rsa: introduce rsa_internal_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check()
And use it in the non-PSA version of mbedtls_pk_sign_ext()
to bypass checks that didn't succeed when used by TLS 1.3.
That is because in the failing scenarios the padding of
the RSA context is not set to PKCS_V21.
See the discussion on PR #7930 for more details.
Signed-off-by: Tomi Fontanilles <129057597+tomi-font@users.noreply.github.com>
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 1bf5d13..2b9f85b 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
+#include "rsa_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@@ -1712,14 +1713,14 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- unsigned int hashlen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- int saltlen,
- unsigned char *sig)
+static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ int saltlen,
+ unsigned char *sig)
{
size_t olen;
unsigned char *p = sig;
@@ -1727,15 +1728,12 @@
size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t msb;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id;
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
if (f_rng == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@@ -1754,7 +1752,11 @@
}
}
- hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
+ hash_id = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id;
+ if (hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ hash_id = md_alg;
+ }
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(hash_id);
if (hlen == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@@ -1797,7 +1799,7 @@
p += slen;
/* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */
- ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
+ ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, hash_id);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -1808,8 +1810,7 @@
}
/* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
- ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
- (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
+ ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, hash_id);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -1823,6 +1824,37 @@
return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig);
}
+static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ int saltlen,
+ unsigned char *sig)
+{
+ if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen,
+ sig);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig)
+{
+ return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+ hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig);
+}
+
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with
* the option to pass in the salt length.
@@ -1840,7 +1872,6 @@
hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig);
}
-
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
*/