Merge pull request #814 from ARMmbed/mbedtls-2.16.10-rc0-pr
Mbedtls 2.16.10 rc0 pr
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1ecfc8b..fe7aecd 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,52 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
+= mbed TLS 2.16.10 branch released 2021-03-12
+
+Default behavior changes
+ * In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented
+ as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take
+ different values.
+
+Security
+ * Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating
+ |A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the
+ function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only
+ applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
+ all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
+ only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042.
+ * Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
+ mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
+ value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest
+ supported size.
+ Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094,
+ backported in #4100.
+ * Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and
+ mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is
+ beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169.
+ * Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 tables by
+ making access aceess to them use constant flow code.
+
+Bugfix
+ * Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched.
+ * Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+ is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources.
+ This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in
+ #4017, #4045 and #4071.
+ * Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free()
+ twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions
+ fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was
+ enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe.
+ * Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()
+ when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing
+ a mutex allocates resources.
+ * This change makes 'mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints'
+ consistent with RFC 5280 4.2.1.9 which says: "Conforming CAs MUST
+ include this extension in all CA certificates that contain public keys
+ used to validate digital signatures on certificates and MUST mark the
+ extension as critical in such certificates." Previous to this change,
+ the extension was always marked as non-critical. This was fixed by
+ #4044.
+
= mbed TLS 2.16.9 branch released 2020-12-11
Security
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/drbg-mutex.txt b/ChangeLog.d/drbg-mutex.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ac5abf..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/drbg-mutex.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
- is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources.
- This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in
- #4017, #4045 and #4071.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue4093.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue4093.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b8d634b..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/issue4093.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Security
- * Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
- mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
- value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest
- supported size.
- Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094,
- backported in #4100.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mpi_sub_abs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mpi_sub_abs.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f34ee7..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mpi_sub_abs.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Security
- * Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating
- |A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the
- function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only
- applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
- all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
- only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/net_poll-fd_setsize.txt b/ChangeLog.d/net_poll-fd_setsize.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e4db8c7..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/net_poll-fd_setsize.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Security
- * Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and
- mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is
- beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-mutex.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-mutex.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a477a9..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-mutex.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free()
- twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions
- fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was
- enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe.
- * Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()
- when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing
- a mutex allocates resources.
-
-Default behavior changes
- * In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented
- as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take
- different values.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rsa_private-ret.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rsa_private-ret.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b965cea..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/rsa_private-ret.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched.
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 4fe1613..e640c7b 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
*/
/**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.9 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.10 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 9197a4a..61a42c4 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
-PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.9"
+PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.10"
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index 5f0a8f1..bd5c730 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -65,16 +65,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 9
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 10
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100900
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.9"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.9"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100A00
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.10"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.10"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 8002cdb..4f61f99 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -165,15 +165,15 @@
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
- set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.9 SOVERSION 3)
+ set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.10 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
- set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.9 SOVERSION 0)
+ set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.10 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
- set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.9 SOVERSION 12)
+ set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.10 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
diff --git a/library/base64.c b/library/base64.c
index bfafb05..692e11e 100644
--- a/library/base64.c
+++ b/library/base64.c
@@ -97,6 +97,99 @@
#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */
/*
+ * Constant flow conditional assignment to unsigned char
+ */
+static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( unsigned char * dest, const unsigned char * const src,
+ unsigned char condition )
+{
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFF or 0 */
+ unsigned char mask = ( condition | -condition );
+ mask >>= 7;
+ mask = -mask;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ *dest = ( ( *src ) & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constant flow conditional assignment to uint_32
+ */
+static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( uint32_t * dest, const uint32_t src,
+ uint32_t condition )
+{
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFFFFFFFF or 0 */
+ uint32_t mask = ( condition | -condition );
+ mask >>= 31;
+ mask = -mask;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ *dest = ( src & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constant flow check for equality
+ */
+static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_eq( size_t in_a, size_t in_b )
+{
+ size_t difference = in_a ^ in_b;
+
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ difference |= -difference;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ /* cope with the varying size of size_t per platform */
+ difference >>= ( sizeof( difference ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+ return (unsigned char) ( 1 ^ difference );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constant flow lookup into table.
+ */
+static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( const unsigned char * const table,
+ const size_t table_size, const size_t table_index )
+{
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char result = 0;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < table_size; ++i )
+ {
+ mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( &result, &table[i], mbedtls_base64_eq( i, table_index ) );
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
* Encode a buffer into base64 format
*/
int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
@@ -136,10 +229,17 @@
C2 = *src++;
C3 = *src++;
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F];
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F];
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6)) & 0x3F];
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[C3 & 0x3F];
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( C3 & 0x3F ) );
}
if( i < slen )
@@ -147,11 +247,15 @@
C1 = *src++;
C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0;
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F];
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F];
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
if( ( i + 1 ) < slen )
- *p++ = base64_enc_map[((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F];
+ *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
+ ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
else *p++ = '=';
*p++ = '=';
@@ -172,6 +276,7 @@
size_t i, n;
uint32_t j, x;
unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char dec_map_lookup;
/* First pass: check for validity and get output length */
for( i = n = j = 0; i < slen; i++ )
@@ -202,10 +307,12 @@
if( src[i] == '=' && ++j > 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
- if( src[i] > 127 || base64_dec_map[src[i]] == 127 )
+ dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), src[i] );
+
+ if( src[i] > 127 || dec_map_lookup == 127 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
- if( base64_dec_map[src[i]] < 64 && j != 0 )
+ if( dec_map_lookup < 64 && j != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
n++;
@@ -235,8 +342,10 @@
if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' )
continue;
- j -= ( base64_dec_map[*src] == 64 );
- x = ( x << 6 ) | ( base64_dec_map[*src] & 0x3F );
+ dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), *src );
+
+ mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( &j, j - 1, mbedtls_base64_eq( dec_map_lookup, 64 ) );
+ x = ( x << 6 ) | ( dec_map_lookup & 0x3F );
if( ++n == 4 )
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
index da99ffa..3a892f4 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
@@ -151,6 +151,20 @@
Base64 encode hex #4
base64_encode_hex:"01020304050607":"AQIDBAUGBw==":13:0
+# Rotate the bytes around so that they end up at each offset modulo 3 in
+# successive test cases.
+Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #0
+base64_encode_hex:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjJCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMzQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0BBQkNERUZHSElKS0xNTk9QUVJTVFVWV1hZWltcXV5fYGFiY2RlZmdoaWprbG1ub3BxcnN0dXZ3eHl6e3x9fn+AgYKDhIWGh4iJiouMjY6PkJGSk5SVlpeYmZqbnJ2en6ChoqOkpaanqKmqq6ytrq+wsbKztLW2t7i5uru8vb6/wMHCw8TFxsfIycrLzM3Oz9DR0tPU1dbX2Nna29zd3t/g4eLj5OXm5+jp6uvs7e7v8PHy8/T19vf4+fr7/P3+/w==":345:0
+
+Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #1
+base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff00":"AQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMkJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzNDU2Nzg5Ojs8PT4/QEFCQ0RFRkdISUpLTE1OT1BRUlNUVVZXWFlaW1xdXl9gYWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXp7fH1+f4CBgoOEhYaHiImKi4yNjo+QkZKTlJWWl5iZmpucnZ6foKGio6SlpqeoqaqrrK2ur7CxsrO0tba3uLm6u7y9vr/AwcLDxMXGx8jJysvMzc7P0NHS09TV1tfY2drb3N3e3+Dh4uPk5ebn6Onq6+zt7u/w8fLz9PX29/j5+vv8/f7/AA==":345:0
+
+Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #2
+base64_encode_hex:"02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff0001":"AgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AQUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVpbXF1eX2BhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3h5ent8fX5/gIGCg4SFhoeIiYqLjI2Oj5CRkpOUlZaXmJmam5ydnp+goaKjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vsLGys7S1tre4ubq7vL2+v8DBwsPExcbHyMnKy8zNzs/Q0dLT1NXW19jZ2tvc3d7f4OHi4+Tl5ufo6err7O3u7/Dx8vP09fb3+Pn6+/z9/v8AAQ==":345:0
+
+Base64 encode all valid output characters at all offsets
+base64_encode_hex:"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":261:0
+
Base64 decode hex #1
base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":"010203040506070809":9:0
@@ -166,6 +180,9 @@
Base64 decode hex #5 (buffer too small)
base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":6:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+Base64 decode all valid input characters at all offsets
+base64_decode_hex:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":195:0
+
Base64 Selftest
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
base64_selftest:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
index 3a8bf43..0185f3b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function
@@ -13,13 +13,22 @@
{
unsigned char src_str[1000];
unsigned char dst_str[1000];
- size_t len;
+ size_t len, src_len;
memset(src_str, 0x00, 1000);
memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000);
strncpy( (char *) src_str, src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ) ) == result );
+ src_len = strlen( (char *) src_str );
+
+ TEST_CF_SECRET( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, src_len) == result );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) );
+
+ /* dest_str will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering
+ CF failures by unmarking it. */
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst_str, len );
+
if( result == 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) dst_str, dst_string ) == 0 );
@@ -57,7 +66,14 @@
res = zero_alloc( dst_buf_size );
+ TEST_CF_SECRET( src->x, src->len );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( res, dst_buf_size, &len, src->x, src->len ) == result );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src->x, src->len );
+
+ /* res will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering
+ CF failures by unmarking it. */
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( res, len );
+
if( result == 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( len == strlen( dst ) );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index d43ddad..66ee453 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Check compiletime library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.16.9"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.16.10"
Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.16.9"
+check_runtime_version:"2.16.10"
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0