Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/mbedtls-2.7' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
* origin/mbedtls-2.7:
ssl-opt.sh: wait for proxy to start before running the script further
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 55f416e..f09995f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,28 @@
= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+Security
+ * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a
+ predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other
+ side of the key exchange had a similar bug.
+ * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to
+ implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same
+ blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the
+ countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side
+ channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd.
+ * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
+ value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written
+ as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak
+ about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be
+ 1 byte too large for the output buffer.
+
+API Changes
+ * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the
+ purpose of blinding.
+ * The new function mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() allows to generate a private
+ key without generating the public part of the pair.
+
Bugfix
* Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused
functions. Fixes #1628.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 48e96e5..8ea1c15 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) ) )
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 75d5eb1..fa88ebf 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -333,6 +333,16 @@
* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
* and ciphers instead.
*
+ * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
+ * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
+ * desirable).
+ *
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index cfd1370..08811a3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -107,6 +107,20 @@
* Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
* Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
*
+ *
+ * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
+ * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
+ * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
+ * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
+ * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
+ * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
+ * each execution. This means that this blinding does not
+ * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
+ * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
+ * that exploit relationships between secret data.)
+ *
* \param grp The ECP group.
* \param r The first output integer.
* \param s The second output integer.
@@ -127,9 +141,56 @@
*
* \see ecp.h
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 6c43c00..691415e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -602,6 +602,22 @@
int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d );
/**
+ * \brief Generate a private key
+ *
+ * \param grp ECP group
+ * \param d Destination MPI (secret part)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
+
+/**
* \brief Generate a keypair with configurable base point
*
* \param grp ECP group
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index ee06b2f..8beb2af 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -343,6 +343,10 @@
*
* \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
* For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ *
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index 23e0ebb..a1298da 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -819,6 +819,7 @@
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
* mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on
@@ -862,6 +863,7 @@
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@@ -902,6 +904,7 @@
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the
* encoding. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of hash
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index ab75620..c635a50 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -70,9 +70,14 @@
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
@@ -99,7 +104,10 @@
key_tries = 0;
do
{
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
@@ -118,15 +126,20 @@
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
+ *
+ * This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
+ * replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
+ * necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
+ * key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
- /* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
@@ -158,15 +171,27 @@
return( ret );
}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
+ return( ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
@@ -174,12 +199,16 @@
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
+ /* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
+ const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
@@ -187,15 +216,71 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
- ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
+ if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
+ * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
+ * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
+ * risk that they leak this way.
+ */
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
+ data, 2 * grp_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
+ (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
+ strlen( blind_label ) );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
+ * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
+ * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
+ * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
+ * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
+ */
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );
+
+ }
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
+
+/*
+ * Deterministic signature wrappers
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+{
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ NULL, NULL ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
+{
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
@@ -326,17 +411,15 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, md_alg,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
diff --git a/library/ecjpake.c b/library/ecjpake.c
index 0cd79d0..65ba0d0 100644
--- a/library/ecjpake.c
+++ b/library/ecjpake.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
p += id_len;
/* Compute hash */
- mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) );
/* Turn it into an integer mod n */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash,
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 75233f8..cb8e947 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -1918,15 +1918,14 @@
}
/*
- * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ * Generate a private key
*/
-int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
- const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
- mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
@@ -1951,8 +1950,8 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
}
- else
#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
@@ -1986,15 +1985,28 @@
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
}
- else
#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cleanup:
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ return( ret );
+}
- return( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
}
/*
diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c
index 8eabd88..fa93470 100644
--- a/library/pkwrite.c
+++ b/library/pkwrite.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
@@ -54,6 +55,13 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
+static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
+ volatile unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -143,6 +151,26 @@
return( (int) len );
}
+
+/*
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8)
+ */
+static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec )
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8;
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, tmp, byte_length );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, byte_length );
+ return( ret );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
@@ -340,9 +368,8 @@
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) );
len += par_len;
- /* privateKey: write as MPI then fix tag */
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &ec->d ) );
- *c = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ /* privateKey */
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) );
/* version */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) );
diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c
index 4cdb941..905de4c 100644
--- a/library/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509write_crt.c
@@ -49,6 +49,16 @@
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
}
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) );
@@ -338,7 +348,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c
index d59354d..d6e8c13 100644
--- a/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
}
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) );
@@ -163,7 +173,7 @@
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
index 7ec4675..0f08db9 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
FILE *f;
@@ -68,7 +78,7 @@
mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
unsigned char hash[32];
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
char filename[512];
const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_sign";
size_t olen = 0;
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index 2ffb706..658aa22 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -762,6 +762,14 @@
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 force_ns_cert_type=1
all_final += server1.req.cert_type_empty
+###
+### A generic SECP521R1 private key
+###
+
+secp521r1_prv.der:
+ $(OPENSSL) ecparam -genkey -name secp521r1 -noout -out secp521r1_prv.der
+all_final += secp521r1_prv.der
+
################################################################
### Generate certificates for CRT write check tests
################################################################
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5141e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIIcex4mqXsQamUKTVf8vXmTAJrQvGjh5mXG8p9+OR4xAoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEqJ2HQjPpc6fDwE/vSa6U35USXawkTo98y4U6NsAl+rOGuqMPEFXf
+P1Srm/Jrzwa/RuppRL5kgyAsGJTUmwZEzQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..427b7ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIAOXdk7W+Hf5L7Hc9fKe44wmpaRNs5ERFTkv5CrlXv/Bu3y28M673q
+vBNo7a/UE/6NNQHu2pQODEYFpMg6R34b5SigBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAFUMHXV
+KPA4vkMgq+pFgDoH96XoM517gF2GJFV6h2gLhykzIHL/otAyEpAStw7MBvbU0V21
+ixB+hjqzO7Snxaj9mwB8g87OKxm5eGfsqvJNPdJ0RZ/EKy06Ukg6KThlhQeyrtIk
+g5PTCrPnNszlffAy6/jCOe3Moi59g15H13sSzwfX6g==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d342bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 427ab6d..44eee7a 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -591,6 +591,23 @@
#### Build and test many configurations and targets
################################################################
+component_test_large_ecdsa_key_signature () {
+
+ SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE=136 # Small enough to interfere with the EC signatures
+
+ msg "build: cmake + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE}, gcc, ASan" # ~ 1 min 50s
+ scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE $SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+ CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
+ make
+
+ INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE=Makefile
+ SIGNATURE_FILE="${INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE}.sig" # Warning, this is rm -f'ed below
+
+ msg "test: pk_sign secp521r1_prv.der for MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE=${SMALL_MPI_MAX_SIZE} (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
+ if_build_succeeded programs/pkey/pk_sign tests/data_files/secp521r1_prv.der $INEVITABLY_PRESENT_FILE
+ rm -f $SIGNATURE_FILE
+}
+
component_test_default_out_of_box () {
msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~1min
make
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
index 9b1315f..74fc49b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
@@ -129,6 +129,16 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, hlen,
+ md_alg, rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
index 1a772a9..2b9821f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
ECJPAKE selftest
ecjpake_selftest:
+ECJPAKE fail read corrupt MD
+read_bad_md:"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"
+
ECJPAKE round one: client, valid
read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
index 5c8856b..2f986f3 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function
@@ -106,6 +106,37 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void read_bad_md( char *data )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context corrupt_ctx;
+
+ const unsigned char * pw = NULL;
+ const size_t pw_len = 0;
+
+ unsigned char *msg;
+ size_t len;
+
+ int any_role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
+
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &corrupt_ctx );
+
+ msg = unhexify_alloc( data, &len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( msg != NULL );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &corrupt_ctx, any_role,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 );
+ corrupt_ctx.md_info = NULL;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &corrupt_ctx, msg,
+ len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &corrupt_ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( msg );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
void read_round_one( int role, char *data, int ref_ret )
{
mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
index c8ff177..e0101cc 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data
@@ -30,10 +30,18 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.pem"
+Private key write check EC 256 bits (top bit set)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC 521 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_prv.pem"
+Private key write check EC 521 bits (top byte is 0)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem"
+
Private key write check EC Brainpool 512 bits
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem"