diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 961e6e2..099df83 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
      last paragraph).
    * Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram,
      enabled by default.
-   * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages.
+   * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS.
      The maximum amount of RAM used for this can be controlled by the
      compile-time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING defined
      in mbedtls/config.h.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 1cdff71..052aed0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -3015,6 +3015,15 @@
  * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
  * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
  *
+ * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
+ * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size,
+ * together with its reassembly bitmap.
+ *
+ * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default)
+ * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows
+ * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate)
+ * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages.
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING             32768
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 39c7bfa..83849a5 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -243,8 +243,12 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
+ * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
+ */
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ( 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
 #endif
 
 /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */
@@ -1027,14 +1031,14 @@
     int renego_records_seen;    /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS,
                                   number of retransmissions of request if
                                   renego_max_records is < 0           */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
 
     int major_ver;              /*!< equal to  MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3    */
     int minor_ver;              /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0)    */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
     unsigned badmac_seen;       /*!< records with a bad MAC received    */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
 
     mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */
     mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */
@@ -1090,11 +1094,11 @@
     uint16_t in_epoch;          /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records  */
     size_t next_record_offset;  /*!< offset of the next record in datagram
                                      (equal to in_left if none)       */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
     uint64_t in_window_top;     /*!< last validated record seq_num    */
     uint64_t in_window;         /*!< bitmask for replay detection     */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
 
     size_t in_hslen;            /*!< current handshake message length,
                                      including the handshake header   */
@@ -1126,14 +1130,14 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
     uint16_t mtu;               /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
     unsigned char *compress_buf;        /*!<  zlib data buffer        */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
     signed char split_done;     /*!< current record already splitted? */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
 
     /*
      * PKI layer
@@ -1146,11 +1150,11 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
     char *hostname;             /*!< expected peer CN for verification
                                      (and SNI if available)                 */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
     const char *alpn_chosen;    /*!<  negotiated protocol                   */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
 
     /*
      * Information for DTLS hello verify
@@ -1158,7 +1162,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
     unsigned char  *cli_id;         /*!<  transport-level ID of the client  */
     size_t          cli_id_len;     /*!<  length of cli_id                  */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 
     /*
      * Secure renegotiation
@@ -1170,7 +1174,7 @@
     size_t verify_data_len;             /*!<  length of verify data stored   */
     char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!<  previous handshake verify data */
     char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!<  previous handshake verify data */
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
 };
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
@@ -1405,8 +1409,9 @@
  *                 encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
  *
  * \note           This can be called at any point during the connection, for
- *                 example when a PMTU estimate becomes available from other
- *                 sources, such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
+ *                 example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU)
+ *                 estimate becomes available from other sources,
+ *                 such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
  *
  * \note           This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
  *                 and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index f77c177..8385720 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
         return( ret );
     }
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
 
@@ -3414,7 +3414,7 @@
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
             return( ret );
     }
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
     /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
      * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 84c83e3..36ca0d6 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -2397,7 +2397,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
         return( ret );
     }
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) );
 
@@ -3385,7 +3385,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
         return( ret );
     }
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) );
 
@@ -4264,7 +4264,7 @@
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
             return( ret );
     }
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
     switch( ssl->state )
     {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 141f4e0..78955bb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 #endif
 
 static void ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
 
 /* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
 static inline size_t ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -109,6 +109,17 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
 
+/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */
+static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     uint8_t slot );
+static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+
 static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
 {
@@ -183,11 +194,6 @@
     return( (int) remaining );
 }
 
-static void ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                     uint8_t slot );
-
 /*
  * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range,
  * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached.
@@ -3037,7 +3043,7 @@
 
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 );
 
-            /* Copy the handshame message content and set records fields */
+            /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */
             memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len );
             ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12;
             ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
@@ -3274,7 +3280,7 @@
         }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
-        /* Update running hashes of hanshake messages seen */
+        /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */
         if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
             ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
     }
@@ -3402,12 +3408,12 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %d, "
-                    "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
-                    ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
-
+                                    "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %d",
+                                    ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1],
+                                    ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
-                       ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size );
+                               ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size );
 
         ssl->out_left += protected_record_size;
         ssl->out_hdr  += protected_record_size;
@@ -3440,7 +3446,9 @@
 
         remaining = (size_t) ret;
         if( remaining == 0 )
+        {
             flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH;
+        }
         else
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) );
@@ -3473,21 +3481,21 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
 {
     return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16  ) |
             ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8  ) |
               ssl->in_msg[11] );
 }
 
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
 {
     return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) |
             ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8  ) |
               ssl->in_msg[8] );
 }
 
-static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
 {
     uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len;
 
@@ -3585,7 +3593,7 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
-static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
 {
     return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) |
             ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8  ) |
@@ -3664,7 +3672,7 @@
 
         /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future
          * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
-         * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the handshake
+         * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
          * handshake logic layer. */
         if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
         {
@@ -4285,14 +4293,6 @@
 static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-static int ssl_another_record_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-
 int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                              unsigned update_hs_digest )
 {
@@ -4316,7 +4316,7 @@
                 /* We only check for buffered messages if the
                  * current datagram is fully consumed. */
                 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
-                    ssl_another_record_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
+                    ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
                 {
                     if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 )
                         have_buffered = 1;
@@ -4331,7 +4331,7 @@
 
                     if( ret != 0 )
                     {
-                        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer" ), ret );
+                        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret );
                         return( ret );
                     }
                 }
@@ -4378,7 +4378,7 @@
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
-static int ssl_another_record_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
         return( 1 );
@@ -4409,7 +4409,7 @@
             goto exit;
         }
 
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Inject buffered CCS message" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) );
         ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
         ssl->in_msglen = 1;
         ssl->in_msg[0] = 1;
@@ -4422,6 +4422,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
     /* Debug only */
     {
         unsigned offset;
@@ -4432,10 +4433,11 @@
             {
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.",
                             hs->in_msg_seq + offset,
-                            hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partitially" ) );
+                            hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) );
             }
         }
     }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
 
     /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the
      * next handshake message. */
@@ -4481,7 +4483,6 @@
     return( ret );
 }
 
-static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                   size_t desired )
 {
@@ -4501,9 +4502,9 @@
         return( 0 );
     }
 
-    /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected
-     * handshake message. Remove buffers used for future msgs
-     * to gain space, starting with the most distant one. */
+    /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake
+     * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space,
+     * starting with the most distant one. */
     for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1;
          offset >= 0; offset-- )
     {
@@ -4706,6 +4707,7 @@
         }
 
         default:
+            /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */
             break;
     }
 
@@ -4851,7 +4853,7 @@
 
     /* Only consider loading future records if the
      * input buffer is empty. */
-    if( ssl_another_record_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 )
+    if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 )
         return( 0 );
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
@@ -7723,7 +7725,7 @@
 
     /*
      * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped.
-     * As in ssl_read_record_layer, this needs to be adapted if
+     * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if
      * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records.
      */
 
diff --git a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
index 2585220..41739d0 100644
--- a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
+++ b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
@@ -152,10 +152,10 @@
     int delay;                  /* delay 1 packet in N (none if 0)          */
     int delay_ccs;              /* delay ChangeCipherSpec                   */
     char* delay_cli[MAX_DELAYED_HS];  /* handshake types of messages from
-                                      * client that should be delayed.      */
+                                       * client that should be delayed.     */
     uint8_t delay_cli_cnt;      /* Number of entries in delay_cli.          */
     char* delay_srv[MAX_DELAYED_HS];  /* handshake types of messages from
-                                      * server that should be delayed.      */
+                                       * server that should be delayed.     */
     uint8_t delay_srv_cnt;      /* Number of entries in delay_srv.          */
     int drop;                   /* drop 1 packet in N (none if 0)           */
     int mtu;                    /* drop packets larger than this            */
@@ -249,8 +249,8 @@
 
             if( *delay_cnt == MAX_DELAYED_HS )
             {
-                mbedtls_printf( " maximally %d uses of delay_cli argument allowed\n",
-                                MAX_DELAYED_HS );
+                mbedtls_printf( " too many uses of %s: only %d allowed\n",
+                                p, MAX_DELAYED_HS );
                 exit_usage( p, NULL );
             }
 
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@
         delay_list     = opt.delay_srv;
         delay_list_len = opt.delay_srv_cnt;
     }
+
     /* Check if message type is in the list of messages
      * that should be delayed */
     for( delay_idx = 0; delay_idx < delay_list_len; delay_idx++ )
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index ce6c201..227d042 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@
     done
 }
 
+# Skip next test; use this macro to skip tests which are legitimate
+# in theory and expected to be re-introduced at some point, but
+# aren't expected to succeed at the moment due to problems outside
+# our control (such as bugs in other TLS implementations).
+skip_next_test() {
+    SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+}
+
 # skip next test if the flag is not enabled in config.h
 requires_config_enabled() {
     if grep "^#define $1" $CONFIG_H > /dev/null; then :; else
@@ -156,21 +164,22 @@
     fi
 }
 
-requires_config_value_at_least() {
+get_config_value_or_default() {
     NAME="$1"
-    DEF_VAL=$( grep ".*#define.*MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" ../include/mbedtls/config.h |
+    DEF_VAL=$( grep ".*#define.*${NAME}" ../include/mbedtls/config.h |
                sed 's/^.*\s\([0-9]*\)$/\1/' )
-    VAL=$( ../scripts/config.pl get $NAME || echo "$DEF_VAL" )
+    ../scripts/config.pl get $NAME || echo "$DEF_VAL"
+}
+
+requires_config_value_at_least() {
+    VAL=$( get_config_value_or_default "$1" )
     if [ "$VAL" -lt "$2" ]; then
        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
     fi
 }
 
 requires_config_value_at_most() {
-    NAME="$1"
-    DEF_VAL=$( grep ".*#define.*MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" ../include/mbedtls/config.h |
-               sed 's/^.*\s\([0-9]*\)$/\1/' )
-    VAL=$( ../scripts/config.pl get $NAME || echo "$DEF_VAL" )
+    VAL=$( get_config_value_or_default "$1" )
     if [ "$VAL" -gt "$2" ]; then
        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
     fi
@@ -5317,9 +5326,8 @@
             -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
             -C "error"
 
-# This ensures things still work after session_reset(),
-# for example it would have caught #1941.
-# It also exercises the "resumed hanshake" flow.
+# This ensures things still work after session_reset().
+# It also exercises the "resumed handshake" flow.
 # Since we don't support reading fragmented ClientHello yet,
 # up the MTU to 1450 (larger than ClientHello with session ticket,
 # but still smaller than client's Certificate to ensure fragmentation).
@@ -5571,6 +5579,13 @@
             -c "fragmenting handshake message" \
             -C "error"
 
+# We use --insecure for the GnuTLS client because it expects
+# the hostname / IP it connects to to be the name used in the
+# certificate obtained from the server. Here, however, it
+# connects to 127.0.0.1 while our test certificates use 'localhost'
+# as the server name in the certificate. This will make the
+# certifiate validation fail, but passing --insecure makes
+# GnuTLS continue the connection nonetheless.
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
@@ -5585,6 +5600,7 @@
             0 \
             -s "fragmenting handshake message"
 
+# See previous test for the reason to use --insecure
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
@@ -5696,38 +5712,39 @@
 ## https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/issues/543
 ## We can re-enable them when a fixed version fo GnuTLS is available
 ## and installed in our CI system.
-##
-## requires_gnutls
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-## client_needs_more_time 4
-## run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.2" \
-##             -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
-##             "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
-##              crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
-##              key_file=data_files/server7.key \
-##              hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1_2" \
-##            "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \
-##             0 \
-##             -s "fragmenting handshake message"
-##
-## requires_gnutls
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
-## client_needs_more_time 4
-## run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.0" \
-##             -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
-##             "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
-##              crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
-##              key_file=data_files/server7.key \
-##              hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \
-##            "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \
-##             0 \
-##             -s "fragmenting handshake message"
+skip_next_test
+requires_gnutls
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+client_needs_more_time 4
+run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.2" \
+            -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+             crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server7.key \
+             hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1_2" \
+           "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \
+            0 \
+            -s "fragmenting handshake message"
+
+skip_next_test
+requires_gnutls
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
+client_needs_more_time 4
+run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.0" \
+            -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+             crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server7.key \
+             hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \
+           "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \
+            0 \
+            -s "fragmenting handshake message"
 
 ## Interop test with OpenSSL might triger a bug in recent versions (that
 ## probably won't be fixed before 1.1.1X), so we use an old version that
@@ -5736,22 +5753,22 @@
 ## Bug report: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6902
 ## They should be re-enabled (and the DTLS 1.0 switched back to a non-legacy
 ## version of OpenSSL once a fixed version of OpenSSL is available)
-##
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-## client_needs_more_time 4
-## run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl server, DTLS 1.2" \
-##             -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
-##             "$O_SRV -dtls1_2 -verify 10" \
-##             "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
-##              crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
-##              key_file=data_files/server8.key \
-##              hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1_2" \
-##             0 \
-##             -c "fragmenting handshake message" \
-##             -C "error"
+skip_next_test
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+client_needs_more_time 4
+run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl server, DTLS 1.2" \
+            -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
+            "$O_SRV -dtls1_2 -verify 10" \
+            "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+             crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
+             key_file=data_files/server8.key \
+             hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1_2" \
+            0 \
+            -c "fragmenting handshake message" \
+            -C "error"
 
 requires_openssl_legacy
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
@@ -5935,9 +5952,25 @@
             -c "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
             -S "Buffering HS message" \
             -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
-            -C "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -C "Remember CCS message" \
-            -S "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Remember CCS message"
+
+run_test    "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order handshake message fragment on client" \
+            -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=ServerHello" \
+            "$P_SRV mtu=512 dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
+            "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
+            0 \
+            -c "Buffering HS message" \
+            -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message"\
+            -c "Next handshake message 1 not or only partially bufffered" \
+            -c "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
+            -S "Buffering HS message" \
+            -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Remember CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -S "Remember CCS message"
 
 # The client buffers the ServerKeyExchange before receiving the fragmented
@@ -5955,9 +5988,9 @@
             -C "attempt to make space by freeing buffered messages" \
             -S "Buffering HS message" \
             -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
-            -C "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -C "Remember CCS message" \
-            -S "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -S "Remember CCS message"
 
 # The size constraints ensure that the delayed certificate message can't
@@ -5975,9 +6008,9 @@
             -c "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" \
             -S "Buffering HS message" \
             -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
-            -C "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -C "Remember CCS message" \
-            -S "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -S "Remember CCS message"
 
 run_test    "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order handshake message on server" \
@@ -5989,9 +6022,9 @@
             -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
             -s "Buffering HS message" \
             -s "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \
-            -C "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -C "Remember CCS message" \
-            -S "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -S "Remember CCS message"
 
 run_test    "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order CCS message on client"\
@@ -6003,9 +6036,9 @@
             -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
             -S "Buffering HS message" \
             -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \
-            -c "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -c "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -c "Remember CCS message" \
-            -S "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -S "Remember CCS message"
 
 run_test    "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order CCS message on server"\
@@ -6017,9 +6050,9 @@
             -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\
             -S "Buffering HS message" \
             -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \
-            -C "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -C "Remember CCS message" \
-            -s "Inject buffered CCS message" \
+            -s "Injecting buffered CCS message" \
             -s "Remember CCS message"
 
 run_test    "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message" \