alg, pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out,
+                                    outsize, &my_out_len);
+    TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, my_out_len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(my_out);
+    MD_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data
index 06d620a..f3ea553 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data
@@ -106,109 +106,141 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
 pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"9d9e9c4cd21fe4be24d5b8244c759665"
 
+PBES2 Encrypt, pad=6 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+
+PBES2 Encrypt, pad=8 (OK)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+
+PBES2 Encrypt, pad=8 (Invalid output size)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D5510101010101010101010101010101010":151:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL:"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22D8D337E00CB5D1B5B76BE4AE393414050646A102DEF61A9F"
+
+PBES2 Encrypt, pad=6 (PKCS7 padding disabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF":138:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+
+PBES2 Encrypt, pad=8 (PKCS7 padding disabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D5510101010101010101010101010101010":138:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+
 PBES2 Decrypt (OK)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":144:0:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF"
+
+PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid output size)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":143:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF060606060606"
+
+PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding disabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+
+PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad params tag)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad KDF AlgId: not a sequence)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"31":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"31":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad KDF AlgId: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"3001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"3001":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (KDF != PBKDF2)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300B06092A864886F70D01050D":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300B06092A864886F70D01050D":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params: not a sequence)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3100":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3001":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params salt: not an octet string)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010500":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010500":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params salt: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010401":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010401":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params iter: not an int)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70300":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70300":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params iter: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70201":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70201":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (OK, PBKDF2 params explicit keylen)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301E06092A864886F70D01050C301104082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800020118301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301E06092A864886F70D01050C301104082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800020118301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params explicit keylen: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208000201":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208000201":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (OK, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0207301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0207301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg not a sequence)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg != HMAC-SHA*)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0206":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0206":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params extra data)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302806092A864886F70D01050C301B04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D020700":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302806092A864886F70D01050C301B04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D020700":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: not a sequence)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: unknown oid)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D03FF":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D03FF":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: not an octet string)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070500":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070500":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: overlong)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070401":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070401":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: len != iv_len)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301306082A864886F70D030704078A4FCC9DCC3949":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:""
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301306082A864886F70D030704078A4FCC9DCC3949":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:""
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad password)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"F0617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF060606060606"
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"F0617373776f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
 
 PBES2 Decrypt (bad iter value)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020801301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF060606060606"
+pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020801301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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
 
 PKCS#5 Selftest
 pkcs5_selftest:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
index 9f99586..2b0b0c1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -27,12 +28,64 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
-void mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(int params_tag, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw,
-                         data_t *data, int ref_ret, data_t *ref_out)
+void pbes2_encrypt(int params_tag, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw,
+                   data_t *data, int outsize, int ref_ret,
+                   data_t *ref_out)
 {
     int my_ret;
     mbedtls_asn1_buf params;
     unsigned char *my_out = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    size_t my_out_len = 0;
+#endif
+    MD_PSA_INIT();
+
+    params.tag = params_tag;
+    params.p = params_hex->x;
+    params.len = params_hex->len;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC(my_out, outsize);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED)
+    if (ref_ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) {
+        my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT,
+                                     pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out);
+        TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    }
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, ref_out->len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT,
+                                     pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out,
+                                     outsize, &my_out_len);
+    TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, my_out_len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free(my_out);
+    MD_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+void pbes2_decrypt(int params_tag, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw,
+                   data_t *data, int outsize, int ref_ret,
+                   data_t *ref_out)
+{
+    int my_ret;
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf params;
+    unsigned char *my_out = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    size_t my_out_len = 0;
+#endif
 
     MD_PSA_INIT();
 
@@ -40,15 +93,30 @@
     params.p = params_hex->x;
     params.len = params_hex->len;
 
-    my_out = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc(ref_out->len);
+    ASSERT_ALLOC(my_out, outsize);
 
