Merge branch 'development' into dtls
* development:
Add missing guards for gnuTLS
Prepare for mbed TLS 1.3.10 release
Fix potential timing issue in RSA pms handling
Conflicts:
ChangeLog
doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
include/polarssl/version.h
library/CMakeLists.txt
library/ssl_srv.c
tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
visualc/VS6/mbedtls.dsp
visualc/VS6/mbedtls.dsw
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 2fefdda..597ede2 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -3218,6 +3218,10 @@
size_t len = pk_get_len( ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char ver[2];
+ unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
+ unsigned char mask;
+ unsigned int uret;
+ size_t i;
if( ! pk_can_do( ssl_own_key( ssl ), POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) )
{
@@ -3250,32 +3254,47 @@
ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
ssl->transport, ver );
+ /*
+ * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
+ * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
+ * bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
+ * Also, avoid data-dependant branches here to protect against
+ * timing-based variants.
+ */
+ ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
ret = pk_decrypt( ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len,
- pms, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
- sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset,
+ peer_pms, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ sizeof( peer_pms ),
ssl->f_rng, ssl->p_rng );
- if( ret != 0 || ssl->handshake->pmslen != 48 ||
- pms[0] != ver[0] ||
- pms[1] != ver[1] )
- {
+ ret |= ssl->handshake->pmslen - 48;
+ ret |= peer_pms[0] - ver[0];
+ ret |= peer_pms[1] - ver[1];
+
+#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ if( ret != 0 )
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
+#endif
- /*
- * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack:
- * invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding must not cause
- * the connection to end immediately; instead,
- * send a bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
- */
- ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
-
- ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset ||
+ sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 )
+ {
+ SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
+ ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
- return( ret );
+ uret = (unsigned) ret;
+ uret |= -uret; /* msb = ( ret != 0 ) */
+ uret >>= 8 * sizeof( uret ) - 1; /* uret = ( ret != 0 ) */
+ mask = (unsigned char)( -uret ) ; /* ret ? 0xff : 0x00 */
+ for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
+ pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );
+
+ return( 0 );
}
#endif /* POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */