fix various issues.
- comments issues
- code format style issues
- naming improvement.
- error return improvements
Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu <jerry.h.yu@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index e4ff3b1..43b633e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -140,22 +140,20 @@
const unsigned char *binder,
size_t binder_len,
int psk_type,
- mbedtls_md_type_t psk_alg )
+ psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
unsigned char transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
unsigned char *psk;
size_t psk_len;
unsigned char server_computed_binder[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
- psa_md_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( psk_alg );
/* Get current state of handshake transcript. */
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, psk_alg,
- transcript, sizeof( transcript ),
- &transcript_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
+ ssl, mbedtls_hash_info_md_from_psa( psk_hash_alg ),
+ transcript, sizeof( transcript ), &transcript_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -163,7 +161,7 @@
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder( ssl, psa_md_alg,
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder( ssl, psk_hash_alg,
psk, psk_len, psk_type,
transcript,
server_computed_binder );
@@ -276,12 +274,12 @@
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- const unsigned char *end,
+ const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext,
+ const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end,
const unsigned char *ciphersuites,
const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end )
{
- const unsigned char *identities = buf;
+ const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext;
const unsigned char *p_identity_len;
size_t identities_len;
const unsigned char *identities_end;
@@ -292,28 +290,32 @@
int matched_identity = -1;
int identity_id = -1;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "pre_shared_key extension", buf, end - buf );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "pre_shared_key extension",
+ pre_shared_key_ext,
+ pre_shared_key_ext_end - pre_shared_key_ext );
/* identities_len 2 bytes
* identities_data >= 7 bytes
*/
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( identities, end, 7 + 2 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( identities, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 7 + 2 );
identities_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( identities, 0 );
p_identity_len = identities + 2;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p_identity_len, end, identities_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p_identity_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end,
+ identities_len );
identities_end = p_identity_len + identities_len;
/* binders_len 2 bytes
* binders >= 33 bytes
*/
binders = identities_end;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( binders, end, 33 + 2 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( binders, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 33 + 2 );
binders_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( binders, 0 );
p_binder_len = binders + 2;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p_binder_len, end, binders_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p_binder_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, binders_len );
binders_end = p_binder_len + binders_len;
- ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, identities_end - buf );
+ ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, pre_shared_key_ext,
+ identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext );
while( p_identity_len < identities_end && p_binder_len < binders_end )
{
@@ -324,7 +326,7 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int psk_type;
uint16_t cipher_suite;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t* ciphersuite_info;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p_identity_len, identities_end, 2 + 1 + 4 );
identity_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p_identity_len, 0 );
@@ -370,11 +372,12 @@
}
ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(
- ssl, binder, binder_len, psk_type, ciphersuite_info->mac );
- /* For the security rationale, handshake should be abort when binder
- * value mismatch. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2 and appendix E.6. */
+ ssl, binder, binder_len, psk_type,
+ mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ciphersuite_info->mac ) );
if( ret != SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH )
{
+ /* For the security rationale, handshake should be abort when binder
+ * value mismatch. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2 and appendix E.6. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Binder is not matched." ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
"ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match" , ret );
@@ -1006,7 +1009,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
const unsigned char *cipher_suites;
- const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_start = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext = NULL;
const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
@@ -1334,7 +1337,7 @@
* found out which algorithms to use. We keep a pointer
* to the buffer and the size for later processing.
*/
- pre_shared_key_ext_start = p;
+ pre_shared_key_ext = p;
pre_shared_key_ext_end = extension_data_end;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY;
@@ -1401,9 +1404,9 @@
( ssl->handshake->extensions_present & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY ) )
{
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf,
- pre_shared_key_ext_start - buf );
+ pre_shared_key_ext - buf );
ret = ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext( ssl,
- pre_shared_key_ext_start,
+ pre_shared_key_ext,
pre_shared_key_ext_end,
cipher_suites,
cipher_suites_end );