diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index be38614..915c718 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
-= mbed TLS 2.1.1 released 2015-09-??
+= mbed TLS 2.1.1 released 2015-09-16
 
 Bugfix
    * Fix warning when using a 64bit platform. (found by embedthis) (#275)
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 Changes
    * Made X509 profile pointer const in mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() to allow
      use of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next. (found by NWilson)
+   * When a client initiates a reconnect from the same port as a live
+     connection, if cookie verification is available
+     (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined in config.h, and usable cookie
+     callbacks set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies()), this will be
+     detected and mbedtls_ssl_read() will return
+     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - it is then possible to start a new
+     handshake with the same context. (See RFC 6347 section 4.2.8.)
 
 = mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index cb707e9..8dadbe1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY  defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE  defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) &&                              \
     ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) )
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY  defined, but not all prerequisites"
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 66657da..6e9d8f3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -1135,6 +1135,22 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+ *
+ * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port.
+ *
+ * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the
+ * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the
+ * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This
+ * flag enables that support.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+
+/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT
  *
  * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 907bba1..2d7beb3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ                         -0x6900  /**< Connection requires a read call. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE                        -0x6880  /**< Connection requires a write call. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT                           -0x6800  /**< The operation timed out. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT                  -0x6780  /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
 
 /*
  * Various constants
@@ -1169,6 +1170,11 @@
  *                  the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected
  *                  on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled.
  *
+ * \note            This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from
+ *                  the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only
+ *                  the variant with cookies is supported currently). See
+ *                  comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details.
+ *
  * \param conf              SSL configuration
  * \param f_cookie_write    Cookie write callback
  * \param f_cookie_check    Cookie check callback
@@ -2089,29 +2095,35 @@
  *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
  *
- * \return         0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
- *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or a specific SSL error code.
+ * \return         0 if successful, or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED (see below), or
+ *                 a specific SSL error code.
  *
- * \note           If this function returns non-zero, then the ssl context
+ * \note           If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, then the ssl context
  *                 becomes unusable, and you should either free it or call
  *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it.
- *                 If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
+ *
+ * \note           If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
- *                 purposes, but you still need to reset/free the context.
+ *                 purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
+ *                 actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
 /**
  * \brief          Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
  *
- *                 Note: the state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
+ * \note           The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
  *                 the following state after execution of this function.
  *                 Do not call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER.
  *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
  *
- * \return         0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
- *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or a specific SSL error code.
+ * \return         0 if successful, or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or
+ *                 a specific SSL error code.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
@@ -2138,7 +2150,23 @@
  *
  * \return         the number of bytes read, or
  *                 0 for EOF, or
- *                 a negative error code.
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or
+ *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT (see below), or
+ *                 another negative error code.
+ *
+ * \note           When this function return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
+ *                 (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
+ *                 is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
+ *                 You can either treat that as a connection close and wait
+ *                 for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly
+ *                 continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same
+ *                 context (as it has beeen reset internally). Either way, you
+ *                 should make sure this is seen by the application as a new
+ *                 connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and
+ *                 most importantly the identity of the client must be checked
+ *                 again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client
+ *                 again, or not transmitting the new identity to the
+ *                 application layer, would allow authentication bypass!
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len );
 
diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index a7de110..a1cf83a 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -428,6 +428,8 @@
             mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a write call" );
         if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) )
             mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" );
+        if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) )
+            mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index f1d2dd2..d9b05fd 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -3250,6 +3250,196 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/* Forward declaration */
+static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
+
+/*
+ * Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with
+ * a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
+ * Both input and output include full DTLS headers.
+ *
+ * - if cookie is valid, return 0
+ * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not,
+ *   fill obuf and set olen, then
+ *   return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
+ * - otherwise return a specific error code
+ */
+static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
+                           mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
+                           mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
+                           void *p_cookie,
+                           const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
+                           const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
+                           unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen )
+{
+    size_t sid_len, cookie_len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    if( f_cookie_write == NULL || f_cookie_check == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    /*
+     * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers,
+     * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be
+     * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks
+     * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier.
+     *
+     *  0-0  ContentType type;                  copied, must be handshake
+     *  1-2  ProtocolVersion version;           copied
+     *  3-4  uint16 epoch;                      copied, must be 0
+     *  5-10 uint48 sequence_number;            copied
+     * 11-12 uint16 length;                     (ignored)
+     *
+     * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type;            (ignored)
+     * 14-16 uint24 length;                     (ignored)
+     * 17-18 uint16 message_seq;                copied
+     * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset;            copied, must be 0
+     * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length;            (ignored)
+     *
+     * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version;    (ignored)
+     * 27-58 Random random;                     (ignored)
+     * 59-xx SessionID session_id;              1 byte len + sid_len content
+     * 60+   opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;           1 byte len + content
+     *       ...
+     *
+     * Minimum length is 61 bytes.
+     */
+    if( in_len < 61 ||
+        in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
+        in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 ||
+        in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+    }
+
+    sid_len = in[59];
+    if( sid_len > in_len - 61 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+
+    cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len];
+    if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+
+    if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
+                        cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
+    {
+        /* Valid cookie */
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR.
+     *
+     *  0-0  ContentType type;                  copied
+     *  1-2  ProtocolVersion version;           copied
+     *  3-4  uint16 epoch;                      copied
+     *  5-10 uint48 sequence_number;            copied
+     * 11-12 uint16 length;                     olen - 13
+     *
+     * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type;            hello_verify_request
+     * 14-16 uint24 length;                     olen - 25
+     * 17-18 uint16 message_seq;                copied
+     * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset;            copied
+     * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length;            olen - 25
+     *
+     * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version;    0xfe 0xff
+     * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;           cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie
+     *
+     * Minimum length is 28.
+     */
+    if( buf_len < 28 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+    /* Copy most fields and adapt others */
+    memcpy( obuf, in, 25 );
+    obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+    obuf[25] = 0xfe;
+    obuf[26] = 0xff;
+
+    /* Generate and write actual cookie */
+    p = obuf + 28;
+    if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie,
+                        &p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+    }
+
+    *olen = p - obuf;
+
+    /* Go back and fill length fields */
+    obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 );
+
+    obuf[14] = obuf[22] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >> 16 );
+    obuf[15] = obuf[23] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 ) >>  8 );
+    obuf[16] = obuf[24] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 25 )       );
+
+    obuf[11] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 ) >>  8 );
+    obuf[12] = (unsigned char)( ( *olen - 13 )       );
+
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet
+ * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8).
+ *
+ * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record
+ * that looks like a ClientHello.
+ *
+ * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies,
+ *   send back HelloVerifyRequest, then
+ *   return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
+ * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie,
+ *   reset the session of the current context, and
+ *   return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
+ * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code
+ *
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will ignore the record if anything else than
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or 0 is returned, although this function
+ * cannot not return 0.
+ */
+static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret;
+    size_t len;
+
+    ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
+            ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
+            ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
+            ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+            ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
+            ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
+            ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
+
+    if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
+    {
+        /* Dont check write errors as we can't do anything here.
+         * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
+         * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
+        (void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
+
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
+    }
+
+    if( ret == 0 )
+    {
+        /* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */
+        if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT );
+    }
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
 /*
  * ContentType type;
  * ProtocolVersion version;
@@ -3341,13 +3531,36 @@
         if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
-                                "expected %d, received %d",
-                                 ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
+                                        "expected %d, received %d",
+                                        ssl->in_epoch, rec_epoch ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+            /*
+             * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
+             * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we
+             * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
+             * fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
+             */
+            if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+                ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
+                rec_epoch == 0 &&
+                ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
+                ssl->in_left > 13 &&
+                ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
+            {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
+                                            "from the same port" ) );
+                return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) );
+            }
+            else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
         }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
+        /* Replay detection only works for the current epoch */
+        if( rec_epoch == ssl->in_epoch &&
+            mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
@@ -3528,7 +3741,8 @@
     if( ( ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl ) ) != 0 )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-        if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+        if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT )
         {
             /* Ignore bad record and get next one; drop the whole datagram
              * since current header cannot be trusted to find the next record
@@ -5123,8 +5337,11 @@
 /*
  * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining
  * all application-set variables, function pointers and data.
+ *
+ * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID.
+ * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.)
  */
-int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial )
 {
     int ret;
 
@@ -5148,7 +5365,8 @@
     ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + 13;
     ssl->in_msgtype = 0;
     ssl->in_msglen = 0;
-    ssl->in_left = 0;
+    if( partial == 0 )
+        ssl->in_left = 0;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
     ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
     ssl->in_epoch = 0;
@@ -5174,7 +5392,8 @@
     ssl->transform_out = NULL;
 
     memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN );
-    memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN );
+    if( partial == 0 )
+        memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
     if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL )
@@ -5207,9 +5426,12 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-    mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id );
-    ssl->cli_id = NULL;
-    ssl->cli_id_len = 0;
+    if( partial == 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id );
+        ssl->cli_id = NULL;
+        ssl->cli_id_len = 0;
+    }
 #endif
 
     if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 )
@@ -5219,6 +5441,15 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining
+ * all application-set variables, function pointers and data.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    return( ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) );
+}
+
+/*
  * SSL set accessors
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint )
diff --git a/library/version_features.c b/library/version_features.c
index c2f30f2..196b93c 100644
--- a/library/version_features.c
+++ b/library/version_features.c
@@ -369,6 +369,9 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
     "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY",
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE)
+    "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE",
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
     "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT",
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
index 606fc93..322e8af 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 int main( void )
 {
     mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or "
-           "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDLTS_MD_C and/or "
+           "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or "
            "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or "
            "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n");
     return( 0 );
diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c
index 469ad9f..e897c65 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 int main( void )
 {
     mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or "
-            "MBEDLTS_MD_C and/or "
+            "MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or "
             "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n");
     return( 0 );
 }
diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c
index 9d48a18..ade36dc 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 int main( void )
 {
     mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or "
-            "MBEDLTS_MD_C and/or "
+            "MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or "
             "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n");
     return( 0 );
 }
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 99c2d2a..c090db9 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #define DFL_DHMLEN              -1
 #define DFL_RECONNECT           0
 #define DFL_RECO_DELAY          0
+#define DFL_RECONNECT_HARD      0
 #define DFL_TICKETS             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
 #define DFL_ALPN_STRING         NULL
 #define DFL_TRANSPORT           MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM
@@ -222,7 +223,7 @@
     "    debug_level=%%d      default: 0 (disabled)\n"      \
     "    nbio=%%d             default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n"  \
     "                        options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \
-    "    read_timeout=%%d     default: 0 (no timeout)\n"    \
+    "    read_timeout=%%d     default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n"    \
     "    max_resend=%%d       default: 0 (no resend on timeout)\n" \
     "\n"                                                    \
     USAGE_DTLS                                              \
@@ -238,6 +239,7 @@
     "    exchanges=%%d        default: 1\n"                 \
     "    reconnect=%%d        default: 0 (disabled)\n"      \
     "    reco_delay=%%d       default: 0 seconds\n"         \
+    "    reconnect_hard=%%d   default: 0 (disabled)\n"      \
     USAGE_TICKETS                                           \
     USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN                                      \
     USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC                                        \
@@ -293,6 +295,7 @@
     int dhmlen;                 /* minimum DHM params len in bits           */
     int reconnect;              /* attempt to resume session                */
     int reco_delay;             /* delay in seconds before resuming session */
+    int reconnect_hard;         /* unexpectedly reconnect from the same port */
     int tickets;                /* enable / disable session tickets         */
     const char *alpn_string;    /* ALPN supported protocols                 */
     int transport;              /* TLS or DTLS?                             */
@@ -481,6 +484,7 @@
     opt.dhmlen              = DFL_DHMLEN;
     opt.reconnect           = DFL_RECONNECT;
     opt.reco_delay          = DFL_RECO_DELAY;
+    opt.reconnect_hard      = DFL_RECONNECT_HARD;
     opt.tickets             = DFL_TICKETS;
     opt.alpn_string         = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
     opt.transport           = DFL_TRANSPORT;
@@ -603,6 +607,12 @@
             if( opt.reco_delay < 0 )
                 goto usage;
         }
+        else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect_hard" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            opt.reconnect_hard = atoi( q );
+            if( opt.reconnect_hard < 0 || opt.reconnect_hard > 1 )
+                goto usage;
+        }
         else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 )
         {
             opt.tickets = atoi( q );
@@ -1479,7 +1489,38 @@
     }
 
     /*
-     * 7b. Continue doing data exchanges?
+     * 7b. Simulate hard reset and reconnect from same port?
+     */
+    if( opt.reconnect_hard != 0 )
+    {
+        opt.reconnect_hard = 0;
+
+        mbedtls_printf( "  . Restarting connection from same port..." );
+        fflush( stdout );
+
+        if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+                ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+            {
+                mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
+                goto exit;
+            }
+        }
+
+        mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
+
+        goto send_request;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * 7c. Continue doing data exchanges?
      */
     if( --opt.exchanges > 0 )
         goto send_request;
@@ -1489,6 +1530,7 @@
      */
 close_notify:
     mbedtls_printf( "  . Closing the connection..." );
+    fflush( stdout );
 
     /* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */
     do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl );
@@ -1513,7 +1555,6 @@
 #endif
 
         mbedtls_printf( "  . Reconnecting with saved session..." );
-        fflush( stdout );
 
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
         {
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index f169291..bd4d1d1 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
     "    debug_level=%%d      default: 0 (disabled)\n"      \
     "    nbio=%%d             default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n"  \
     "                        options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \
-    "    read_timeout=%%d     default: 0 (no timeout)\n"    \
+    "    read_timeout=%%d     default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n"    \
     "\n"                                                    \
     USAGE_DTLS                                              \
     USAGE_COOKIES                                           \
@@ -1838,6 +1838,12 @@
     }
 #endif
 
+    if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT )
+    {
+        mbedtls_printf( "  ! Client initiated reconnection from same port\n" );
+        goto handshake;
+    }
+
 #ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
     if( ret != 0 )
     {
@@ -1903,6 +1909,7 @@
     /*
      * 4. Handshake
      */
+handshake:
     mbedtls_printf( "  . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." );
     fflush( stdout );
 
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 77db588..e494413 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -2867,6 +2867,40 @@
             -s "hello verification requested" \
             -S "SSL - The requested feature is not available"
 
+# Tests for client reconnecting from the same port with DTLS
+
+not_with_valgrind # spurious resend
+run_test    "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reference" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000" \
+            "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000" \
+            0 \
+            -C "resend" \
+            -S "The operation timed out" \
+            -S "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
+
+not_with_valgrind # spurious resend
+run_test    "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000" \
+            "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000 reconnect_hard=1" \
+            0 \
+            -C "resend" \
+            -S "The operation timed out" \
+            -s "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
+
+run_test    "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect, nbio" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000 nbio=2" \
+            "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000 reconnect_hard=1" \
+            0 \
+            -S "The operation timed out" \
+            -s "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
+
+run_test    "DTLS client reconnect from same port: no cookies" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000 cookies=0" \
+            "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-8000 reconnect_hard=1" \
+            0 \
+            -s "The operation timed out" \
+            -S "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
+
 # Tests for various cases of client authentication with DTLS
 # (focused on handshake flows and message parsing)