diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index bef3002..6761fbd 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1586,7 +1586,7 @@
 int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
                                  int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                                  void *p_rng,
-                                 int mode, size_t *olen,
+                                 size_t *olen,
                                  const unsigned char *input,
                                  unsigned char *output,
                                  size_t output_max_len )
@@ -1611,8 +1611,6 @@
     unsigned output_too_large;
 
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
-                      mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
     RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
@@ -1622,15 +1620,13 @@
                            ilen - 11 :
                            output_max_len );
 
-    if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
+    if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
-    ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
-          ? mbedtls_rsa_public(  ctx, input, buf )
-          : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
 
     if( ret != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
@@ -1639,37 +1635,20 @@
      * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
     bad |= buf[0];
 
-    if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
-    {
-        /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
-         * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
-        bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
 
-        /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-         * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
-        for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
-        {
-            pad_done  |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
-            pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
-        }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
-         * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
-        bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
+    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
+        * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+    bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
 
-        /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-         * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count.
-         * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
-        for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
-        {
-            pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 );
-            pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
-            bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
-        }
+    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
+        * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+    for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
+    {
+        pad_done  |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+        pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
     }
 
+
     /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
     bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
 
@@ -1772,7 +1751,7 @@
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen,
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
                                                 input, output, output_max_len );
 #endif