Clarify attribution for the Bleichenbacher's Cat fix
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1e3ffbf..eae0a08 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,8 +7,11 @@
decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle
attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on
RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not
- (EC)DH(E)). Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi
- Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. CVE-2018-19608
+ (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham
+ (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan),
+ Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom
+ (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail
+ in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608
* In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number
via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit
a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing