diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 86b6b58..2829c0a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,17 @@
      allocate memory. Only used for certificate generation, not triggerable
      remotely in SSL/TLS. Found by Rafał Przywara. #367
 
+Bugfix
+   * Fix over-restrictive length limit in GCM. Found by Andreas-N. #362
+
+Changes
+   * To avoid dropping an entire DTLS datagram if a single record in a datagram
+     is invalid, we now only drop the record and look at subsequent records (if
+     any are presemt) in the same datagram to avoid interoperability issues.
+     Previously the library was dropping the entire datagram. Where a record is
+     unexpected, the function mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will now return
+     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD.
+
 = mbed TLS 2.2.0 released 2015-11-04
 
 Security
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index a182713..5e549f6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
  * ECP       4   8 (Started from top)
  * MD        5   4
  * CIPHER    6   6
- * SSL       6   16 (Started from top)
+ * SSL       6   17 (Started from top)
  * SSL       7   31
  *
  * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 810409c..4514678 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE                        -0x6880  /**< Connection requires a write call. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT                           -0x6800  /**< The operation timed out. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT                  -0x6780  /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD                 -0x6700  /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
 
 /*
  * Various constants
@@ -2167,7 +2168,8 @@
  * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
  *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
- *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it.
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
  *
  * \note           If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
@@ -2183,6 +2185,12 @@
  *                 the following state after execution of this function.
  *                 Do not call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER.
  *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
+ *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or
@@ -2201,6 +2209,12 @@
  * \param ssl      SSL context
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return value.
+ *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
@@ -2218,6 +2232,13 @@
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT (see below), or
  *                 another negative error code.
  *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than a positive
+ *                 value or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, then the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
+ *
  * \note           When this function return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
  *                 (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
  *                 is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
@@ -2251,6 +2272,12 @@
  *                 or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
  *                 or another negative error code.
  *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than a positive
+ *                 value or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
+ *
  * \note           When this function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
  *                 it must be called later with the *same* arguments,
  *                 until it returns a positive value.
@@ -2274,6 +2301,12 @@
  * \param message   The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*)
  *
  * \return          0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
+ *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                             unsigned char level,
@@ -2282,6 +2315,14 @@
  * \brief          Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
  *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
+ *
+ * \return          0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
+ *
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
+ *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
+ *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it for
+ *                 a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index a1cf83a..debda1d 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@
             mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" );
         if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) )
             mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
+        if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) )
+            mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index 4298254..aaacf97 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
     /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes
      * Also check for possible overflow */
     if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len ||
-        (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0x03FFFFE0ull )
+        (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull )
     {
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
     }
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 9afd399..6b5b461 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -2584,7 +2584,9 @@
     {
         dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
 
-        if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
+        if( end < p ||
+            (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size ||
+            (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
             break;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index c18a3b4..aa473e9 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -3465,6 +3465,18 @@
  * uint16 epoch;            // DTLS only
  * uint48 sequence_number;  // DTLS only
  * uint16 length;
+ *
+ * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected)
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected.
+ *
+ * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will:
+ * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0
+ * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD
+ * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value
+ * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else.
+ * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received
+ * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others.
  */
 static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
@@ -3500,34 +3512,6 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-    if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
-    {
-        /* Drop unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages */
-        if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
-            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
-            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ChangeCipherSpec" ) );
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
-        }
-
-        /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records,
-         * except at the beginning of renegotiations */
-        if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
-            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
-            && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
-                   ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO )
-#endif
-            )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) );
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
-        }
-    }
-#endif
-
     /* Check version */
     if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver )
     {
@@ -3541,53 +3525,6 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
     }
 
-    /* Check epoch (and sequence number) with DTLS */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-    if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
-    {
-        unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
-
-        if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
-                                        "expected %d, received %d",
-                                        ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-            /*
-             * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
-             * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we
-             * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
-             * fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
-             */
-            if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
-                ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
-                rec_epoch == 0 &&
-                ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
-                ssl->in_left > 13 &&
-                ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
-            {
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
-                                            "from the same port" ) );
-                return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) );
-            }
-            else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
-        /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */
-        if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch &&
-            mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
-        }
-#endif
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
     /* Check length against the size of our buffer */
     if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN
                          - (size_t)( ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf ) )
@@ -3637,6 +3574,82 @@
 #endif
     }
 
+    /*
+     * DTLS-related tests done last, because most of them may result in
+     * silently dropping the record (but not the whole datagram), and we only
+     * want to consider that after ensuring that the "basic" fields (type,
+     * version, length) are sane.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+    {
+        unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
+
+        /* Drop unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages */
+        if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ChangeCipherSpec" ) );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
+        }
+
+        /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records,
+         * except at the beginning of renegotiations */
+        if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+            ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+            && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+                   ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO )
+#endif
+            )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
+        }
+
+        /* Check epoch (and sequence number) with DTLS */
+        if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
+                                        "expected %d, received %d",
+                                        ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+            /*
+             * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
+             * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we
+             * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
+             * fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
+             */
+            if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+                ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
+                rec_epoch == 0 &&
+                ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+                ssl->in_left > 13 &&
+                ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
+            {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
+                                            "from the same port" ) );
+                return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) );
+            }
+            else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+        /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */
+        if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch &&
+            mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
     return( 0 );
 }
 
@@ -3762,13 +3775,26 @@
         if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
             ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT )
         {
-            /* Ignore bad record and get next one; drop the whole datagram
-             * since current header cannot be trusted to find the next record
-             * in current datagram */
-            ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
-            ssl->in_left = 0;
+            if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD )
+            {
+                /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */
+                ssl->next_record_offset = ssl->in_msglen
+                                        + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl );
 
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (header)" ) );
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record "
+                                            "(header)" ) );
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */
+                ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
+                ssl->in_left = 0;
+
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record "
+                                            "(header)" ) );
+            }
+
+            /* Get next record */
             goto read_record_header;
         }
 #endif