-    my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
-                                 pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out);
-    TEST_ASSERT(my_ret == ref_ret);
-
-    if (ref_ret == 0) {
-        TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(my_out, ref_out->x, ref_out->len) == 0);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED)
+    if (ref_ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) {
+        my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
+                                     pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out);
+        TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
     }
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, ref_out->len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+    my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
+                                     pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out,
+                                     outsize, &my_out_len);
+    TEST_EQUAL(my_ret, ref_ret);
+    if (ref_ret == 0) {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE(my_out, my_out_len,
+                       ref_out->x, ref_out->len);
+    }
+#endif
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_free(my_out);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data
index 88b2fc9..f82dcb5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data
@@ -1219,6 +1219,14 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519
 pk_parse_key:"3072020101300506032b656e04220420b06d829655543a51cba36e53522bc0acfd60af59466555fb3e1e796872ab1a59a01f301d060a2a864886f70d01090914310f0c0d437572646c65204368616972738121009bc3b0e93d8233fe6a8ba6138948cc12a91362d5c2ed81584db05ab5419c9d11":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT
 
+Key ASN1 (Encrypted key PKCS5, trailing garbage data)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
+pk_parse_key_encrypted:"307C304006092A864886F70D01050D3033301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC3949100438AD100BAC552FD0AE70BECAFA60F5E519B6180C77E8DB0B9ECC6F23FEDD30AB9BDCA2AF9F97BC470FC3A82DCA2364E22642DE0AF9275A82CB":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
+
+Key ASN1 (Encrypted key PKCS12, trailing garbage data)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
+pk_parse_key_encrypted:"3058301C060A2A864886F70D010C0103300E0409CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC02010A04380A8CAF39C4FA001884D0583B323C5E70942444FBE1F650B92F8ADF4AD7BD5049B4748F53A2531139EBF253FE01E8FC925C82C759C944B4D0":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
+
 # From RFC8410 Appendix A but made into version 0
 OneAsymmetricKey X25519, doesn't match masking requirements #1
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
index 0d9a0c8..64a3175 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
 #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
 #include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+#define HAVE_mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der
+#endif
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -150,6 +155,24 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:HAVE_mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der */
+void pk_parse_key_encrypted(data_t *buf, data_t *pass, int result)
+{
+    mbedtls_pk_context pk;
+
+    mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
+    USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(&pk, buf->x, buf->len,
+                                                        pass->x, pass->len,
+                                                        mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand,
+                                                        NULL), result);
+exit:
+    mbedtls_pk_free(&pk);
+    USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
 void pk_parse_fix_montgomery(data_t *input_key, data_t *exp_output)
 {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index cf67983..faf44e4 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -2681,390 +2681,6 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
 ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:0:0
 
