Merge pull request #3596 from gilles-peskine-arm/cert-gen-cleanup-202008-2.16
Backport 2.16: Minor cleanups in certificate generation
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b765f6b..c68bd1b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,70 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
+= mbed TLS 2.16.8 branch released 2020-09-01
+
+Features
+ * Support building on e2k (Elbrus) architecture: correctly enable
+ -Wformat-signedness, and fix the code that causes signed-one-bit-field
+ and sign-compare warnings. Contributed by makise-homura (Igor Molchanov)
+ <akemi_homura@kurisa.ch>.
+
+Security
+ * When checking X.509 CRLs, a certificate was only considered as revoked if
+ its revocationDate was in the past according to the local clock if
+ available. In particular, on builds without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE,
+ certificates were never considered as revoked. On builds with
+ MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, an attacker able to control the local clock (for
+ example, an untrusted OS attacking a secure enclave) could prevent
+ revocation of certificates via CRLs. Fixed by no longer checking the
+ revocationDate field, in accordance with RFC 5280. Reported by
+ yuemonangong in #3340. Reported independently and fixed by
+ Raoul Strackx and Jethro Beekman in #3433.
+ * In (D)TLS record decryption, when using a CBC ciphersuites without the
+ Encrypt-then-Mac extension, use constant code flow memory access patterns
+ to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing
+ countermeasure against Lucky 13 attacks. The previous countermeasure was
+ effective against network-based attackers, but less so against local
+ attackers. The new countermeasure defends against local attackers, even
+ if they have access to fine-grained measurements. In particular, this
+ fixes a local Lucky 13 cache attack found and reported by Tuba Yavuz,
+ Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihan) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler
+ (University of Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University).
+ * Fix side channel in RSA private key operations and static (finite-field)
+ Diffie-Hellman. An adversary with precise enough timing and memory access
+ information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
+ enclave) could bypass an existing counter-measure (base blinding) and
+ potentially fully recover the private key.
+ * Fix a 1-byte buffer overread in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der().
+ Credit to OSS-Fuzz for detecting the problem and to Philippe Antoine
+ for pinpointing the problematic code.
+ * Zeroising of plaintext buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read() to erase unused
+ application data from memory. Reported in #689 by
+ Johan Uppman Bruce of Sectra.
+
+Bugfix
+ * Avoid use of statically sized stack buffers for certificate writing.
+ This previously limited the maximum size of DER encoded certificates
+ in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() to 2Kb. Reported by soccerGB in #2631.
+ * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() which
+ previously could lead to stack overflow on constrained devices.
+ Contributed by Doru Gucea and Simon Leet in #3464.
+ * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical
+ lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540.
+ * Fix building library/net_sockets.c and the ssl_mail_client program on
+ NetBSD. NetBSD conditionals were added for the backport to avoid the risk
+ of breaking a platform. Original fix contributed by Nia Alarie in #3422.
+ Adapted for long-term support branch 2.16 in #3558.
+ * Fix bug in redirection of unit test outputs on platforms where stdout is
+ defined as a macro. First reported in #2311 and fix contributed in #3528.
+ Adopted for LTS branch 2.16 in #3601.
+
+Changes
+ * Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance. As a result,
+ the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now acknowledged, and the
+ years of publishing are no longer tracked in the source files. This also
+ eliminates the need for the lines declaring the files to be part of
+ MbedTLS. Fixes #3457.
+
= mbed TLS 2.16.7 branch released 2020-07-01
Security
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/00README.md b/ChangeLog.d/00README.md
index b559e23..a2e096f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/00README.md
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/00README.md
@@ -3,6 +3,29 @@
This directory contains changelog entries that have not yet been merged
to the changelog file ([`../ChangeLog`](../ChangeLog)).
+## What requires a changelog entry?
+
+Write a changelog entry if there is a user-visible change. This includes:
+
+* Bug fixes in the library or in sample programs: fixing a security hole,
+ fixing broken behavior, fixing the build in some configuration or on some
+ platform, etc.
+* New features in the library, new sample programs, or new platform support.
+* Changes in existing behavior. These should be rare. Changes in features
+ that are documented as experimental may or may not be announced, depending
+ on the extent of the change and how widely we expect the feature to be used.
+
+We generally don't include changelog entries for:
+
+* Documentation improvements.
+* Performance improvements, unless they are particularly significant.
+* Changes to parts of the code base that users don't interact with directly,
+ such as test code and test data.
+
+Until Mbed TLS 2.16.8, we required changelog entries in more cases.
+Looking at older changelog entries is good practice for how to write a
+changelog entry, but not for deciding whether to write one.
+
## Changelog entry file format
A changelog entry file must have the extension `*.txt` and must have the
@@ -33,8 +56,7 @@
Bugfix
Changes
-Use “Changes” for anything that doesn't fit in the other categories, such as
-performance, documentation and test improvements.
+Use “Changes” for anything that doesn't fit in the other categories.
## How to write a changelog entry
@@ -49,8 +71,7 @@
Mbed TLS issue. Add other external references such as CVE numbers where
applicable.
-Credit the author of the contribution if the contribution is not a member of
-the Mbed TLS development team. Also credit bug reporters where applicable.
+Credit bug reporters where applicable.
**Explain why, not how**. Remember that the audience is the users of the
library, not its developers. In particular, for a bug fix, explain the
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt b/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59c8a15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/_GNU_SOURCE-redefined.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value.
+ Fix #3432.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt b/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6089565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/adjusting sliding_window_size_PR3592.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Changes
+ * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation.
+ Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR_2632.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR_2632.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d54b4d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix_PR_2632.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Avoid use of statically sized stack buffers for certificate writing.
- This previously limited the maximum size of DER encoded certificates
- in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() to 2Kb. Reported by soccerGB in #2631.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/copyright.txt b/ChangeLog.d/copyright.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index aefc6bc..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/copyright.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Changes
- * Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance. As a result,
- the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now acknowledged, and the
- years of publishing are no longer tracked in the source files. This also
- eliminates the need for the lines declaring the files to be part of
- MbedTLS. Fixes #3457.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-build-netbsd.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-build-netbsd.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 000614e..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-build-netbsd.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix building library/net_sockets.c and the ssl_mail_client program on
- NetBSD. NetBSD conditionals were added for the backport to avoid the risk
- of breaking a platform. Original fix contributed by Nia Alarie in #3422.
- Adapted for long-term support branch 2.16 in #3558.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a13572c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-blinding.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not
+ invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This
+ addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)).
+ Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin).
+ Fixes #3647.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8539d1f..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical
- lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/x509write_csr_heap_alloc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/x509write_csr_heap_alloc.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 6223698..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/x509write_csr_heap_alloc.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() which
- previously could lead to stack overflow on constrained devices.
- Contributed by Doru Gucea and Simon Leet in #3464.
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 3faf41a..acd8be1 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
*/
/**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.7 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.8 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 642c630..45398b7 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
-PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.7"
+PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.8"
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 4bb9fa3..4d04b33 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -88,12 +88,12 @@
* Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6
* Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6.
*
- * Result is an array of ( 2 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used
+ * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used
* for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default)
*
* Reduction in size, reduces speed.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum windows size used. */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
index 3dcdc91..d50c6ec 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
* than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
* that length.
* \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes:
* 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
*
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
* than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
* that length.
* \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes:
* 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 9043978..2bbd7a8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -197,6 +197,16 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN)
+#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer"
+#endif
+#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) )
#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites"
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 91c8452..6b45021 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -550,6 +550,42 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT
/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+ *
+ * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
+ * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test
+ * this non-functional property of the code under test.
+ *
+ * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test
+ * suites can then be run normally.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
+ * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+ *
+ * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
+ * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test
+ * this non-functional property of the code under test.
+ *
+ * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for
+ * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be
+ * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when
+ * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
+ * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+
+/**
* \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
*
* Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources.
@@ -3090,7 +3126,7 @@
*/
/* MPI / BIGNUM options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum windows size used. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */
//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */
/* CTR_DRBG options */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
index 4e4434e..1201fbd 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
* than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that
* size in Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate.
- * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a readable
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable
* buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@
* tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes.
*
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
- * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a readable
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable
* buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least
* four.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index d3ee3c4..fe33ac8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@
* \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL
* f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block.
*
- * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_sent_t,
+ * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t,
* \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for
* the conventions those callbacks must follow.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
index c3e586a..6ba6c2a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
@@ -150,6 +150,24 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
+/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
+#endif
+
+/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as
+ * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
+#endif
+
/*
* Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
* counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256)
@@ -841,6 +859,73 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+/** \brief Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
+ * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
+ * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
+ * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
+ * max_data_len bytes from \p data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured
+ * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the
+ * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
+ * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after
+ * the computation is complete to prepare for the
+ * next computation.
+ * \param add_data The additional data prepended to \p data. This
+ * must point to a readable buffer of \p add_data_len
+ * bytes.
+ * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes.
+ * \param data The data appended to \p add_data. This must point
+ * to a readable buffer of \p max_data_len bytes.
+ * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data.
+ * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
+ * greater than \p max_data_len.
+ * \param min_data_len The minimal length of \p data in bytes.
+ * \param max_data_len The maximal length of \p data in bytes.
+ * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
+ * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
+ * HMAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval 0
+ * Success.
+ * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
+ * The hardware accelerator failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
+ mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
+ size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
+ unsigned char *output );
+
+/** \brief Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
+ * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
+ * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param src_base The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
+ * bytes.
+ * \param offset_secret The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
+ * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
+ * than \p offset_max.
+ * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset_secret.
+ * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset_secret.
+ * \param len The number of bytes to copy.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src_base,
+ size_t offset_secret,
+ size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index a5725cc..d09b450 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -65,16 +65,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 7
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 8
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100700
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.7"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.7"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100800
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.8"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.8"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index fb4acd9..beec785 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -165,15 +165,15 @@
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
- set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.7 SOVERSION 3)
+ set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
- set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.7 SOVERSION 0)
+ set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
- set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.7 SOVERSION 12)
+ set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.8 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index dfe976d..6d0a67c 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@
size_t i, j, nblimbs;
size_t bufsize, nbits;
mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state;
- mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 2 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], Apos;
+ mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], Apos;
int neg;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
diff --git a/library/dhm.c b/library/dhm.c
index d7ceb77..d652cf0 100644
--- a/library/dhm.c
+++ b/library/dhm.c
@@ -349,6 +349,32 @@
}
/*
+ * Pick a random R in the range [2, M) for blinding purposes
+ */
+static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ int ret, count;
+
+ count = 0;
+ do
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( R, mbedtls_mpi_size( M ), f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, M ) >= 0 )
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( R, 1 ) );
+
+ if( count++ > 10 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
+ }
+ while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 1 ) <= 0 );
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+
+/*
* Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of:
* KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
@@ -357,7 +383,10 @@
static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
- int ret, count;
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_mpi R;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
/*
* Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used,
@@ -392,24 +421,23 @@
*/
/* Vi = random( 2, P-1 ) */
- count = 0;
- do
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vi, mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ), f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) );
+ /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P
+ * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod),
+ * then elevate to the Xth power. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) );
- if( count++ > 10 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
- }
- while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) <= 0 );
-
- /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+
return( ret );
}
diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.c b/library/entropy_poll.c
index 4ad878e..d7062ea 100644
--- a/library/entropy_poll.c
+++ b/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
* **********
*/
-#if defined(__linux__)
+#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 086807d..e410f3a 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
if( ret == 0 && *p != end )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
if( ret != 0 )
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index a400132..a25c633 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -806,6 +806,9 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret, count = 0;
+ mbedtls_mpi R;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
{
@@ -821,18 +824,40 @@
/* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
do {
if( count++ > 10 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED );
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
- } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 );
- /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
+ /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+
+ /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R
+ * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know
+ * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them.
+ * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N );
+ if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
+
+ /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+
+ /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N
+ * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+
return( ret );
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 21682be..2471600 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1431,32 +1431,10 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) )
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
#define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
#endif
-/* The function below is only used in the Lucky 13 counter-measure in
- * ssl_decrypt_buf(). These are the defines that guard the call site. */
-#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
-/* This function makes sure every byte in the memory region is accessed
- * (in ascending addresses order) */
-static void ssl_read_memory( unsigned char *p, size_t len )
-{
- unsigned char acc = 0;
- volatile unsigned char force;
-
- for( ; len != 0; p++, len-- )
- acc ^= *p;
-
- force = acc;
- (void) force;
-}
-#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC && ( TLS1 || TLS1_1 || TLS1_2 ) */
-
/*
* Encryption/decryption functions
*/
@@ -1667,8 +1645,7 @@
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
int ret;
@@ -1787,8 +1764,7 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
- ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
@@ -1806,6 +1782,156 @@
return( 0 );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+/*
+ * Constant-flow conditional memcpy:
+ * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len),
+ * - otherwise, a no-op,
+ * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2.
+ *
+ * Use only bit operations to avoid branches that could be used by some
+ * compilers on some platforms to translate comparison operators.
+ */
+static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t c1, size_t c2 )
+{
+ /* diff = 0 if c1 == c2, non-zero otherwise */
+ const size_t diff = c1 ^ c2;
+
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to c1 != c2 */
+ const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
+
+ /* diff1 = c1 != c2 */
+ const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+ /* mask = c1 != c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
+ const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) -diff1;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ /* dst[i] = c1 != c2 ? dst[i] : src[i] */
+ size_t i;
+ for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
+ dst[i] = ( dst[i] & mask ) | ( src[i] & ~mask );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
+ *
+ * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
+ * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
+ mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
+ size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
+ unsigned char *output )
+{
+ /*
+ * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
+ * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
+ *
+ * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
+ * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
+ * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
+ *
+ * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
+ * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
+ * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
+ *
+ * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
+ */
+ const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
+ /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
+ * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
+ const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
+ const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
+ const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
+ const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
+
+ unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
+ size_t offset;
+ int ret;
+
+ mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
+
+#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
+ do { \
+ ret = (func_call); \
+ if( ret != 0 ) \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ } while( 0 )
+
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
+
+ /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
+ * so we can start directly with the message */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
+
+ /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
+ for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
+ {
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
+ /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
+ offset, data_len_secret );
+
+ if( offset < max_data_len )
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
+ }
+
+ /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
+
+ /* Done, get ready for next time */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
+
+#undef MD_CHK
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
+ * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
+ * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
+ const unsigned char *src_base,
+ size_t offset_secret,
+ size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ size_t offset;
+
+ for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
+ offset, offset_secret );
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
@@ -1960,8 +2086,7 @@
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
- ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
/*
@@ -2174,8 +2299,7 @@
ssl->in_msglen -= padlen;
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
- ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C || MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
@@ -2194,6 +2318,7 @@
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+ unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
@@ -2208,6 +2333,8 @@
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype,
mac_expect );
+ memcpy( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
+ ssl->transform_in->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
@@ -2215,34 +2342,8 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
- /*
- * Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make
- * total time independent of padlen.
- *
- * Known timing attacks:
- * - Lucky Thirteen (http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf)
- *
- * To compensate for different timings for the MAC calculation
- * depending on how much padding was removed (which is determined
- * by padlen), process extra_run more blocks through the hash
- * function.
- *
- * The formula in the paper is
- * extra_run = ceil( (L1-55) / 64 ) - ceil( (L2-55) / 64 )
- * where L1 is the size of the header plus the decrypted message
- * plus CBC padding and L2 is the size of the header plus the
- * decrypted message. This is for an underlying hash function
- * with 64-byte blocks.
- * We use ( (Lx+8) / 64 ) to handle 'negative Lx' values
- * correctly. We round down instead of up, so -56 is the correct
- * value for our calculations instead of -55.
- *
- * Repeat the formula rather than defining a block_size variable.
- * This avoids requiring division by a variable at runtime
- * (which would be marginally less efficient and would require
- * linking an extra division function in some builds).
- */
- size_t j, extra_run = 0;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char add_data[13];
/*
* The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
@@ -2257,66 +2358,25 @@
const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
- switch( ssl->transform_in->ciphersuite_info->mac )
+ memcpy( add_data + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
+ memcpy( add_data + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
+ memcpy( add_data + 11, ssl->in_len, 2 );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
+ add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+ ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
+ min_len, max_len,
+ mac_expect );
+ if( ret != 0 )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
- /* 8 bytes of message size, 64-byte compression blocks */
- extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 -
- ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64;
- break;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
- /* 16 bytes of message size, 128-byte compression blocks */
- extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 16 ) / 128 -
- ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 16 ) / 128;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
+ return( ret );
}
- extra_run &= correct * 0xFF;
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
- ssl->in_msglen );
- /* Make sure we access everything even when padlen > 0. This
- * makes the synchronisation requirements for just-in-time
- * Prime+Probe attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
- ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
-
- /* Dummy calls to compression function.
- * Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks
- * that observe whether md_process() was called of not.
- * Respect the usual start-(process|update)-finish sequence for
- * the sake of hardware accelerators that might require it. */
- mbedtls_md_starts( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
- for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
- mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
- {
- /* The switch statement above already checks that we're using
- * one of MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384. */
- unsigned char tmp[384 / 8];
- mbedtls_md_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, tmp );
- }
-
- mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
-
- /* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC,
- * before we check it in the next code block. This makes the
- * synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe
- * attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
- ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len,
- max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg,
+ ssl->in_msglen,
+ min_len, max_len,
+ ssl->transform_in->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@@ -2328,11 +2388,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
#endif
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
@@ -2760,7 +2819,7 @@
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
- if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) )
+ if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %lu were requested",
@@ -2814,7 +2873,7 @@
if( ret <= 0 )
return( ret );
- if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > SIZE_MAX ) )
+ if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %lu bytes were sent",
@@ -8594,6 +8653,10 @@
memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n );
ssl->in_msglen -= n;
+ /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data
+ from the memory. */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n );
+
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
{
/* all bytes consumed */
diff --git a/library/version_features.c b/library/version_features.c
index 7812a90..cbf38dc 100644
--- a/library/version_features.c
+++ b/library/version_features.c
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
+ "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN",
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND)
+ "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND",
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
"MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */
diff --git a/library/x509_crl.c b/library/x509_crl.c
index 520b76e..dba71fa 100644
--- a/library/x509_crl.c
+++ b/library/x509_crl.c
@@ -283,13 +283,13 @@
size_t len2;
const unsigned char *end2;
+ cur_entry->raw.tag = **p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
- cur_entry->raw.tag = **p;
cur_entry->raw.p = *p;
cur_entry->raw.len = len2;
end2 = *p + len2;
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index d519a3f..fadd28e 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -1816,8 +1816,7 @@
if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&
memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 )
{
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) )
- return( 1 );
+ return( 1 );
}
cur = cur->next;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
index 1588822..fcfa5b9 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
{
usage:
mbedtls_printf( USAGE );
- mbedtls_exit( exit_code );
+ goto exit;
}
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
diff --git a/programs/ssl/query_config.c b/programs/ssl/query_config.c
index ee95c27..798c917 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/query_config.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/query_config.c
@@ -739,6 +739,22 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
+ if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", config ) == 0 )
+ {
+ MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND)
+ if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", config ) == 0 )
+ {
+ MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", config ) == 0 )
{
diff --git a/scripts/config.pl b/scripts/config.pl
index ff862be..e5cc697 100755
--- a/scripts/config.pl
+++ b/scripts/config.pl
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@
MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES
MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL
+MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
diff --git a/tests/compat.sh b/tests/compat.sh
index e0da373..7796bd2 100755
--- a/tests/compat.sh
+++ b/tests/compat.sh
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@
M_SERVER_ARGS="server_port=$PORT server_addr=0.0.0.0 force_version=$MODE arc4=1"
O_SERVER_ARGS="-accept $PORT -cipher NULL,ALL -$MODE -dhparam data_files/dhparams.pem"
G_SERVER_ARGS="-p $PORT --http $G_MODE"
- G_SERVER_PRIO="NORMAL:${G_PRIO_CCM}+ARCFOUR-128:+NULL:+MD5:+PSK:+DHE-PSK:+ECDHE-PSK:+RSA-PSK:-VERS-TLS-ALL:$G_PRIO_MODE"
+ G_SERVER_PRIO="NORMAL:${G_PRIO_CCM}+ARCFOUR-128:+NULL:+MD5:+PSK:+DHE-PSK:+ECDHE-PSK:+SHA256:+SHA384:+RSA-PSK:-VERS-TLS-ALL:$G_PRIO_MODE"
# with OpenSSL 1.0.1h, -www, -WWW and -HTTP break DTLS handshakes
if is_dtls "$MODE"; then
@@ -983,39 +983,29 @@
;;
"RSA")
- M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server2.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
- O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server2.crt -key data_files/server2.key"
- G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key"
+ M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
+ O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key"
+ G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key"
if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; then
- M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server1.crt key_file=data_files/server1.key"
- O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/server1.crt -key data_files/server1.key"
- G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server1.key"
+ M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/cert_sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server1.key"
+ O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/cert_sha256.crt -key data_files/server1.key"
+ G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/cert_sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server1.key"
else
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=none key_file=none"
fi
-
- # Allow SHA-1. It's disabled by default for security reasons but
- # our tests still use certificates signed with it.
- M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS allow_sha1=1"
- M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS allow_sha1=1"
;;
"PSK")
# give RSA-PSK-capable server a RSA cert
# (should be a separate type, but harder to close with openssl)
- M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 ca_file=none crt_file=data_files/server2.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
+ M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 ca_file=none crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 -nocert"
- G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --pskpasswd data_files/passwd.psk"
+ G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --pskpasswd data_files/passwd.psk"
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 crt_file=none key_file=none"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70"
-
- # Allow SHA-1. It's disabled by default for security reasons but
- # our tests still use certificates signed with it.
- M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS allow_sha1=1"
- M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS allow_sha1=1"
;;
esac
}
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index 3578b6b..f5a2715 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -1005,7 +1005,10 @@
crl.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file)
$(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -batch -cert $(test_ca_crt) -keyfile $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -key $(test_ca_pwd_rsa) -config $(test_ca_server1_config_file) -md sha1 -crldays 3653 -out $@
-server1_all: crl.pem server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.openssl server1.v1.crt server1.v1.crt.openssl server1.key_usage.crt server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt server1.key_usage.crt.openssl server1.cert_type.crt server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt server1.cert_type.crt.openssl server1.der server1.der.openssl server1.v1.der server1.v1.der.openssl server1.key_usage.der server1.key_usage.der.openssl server1.cert_type.der server1.cert_type.der.openssl
+crl-futureRevocationDate.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file) test-ca.server1.future-crl.db test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf
+ $(FAKETIME) '2028-12-31' $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -config test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf -crldays 365 -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -out $@
+
+server1_all: crl.pem crl-futureRevocationDate.pem server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.openssl server1.v1.crt server1.v1.crt.openssl server1.key_usage.crt server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt server1.key_usage.crt.openssl server1.cert_type.crt server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt server1.cert_type.crt.openssl server1.der server1.der.openssl server1.v1.der server1.v1.der.openssl server1.key_usage.der server1.key_usage.der.openssl server1.cert_type.der server1.cert_type.der.openssl
# server2*
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt b/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt
index 6f54ed0..d07241a 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt
+++ b/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
- crl-ec-sha*.pem: (2) server6.crt
- crl-future.pem: (2) server6.crt + unknown
- crl-rsa-pss-*.pem: (1) server9{,badsign,with-ca}.crt + cert_sha384.crt + unknown
-- crl.pem, crl_expired.pem: (1) server1{,.cert_type,.key_usage,.v1}.crt + unknown
+- crl.pem, crl-futureRevocationDate.pem, crl_expired.pem: (1) server1{,.cert_type,.key_usage,.v1}.crt + unknown
- crl_md*.pem: crl_sha*.pem: (1) same as crl.pem
- crt_cat_*.pem: (1+2) concatenations in various orders:
ec = crl-ec-sha256.pem, ecfut = crl-future.pem
diff --git a/tests/data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem b/tests/data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f147a8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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=
+-----END X509 CRL-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..763aa12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+R 210212144406Z 290101124407Z 01 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Server 1
+R 210212144400Z 290101124407Z 03 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9ce754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+ [ ca ]
+ default_ca = test-ca
+
+ [ test-ca ]
+ certificate = test-ca.crt
+ private_key = test-ca.key
+ serial = test-ca.server1.serial
+ default_md = sha1
+ default_startdate = 110212144406Z
+ default_enddate = 210212144406Z
+ new_certs_dir = ./
+ database = ./test-ca.server1.future-crl.db
+ policy = policy_match
+
+ [policy_match]
+ countryName = supplied
+ organizationName = supplied
+ commonName = supplied
diff --git a/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh b/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh
index fb28dad..fac10cc 100755
--- a/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh
+++ b/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh
@@ -3,7 +3,13 @@
# pre-commit.sh
#
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the
+# GNU General Public License v2.0 or later.
+#
+# **********
+# Apache License 2.0:
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -16,6 +22,27 @@
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
+#
+# **********
+#
+# **********
+# GNU General Public License v2.0 or later:
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+# with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+# 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+#
+# **********
# Purpose
#
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index d0a3edc..1184119 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1029,6 +1029,46 @@
if_build_succeeded env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
}
+component_test_memsan_constant_flow () {
+ # This tests both (1) accesses to undefined memory, and (2) branches or
+ # memory access depending on secret values. To distinguish between those:
+ # - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN - does the failure persist?
+ # - or alternatively, change the build type to MemSanDbg, which enables
+ # origin tracking and nicer stack traces (which are useful for debugging
+ # anyway), and check if the origin was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else.
+ msg "build: cmake MSan (clang), full config with constant flow testing"
+ scripts/config.pl full
+ scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+ scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm
+ CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan .
+ make
+
+ msg "test: main suites (Msan + constant flow)"
+ make test
+}
+
+component_test_valgrind_constant_flow () {
+ # This tests both (1) everything that valgrind's memcheck usually checks
+ # (heap buffer overflows, use of uninitialized memory, use-after-free,
+ # etc.) and (2) branches or memory access depending on secret values,
+ # which will be reported as uninitialized memory. To distinguish between
+ # secret and actually uninitialized:
+ # - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND - does the failure persist?
+ # - or alternatively, build with debug info and manually run the offending
+ # test suite with valgrind --track-origins=yes, then check if the origin
+ # was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else.
+ msg "build: cmake release GCC, full config with constant flow testing"
+ scripts/config.pl full
+ scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+ cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
+ make
+
+ # this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type)
+ # details are left in Testing/<date>/DynamicAnalysis.xml
+ msg "test: main suites (valgrind + constant flow)"
+ make memcheck
+}
+
component_test_default_no_deprecated () {
# Test that removing the deprecated features from the default
# configuration leaves something consistent.
@@ -1245,6 +1285,16 @@
make test
}
+component_test_no_date_time () {
+ msg "build: default config without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE"
+ scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+ CC=gcc cmake
+ make
+
+ msg "test: !MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE - main suites"
+ make test
+}
+
component_test_platform_calloc_macro () {
msg "build: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC/FREE}_MACRO enabled (ASan build)"
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
diff --git a/tests/suites/helpers.function b/tests/suites/helpers.function
index 523db86..9403d99 100644
--- a/tests/suites/helpers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/helpers.function
@@ -46,6 +46,52 @@
#include <strings.h>
#endif
+/*
+ * Define the two macros
+ *
+ * #define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size)
+ * #define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size)
+ *
+ * that can be used in tests to mark a memory area as secret (no branch or
+ * memory access should depend on it) or public (default, only needs to be
+ * marked explicitly when it was derived from secret data).
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * - ptr: a pointer to the memory area to be marked
+ * - size: the size in bytes of the memory area
+ *
+ * Implementation:
+ * The basic idea is that of ctgrind <https://github.com/agl/ctgrind>: we can
+ * re-use tools that were designed for checking use of uninitialized memory.
+ * This file contains two implementations: one based on MemorySanitizer, the
+ * other on valgrind's memcheck. If none of them is enabled, dummy macros that
+ * do nothing are defined for convenience.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
+#include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
+
+/* Use macros to avoid messing up with origin tracking */
+#define TEST_CF_SECRET __msan_allocated_memory
+// void __msan_allocated_memory(const volatile void* data, size_t size);
+#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC __msan_unpoison
+// void __msan_unpoison(const volatile void *a, size_t size);
+
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND)
+#include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
+
+#define TEST_CF_SECRET VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED
+// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len)
+#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED
+// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN ||
+ MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */
+
+#define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size)
+#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size)
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */
+
/* Type for Hex parameters */
typedef struct data_tag
{
@@ -108,6 +154,27 @@
} \
} while( 0 )
+/** Compare two buffers and fail the test case if they differ.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
+ * It may jump to the \c exit label.
+ *
+ * \param p1 Pointer to the start of the first buffer.
+ * \param size1 Size of the first buffer in bytes.
+ * This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ * \param p2 Pointer to the start of the second buffer.
+ * \param size2 Size of the second buffer in bytes.
+ * This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ */
+#define ASSERT_COMPARE( p1, size1, p2, size2 ) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ TEST_ASSERT( ( size1 ) == ( size2 ) ); \
+ if( ( size1 ) != 0 ) \
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( ( p1 ), ( p2 ), ( size1 ) ) == 0 ); \
+ } \
+ while( 0 )
+
/**
* \brief This macro tests the expression passed to it and skips the
* running test if it doesn't evaluate to 'true'.
@@ -244,7 +311,7 @@
/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a
* compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */
#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR( const_expr ) \
- ( 0 && sizeof( struct { int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * ! ( const_expr ); } ) )
+ ( 0 && sizeof( struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * ! ( const_expr ); } ) )
/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time
* constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant.
* If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */
@@ -336,6 +403,12 @@
void test_fail( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename )
{
+ if( test_info.result == TEST_RESULT_FAILED )
+ {
+ /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't
+ * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */
+ return;
+ }
test_info.result = TEST_RESULT_FAILED;
test_info.test = test;
test_info.line_no = line_no;
@@ -391,45 +464,52 @@
#endif
#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
-static int redirect_output( FILE** out_stream, const char* path )
+static int redirect_output( FILE* out_stream, const char* path )
{
- int stdout_fd = dup( fileno( *out_stream ) );
+ int out_fd, dup_fd;
+ FILE* path_stream;
- if( stdout_fd == -1 )
+ out_fd = fileno( out_stream );
+ dup_fd = dup( out_fd );
+
+ if( dup_fd == -1 )
{
- return -1;
+ return( -1 );
}
- fflush( *out_stream );
- fclose( *out_stream );
- *out_stream = fopen( path, "w" );
-
- if( *out_stream == NULL )
+ path_stream = fopen( path, "w" );
+ if( path_stream == NULL )
{
- close( stdout_fd );
- return -1;
+ close( dup_fd );
+ return( -1 );
}
- return stdout_fd;
+ fflush( out_stream );
+ if( dup2( fileno( path_stream ), out_fd ) == -1 )
+ {
+ close( dup_fd );
+ fclose( path_stream );
+ return( -1 );
+ }
+
+ fclose( path_stream );
+ return( dup_fd );
}
-static int restore_output( FILE** out_stream, int old_fd )
+static int restore_output( FILE* out_stream, int dup_fd )
{
- fflush( *out_stream );
- fclose( *out_stream );
+ int out_fd = fileno( out_stream );
- *out_stream = fdopen( old_fd, "w" );
- if( *out_stream == NULL )
+ fflush( out_stream );
+ if( dup2( dup_fd, out_fd ) == -1 )
{
- return -1;
+ close( out_fd );
+ close( dup_fd );
+ return( -1 );
}
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void close_output( FILE* out_stream )
-{
- fclose( out_stream );
+ close( dup_fd );
+ return( 0 );
}
#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */
@@ -679,7 +759,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
-int hexcmp( uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, uint32_t a_len, uint32_t b_len )
+int mbedtls_test_hexcmp( uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, uint32_t a_len, uint32_t b_len )
{
int ret = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function
index 4be6308..ca51e7b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/host_test.function
+++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
*/
if( !option_verbose )
{
- stdout_fd = redirect_output( &stdout, "/dev/null" );
+ stdout_fd = redirect_output( stdout, "/dev/null" );
if( stdout_fd == -1 )
{
/* Redirection has failed with no stdout so exit */
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@
}
#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
- if( !option_verbose && restore_output( &stdout, stdout_fd ) )
+ if( !option_verbose && restore_output( stdout, stdout_fd ) )
{
/* Redirection has failed with no stdout so exit */
exit( 1 );
@@ -667,10 +667,5 @@
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
#endif
-#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
- if( stdout_fd != -1 )
- close_output( stdout );
-#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */
-
return( total_errors != 0 );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
index 3374a07..23bf83d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aes_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aes_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void aes_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void aes_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -96,7 +97,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0)
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -228,7 +230,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aes_encrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -241,7 +243,7 @@
mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx );
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aes_decrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -263,7 +265,7 @@
mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx );
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aes_encrypt_cfb8( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -284,7 +286,8 @@
mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx );
@@ -293,7 +296,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aes_decrypt_cfb8( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
@@ -305,7 +308,8 @@
mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx );
@@ -315,17 +319,15 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
void aes_encrypt_ofb( int fragment_size, data_t *key_str,
data_t *iv_str, data_t *src_str,
- char *expected_output_string)
+ data_t *expected_output )
{
unsigned char output[32];
- unsigned char output_string[65];
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
size_t iv_offset = 0;
int in_buffer_len;
unsigned char* src_str_next;
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
- memset( output_string, 0x00, sizeof( output_string ) );
mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)fragment_size < sizeof( output ) );
@@ -340,12 +342,10 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &ctx, fragment_size, &iv_offset,
iv_str->x, src_str_next, output ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( output_string, output, fragment_size );
- TEST_ASSERT( strncmp( (char *) output_string, expected_output_string,
- ( 2 * fragment_size ) ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, expected_output->x, fragment_size ) == 0 );
in_buffer_len -= fragment_size;
- expected_output_string += ( fragment_size * 2 );
+ expected_output->x += fragment_size;
src_str_next += fragment_size;
if( in_buffer_len < fragment_size )
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function
index ae3b032..c1e2386 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function
@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void mbedtls_arc4_crypt( data_t * src_str, data_t * key_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+void mbedtls_arc4_crypt( data_t * src_str, data_t * key_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char dst_str[1000];
mbedtls_arc4_context ctx;
@@ -19,9 +18,11 @@
mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len);
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, src_str->len, src_str->x, dst_str ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, src_str->len,
+ src_str->x, dst_str ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( dst_str, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( dst_str, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function
index d08c39d..6d6a203 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function
@@ -207,14 +207,12 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aria_encrypt_ecb( data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str,
- char *hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t *expected_output, int setkey_result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t i;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -227,9 +225,9 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x + i,
output + i ) == 0 );
}
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
}
exit:
@@ -239,14 +237,12 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aria_decrypt_ecb( data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str,
- char *hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t *expected_output, int setkey_result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t i;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -259,9 +255,9 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x + i,
output + i ) == 0 );
}
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
}
exit:
@@ -271,14 +267,12 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void aria_encrypt_cbc( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int cbc_result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -288,9 +282,8 @@
output ) == cbc_result );
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
-
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
}
exit:
@@ -300,14 +293,12 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void aria_decrypt_cbc( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int cbc_result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -317,9 +308,8 @@
output ) == cbc_result );
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
-
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
}
exit:
@@ -329,15 +319,13 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aria_encrypt_cfb128( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t iv_offset = 0;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -346,9 +334,9 @@
src_str->len, &iv_offset,
iv_str->x, src_str->x, output )
== result );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
exit:
mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx );
@@ -357,15 +345,13 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void aria_decrypt_cfb128( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t iv_offset = 0;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -374,9 +360,9 @@
src_str->len, &iv_offset,
iv_str->x, src_str->x, output )
== result );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
exit:
mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx );
@@ -385,16 +371,14 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
void aria_encrypt_ctr( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
unsigned char blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t iv_offset = 0;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -402,9 +386,9 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset,
iv_str->x, blk, src_str->x, output )
== result );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
exit:
mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx );
@@ -413,16 +397,14 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
void aria_decrypt_ctr( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str,
- data_t *src_str, char *hex_dst_string,
+ data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output,
int result )
{
- unsigned char dst_str[ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR];
unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE];
unsigned char blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
size_t iv_offset = 0;
- memset( dst_str, 0x00, sizeof( dst_str ) );
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
@@ -430,9 +412,9 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset,
iv_str->x, blk, src_str->x, output )
== result );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( dst_str, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) dst_str, hex_dst_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
exit:
mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function
index 7a93cd1..f89353c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void blowfish_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx;
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void blowfish_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx;
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void blowfish_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -241,7 +242,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void blowfish_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -256,7 +257,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0)
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -266,8 +268,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void blowfish_encrypt_cfb64( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string
- )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx;
@@ -280,7 +281,8 @@
mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx );
@@ -289,8 +291,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void blowfish_decrypt_cfb64( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string
- )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx;
@@ -303,7 +304,8 @@
mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx );
@@ -312,7 +314,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
void blowfish_encrypt_ctr( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char stream_str[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -327,7 +329,8 @@
mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, stream_str, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function
index 9408348..312495c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void camellia_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void camellia_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int setkey_result )
+ data_t * dst, int setkey_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -223,8 +223,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void camellia_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
- int cbc_result )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
@@ -238,7 +237,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void camellia_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -263,7 +263,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -273,8 +274,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void camellia_encrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx );
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
void camellia_decrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@
mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 16, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
index a04583b..1bba531 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@
void mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, data_t * key,
data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add, int tag_len, int result,
- data_t * hex_msg )
+ data_t * expected_msg )
{
unsigned char tag[16];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, hex_msg->x, hex_msg->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, expected_msg->x, expected_msg->len ) == 0 );
}
else
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function
index afe2418..67c8de2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function
@@ -17,13 +17,6 @@
unsigned char output[375];
mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx;
- /*
- * Buffers to store the ASCII string representation of output and
- * expected_output_str.
- */
- unsigned char output_string[751] = { '\0' };
- unsigned char expected_output_string[751] = { '\0' };
-
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
TEST_ASSERT( src_str->len == expected_output_str->len );
@@ -35,12 +28,8 @@
*/
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( key_str->x, nonce_str->x, counter, src_str->len, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( expected_output_string,
- expected_output_str->x,
- expected_output_str->len);
- mbedtls_test_hexify( output_string, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *)output_string,
- (char *)expected_output_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len,
+ expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len );
/*
* Test the streaming API
@@ -54,9 +43,8 @@
memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, src_str->len, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( output_string, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *)output_string,
- (char *)expected_output_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len,
+ expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len );
/*
* Test the streaming API again, piecewise
@@ -71,9 +59,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, src_str->len - 1,
src_str->x + 1, output + 1 ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( output_string, output, src_str->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *)output_string,
- (char *)expected_output_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len,
+ expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len );
mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
index b5acb7b..5b24935 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void des_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+void des_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des_context ctx;
@@ -28,7 +27,7 @@
mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_des_free( &ctx );
@@ -36,8 +35,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void des_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+void des_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des_context ctx;
@@ -49,7 +47,7 @@
mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_des_free( &ctx );
@@ -58,8 +56,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void des_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
- int cbc_result )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des_context ctx;
@@ -73,7 +70,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -83,7 +81,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void des_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst,
int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -98,7 +96,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -108,7 +107,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void des3_encrypt_ecb( int key_count, data_t * key_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des3_context ctx;
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx );
@@ -135,7 +134,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void des3_decrypt_ecb( int key_count, data_t * key_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des3_context ctx;
@@ -153,7 +152,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx );
@@ -163,7 +162,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void des3_encrypt_cbc( int key_count, data_t * key_str,
data_t * iv_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int cbc_result )
+ data_t * dst, int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des3_context ctx;
@@ -184,7 +183,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void des3_decrypt_cbc( int key_count, data_t * key_str,
data_t * iv_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string, int cbc_result )
+ data_t * dst, int cbc_result )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_des3_context ctx;
@@ -216,7 +216,8 @@
if( cbc_result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len,
+ dst->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index 850b77c..e37a017 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@
if( ret == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( buf, out->x, olen, out->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, out->x, olen, out->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
index 1fcb681..9b7b0ee 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void gcm_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id, data_t * key_str,
data_t * src_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * add_str, data_t * hex_dst_string,
- int tag_len_bits, data_t * hex_tag_string,
+ data_t * add_str, data_t * dst,
+ int tag_len_bits, data_t * tag,
int init_result )
{
unsigned char output[128];
@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, iv_str->len, add_str->x, add_str->len, src_str->x, output, tag_len, tag_output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( tag_output, hex_tag_string->x, tag_len, hex_tag_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( tag_output, tag->x,
+ tag_len, tag->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -94,7 +96,9 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, pt_result->x, src_str->len, pt_result->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, pt_result->x,
+ src_str->len,
+ pt_result->len ) == 0 );
}
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function
index ddd64fa..af871e1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function
@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@
{
int ret;
unsigned char okm[128] = { '\0' };
- /*
- * okm_string and expected_okm_string are the ASCII string representations
- * of km and expected_okm, so their size should be twice the size of
- * okm and expected_okm, and an extra null-termination.
- */
- unsigned char okm_string[257] = { '\0' };
- unsigned char expected_okm_string[257] = { '\0' };
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
TEST_ASSERT( md != NULL );
@@ -31,14 +24,8 @@
info->x, info->len, okm, expected_okm->len );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- /*
- * Run mbedtls_test_hexify on okm and expected_okm so that it looks nicer
- * if the assertion fails.
- */
- mbedtls_test_hexify( okm_string, okm, expected_okm->len );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( expected_okm_string,
- expected_okm->x, expected_okm->len );
- TEST_ASSERT( !strcmp( (char *)okm_string, (char *)expected_okm_string ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( okm , expected_okm->len,
+ expected_okm->x, expected_okm->len );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -62,12 +49,11 @@
ikm = unhexify_alloc( hex_ikm_string, &ikm_len );
salt = unhexify_alloc( hex_salt_string, &salt_len );
prk = unhexify_alloc( hex_prk_string, &prk_len );
- TEST_ASSERT( prk_len == output_prk_len );
ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, output_prk );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( !memcmp( output_prk, prk, prk_len ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output_prk, output_prk_len, prk, prk_len );
exit:
mbedtls_free(ikm);
@@ -103,7 +89,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len,
output_okm, OKM_LEN );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( !memcmp( output_okm, okm, okm_len ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output_okm, okm_len, okm, okm_len );
exit:
mbedtls_free(info);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
index 11cf88a..d918ce3 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void md_text( char * text_md_name, char * text_src_string,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+ data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char src_str[1000];
@@ -145,13 +145,14 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md( md_info, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void md_hex( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void md_hex( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -167,14 +168,15 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md( md_info, src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x,
- mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void md_text_multi( char * text_md_name, char * text_src_string,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+ data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char src_str[1000];
@@ -208,15 +210,18 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str + halfway, len - halfway ) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x,
- mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len) == 0 );
/* Test clone */
memset( output, 0x00, 100 );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx_copy, src_str + halfway, len - halfway ) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx_copy, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
@@ -225,8 +230,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void md_hex_multi( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void md_hex_multi( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -255,14 +259,18 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
/* Test clone */
memset( output, 0x00, 100 );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx_copy, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx_copy, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
@@ -273,7 +281,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_md_hmac( char * text_md_name, int trunc_size,
data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+ data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -289,13 +297,14 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( mbedtls_md_hmac( md_info, key_str->x, key_str->len, src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, trunc_size, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void md_hmac_multi( char * text_md_name, int trunc_size, data_t * key_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -321,7 +330,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, trunc_size, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 );
/* Test again, for reset() */
memset( output, 0x00, 100 );
@@ -331,7 +341,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) );
TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, trunc_size, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
@@ -340,7 +351,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
void mbedtls_md_file( char * text_md_name, char * filename,
- data_t * hex_hash_string )
+ data_t * hash )
{
char md_name[100];
unsigned char output[100];
@@ -355,6 +366,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_file( md_info, filename, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+ hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
index 02004ef..aa35c58 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C */
-void md2_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void md2_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash )
{
int ret;
unsigned char src_str[100];
@@ -20,12 +20,13 @@
ret = mbedtls_md2_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ) ;
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, sizeof output, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C */
-void md4_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void md4_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash )
{
int ret;
unsigned char src_str[100];
@@ -39,12 +40,13 @@
ret = mbedtls_md4_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, sizeof output, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C */
-void md5_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void md5_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash )
{
int ret;
unsigned char src_str[100];
@@ -58,12 +60,13 @@
ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, sizeof output, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */
-void ripemd160_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void ripemd160_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash )
{
int ret;
unsigned char src_str[100];
@@ -77,7 +80,8 @@
ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, sizeof output, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x,
+ sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function
index f2702f1..dcb0aaf 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function
@@ -354,7 +354,8 @@
if( result == 0)
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( buf, input_A->x, buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, input_A->x,
+ buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -388,7 +389,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &X, buf, buflen ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( buf, input_A->x, buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, input_A->x,
+ buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -542,7 +544,7 @@
int size_Y, char * input_Y,
int input_ret, int input_err )
{
- unsigned ret;
+ unsigned ret = -1;
unsigned input_uret = input_ret;
mbedtls_mpi X, Y;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function
index 08f590b..a1e11f7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
void pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt( int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E, int hash,
data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char output[128];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, &rnd_buffer_rand, &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, message_str->len, message_str->x, output ) == result );
if( result == 0 )
{
-
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
void pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P,
int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N,
char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E,
- int hash, data_t * result_hex_str,
+ int hash, data_t * result_str,
char * seed, data_t * message_str,
int result )
{
@@ -78,12 +78,12 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 );
-
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, &output_len, message_str->x, output, 1000 ) == result );
if( result == 0 )
{
-
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, output_len, result_hex_str->len) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ output_len,
+ result_str->len) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
char * input_Q, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E, int digest, int hash,
data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char output[128];
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function
index 3cd3903..a4119a2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
void pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E, int hash,
data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char output[256];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, &rnd_buffer_rand, &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, message_str->len, message_str->x, output ) == result );
if( result == 0 )
{
-
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
void pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P,
int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N,
char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E,
- int hash, data_t * result_hex_str,
+ int hash, data_t * result_str,
char * seed, data_t * message_str,
int result )
{
@@ -85,7 +85,9 @@
sizeof( output ) ) == result );
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, output_len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ output_len,
+ result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -100,7 +102,7 @@
char * input_Q, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E, int digest, int hash,
data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char output[256];
@@ -137,7 +139,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
index 26f1d33..a525282 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &ctx, pw_str->x, pw_str->len, salt_str->x, salt_str->len,
it_cnt, key_len, key ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( key, result_key_string->x, key_len, result_key_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( key, result_key_string->x,
+ key_len, result_key_string->len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function
index 44617d9..4b8995b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function
@@ -9,14 +9,12 @@
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void mbedtls_poly1305( data_t *key, char *hex_mac_string, data_t *src_str )
+void mbedtls_poly1305( data_t *key, data_t *expected_mac, data_t *src_str )
{
unsigned char mac[16]; /* size set by the standard */
- unsigned char mac_str[33]; /* hex expansion of the above */
mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx;
- memset( mac_str, 0x00, sizeof( mac_str ) );
- memset( mac, 0x00, sizeof( mac ) );
+ memset( mac, 0x00, sizeof( mac ) );
/*
* Test the integrated API
@@ -24,8 +22,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_mac( key->x, src_str->x,
src_str->len, mac ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( mac_str, mac, 16 );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) mac_str, hex_mac_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len,
+ expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len );
/*
* Test the streaming API
@@ -38,8 +36,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( mac_str, mac, 16 );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) mac_str, hex_mac_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len,
+ expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len );
/*
* Test the streaming API again, piecewise
@@ -56,8 +54,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( mac_str, mac, 16 );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) mac_str, hex_mac_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len,
+ expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len );
}
/*
@@ -73,8 +71,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 );
- mbedtls_test_hexify( mac_str, mac, 16 );
- TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) mac_str, hex_mac_string ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len,
+ expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len );
}
mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
index 9a3b583..f8a2dad 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@
int digest, int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P,
int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N,
char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char output[256];
@@ -506,7 +506,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -555,7 +556,7 @@
int padding_mode, int mod, int radix_P,
char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q,
int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E,
- char * input_E, data_t * result_hex_str )
+ char * input_E, data_t * result_str )
{
unsigned char output[256];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -586,7 +587,8 @@
output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to generate signatures */
@@ -608,7 +610,9 @@
if( res == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len,
+ result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
@@ -686,7 +690,7 @@
void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode,
int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char output[256];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -714,7 +718,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -727,7 +732,7 @@
void rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_bad_rng( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode,
int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N,
int radix_E, char * input_E,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char output[256];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -752,7 +757,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -766,7 +772,7 @@
int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P,
int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N,
char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E,
- int max_output, data_t * result_hex_str,
+ int max_output, data_t * result_str,
int result )
{
unsigned char output[32];
@@ -800,7 +806,9 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, output_len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ output_len,
+ result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -813,7 +821,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_rsa_public( data_t * message_str, int mod, int radix_N,
char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E,
- data_t * result_hex_str, int result )
+ data_t * result_str, int result )
{
unsigned char output[256];
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx, ctx2; /* Also test mbedtls_rsa_copy() while at it */
@@ -837,7 +845,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
/* And now with the copy */
@@ -852,7 +861,8 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
@@ -866,7 +876,7 @@
void mbedtls_rsa_private( data_t * message_str, int mod, int radix_P,
char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q,
int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E,
- char * input_E, data_t * result_hex_str,
+ char * input_E, data_t * result_str,
int result )
{
unsigned char output[256];
@@ -902,7 +912,9 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx.len,
+ result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
}
@@ -919,7 +931,9 @@
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, result_hex_str->x, ctx2.len, result_hex_str->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x,
+ ctx2.len,
+ result_str->len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function
index e621f49..f3477ec 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-void mbedtls_sha1( data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void mbedtls_sha1( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
unsigned char output[41];
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha1_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, 20, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 20, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-void sha224( data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void sha224( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
unsigned char output[57];
@@ -131,12 +131,12 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha256_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 1 ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, 28, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 28, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-void mbedtls_sha256( data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void mbedtls_sha256( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
unsigned char output[65];
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha256_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 0 ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, 32, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 32, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-void sha384( data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void sha384( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
unsigned char output[97];
@@ -215,12 +215,12 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha512_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 1 ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, 48, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 48, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-void mbedtls_sha512( data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_hash_string )
+void mbedtls_sha512( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash )
{
unsigned char output[129];
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha512_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 0 ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_hash_string->x, 64, hex_hash_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 64, hash->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index 1473507..66f6b84 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -57,3 +57,31 @@
SSL SET_HOSTNAME memory leak: call ssl_set_hostname twice
ssl_set_hostname_twice:"server0":"server1"
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: MD5
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
+
+# these are the numbers we'd get with an empty plaintext and truncated HMAC
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: small
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:5:10
+
+# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-256
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: medium
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:255:32
+
+# we could get this with 355-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 326f22d..c1f7d0d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -52,3 +52,128 @@
mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
+{
+ /*
+ * Test the function mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac() against a reference
+ * implementation.
+ */
+ mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+ size_t out_len, block_size;
+ size_t min_in_len, in_len, max_in_len, i;
+ /* TLS additional data is 13 bytes (hence the "lucky 13" name) */
+ unsigned char add_data[13];
+ unsigned char ref_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ unsigned char rec_num = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_md_init( &ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_init( &ref_ctx );
+
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash );
+ TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL );
+ out_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ TEST_ASSERT( out_len != 0 );
+ block_size = hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
+
+ /* Use allocated out buffer to catch overwrites */
+ out = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( out != NULL );
+
+ /* Set up contexts with the given hash and a dummy key */
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ref_ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
+ memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ref_ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
+ memset( ref_out, 0, sizeof( ref_out ) );
+
+ /*
+ * Test all possible lengths up to a point. The difference between
+ * max_in_len and min_in_len is at most 255, and make sure they both vary
+ * by at least one block size.
+ */
+ for( max_in_len = 0; max_in_len <= 255 + block_size; max_in_len++ )
+ {
+ /* Use allocated in buffer to catch overreads */
+ data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, max_in_len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( data != NULL || max_in_len == 0 );
+
+ min_in_len = max_in_len > 255 ? max_in_len - 255 : 0;
+ for( in_len = min_in_len; in_len <= max_in_len; in_len++ )
+ {
+ /* Set up dummy data and add_data */
+ rec_num++;
+ memset( add_data, rec_num, sizeof( add_data ) );
+ for( i = 0; i < in_len; i++ )
+ data[i] = ( i & 0xff ) ^ rec_num;
+
+ /* Get the function's result */
+ TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+ data, in_len,
+ min_in_len, max_in_len,
+ out ) );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
+
+ /* Compute the reference result */
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, add_data,
+ sizeof( add_data ) ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, data, in_len ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ref_ctx, ref_out ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ref_ctx ) );
+
+ /* Compare */
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( out, ref_out, out_len ) );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free( data );
+ data = NULL;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md_free( &ref_ctx );
+ mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
+
+ mbedtls_free( data );
+ mbedtls_free( out );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+void ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( int offset_min, int offset_max, int len )
+{
+ unsigned char *dst = NULL;
+ unsigned char *src = NULL;
+ size_t src_len = offset_max + len;
+ size_t secret;
+
+ dst = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( dst != NULL );
+ src = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src_len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( src != NULL );
+
+ /* Fill src in a way that we can detect if we copied the right bytes */
+ rnd_std_rand( NULL, src, src_len );
+
+ for( secret = offset_min; secret <= (size_t) offset_max; secret++ )
+ {
+ TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
+ offset_min, offset_max, len );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
+ TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( dst, src + secret, len ) == 0 );
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( dst );
+ mbedtls_free( src );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index 6a0ac0b..cc907b6 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Check compiletime library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.16.7"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.16.8"
Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.16.7"
+check_runtime_version:"2.16.8"
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index 5022186..fe84474 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -843,6 +843,14 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha256.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"next":"NULL"
+X509 CRT verification #98 (Revoked Cert, revocation date in the future, _with_ MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL"
+
+X509 CRT verification #99 (Revoked Cert, revocation date in the future, _without_ MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:!MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL"
+
X509 Certificate verification: domain identical to IPv4 in SubjectAltName
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
x509_verify:"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/crl_sha256.pem":"abcd":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"":"NULL"
@@ -1344,10 +1352,60 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
x509parse_crl:"305d3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e05000302000100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
+# 305c
+# 3047 tbsCertList TBSCertList
+# 020100 version INTEGER OPTIONAL
+# 300d signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifi
+# 06092a864886f70d01010e
+# 0500
+# 300f issuer Name
+# 310d300b0603550403130441424344
+# 170c303930313031303030303030 thisUpdate Time
+# 3014 revokedCertificates
+# 3012 entry 1
+# 8202abcd userCertificate CertificateSerialNum
+# 170c303831323331323335393539 revocationDate Time
+# 300d signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifi
+# 06092a864886f70d01010e
+# 0500
+# 03020001 signatureValue BIT STRING
+# The subsequent TBSCertList negative tests remove or modify some elements.
X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig present)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: CN=ABCD\nthis update \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nnext update \: 0000-00-00 00\:00\:00\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: AB\:CD revocation date\: 2008-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\n":0
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, signatureValue missing)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"30583047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm missing)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"30493047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, single empty entry at end)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"30373035020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c30393031303130303030303030023000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, good entry then empty entry at end)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"304b3049020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301630128202abcd170c3038313233313233353935393000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, missing time in entry)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"304e3039020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300630048202abcd300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, missing time in entry at end)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"303b3039020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300630048202abcd":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, invalid tag for time in entry)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd190c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, invalid tag for serial)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128402abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, no entries)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
x509parse_crl:"30463031020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: CN=ABCD\nthis update \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nnext update \: 0000-00-00 00\:00\:00\nRevoked certificates\:\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\n":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index e6b1b47..664aac7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -804,21 +804,21 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
-void x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params( data_t * hex_params, int params_tag,
+void x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params( data_t * params, int params_tag,
int ref_msg_md, int ref_mgf_md,
int ref_salt_len, int ref_ret )
{
int my_ret;
- mbedtls_x509_buf params;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf buf;
mbedtls_md_type_t my_msg_md, my_mgf_md;
int my_salt_len;
- params.p = hex_params->x;
- params.len = hex_params->len;
- params.tag = params_tag;
+ buf.p = params->x;
+ buf.len = params->len;
+ buf.tag = params_tag;
- my_ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( ¶ms, &my_msg_md, &my_mgf_md,
- &my_salt_len );
+ my_ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( &buf, &my_msg_md, &my_mgf_md,
+ &my_salt_len );
TEST_ASSERT( my_ret == ref_ret );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function
index a24a420..1d5b29b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void xtea_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_xtea_context ctx;
@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@
mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void xtea_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str,
- data_t * hex_dst_string )
+void xtea_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_xtea_context ctx;
@@ -37,13 +36,13 @@
mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, 8, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void xtea_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_xtea_context ctx;
@@ -55,13 +54,14 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x,
src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
void xtea_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str,
- data_t * src_str, data_t * hex_dst_string )
+ data_t * src_str, data_t * dst )
{
unsigned char output[100];
mbedtls_xtea_context ctx;
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x,
src_str->x, output ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( hexcmp( output, hex_dst_string->x, src_str->len, hex_dst_string->len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x,
+ src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */