Remove support for static ECDH cipher suites
Signed-off-by: Ben Taylor <ben.taylor@linaro.org>
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index 2129da1..7675f95 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -1732,71 +1732,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
- peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
-#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
- if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
- /* Should never happen */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
-
- /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
- * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */
- if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- }
-
- uint16_t tls_id = 0;
- psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
- mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(peer_pk);
-
- if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- }
-
- tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id);
- if (tls_id == 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ECC group %u not supported",
- grp_id));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be,
- so there is no need to check the return value here */
- mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type,
- &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
-
- ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
-
- /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */
- memcpy(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, peer_pk->pub_raw, peer_pk->pub_raw_len);
- ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peer_pk->pub_raw_len;
- ret = 0;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
- /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
- * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
- * operations like ECDHE. */
- mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk);
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
-
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
@@ -1807,28 +1742,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server key exchange"));
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
- if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
- if ((ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl)) != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret);
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
- ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return ret;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange"));
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
- return 0;
- }
- ((void) p);
- ((void) end);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing) {
@@ -2380,13 +2293,9 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client key exchange"));
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
- ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) {
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
@@ -2460,9 +2369,7 @@
}
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;