diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 677632b..ea652ee 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@
    * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a
      predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other
      side of the key exchange had a similar bug.
+   * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to
+     implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same
+     blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the
+     countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side
+     channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd.
+
+API Changes
+   * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to
+     mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the
+     purpose of blinding.
+   * The new function mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() allows to generate a private
+     key without generating the public part of the pair.
 
 Bugfix
    * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 75d5eb1..fa88ebf 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -333,6 +333,16 @@
  *            dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
  *            and ciphers instead.
  *
+ * \warning   If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ *            enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ *            the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ *            alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ *            the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ *            MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ *            implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
+ *            (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
+ *            desirable).
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index cfd1370..08811a3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -107,6 +107,20 @@
  *                  Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
  *                  Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
  *
+ *
+ * \warning         Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
+ *                  the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
+ *                  blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
+ *                  secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
+ *
+ *                  (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
+ *                  on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
+ *                  random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
+ *                  each execution. This means that this blinding does not
+ *                  prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
+ *                  several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
+ *                  that exploit relationships between secret data.)
+ *
  * \param grp       The ECP group.
  * \param r         The first output integer.
  * \param s         The second output integer.
@@ -127,9 +141,56 @@
  *
  * \see             ecp.h
  */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                    const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                            mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                            const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                            mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+/**
+ * \brief           This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ *                  previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ *                  For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ *                  Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ *                  Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note            If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ *                  bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ *                  defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ *                  (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ *                  4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see             ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp           The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ *                      This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ *                      set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r             The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ *                      the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s             The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ *                      the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d             The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ *                      and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf           The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ *                      buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ *                      \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen          The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg        The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind   The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ *                      \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind   The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ *                      \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ *                  error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+                                                   size_t),
+                                void *p_rng_blind );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 6c43c00..691415e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -602,6 +602,22 @@
 int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d );
 
 /**
+ * \brief           Generate a private key
+ *
+ * \param grp       ECP group
+ * \param d         Destination MPI (secret part)
+ * \param f_rng     RNG function
+ * \param p_rng     RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return          0 if successful,
+ *                  or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+                     mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                     int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                     void *p_rng );
+
+/**
  * \brief           Generate a keypair with configurable base point
  *
  * \param grp       ECP group
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index ab75620..c635a50 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -70,9 +70,14 @@
  * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
  * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
  */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                void *p_rng,
+                                int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+                                                   size_t),
+                                void *p_rng_blind )
 {
     int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
     mbedtls_ecp_point R;
@@ -99,7 +104,10 @@
         key_tries = 0;
         do
         {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
+                                              f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
 
             if( key_tries++ > 10 )
@@ -118,15 +126,20 @@
         /*
          * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
          * avoiding a potential timing leak.
+         *
+         * This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
+         * replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
+         * necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
+         * key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
          */
         blind_tries = 0;
         do
         {
             size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
+                                                      p_rng_blind ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
 
-            /* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
             if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
                 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
         }
@@ -158,15 +171,27 @@
 
     return( ret );
 }
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+                        const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf,
+                        size_t blen,
+                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                        void *p_rng )
+{
+    /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
+    return( ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
+                                 f_rng, p_rng ) );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                    const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                                    mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                    int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+                                                       size_t),
+                                    void *p_rng_blind )
 {
     int ret;
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
@@ -174,12 +199,16 @@
     size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_mpi h;
+    /* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
+    const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
+    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
 
     if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
+    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
 
     /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
@@ -187,15 +216,71 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
-                      mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
+    if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
+        ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+                                   mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+                                   f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
+    else
+    {
+        /*
+         * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
+         * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
+         * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
+         * risk that they leak this way.
+         */
+
+        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
+                                    data, 2 * grp_len );
+        ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
+                                            (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
+                                            strlen( blind_label ) );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        /*
+         * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
+         * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
+         * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
+         * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
+         * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
+         */
+        ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+                                   mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+                                   mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );
+
+    }
 
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
+    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
 
     return( ret );
 }
+
+/*
+ * Deterministic signature wrappers
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                            mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                            const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                            mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+{
+    return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+                                     NULL, NULL ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+                                                   size_t),
+                                void *p_rng_blind )
+{
+    return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+                                     f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
+}
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
@@ -326,17 +411,15 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-    (void) f_rng;
-    (void) p_rng;
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
-                             hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+                                              hash, hlen, md_alg,
+                                              f_rng, p_rng ) );
 #else
     (void) md_alg;
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
                          hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
 
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 75233f8..cb8e947 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -1918,15 +1918,14 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ * Generate a private key
  */
-int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
-                     const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
-                     mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+                     mbedtls_mpi *d,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                      void *p_rng )
 {
-    int ret;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
 
 #if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
@@ -1951,8 +1950,8 @@
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
     }
-    else
 #endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+
 #if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
     if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
     {
@@ -1986,15 +1985,28 @@
         while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ||
                mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
     }
-    else
 #endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
 cleanup:
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return( ret );
+    return( ret );
+}
 
-    return( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+                     const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+                     mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+                     int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                     void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
index 9b1315f..74fc49b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
@@ -129,6 +129,16 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT(
+                mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, hlen,
+                                            md_alg, rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+                == 0 );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 );
 exit:
     mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );