Merge branch 'baremetal' into baremetal-2.16-20190909
* baremetal: (78 commits)
Review corrections 6
Review corrections 5
Minor changes to tinycrypt README
Typos in the tinycrypt README
Addition of copyright statements to tinycrypt files
Add LICENSE and README for tinycrypt
Add SPDX lines to each imported TinyCrypt file
Review corrections 4
Review corrections 3
Review corrections 2
Review corrections
Update signature of BE conversion functions
Use function for 16/24/32-bit BE conversion
x509.c: Minor readability improvement
x509_crt.c: Indicate guarding condition in #else branch
X.509: Don't remove verify callback by default
Fix Doxygen warnings regarding removed verify cb+ctx parameters
ECC restart: Use optional verification mode in bad signature test
Re-implement verify chain if vrfy cbs are disabled
Add zero-cost abstraction layer for CRT verification chain
...
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d1dfb61..ad33284 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
-= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+= mbed TLS "baremetal" branch
Features
* Add new configuration option MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_CACHE that enables
@@ -9,56 +9,6 @@
* Add new configuration option MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION that
enables code size savings in configurations where no form of session
resumption is used.
-
-Bugfix
- * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused
- functions. Fixes #1628.
- * Fix typo in net_would_block(). Fixes #528 reported by github-monoculture.
- * Remove redundant include file in timing.c. Fixes #2640 reported by irwir.
- * Fix Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration by inheriting
- PlatformToolset from the project configuration. Fixes #1430 reported by
- irwir.
- * Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves. Make sure the code compiles even
- if some curves are not defined. Fixes #1591 reported by dbedev.
- * Fix misuse of signed arithmetic in the HAVEGE module. #2598
- * Fix incompatibility of HMAC DRBG with Mbed TLS' own entropy module that
- lead to HMAC DRBG seeding failure in configurations disabling SHA-512.
- * Update test certificates that were about to expire. Reported by
- Bernhard M. Wiedemann in #2357.
- * Fix the build on ARMv5TE in ARM mode to not use assembly instructions
- that are only available in Thumb mode. Fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno
- in #2169.
- * Fix undefined memset(NULL) call in test_suite_nist_kw.
- * Make NV seed test support MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256.
- * Fix propagation of restart contexts in restartable EC operations.
- This could previously lead to segmentation faults in builds using an
- address-sanitizer and enabling but not using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE.
-
-Changes
- * Make it easier to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert (which config.h
- suggests). #2671
- * Make `make clean` clean all programs always. Fixes #1862.
-
-API Changes
- * Add a new compile-time option `MBEDTLS_X509_ON_DEMAND_PARSING`,
- disabled by default, which allows to parse and cache X.509 CRTs
- on demand only, at the benefit of lower RAM usage. Enabling
- this option breaks the structure API of X.509 in that most
- fields of `mbedtls_x509_crt` are removed, but it keeps the
- X.509 function API. See the API changes section as well as
- the documentation in `config.h` for more information.
-
-= mbed TLS 2.16.2 branch released 2019-06-11
-
-Security
- * Make mbedtls_ecdh_get_params return an error if the second key
- belongs to a different group from the first. Before, if an application
- passed keys that belonged to different group, the first key's data was
- interpreted according to the second group, which could lead to either
- an error or a meaningless output from mbedtls_ecdh_get_params. In the
- latter case, this could expose at most 5 bits of the private key.
-
-Features
* Add support for draft-05 of the Connection ID extension, as specified
in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05.
The Connection ID extension allows to keep DTLS connections beyond the
@@ -97,6 +47,89 @@
always return NULL, and removes the peer_cert field from the
mbedtls_ssl_session structure which otherwise stores the peer's
certificate.
+ * Add a new compile-time option `MBEDTLS_X509_ON_DEMAND_PARSING`,
+ disabled by default, which allows to parse and cache X.509 CRTs
+ on demand only, at the benefit of lower RAM usage. Enabling
+ this option breaks the structure API of X.509 in that most
+ fields of `mbedtls_x509_crt` are removed, but it keeps the
+ X.509 function API. See the API changes section as well as
+ the documentation in `config.h` for more information.
+
+Changes
+ * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing
+ the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice.
+
+
+= mbed TLS 2.16.3 branch released 2019-09-06
+
+Security
+ * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a
+ predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other
+ side of the key exchange had a similar bug.
+ * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to
+ implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same
+ blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the
+ countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side
+ channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd.
+ * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
+ value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written
+ as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak
+ about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be
+ 1 byte too large for the output buffer.
+
+API Changes
+ * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the
+ purpose of blinding.
+
+Bugfix
+ * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused
+ functions. Fixes #1628.
+ * Fix typo in net_would_block(). Fixes #528 reported by github-monoculture.
+ * Remove redundant include file in timing.c. Fixes #2640 reported by irwir.
+ * Fix Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration by inheriting
+ PlatformToolset from the project configuration. Fixes #1430 reported by
+ irwir.
+ * Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves. Make sure the code compiles even
+ if some curves are not defined. Fixes #1591 reported by dbedev.
+ * Fix misuse of signed arithmetic in the HAVEGE module. #2598
+ * Fix incompatibility of HMAC DRBG with Mbed TLS' own entropy module that
+ lead to HMAC DRBG seeding failure in configurations disabling SHA-512.
+ * Update test certificates that were about to expire. Reported by
+ Bernhard M. Wiedemann in #2357.
+ * Fix the build on ARMv5TE in ARM mode to not use assembly instructions
+ that are only available in Thumb mode. Fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno
+ in #2169.
+ * Fix undefined memset(NULL) call in test_suite_nist_kw.
+ * Make NV seed test support MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256.
+ * Fix propagation of restart contexts in restartable EC operations.
+ This could previously lead to segmentation faults in builds using an
+ address-sanitizer and enabling but not using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE.
+ * Fix memory leak in in mpi_miller_rabin(). Contributed by
+ Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> in #2363
+ * Improve code clarity in x509_crt module, removing false-positive
+ uninitialized variable warnings on some recent toolchains (GCC8, etc).
+ Discovered and fixed by Andy Gross (Linaro), #2392.
+ * Zero length buffer check for undefined behavior in
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). Fixes ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#49.
+ * Fix bug in endianness conversion in bignum module. This lead to
+ functionally incorrect code on bigendian systems which don't have
+ __BYTE_ORDER__ defined. Reported by Brendan Shanks. Fixes #2622.
+
+Changes
+ * Make it easier to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert (which config.h
+ suggests). #2671
+ * Make `make clean` clean all programs always. Fixes #1862.
+
+= mbed TLS 2.16.2 branch released 2019-06-11
+
+Security
+ * Make mbedtls_ecdh_get_params return an error if the second key
+ belongs to a different group from the first. Before, if an application
+ passed keys that belonged to different group, the first key's data was
+ interpreted according to the second group, which could lead to either
+ an error or a meaningless output from mbedtls_ecdh_get_params. In the
+ latter case, this could expose at most 5 bits of the private key.
Bugfix
* Server's RSA certificate in certs.c was SHA-1 signed. In the default
@@ -185,8 +218,6 @@
leading content octet. Fixes #1610.
Changes
- * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing
- the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice.
* Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration,
instead of relying on other header files that they include.
Inserted as an enhancement for #1371
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 3336f0f..a6126f3 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
*/
/**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.2 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.3 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 0a26dcb..3fcc034 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
-PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.2"
+PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.3"
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 96340e8..ceeb2ef 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \
@@ -169,7 +169,9 @@
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) ) )
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index f2daf32..3b38a5b 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -440,6 +440,16 @@
* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
* and ciphers instead.
*
+ * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
+ * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
+ * desirable).
+ *
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index f8b2850..932acc6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -175,6 +175,19 @@
* (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
* 4.1.3, step 5.
*
+ * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
+ * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
+ * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
+ * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
+ * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
+ * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
+ * each execution. This means that this blinding does not
+ * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
+ * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
+ * that exploit relationships between secret data.)
+ *
* \see ecp.h
*
* \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
@@ -200,6 +213,52 @@
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h
index ebf5e12..4fc897e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h
@@ -7,22 +7,22 @@
* specified by RFC 5869.
*/
/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
*
- * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index a9d763a..e9fd78f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -435,6 +435,10 @@
*
* \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
* For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ *
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@@ -449,6 +453,10 @@
* \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
* operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign().
*
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
+ *
* \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
* with a private key.
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index 4ff5bdd..35bacd8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -904,7 +904,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
@@ -951,7 +952,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
@@ -1012,7 +1014,8 @@
* the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg.
* \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
* buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
- * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index ef8e4c1..b4eef71 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -40,16 +40,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 3
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100200
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.2"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.2"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100300
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.3"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.3"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index bb975cd..98c7e97 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -166,15 +166,15 @@
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
- set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.2 SOVERSION 3)
+ set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.3 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
- set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.2 SOVERSION 0)
+ set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.3 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
- set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.2 SOVERSION 12)
+ set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.3 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index d94754a..e45426c 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -742,10 +742,15 @@
static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x )
{
uint8_t i;
+ unsigned char *x_ptr;
mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0;
- /* This works regardless of the endianness. */
- for( i = 0; i < ciL; i++, x >>= 8 )
- tmp |= ( x & 0xFF ) << ( ( ciL - 1 - i ) << 3 );
+
+ for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ )
+ {
+ tmp <<= CHAR_BIT;
+ tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr;
+ }
+
return( tmp );
}
@@ -2351,7 +2356,8 @@
}
if (count++ > 30) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
}
} while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 ||
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 94bb7f0..3a11e18 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
@@ -323,7 +325,9 @@
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
- f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
+ f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind,
+ ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
@@ -349,7 +353,8 @@
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
@@ -392,8 +397,9 @@
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
+ f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
@@ -405,6 +411,8 @@
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
@@ -454,8 +462,70 @@
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
+ if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /*
+ * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
+ * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
+ * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
+ * risk that they leak this way.
+ */
+ const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
+ p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
+ data, 2 * grp_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
+ (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
+ strlen( blind_label ) );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#else
+ /*
+ * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
+ * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
+ * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
+ * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
+ * restartable feature.
+ *
+ * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
+ * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
+ * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
+ * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
+ * a valid ECDSA signature.
+ */
+ p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /*
+ * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
+ * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
+ * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
+ * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
+ * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
+ */
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
+ rs_ctx );
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
+#endif
+ }
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@@ -468,11 +538,12 @@
}
/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
+ * Deterministic signature wrappers
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
@@ -480,7 +551,27 @@
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
- return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
+{
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL );
+
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
@@ -659,11 +750,9 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
-
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, md_alg, rs_ctx ) );
+ hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
@@ -671,8 +760,10 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
+ hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
diff --git a/library/ecjpake.c b/library/ecjpake.c
index ea28e6d..3381c7c 100644
--- a/library/ecjpake.c
+++ b/library/ecjpake.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
p += id_len;
/* Compute hash */
- mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) );
/* Turn it into an integer mod n */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash,
diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c
index bf4ce73..c8d9230 100644
--- a/library/pkwrite.c
+++ b/library/pkwrite.c
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
@@ -120,6 +122,9 @@
return( (int) len );
}
+/*
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8)
+ */
static int pk_write_ec_privkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_pk_context const *key )
{
@@ -181,11 +186,25 @@
return( (int) len );
}
+/*
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8)
+ */
static int pk_write_ec_privkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_pk_context const *key )
{
+ int ret;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair const * const ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *key );
- return( mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( p, start, &ec->d ) );
+ size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8;
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, tmp, byte_length );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, byte_length );
+ return( ret );
}
/*
@@ -209,6 +228,7 @@
return( (int) len );
}
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
@@ -423,9 +443,8 @@
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) );
len += par_len;
- /* privateKey: write as MPI then fix tag */
+ /* privateKey */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_privkey( &c, buf, key ) );
- *c = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
/* version */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) );
diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c
index 8f8a3aa..6f6d8b6 100644
--- a/library/platform_util.c
+++ b/library/platform_util.c
@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@
void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len )
{
- memset_func( buf, 0, len );
+ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( len == 0 || buf != NULL );
+
+ if( len > 0 )
+ memset_func( buf, 0, len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index dfd9111..1923abf 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -3054,15 +3054,13 @@
continue;
}
+ *r_parent = parent_crt;
+ *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
+
break;
}
- if( parent_crt != NULL )
- {
- *r_parent = parent_crt;
- *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
- }
- else
+ if( parent_crt == NULL )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
*r_parent = fallback_parent;
diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c
index 93cd82f..4804d7a 100644
--- a/library/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509write_crt.c
@@ -46,6 +46,16 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) );
@@ -335,7 +345,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c
index 85331b1..6105f14 100644
--- a/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) );
@@ -160,7 +170,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
index 47a098a..bdedca4 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
@@ -61,6 +61,16 @@
#include <string.h>
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
FILE *f;
@@ -70,7 +80,7 @@
mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
unsigned char hash[32];
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
char filename[512];
const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_sign";
size_t olen = 0;
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index 484c22b..d1e7c08 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -840,6 +840,14 @@
# The use of 'Server 1' in the DN is intentional here, as the DN is hardcoded in the x509_write test suite.'
+###
+### A generic SECP521R1 private key
+###
+
+secp521r1_prv.der:
+ $(OPENSSL) ecparam -genkey -name secp521r1 -noout -out secp521r1_prv.der
+all_final += secp521r1_prv.der
+
################################################################
### Generate CSRs for X.509 write test suite
################################################################
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5141e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIIcex4mqXsQamUKTVf8vXmTAJrQvGjh5mXG8p9+OR4xAoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEqJ2HQjPpc6fDwE/vSa6U35USXawkTo98y4U6NsAl+rOGuqMPEFXf
+P1Srm/Jrzwa/RuppRL5kgyAsGJTUmwZEzQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..427b7ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIAOXdk7W+Hf5L7Hc9fKe44wmpaRNs5ERFTkv5CrlXv/Bu3y28M673q
+vBNo7a/UE/6NNQHu2pQODEYFpMg6R34b5SigBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAFUMHXV
+KPA4vkMgq+pFgDoH96XoM517gF2GJFV6h2gLhykzIHL/otAyEpAStw7MBvbU0V21
+ixB+hjqzO7Snxaj9mwB8g87OKxm5eGfsqvJNPdJ0RZ/EKy06Ukg6KThlhQeyrtIk
+g5PTCrPnNszlffAy6/jCOe3Moi59g15H13sSzwfX6g==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d342bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 977ee9c..69f97c7 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -590,6 +590,23 @@
#### Build and test many configurations and targets
################################################################
+component_test_large_ecdsa_key_signature () {
+
+ SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE=136 # Small enough to interfere with the EC signatures
+
+ msg "build: cmake + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE}, gcc, ASan" # ~ 1 min 50s
+ scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE $SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+ CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+ make
+
+ INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE=Makefile
+ SIGNATURE_FILE="${INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE}.sig" # Warning, this is rm -f'ed below
+
+ msg "test: pk_sign secp521r1_prv.der for MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE} (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
+ if_build_succeeded programs/pkey/pk_sign tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der $INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE
+ rm -f $SIGNATURE_FILE
+}
+
component_test_default_out_of_box () {
msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~1min
make
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index b0e4515..49d2d1f 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -426,9 +426,9 @@
fi
}
-# Wait for process $2 to be listening on port $1
+# Wait for process $2 named $3 to be listening on port $1. Print error to $4.
if type lsof >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
- wait_server_start() {
+ wait_app_start() {
START_TIME=$(date +%s)
if [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then
proto=UDP
@@ -438,8 +438,8 @@
# Make a tight loop, server normally takes less than 1s to start.
while ! lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -p "$2" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; do
if [ $(( $(date +%s) - $START_TIME )) -gt $DOG_DELAY ]; then
- echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT"
- echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT" >> $SRV_OUT
+ echo "$3 START TIMEOUT"
+ echo "$3 START TIMEOUT" >> $4
break
fi
# Linux and *BSD support decimal arguments to sleep. On other
@@ -448,12 +448,22 @@
done
}
else
- echo "Warning: lsof not available, wait_server_start = sleep"
- wait_server_start() {
+ echo "Warning: lsof not available, wait_app_start = sleep"
+ wait_app_start() {
sleep "$START_DELAY"
}
fi
+# Wait for server process $2 to be listening on port $1.
+wait_server_start() {
+ wait_app_start $1 $2 "SERVER" $SRV_OUT
+}
+
+# Wait for proxy process $2 to be listening on port $1.
+wait_proxy_start() {
+ wait_app_start $1 $2 "PROXY" $PXY_OUT
+}
+
# Given the client or server debug output, parse the unix timestamp that is
# included in the first 4 bytes of the random bytes and check that it's within
# acceptable bounds
@@ -807,7 +817,7 @@
echo "$PXY_CMD" > $PXY_OUT
$PXY_CMD >> $PXY_OUT 2>&1 &
PXY_PID=$!
- # assume proxy starts faster than server
+ wait_proxy_start "$PXY_PORT" "$PXY_PID"
fi
check_osrv_dtls
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
index fa77dfa..4f3143f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
@@ -74,6 +74,31 @@
mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &grp, &m, &m, &m,
NULL, sizeof( buf ),
valid_md ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( NULL, &m, &m, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, NULL, &m, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, NULL, &m,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, NULL,
+ buf, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, &m,
+ NULL, sizeof( buf ),
+ valid_md,
+ rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
@@ -330,6 +355,16 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, hlen,
+ md_alg, rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
index 84c99c9..ffa59e5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
ECJPAKE selftest
ecjpake_selftest:
+ECJPAKE fail read corrupt MD
+read_bad_md:"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"
+
ECJPAKE round one: client, valid
read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
index d267295..38f190d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
@@ -237,6 +237,27 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void read_bad_md( data_t *msg )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context corrupt_ctx;
+ const unsigned char * pw = NULL;
+ const size_t pw_len = 0;
+ int any_role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
+
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &corrupt_ctx );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &corrupt_ctx, any_role,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 );
+ corrupt_ctx.md_info = NULL;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &corrupt_ctx, msg->x,
+ msg->len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &corrupt_ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
void read_round_one( int role, data_t * msg, int ref_ret )
{
mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
index 8e15325..96278ad 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
@@ -38,10 +38,22 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_prv.pem"
+Private key write check EC 256 bits (top bit set, legacy ECC)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem"
+
+Private key write check EC 256 bits (top bit set, TinyCrypt)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC 521 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_prv.pem"
+Private key write check EC 521 bits (top byte is 0)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC Brainpool 512 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index cd1cee4..c3189c8 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Check compiletime library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.16.2"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.16.3"
Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.16.2"
+check_runtime_version:"2.16.3"
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0