Merge pull request #5634 from superna9999/5625-pk-opaque-rsa-basics
PK Opaque RSA sign
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/alert_reentrant.txt b/ChangeLog.d/alert_reentrant.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..691d64c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/alert_reentrant.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix bug in the alert sending function mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message()
+ potentially leading to corrupted alert messages being sent in case
+ the function needs to be re-called after initially returning
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_WANT_WRITE. Fixes #1916.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4746c7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix a race condition in out-of-source builds with CMake when generated data
+ files are already present. Fixes #5374
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6878645
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix compilation on Windows when building shared library, by setting
+ library search path to CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28c3371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Features
+ * Introduce mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t typedef for use with
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb() and perhaps future callbacks
+ during TLS handshake.
diff --git a/configs/config-no-entropy.h b/configs/config-no-entropy.h
index edba4a0..31fab4e 100644
--- a/configs/config-no-entropy.h
+++ b/configs/config-no-entropy.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*/
/*
* Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source
- * Distinguishing reatures:
+ * Distinguishing features:
* - no entropy module
* - no TLS protocol implementation available due to absence of an entropy
* source
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index e8a2705..72a1e10 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -129,7 +129,12 @@
* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and
* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME.
*
- * Comment if your system does not support time functions
+ * Comment if your system does not support time functions.
+ *
+ * \note If MBEDTLS_TIMING_C is set - to enable the semi-portable timing
+ * interface - timing.c will include time.h on suitable platforms
+ * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless
+ * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
@@ -1273,7 +1278,7 @@
* Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also
* lower performance.
*
- * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between
+ * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonable compromise between
* performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at
* the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of
* mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about
@@ -3013,6 +3018,10 @@
* your own implementation of the whole module by setting
* \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file.
*
+ * \note The timing module will include time.h on suitable platforms
+ * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless
+ * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information.
+ *
* \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new
* environment:
* https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 9be083a..9b29c85 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1218,6 +1218,25 @@
const unsigned char server_random[32],
mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback
+ *
+ * \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data.
+ * See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n()
+ *
+ * \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run
+ *
+ * \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful,
+ * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause
+ * the handshake to be aborted.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+#endif
+
/* A type for storing user data in a library structure.
*
* The representation of type may change in future versions of the library.
@@ -1477,7 +1496,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- int (*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb))(mbedtls_ssl_context *); /*!< certificate selection callback */
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
};
@@ -2278,19 +2297,15 @@
* If set, the callback is always called for each handshake,
* after `ClientHello` processing has finished.
*
- * The callback has the following parameters:
- * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
- * the operation applies.
- * The return value of the callback is 0 if successful,
- * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause
- * the handshake to be aborted.
- *
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after
* `ClientHello` processing has finished.
*/
-void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
- int (*f_cert_cb)(mbedtls_ssl_context *) );
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb )
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb;
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/**
@@ -4812,7 +4827,7 @@
void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf );
/**
- * \brief Load reasonnable default SSL configuration values.
+ * \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values.
* (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index df7f170..6bb2ad3 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@
endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.1.0 SOVERSION 11)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 4eac24b..051e4b0 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -4855,6 +4855,9 @@
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
+
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message ));
@@ -5714,9 +5717,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) );
- if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
- return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
-
if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 1 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 32b9799..3fc0701 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1313,14 +1313,6 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
- int (*f_cert_cb)(mbedtls_ssl_context *) )
-{
- conf->f_cert_cb = f_cert_cb;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
void *p_cache,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache,
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index 7771d38..8250260 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -1813,6 +1813,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
@@ -2346,8 +2347,10 @@
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
@@ -2363,6 +2366,7 @@
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
@@ -2996,6 +3000,162 @@
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
+ {
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ /*
+ * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
+ /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
+ * and we check that the server's choice is among the
+ * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
+ if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+ /* uint16 to store content length */
+ const size_t content_len_size = 2;
+
+ header_len = 4;
+
+ if( header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len
+ > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ }
+
+ unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ header_len += content_len_size;
+
+ memcpy( p, ssl->conf->psk_identity,
+ ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+ header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
+
+ /*
+ * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
+ */
+
+ /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
+ * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
+ * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
+ * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
+ * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
+ * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
+ * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
+ psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
+ psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
+
+ /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+ status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
+ &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+
+ /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+ * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
+ * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
+ unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1;
+ unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
+ size_t own_pubkey_len = 0;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+ &own_pubkey_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+ }
+
+ *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
+ content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
+
+ /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+ * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+ * - the PSK itself
+ */
+ unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ const unsigned char* const pms_end = pms +
+ sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
+ /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+ const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+ size_t zlen = 0;
+
+ /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ pms + zlen_size,
+ pms_end - ( pms + zlen_size ),
+ &zlen );
+
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+ else if( destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( destruction_status ) );
+
+ /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, pms, 0 );
+ pms += zlen_size + zlen;
+
+ const unsigned char *psk = NULL;
+ size_t psk_len = 0;
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len )
+ == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED )
+ /*
+ * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always
+ * checked before calling this function
+ */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */
+ if( (size_t)( pms_end - pms ) < ( 2 + psk_len ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* Write the PSK length as uint16 */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, pms, 0 );
+ pms += 2;
+
+ /* Write the PSK itself */
+ memcpy( pms, psk, psk_len );
+ pms += psk_len;
+
+ ssl->handshake->pmslen = pms - ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 9ecfdd2..93cd0a5 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -3163,7 +3163,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
@@ -4142,6 +4143,115 @@
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
+ {
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint8_t ecpoint_len;
+
+ /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
+ if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
+ if( p >= end )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ ecpoint_len = *(p++);
+ if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ecpoint_len ) {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ if( ecpoint_len > sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ) ) {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
+ p += ecpoint_len;
+
+ /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+ * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+ * - the PSK itself
+ */
+ unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ const unsigned char* const psm_end =
+ psm + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
+ /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+ const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+ size_t zlen = 0;
+
+ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ psm + zlen_size,
+ psm_end - ( psm + zlen_size ),
+ &zlen );
+
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+ else if( destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( destruction_status ) );
+
+ /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, psm, 0 );
+ psm += zlen_size + zlen;
+
+ const unsigned char *psk = NULL;
+ size_t psk_len = 0;
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len )
+ == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED )
+ /*
+ * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always
+ * checked before calling this function
+ */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */
+ if( (size_t)( psm_end - psm ) < ( 2 + psk_len ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* Write the PSK length as uint16 */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, psm, 0 );
+ psm += 2;
+
+ /* Write the PSK itself */
+ memcpy( psm, psk, psk_len );
+ psm += psk_len;
+
+ ssl->handshake->pmslen = psm - ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
diff --git a/library/timing.c b/library/timing.c
index a65bc99..859c1b8 100644
--- a/library/timing.c
+++ b/library/timing.c
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+/* time.h should be included independently of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME. If the
+ * platform matches the ifdefs above, it will be used. */
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
struct _hr_time
{
struct timeval start;
};
-#endif
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
/**
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
* get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately
* the delay since the first reset.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset )
@@ -167,33 +166,5 @@
{
return( data->fin_ms );
}
-#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
-uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay(
- const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data )
-{
- (void) data;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data )
-{
- (void) data;
- return( 0 );
-}
-void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms )
-{
- (void) data;
- (void) int_ms;
- (void) fin_ms;
-}
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset )
-{
- (void) val;
- (void) reset;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
diff --git a/programs/test/selftest.c b/programs/test/selftest.c
index c7bcc53..0c40686 100644
--- a/programs/test/selftest.c
+++ b/programs/test/selftest.c
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
@@ -361,6 +363,78 @@
}
/*
+ * The C standard allows padding bits in the representation
+ * of standard integer types, but our code does currently not
+ * support them.
+ *
+ * Here we check that the underlying C implementation doesn't
+ * use padding bits, and fail cleanly if it does.
+ *
+ * The check works by casting the maximum value representable
+ * by a given integer type into the unpadded integer type of the
+ * same bit-width and checking that it agrees with the maximum value
+ * of that unpadded type. For example, for a 4-byte int,
+ * MAX_INT should be 0x7fffffff in int32_t. This assumes that
+ * CHAR_BIT == 8, which is checked in check_config.h.
+ *
+ * We assume that [u]intxx_t exist and that they don't
+ * have padding bits, as the standard requires.
+ */
+
+#define CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED(TYPE, NAME) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if( sizeof( TYPE ) == 2 || sizeof( TYPE ) == 4 || \
+ sizeof( TYPE ) == 8 ) { \
+ if( ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 2 && \
+ (int16_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0x7FFF ) || \
+ ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 4 && \
+ (int32_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0x7FFFFFFF ) || \
+ ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 8 && \
+ (int64_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ) ) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_printf( "Type '" #TYPE "' has padding bits\n" );\
+ mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); \
+ } \
+ } else { \
+ mbedtls_printf( "Padding checks only implemented for types of size 2, 4 or 8" \
+ " - cannot check type '" #TYPE "' of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "\n", \
+ sizeof( TYPE ) ); \
+ mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); \
+ } \
+ } while( 0 )
+
+#define CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED(TYPE, NAME) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if( ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 2 && \
+ (uint16_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0xFFFF ) || \
+ ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 4 && \
+ (uint32_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0xFFFFFFFF ) || \
+ ( sizeof( TYPE ) == 8 && \
+ (uint64_t) NAME ## _MAX != 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ) ) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_printf( "Type '" #TYPE "' has padding bits\n" ); \
+ mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); \
+ } \
+ } while( 0 )
+
+ CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED( short, SHRT );
+ CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED( int, INT );
+ CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED( long, LONG );
+ CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED( long long, LLONG );
+ CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED( ptrdiff_t, PTRDIFF );
+
+ CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED( unsigned short, USHRT );
+ CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED( unsigned, UINT );
+ CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED( unsigned long, ULONG );
+ CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED( unsigned long long, ULLONG );
+ CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED( size_t, SIZE );
+
+#undef CHECK_PADDING_SIGNED
+#undef CHECK_PADDING_UNSIGNED
+
+ /*
* Make sure we have a snprintf that correctly zero-terminates
*/
if( run_test_snprintf() != 0 )
diff --git a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
index bc78fab..41a90a9 100644
--- a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
+++ b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
@@ -825,7 +825,6 @@
get_options( argc, argv );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/*
* Decisions to drop/delay/duplicate packets are pseudo-random: dropping
* exactly 1 in N packets would lead to problems when a flight has exactly
@@ -836,12 +835,15 @@
*/
if( opt.seed == 0 )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
opt.seed = (unsigned int) mbedtls_time( NULL );
+#else
+ opt.seed = 1;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
mbedtls_printf( " . Pseudo-random seed: %u\n", opt.seed );
}
srand( opt.seed );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
/*
* 0. "Connect" to the server
diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 2431e40..c1c9052 100644
--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -50,12 +50,18 @@
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/psa/crypto_values.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/psa/crypto_extra.h
)
+
else()
foreach(file ${base_generated_data_files})
link_to_source(${file})
endforeach()
endif()
-
+# CMake generates sub-makefiles for each target and calls them in subprocesses.
+# Without this command, cmake will generate rules in each sub-makefile. As a result,
+# they can cause race conditions in parallel builds.
+# With this line, only 4 sub-makefiles include the above command, that reduces
+# the risk of a race.
+add_custom_target(test_suite_generated_data DEPENDS ${generated_data_files})
# Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed.
# "foo" as a skip pattern skips "test_suite_foo" and "test_suite_foo.bar"
# but not "test_suite_foobar".
@@ -119,6 +125,7 @@
)
add_executable(test_suite_${data_name} test_suite_${data_name}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
+ add_dependencies(test_suite_${data_name} test_suite_generated_data)
target_link_libraries(test_suite_${data_name} ${libs})
# Include test-specific header files from ./include and private header
# files (used by some invasive tests) from ../library. Public header
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 70dac3f..18fff9d 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -1164,7 +1164,8 @@
analyze_test_commands "$@"
- TIMES_LEFT=2
+ # One regular run and two retries
+ TIMES_LEFT=3
while [ $TIMES_LEFT -gt 0 ]; do
TIMES_LEFT=$(( $TIMES_LEFT - 1 ))
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
index a45ed0e..de89239 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
Timing: get timer
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
timing_get_timer:
Timing: delay 0ms
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
timing_delay:0:
Timing: delay 100ms
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
timing_delay:100: