diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index bcceda8..9d5d779 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@
 - [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
 - [`mbedtls-3.6`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-3.6)
  maintained until March 2027, see
-  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.6.0>.
+  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.6.1>.
 - [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
  maintained until the end of 2024, see
-  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.8>.
+  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.9>.
 
 Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index f62b4b0..51944fa 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@
 if(TEST_CPP)
     project("Mbed TLS"
         LANGUAGES C CXX
-        VERSION 3.6.0
+        VERSION 3.6.1
     )
 else()
     project("Mbed TLS"
         LANGUAGES C
-        VERSION 3.6.0
+        VERSION 3.6.1
     )
 endif()
 
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
     write_basic_package_version_file(
         "cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
             COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
-            VERSION 3.6.0)
+            VERSION 3.6.1)
 
     install(
         FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b691a0f..8eb43fe 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,188 @@
 Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
+= Mbed TLS 3.6.1 branch released 2024-08-30
+
+API changes
+   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
+     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are no longer declared when compiling
+     in C++. This resolves a build failure under C++ compilers that do not
+     support flexible array members (a C99 feature not adopted by C++).
+     Fixes #9020.
+
+Default behavior changes
+   * In a PSA-client-only build (i.e. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT &&
+     !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C), do not automatically enable local crypto when the
+     corresponding PSA mechanism is enabled, since the server provides the
+     crypto. Fixes #9126.
+   * A TLS handshake may now call psa_crypto_init() if TLS 1.3 is enabled.
+     This can happen even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually not selected
+     in the protocol version negotiation.
+   * By default, the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets by the Mbed TLS client is now
+     disabled at runtime. Applications that were using TLS 1.3 tickets
+     signalled by MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET return values now
+     need to enable the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets through the new
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() API.
+
+New deprecations
+   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
+     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are deprecated in favor of
+     psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+     They have almost exactly the same interface, but the variable-length
+     data is passed in a separate parameter instead of a flexible array
+     member.
+   * The following cryptographic mechanisms are planned to be removed
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - DES (including 3DES).
+     - PKCS#1v1.5 encryption/decryption (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5).
+       (OAEP, PSS, and PKCS#1v1.5 signature are staying.)
+     - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman with custom groups.
+       (RFC 7919 groups remain supported.)
+     - Elliptic curves of size 225 bits or less.
+   * The following cipher suites are planned to be removed from (D)TLS 1.2
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - TLS_RSA_* (including TLS_RSA_PSK_*), i.e. cipher suites using
+       RSA decryption.
+       (RSA signatures, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*, are staying.)
+     - TLS_ECDH_*, i.e. cipher suites using static ECDH.
+       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
+     - TLS_DHE_*, i.e. cipher suites using finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
+       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
+     - TLS_*CBC*, i.e. all cipher suites using CBC.
+   * The following low-level application interfaces are planned to be removed
+     from the public API in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - Hashes: hkdf.h, md5.h, ripemd160.h, sha1.h, sha3.h, sha256.h, sha512.h;
+     - Random generation: ctr_drbg.h, hmac_drbg.h, entropy.h;
+     - Ciphers and modes: aes.h, aria.h, camellia.h, chacha20.h, chachapoly.h,
+       cipher.h, cmac.h, gcm.h, poly1305.h;
+     - Private key encryption mechanisms: pkcs5.h, pkcs12.h.
+     - Asymmetric cryptography: bignum.h, dhm.h, ecdh.h, ecdsa.h, ecjpake.h,
+       ecp.h, rsa.h.
+     The cryptographic mechanisms remain present, but they will only be
+     accessible via the PSA API (psa_xxx functions introduced gradually
+     starting with Mbed TLS 2.17) and, where relevant, `pk.h`.
+     For guidance on migrating application code to the PSA API, please consult
+     the PSA transition guide (docs/psa-transition.md).
+   * The following integration interfaces are planned to be removed
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT replacement of cryptographic modules and functions.
+       Use PSA transparent drivers instead.
+     - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C.
+       Use PSA opaque drivers instead.
+
+Features
+   * When the new compilation option MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
+     the number of volatile PSA keys is virtually unlimited, at the expense
+     of increased code size. This option is off by default, but enabled in
+     the default mbedtls_config.h. Fixes #9216.
+
+Security
+   * Unlike previously documented, enabling MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE does
+     not cause the PSA subsystem to use HMAC_DRBG: it uses HMAC_DRBG only when
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C are disabled.
+     CVE-2024-45157
+   * Fix a stack buffer overflow in mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() and
+     mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() when the bits parameter is larger than the
+     largest supported curve. In some configurations with PSA disabled,
+     all values of bits are affected. This never happens in internal library
+     calls, but can affect applications that call these functions directly.
+     CVE-2024-45158
+   * With TLS 1.3, when a server enables optional authentication of the
+     client, if the client-provided certificate does not have appropriate values
+     in keyUsage or extKeyUsage extensions, then the return value of
+     mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly have the
+     MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE and MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE bits
+     clear. As a result, an attacker that had a certificate valid for uses other
+     than TLS client authentication could be able to use it for TLS client
+     authentication anyway. Only TLS 1.3 servers were affected, and only with
+     optional authentication (required would abort the handshake with a fatal
+     alert).
+     CVE-2024-45159
+
+Bugfix
+   * Fix TLS 1.3 client build and runtime when support for session tickets is
+     disabled (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option). Fixes #6395.
+   * Fix compilation error when memcpy() is a function-like macros. Fixes #8994.
+   * MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C are now automatically enabled
+     as soon as MBEDTLS_RSA_C is enabled. Fixes #9041.
+   * Fix undefined behaviour (incrementing a NULL pointer by zero length) when
+     passing in zero length additional data to multipart AEAD.
+   * Fix rare concurrent access bug where attempting to operate on a
+     non-existent key while concurrently creating a new key could potentially
+     corrupt the key store.
+   * Fix error handling when creating a key in a dynamic secure element
+     (feature enabled by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C). In a low memory condition,
+     the creation could return PSA_SUCCESS but using or destroying the key
+     would not work. Fixes #8537.
+   * Fix issue of redefinition warning messages for _GNU_SOURCE in
+     entropy_poll.c and sha_256.c. There was a build warning during
+     building for linux platform.
+     Resolves #9026
+   * Fix a compilation warning in pk.c when PSA is enabled and RSA is disabled.
+   * Fix the build when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled and the built-in
+     CMAC is enabled, but no built-in unauthenticated cipher is enabled.
+     Fixes #9209.
+   * Fix redefinition warnings when SECP192R1 and/or SECP192K1 are disabled.
+     Fixes #9029.
+   * Fix psa_cipher_decrypt() with CCM* rejecting messages less than 3 bytes
+     long. Credit to Cryptofuzz. Fixes #9314.
+   * Fix interference between PSA volatile keys and built-in keys
+     when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled and
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT is more than 4096.
+   * Document and enforce the limitation of mbedtls_psa_register_se_key()
+     to persistent keys. Resolves #9253.
+   * Fix Clang compilation error when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled
+     but MBEDTLS_DHM_C is disabled. Reported by Michael Schuster in #9188.
+   * Fix server mode only build when MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C is enabled but
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C is disabled. Reported by M-Bab on GitHub in #9186.
+   * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C was disabled and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C enabled,
+     some code was defining 0-size arrays, resulting in compilation errors.
+     Fixed by disabling the offending code in configurations without PSA
+     Crypto, where it never worked. Fixes #9311.
+   * Fix unintended performance regression when using short RSA public keys.
+     Fixes #9232.
+   * Fixes an issue where some TLS 1.2 clients could not connect to an
+     Mbed TLS 3.6.0 server, due to incorrect handling of
+     legacy_compression_methods in the ClientHello.
+     Fixes #8995, #9243.
+   * Fix TLS connections failing when the handshake selects TLS 1.3
+     in an application that does not call psa_crypto_init().
+     Fixes #9072.
+   * Fix TLS connection failure in applications using an Mbed TLS client in
+     the default configuration connecting to a TLS 1.3 server sending tickets.
+     See the documentation of
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() for more
+     information.
+     Fixes #8749.
+   * Fix a memory leak that could occur when failing to process an RSA
+     key through some PSA functions due to low memory conditions.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where the CA callback set with
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() would stop working when connections were
+     upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding support for the CA callback with TLS
+     1.3.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where clients that relied on
+     optional/none authentication mode, by calling mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode()
+     with MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, would stop
+     working when connections were upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding
+     support for optional/none with TLS 1.3 as well. Note that the TLS 1.3
+     standard makes server authentication mandatory; users are advised not to
+     use authmode none, and to carefully check the results when using optional
+     mode.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where context-specific certificate
+     verify callbacks, set with mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() as opposed to
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(), would stop working when connections were
+     upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding support for context-specific verify
+     callback in TLS 1.3.
+
+Changes
+   * Warn if mbedtls/check_config.h is included manually, as this can
+     lead to spurious errors. Error if a *adjust*.h header is included
+     manually, as this can lead to silently inconsistent configurations,
+     potentially resulting in buffer overflows.
+     When migrating from Mbed TLS 2.x, if you had a custom config.h that
+     included check_config.h, remove this inclusion from the Mbed TLS 3.x
+     configuration file (renamed to mbedtls_config.h). This change was made
+     in Mbed TLS 3.0, but was not announced in a changelog entry at the time.
+
 = Mbed TLS 3.6.0 branch released 2024-03-28
 
 API changes
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/9126.txt b/ChangeLog.d/9126.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 22939df..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/9126.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Default behavior changes
-   * In a PSA-client-only build (i.e. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT &&
-     !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C), do not automatically enable local crypto when the
-     corresponding PSA mechanism is enabled, since the server provides the
-     crypto. Fixes #9126.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/announce-4.0-removals.txt b/ChangeLog.d/announce-4.0-removals.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index bf941e2..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/announce-4.0-removals.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-New deprecations
-   * The following cryptographic mechanisms are planned to be removed
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - DES (including 3DES).
-     - PKCS#1v1.5 encryption/decryption (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5).
-       (OAEP, PSS, and PKCS#1v1.5 signature are staying.)
-     - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman with custom groups.
-       (RFC 7919 groups remain supported.)
-     - Elliptic curves of size 225 bits or less.
-   * The following cipher suites are planned to be removed from (D)TLS 1.2
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - TLS_RSA_* (including TLS_RSA_PSK_*), i.e. cipher suites using
-       RSA decryption.
-       (RSA signatures, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*, are staying.)
-     - TLS_ECDH_*, i.e. cipher suites using static ECDH.
-       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
-     - TLS_DHE_*, i.e. cipher suites using finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
-       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
-     - TLS_*CBC*, i.e. all cipher suites using CBC.
-   * The following low-level application interfaces are planned to be removed
-     from the public API in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - Hashes: hkdf.h, md5.h, ripemd160.h, sha1.h, sha3.h, sha256.h, sha512.h;
-     - Random generation: ctr_drbg.h, hmac_drbg.h, entropy.h;
-     - Ciphers and modes: aes.h, aria.h, camellia.h, chacha20.h, chachapoly.h,
-       cipher.h, cmac.h, gcm.h, poly1305.h;
-     - Private key encryption mechanisms: pkcs5.h, pkcs12.h.
-     - Asymmetric cryptography: bignum.h, dhm.h, ecdh.h, ecdsa.h, ecjpake.h,
-       ecp.h, rsa.h.
-     The cryptographic mechanisms remain present, but they will only be
-     accessible via the PSA API (psa_xxx functions introduced gradually
-     starting with Mbed TLS 2.17) and, where relevant, `pk.h`.
-     For guidance on migrating application code to the PSA API, please consult
-     the PSA transition guide (docs/psa-transition.md).
-   * The following integration interfaces are planned to be removed
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT replacement of cryptographic modules and functions.
-       Use PSA transparent drivers instead.
-     - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C.
-       Use PSA opaque drivers instead.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/asn1-missing-guard-in-rsa.txt b/ChangeLog.d/asn1-missing-guard-in-rsa.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index bb5b470..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/asn1-missing-guard-in-rsa.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C are now automatically enabled
-     as soon as MBEDTLS_RSA_C is enabled. Fixes #9041.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/check-config.txt b/ChangeLog.d/check-config.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8570a11..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/check-config.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-Changes
-   * Warn if mbedtls/check_config.h is included manually, as this can
-     lead to spurious errors. Error if a *adjust*.h header is included
-     manually, as this can lead to silently inconsistent configurations,
-     potentially resulting in buffer overflows.
-     When migrating from Mbed TLS 2.x, if you had a custom config.h that
-     included check_config.h, remove this inclusion from the Mbed TLS 3.x
-     configuration file (renamed to mbedtls_config.h). This change was made
-     in Mbed TLS 3.0, but was not announced in a changelog entry at the time.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt b/ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index d576dcd..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix interference between PSA volatile keys and built-in keys
-     when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled and
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT is more than 4096.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-clang-psa-build-without-dhm.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-clang-psa-build-without-dhm.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7ae1c68..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-clang-psa-build-without-dhm.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix Clang compilation error when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled
-     but MBEDTLS_DHM_C is disabled. Reported by Michael Schuster in #9188.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-compilation-when-memcpy-is-function-like-macro.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-compilation-when-memcpy-is-function-like-macro.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 11e7d25..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-compilation-when-memcpy-is-function-like-macro.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix compilation error when memcpy() is a function-like macros. Fixes #8994.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-concurrently-loading-non-existent-keys.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-concurrently-loading-non-existent-keys.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a406a1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-concurrently-loading-non-existent-keys.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix rare concurrent access bug where attempting to operate on a
-     non-existent key while concurrently creating a new key could potentially
-     corrupt the key store.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa-cmac.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa-cmac.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e3c8aec..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-psa-cmac.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix the build when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled and the built-in
-     CMAC is enabled, but no built-in unauthenticated cipher is enabled.
-     Fixes #9209.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-redefination_warning_messages_for_GNU_SOURCE.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-redefination_warning_messages_for_GNU_SOURCE.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b5c2650..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-redefination_warning_messages_for_GNU_SOURCE.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix issue of redefinition warning messages for _GNU_SOURCE in
-     entropy_poll.c and sha_256.c. There was a build warning during
-     building for linux platform.
-     Resolves #9026
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-secure-element-key-creation.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-secure-element-key-creation.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 23a46c0..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-secure-element-key-creation.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix error handling when creating a key in a dynamic secure element
-     (feature enabled by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C). In a low memory condition,
-     the creation could return PSA_SUCCESS but using or destroying the key
-     would not work. Fixes #8537.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-server-mode-only-build.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-server-mode-only-build.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index d1d8341..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-server-mode-only-build.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix server mode only build when MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C is enabled but
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C is disabled. Reported by M-Bab on GitHub in #9186.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-test-suite-pk-warnings.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-test-suite-pk-warnings.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 2604219..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-test-suite-pk-warnings.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix redefinition warnings when SECP192R1 and/or SECP192K1 are disabled.
-     Fixes #9029.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_ubsan_mp_aead_gcm.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_ubsan_mp_aead_gcm.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e4726a4..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_ubsan_mp_aead_gcm.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix undefined behaviour (incrementing a NULL pointer by zero length) when
-     passing in zero length additional data to multipart AEAD.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 2fc2751..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Document and enforce the limitation of mbedtls_psa_register_se_key()
-     to persistent keys. Resolves #9253.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/pk-norsa-warning.txt b/ChangeLog.d/pk-norsa-warning.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index d00aa8a..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/pk-norsa-warning.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a compilation warning in pk.c when PSA is enabled and RSA is disabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_decrypt-ccm_star-iv_length_enforcement.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_decrypt-ccm_star-iv_length_enforcement.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 39e03b9..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_decrypt-ccm_star-iv_length_enforcement.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix psa_cipher_decrypt() with CCM* rejecting messages less than 3 bytes
-     long. Credit to Cryptofuzz. Fixes #9314.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key_custom.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key_custom.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 1695be1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key_custom.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-API changes
-   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
-     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are no longer declared when compiling
-     in C++. This resolves a build failure under C++ compilers that do not
-     support flexible array members (a C99 feature not adopted by C++).
-     Fixes #9020.
-
-New deprecations
-   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
-     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are deprecated in favor of
-     psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
-     They have almost exactly the same interface, but the variable-length
-     data is passed in a separate parameter instead of a flexible array
-     member.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_util_in_builds_without_psa.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_util_in_builds_without_psa.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7c0866d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_util_in_builds_without_psa.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C was disabled and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C enabled,
-     some code was defining 0-size arrays, resulting in compilation errors.
-     Fixed by disabling the offending code in configurations without PSA
-     Crypto, where it never worked. Fixes #9311.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-without-tickets.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-without-tickets.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ceef21..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-without-tickets.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix TLS 1.3 client build and runtime when support for session tickets is
-     disabled (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option). Fixes #6395.
diff --git a/docs/psa-transition.md b/docs/psa-transition.md
index dea14fe..952cb1c 100644
--- a/docs/psa-transition.md
+++ b/docs/psa-transition.md
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@
 
 The equivalent of `mbedtls_pk_verify` or `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext` to verify an already calculated hash is [`psa_verify_hash`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__asymmetric/#group__asymmetric_1gae2ffbf01e5266391aff22b101a49f5f5).
 The key must be a public key (or a key pair) allowing the usage `PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH` (see “[Public-key cryptography policies](#public-key-cryptography-policies)”).
-This is also the equivalent of the type-specific functions `mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext`, `mbedtls_ecdsa_verify` amd `mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature`. Note that the PSA API uses the raw format for ECDSA signatures, not the ASN.1 format; see “[ECDSA signature](#ecdsa-signature)” for more details.
+This is also the equivalent of the type-specific functions `mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify`, `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext`, `mbedtls_ecdsa_verify` and `mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature`. Note that the PSA API uses the raw format for ECDSA signatures, not the ASN.1 format; see “[ECDSA signature](#ecdsa-signature)” for more details.
 
 Generally, `psa_sign_hash` and `psa_verify_hash` require the input to have the correct length for the hash (this has historically not always been enforced in the corresponding legacy APIs).
 
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 3eb5f75..740bb19 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.6.0 API Documentation
+ * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.6.1 API Documentation
  *
  * This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS.  It was
  * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index c4505ac..2a82820 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.6.0"
+PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.6.1"
 OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = ../apidoc/
 FULL_PATH_NAMES        = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
diff --git a/framework b/framework
index 94599c0..071831e 160000
--- a/framework
+++ b/framework
@@ -1 +1 @@
-Subproject commit 94599c0e3b5036e086446a51a3f79640f70f22f6
+Subproject commit 071831e25bd336baa58bbdf65e985283f56e1b86
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 71d7b97..8367cd3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@
                         mbedtls_mpi_sint b);
 
 /**
- * \brief          Perform a sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N
+ * \brief          Perform a modular exponentiation: X = A^E mod N
  *
  * \param X        The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
  *                 This must not alias E or N.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
index cf38f90..8242ec6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
@@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  3
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  6
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  0
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  1
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03060000
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.6.0"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.6.0"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03060100
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.6.1"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.6.1"
 
 /* Macros for build-time platform detection */
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 67a05f8..c80e286 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -247,6 +247,9 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) &&  !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN)
 #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer"
 #endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#error "MemorySanitizer does not support assembly implementation"
+#endif
 #undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // temporary macro defined above
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index b7515f3..bd3f71d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -1415,6 +1415,23 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+ *
+ * Dynamically resize the PSA key store to accommodate any number of
+ * volatile keys (until the heap memory is exhausted).
+ *
+ * If this option is disabled, the key store has a fixed size
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT for volatile keys and loaded persistent keys
+ * together.
+ *
+ * This option has no effect when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled.
+ *
+ * Module:  library/psa_crypto.c
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+
+/**
  * Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of
  * key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1.
  * Compared to the default implementation:
@@ -1781,8 +1798,9 @@
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
  *
  * \note TLS 1.3 uses PSA crypto for cryptographic operations that are
- *       directly performed by TLS 1.3 code. As a consequence, you must
- *       call psa_crypto_init() before the first TLS 1.3 handshake.
+ *       directly performed by TLS 1.3 code. As a consequence, when TLS 1.3
+ *       is enabled, a TLS handshake may call psa_crypto_init(), even
+ *       if it ends up negotiating a different TLS version.
  *
  * \note Cryptographic operations performed indirectly via another module
  *       (X.509, PK) or by code shared with TLS 1.2 (record protection,
@@ -4016,19 +4034,30 @@
  * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the
  * PSA crypto subsystem.
  *
- * If this option is unset:
- * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG.
- * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either
- *   #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and
- *   on unspecified heuristics.
+ * If this option is unset, the library chooses a hash (currently between
+ * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 and #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) based on availability and
+ * unspecified heuristics.
+ *
+ * \note The PSA crypto subsystem uses the first available mechanism amongst
+ *       the following:
+ *       - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG if enabled;
+ *       - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus CTR_DRBG with AES
+ *         if #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C is enabled;
+ *       - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ *       A future version may reevaluate the prioritization of DRBG mechanisms.
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
 
 /** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
  *
- * The maximum amount of PSA keys simultaneously in memory. This counts all
+ * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled,
+ * the maximum amount of PSA keys simultaneously in memory. This counts all
  * volatile keys, plus loaded persistent keys.
  *
+ * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
+ * the maximum number of loaded persistent keys.
+ *
  * Currently, persistent keys do not need to be loaded all the time while
  * a multipart operation is in progress, only while the operation is being
  * set up. This may change in future versions of the library.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 4b59e78..42fffbf 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -83,10 +83,7 @@
 /** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE                   -0x7A00
 /* Error space gap */
-/**
- * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message.
- * This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice.
- */
+/** A TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message has been received. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET       -0x7B00
 /** Not possible to read early data */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA            -0x7B80
@@ -324,6 +321,9 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED     0
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED      1
 
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED  0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED   1
+
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT              0
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB               2
 
@@ -1446,6 +1446,12 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+    /** Encodes two booleans, one stating whether TLS 1.2 session tickets are
+     *  enabled or not, the other one whether the handling of TLS 1.3
+     *  NewSessionTicket messages is enabled or not. They are respectively set
+     *  by mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() and
+     *  mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
+     */
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets);   /*!< use session tickets? */
 #endif
 
@@ -4465,21 +4471,50 @@
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
 /**
- * \brief          Enable / Disable session tickets (client only).
- *                 (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.)
+ * \brief          Enable / Disable TLS 1.2 session tickets (client only,
+ *                 TLS 1.2 only). Enabled by default.
  *
  * \note           On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb().
  *
  * \param conf     SSL configuration
- * \param use_tickets   Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
- *                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
+ * \param use_tickets   Enable or disable (#MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
+ *                                         #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS &&
-          MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable / Disable handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages
+ *        (client only, TLS 1.3 only).
+ *
+ *        The handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages is disabled by
+ *        default.
+ *
+ *        In TLS 1.3, servers may send a NewSessionTicket message at any time,
+ *        and may send multiple NewSessionTicket messages. By default, TLS 1.3
+ *        clients ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
+ *
+ *        To support session tickets in TLS 1.3 clients, call this function
+ *        with #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED. When
+ *        this is enabled, when a client receives a NewSessionTicket message,
+ *        the next call to a message processing functions (notably
+ *        mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and mbedtls_ssl_read()) will return
+ *        #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET. The client should then
+ *        call mbedtls_ssl_get_session() to retrieve the session ticket before
+ *        calling the same message processing function again.
+ *
+ * \param conf  SSL configuration
+ * \param signal_new_session_tickets Enable or disable
+ *                                   (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
+ *                                    #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+    mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int signal_new_session_tickets);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
@@ -4887,6 +4922,10 @@
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
  *                 and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
  *                 this case you must stop using the context (see below).
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ *                 NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
+ *                 documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
+ *                 about this error code.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
  *                 defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
  *                 received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
@@ -4903,6 +4942,7 @@
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
  *                 you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
  *                 and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
@@ -4923,10 +4963,13 @@
  *                 currently being processed might or might not contain further
  *                 DTLS records.
  *
- * \note           If the context is configured to allow TLS 1.3, or if
- *                 #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * \note           If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
  *                 subsystem must have been initialized by calling
  *                 psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *                 Otherwise, the handshake may call psa_crypto_init()
+ *                 if a negotiation involving TLS 1.3 takes place (this may
+ *                 be the case even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually
+ *                 not selected).
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 
@@ -4974,6 +5017,7 @@
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using
  *                 the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
  *                 or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
@@ -5042,6 +5086,17 @@
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
  *                 side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
  *                 new connection using the same source port. See below.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ *                 NewSessionTicket message has been received.
+ *                 This error code is only returned on the client side. It is
+ *                 only returned if handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
+ *                 messages has been enabled through
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
+ *                 This error code indicates that a TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
+ *                 message has been received and parsed successfully by the
+ *                 client. The ticket data can be retrieved from the SSL
+ *                 context by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session(). It remains
+ *                 available until the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read().
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
  *                 defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
  *                 received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
@@ -5059,6 +5114,7 @@
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
  *                 you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
  *                 and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
@@ -5124,6 +5180,10 @@
  *                 operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
  *                 in this case you must call this function again to complete
  *                 the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ *                 NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
+ *                 documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
+ *                 about this error code.
  * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
  *                 defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
  *                 received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
@@ -5140,6 +5200,7 @@
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
  *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
  *                 you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
  *                 and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 3f59c3c..e4d8f0d 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
 if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
     add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 16)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 16)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
 
     if(TARGET ${everest_target})
@@ -312,11 +312,11 @@
     endif()
 
     add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 7)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 7)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
 
     add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 21)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 21)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
 endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
 
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index c45fd5b..4244909 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
 #include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_internal.h"
 #include "bn_mul.h"
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
@@ -1610,9 +1611,13 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
-int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
-                        const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
-                        mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+/*
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ */
+static int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+                                               const mbedtls_mpi *E, int E_public,
+                                               const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
@@ -1695,7 +1700,11 @@
     {
         mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
         mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T);
-        mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+        if (E_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+            mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+        } else {
+            mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+        }
         mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T);
     }
 
@@ -1720,6 +1729,20 @@
     return ret;
 }
 
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+                        const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                        mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+{
+    return mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X, A, E, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, N, prec_RR);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                               mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+{
+    return mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X, A, E, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC, N, prec_RR);
+}
+
 /*
  * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B)  (HAC 14.54)
  */
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.c b/library/bignum_core.c
index 1a3e0b9..88582c2 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.c
+++ b/library/bignum_core.c
@@ -746,8 +746,96 @@
     }
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+void (*mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook)(void) = NULL;
+void (*mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook)(void) = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This function calculates the indices of the exponent where the exponentiation algorithm should
+ * start processing.
+ *
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ */
+static inline void exp_mod_calc_first_bit_optionally_safe(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
+                                                          size_t E_limbs,
+                                                          int E_public,
+                                                          size_t *E_limb_index,
+                                                          size_t *E_bit_index)
+{
+    if (E_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+        /*
+         * Skip leading zero bits.
+         */
+        size_t E_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(E, E_limbs);
+        if (E_bits == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If E is 0 mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen() returns 0. Even if that is the case, we will want
+             * to represent it as a single 0 bit and as such the bitlength will be 1.
+             */
+            E_bits = 1;
+        }
+
+        *E_limb_index = E_bits / biL;
+        *E_bit_index = E_bits % biL;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        if (mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+            mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook();
+        }
+#endif
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * Here we need to be constant time with respect to E and can't do anything better than
+         * start at the first allocated bit.
+         */
+        *E_limb_index = E_limbs;
+        *E_bit_index = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        if (mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+            mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook();
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Warning! If the parameter window_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value, this function is
+ * not constant time with respect to the window parameter and consequently the exponent of the
+ * exponentiation (parameter E of mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe).
+ */
+static inline void exp_mod_table_lookup_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wselect,
+                                                        mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable,
+                                                        size_t AN_limbs, size_t welem,
+                                                        mbedtls_mpi_uint window,
+                                                        int window_public)
+{
+    if (window_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+        memcpy(Wselect, Wtable + window * AN_limbs, AN_limbs * ciL);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        if (mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+            mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook();
+        }
+#endif
+    } else {
+        /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through
+         * memory access patterns. */
+        mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable,
+                                              AN_limbs, welem, window);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        if (mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+            mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook();
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
 /* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N.
  *
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ *
  * A must already be in Montgomery form.
  *
  * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero.
@@ -758,16 +846,25 @@
  * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead
  * of a full window.)
  */
-void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
-                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
-                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
-                              size_t AN_limbs,
-                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
-                              size_t E_limbs,
-                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
-                              mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+static void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+                                                     size_t AN_limbs,
+                                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
+                                                     size_t E_limbs,
+                                                     int E_public,
+                                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                                     mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
 {
-    const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL);
+    /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant
+     * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant
+     * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */
+    size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs;
+    size_t E_bit_index = 0;
+    exp_mod_calc_first_bit_optionally_safe(E, E_limbs, E_public,
+                                           &E_limb_index, &E_bit_index);
+
+    const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limb_index * biL);
     const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize;
 
     /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space
@@ -786,7 +883,7 @@
 
     const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N);
 
-    /* Set Wtable[i] = A^(2^i) (in Montgomery representation) */
+    /* Set Wtable[i] = A^i (in Montgomery representation) */
     exp_mod_precompute_window(A, N, AN_limbs,
                               mm, RR,
                               welem, Wtable, temp);
@@ -798,11 +895,6 @@
     /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */
     memcpy(X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL);
 
-    /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant
-     * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant
-     * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */
-    size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs;
-    size_t E_bit_index = 0;
     /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E.
      * window_bits can go up to wsize. */
     size_t window_bits = 0;
@@ -828,10 +920,9 @@
          * when we've finished processing the exponent. */
         if (window_bits == wsize ||
             (E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)) {
-            /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through
-             * memory access patterns. */
-            mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable,
-                                                  AN_limbs, welem, window);
+
+            exp_mod_table_lookup_optionally_safe(Wselect, Wtable, AN_limbs, welem,
+                                                 window, E_public);
             /* Multiply X by the selected element. */
             mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm,
                                      temp);
@@ -841,6 +932,42 @@
     } while (!(E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0));
 }
 
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                              mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X,
+                                             A,
+                                             N,
+                                             AN_limbs,
+                                             E,
+                                             E_limbs,
+                                             MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET,
+                                             RR,
+                                             T);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                     mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X,
+                                             A,
+                                             N,
+                                             AN_limbs,
+                                             E,
+                                             E_limbs,
+                                             MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC,
+                                             RR,
+                                             T);
+}
+
 mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
                                           const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
                                           mbedtls_mpi_uint c,  /* doubles as carry */
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.h b/library/bignum_core.h
index 92c8d47..264ee63 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.h
+++ b/library/bignum_core.h
@@ -70,9 +70,7 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
 #include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
-#endif
 
 #include "constant_time_internal.h"
 
@@ -90,6 +88,34 @@
 #define GET_BYTE(X, i)                                \
     (((X)[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff)
 
+/* Constants to identify whether a value is public or secret. If a parameter is marked as secret by
+ * this constant, the function must be constant time with respect to the parameter.
+ *
+ * This is only needed for functions with the _optionally_safe postfix. All other functions have
+ * fixed behavior that can't be changed at runtime and are constant time with respect to their
+ * parameters as prescribed by their documentation or by conventions in their module's documentation.
+ *
+ * Parameters should be named X_public where X is the name of the
+ * corresponding input parameter.
+ *
+ * Implementation should always check using
+ *  if (X_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+ *      // unsafe path
+ *  } else {
+ *      // safe path
+ *  }
+ * not the other way round, in order to prevent misuse. (That is, if a value
+ * other than the two below is passed, default to the safe path.)
+ *
+ * The value of MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC is chosen in a way that is unlikely to happen by accident, but
+ * which can be used as an immediate value in a Thumb2 comparison (for code size). */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC  0x2a2a2a2a
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET  0
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+// Default value for testing that is neither MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC nor MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST  1
+#endif
+
 /** Count leading zero bits in a given integer.
  *
  * \warning     The result is undefined if \p a == 0
@@ -605,6 +631,42 @@
 size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs);
 
 /**
+ * \brief            Perform a modular exponentiation with public or secret exponent:
+ *                   X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \warning          This function is not constant time with respect to \p E (the exponent).
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs ==
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X     The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length
+ *                   \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A      The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ *                   Must be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] N      The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param AN_limbs   The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR.
+ * \param[in] E      The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs.
+ * \param E_limbs    The number of limbs in \p E.
+ * \param[in] RR     The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little
+ *                   endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T  Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ *                   by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`.
+ *                   Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ *                   indeterminate.
+ *                   It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ *                   parameters.
+ *                   It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ *                   longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ *                   allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+                                     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                     mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
  * \brief            Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent:
  *                   X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form.
  *
diff --git a/library/bignum_core_invasive.h b/library/bignum_core_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..167099d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/bignum_core_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_core_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of bignum core.
+ */
+/**
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+
+extern void (*mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook)(void);
+extern void (*mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook)(void);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/bignum_internal.h b/library/bignum_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aceaf55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/bignum_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief Internal-only bignum public-key cryptosystem API.
+ *
+ * This file declares bignum-related functions that are to be used
+ * only from within the Mbed TLS library itself.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Perform a modular exponentiation: X = A^E mod N
+ *
+ * \warning        This function is not constant time with respect to \p E (the exponent).
+ *
+ * \param X        The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *                 This must not alias E or N.
+ * \param A        The base of the exponentiation.
+ *                 This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param E        The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param N        The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an
+ *                 initialized MPI.
+ * \param prec_RR  A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to
+ *                 speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value
+ *                 of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must
+ *                 point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after
+ *                 the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute
+ *                 the helper value and store it in \p prec_RR for reuse on
+ *                 subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function
+ *                 will assume that \p prec_RR holds the helper value set by a
+ *                 previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it.
+ *
+ * \return         \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or
+ *                 even, or if \c E is negative.
+ * \return         Another negative error code on different kinds of failures.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                               mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR);
+
+#endif /* bignum_internal.h */
diff --git a/library/constant_time_impl.h b/library/constant_time_impl.h
index 2a4574b..aeaeecb 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_impl.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_impl.h
@@ -36,24 +36,9 @@
     #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls"
 #endif
 
-/* Disable asm under Memsan because it confuses Memsan and generates false errors.
- *
- * We also disable under Valgrind by default, because it's more useful
- * for Valgrind to test the plain C implementation. MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM //no-check-names
- * may be set to permit building asm under Valgrind.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) || \
-    (defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM)) //no-check-names
-#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM
-#elif defined(__has_feature)
-#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
-#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM
-#endif
-#endif
-
 /* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || \
-    __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM)
+    __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000)
 #define MBEDTLS_CT_ASM
 #if (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__))
 #define MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 25014e6..c4f41db 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1210,15 +1210,15 @@
         case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION:
             /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the
              * caller is the last reader. */
-            if (slot->registered_readers != 1) {
-                MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1);
+            if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers != 1) {
+                MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1);
                 status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
             }
             break;
         case PSA_SLOT_FILLING:
             /* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */
-            if (slot->registered_readers != 0) {
-                MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 0);
+            if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 0);
                 status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
             }
             break;
@@ -1232,6 +1232,11 @@
             status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    size_t slice_index = slot->slice_index;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+
     /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe
      * because all multipart operation objects are independent from
      * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup
@@ -1242,6 +1247,17 @@
      * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive.
      * This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */
     memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    /* If the slot is already corrupted, something went deeply wrong,
+     * like a thread still using the slot or a stray pointer leading
+     * to the slot's memory being used for another object. Let the slot
+     * leak rather than make the corruption worse. */
+    if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        status = psa_free_key_slot(slice_index, slot);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
     return status;
 }
 
@@ -1753,8 +1769,6 @@
     psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv)
 {
     psa_status_t status;
-    psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id;
-    psa_key_slot_t *slot;
 
     (void) method;
     *p_drv = NULL;
@@ -1764,11 +1778,16 @@
         return status;
     }
 
+    int key_is_volatile = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->lifetime);
+    psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id;
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock(
                               &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex));
 #endif
-    status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
+    status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(
+        key_is_volatile ? &volatile_key_id : NULL,
+        p_slot);
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock(
                               &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex));
@@ -1776,7 +1795,7 @@
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         return status;
     }
-    slot = *p_slot;
+    psa_key_slot_t *slot = *p_slot;
 
     /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each
      * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct.
@@ -1787,7 +1806,7 @@
      * definition. */
 
     slot->attr = *attributes;
-    if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) {
+    if (key_is_volatile) {
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
         slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id;
 #else
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index e7ff151..21e7559 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@
  * and metadata for one key.
  */
 typedef struct {
+    /* This field is accessed in a lot of places. Putting it first
+     * reduces the code size. */
     psa_key_attributes_t attr;
 
     /*
@@ -78,35 +80,77 @@
      * slots that are in a suitable state for the function.
      * For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot
      * containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is
-     * PSA_SLOT_FULL. */
+     * PSA_SLOT_FULL.
+     */
     psa_key_slot_state_t state;
 
-    /*
-     * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot.
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    /* The index of the slice containing this slot.
+     * This field must be filled if the slot contains a key
+     * (including keys being created or destroyed), and can be either
+     * filled or 0 when the slot is free.
      *
-     * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers
-     *
-     * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current
-     * contents of the slot for an operation.
-     * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished
-     * reading the current contents of the slot. If the key slot mutex is not
-     * held (when mutexes are enabled), this call must be done via a call to
-     * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot).
-     * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if
-     * the slot is in use for reading.
-     *
-     * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library
-     * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following
-     * scenarios:
-     * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description
-     *   of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent
-     *   key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by
-     *   the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the
-     *   persistent key.
-     * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close
-     *   or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through
-     *   another thread. */
-    size_t registered_readers;
+     * In most cases, the slice index can be deduced from the key identifer.
+     * We keep it in a separate field for robustness (it reduces the chance
+     * that a coding mistake in the key store will result in accessing the
+     * wrong slice), and also so that it's available even on code paths
+     * during creation or destruction where the key identifier might not be
+     * filled in.
+     * */
+    uint8_t slice_index;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+    union {
+        struct {
+            /* The index of the next slot in the free list for this
+             * slice, relative * to the next array element.
+             *
+             * That is, 0 means the next slot, 1 means the next slot
+             * but one, etc. -1 would mean the slot itself. -2 means
+             * the previous slot, etc.
+             *
+             * If this is beyond the array length, the free list ends with the
+             * current element.
+             *
+             * The reason for this strange encoding is that 0 means the next
+             * element. This way, when we allocate a slice and initialize it
+             * to all-zero, the slice is ready for use, with a free list that
+             * consists of all the slots in order.
+             */
+            int32_t next_free_relative_to_next;
+        } free;
+
+        struct {
+            /*
+             * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot.
+             *
+             * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers
+             *
+             * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading
+             * the current contents of the slot for an operation.
+             * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have
+             * finished reading the current contents of the slot. If the key
+             * slot mutex is not held (when mutexes are enabled), this call
+             * must be done via a call to
+             * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot).
+             * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if
+             * the slot is in use for reading.
+             *
+             * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while
+             * the library may access it. For example, such control is needed
+             * in the following scenarios:
+             * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the
+             *   description of a key, and the library asks for the
+             *   description of a persistent key not present in the
+             *   key slots, the key slots currently accessed by the
+             *   library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load
+             *   the persistent key.
+             * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread
+             *   asks to close or purge or destroy a key while it is in use
+             *   by the library through another thread. */
+            size_t registered_readers;
+        } occupied;
+    } var;
 
     /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer.
      * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */
@@ -169,7 +213,7 @@
  */
 static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
 {
-    return slot->registered_readers > 0;
+    return slot->var.occupied.registered_readers > 0;
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
index 533fb2e..5b51631 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
@@ -21,13 +21,10 @@
 #include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
 
 /* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)
-
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
 
 #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE
 
 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
 
@@ -49,17 +46,11 @@
 #error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG."
 #endif
 
-#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
 
 #error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module."
 
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
 
 /* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index f8e36d8..38dc3b8 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -197,16 +197,14 @@
 
     status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(
         attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa);
-    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return status;
+    if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
+                                            rsa,
+                                            data,
+                                            data_size,
+                                            data_length);
     }
 
-    status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
-                                        rsa,
-                                        data,
-                                        data_size,
-                                        data_length);
-
     mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
     mbedtls_free(rsa);
 
@@ -264,6 +262,7 @@
                               (unsigned int) attributes->bits,
                               exponent);
     if (ret != 0) {
+        mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
         return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
     }
 
@@ -330,7 +329,7 @@
                                                  key_buffer_size,
                                                  &rsa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return status;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
index 9b297c9..9850d8c 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
@@ -58,17 +58,140 @@
 
 
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+
+/* Dynamic key store.
+ *
+ * The key store consists of multiple slices.
+ *
+ * The volatile keys are stored in variable-sized tables called slices.
+ * Slices are allocated on demand and deallocated when possible.
+ * The size of slices increases exponentially, so the average overhead
+ * (number of slots that are allocated but not used) is roughly
+ * proportional to the number of keys (with a factor that grows
+ * when the key store is fragmented).
+ *
+ * One slice is dedicated to the cache of persistent and built-in keys.
+ * For simplicity, they are separated from volatile keys. This cache
+ * slice has a fixed size and has the slice index KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX,
+ * located after the slices for volatile keys.
+ */
+
+/* Size of the last slice containing the cache of persistent and built-in keys. */
+#define PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
+
+/* Volatile keys are stored in slices 0 through
+ * (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1) inclusive.
+ * Each slice is twice the size of the previous slice.
+ * Volatile key identifiers encode the slice number as follows:
+ *     bits 30..31:  0b10 (mandated by the PSA Crypto specification).
+ *     bits 25..29:  slice index (0...KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT-1)
+ *     bits 0..24:   slot index in slice
+ */
+#define KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH 25u
+#define KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH 5u
+
+#define KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH 16u
+#define KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT 22u
+#define KEY_SLICE_COUNT (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT + 1u)
+#define KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT
+
+
+/* Check that the length of the largest slice (calculated as
+ * KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX below) does not overflow size_t. We use
+ * an indirect method in case the calculation of KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX
+ * itself overflows uintmax_t: if (BASE_LENGTH << c)
+ * overflows size_t then BASE_LENGTH > SIZE_MAX >> c.
+ */
+#if (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH >              \
+     SIZE_MAX >> (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1))
+#error "Maximum slice length overflows size_t"
+#endif
+
+#if KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH + KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH > 30
+#error "Not enough room in volatile key IDs for slice index and slot index"
+#endif
+#if KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT > (1 << KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH)
+#error "Too many slices to fit the slice index in a volatile key ID"
+#endif
+#define KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX                                            \
+    (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH << (KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT - 1))
+#if KEY_SLICE_LENGTH_MAX > 1 << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH
+#error "Not enough room in volatile key IDs for a slot index in the largest slice"
+#endif
+#if KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH > 8
+#error "Slice index does not fit in uint8_t for psa_key_slot_t::slice_index"
+#endif
+
+
+/* Calculate the volatile key id to use for a given slot.
+ * This function assumes valid parameter values. */
+static psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id_of_index(size_t slice_idx,
+                                             size_t slot_idx)
+{
+    /* We assert above that the slice and slot indexes fit in separate
+     * bit-fields inside psa_key_id_t, which is a 32-bit type per the
+     * PSA Cryptography specification. */
+    return (psa_key_id_t) (0x40000000u |
+                           (slice_idx << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) |
+                           slot_idx);
+}
+
+/* Calculate the slice containing the given volatile key.
+ * This function assumes valid parameter values. */
+static size_t slice_index_of_volatile_key_id(psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+    size_t mask = (1LU << KEY_ID_SLICE_INDEX_WIDTH) - 1;
+    return (key_id >> KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) & mask;
+}
+
+/* Calculate the index of the slot containing the given volatile key.
+ * This function assumes valid parameter values. */
+static size_t slot_index_of_volatile_key_id(psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+    return key_id & ((1LU << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) - 1);
+}
+
+/* In global_data.first_free_slot_index, use this special value to
+ * indicate that the slice is full. */
+#define FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE ((size_t) -1)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+size_t psa_key_slot_volatile_slice_count(void)
+{
+    return KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+/* Static key store.
+ *
+ * All the keys (volatile or persistent) are in a single slice.
+ * We only use slices as a concept to allow some differences between
+ * static and dynamic key store management to be buried in auxiliary
+ * functions.
+ */
+
+#define PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
+#define KEY_SLICE_COUNT 1u
+#define KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX 0
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+
 typedef struct {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    psa_key_slot_t *key_slices[KEY_SLICE_COUNT];
+    size_t first_free_slot_index[KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT];
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
     psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT];
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
     uint8_t key_slots_initialized;
 } psa_global_data_t;
 
 static psa_global_data_t global_data;
 
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots) <=
-                      PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + 1,
-                      "The key slot array is larger than the volatile key ID range");
-
 static uint8_t psa_get_key_slots_initialized(void)
 {
     uint8_t initialized;
@@ -86,6 +209,125 @@
     return initialized;
 }
 
+
+
+/** The length of the given slice in the key slot table.
+ *
+ * \param slice_idx     The slice number. It must satisfy
+ *                      0 <= slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT.
+ *
+ * \return              The number of elements in the given slice.
+ */
+static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx);
+
+/** Get a pointer to the slot where the given volatile key is located.
+ *
+ * \param key_id        The key identifier. It must be a valid volatile key
+ *                      identifier.
+ * \return              A pointer to the only slot that the given key
+ *                      can be in. Note that the slot may be empty or
+ *                      contain a different key.
+ */
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id);
+
+/** Get a pointer to an entry in the persistent key cache.
+ *
+ * \param slot_idx      The index in the table. It must satisfy
+ *                      0 <= slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT.
+ * \return              A pointer to the slot containing the given
+ *                      persistent key cache entry.
+ */
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx);
+
+/** Get a pointer to a slot given by slice and index.
+ *
+ * \param slice_idx     The slice number. It must satisfy
+ *                      0 <= slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT.
+ * \param slot_idx      An index in the given slice. It must satisfy
+ *                      0 <= slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx).
+ *
+ * \return              A pointer to the given slot.
+ */
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+size_t (*mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length)(size_t slice_idx) = NULL;
+#endif
+
+static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx)
+{
+    if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX) {
+        return PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT;
+    } else {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+        if (mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length != NULL) {
+            return mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length(slice_idx);
+        }
+#endif
+        return KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_BASE_LENGTH << slice_idx;
+    }
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+    size_t slice_idx = slice_index_of_volatile_key_id(key_id);
+    if (slice_idx >= KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    size_t slot_idx = slot_index_of_volatile_key_id(key_id);
+    if (slot_idx >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx];
+    if (slice == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return &slice[slot_idx];
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx)
+{
+    return &global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX][slot_idx];
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx)
+{
+    return &global_data.key_slices[slice_idx][slot_idx];
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+static inline size_t key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx)
+{
+    (void) slice_idx;
+    return ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots);
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+    MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots) <=
+                          PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + 1,
+                          "The key slot array is larger than the volatile key ID range");
+    return &global_data.key_slots[key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN];
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_persistent_key_slot(size_t slot_idx)
+{
+    return &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_slot_t *get_key_slot(size_t slice_idx, size_t slot_idx)
+{
+    (void) slice_idx;
+    return &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+
+
 int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok)
 {
     psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key);
@@ -147,12 +389,13 @@
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
 
     if (psa_key_id_is_volatile(key_id)) {
-        slot = &global_data.key_slots[key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN];
+        slot = get_volatile_key_slot(key_id);
 
         /* Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner
          * identifier of key match those of the key slot. */
-        if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
-            (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) {
+        if (slot != NULL &&
+            slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL &&
+            mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) {
             status = PSA_SUCCESS;
         } else {
             status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST;
@@ -162,8 +405,8 @@
             return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE;
         }
 
-        for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
-            slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
+        for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
+            slot = get_persistent_key_slot(slot_idx);
             /* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */
             if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
                 (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) {
@@ -186,29 +429,169 @@
 
 psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void)
 {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX] =
+        mbedtls_calloc(PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT,
+                       sizeof(*global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX]));
+    if (global_data.key_slices[KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX] == NULL) {
+        return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+    }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
     /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both
      * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which
      * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. The global
      * data mutex is already held when calling this function, so no need to
      * lock it here, to set the flag. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
     global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1;
     return PSA_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void)
 {
-    size_t slot_idx;
-
-    for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
-        psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
-        slot->registered_readers = 1;
-        slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION;
-        (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
+    for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+        if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) {
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif  /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+        for (size_t slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx); slot_idx++) {
+            psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(slice_idx, slot_idx);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+            /* When MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled, calling
+             * psa_wipe_key_slot() on an unused slot is useless, but it
+             * happens to work (because we flip the state to PENDING_DELETION).
+             *
+             * When MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
+             * psa_wipe_key_slot() needs to have a valid slice_index
+             * field, but that value might not be correct in a
+             * free slot, so we must not call it.
+             *
+             * Bypass the call to psa_wipe_key_slot() if the slot is empty,
+             * but only if MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled, to save
+             * a few bytes of code size otherwise.
+             */
+            if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
+                continue;
+            }
+#endif
+            slot->var.occupied.registered_readers = 1;
+            slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION;
+            (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
+        }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+        mbedtls_free(global_data.key_slices[slice_idx]);
+        global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] = NULL;
+#endif  /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
     }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) {
+        global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = 0;
+    }
+#endif  /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
     /* The global data mutex is already held when calling this function. */
     global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0;
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+
+static psa_status_t psa_allocate_volatile_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *key_id,
+                                                   psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
+{
+    size_t slice_idx;
+    for (slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) {
+        if (global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] != FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) {
+        return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) {
+        global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] =
+            mbedtls_calloc(key_slice_length(slice_idx),
+                           sizeof(psa_key_slot_t));
+        if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) {
+            return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        }
+    }
+    psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx];
+
+    size_t slot_idx = global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx];
+    *key_id = volatile_key_id_of_index(slice_idx, slot_idx);
+
+    psa_key_slot_t *slot = &slice[slot_idx];
+    size_t next_free = slot_idx + 1 + slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next;
+    if (next_free >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) {
+        next_free = FREE_SLOT_INDEX_NONE;
+    }
+    global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = next_free;
+    /* The .next_free field is not meaningful when the slot is not free,
+     * so give it the same content as freshly initialized memory. */
+    slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next = 0;
+
+    psa_status_t status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot,
+                                                        PSA_SLOT_EMPTY,
+                                                        PSA_SLOT_FILLING);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        /* The only reason for failure is if the slot state was not empty.
+         * This indicates that something has gone horribly wrong.
+         * In this case, we leave the slot out of the free list, and stop
+         * modifying it. This minimizes any further corruption. The slot
+         * is a memory leak, but that's a lesser evil. */
+        return status;
+    }
+
+    *p_slot = slot;
+    /* We assert at compile time that the slice index fits in uint8_t. */
+    slot->slice_index = (uint8_t) slice_idx;
+    return PSA_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_free_key_slot(size_t slice_idx,
+                               psa_key_slot_t *slot)
+{
+
+    if (slice_idx == KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX) {
+        /* This is a cache entry. We don't maintain a free list, so
+         * there's nothing to do. */
+        return PSA_SUCCESS;
+    }
+    if (slice_idx >= KEY_SLOT_VOLATILE_SLICE_COUNT) {
+        return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    }
+
+    psa_key_slot_t *slice = global_data.key_slices[slice_idx];
+    psa_key_slot_t *slice_end = slice + key_slice_length(slice_idx);
+    if (slot < slice || slot >= slice_end) {
+        /* The slot isn't actually in the slice! We can't detect that
+         * condition for sure, because the pointer comparison itself is
+         * undefined behavior in that case. That same condition makes the
+         * subtraction to calculate the slot index also UB.
+         * Give up now to avoid causing further corruption.
+         */
+        return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    }
+    size_t slot_idx = slot - slice;
+
+    size_t next_free = global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx];
+    if (next_free >= key_slice_length(slice_idx)) {
+        /* The slot was full. The newly freed slot thus becomes the
+         * end of the free list. */
+        next_free = key_slice_length(slice_idx);
+    }
+    global_data.first_free_slot_index[slice_idx] = slot_idx;
+    slot->var.free.next_free_relative_to_next =
+        (int32_t) next_free - (int32_t) slot_idx - 1;
+
+    return PSA_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
 psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
                                        psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
 {
@@ -221,9 +604,19 @@
         goto error;
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+    if (volatile_key_id != NULL) {
+        return psa_allocate_volatile_key_slot(volatile_key_id, p_slot);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+    /* With a dynamic key store, allocate an entry in the cache slice,
+     * applicable only to non-volatile keys that get cached in RAM.
+     * With a static key store, allocate an entry in the sole slice,
+     * applicable to all keys. */
     selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL;
-    for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
-        psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
+    for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < PERSISTENT_KEY_CACHE_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
+        psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX, slot_idx);
         if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
             selected_slot = slot;
             break;
@@ -261,8 +654,18 @@
             goto error;
         }
 
-        *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN +
-                           ((psa_key_id_t) (selected_slot - global_data.key_slots));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+        selected_slot->slice_index = KEY_SLOT_CACHE_SLICE_INDEX;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+        if (volatile_key_id != NULL) {
+            /* Refresh slot_idx, for when the slot is not the original
+             * selected_slot but rather unused_persistent_key_slot.  */
+            slot_idx = selected_slot - global_data.key_slots;
+            *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + slot_idx;
+        }
+#endif
         *p_slot = selected_slot;
 
         return PSA_SUCCESS;
@@ -271,7 +674,6 @@
 
 error:
     *p_slot = NULL;
-    *volatile_key_id = 0;
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -430,9 +832,8 @@
     /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \
     defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
-    psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id;
 
-    status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
+    status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(NULL, p_slot);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
         PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock(
@@ -500,12 +901,12 @@
     /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion,
      * we must wipe the slot here. */
     if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) &&
-        (slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
+        (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1)) {
         return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
     }
 
     if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
-        slot->registered_readers--;
+        slot->var.occupied.registered_readers--;
         return PSA_SUCCESS;
     }
 
@@ -639,7 +1040,7 @@
         return status;
     }
 
-    if (slot->registered_readers == 1) {
+    if (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1) {
         status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
     } else {
         status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
@@ -674,7 +1075,7 @@
     }
 
     if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) &&
-        (slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
+        (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers == 1)) {
         status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
     } else {
         status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
@@ -689,34 +1090,39 @@
 
 void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats)
 {
-    size_t slot_idx;
-
     memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
 
-    for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
-        const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
-        if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
-            ++stats->locked_slots;
-        }
-        if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
-            ++stats->empty_slots;
+    for (size_t slice_idx = 0; slice_idx < KEY_SLICE_COUNT; slice_idx++) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+        if (global_data.key_slices[slice_idx] == NULL) {
             continue;
         }
-        if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) {
-            ++stats->volatile_slots;
-        } else {
-            psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id);
-            ++stats->persistent_slots;
-            if (id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id) {
-                stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id;
+#endif  /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+        for (size_t slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < key_slice_length(slice_idx); slot_idx++) {
+            const psa_key_slot_t *slot = get_key_slot(slice_idx, slot_idx);
+            if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
+                ++stats->empty_slots;
+                continue;
             }
-        }
-        if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime) !=
-            PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) {
-            psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id);
-            ++stats->external_slots;
-            if (id > stats->max_open_external_key_id) {
-                stats->max_open_external_key_id = id;
+            if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
+                ++stats->locked_slots;
+            }
+            if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) {
+                ++stats->volatile_slots;
+            } else {
+                psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id);
+                ++stats->persistent_slots;
+                if (id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id) {
+                    stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id;
+                }
+            }
+            if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime) !=
+                PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) {
+                psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id);
+                ++stats->external_slots;
+                if (id > stats->max_open_external_key_id) {
+                    stats->max_open_external_key_id = id;
+                }
             }
         }
     }
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
index 88b7c83..af1208e 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@
  *
  *  The first #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation
  *  range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers.
- *  A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the
- *  index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition.
+ *
+ *  If \c id is a a volatile key identifier, #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN - \c id
+ *  indicates the key slot containing the volatile key definition. See
+ *  psa_crypto_slot_management.c for details.
  */
 
 /** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier.
@@ -27,8 +29,12 @@
 
 /** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier.
  */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX (MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN - 1)
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX                                 \
     (PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
 
 /** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier.
  *
@@ -94,6 +100,24 @@
  */
 psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+/* Allow test code to customize the key slice length. We use this in tests
+ * that exhaust the key store to reach a full key store in reasonable time
+ * and memory.
+ *
+ * The length of each slice must be between 1 and
+ * (1 << KEY_ID_SLOT_INDEX_WIDTH) inclusive.
+ *
+ * The length for a given slice index must not change while
+ * the key store is initialized.
+ */
+extern size_t (*mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length)(
+    size_t slice_idx);
+
+/* The number of volatile key slices. */
+size_t psa_key_slot_volatile_slice_count(void);
+#endif
+
 /** Delete all data from key slots in memory.
  * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of
  * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use.
@@ -113,13 +137,22 @@
  * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
  * global key slot mutex.
  *
- * \param[out] volatile_key_id   On success, volatile key identifier
- *                               associated to the returned slot.
+ * \param[out] volatile_key_id   - If null, reserve a cache slot for
+ *                                 a persistent or built-in key.
+ *                               - If non-null, allocate a slot for
+ *                                 a volatile key. On success,
+ *                                 \p *volatile_key_id is the
+ *                                 identifier corresponding to the
+ *                                 returned slot. It is the caller's
+ *                                 responsibility to set this key identifier
+ *                                 in the attributes.
  * \param[out] p_slot            On success, a pointer to the slot.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  *         There were no free key slots.
+ *         When #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled, there was not
+ *         enough memory to allocate more slots.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
  *         This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an
@@ -128,6 +161,29 @@
 psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
                                        psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+/** Return a key slot to the free list.
+ *
+ * Call this function when a slot obtained from psa_reserve_free_key_slot()
+ * is no longer in use.
+ *
+ * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
+ * global key slot mutex.
+ *
+ * \param slice_idx             The slice containing the slot.
+ *                              This is `slot->slice_index` when the slot
+ *                              is obtained from psa_reserve_free_key_slot().
+ * \param slot                  The key slot.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ *         This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an
+ *         unexpected state.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_free_key_slot(size_t slice_idx,
+                               psa_key_slot_t *slot);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
+
 /** Change the state of a key slot.
  *
  * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to
@@ -174,10 +230,10 @@
 static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
 {
     if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) ||
-        (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) {
+        (slot->var.occupied.registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) {
         return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     }
-    slot->registered_readers++;
+    slot->var.occupied.registered_readers++;
 
     return PSA_SUCCESS;
 }
diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c
index 4ccc5b0..679d00e 100644
--- a/library/psa_util.c
+++ b/library/psa_util.c
@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@
     if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
     }
+    if (coordinate_len > sizeof(r)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
 
     /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting
      * the conversion. */
@@ -561,6 +564,9 @@
     if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
     }
+    if (2 * coordinate_size > sizeof(raw_tmp)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
 
     /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */
     ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len,
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 7eb4a25..557faaf 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
 #include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_internal.h"
 #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
 #include "rsa_internal.h"
 #include "mbedtls/oid.h"
@@ -1259,7 +1260,7 @@
     }
 
     olen = ctx->len;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
 
 cleanup:
diff --git a/library/sha256.c b/library/sha256.c
index 8b2c345..159accc 100644
--- a/library/sha256.c
+++ b/library/sha256.c
@@ -152,7 +152,9 @@
     return 1;
 }
 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64)
+#ifndef WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
 #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
+#endif
 #include <Windows.h>
 #include <processthreadsapi.h>
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 8402fe8..78ec3bd 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -1674,18 +1674,53 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
- * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
+ * Verify a certificate.
  *
- * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
- * check a cert we received from them)!
+ * [in/out] ssl: misc. things read
+ *               ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result updated
+ * [in] authmode: one of MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_{NONE,OPTIONAL,REQUIRED}
+ * [in] chain: the certificate chain to verify (ie the peer's chain)
+ * [in] ciphersuite_info: For TLS 1.2, this session's ciphersuite;
+ *                        for TLS 1.3, may be left NULL.
+ * [in] rs_ctx: restart context if restartable ECC is in use;
+ *              leave NULL for no restartable behaviour.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 if the handshake should continue. Depending on the
+ *   authmode it means:
+ *   - REQUIRED: the certificate was found to be valid, trusted & acceptable.
+ *     ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result is 0.
+ *   - OPTIONAL: the certificate may or may not be acceptable, but
+ *     ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result was updated with the result.
+ *   - NONE: the certificate wasn't even checked.
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE if
+ *   the certificate was found to be invalid/untrusted/unacceptable and the
+ *   handshake should be aborted (can only happen with REQUIRED).
+ * - another error code if another error happened (out-of-memory, etc.)
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   int authmode,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                   const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
+                                   void *rs_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Check usage of a certificate wrt usage extensions:
+ * keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage.
+ * (Note: nSCertType is deprecated and not standard, we don't check it.)
+ *
+ * Note: if tls_version is 1.3, ciphersuite is ignored and can be NULL.
+ *
+ * Note: recv_endpoint is the receiver's endpoint.
  *
  * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
  */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
                                  const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
-                                 int cert_endpoint,
+                                 int recv_endpoint,
+                                 mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version,
                                  uint32_t *flags);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 
@@ -1891,6 +1926,26 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+/** \brief Initialize the PSA crypto subsystem if necessary.
+ *
+ * Call this function before doing any cryptography in a TLS 1.3 handshake.
+ *
+ * This is necessary in Mbed TLS 3.x for backward compatibility.
+ * Up to Mbed TLS 3.5, in the default configuration, you could perform
+ * a TLS connection with default parameters without having called
+ * psa_crypto_init(), since the TLS layer only supported TLS 1.2 and
+ * did not use PSA crypto. (TLS 1.2 only uses PSA crypto if
+ * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, which is not the case in the default
+ * configuration.) Starting with Mbed TLS 3.6.0, TLS 1.3 is enabled
+ * by default, and the TLS 1.3 layer uses PSA crypto. This means that
+ * applications that are not otherwise using PSA crypto and that worked
+ * with Mbed TLS 3.5 started failing in TLS 3.6.0 if they connected to
+ * a peer that supports TLS 1.3. See
+ * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9072
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
 extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[
     MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
@@ -2914,8 +2969,39 @@
 {
     session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK);
 }
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_BIT 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_BIT 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_MASK \
+    (1 << MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_BIT)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_MASK \
+    (1 << MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_BIT)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_session_tickets(
+    const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
+{
+    return conf->session_tickets & MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_MASK ?
+           MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED :
+           MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_signal_new_session_tickets_enabled(
+    const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
+{
+    return conf->session_tickets & MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_MASK ?
+           MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED :
+           MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
 #endif
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 2bdad84..ef722d7 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -5595,13 +5595,19 @@
         if (ssl_tls13_is_new_session_ticket(ssl)) {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NewSessionTicket received"));
-            ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+            if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_signal_new_session_tickets_enabled(ssl->conf) ==
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED) {
+                ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
 
-            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl,
-                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl,
+                                                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+            } else {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ignoring NewSessionTicket, handling disabled."));
+                return 0;
+            }
 #else
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ignore NewSessionTicket, not supported."));
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ignoring NewSessionTicket, not supported."));
             return 0;
 #endif
         }
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index d6077a2..c773365 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1354,29 +1354,6 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
-    /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
-     *
-     * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with
-     * a "decrypt_error" alert.
-     *
-     * If the client is configured as TLS 1.3 only with optional verify, return
-     * bad config.
-     *
-     */
-    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(
-            (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl)                            &&
-        ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT                &&
-        ssl->conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3    &&
-        ssl->conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3    &&
-        ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
-            1, ("Optional verify auth mode "
-                "is not available for TLS 1.3 client"));
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-
     if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
@@ -3009,11 +2986,24 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets)
 {
-    conf->session_tickets = use_tickets;
+    conf->session_tickets &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_MASK;
+    conf->session_tickets |= (use_tickets != 0) <<
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_2_BIT;
 }
-#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+    mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int signal_new_session_tickets)
+{
+    conf->session_tickets &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_MASK;
+    conf->session_tickets |= (signal_new_session_tickets != 0) <<
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_TLS1_3_BIT;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
 
@@ -5878,7 +5868,33 @@
     if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
         conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-        conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED;
+        mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+        /* Contrary to TLS 1.2 tickets, TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message
+         * handling is disabled by default in Mbed TLS 3.6.x for backward
+         * compatibility with client applications developed using Mbed TLS 3.5
+         * or earlier with the default configuration.
+         *
+         * Up to Mbed TLS 3.5, in the default configuration TLS 1.3 was
+         * disabled, and a Mbed TLS client with the default configuration would
+         * establish a TLS 1.2 connection with a TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 capable
+         * server.
+         *
+         * Starting with Mbed TLS 3.6.0, TLS 1.3 is enabled by default, and thus
+         * an Mbed TLS client with the default configuration establishes a
+         * TLS 1.3 connection with a TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 capable server. If
+         * following the handshake the TLS 1.3 server sends NewSessionTicket
+         * messages and the Mbed TLS client processes them, this results in
+         * Mbed TLS high level APIs (mbedtls_ssl_read(),
+         * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), ...) to eventually return an
+         * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET non fatal error code
+         * (see the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information on
+         * that error code). Applications unaware of that TLS 1.3 specific non
+         * fatal error code are then failing.
+         */
+        mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+            conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED);
+#endif
 #endif
     }
 #endif
@@ -6358,71 +6374,6 @@
 }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
-                                 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
-                                 int cert_endpoint,
-                                 uint32_t *flags)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    unsigned int usage = 0;
-    const char *ext_oid;
-    size_t ext_len;
-
-    if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-        /* Server part of the key exchange */
-        switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) {
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT;
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT;
-                break;
-
-            /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
-                usage = 0;
-        }
-    } else {
-        /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */
-        usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) {
-        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE;
-        ret = -1;
-    }
-
-    if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
-    } else {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) {
-        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE;
-        ret = -1;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
@@ -7941,196 +7892,6 @@
     return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED;
 }
 
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        int authmode,
-                                        mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                                        void *rs_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
-    int have_ca_chain = 0;
-
-    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
-    void *p_vrfy;
-
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback"));
-        f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy;
-        p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy;
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback"));
-        f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy;
-        p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Main check: verify certificate
-     */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-    if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) {
-        ((void) rs_ctx);
-        have_ca_chain = 1;
-
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification"));
-        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(
-            chain,
-            ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
-            ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
-            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
-            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
-            f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
-    } else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-    {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
-        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
-            ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
-            ca_crl   = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
-        } else
-#endif
-        {
-            ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
-            ca_crl   = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
-        }
-
-        if (ca_chain != NULL) {
-            have_ca_chain = 1;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
-            chain,
-            ca_chain, ca_crl,
-            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
-            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
-            f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
-    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
-     */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
-    {
-        const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
-
-        /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK.
-         * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
-         * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */
-        if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
-            /* and in the unlikely case the above assumption no longer holds
-             * we are making sure that pk_ec() here does not return a NULL
-             */
-            mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
-            if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid group ID"));
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-            }
-            if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) {
-                ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |=
-                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)"));
-                if (ret == 0) {
-                    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-
-    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain,
-                                     ciphersuite_info,
-                                     !ssl->conf->endpoint,
-                                     &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
-     * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
-     * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
-     * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
-     * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
-     * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
-        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
-         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
-        ret = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        uint8_t alert;
-
-        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
-           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
-           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
-        if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
-        } else {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
-        }
-        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
-                                       alert);
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-    if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
-                                  (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result));
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -8187,6 +7948,7 @@
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int crt_expected;
+    /* Authmode: precedence order is SNI if used else configuration */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
     const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
                        ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
@@ -8266,8 +8028,9 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode,
-                                       chain, rs_ctx);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(ssl, authmode, chain,
+                                         ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info,
+                                         rs_ctx);
     if (ret != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
@@ -9933,4 +9696,274 @@
     return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are used by 1.2 and 1.3, client and server.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
+                                 int recv_endpoint,
+                                 mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version,
+                                 uint32_t *flags)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned int usage = 0;
+    const char *ext_oid;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    /*
+     * keyUsage
+     */
+
+    /* Note: don't guard this with MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C because the server wants
+     * to check what a compliant client will think while choosing which cert
+     * to send to the client. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+    if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+        recv_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
+        /* TLS 1.2 server part of the key exchange */
+        switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) {
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT;
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT;
+                break;
+
+            /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
+                usage = 0;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        /* This is either TLS 1.3 authentication, which always uses signatures,
+         * or 1.2 client auth: rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign are the only
+         * options we implement, both using signatures. */
+        (void) tls_version;
+        (void) ciphersuite;
+        usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) {
+        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE;
+        ret = -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * extKeyUsage
+     */
+
+    if (recv_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
+        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
+        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
+    } else {
+        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
+        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) {
+        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE;
+        ret = -1;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   int authmode,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                   const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
+                                   void *rs_ctx)
+{
+    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Primary check: use the appropriate X.509 verification function
+     */
+    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
+    void *p_vrfy;
+    if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback"));
+        f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy;
+        p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback"));
+        f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy;
+        p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
+    }
+
+    int ret = 0;
+    int have_ca_chain_or_callback = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+    if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) {
+        ((void) rs_ctx);
+        have_ca_chain_or_callback = 1;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification"));
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(
+            chain,
+            ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
+            ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
+            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+            ssl->hostname,
+            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+            f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+    {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
+        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
+            ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+            ca_crl   = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+            ca_crl   = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
+        }
+
+        if (ca_chain != NULL) {
+            have_ca_chain_or_callback = 1;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
+            chain,
+            ca_chain, ca_crl,
+            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+            ssl->hostname,
+            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+            f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
+     */
+
+    /* With TLS 1.2 and ECC certs, check that the curve used by the
+     * certificate is on our list of acceptable curves.
+     *
+     * With TLS 1.3 this is not needed because the curve is part of the
+     * signature algorithm (eg ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) which is checked when
+     * we validate the signature made with the key associated to this cert.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+    if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+        mbedtls_pk_can_do(&chain->pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(&chain->pk)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)"));
+            ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+    /* Check X.509 usage extensions (keyUsage, extKeyUsage) */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain,
+                                     ciphersuite_info,
+                                     ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                     ssl->tls_version,
+                                     &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* With authmode optional, we want to keep going if the certificate was
+     * unacceptable, but still fail on other errors (out of memory etc),
+     * including fatal errors from the f_vrfy callback.
+     *
+     * The only acceptable errors are:
+     * - MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED: cert rejected by primary check;
+     * - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE: cert rejected by secondary checks.
+     * Anything else is a fatal error. */
+    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
+        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Return a specific error as this is a user error: inconsistent
+     * configuration - can't verify without trust anchors. */
+    if (have_ca_chain_or_callback == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        uint8_t alert;
+
+        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
+           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
+           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
+        if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
+        } else {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
+        }
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       alert);
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
+                                  (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result));
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index eac6a3a..9b2da5a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -364,7 +364,8 @@
 
     *olen = 0;
 
-    if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) {
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_session_tickets(ssl->conf) ==
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) {
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -787,7 +788,8 @@
                                         const unsigned char *buf,
                                         size_t len)
 {
-    if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
+    if ((mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_session_tickets(ssl->conf) ==
+         MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) ||
         len != 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
                               ("non-matching session ticket extension"));
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 81ee600..03722ac 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -756,7 +756,9 @@
          * and decrypting with the same RSA key.
          */
         if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
-                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) {
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2,
+                                         &flags) != 0) {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: "
                                       "(extended) key usage extension"));
             continue;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index 162e3a3..b63b5e6 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -1141,6 +1141,11 @@
 
     *out_len = 0;
 
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
     /* Write supported_versions extension
      *
      * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 8ac6579..b6d0978 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 #include "psa_util_internal.h"
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
 /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
  * arguments in each translating place. */
 static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
@@ -37,7 +36,16 @@
                                  psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
 }
 #define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
-#endif
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = psa_crypto_init();
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        (void) ssl; // unused when debugging is disabled
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_crypto_init", status);
+    }
+    return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
 
 const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[
     MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN] =
@@ -472,6 +480,7 @@
         mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert);
     }
 
+    /* This is used by ssl_tls13_validate_certificate() */
     if (certificate_list_len == 0) {
         ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL;
         ret = 0;
@@ -627,25 +636,13 @@
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
-    int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
-    mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
-    const char *ext_oid;
-    size_t ext_len;
-    uint32_t verify_result = 0;
-
-    /* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode
-     * from the configuration. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-    if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-        if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) {
-            authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
-        } else
-#endif
-        authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
-    }
+    /* Authmode: precedence order is SNI if used else configuration */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
+                       ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
+                       : ssl->conf->authmode;
+#else
+    const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
 #endif
 
     /*
@@ -677,6 +674,11 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+        /* Regardless of authmode, the server is not allowed to send an empty
+         * certificate chain. (Last paragraph before 4.4.2.1 in RFC 8446: "The
+         * server's certificate_list MUST always be non-empty.") With authmode
+         * optional/none, we continue the handshake if we can't validate the
+         * server's cert, but we still break it if no certificate was sent. */
         if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT,
                                          MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE);
@@ -685,114 +687,9 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-    if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
-        ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
-        ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
-    } else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
-    {
-        ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
-        ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Main check: verify certificate
-     */
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(
-        ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-        ca_chain, ca_crl,
-        ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-        ssl->hostname,
-        &verify_result,
-        ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
-     */
-    if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
-    } else {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
-    }
-
-    if ((mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(
-             ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-             MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0) ||
-        (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(
-             ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-             ext_oid, ext_len) != 0)) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
-     * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
-     * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
-     * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
-     * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
-     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional.
-     */
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
-        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
-         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
-        ret = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
-           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
-           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
-        if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & (MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY)) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret);
-        } else {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret);
-        }
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-    if (verify_result != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
-                                  (unsigned int) verify_result));
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
-
-    ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result;
-    return ret;
+    return mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(ssl, authmode,
+                                          ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
+                                          NULL, NULL);
 }
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index f5ef920..693edc7 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -1355,19 +1355,23 @@
      * compression methods and the length of the extensions.
      *
      * cipher_suites                cipher_suites_len bytes
-     * legacy_compression_methods                   2 bytes
-     * extensions_len                               2 bytes
+     * legacy_compression_methods length            1 byte
      */
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cipher_suites_len + 2 + 2);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cipher_suites_len + 1);
     p += cipher_suites_len;
     cipher_suites_end = p;
 
+    /* Check if we have enough data for legacy_compression_methods
+     * and the length of the extensions (2 bytes).
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p + 1, end, p[0] + 2);
+
     /*
      * Search for the supported versions extension and parse it to determine
      * if the client supports TLS 1.3.
      */
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts(
-        ssl, p + 2, end,
+        ssl, p + 1 + p[0], end,
         &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end);
     if (ret < 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
@@ -1408,6 +1412,12 @@
     ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
     ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint;
 
+    /* Before doing any crypto, make sure we can. */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
     /*
      * We are negotiating the version 1.3 of the protocol. Do what we have
      * postponed: copy of the client random bytes, copy of the legacy session
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index 2fd56fb..53cdcf0 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+#ifndef WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
 #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
+#endif
 #include <windows.h>
 #else
 #include <time.h>
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index d494de3..929f83d 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
 #define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO    NULL
 #define DFL_RECONNECT_HARD      0
 #define DFL_TICKETS             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
+#define DFL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS -1
 #define DFL_ALPN_STRING         NULL
 #define DFL_GROUPS              NULL
 #define DFL_SIG_ALGS            NULL
@@ -198,7 +199,8 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
 #define USAGE_TICKETS                                       \
-    "    tickets=%%d          default: 1 (enabled)\n"
+    "    tickets=%%d              default: 1 (enabled)\n"    \
+    "    new_session_tickets=%%d  default: (library default: disabled)\n"
 #else
 #define USAGE_TICKETS ""
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
@@ -514,7 +516,8 @@
     int reco_delay;             /* delay in seconds before resuming session */
     int reco_mode;              /* how to keep the session around           */
     int reconnect_hard;         /* unexpectedly reconnect from the same port */
-    int tickets;                /* enable / disable session tickets         */
+    int tickets;                /* enable / disable session tickets (TLS 1.2) */
+    int new_session_tickets;    /* enable / disable new session tickets (TLS 1.3) */
     const char *groups;         /* list of supported groups                 */
     const char *sig_algs;       /* supported TLS 1.3 signature algorithms   */
     const char *alpn_string;    /* ALPN supported protocols                 */
@@ -818,8 +821,6 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
 #endif
     psa_status_t status;
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
-    psa_status_t status;
 #endif
 
     rng_context_t rng;
@@ -894,7 +895,15 @@
     memset((void *) alpn_list, 0, sizeof(alpn_list));
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+    /* For builds with TLS 1.3 enabled but not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
+     * we deliberately do not call psa_crypto_init() here, to test that
+     * the library is backward-compatible with versions prior to 3.6.0
+     * where calling psa_crypto_init() was not required to open a TLS
+     * connection in the default configuration. See
+     * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9072 and
+     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init().
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     status = psa_crypto_init();
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n",
@@ -963,6 +972,7 @@
     opt.reco_mode           = DFL_RECO_MODE;
     opt.reconnect_hard      = DFL_RECONNECT_HARD;
     opt.tickets             = DFL_TICKETS;
+    opt.new_session_tickets = DFL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS;
     opt.alpn_string         = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
     opt.groups              = DFL_GROUPS;
     opt.sig_algs            = DFL_SIG_ALGS;
@@ -1220,6 +1230,11 @@
             if (opt.tickets < 0) {
                 goto usage;
             }
+        } else if (strcmp(p, "new_session_tickets") == 0) {
+            opt.new_session_tickets = atoi(q);
+            if (opt.new_session_tickets < 0) {
+                goto usage;
+            }
         } else if (strcmp(p, "alpn") == 0) {
             opt.alpn_string = q;
         } else if (strcmp(p, "extended_ms") == 0) {
@@ -1930,7 +1945,13 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
     mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(&conf, opt.tickets);
-#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+    if (opt.new_session_tickets != DFL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+            &conf, opt.new_session_tickets);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
 
     if (opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER) {
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(&conf, opt.force_ciphersuite);
@@ -2204,7 +2225,9 @@
             ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) {
             mbedtls_printf(" failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n",
                            (unsigned int) -ret);
-            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+                ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
                 mbedtls_printf(
                     "    Unable to verify the server's certificate. "
                     "Either it is invalid,\n"
@@ -2215,7 +2238,13 @@
                     "not using TLS 1.3.\n"
                     "    For TLS 1.3 server, try `ca_path=/etc/ssl/certs/`"
                     "or other folder that has root certificates\n");
+
+                flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&ssl);
+                char vrfy_buf[512];
+                x509_crt_verify_info(vrfy_buf, sizeof(vrfy_buf), "  ! ", flags);
+                mbedtls_printf("%s\n", vrfy_buf);
             }
+#endif
             mbedtls_printf("\n");
             goto exit;
         }
@@ -3192,6 +3221,9 @@
 
     /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto
      * resources are freed by rng_free(). */
+    /* For builds with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3, PSA may have been
+     * initialized under the hood by the TLS layer. See
+     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(). */
 #if (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) && \
     !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG)
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index 480b262..ed69590 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -1594,7 +1594,7 @@
     int i;
     char *p, *q;
     const int *list;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     psa_status_t status;
 #endif
     unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16];
@@ -1660,7 +1660,15 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init(&cookie_ctx);
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+    /* For builds with TLS 1.3 enabled but not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
+     * we deliberately do not call psa_crypto_init() here, to test that
+     * the library is backward-compatible with versions prior to 3.6.0
+     * where calling psa_crypto_init() was not required to open a TLS
+     * connection in the default configuration. See
+     * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9072 and
+     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init().
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
     status = psa_crypto_init();
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n",
@@ -3505,7 +3513,8 @@
                        (unsigned int) -ret);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+            ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
             char vrfy_buf[512];
             flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&ssl);
 
@@ -4309,6 +4318,9 @@
 
     /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto
      * resources are freed by rng_free(). */
+    /* For builds with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3, PSA may have been
+     * initialized under the hood by the TLS layer. See
+     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init(). */
 #if (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) \
     && !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG)
     mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index af26965..14c6995 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@
 clean:
 ifndef WINDOWS
 	rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax
-	rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/test_helpers/*.o src/libmbed* src/test_keys.h src/test_certs.h
-	rm -f src/test_keys.h src/test_certs.h
+	rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/test_helpers/*.o src/libmbed*
 	rm -f include/test/instrument_record_status.h
 	rm -f include/alt-extra/*/*_alt.h
 	rm -rf libtestdriver1
@@ -224,10 +223,8 @@
 	if exist *.datax del /Q /F *.datax
 	if exist src/*.o del /Q /F src/*.o
 	if exist src/drivers/*.o del /Q /F src/drivers/*.o
-	if exist src/test_keys.h del /Q /F src/test_keys.h
-	if exist src/test_certs.h del /Q /F src/test_cers.h
 	if exist src/test_helpers/*.o del /Q /F src/test_helpers/*.o
-	if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmed*
+	if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmbed*
 	if exist include/test/instrument_record_status.h del /Q /F include/test/instrument_record_status.h
 endif
 
diff --git a/tests/include/test/bignum_codepath_check.h b/tests/include/test/bignum_codepath_check.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d72be1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/include/test/bignum_codepath_check.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/** Support for path tracking in optionally safe bignum functions
+ *
+ * The functions are called when an optionally safe path is taken and logs it with a single
+ * variable. This variable is at any time in one of three states:
+ *      - MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST: No optionally safe path has been taken since the last reset
+ *      - MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET: Only safe paths were teken since the last reset
+ *      - MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC: At least one unsafe path has been taken since the last reset
+ *
+ * Use a simple global variable to track execution path. Making it work with multithreading
+ * isn't worth the effort as multithreaded tests add little to no value here.
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef BIGNUM_CODEPATH_CHECK_H
+#define BIGNUM_CODEPATH_CHECK_H
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+
+extern int mbedtls_codepath_check;
+
+/**
+ * \brief         Setup the codepath test hooks used by optionally safe bignum functions to signal
+ *                the path taken.
+ */
+void mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_setup(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief         Teardown the codepath test hooks used by optionally safe bignum functions to
+ *                signal the path taken.
+ */
+void mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_teardown(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief         Reset the state of the codepath to the initial state.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_codepath_reset(void)
+{
+    mbedtls_codepath_check = MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST;
+}
+
+/** Check the codepath taken and fail if it doesn't match.
+ *
+ * When a function returns with an error, it can do so before reaching any interesting codepath. The
+ * same can happen if a parameter to the function is zero. In these cases we need to allow
+ * the codepath tracking variable to still have its initial "not set" value.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
+ * It may jump to the \c exit label.
+ *
+ * \param path      The expected codepath.
+ *                  This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ * \param ret       The expected return value.
+ * \param E         The MPI parameter that can cause shortcuts.
+ */
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(path, ret, E)                            \
+    do {                                                                \
+        if ((ret) != 0 || (E).n == 0) {                                 \
+            TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_codepath_check == (path) ||             \
+                        mbedtls_codepath_check == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST); \
+        } else {                                                        \
+            TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, (path));                 \
+        }                                                               \
+    } while (0)
+
+/** Check the codepath taken and fail if it doesn't match.
+ *
+ * When a function returns with an error, it can do so before reaching any interesting codepath. In
+ * this case we need to allow the codepath tracking variable to still have its
+ * initial "not set" value.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
+ * It may jump to the \c exit label.
+ *
+ * \param path      The expected codepath.
+ *                  This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ * \param ret       The expected return value.
+ */
+#define ASSERT_RSA_CODEPATH(path, ret)                                  \
+    do {                                                                \
+        if ((ret) != 0) {                                               \
+            TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_codepath_check == (path) ||             \
+                        mbedtls_codepath_check == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST); \
+        } else {                                                        \
+            TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, (path));                 \
+        }                                                               \
+    } while (0)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+#endif /* BIGNUM_CODEPATH_CHECK_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
index 71ba0fc..1039712 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
@@ -334,9 +334,18 @@
  * This is like #PSA_DONE except it does nothing under the same conditions as
  * #USE_PSA_INIT.
  */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 #define USE_PSA_INIT() PSA_INIT()
 #define USE_PSA_DONE() PSA_DONE()
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/* TLS 1.3 must work without having called psa_crypto_init(), for backward
+ * compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 3.5 when connecting with a peer that
+ * supports both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. See mbedtls_ssl_tls13_crypto_init()
+ * and https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9072 . */
+#define USE_PSA_INIT() ((void) 0)
+/* TLS 1.3 may have initialized the PSA subsystem. Shut it down cleanly,
+ * otherwise Asan and Valgrind would notice a resource leak. */
+#define USE_PSA_DONE() PSA_DONE()
 #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 /* Define empty macros so that we can use them in the preamble and teardown
  * of every test function that uses PSA conditionally based on
@@ -408,13 +417,12 @@
  * This is like #PSA_DONE except it does nothing under the same conditions as
  * #MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT.
  */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) || \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
 #define MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT()   PSA_INIT()
 #define MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE()   PSA_DONE()
 #else
-#define MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT() ((void) 0)
-#define MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE() ((void) 0)
+#define MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT()   USE_PSA_INIT()
+#define MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE()   USE_PSA_DONE()
 #endif
 
 /** \def AES_PSA_INIT
diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
index 9d5870d..f6520a1 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: Multiple PSKs: valid ticket, reconnect with ticket" \
          "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 tickets=8" \
-         "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Pre-configured PSK number = 2" \
          -s "sent selected_identity: 0" \
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: Multiple PSKs: invalid ticket, reconnect with PSK" \
          "$P_SRV tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 tickets=8 dummy_ticket=1" \
-         "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI tls13_kex_modes=psk_ephemeral debug_level=5 psk_identity=Client_identity psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Pre-configured PSK number = 2" \
          -s "sent selected_identity: 1" \
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption with servername" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key \
             sni=localhost,../framework/data_files/server2.crt,../framework/data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,../framework/data_files/server1-nospace.crt,../framework/data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \
-         "$P_CLI server_name=localhost reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI server_name=localhost new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption with ticket max lifetime (7d)" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key ticket_timeout=604800 tickets=1" \
-         "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
 requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption with AES-256-GCM-SHA384 only" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Ciphersuite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption with early data" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 early_data=1 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
 requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption with early data, AES-256-GCM-SHA384 only" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 early_data=1 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Ciphersuite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, early data cli-enabled/srv-default" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, early data cli-enabled/srv-disabled" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 early_data=0 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, early data cli-default/srv-enabled" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 early_data=1 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, early data cli-disabled/srv-enabled" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 early_data=1 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=0 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=0 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, ticket lifetime too long (7d + 1s)" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key ticket_timeout=604801 tickets=1" \
-         "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          1 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, ticket lifetime=0" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key ticket_timeout=0 tickets=1" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=2 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=2 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          1 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, servername check failed" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=2 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key \
             sni=localhost,../framework/data_files/server2.crt,../framework/data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,../framework/data_files/server1-nospace.crt,../framework/data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 server_name=localhost reco_server_name=remote reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 server_name=localhost reco_server_name=remote new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          1 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, ticket auth failed." \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=1" \
-         "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, ticket expired." \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=2" \
-         "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, invalid creation time." \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=3" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, ticket expired, too old" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=4" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, age outside tolerance window, too young" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=5" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, age outside tolerance window, too old" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key tickets=8 dummy_ticket=6" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, cli/tkt kex modes psk/none" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=7" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: ephemeral over psk resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk/psk" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=8" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, cli/tkt kex modes psk/psk_ephemeral" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=9" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: ephemeral over psk resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk/psk_all" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=10" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, cli/tkt kex modes psk_ephemeral/none" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=7" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, cli/tkt kex modes psk_ephemeral/psk" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=8" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk_ephemeral/psk_ephemeral" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=9" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk_ephemeral/psk_all" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=10" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption fails, cli/tkt kex modes psk_all/none" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=7" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
          -S "sent selected_identity:" \
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: ephemeral over psk resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk_all/psk" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=8" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk_all/psk_ephemeral" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=9" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: resumption, cli/tkt kex modes psk_all/psk_all" \
          "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=../framework/data_files/server5.crt key_file=../framework/data_files/server5.key dummy_ticket=10" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->O: resumption" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache --num_tickets 1" \
-            "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -839,7 +839,35 @@
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
             -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
-            -c "Ignore NewSessionTicket, not supported."
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, not supported."
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->O: resumption fails, ticket handling disabled (explicit)" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache --num_tickets 1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 new_session_tickets=0 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            1 \
+            -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+            -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
+            -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, handling disabled."
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->O: resumption fails, ticket handling disabled (default)" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache --num_tickets 1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            1 \
+            -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+            -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
+            -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, handling disabled."
 
 # No early data m->O tests for the time being. The option -early_data is needed
 # to enable early data on OpenSSL server and it is not compatible with the
@@ -858,7 +886,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->O: resumption with early data" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_EARLY_DATA -msg -tls1_3 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache --num_tickets 1" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
              0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -880,7 +908,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert" \
-            "$P_CLI reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -899,7 +927,35 @@
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
             -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
-            -c "Ignore NewSessionTicket, not supported."
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, not supported."
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption fails, ticket handling disabled (explicit)" \
+            "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 new_session_tickets=0 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            1 \
+            -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+            -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
+            -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, handling disabled."
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption fails, ticket handling disabled (default)" \
+            "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            1 \
+            -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+            -C "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
+            -C "Reconnecting with saved session... ok" \
+            -c "Ignoring NewSessionTicket, handling disabled."
 
 requires_gnutls_tls1_3
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C \
@@ -911,7 +967,7 @@
 requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption with AES-256-GCM-SHA384 only" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert" \
-            "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
@@ -929,7 +985,7 @@
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption with early data" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert \
                          --earlydata --maxearlydata 16384" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -953,7 +1009,7 @@
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption with early data, AES-256-GCM-SHA384 only" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert \
                          --earlydata --maxearlydata 16384" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
@@ -976,7 +1032,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption, early data cli-enabled/srv-disabled" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:+ECDHE-PSK:+PSK --disable-client-cert" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=1 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -995,7 +1051,7 @@
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption, early data cli-default/srv-enabled" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert \
                          --earlydata --maxearlydata 16384" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -1015,7 +1071,7 @@
 run_test    "TLS 1.3 m->G: resumption, early data cli-disabled/srv-enabled" \
             "$G_NEXT_SRV -d 5 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 --disable-client-cert \
                          --earlydata --maxearlydata 16384" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=0 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 early_data=0 new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
             -c "Saving session for reuse... ok" \
@@ -1212,7 +1268,7 @@
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: Ephemeral over PSK kex with early data enabled" \
          "$P_SRV force_version=tls13 debug_level=4 early_data=1 max_early_data_size=1024" \
-         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 early_data=1 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+         "$P_CLI debug_level=4 early_data=1 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral new_session_tickets=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
          0 \
          -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
          -S "key exchange mode: psk" \
diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
index 082ed01..58c1783 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@
 def analyze_driver_vs_reference(results: Results, outcomes: Outcomes,
                                 component_ref: str, component_driver: str,
                                 ignored_suites: typing.List[str], ignored_tests=None) -> None:
-    """Check that all tests passing in the reference component are also
-    passing in the corresponding driver component.
+    """Check that all tests passing in the driver component are also
+    passing in the corresponding reference component.
     Skip:
     - full test suites provided in ignored_suites list
     - only some specific test inside a test suite, for which the corresponding
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
                 ignored = True
 
         if not ignored and not suite_case in driver_outcomes.successes:
-            results.error("PASS -> SKIP/FAIL: {}", suite_case)
+            results.error("SKIP/FAIL -> PASS: {}", suite_case)
         if ignored and suite_case in driver_outcomes.successes:
             results.error("uselessly ignored: {}", suite_case)
 
diff --git a/tests/scripts/components-build-system.sh b/tests/scripts/components-build-system.sh
index c41aa48..0db7885 100644
--- a/tests/scripts/components-build-system.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/components-build-system.sh
@@ -108,10 +108,15 @@
     make neat
 
     msg "build: cmake 'as-package' build"
+    root_dir="$(pwd)"
     cd programs/test/cmake_package
+    build_variant_dir="$(pwd)"
     cmake .
     make
     ./cmake_package
+    if [[ "$OSTYPE" == linux* ]]; then
+        PKG_CONFIG_PATH="${build_variant_dir}/mbedtls/pkgconfig" ${root_dir}/tests/scripts/pkgconfig.sh
+    fi
 }
 
 support_test_cmake_as_package () {
diff --git a/tests/scripts/components-configuration-crypto.sh b/tests/scripts/components-configuration-crypto.sh
index 39b9d5d..da0e180 100644
--- a/tests/scripts/components-configuration-crypto.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/components-configuration-crypto.sh
@@ -2504,6 +2504,40 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
 }
 
+component_test_full_block_cipher_psa_dispatch_static_keystore () {
+    msg "build: full + PSA dispatch in block_cipher with static keystore"
+    # Check that the static key store works well when CTR_DRBG uses a
+    # PSA key for AES.
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+
+    loc_accel_list="ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING \
+                    KEY_TYPE_AES KEY_TYPE_ARIA KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA"
+
+    # Configure
+    # ---------
+
+    common_block_cipher_dispatch 1
+
+    # Build
+    # -----
+
+    helper_libtestdriver1_make_drivers "$loc_accel_list"
+
+    helper_libtestdriver1_make_main "$loc_accel_list"
+
+    # Make sure disabled components were not re-enabled by accident (additive
+    # config)
+    not grep mbedtls_aes_ library/aes.o
+    not grep mbedtls_aria_ library/aria.o
+    not grep mbedtls_camellia_ library/camellia.o
+
+    # Run the tests
+    # -------------
+
+    msg "test: full + PSA dispatch in block_cipher with static keystore"
+    make test
+}
+
 component_test_full_block_cipher_psa_dispatch () {
     msg "build: full + PSA dispatch in block_cipher"
 
@@ -3038,6 +3072,16 @@
     make test
 }
 
+component_test_full_static_keystore () {
+    msg "build: full config - MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC"
+    scripts/config.py full
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+    make CC=clang CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Os" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+    msg "test: full config - MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC"
+    make test
+}
+
 component_test_psa_crypto_drivers () {
     msg "build: full + test drivers dispatching to builtins"
     scripts/config.py full
diff --git a/tests/scripts/components-sanitizers.sh b/tests/scripts/components-sanitizers.sh
index 5b79d2b..c9648aa 100644
--- a/tests/scripts/components-sanitizers.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/components-sanitizers.sh
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
     CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan .
     make
 
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
     scripts/config.py full
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
     CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan .
     make
 
@@ -93,7 +95,6 @@
     # Test asm path in constant time module - by default, it will test the plain C
     # path under Valgrind or Memsan. Running only the constant_time tests is fast (<1s)
     msg "test: valgrind asm constant_time"
-    scripts/config.py --force set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM
     skip_all_except_given_suite test_suite_constant_time
     cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make clean
@@ -101,6 +102,32 @@
     make memcheck
 }
 
+component_release_test_valgrind_constant_flow_no_asm () {
+    # This tests both (1) everything that valgrind's memcheck usually checks
+    # (heap buffer overflows, use of uninitialized memory, use-after-free,
+    # etc.) and (2) branches or memory access depending on secret values,
+    # which will be reported as uninitialized memory. To distinguish between
+    # secret and actually uninitialized:
+    # - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND - does the failure persist?
+    # - or alternatively, build with debug info and manually run the offending
+    # test suite with valgrind --track-origins=yes, then check if the origin
+    # was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else.
+    msg "build: cmake release GCC, full config minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, minus MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM with constant flow testing"
+    scripts/config.py full
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+    skip_suites_without_constant_flow
+    cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
+    make
+
+    # this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type)
+    # details are left in Testing/<date>/DynamicAnalysis.xml
+    msg "test: some suites (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, minus MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM, valgrind + constant flow)"
+    make memcheck
+}
+
 component_release_test_valgrind_constant_flow_psa () {
     # This tests both (1) everything that valgrind's memcheck usually checks
     # (heap buffer overflows, use of uninitialized memory, use-after-free,
@@ -145,6 +172,7 @@
 component_test_memsan () {
     msg "build: MSan (clang)" # ~ 1 min 20s
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
     CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan .
     make
 
diff --git a/tests/scripts/pkgconfig.sh b/tests/scripts/pkgconfig.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2702bfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/pkgconfig.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# Purpose
+#
+# Test pkgconfig files.
+#
+# For each of the build pkg-config files, .pc files, check that
+# they validate and do some basic sanity testing on the output,
+# i.e. that the strings are non-empty.
+#
+# NOTE: This requires the built pc files to be on the pkg-config
+# search path, this can be controlled with env variable
+# PKG_CONFIG_PATH. See man(1) pkg-config for details.
+#
+
+set -e -u
+
+# These are the EXPECTED package names. Renaming these could break
+# consumers of pkg-config, consider carefully.
+all_pcs="mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto"
+
+for pc in $all_pcs; do
+    printf "testing package config file: ${pc} ... "
+    pkg-config --validate "${pc}"
+    version="$(pkg-config --modversion "${pc}")"
+    test -n "$version"
+    cflags="$(pkg-config --cflags "${pc}")"
+    test -n "$cflags"
+    libs="$(pkg-config --libs "${pc}")"
+    test -n "$libs"
+    printf "passed\n"
+done
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/src/bignum_codepath_check.c b/tests/src/bignum_codepath_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b752d13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/src/bignum_codepath_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/** Support for path tracking in optionally safe bignum functions
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "test/bignum_codepath_check.h"
+#include "bignum_core_invasive.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+int mbedtls_codepath_check = MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST;
+
+void mbedtls_codepath_take_safe(void)
+{
+    if (mbedtls_codepath_check == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST) {
+        mbedtls_codepath_check = MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET;
+    }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_codepath_take_unsafe(void)
+{
+    mbedtls_codepath_check = MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_setup(void)
+{
+    mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook = mbedtls_codepath_take_safe;
+    mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook = mbedtls_codepath_take_unsafe;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_teardown(void)
+{
+    mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook = NULL;
+    mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c
index 065d17d..db50296 100644
--- a/tests/src/helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/helpers.c
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
 #include <test/psa_memory_poisoning_wrappers.h>
 #endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include <test/bignum_codepath_check.h>
+#endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
 #include "mbedtls/threading.h"
 #endif
@@ -342,6 +345,11 @@
     mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
 
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_setup();
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -359,6 +367,10 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
     mbedtls_platform_teardown(&platform_ctx);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_test_hooks_teardown();
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
 }
 
 int mbedtls_test_ascii2uc(const char c, unsigned char *uc)
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index f546e76..3cb6175 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -2543,6 +2543,9 @@
                                          server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL);
     TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
 
+    mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+        &client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED);
+
     mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf,
                                         mbedtls_test_ticket_write,
                                         mbedtls_test_ticket_parse,
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 0b8f129..83d6d73 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -273,31 +273,39 @@
 }
 
 requires_all_configs_enabled() {
-    if ! $P_QUERY -all $* 2>&1 > /dev/null
-    then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
-    fi
+    for x in "$@"; do
+        if ! is_config_enabled "$x"; then
+            SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+            return
+        fi
+    done
 }
 
 requires_all_configs_disabled() {
-    if $P_QUERY -any $* 2>&1 > /dev/null
-    then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
-    fi
+    for x in "$@"; do
+        if is_config_enabled "$x"; then
+            SKIP_NEXT="YES"
+            return
+        fi
+    done
 }
 
 requires_any_configs_enabled() {
-    if ! $P_QUERY -any $* 2>&1 > /dev/null
-    then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
-    fi
+    for x in "$@"; do
+        if is_config_enabled "$x"; then
+            return
+        fi
+    done
+    SKIP_NEXT="YES"
 }
 
 requires_any_configs_disabled() {
-    if $P_QUERY -all $* 2>&1 > /dev/null
-    then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
-    fi
+    for x in "$@"; do
+        if ! is_config_enabled "$x"; then
+            return
+        fi
+    done
+    SKIP_NEXT="YES"
 }
 
 TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT="MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED \
@@ -317,13 +325,14 @@
                                        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED \
                                        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled() {
-    if $P_QUERY -all MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_certificate_authentication () {
+    if is_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
     then
+        # TLS 1.3 is negotiated by default, so check whether it supports
+        # certificate-based authentication.
+        requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+    else # Only TLS 1.2 is enabled.
         requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
-    elif ! $P_QUERY -all MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-    then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
     fi
 }
 
@@ -475,10 +484,19 @@
             requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN;;
     esac
 
+    case " $CMD_LINE " in
+         *\ auth_mode=*|*[-_\ =]crt[_=]*)
+            # The test case involves certificates (crt), or a relevant
+            # aspect of it is the (certificate-based) authentication mode.
+            requires_certificate_authentication;;
+    esac
+
     case "$CMD_LINE" in
+        *[-_\ =]psk*|*[-_\ =]PSK*) :;; # No certificate requirement with PSK
         */server5*|\
         */server7*|\
         */dir-maxpath*)
+            requires_certificate_authentication
             if [ "$TLS_VERSION" = "TLS13" ]; then
                 # In case of TLS13 the support for ECDSA is enough
                 requires_pk_alg "ECDSA"
@@ -510,9 +528,11 @@
     esac
 
     case "$CMD_LINE" in
+        *[-_\ =]psk*|*[-_\ =]PSK*) :;; # No certificate requirement with PSK
         */server1*|\
         */server2*|\
         */server7*)
+            requires_certificate_authentication
             # Certificates with an RSA key. The algorithm requirement is
             # some subset of {PKCS#1v1.5 encryption, PKCS#1v1.5 signature,
             # PSS signature}. We can't easily tell which subset works, and
@@ -525,17 +545,12 @@
     unset tmp
 }
 
-requires_certificate_authentication () {
-    if [ "$PSK_ONLY" = "YES" ]; then
-        SKIP_NEXT="YES"
-    fi
-}
-
 adapt_cmd_for_psk () {
     case "$2" in
         *openssl*s_server*) s='-psk 73776f726466697368 -nocert';;
         *openssl*) s='-psk 73776f726466697368';;
-        *gnutls-*) s='--pskusername=Client_identity --pskkey=73776f726466697368';;
+        *gnutls-cli*) s='--pskusername=Client_identity --pskkey=73776f726466697368';;
+        *gnutls-serv*) s='--pskpasswd=../framework/data_files/simplepass.psk';;
         *) s='psk=73776f726466697368';;
     esac
     eval $1='"$2 $s"'
@@ -586,14 +601,28 @@
     adapt_cmd_for_psk SRV_CMD "$SRV_CMD"
 }
 
-case " $CONFIGS_ENABLED " in
-    *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_[^P]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
-    *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_P[^S]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
-    *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PS[^K]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
-    *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK[^_]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
-    *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED\ *) PSK_ONLY="YES";;
-    *) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
-esac
+# PSK_PRESENT="YES" if at least one protocol versions supports at least
+# one PSK key exchange mode.
+PSK_PRESENT="NO"
+# PSK_ONLY="YES" if all the available key exchange modes are PSK-based
+# (pure-PSK or PSK-ephemeral, possibly both).
+PSK_ONLY=""
+for c in $CONFIGS_ENABLED; do
+    case $c in
+        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) PSK_PRESENT="YES";;
+        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_*_PSK_ENABLED) PSK_PRESENT="YES";;
+        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_*_ENABLED) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) PSK_PRESENT="YES";;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_*_ENABLED) PSK_PRESENT="YES";;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_*_ENABLED) PSK_ONLY="NO";;
+    esac
+done
+# At this stage, $PSK_ONLY is empty if we haven't detected a non-PSK
+# key exchange, i.e. if we're in a PSK-only build or a build with no
+# key exchanges at all. We avoid triggering PSK-only adaptation code in
+# the edge case of no key exchanges.
+: ${PSK_ONLY:=$PSK_PRESENT}
+unset c
 
 HAS_ALG_MD5="NO"
 HAS_ALG_SHA_1="NO"
@@ -795,6 +824,14 @@
     fi
 }
 
+# OpenSSL servers forbid client renegotiation by default since OpenSSL 3.0.
+# Older versions always allow it and have no command-line option.
+OPENSSL_S_SERVER_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION=
+case $($OPENSSL s_server -help 2>&1) in
+    *-client_renegotiation*)
+        OPENSSL_S_SERVER_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION=-client_renegotiation;;
+esac
+
 # skip next test if tls1_3 is not available
 requires_gnutls_tls1_3() {
     requires_gnutls_next
@@ -1645,7 +1682,7 @@
     esac
     # Third if the version is not forced, if TLS 1.3 is enabled then the test
     # is aimed to run a TLS 1.3 handshake.
-    if $P_QUERY -all MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+    if is_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
     then
         echo "TLS13"
     else
@@ -1731,14 +1768,14 @@
         TLS_VERSION="TLS12"
     fi
 
+    # If we're in a PSK-only build and the test can be adapted to PSK, do that.
+    maybe_adapt_for_psk "$@"
+
     # If the client or server requires certain features that can be detected
     # from their command-line arguments, check whether they're enabled.
     detect_required_features "$SRV_CMD" "server" "$TLS_VERSION" "$EXT_WO_ECDH" "$@"
     detect_required_features "$CLI_CMD" "client" "$TLS_VERSION" "$EXT_WO_ECDH" "$@"
 
-    # If we're in a PSK-only build and the test can be adapted to PSK, do that.
-    maybe_adapt_for_psk "$@"
-
     # should we skip?
     if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then
         SKIP_NEXT="NO"
@@ -2070,8 +2107,8 @@
 # - the expected parameters are selected
 requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256
 requires_hash_alg SHA_512 # "signature_algorithm ext: 6"
-requires_any_configs_enabled "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED \
-                              PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255"
+requires_any_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED \
+                             PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255
 run_test    "Default, TLS 1.2" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
             "$P_CLI force_version=tls12" \
@@ -2092,7 +2129,6 @@
             -s "Protocol is DTLSv1.2" \
             -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "TLS client auth: required" \
             "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -2155,7 +2191,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "CA callback on client" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 " \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 " \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -S "error" \
@@ -2165,7 +2201,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
 requires_hash_alg SHA_256
 run_test    "CA callback on server" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             0 \
@@ -2696,8 +2732,8 @@
             -U "IV used"
 
 # Test for correctness of sent single supported algorithm
-requires_any_configs_enabled "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED \
-                              PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256"
+requires_any_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED \
+                             PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -2712,8 +2748,8 @@
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
-requires_any_configs_enabled "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED \
-                              PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256"
+requires_any_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED \
+                             PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 requires_hash_alg SHA_256
 run_test    "Single supported algorithm sending: openssl client" \
             "$P_SRV sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 auth_mode=required" \
@@ -2724,7 +2760,7 @@
 # Tests for certificate verification callback
 run_test    "Configuration-specific CRT verification callback" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 context_crt_cb=0 debug_level=3" \
+            "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=0 debug_level=3" \
             0 \
             -S "error" \
             -c "Verify requested for " \
@@ -2734,7 +2770,7 @@
 
 run_test    "Context-specific CRT verification callback" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 context_crt_cb=1 debug_level=3" \
+            "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=1 debug_level=3" \
             0 \
             -S "error" \
             -c "Verify requested for " \
@@ -3863,7 +3899,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Session resume using tickets: openssl server" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \
             -c "found session_ticket extension" \
@@ -5548,7 +5584,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 run_test    "Renegotiation: openssl server, client-initiated" \
-            "$O_SRV -www -tls1_2" \
+            "$O_SRV -www $OPENSSL_S_SERVER_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION -tls1_2" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \
             0 \
             -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \
@@ -5809,30 +5845,113 @@
 # Tests for auth_mode, there are duplicated tests using ca callback for authentication
 # When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
+# The next 4 cases test the 3 auth modes with a badly signed server cert.
 run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client required" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             1 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=48" \
             -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA
+# We don't check that the server receives the alert because it might
+# detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
+# before reading the alert message.
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client required (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            1 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA
 
 run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls13 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             0 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
             -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client optional (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            0 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            1 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            1 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
 run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA" \
             "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
             "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
             0 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
@@ -5842,16 +5961,28 @@
             -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
             -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
-run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client none, no trusted CA" \
             "$P_SRV" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
-            1 \
-            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
-            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
-            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=none ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client none, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
 
 # The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server
 # certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because
@@ -5878,16 +6009,6 @@
             -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
             -c "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure only at ECDH params check
 
-run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none" \
-            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
-             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            0 \
-            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
-            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
 run_test    "Authentication: client SHA256, server required" \
             "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
@@ -5908,7 +6029,6 @@
             -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 " \
             -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 05 "
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client has no cert, server required (TLS)" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none \
@@ -5924,7 +6044,6 @@
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client badcert, server required" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -5945,7 +6064,6 @@
 # detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
 # before reading the alert message.
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client cert self-signed and trusted, server required" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-selfsigned.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-selfsigned.crt \
@@ -5961,7 +6079,6 @@
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed" \
             -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client cert not trusted, server required" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-selfsigned.crt \
@@ -5978,7 +6095,6 @@
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client badcert, server optional" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -5996,7 +6112,6 @@
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client badcert, server none" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -6014,7 +6129,6 @@
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client no cert, server optional" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none" \
@@ -6032,7 +6146,6 @@
             -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: openssl client no cert, server optional" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -no_middlebox" \
@@ -6098,7 +6211,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
+            "$P_CLI server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
                     auth_mode=optional" \
             1 \
             -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6219,7 +6332,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client required" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
@@ -6231,7 +6344,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
@@ -6239,6 +6352,18 @@
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client none" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
 # The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server
 # certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because
 # the client informs the server about the supported curves - it does, though, in the
@@ -6270,7 +6395,7 @@
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
-run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \
             "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.key \
@@ -6282,7 +6407,7 @@
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
-run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \
             "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.key \
@@ -6294,7 +6419,7 @@
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6309,7 +6434,6 @@
             -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "send alert level=2 message=48" \
-            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 # We don't check that the client receives the alert because it might
 # detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
@@ -6317,7 +6441,7 @@
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client cert not trusted, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-selfsigned.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6331,12 +6455,11 @@
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server optional" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             0 \
@@ -6359,7 +6482,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int chain, client default" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/09.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 server_name=CA09 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 server_name=CA09 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -C "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6370,7 +6493,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client default" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6381,7 +6504,7 @@
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
                     debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
@@ -6391,7 +6514,7 @@
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server optional" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6402,7 +6525,7 @@
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6413,7 +6536,7 @@
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int chain, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/09.key" \
             0 \
@@ -6436,7 +6559,6 @@
 # tests for SNI
 
 requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: no SNI callback" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
@@ -6446,7 +6568,6 @@
             -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
 
 requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: matching cert 1" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6458,7 +6579,6 @@
             -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
 
 requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: matching cert 2" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6470,7 +6590,6 @@
             -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=polarssl.example"
 
 requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: no matching cert" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6483,7 +6602,6 @@
             -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: client auth no override: optional" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6497,7 +6615,6 @@
             -C "skip write certificate verify" \
             -S "skip parse certificate verify"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: client auth override: none -> optional" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6511,7 +6628,6 @@
             -C "skip write certificate verify" \
             -S "skip parse certificate verify"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: client auth override: optional -> none" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6523,7 +6639,6 @@
             -c "got no certificate request" \
             -c "skip write certificate"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: CA no override" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6542,7 +6657,6 @@
             -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: CA override" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6561,7 +6675,6 @@
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "SNI: CA override with CRL" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -6578,7 +6691,9 @@
             -S "skip parse certificate verify" \
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=44" \
             -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED
 
 # Tests for SNI and DTLS
 
@@ -6726,11 +6841,12 @@
             -S "skip parse certificate verify" \
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=44" \
             -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED
 
 # Tests for non-blocking I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: basic handshake" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \
             "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \
@@ -6739,7 +6855,6 @@
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: client auth" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \
@@ -6748,21 +6863,19 @@
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: ticket" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1" \
+            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: ticket + client auth" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \
-            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1" \
+            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -6784,7 +6897,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: TLS 1.3 + ticket + client auth + resume" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \
-            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -6806,7 +6919,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Non-blocking I/O: TLS 1.3 + ticket + resume" \
             "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -6823,7 +6936,6 @@
 
 # Tests for event-driven I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: basic handshake" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \
             "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \
@@ -6832,7 +6944,6 @@
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: client auth" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \
@@ -6841,21 +6952,19 @@
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: ticket" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1" \
+            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: ticket + client auth" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \
-            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1" \
+            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -6877,7 +6986,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: TLS 1.3 + ticket + client auth + resume" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \
-            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -6899,7 +7008,7 @@
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
 run_test    "Event-driven I/O: TLS 1.3 + ticket + resume" \
             "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
+            "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 new_session_tickets=1 reconnect=1" \
             0 \
             -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
@@ -7546,7 +7655,6 @@
 
 # Tests for ALPN extension
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: none" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
@@ -7559,7 +7667,6 @@
             -C "Application Layer Protocol is" \
             -S "Application Layer Protocol is"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: client only" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
@@ -7572,7 +7679,6 @@
             -c "Application Layer Protocol is (none)" \
             -S "Application Layer Protocol is"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: server only" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
@@ -7585,7 +7691,6 @@
             -C "Application Layer Protocol is" \
             -s "Application Layer Protocol is (none)"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv1" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
@@ -7598,7 +7703,6 @@
             -c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \
             -s "Application Layer Protocol is abc"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: both, common cli2-srv1" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abc" \
@@ -7611,7 +7715,6 @@
             -c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \
             -s "Application Layer Protocol is abc"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv2" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \
@@ -7624,7 +7727,6 @@
             -c "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" \
             -s "Application Layer Protocol is 1234"
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "ALPN: both, no common" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,123" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \
@@ -7640,22 +7742,26 @@
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 1:
 # server-side certificate/suite selection
+#
+# This is only about 1.2 (for 1.3, all key exchanges use signatures).
+# In 4.0 this will probably go away as all TLS 1.2 key exchanges will use
+# signatures too, following the removal of RSA #8170 and static ECDH #9201.
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, digitalSignature -> (EC)DHE-RSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, digitalSignature -> (EC)DHE-RSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-[EC]*DHE-RSA-WITH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyEncipherment -> RSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, keyEncipherment -> RSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ka.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7663,7 +7769,7 @@
             -C "Ciphersuite is "
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7671,14 +7777,14 @@
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-"
 
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyAgreement -> ECDH-" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, keyAgreement -> ECDH-" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyEncipherment -> fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, keyEncipherment -> fail" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7687,8 +7793,12 @@
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 2:
 # client-side checking of server cert
+#
+# TLS 1.3 uses only signature, but for 1.2 it depends on the key exchange.
+# In 4.0 this will probably change as all TLS 1.2 key exchanges will use
+# signatures too, following the removal of RSA #8170 and static ECDH #9201.
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7698,7 +7808,7 @@
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7708,7 +7818,7 @@
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7718,28 +7828,32 @@
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail, soft" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
             -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7749,30 +7863,46 @@
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail, soft" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
             -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: DigitalSignature, RSA: OK" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ds.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+            0 \
+            -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
@@ -7785,26 +7915,32 @@
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ka.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -7821,32 +7957,40 @@
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, ECDSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, ECDSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, ECDSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, ECDSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 3:
 # server-side checking of client cert
+#
+# Here, both 1.2 and 1.3 only use signatures.
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
@@ -7856,25 +8000,40 @@
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
+            0 \
+            -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             1 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ds.crt" \
@@ -7884,14 +8043,28 @@
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
@@ -7907,17 +8080,46 @@
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
+            0 \
+            -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
@@ -7931,37 +8133,49 @@
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 1: server-side certificate/suite selection
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "extKeyUsage srv: serverAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "extKeyUsage srv: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "extKeyUsage srv: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0
 
-requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "extKeyUsage srv: codeSign -> fail" \
             "$P_SRV key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cli.crt" \
@@ -7971,7 +8185,7 @@
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 2: client-side checking of server cert
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: serverAuth -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -7981,7 +8195,7 @@
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -7991,7 +8205,7 @@
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -8001,14 +8215,30 @@
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign -> fail" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            0 \
+            -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+            "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -8049,19 +8279,22 @@
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.3: codeSign -> fail" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.3: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 3: server-side checking of client cert
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cli.crt" \
@@ -8070,7 +8303,7 @@
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \
@@ -8079,7 +8312,7 @@
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \
@@ -8088,22 +8321,27 @@
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
-            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             1 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
             -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -8142,13 +8380,29 @@
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.3: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.3: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 # Tests for DHM parameters loading
 
 run_test    "DHM parameters: reference" \
@@ -12001,7 +12255,7 @@
 client_needs_more_time 2
 run_test    "DTLS proxy: 3d (drop, delay, duplicate), \"short\" PSK handshake" \
             -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \
-            "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \
+            "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 \
              psk=73776f726466697368" \
             "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=73776f726466697368 \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \
@@ -14142,6 +14396,18 @@
             -c "Selected key exchange mode: psk$" \
             -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
 
+# Legacy_compression_methods testing
+
+requires_gnutls
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "TLS 1.2 ClientHello indicating support for deflate compression method" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
+            "$G_CLI  --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:+COMP-DEFLATE localhost" \
+            0 \
+            -c "Handshake was completed" \
+            -s "dumping .client hello, compression. (2 bytes)"
+
 # Test heap memory usage after handshake
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
index 1830e5a..3d2b8a1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 #include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
 #include "constant_time_internal.h"
 #include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_internal.h"
 #include "test/constant_flow.h"
+#include "test/bignum_codepath_check.h"
 
 #if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS > 792
 #define MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792
@@ -988,7 +990,13 @@
      * against a smaller RR. */
     TEST_LE_U(RR.n, N.n - 1);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, res, E);
+#endif
     /* We know that exp_mod internally needs RR to be as large as N.
      * Validate that it is the case now, otherwise there was probably
      * a buffer overread. */
@@ -1021,7 +1029,26 @@
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&N, input_N) == 0);
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&X, input_X) == 0);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, NULL);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, res, E);
+#endif
+    TEST_ASSERT(res == exp_result);
+    if (res == 0) {
+        TEST_ASSERT(sign_is_valid(&Z));
+        TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Z, &X) == 0);
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
+    res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(&Z, &A, &E, &N, NULL);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC, res, E);
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(res == exp_result);
     if (res == 0) {
         TEST_ASSERT(sign_is_valid(&Z));
@@ -1029,7 +1056,13 @@
     }
 
     /* Now test again with the speed-up parameter supplied as an output. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, res, E);
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(res == exp_result);
     if (res == 0) {
         TEST_ASSERT(sign_is_valid(&Z));
@@ -1037,7 +1070,13 @@
     }
 
     /* Now test again with the speed-up parameter supplied in calculated form. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, res, E);
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(res == exp_result);
     if (res == 0) {
         TEST_ASSERT(sign_is_valid(&Z));
@@ -1077,7 +1116,21 @@
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&RR, input_RR) == 0);
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR) == exp_result);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, exp_result, E);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
+    TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR) == exp_result);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_BIGNUM_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC, exp_result, E);
+#endif
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&N);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
index db84d62..c2b44bc 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "bignum_core.h"
 #include "constant_time_internal.h"
 #include "test/constant_flow.h"
+#include "test/bignum_codepath_check.h"
 
 /** Verifies mbedtls_mpi_core_add().
  *
@@ -1178,6 +1179,7 @@
                       char *input_E, char *input_X)
 {
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A_copy = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *E = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
@@ -1229,19 +1231,56 @@
 
     TEST_CALLOC(T, working_limbs);
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(Y, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T);
+    /* Test the safe variant */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(Y, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET);
+#endif
     TEST_EQUAL(0, memcmp(X, Y, N_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)));
 
-    /* Check when output aliased to input */
+    /* Test the unsafe variant */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(Y, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC);
+#endif
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, memcmp(X, Y, N_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)));
+
+    /* Check both with output aliased to input */
+
+    TEST_CALLOC(A_copy, A_limbs);
+    memcpy(A_copy, A, sizeof(*A_copy) * A_limbs);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(A, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET);
+#endif
+    TEST_EQUAL(0, memcmp(X, A, N_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)));
 
+    memcpy(A, A_copy, sizeof(*A) * A_limbs);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(A, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_codepath_check, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC);
+#endif
     TEST_EQUAL(0, memcmp(X, A, N_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)));
 
 exit:
     mbedtls_free(T);
     mbedtls_free(A);
+    mbedtls_free(A_copy);
     mbedtls_free(E);
     mbedtls_free(N);
     mbedtls_free(X);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
index af3b946..f379dba 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data
@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@
 # writing, this happens in builds where AES uses a PSA driver and the
 # PSA RNG uses AES-CTR_DRBG through the PSA AES.
 # Pick a key id that's in the middle of the volatile key ID range.
-# That works out both when MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_DYNAMIC is enabled and
+# That works out both when MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled and
 # volatile key IDs are assigned starting with the lowest value, and when
-# MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_DYNAMIC is disabled and volatile key IDs are assigned
+# MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled and volatile key IDs are assigned
 # starting with the highest values.
 open_fail:(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX) / 2:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
 
@@ -228,6 +228,11 @@
 Key slot count: maximum
 many_transient_keys:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS
 
+Key slot count: dynamic: more than MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+# Check that MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT doesn't apply to volatile keys.
+many_transient_keys:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1
+
 Key slot count: try to overfill, destroy first
 fill_key_store:0
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function
index f679f2e..604c4bd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function
@@ -98,10 +98,30 @@
     return 0;
 }
 
-/* Currently, there is always a maximum number of volatile keys that can
- * realistically be reached in tests. When we add configurations where this
- * is not true, undefine the macro in such configurations. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+/* Artificially restrictable dynamic key store */
+#define KEY_SLICE_1_LENGTH 4
+#define KEY_SLICE_2_LENGTH 10
+static size_t tiny_key_slice_length(size_t slice_idx)
+{
+    switch (slice_idx) {
+        case 1: return KEY_SLICE_1_LENGTH;
+        case 2: return KEY_SLICE_2_LENGTH;
+        default: return 1;
+    }
+}
+#define MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS                       \
+    (KEY_SLICE_1_LENGTH + KEY_SLICE_2_LENGTH +  \
+     psa_key_slot_volatile_slice_count() - 2)
+
+#else  /* Effectively unbounded dynamic key store */
+#undef MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS
+#endif
+
+#else  /* Static key store */
 #define MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
+#endif
 
 /* END_HEADER */
 
@@ -867,6 +887,10 @@
     uint8_t exported[sizeof(size_t)];
     size_t exported_length;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) && defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+    mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length = &tiny_key_slice_length;
+#endif
+
     PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
 
     mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats;
@@ -949,6 +973,9 @@
 exit:
     PSA_DONE();
     mbedtls_free(keys);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) && defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+    mbedtls_test_hook_psa_volatile_key_slice_length = NULL;
+#endif
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
@@ -1028,7 +1055,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C:!MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC */
 void non_reusable_key_slots_integrity_in_case_of_key_slot_starvation()
 {
     psa_status_t status;
@@ -1068,7 +1095,14 @@
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(returned_key_id, persistent_key));
 
     /*
-     * Create the maximum available number of volatile keys
+     * Create the maximum available number of keys that are locked in
+     * memory. This can be:
+     * - volatile keys, when MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled;
+     * - opened persistent keys (could work, but not currently implemented
+     *   in this test function);
+     * - keys in use by another thread (we don't do this because it would
+     *   be hard to arrange and we can't control how long the keys are
+     *   locked anyway).
      */
     psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE);
     for (i = 0; i < available_key_slots; i++) {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data
index 807007b..c84a836 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data
@@ -6,6 +6,16 @@
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
 
+# Check coordinates one byte larger than the largest supported curve.
+# If we add an even larger curve, this test case will fail in the full
+# configuration because mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() will return 0, and we'll
+# need to use larger data for this test case.
+ECDSA Raw -> DER, very large input (536-bit)
+ecdsa_raw_to_der:536:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818a024311111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024322222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
+ECDSA Raw -> DER, very large input (1016-bit)
+ecdsa_raw_to_der:1016:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30820102027f11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111027f22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA
@@ -58,6 +68,16 @@
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
 
+# Check coordinates one byte larger than the largest supported curve.
+# If we add an even larger curve, this test case will fail in the full
+# configuration because mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() will return 0, and we'll
+# need to use larger data for this test case.
+ECDSA DER -> Raw, very large input (536-bit)
+ecdsa_der_to_raw:536:"30818a024311111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024322222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
+ECDSA DER -> Raw, very large input (1016-bit)
+ecdsa_der_to_raw:1016:"30820102027f11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111027f22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
index e824529..98ea9ef 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#include "bignum_core.h"
 #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
 #include "rsa_internal.h"
+#include "test/bignum_codepath_check.h"
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -489,7 +491,13 @@
     TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod);
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0);
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
     TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_public(&ctx, message_str->x, output) == result);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    ASSERT_RSA_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC, result);
+#endif
     if (result == 0) {
 
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_hexcmp(output, result_str->x,
@@ -554,9 +562,15 @@
     /* repeat three times to test updating of blinding values */
     for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
         memset(output, 0x00, sizeof(output));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        mbedtls_codepath_reset();
+#endif
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
                                         &rnd_info, message_str->x,
                                         output) == result);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+        ASSERT_RSA_CODEPATH(MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, result);
+#endif
         if (result == 0) {
 
             TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_hexcmp(output, result_str->x,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index 0edee96..670e06b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Check compile time library version
-check_compiletime_version:"3.6.0"
+check_compiletime_version:"3.6.1"
 
 Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"3.6.0"
+check_runtime_version:"3.6.1"
 
 Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
 check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0