diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b26b4b0..d8d6798 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,30 +1,37 @@
 mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
-= mbed TLS 1.3.14 released 2015-10-??
+= mbed TLS 1.3.14 released 2015-10-xx
 
 Security
+   * Added fix for CVE-2015-5291 to prevent heap corruption due to buffer
+     overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks.
    * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by
-     mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes.
-     Found by Guido Vranken. Not triggerable remotely.
+     mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes. Found by
+     Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely.
    * Fix potential buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_read_string().
-     Found by Guido Vranken. Not exploitable remotely in the context of TLS,
-     but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a string
-     of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would require
-     reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes.
+     Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not exploitable remotely in the context
+     of TLS, but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a
+     string of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would
+     require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes.
    * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer()
-     on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken.
-     Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you accept PEM
-     data from an untrusted source.
+     on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you
+     accept PEM data from an untrusted source.
    * Fix potential double-free if ssl_set_psk() is called repeatedly on
-     the same ssl_context object and some memory allocations fail.
-     Found by Guido Vranken. Can not be forced remotely.
+     the same ssl_context object and some memory allocations fail. Found by
+     Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Can not be forced remotely.
    * Fix possible heap buffer overflow in base64_encode() when the input
-     buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms.
-     Found by Guido Vranken. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS.
+     buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms. Found by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks. Found by Guido Vranken. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS.
    * Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client
      authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely
-     unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth.
-     Found by Guido Vranken.
+     unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth. Found by
+     Guido Vranken, Intelworks.
+
+Changes
+   * Added checking of hostname length in ssl_set_hostname() to ensure domain
+     names are compliant with RFC 1035.
 
 = mbed TLS 1.3.13 released 2015-09-17
 
diff --git a/include/polarssl/ssl.h b/include/polarssl/ssl.h
index 1f9f8be..0d84663 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ssl.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ssl.h
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@
 #endif /* POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
 #endif /* POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
+#define SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN           255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */
+
 /* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c
  * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */
 #define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE           0   /*!< don't use this extension   */
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index f603cff..39dc02e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
                                     size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
@@ -74,6 +75,12 @@
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
                    ssl->hostname ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->hostname_len + 9 )
+    {
+         SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+         return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * struct {
      *     NameType name_type;
@@ -117,6 +124,7 @@
                                          size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
@@ -125,6 +133,12 @@
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)(end - p) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Secure renegotiation
      */
@@ -151,6 +165,7 @@
                                                 size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
 #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C) || defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
     unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6;
@@ -163,9 +178,54 @@
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
 
+#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA512_C)
+    /* SHA512 + RSA signature, SHA384 + RSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 4;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA256_C)
+    /* SHA256 + RSA signature, SHA224 + RSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 4;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
+    /* SHA1 + RSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
+    /* MD5 + RSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
+#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA512_C)
+    /* SHA512 + ECDSA signature, SHA384 + ECDSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 4;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA256_C)
+    /* SHA256 + ECDSA signature, SHA224 + ECDSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 4;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
+    /* SHA1 + ECDSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
+    /* MD5 + ECDSA signature */
+    sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+#endif /* POLARSSL_ECDSA_C */
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2)
      */
+    sig_alg_len = 0;
+
 #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
 #if defined(POLARSSL_SHA512_C)
     sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = SSL_HASH_SHA512;
@@ -248,6 +308,7 @@
                                                      size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6;
     size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
     const ecp_curve_info *info;
@@ -269,6 +330,25 @@
     for( info = ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ )
     {
 #endif
+        elliptic_curve_len += 2;
+    }
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
+    elliptic_curve_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SET_CURVES)
+    for( grp_id = ssl->curve_list; *grp_id != POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ )
+    {
+       info = ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
+#else
+    for( info = ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ )
+    {
+#endif
 
         elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8;
         elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF;
@@ -294,12 +374,18 @@
                                                    size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
-    ((void) ssl);
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -319,14 +405,21 @@
                                                size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
-    if( ssl->mfl_code == SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) {
-        *olen = 0;
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if( ssl->mfl_code == SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
         return;
-    }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -344,15 +437,21 @@
                                           unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->trunc_hmac == SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
-    {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
-    }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -368,17 +467,25 @@
                                        unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->encrypt_then_mac == SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
         ssl->max_minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac "
                         "extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -394,17 +501,25 @@
                                        unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->extended_ms == SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
         ssl->max_minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret "
                         "extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -420,16 +535,22 @@
                                           unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
 
+    *olen = 0;
+
     if( ssl->session_tickets == SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
-    {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
-    }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -457,16 +578,26 @@
                                 unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+    size_t alpnlen = 0;
     const char **cur;
 
+    *olen = 0;
+
     if( ssl->alpn_list == NULL )
-    {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
-    }
 
     SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
 
+    for( cur = ssl->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
+        alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1;
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen )
+    {
+        SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( TLS_EXT_ALPN      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -746,13 +877,13 @@
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN)
+    ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN)
-    ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index f16bb53..7fc9d99 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -4150,6 +4150,9 @@
     if( ssl->hostname_len + 1 == 0 )
         return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
+    if( ssl->hostname_len > SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN )
+        return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
     ssl->hostname = polarssl_malloc( ssl->hostname_len + 1 );
 
     if( ssl->hostname == NULL )