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
-
-Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
-ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
-
 SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Secret evolution #1
 # Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/)
 # Initial secret to Early Secret
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 3ad1e19..eb2407d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -1461,235 +1461,6 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
-void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac,
-                             int length_selector)
-{
-    /*
-     * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification
-     * of padding and MAC.
-     *
-     * Actually depends on TLS 1.2 and either AES, ARIA or Camellia, but since
-     * the test framework doesn't support alternation in dependency statements,
-     * just depend on AES.
-     *
-     * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows:
-     * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied
-     * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied
-     * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246:
-     *   it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the
-     *   byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length
-     *   that gives this padding_length is automatically selected.
-     */
-    mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1;
-    mbedtls_record rec, rec_save;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL;
-    size_t buflen, olen = 0;
-    size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i;
-    unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */
-    unsigned char add_data[13];
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
-    size_t sign_mac_length = 0;
-    unsigned char mac[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
-#else
-    unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-#endif
-    int exp_ret;
-    int ret;
-    const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */
-
-    mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl);
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0);
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1);
-    MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
-
-    /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */
-    ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id,
-                                            0, trunc_hmac,
-                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2,
-                                            0, 0);
-
-    TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0);
-
-    /* Determine padding/plaintext length */
-    TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255);
-    block_size = t0.ivlen;
-    if (length_selector < 0) {
-        plaintext_len = 0;
-
-        /* Minimal padding
-         * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */
-        padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size;
-
-        /* Maximal padding? */
-        if (length_selector == -2) {
-            padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size);
-        }
-    } else {
-        padlen = length_selector;
-
-        /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding.
-         * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */
-        plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size;
-    }
-
-    /* Prepare a buffer for record data */
-    buflen = block_size
-             + plaintext_len
-             + t0.maclen
-             + padlen + 1;
-    TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen);
-    TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen);
-
-    /* Prepare a dummy record header */
-    memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr));
-    rec.type    = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
-    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
-                              MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
-    rec.cid_len = 0;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-
-    /* Prepare dummy record content */
-    rec.buf     = buf;
-    rec.buf_len = buflen;
-    rec.data_offset = block_size;
-    rec.data_len = plaintext_len;
-    memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len);
-
-    /* Serialized version of record header for MAC purposes */
-    memcpy(add_data, rec.ctr, 8);
-    add_data[8] = rec.type;
-    add_data[9] = rec.ver[0];
-    add_data[10] = rec.ver[1];
-    add_data[11] = (rec.data_len >> 8) & 0xff;
-    add_data[12] = (rec.data_len >> 0) & 0xff;
-
-    /* Set dummy IV */
-    memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen);
-    memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen);
-
-    /*
-     * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it.
-     */
-
-    /* MAC with additional data */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation,
-                                               t0.psa_mac_enc,
-                                               t0.psa_mac_alg));
-    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, 13));
-    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update(&operation,
-                                           rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
-                                           rec.data_len));
-    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation,
-                                                mac, sizeof(mac),
-                                                &sign_mac_length));
-#else
-    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&t0.md_ctx_enc, add_data, 13));
-    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&t0.md_ctx_enc,
-                                         rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
-                                         rec.data_len));
-    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&t0.md_ctx_enc, mac));
-#endif
-
-    memcpy(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, mac, t0.maclen);
-    rec.data_len += t0.maclen;
-
-    /* Pad */
-    memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1);
-    rec.data_len += padlen + 1;
-
-    /* Save correct pre-encryption record */
-    rec_save = rec;
-    rec_save.buf = buf_save;
-    memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen);
-
-    /*
-     * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success
-     */
-    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
-                   &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
-                   rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
-    rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
-    rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
-
-    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
-
-    /*
-     * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and
-     * decrypting it, expecting failure every time.
-     */
-    for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) {
-        mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
-
-        /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */
-        rec = rec_save;
-        rec.buf = buf;
-        memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen);
-
-        /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */
-        rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01;
-
-        /* Encrypt */
-        TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
-                       &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
-                       rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
-        rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
-        rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
-
-        /* Decrypt and expect failure */
-        TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC,
-                   mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests
-     * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer
-     * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make
-     * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads
-     * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or
-     * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't
-     * hurt to test.)
-     *
-     * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record
-     * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.)
-     */
-    for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) {
-        mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
-
-        /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */
-        rec = rec_save;
-        rec.buf = buf;
-        memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen);
-
-        /* Set padding bytes to new value */
-        memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1);
-
-        /* Encrypt */
-        TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
-                       &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
-                       rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
-        rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
-        rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
-
-        /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */
-        exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
-        TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
-    }
-
-exit:
-    mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl);
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0);
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1);
-    mbedtls_free(buf);
-    mbedtls_free(buf_save);
-    MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE();
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 void ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int hash_alg,
                                  data_t *secret,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad94a58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.function
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+/* Testing of mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() specifically, focusing on negative
+ * testing (using malformed inputs). */
+
+#include <mbedtls/ssl.h>
+#include <ssl_misc.h>
+#include <test/ssl_helpers.h>
+
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
+ * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+ * END_DEPENDENCIES
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
+void ssl_decrypt_null(int hash_id)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform transform_in, transform_out;
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_in);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_out);
+    const mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
+    const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL;
+    mbedtls_record rec_good = {
+        .ctr = { 0 },
+        .type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA,
+        .ver = { 0, 0 },    /* Will be set by a function call below */
+        .buf = NULL,
+        .buf_len = 0,
+        .data_offset = 0,
+        .data_len = 0,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+        .cid_len = 0,
+        .cid = { 0 },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+    };
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec_good.ver,
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+                              version);
+    const char sample_plaintext[3] = "ABC";
+    mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
+    mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl);
+    uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+
+    MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&transform_in, &transform_out,
+                                                 cipher_type, hash_id, 0, 0,
+                                                 version,
+                                                 0, 0), 0);
+
+    const size_t plaintext_length = sizeof(sample_plaintext);
+    rec_good.buf_len = plaintext_length + transform_in.maclen;
+    rec_good.data_len = plaintext_length;
+    TEST_CALLOC(rec_good.buf, rec_good.buf_len);
+    memcpy(rec_good.buf, sample_plaintext, plaintext_length);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec_good,
+                                                   &transform_out), 0);
+
+    /* Good case */
+    mbedtls_record rec = rec_good;
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), 0);
+
+    /* Change any one byte of the plaintext or MAC. The MAC will be wrong. */
+    TEST_CALLOC(buf, rec.buf_len);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < rec.buf_len; i++) {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
+        rec = rec_good;
+        rec.buf = buf;
+        memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, rec.buf_len);
+        buf[i] ^= 1;
+        TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec),
+                   MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC);
+    }
+    mbedtls_free(buf);
+    buf = NULL;
+
+    /* Shorter input buffer. Either the MAC will be wrong, or there isn't
+     * enough room for a MAC. */
+    for (size_t n = 1; n < rec.buf_len; n++) {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step(n);
+        rec = rec_good;
+        TEST_CALLOC(buf, n);
+        rec.buf = buf;
+        rec.buf_len = n;
+        rec.data_len = n;
+        memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, n);
+        TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec),
+                   MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC);
+        mbedtls_free(buf);
+        buf = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* For robustness, check a 0-length buffer (non-null, then null).
+     * This should not reach mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() as used in the library,
+     * so the exact error doesn't matter, but we don't want a crash. */
+    {
+        const uint8_t buf1[1] = { 'a' };
+        rec = rec_good;
+        /* We won't write to buf1[0] since it's out of range, so we can cast
+         * the const away. */
+        rec.buf = (uint8_t *) buf1;
+        rec.buf_len = 0;
+        TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec),
+                   MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    }
+    rec = rec_good;
+    rec.buf = NULL;
+    rec.buf_len = 0;
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec),
+               MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_in);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_out);
+    mbedtls_free(rec_good.buf);
+    mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl);
+    mbedtls_free(buf);
+    MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac,
+                             int length_selector)
+{
+    /*
+     * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification
+     * of padding and MAC.
+     *
+     * Actually depends on TLS 1.2 and either AES, ARIA or Camellia, but since
+     * the test framework doesn't support alternation in dependency statements,
+     * just depend on AES.
+     *
+     * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows:
+     * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied
+     * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied
+     * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246:
+     *   it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the
+     *   byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length
+     *   that gives this padding_length is automatically selected.
+     */
+    mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1;
+    mbedtls_record rec, rec_save;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL;
+    size_t buflen, olen = 0;
+    size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i;
+    unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */
+    int exp_ret;
+    int ret;
+    const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1);
+    MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+    /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */
+    ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id,
+                                            0, trunc_hmac,
+                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2,
+                                            0, 0);
+
+    TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0);
+
+    /* Determine padding/plaintext length */
+    TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255);
+    block_size = t0.ivlen;
+    if (length_selector < 0) {
+        plaintext_len = 0;
+
+        /* Minimal padding
+         * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */
+        padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size;
+
+        /* Maximal padding? */
+        if (length_selector == -2) {
+            padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size);
+        }
+    } else {
+        padlen = length_selector;
+
+        /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding.
+         * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */
+        plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size;
+    }
+
+    /* Prepare a buffer for record data */
+    buflen = block_size
+             + plaintext_len
+             + t0.maclen
+             + padlen + 1;
+    TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen);
+    TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen);
+
+    /* Prepare a dummy record header */
+    memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr));
+    rec.type    = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    rec.cid_len = 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+    /* Prepare dummy record content */
+    rec.buf     = buf;
+    rec.buf_len = buflen;
+    rec.data_offset = block_size;
+    rec.data_len = plaintext_len;
+    memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len);
+
+    /* Set dummy IV */
+    memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen);
+    memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen);
+
+    /*
+     * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it.
+     */
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec, &t0));
+
+    /* Pad */
+    memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1);
+    rec.data_len += padlen + 1;
+
+    /* Save correct pre-encryption record */
+    rec_save = rec;
+    rec_save.buf = buf_save;
+    memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen);
+
+    /*
+     * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success
+     */
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
+                   &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
+                   rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
+    rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
+    rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
+
+    /*
+     * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and
+     * decrypting it, expecting failure every time.
+     */
+    for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
+
+        /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */
+        rec = rec_save;
+        rec.buf = buf;
+        memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen);
+
+        /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */
+        rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01;
+
+        /* Encrypt */
+        TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
+                       &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
+                       rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
+        rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
+        rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
+
+        /* Decrypt and expect failure */
+        TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC,
+                   mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests
+     * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer
+     * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make
+     * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads
+     * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or
+     * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't
+     * hurt to test.)
+     *
+     * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record
+     * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.)
+     */
+    for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
+
+        /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */
+        rec = rec_save;
+        rec.buf = buf;
+        memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen);
+
+        /* Set padding bytes to new value */
+        memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1);
+
+        /* Encrypt */
+        TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_psa_cipher_encrypt_helper(
+                       &t0, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, rec.buf + rec.data_offset,
+                       rec.data_len, rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen));
+        rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen;
+        rec.data_len    += t0.ivlen;
+
+        /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */
+        exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
+        TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec));
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0);
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1);
+    mbedtls_free(buf);
+    mbedtls_free(buf_save);
+    MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.misc.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f663b26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl_decrypt.misc.data
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+Decrypt null cipher, MD5
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_null:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5
+
+Decrypt null cipher, SHA-1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_null:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
+
+Decrypt null cipher, SHA-256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_null:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+
+Decrypt null cipher, SHA-384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_null:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15
+
+Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index dac3f70..11c41b0 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Check compile time library version
-check_compiletime_version:"3.4.1"
+check_compiletime_version:"3.5.0"
 
 Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"3.4.1"
+check_runtime_version:"3.5.0"
 
 Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
 check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
index b278a20..0f19028 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
@@ -167,73 +167,101 @@
 x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.allSubjectAltNames.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt":1
 
 X509 String to Names #1
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #2
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #3 (Name precisely 255 bytes)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345,OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345,OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #4 (Name larger than 255 bytes)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #5 (Escape non-allowed characters)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\a Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\a Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #6 (Escape at end)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #7 (Invalid, no '=' or ',')
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"ABC123":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"ABC123":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #8 (Escaped valid characters)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\+ \\> \\=, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\\+ \\> \\=, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\\+ \\> \\=, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\\+ \\> \\=, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #9 (Escaped ascii hexpairs uppercase encoded)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4F\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4F\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #10 (Escaped ascii hexpairs lowercase encoded)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4f\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6b, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4f\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6b, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #11 (Invalid hexpair escape at end of string)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4f\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=\\4f\\66\\66\\73\\70\\61\\72\\6, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #12 (Reject escaped null hexpair)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\00spark, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\00spark, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #13 (Invalid hexpairs)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\flspark, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\flspark, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #14 (Accept numercoid/hexstring)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
+
+# TODO: Should the trailing garbage be ignored?
+X509 String to Names (hexstring: trailing garbage after DER is ignored)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726Baa, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
+
+X509 String to Names: long hexstring (payload=256 bytes)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C82010041414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, OU=PolarSSL":0:MAY_FAIL_DN_GETS
+
+X509 String to Names: long hexstring (payload=257 bytes)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C820101aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #15 (Odd length DER hexstring)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
-X509 String to Names #16 (Length mismatch DER hexstring)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C0B4F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+X509 String to Names (empty DER hexstring)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
-X509 String to Names #17 (Invalid OID)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 10.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+X509 String to Names (empty DER hexstring at end)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
+
+X509 String to Names (1-byte DER hexstring)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
+
+X509 String to Names (1-byte DER hexstring at end)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
+
+X509 String to Names #16 (hexstring: DER length exceeds available data)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#0C0B4F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
+
+X509 String to Names #17 (hexstring: Invalid OID)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 10.5.4.10=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 String to Names #18 (short name and hexstring)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
+
+X509 String to Names (null byte in hexstring with string type)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=#0C0100, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
+
+X509 String to Names (null byte in hexstring with non-string type)
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=#040100, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=\\x00, OU=PolarSSL":0:MAY_FAIL_GET_NAME
 
 X509 String to Names #19 (Accept non-ascii hexpairs)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\CCspark, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Of\\CCspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Of\\CCspark, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Of\\CCspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 String to Names #20 (Reject empty AttributeValue)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME:0
 
 X509 Round trip test (Escaped characters)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"CN=Lu\\C4\\8Di\\C4\\87, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":"CN=Lu\\C4\\8Di\\C4\\87, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"CN=Lu\\C4\\8Di\\C4\\87, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":"CN=Lu\\C4\\8Di\\C4\\87, O=Offspark, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 Round trip test (hexstring output for non string input)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#03084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=#03084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10=#03084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=#03084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 X509 Round trip test (numercoid hexstring output for unknown OID)
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=PolarSSL":0:0
 
 Check max serial length
 x509_set_serial_check:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
index 26988ce..a7ed262 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@
     return ret;
 }
 #endif  /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */
+
+/* Due to inconsistencies in the input size limits applied by different
+ * library functions, some write-parse tests may fail. */
+#define MAY_FAIL_GET_NAME       0x0001
+#define MAY_FAIL_DN_GETS        0x0002
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -687,8 +693,8 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */
-void mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(char *name, char *parsed_name, int result
-                                  )
+void mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(char *name, char *parsed_name,
+                                  int result, int may_fail)
 {
     int ret;
     size_t len = 0;
@@ -704,22 +710,32 @@
     c = buf + sizeof(buf);
 
     ret = mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&names, name);
-    TEST_ASSERT(ret == result);
+    TEST_EQUAL(ret, result);
 
     if (ret != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
 
     ret = mbedtls_x509_write_names(&c, buf, names);
-    TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0);
+    TEST_LE_S(1, ret);
 
-    TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&c, buf + sizeof(buf), &len,
-                                     MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) == 0);
-    TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509_get_name(&c, buf + sizeof(buf), &parsed) == 0);
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&c, buf + sizeof(buf), &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE), 0);
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&c, buf + sizeof(buf), &parsed);
+    if ((may_fail & MAY_FAIL_GET_NAME) && ret < 0) {
+        /* Validation inconsistency between mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() and
+         * mbedtls_x509_get_name(). Accept it for now. */
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
 
     ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets((char *) out, sizeof(out), &parsed);
-    TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0);
-
+    if ((may_fail & MAY_FAIL_DN_GETS) && ret < 0) {
+        /* Validation inconsistency between mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() and
+         * mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(). Accept it for now. */
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    TEST_LE_S(1, ret);
     TEST_ASSERT(strcmp((char *) out, parsed_name) == 0);
 
 exit: