diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/include/mbedtls/aria.h
index 587cbf8..7e55df7 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aria.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aria.h
@@ -259,10 +259,6 @@
  * \brief      This function performs an ARIA-CTR encryption or decryption
  *             operation.
  *
- *             This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode
- *             parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer
- *             defined in the \p input parameter.
- *
  *             Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule
  *             for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you
  *             must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc()
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
index e15aeb3..002c8de 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
  *                       on a successful invocation.
  * \param end            The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container.
  * \param tag_must_mask  A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within
- *                       the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_value.
+ *                       the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_val.
  * \param tag_must_val   The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the
  *                       SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask.
  *                       Mismatching tags lead to an error.
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
  *                       while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means
  *                       that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag.
  * \param tag_may_mask   A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within
- *                       the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_value.
+ *                       the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_val.
  * \param tag_may_val    The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the
  *                       SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask.
  *                       Mismatching tags will be silently ignored.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index e7f3131..3ba1777 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
         #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
 typedef  int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
 typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX                UINT64_MAX
     #elif defined(__GNUC__) && (                         \
     defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)     || \
     defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__)  || \
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@
         #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
 typedef  int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
 typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX                UINT64_MAX
         #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
 /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */
 typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI)));
@@ -156,6 +158,7 @@
         #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
 typedef  int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
 typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX                UINT64_MAX
         #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
 /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */
 typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl;
@@ -165,6 +168,7 @@
 /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */
 typedef  int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
 typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX                UINT64_MAX
     #endif
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */
 
@@ -175,6 +179,7 @@
     #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */
 typedef  int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
 typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX                UINT32_MAX
     #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
 typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl;
         #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL
@@ -203,6 +208,12 @@
  * \brief          MPI structure
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_mpi {
+    /** Pointer to limbs.
+     *
+     * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0.
+     */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p);
+
     /** Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise.
      *
      * The number 0 must be represented with `s = +1`. Although many library
@@ -214,16 +225,19 @@
      * Note that this implies that calloc() or `... = {0}` does not create
      * a valid MPI representation. You must call mbedtls_mpi_init().
      */
-    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s);
+    signed short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s);
 
     /** Total number of limbs in \c p.  */
-    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n);
-
-    /** Pointer to limbs.
-     *
-     * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0.
+    unsigned short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n);
+    /* Make sure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS fits in n.
+     * Use the same limit value on all platforms so that we don't have to
+     * think about different behavior on the rare platforms where
+     * unsigned short can store values larger than the minimum required by
+     * the C language, which is 65535.
      */
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p);
+#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535
+#error "MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 is not supported"
+#endif
 }
 mbedtls_mpi;
 
@@ -530,7 +544,7 @@
  * \param X        The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
  * \param buf      The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length
  *                 \p buflen Bytes.
- * \param buflen   The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes.
+ * \param buflen   The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 if successful.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
@@ -545,7 +559,7 @@
  * \param X        The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
  * \param buf      The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length
  *                 \p buflen Bytes.
- * \param buflen   The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes.
+ * \param buflen   The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 if successful.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
@@ -985,8 +999,8 @@
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than
  *                 or equal to one.
- * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p has no modular inverse
- *                 with respect to \p N.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p A has no modular
+ *                 inverse with respect to \p N.
  */
 int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
                         const mbedtls_mpi *N);
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/include/mbedtls/camellia.h
index f4aa002..8033c13 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/camellia.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/camellia.h
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
  * *note       Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same
  *             key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls
  *             to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via
- *             mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode
+ *             mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether the mode
  *             is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
  *
  * \warning    You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index 03e2327..53ef2ad 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@
  *
  * \return              The cipher name, which is a human readable string,
  *                      with static storage duration.
- * \return              \c NULL if \c info is \p NULL.
+ * \return              \c NULL if \p info is \c NULL.
  */
 static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name(
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@
 }
 
 /**
- * \brief               This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE.
+ * \brief               This function initializes a \p ctx as NONE.
  *
  * \param ctx           The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL.
  */
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@
  * \param ctx           The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
  *
  * \return              The key length of the cipher in bits.
- * \return              #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been
+ * \return              #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if \p ctx has not been
  *                      initialized.
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@
  * \param ctx           The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
  *                      bound to a key.
  * \param output        The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable
- *                      buffer of at least \p block_size Bytes.
+ *                      buffer of at least block_size Bytes.
  * \param olen          The length of the data written to the \p output buffer.
  *                      This may not be \c NULL.
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
index 6ffe681..0232a71 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@
  *                 initialized.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
- * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p field is invalid.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p param is invalid.
  * \return         An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code if the copy fails.
  */
 int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index e797c1a..3b2b418 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -207,8 +207,9 @@
  * \param md_alg        The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
  * \param f_rng_blind   The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
  *                      \c NULL.
- * \param p_rng_blind   The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
- *                      \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ * \param p_rng_blind   The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This
+ *                      may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context
+ *                      parameter.
  *
  * \return          \c 0 on success.
  * \return          An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
@@ -326,8 +327,8 @@
  * \param md_alg        The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
  * \param f_rng_blind   The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
  *                      \c NULL.
- * \param p_rng_blind   The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
- *                      \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ * \param p_rng_blind   The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This may be
+ *                      \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context parameter.
  * \param rs_ctx        The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL
  *                      to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it
  *                      must point to an initialized restart context.
@@ -459,7 +460,7 @@
  *                  via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair().
  * \param md_alg    The message digest that was used to hash the message.
  * \param hash      The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable
- *                  buffer of length \p blen Bytes.
+ *                  buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
  * \param hlen      The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes.
  * \param sig       The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a
  *                  writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the
@@ -502,7 +503,7 @@
  *                  via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair().
  * \param md_alg    The message digest that was used to hash the message.
  * \param hash      The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable
- *                  buffer of length \p blen Bytes.
+ *                  buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
  * \param hlen      The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes.
  * \param sig       The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a
  *                  writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the
@@ -549,7 +550,7 @@
  * \param ctx       The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
  *                  and have a group and public key bound to it.
  * \param hash      The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable
- *                  buffer of length \p size Bytes.
+ *                  buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
  * \param hlen      The size of the hash \p hash.
  * \param sig       The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable
  *                  buffer of length \p slen Bytes.
@@ -579,7 +580,7 @@
  * \param ctx       The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
  *                  and have a group and public key bound to it.
  * \param hash      The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable
- *                  buffer of length \p size Bytes.
+ *                  buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
  * \param hlen      The size of the hash \p hash.
  * \param sig       The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable
  *                  buffer of length \p slen Bytes.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index fc42838..0e678a3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@
  *
  *                  It only checks that the point is non-zero, has
  *                  valid coordinates and lies on the curve. It does not verify
- *                  that it is indeed a multiple of \p G. This additional
+ *                  that it is indeed a multiple of \c G. This additional
  *                  check is computationally more expensive, is not required
  *                  by standards, and should not be necessary if the group
  *                  used has a small cofactor. In particular, it is useless for
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@
                              const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
 
 /**
- * \brief           This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a
+ * \brief           This function checks that an \c mbedtls_mpi is a
  *                  valid private key for this curve.
  *
  * \note            This function uses bare components rather than an
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
index 4ca6b08..2e5aa6d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@
  * \param len           The length of the personalization string.
  *                      This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT
  *                      and also at most
- *                      #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2
- *                      where \p entropy_len is the entropy length
+ *                      #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len * 3 / 2
+ *                      where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
  *                      described above.
  *
  * \return              \c 0 if successful.
@@ -313,8 +313,8 @@
  * \param len           The length of the additional data.
  *                      This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT
  *                      and also at most
- *                      #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len
- *                      where \p entropy_len is the entropy length
+ *                      #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len
+ *                      where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
  *                      (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()).
  *
  * \return              \c 0 if successful.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index fbf464d..30e4d13 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -1283,8 +1283,8 @@
  * );
  * ```
  * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call.
- * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes
- * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size.
+ * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \c output_size bytes
+ * of random data and set \c *output_length to \c output_size.
  *
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/md.h b/include/mbedtls/md.h
index f717618..5831e12 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/md.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/md.h
@@ -146,19 +146,22 @@
  *            stronger message digests instead.
  *
  */
+/* Note: these are aligned with the definitions of PSA_ALG_ macros for hashes,
+ * in order to enable an efficient implementation of conversion functions.
+ * This is tested by md_to_from_psa() in test_suite_md. */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0,    /**< None. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_MD5,       /**< The MD5 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,      /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,    /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,    /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,    /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,    /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224,    /**< The SHA3-224 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256,    /**< The SHA3-256 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384,    /**< The SHA3-384 message digest. */
-    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512,    /**< The SHA3-512 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_MD5=0x03,       /**< The MD5 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160=0x04, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1=0x05,      /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224=0x08,    /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256=0x09,    /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384=0x0a,    /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512=0x0b,    /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224=0x10,  /**< The SHA3-224 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256=0x11,  /**< The SHA3-256 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384=0x12,  /**< The SHA3-384 message digest. */
+    MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512=0x13,  /**< The SHA3-512 message digest. */
 } mbedtls_md_type_t;
 
 /* Note: this should always be >= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index cdd3882..b5d12cf 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@
  *
  * \return          0 on success (signature is valid),
  *                  #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
- *                  signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen,
+ *                  signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len,
  *                  or a specific error code.
  *
  * \note            For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5.
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@
  *                  #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can't be
  *                  used for this type of signatures,
  *                  #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
- *                  signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen,
+ *                  signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len,
  *                  or a specific error code.
  *
  * \note            If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index da8639b..3d57aa2 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -282,15 +282,15 @@
  * \brief          This function completes an RSA context from
  *                 a set of imported core parameters.
  *
- *                 To setup an RSA public key, precisely \p N and \p E
+ *                 To setup an RSA public key, precisely \c N and \c E
  *                 must have been imported.
  *
  *                 To setup an RSA private key, sufficient information must
  *                 be present for the other parameters to be derivable.
  *
  *                 The default implementation supports the following:
- *                 <ul><li>Derive \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, \p E.</li>
- *                 <li>Derive \p N, \p D from \p P, \p Q, \p E.</li></ul>
+ *                 <ul><li>Derive \c P, \c Q from \c N, \c D, \c E.</li>
+ *                 <li>Derive \c N, \c D from \c P, \c Q, \c E.</li></ul>
  *                 Alternative implementations need not support these.
  *
  *                 If this function runs successfully, it guarantees that
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
  * \note           This function does not handle message padding.
  *
  * \note           Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that
- *                 input is smaller than \p N.
+ *                 input is smaller than \c N.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 on success.
  * \return         An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
@@ -984,8 +984,8 @@
  *                 verification.
  *
  * \note           For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
- *                 mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and
- *                 \p hash_id.
+ *                 mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \c md_alg and
+ *                 \c hash_id.
  *
  * \param ctx      The initialized RSA public key context to use.
  * \param md_alg   The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 7b11e51..e4d817f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@
     const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs);      /*!< allowed signature algorithms       */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
     const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves             */
 #endif
 
@@ -2170,10 +2170,10 @@
  * \param own_cid     The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want
  *                    the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us.
  *                    This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0.
- *                    This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to
+ *                    This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
  *                    MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
  * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid.
- *                    This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to
+ *                    This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
  *                    MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
  *
  * \note              The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the
@@ -3124,8 +3124,8 @@
  *
  * \param session  The session structure to be saved.
  * \param buf      The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
- *                 writeable buffer of at least \p len bytes, or may be \c
- *                 NULL if \p len is \c 0.
+ *                 writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
+ *                 NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
  * \param buf_len  The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
  * \param olen     The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
  *                 been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
@@ -3266,7 +3266,7 @@
  *                      record headers.
  *
  * \return              \c 0 on success.
- * \return              #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p own_cid_len
+ * \return              #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p len
  *                      is too large.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
@@ -3634,7 +3634,7 @@
                                      unsigned int bitlen);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /**
  * \brief          Set the allowed curves in order of preference.
@@ -3680,7 +3680,7 @@
 void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                                 const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 /**
  * \brief          Set the allowed groups in order of preference.
@@ -3810,8 +3810,8 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
 /**
  * \brief          Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake.
- *                 Available in \p f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(),
- *                 this is the same value passed to \p f_sni callback of
+ *                 Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(),
+ *                 this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of
  *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of
  *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni().
  *
@@ -3820,10 +3820,10 @@
  *                 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed.
  *
  * \return         const pointer to SNI extension value.
- *                 - value is valid only when called in \p f_cert_cb
+ *                 - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb
  *                   registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb().
  *                 - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present.
- *                 - value is not '\0'-terminated.  Use \c name_len for len.
+ *                 - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len.
  *                 - value must not be freed.
  */
 const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -4116,7 +4116,7 @@
  *                 negotiated.
  *
  * \param conf         SSL configuration
- * \param tls_version  TLS protocol version number (\p mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
+ * \param tls_version  TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
  *                     (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
  */
 static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
@@ -4173,7 +4173,7 @@
  *                 negotiated.
  *
  * \param conf         SSL configuration
- * \param tls_version  TLS protocol version number (\p mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
+ * \param tls_version  TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
  *                     (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
  */
 static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
index b1b4250..7a90191 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
  *
  * \param data            The SSL cache context to use.
  * \param session_id      The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
- *                        associated to \p session.
+ *                        associated to session.
  * \param session_id_len  The length of \p session_id in bytes.
  *
  * \return                \c 0 on success. This indicates the cache entry for
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
index 7c9a761..6e1f5b6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
  * \param san_buf  The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
  *                 alternative name.
  * \param san      The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
- *                 of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
+ *                 of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf.
  *
  * \note           Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280:
  *                 "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName",
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
  * \note           This function should be called on a single raw data of
  *                 subject alternative name. For example, after successful
  *                 certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
- *                 \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
+ *                 \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
  *                 this function.
  *
  * \warning        The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index 8a05efd..6b06187 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -4407,9 +4407,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
  *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
  *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
+ *         respectively of \c key.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         An operation was not previously started on this context via
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index 94def5c..4b0cc70 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -1036,12 +1036,12 @@
  *                      (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t).
  * \param pake_family   The family of the primitive
  *                      (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends
- *                      on \p type, for more information consult the
+ *                      on \p pake_type, for more information consult the
  *                      documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t
  *                      constants).
  * \param pake_bits     The bit-size of the primitive
  *                      (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation
- *                      of this parameter depends on \p family, for more
+ *                      of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more
  *                      information consult the documentation of individual
  *                      ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants).
  *
@@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
+ *         \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
  *         suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session.
@@ -1627,8 +1627,8 @@
  *                             \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
  *                             information.
  * \param output_size          Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must
- *                             be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p
- *                             primitive, \p step) where \p alg and
+ *                             be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c
+ *                             primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and
  *                             \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive
  *                             in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is
  *                             the output step.
@@ -1693,9 +1693,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm, or the
- *         \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher suite
- *         or \p step.
+ *         \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm,
+ *         or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm,
+ *         cipher suite or \p step.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the
  *         \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@
  *
  * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive.
  * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation
- * and \p key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by
+ * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by
  * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
@@ -1877,7 +1877,7 @@
  * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
  * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
  *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p step).
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
 
@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@
  * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
  * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE()
  *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p step).
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
 
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 36effaf..d559c9e 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -114,7 +114,9 @@
             mbedtls_free(X->p);
         }
 
-        X->n = nblimbs;
+        /* nblimbs fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS
+         * fits, and we've checked that nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */
+        X->n = (unsigned short) nblimbs;
         X->p = p;
     }
 
@@ -162,7 +164,9 @@
         mbedtls_free(X->p);
     }
 
-    X->n = i;
+    /* i fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS
+     * fits, and we've checked that i <= nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */
+    X->n = (unsigned short) i;
     X->p = p;
 
     return 0;
@@ -896,6 +900,8 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t j;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint c;
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
@@ -929,9 +935,9 @@
 
     /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = X->p;
+    p = X->p;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j);
+    c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j);
 
     p += j;
 
@@ -1574,8 +1580,8 @@
 {
     mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1;
     mbedtls_mpi U;
-
-    U.n = U.s = (int) z;
+    U.n = 1;
+    U.s = 1;
     U.p = &z;
 
     mpi_montmul(A, &U, N, mm, T);
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.c b/library/bignum_core.c
index de57cfc..8bf819c 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.c
+++ b/library/bignum_core.c
@@ -36,22 +36,17 @@
 size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a)
 {
 #if defined(__has_builtin)
-#if __has_builtin(__builtin_clz)
-    if (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) == sizeof(unsigned int)) {
-        return (size_t) __builtin_clz(a);
-    }
-#endif
-#if __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl)
-    if (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) == sizeof(unsigned long)) {
-        return (size_t) __builtin_clzl(a);
-    }
-#endif
-#if __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll)
-    if (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) == sizeof(unsigned long long)) {
-        return (size_t) __builtin_clzll(a);
-    }
+#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clz)
+    #define core_clz __builtin_clz
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl)
+    #define core_clz __builtin_clzl
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll)
+    #define core_clz __builtin_clzll
 #endif
 #endif
+#if defined(core_clz)
+    return (size_t) core_clz(a);
+#else
     size_t j;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1);
 
@@ -64,6 +59,7 @@
     }
 
     return j;
+#endif
 }
 
 size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs)
diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h
index 839b7d1..66033dc 100644
--- a/library/common.h
+++ b/library/common.h
@@ -242,8 +242,12 @@
 /* Define `asm` for compilers which don't define it. */
 /* *INDENT-OFF* */
 #ifndef asm
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#define asm __asm
+#else
 #define asm __asm__
 #endif
+#endif
 /* *INDENT-ON* */
 
 /*
@@ -291,8 +295,8 @@
 /* Define compiler branch hints */
 #if defined(__has_builtin)
 #if __has_builtin(__builtin_expect)
-#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x)       __builtin_expect((x), 1)
-#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x)     __builtin_expect((x), 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x)       __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1)
+#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x)     __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0)
 #endif
 #endif
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_LIKELY)
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index d907587..049a1e0 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -2932,9 +2932,9 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
-#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) }
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
 #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x)   \
-    ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x)
+    ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
 /*
  * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in
  * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate
@@ -3650,4 +3650,4 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
 
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index a4fa663..e3b3376 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@
 #define ECP_VALIDATE(cond)        \
     MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
 
-#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) }
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
 
 #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x)   \
-    ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x)
+    ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
 
 #define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \
-        ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(1, 0, NULL) }
+        ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) }
 #define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \
-        ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(1, 1, mpi_one) }
+        ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) ||   \
     defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) ||   \
@@ -4512,12 +4512,13 @@
     defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
 /*
  * Create an MPI from embedded constants
- * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+ * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) and
+ * len < 1048576)
  */
 static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len)
 {
     X->s = 1;
-    X->n = len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+    X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
     X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p;
 }
 #endif
@@ -5657,6 +5658,7 @@
     size_t shift   = bits % biL;
     size_t adjust  = (shift + biL - 1) / biL;
     size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL);
     if (A1 == NULL) {
@@ -5672,7 +5674,6 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0;
     if (adjust != 0) {
         mask  = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1;
     }
diff --git a/library/md.c b/library/md.c
index 964d4bd..3589d63 100644
--- a/library/md.c
+++ b/library/md.c
@@ -786,78 +786,6 @@
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
-psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
-{
-    switch (md_type) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
-            return PSA_ALG_MD5;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
-            return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
-            return PSA_ALG_SHA_1;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
-            return PSA_ALG_SHA_224;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
-            return PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
-            return PSA_ALG_SHA_384;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
-        case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
-            return PSA_ALG_SHA_512;
-#endif
-        default:
-            return PSA_ALG_NONE;
-    }
-}
-
-mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
-{
-    switch (psa_alg) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
-        case PSA_ALG_MD5:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
-        case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
-        case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
-#endif
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
-    }
-}
-
 int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
 {
     return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_md_errors,
diff --git a/library/md_psa.h b/library/md_psa.h
index 6645c83..8e00bb1 100644
--- a/library/md_psa.h
+++ b/library/md_psa.h
@@ -31,12 +31,21 @@
  * \brief           This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
  *                  associated with the given digest type.
  *
- * \param md_type   The type of digest to search for.
+ * \param md_type   The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
  *
- * \return          The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type.
- * \return          PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is not supported.
+ * \warning         If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
+ *                  not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
+ *
+ * \warning         This function does not check if the algorithm is
+ *                  supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
+ *
+ * \return          The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
+ *                  regardless of whether it is supported or not.
  */
-psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type);
+static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
+{
+    return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
+}
 
 /**
  * \brief           This function returns the given digest type
@@ -44,10 +53,16 @@
  *
  * \param psa_alg   The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
  *
- * \return          The MD type associated with \p psa_alg.
- * \return          MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the algorithm is not supported.
+ * \warning         This function does not check if the algorithm is
+ *                  supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
+ *
+ * \return          The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
+ *                  regardless of whether it is supported or not.
  */
-mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg);
+static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
+{
+    return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
+}
 
 /** Convert PSA status to MD error code.
  *
diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c
index c67b80d..2e93a5b 100644
--- a/library/platform_util.c
+++ b/library/platform_util.c
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@
  * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their
  * platform and needs.
  */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && !defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) \
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && !(defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && \
+    !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)) \
     && !defined(_WIN32)
 static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset;
 #endif
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@
          */
         __msan_unpoison(buf, len);
 #endif
-#elif defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__)
+#elif defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
         memset_s(buf, len, 0, len);
 #elif defined(_WIN32)
         SecureZeroMemory(buf, len);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index a2a6755..5e8d0d0 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1535,6 +1535,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a
      * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid
@@ -1560,7 +1561,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key(
@@ -2509,6 +2510,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -2525,7 +2527,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2695,6 +2697,7 @@
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
     uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
         key,
@@ -2705,7 +2708,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2831,6 +2834,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     *signature_length = 0;
 
@@ -2862,7 +2866,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3165,6 +3169,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3189,7 +3194,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3216,6 +3221,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3239,7 +3245,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3313,6 +3319,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not
      * previously errored. */
@@ -3339,7 +3346,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4020,6 +4027,7 @@
     psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ?
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT :
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -4049,7 +4057,7 @@
     }
     operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg);
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4275,6 +4283,7 @@
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t default_iv_length = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4288,7 +4297,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4345,6 +4354,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4358,7 +4368,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4612,6 +4622,7 @@
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
@@ -4641,7 +4652,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -5789,6 +5800,8 @@
     mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t m;
+    size_t m_bytes;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&k);
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2);
@@ -5810,9 +5823,9 @@
 
     /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */
     /* Let m be the bit size of N. */
-    size_t m = ecp_group.nbits;
+    m = ecp_group.nbits;
 
-    size_t m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
+    m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
 
     /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2));
@@ -5965,6 +5978,7 @@
     size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
     size_t storage_size = bytes;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) {
         return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -6013,7 +6027,7 @@
     }
 
     slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -7114,6 +7128,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    size_t expected_length;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -7133,7 +7148,7 @@
      * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot.
      * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily
      * be exact for it as well. */
-    size_t expected_length =
+    expected_length =
         PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits);
     if (output_size < expected_length) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
@@ -7789,6 +7804,8 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
+    psa_key_type_t type;
 
     if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
@@ -7802,11 +7819,11 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
-    psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+    type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
 
     if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
         type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) {
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index 4e11b36..30d4c04 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -529,6 +529,12 @@
     psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg);
     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg);
 
+    /* Just to get the error status right, as rsa_set_padding() doesn't
+     * distinguish between "bad RSA algorithm" and "unknown hash". */
+    if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg) == NULL) {
+        return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
     return mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg);
 }
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 21a89be..5074c3a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -1567,10 +1567,10 @@
 
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 /**
  * \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index d18b80a..6e15493 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
  * mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves returns void and so can't return
  * any error codes.
  */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
     /* Heap allocate and translate curve_list from internal to IANA group ids */
     if (ssl->conf->curve_list != NULL) {
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@
         ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 0;
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
@@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
 /*
  * Set the allowed elliptic curves
@@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@
     conf->group_list = NULL;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 /*
  * Set the allowed groups
@@ -2949,7 +2949,7 @@
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                              const uint16_t *group_list)
 {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
     conf->curve_list = NULL;
 #endif
     conf->group_list = group_list;
@@ -4084,14 +4084,14 @@
         return;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
     if (ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated) {
         mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->group_list);
     }
     handshake->group_list = NULL;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
@@ -5326,7 +5326,7 @@
             conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
             conf->curve_list = NULL;
 #endif
             conf->group_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_groups;
@@ -5352,7 +5352,7 @@
             conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_default_sig_algs;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
             conf->curve_list = NULL;
 #endif
             conf->group_list = ssl_preset_default_groups;
@@ -5544,7 +5544,7 @@
     return -1;
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
 /*
  * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id() but with a mbedtls_ecp_group_id.
  */
@@ -5558,62 +5558,55 @@
 
     return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id);
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-#define EC_NAME(_name_)     _name_
-#else
-#define EC_NAME(_name_)     NULL
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
 static const struct {
     uint16_t tls_id;
     mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
     psa_ecc_family_t psa_family;
     uint16_t bits;
-    const char *name;
 } tls_id_match_table[] =
 {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
-    { 25, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 521, EC_NAME("secp521r1") },
+    { 25, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 521 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
-    { 28, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 512, EC_NAME("brainpoolP512r1") },
+    { 28, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 512 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
-    { 24, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 384, EC_NAME("secp384r1") },
+    { 24, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 384 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
-    { 27, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 384, EC_NAME("brainpoolP384r1") },
+    { 27, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 384 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
-    { 23, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256, EC_NAME("secp256r1") },
+    { 23, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
-    { 22, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256, EC_NAME("secp256k1") },
+    { 22, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
-    { 26, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 256, EC_NAME("brainpoolP256r1") },
+    { 26, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 256 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
-    { 21, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 224, EC_NAME("secp224r1") },
+    { 21, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 224 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
-    { 20, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 224, EC_NAME("secp224k1") },
+    { 20, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 224 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
-    { 19, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 192, EC_NAME("secp192r1") },
+    { 19, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 192 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
-    { 18, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 192, EC_NAME("secp192k1") },
+    { 18, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 192 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
-    { 29, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255, EC_NAME("x25519") },
+    { 29, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 },
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
-    { 30, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448, EC_NAME("x448") },
+    { 30, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 },
 #endif
-    { 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL },
+    { 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0 },
 };
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id,
@@ -5659,11 +5652,32 @@
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+static const struct {
+    uint16_t tls_id;
+    const char *name;
+} tls_id_curve_name_table[] =
+{
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519" },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448" },
+    { 0, NULL },
+};
+
 const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id)
 {
-    for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) {
-        if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) {
-            return tls_id_match_table[i].name;
+    for (int i = 0; tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) {
+        if (tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) {
+            return tls_id_curve_name_table[i].name;
         }
     }
 
@@ -7344,7 +7358,7 @@
      * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
      */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
     {
         const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
 
@@ -7371,7 +7385,7 @@
             }
         }
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 
     if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain,
                                      ciphersuite_info,
@@ -8793,11 +8807,17 @@
             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
                 received_sig_algs[i]);
 
+        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg =
+            mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((unsigned char) hash_alg_received);
+        if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
         if (sig_alg == sig_alg_received) {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
             if (ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key) {
                 psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg =
-                    mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(hash_alg_received);
+                    mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
 
                 if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA &&
                     !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key,
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index c7124cd..7c2c818 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@
 #define USAGE_ALPN ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) || \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) || \
     (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
     defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH))
 #define USAGE_GROUPS \
@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@
     }
 #endif  /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) || \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) || \
     (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
     defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH))
     if (opt.groups != NULL &&
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index 474f2d9..58c2f1e 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@
 #define USAGE_EARLY_DATA ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) || \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) || \
     (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
     defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH))
 #define USAGE_GROUPS \
@@ -3095,7 +3095,7 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) || \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) || \
     (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
     defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH))
     if (opt.groups != NULL &&
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c
index 2ce4f1a..aea056b 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE)
 
+#define ARRAY_LENGTH(x)     (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
+
 void my_debug(void *ctx, int level,
               const char *file, int line,
               const char *str)
@@ -449,64 +451,117 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
 
+static const struct {
+    uint16_t tls_id;
+    const char *name;
+    uint8_t is_supported;
+} tls_id_group_name_table[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519", 0 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448", 0 },
+#endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
     defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, "ffdhe2048", 1 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, "ffdhe3072", 1 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, "ffdhe4096", 1 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, "ffdhe6144", 1 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, "ffdhe8192", 1 },
+#else
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, "ffdhe2048", 0 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, "ffdhe3072", 0 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, "ffdhe4096", 0 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, "ffdhe6144", 0 },
+    { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, "ffdhe8192", 0 },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED && PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+    { 0, NULL, 0 },
+};
 
-/* Finite Field Group Names (DHE) */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE2048     "ffdhe2048"
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE3072     "ffdhe3072"
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE4096     "ffdhe4096"
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE6144     "ffdhe6144"
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE8192     "ffdhe8192"
-
-static uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_group_from_name(const char *name)
+static uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_tls_id_from_name(const char *name)
 {
-    if (strcmp(name, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE2048) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048;
-    } else if (strcmp(name, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE3072) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072;
-    } else if (strcmp(name, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE4096) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096;
-    } else if (strcmp(name, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE6144) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144;
-    } else if (strcmp(name, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE8192) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192;
+    if (name == NULL) {
+        return 0;
     }
+
+    for (int i = 0; tls_id_group_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(tls_id_group_name_table[i].name, name) == 0) {
+            return tls_id_group_name_table[i].tls_id;
+        }
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }
 
-static const uint16_t *mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_supported_groups(void)
+static void mbedtls_ssl_print_supported_groups_list(void)
 {
-    static const uint16_t ffdh_groups[] = {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048,
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072,
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096,
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144,
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192,
-        0
-    };
-    return ffdh_groups;
-}
-
-static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_name_from_group(uint16_t group)
-{
-    switch (group) {
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048:
-            return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE2048;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072:
-            return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE3072;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096:
-            return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE4096;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144:
-            return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE6144;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192:
-            return MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NAME_FFDHE8192;
-        default:
-            return NULL;
+    for (int i = 0; tls_id_group_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) {
+        if (tls_id_group_name_table[i].is_supported == 1) {
+            mbedtls_printf("%s ", tls_id_group_name_table[i].name);
+        }
     }
-    return NULL;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED && PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
 
 int parse_groups(const char *groups, uint16_t *group_list, size_t group_list_len)
 {
@@ -519,14 +574,9 @@
     } else if (strcmp(p, "default") != 0) {
         /* Leave room for a final NULL in group list */
         while (i < group_list_len - 1 && *p != '\0') {
+            uint16_t curve_tls_id;
             q = p;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
-            defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
-            uint16_t ffdh_group = 0;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
-            const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_cur = NULL;
-#endif
+
             /* Terminate the current string */
             while (*p != ',' && *p != '\0') {
                 p++;
@@ -535,36 +585,12 @@
                 *p++ = '\0';
             }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
-            if ((curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name(q)) != NULL) {
-                group_list[i++] = curve_cur->tls_id;
-            } else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
-            defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
-            if ((ffdh_group = mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_group_from_name(q)) != 0) {
-                group_list[i++] = ffdh_group;
-            } else
-#endif
-            {
+            if ((curve_tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_tls_id_from_name(q)) != 0) {
+                group_list[i++] = curve_tls_id;
+            } else {
                 mbedtls_printf("unknown group %s\n", q);
                 mbedtls_printf("supported groups: ");
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
-                for (curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
-                     curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
-                     curve_cur++) {
-                    mbedtls_printf("%s ", curve_cur->name);
-                }
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
-                defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
-                const uint16_t *supported_ffdh_group = mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_supported_groups();
-                while (*supported_ffdh_group != 0) {
-                    mbedtls_printf("%s ",
-                                   mbedtls_ssl_ffdh_name_from_group(*supported_ffdh_group));
-                    supported_ffdh_group++;
-                }
-#endif
+                mbedtls_ssl_print_supported_groups_list();
                 mbedtls_printf("\n");
                 return -1;
             }
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 7405491..aefe0c6 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -2527,15 +2527,6 @@
     # start with full config for maximum coverage (also enables USE_PSA)
     helper_libtestdriver1_adjust_config "full"
 
-    # keep excluding TLS and key exchanges (this will be removed in #7749)
-    # Note: key exchanges are not explicitly disabled here because they are
-    #       auto-disabled in build_info.h as long as the following symbols
-    #       are not enabled.
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
-
     # enable support for drivers and configuring PSA-only algorithms
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
     if [ "$DRIVER_ONLY" -eq 1 ]; then
@@ -2564,7 +2555,7 @@
 #
 # Keep in sync with component_test_psa_crypto_config_reference_ecc_no_ecp_at_all()
 component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_no_ecp_at_all () {
-    msg "build: full + accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - TLS - KEY_EXCHANGE - ECP"
+    msg "build: full + accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - ECP"
 
     # Algorithms and key types to accelerate
     loc_accel_list="ALG_ECDSA ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA \
@@ -2603,22 +2594,28 @@
     # Run the tests
     # -------------
 
-    msg "test: full + accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - TLS - KEY_EXCHANGE - ECP"
+    msg "test: full + accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - ECP"
     make test
+
+    msg "ssl-opt: full + accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - ECP"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 # Reference function used for driver's coverage analysis in analyze_outcomes.py
 # in conjunction with component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_no_ecp_at_all().
 # Keep in sync with its accelerated counterpart.
 component_test_psa_crypto_config_reference_ecc_no_ecp_at_all () {
-    msg "build: full + non accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - TLS - KEY_EXCHANGE"
+    msg "build: full + non accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA"
 
     config_psa_crypto_no_ecp_at_all 0
 
     make
 
-    msg "test: crypto_full + non accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA - TLS - KEY_EXCHANGE"
+    msg "test: full + non accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA"
     make test
+
+    msg "ssl-opt: full + non accelerated EC algs + USE_PSA"
+    tests/ssl-opt.sh
 }
 
 # Helper function used in:
@@ -4286,6 +4283,10 @@
 
     msg "size: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m0plus -Os, baremetal_size"
     ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}size -t library/*.o
+    for lib in library/*.a; do
+        echo "$lib:"
+        ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}size -t $lib | grep TOTALS
+    done
 }
 
 component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_udbl_division () {
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index 5f203ab..761d877 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -930,13 +930,14 @@
                                int *written,
                                const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
     if (ret > 0) {
         *written += ret;
     }
@@ -976,13 +977,14 @@
                               int *read, int *fragments,
                               const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
     if (ret > 0) {
         (*fragments)++;
         *read += ret;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_random.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_random.function
index e4db3d7..34221a7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_random.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_random.function
@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@
 
         /* Temporarily use a legacy MPI for analysis, because the
          * necessary auxiliary functions don't exist yet in core. */
-        mbedtls_mpi B = { 1, limbs, upper_bound };
-        mbedtls_mpi R = { 1, limbs, result };
+        mbedtls_mpi B = { .s = 1, .n = limbs, .p = upper_bound };
+        mbedtls_mpi R = { .s = 1, .n = limbs, .p = result };
 
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&R, &B) < 0);
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&R, min) >= 0);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data
index 8c079c5..20890c4 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data
@@ -63,5 +63,5 @@
 mbedtls_debug_print_crt:"data_files/server1.crt":"MyFile":999:"PREFIX_":"MyFile(0999)\: PREFIX_ #1\:\nMyFile(0999)\: cert. version     \: 3\nMyFile(0999)\: serial number     \: 01\nMyFile(0999)\: issuer name       \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nMyFile(0999)\: subject name      \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nMyFile(0999)\: issued  on        \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nMyFile(0999)\: expires on        \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nMyFile(0999)\: signed using      \: RSA with SHA1\nMyFile(0999)\: RSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nMyFile(0999)\: basic constraints \: CA=false\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\:  a9 02 1f 3d 40 6a d5 55 53 8b fd 36 ee 82 65 2e\nMyFile(0999)\:  15 61 5e 89 bf b8 e8 45 90 db ee 88 16 52 d3 f1\nMyFile(0999)\:  43 50 47 96 12 59 64 87 6b fd 2b e0 46 f9 73 be\nMyFile(0999)\:  dd cf 92 e1 91 5b ed 66 a0 6f 89 29 79 45 80 d0\nMyFile(0999)\:  83 6a d5 41 43 77 5f 39 7c 09 04 47 82 b0 57 39\nMyFile(0999)\:  70 ed a3 ec 15 19 1e a8 33 08 47 c1 05 42 a9 fd\nMyFile(0999)\:  4c c3 b4 df dd 06 1f 4d 10 51 40 67 73 13 0f 40\nMyFile(0999)\:  f8 6d 81 25 5f 0a b1 53 c6 30 7e 15 39 ac f9 5a\nMyFile(0999)\:  ee 7f 92 9e a6 05 5b e7 13 97 85 b5 23 92 d9 d4\nMyFile(0999)\:  24 06 d5 09 25 89 75 07 dd a6 1a 8f 3f 09 19 be\nMyFile(0999)\:  ad 65 2c 64 eb 95 9b dc fe 41 5e 17 a6 da 6c 5b\nMyFile(0999)\:  69 cc 02 ba 14 2c 16 24 9c 4a dc cd d0 f7 52 67\nMyFile(0999)\:  73 f1 2d a0 23 fd 7e f4 31 ca 2d 70 ca 89 0b 04\nMyFile(0999)\:  db 2e a6 4f 70 6e 9e ce bd 58 89 e2 53 59 9e 6e\nMyFile(0999)\:  5a 92 65 e2 88 3f 0c 94 19 a3 dd e5 e8 9d 95 13\nMyFile(0999)\:  ed 29 db ab 70 12 dc 5a ca 6b 17 ab 52 82 54 b1\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\:  01 00 01\n"
 
 Debug print certificate #2 (EC)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
 mbedtls_debug_print_crt:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"MyFile":999:"PREFIX_":"MyFile(0999)\: PREFIX_ #1\:\nMyFile(0999)\: cert. version     \: 3\nMyFile(0999)\: serial number     \: C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8\nMyFile(0999)\: issuer name       \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nMyFile(0999)\: subject name      \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nMyFile(0999)\: issued  on        \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:00\nMyFile(0999)\: expires on        \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:00\nMyFile(0999)\: signed using      \: ECDSA with SHA256\nMyFile(0999)\: EC key size       \: 384 bits\nMyFile(0999)\: basic constraints \: CA=true\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->eckey.Q(X)' (384 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\:  c3 da 2b 34 41 37 58 2f 87 56 fe fc 89 ba 29 43\nMyFile(0999)\:  4b 4e e0 6e c3 0e 57 53 33 39 58 d4 52 b4 91 95\nMyFile(0999)\:  39 0b 23 df 5f 17 24 62 48 fc 1a 95 29 ce 2c 2d\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->eckey.Q(Y)' (384 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\:  87 c2 88 52 80 af d6 6a ab 21 dd b8 d3 1c 6e 58\nMyFile(0999)\:  b8 ca e8 b2 69 8e f3 41 ad 29 c3 b4 5f 75 a7 47\nMyFile(0999)\:  6f d5 19 29 55 69 9a 53 3b 20 b4 66 16 60 33 1e\n"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index 0b4cd4b..1b8a84c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -1631,12 +1631,12 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
 void check_variant()
 {
     mbedtls_ecp_variant variant = mbedtls_ecp_get_variant();
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
     TEST_EQUAL(variant, MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT);
 #else
     TEST_EQUAL(variant, MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data
index 0b0afee..9b39e9f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 MD list
 mbedtls_md_list:
 
+MD <-> PSA conversion
+md_to_from_psa:
+
 MD NULL/uninitialised arguments
 md_null_args:
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
index ac9516a..e3f0e15 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "md_psa.h"
+
+#define MD_PSA(md, psa) \
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md), psa);  \
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa), md);
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -36,6 +41,27 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+void md_to_from_psa()
+{
+    /* We use a simplified implementation that relies on numerical values
+     * being aligned, so make sure they remain so. */
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, PSA_ALG_MD5);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, PSA_ALG_SHA_1);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, PSA_ALG_SHA_224);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, PSA_ALG_SHA_512);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, PSA_ALG_SHA3_224);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, PSA_ALG_SHA3_256);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, PSA_ALG_SHA3_384);
+    MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, PSA_ALG_SHA3_512);
+
+    /* Don't test for NONE<->NONE as this is not guaranteed */
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void md_null_args()
 {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index bb2922b..361c160 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -437,87 +437,87 @@
 handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3
 
 Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 
 Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 
 Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, no psk
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, non-opaque
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index e80dd42..8229884 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
 void move_handshake_to_state(int endpoint_type, int tls_version, int state, int need_pass)
 {
     enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 };
@@ -2653,7 +2653,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY */
 void handshake_version(int dtls, int client_min_version, int client_max_version,
                        int server_min_version, int server_max_version,
                        int expected_negotiated_version)
@@ -2774,7 +2774,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY */
 void app_data_tls(int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len,
                   int expected_cli_fragments,
                   int expected_srv_fragments)
@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED:!MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
 void conf_curve()
 {