diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index 4fc31c9..bd5e750 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 - make test
 - programs/test/selftest
 - OSSL_NO_DTLS=1 tests/compat.sh
-- tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '\(DTLS\|SCSV\).*openssl'
+- tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '\(DTLS\|SCSV\).*openssl' --seed 4
 - tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
 - tests/scripts/curves.pl
 - tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl
diff --git a/docs/architecture/.gitignore b/docs/architecture/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23f832b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/architecture/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+*.html
+*.pdf
diff --git a/docs/architecture/Makefile b/docs/architecture/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f763c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/architecture/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+PANDOC = pandoc
+
+default: all
+
+all_markdown = \
+	       mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md \
+	       # This line is intentionally left blank
+
+html: $(all_markdown:.md=.html)
+pdf: $(all_markdown:.md=.pdf)
+all: html pdf
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .md .html .pdf
+
+.md.html:
+	$(PANDOC) -o $@ $<
+.md.pdf:
+	$(PANDOC) -o $@ $<
diff --git a/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md b/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d56d333
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+Mbed Crypto storage specification
+=================================
+
+This document specifies how Mbed Crypto uses storage.
+
+Mbed Crypto may be upgraded on an existing device with the storage preserved. Therefore:
+
+1. Any change may break existing installations and may require an upgrade path.
+1. This document retains historical information about all past released versions. Do not remove information from this document unless it has always been incorrect or it is about a version that you are sure was never released.
+
+Mbed Crypto 0.1.0
+-----------------
+
+Tags: mbedcrypto-0.1.0b, mbedcrypto-0.1.0b2
+
+Released in November 2018. <br>
+Integrated in Mbed OS 5.11.
+
+Supported backends:
+
+* [PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-for-0.1.0)
+* [C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-0.1.0)
+
+Supported features:
+
+* [Persistent transparent keys](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) designated by a [slot number](#key-names-for-0.1.0).
+* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0) on ITS only.
+
+This is a beta release, and we do not promise backward compatibility, with one exception:
+
+> On Mbed OS, if a device has a nonvolatile random seed file produced with Mbed OS 5.11.x and is upgraded to a later version of Mbed OS, the nonvolatile random seed file is preserved or upgraded.
+
+We do not make any promises regarding key storage, or regarding the nonvolatile random seed file on other platforms.
+
+### Key names for 0.1.0
+
+Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file whose name is constructed from the key identifier. The way in which the file name is constructed depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+
+The valid values for a key identifier are the range from 1 to 0xfffeffff. This limitation on the range is not documented in user-facing documentation: according to the user-facing documentation, arbitrary 32-bit values are valid.
+
+The code uses the following constant in an internal header (note that despite the name, this value is actually one plus the maximum permitted value):
+
+    #define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER 0xffff0000
+
+There is a shared namespace for all callers.
+
+### Key file format for 0.1.0
+
+All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes.
+
+The layout of a key file is:
+
+* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"`
+* version (4 bytes): 0
+* type (4 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value
+* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value
+* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value
+* key material length (4 bytes)
+* key material: output of `psa_export_key`
+* Any trailing data is rejected on load.
+
+### Nonvolatile random seed file format for 0.1.0
+
+The nonvolatile random seed file contains a seed for the random generator. If present, it is rewritten at each boot as part of the random generator initialization.
+
+The file format is just the seed as a byte string with no metadata or encoding of any kind.
+
+### File namespace on ITS for 0.1.0
+
+Assumption: ITS provides a 32-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace.
+
+* File 0: unused.
+* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-0.1.0).
+* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff: unused.
+
+### File namespace on stdio for 0.1.0
+
+Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23.
+
+An undocumented build-time configuration value `CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory).
+
+* `CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_0"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present.
+* `sprintf(CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_%lu", key_id)` [content](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) of the [key whose identifier](#key-names-for-0.1.0) is `key_id`.
+* Other files: unused.
+
+Mbed Crypto 0.2.0
+-----------------
+
+**Warning:** the information in this section is provisional and may change before Mbed Crypto is released for Mbed OS 5.12. At the time of writing, we don't even know whether this version will be called 0.2.0.
+
+To be released for Mbed OS 5.12.
+
+Supported backends:
+
+* [PSA platform](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-for-0.2.0)
+* [library using PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-as-a-library-for-0.2.0)
+* [library using C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-0.2.0)
+
+Supported features:
+
+* [Persistent transparent keys](#key-file-format-for-0.2.0) designated by a [key identifier and owner](#key-names-for-0.2.0).
+* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.2.0) on ITS only.
+
+Backward compatibility commitments: TBD
+
+### Key names for 0.2.0
+
+Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file whose name is constructed from the 32-bit key identifier (`psa_key_id_t`) and, if applicable, the owner identifier. The way in which the file name is constructed depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-0.2.0).
+
+The valid values for a key identifier are the range from 1 to 0xfffeffff. This limitation on the range is not documented in user-facing documentation: according to the user-facing documentation, arbitrary 32-bit values are valid.
+
+* Library integration: the key file name is just the key identifer. This is a 32-bit value.
+* PSA service integration: the key file name is `key_id << 32 | owner_uid` where `key_id` is the key identifier specified by the application and `owner_uid` is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value.
+
+### Key file format for 0.2.0
+
+The layout is identical to [0.1.0](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) so far. However note that the encoding of key types, algorithms and key material has changed, therefore the storage format is not compatible (despite using the same value in the version field so far).
+
+### Nonvolatile random seed file format for 0.2.0
+
+[Identical to 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+
+### File namespace on a PSA platform for 0.2.0
+
+Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace.
+
+* Files 0 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff: unused.
+* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-0.2.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-0.2.0).
+
+### File namespace on ITS as a library for 0.2.0
+
+Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The entity using the crypto library can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace.
+
+* File 0: unused.
+* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-0.2.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-0.2.0).
+* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.2.0).
+* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff, 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffffffff: unused.
+
+### File namespace on stdio for 0.2.0
+
+[Identical to 0.1.0](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-0.1.0).
+
+### Upgrade from 0.1.0 to 0.2.0.
+
+* Delete files 1 through 0xfffeffff, which contain keys in a format that is no longer supported.
+
+### Suggested changes to make before 0.2.0
+
+The library integration and the PSA platform integration use different sets of file names. This is annoyingly non-uniform. For example, if we want to store non-key files, we have room in different ranges (0 through 0xffffffff on a PSA platform, 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffffffffffff in a library integration).
+
+It would simplify things to always have a 32-bit owner, with a nonzero value, and thus reserve the range 0–0xffffffff for internal library use.
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index 25c3cb4..b62788b 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@
  */
 static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
 
-/** Start a multipart hash operation.
+/** Set up a multipart hash operation.
  *
  * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest)
  * is as follows:
@@ -816,6 +816,9 @@
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (already set up and not
+ *         subsequently completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -837,7 +840,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -874,7 +877,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg)
@@ -914,7 +917,7 @@
  *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected hash.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -1032,7 +1035,7 @@
  */
 static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
 
-/** Start a multipart MAC calculation operation.
+/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation.
  *
  * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
  * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
@@ -1082,6 +1085,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (already set up and not
+ *         subsequently completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
@@ -1090,7 +1096,7 @@
                                 psa_key_handle_t handle,
                                 psa_algorithm_t alg);
 
-/** Start a multipart MAC verification operation.
+/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation.
  *
  * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
  * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
@@ -1139,6 +1145,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (already set up and not
+ *         subsequently completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
@@ -1162,7 +1171,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -1201,7 +1210,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE().
@@ -1240,7 +1249,7 @@
  *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected MAC.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -1384,6 +1393,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (already set up and not
+ *         subsequently completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
@@ -1443,6 +1455,9 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (already set up and not
+ *         subsequently completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
@@ -1471,7 +1486,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or IV already set).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
@@ -1505,7 +1520,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or IV already set).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
  *         or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
@@ -1541,7 +1556,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, IV required but
  *         not set, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
@@ -1579,7 +1594,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, IV required but
  *         not set, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 325abde..8c7dc1e 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -26,22 +26,8 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
-/*
- * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM
- * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two
- * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing
- * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be
- * included.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
-/*
- * PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE means that this file is compiled for the SPE.
- * Some headers will be affected by this flag.
- */
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1
-#include "crypto_spe.h"
-#endif
 
+#include "psa_crypto_service_integration.h"
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 
 #include "psa_crypto_core.h"
@@ -3621,6 +3607,12 @@
 psa_status_t psa_get_generator_capacity(const psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
                                         size_t *capacity)
 {
+    if( generator->alg == 0 )
+    {
+        /* This is a blank generator. */
+        return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+    }
+
     *capacity = generator->capacity;
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
@@ -3850,6 +3842,12 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status;
 
+    if( generator->alg == 0 )
+    {
+        /* This is a blank generator. */
+        return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+    }
+
     if( output_length > generator->capacity )
     {
         generator->capacity = 0;
@@ -3858,11 +3856,10 @@
         status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
         goto exit;
     }
-    if( output_length == 0 &&
-        generator->capacity == 0 && generator->alg == 0 )
+    if( output_length == 0 && generator->capacity == 0 )
     {
-        /* Edge case: this is a blank or finished generator, and 0
-         * bytes were requested. The right error in this case could
+        /* Edge case: this is a finished generator, and 0 bytes
+         * were requested. The right error in this case could
          * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return
          * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished
          * generator, for consistency with the case when
@@ -3911,7 +3908,13 @@
 exit:
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
     {
+        /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state.
+         * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted generators and
+         * blank generators, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank
+         * generators. */
+        psa_algorithm_t alg = generator->alg;
         psa_generator_abort( generator );
+        generator->alg = alg;
         memset( output, '!', output_length );
     }
     return( status );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_service_integration.h b/library/psa_crypto_service_integration.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..938bfe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_service_integration.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*  Copyright (C) 2019, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ *
+ *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SERVICE_INTEGRATION_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_SERVICE_INTEGRATION_H
+
+/*
+ * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM
+ * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two
+ * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing
+ * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be
+ * included.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
+/*
+ * PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE means that the file which included this file is being
+ * compiled for SPE. The files crypto_structs.h and crypto_types.h have
+ * different implementations for NSPE and SPE and are compiled according to this
+ * flag.
+ */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1
+#include "crypto_spe.h"
+#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
+
+#endif // PSA_CRYPTO_SERVICE_INTEGRATION_H
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
index 227fb5f..33c03a7 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
@@ -26,22 +26,8 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
-/*
- * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM
- * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two
- * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing
- * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be
- * included.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
-/*
- * PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE means that this file is compiled for the SPE.
- * Some headers will be affected by this flag.
- */
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1
-#include "crypto_spe.h"
-#endif
 
+#include "psa_crypto_service_integration.h"
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 
 #include "psa_crypto_core.h"
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
index 42bd938..84a6ed5 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include "psa_crypto_service_integration.h"
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_storage.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_storage_backend.h"
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c b/library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c
index 4b2789f..447c0ae 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
 
 #include "psa/error.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_service_integration.h"
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_storage_backend.h"
 #include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index d9dd9ef..83ce158 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -1012,31 +1012,127 @@
 
 PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 7+9 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":7:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":7:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
 
 PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 3+13 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":3:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":3:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
 
 PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 4+12 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":4:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":4:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
 
 PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 12+20 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:0:32:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 20+12 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:16:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
 
 PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 7+9 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":7:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":7:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
 
 PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 3+13 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":3:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":3:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
 
 PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":11:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":11:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":16:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 12+20 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":12:0:32:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 20+12 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":20:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587"
+
+PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
+
+PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32"
 
 PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 92b6fb0..d900f4d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -2415,8 +2415,8 @@
                                    &function_output_length ) );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                output + function_output_length,
-                                output_buffer_size,
+                                output + total_output_length,
+                                output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                 &function_output_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
 
@@ -2439,12 +2439,16 @@
 void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
                                data_t *key,
                                data_t *input,
-                               int first_part_size,
+                               int first_part_size_arg,
+                               int output1_length_arg, int output2_length_arg,
                                data_t *expected_output )
 {
     psa_key_handle_t handle = 0;
     psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg;
+    size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg;
+    size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg;
     unsigned char iv[16] = {0};
     size_t iv_size;
     unsigned char *output = NULL;
@@ -2475,20 +2479,23 @@
                            PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type ) );
     ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned int) first_part_size < input->len );
+    TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, input->x, first_part_size,
                                    output, output_buffer_size,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
                                    input->x + first_part_size,
                                    input->len - first_part_size,
-                                   output, output_buffer_size,
+                                   output + total_output_length,
+                                   output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                   output + function_output_length,
-                                   output_buffer_size,
+                                   output + total_output_length,
+                                   output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) );
@@ -2507,13 +2514,17 @@
 void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
                                data_t *key,
                                data_t *input,
-                               int first_part_size,
+                               int first_part_size_arg,
+                               int output1_length_arg, int output2_length_arg,
                                data_t *expected_output )
 {
     psa_key_handle_t handle = 0;
 
     psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg;
+    size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg;
+    size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg;
     unsigned char iv[16] = {0};
     size_t iv_size;
     unsigned char *output = NULL;
@@ -2545,21 +2556,24 @@
                            PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type ) );
     ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned int) first_part_size < input->len );
+    TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
                                    input->x, first_part_size,
                                    output, output_buffer_size,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
                                    input->x + first_part_size,
                                    input->len - first_part_size,
-                                   output, output_buffer_size,
+                                   output + total_output_length,
+                                   output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                   output + function_output_length,
-                                   output_buffer_size,
+                                   output + total_output_length,
+                                   output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) );
@@ -2622,8 +2636,8 @@
                                    &function_output_length ) );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                output + function_output_length,
-                                output_buffer_size,
+                                output + total_output_length,
+                                output_buffer_size - total_output_length,
                                 &function_output_length );
     total_output_length += function_output_length;
     TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
@@ -2689,7 +2703,8 @@
                                    output1, output1_size,
                                    &output1_length ) );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation1,
-                                   output1 + output1_length, output1_size,
+                                   output1 + output1_length,
+                                   output1_size - output1_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
 
     output1_length += function_output_length;
@@ -2707,7 +2722,7 @@
     function_output_length = 0;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation2,
                                    output2 + output2_length,
-                                   output2_size,
+                                   output2_size - output2_length,
                                    &function_output_length ) );
 
     output2_length += function_output_length;
@@ -2729,11 +2744,12 @@
                                      int key_type_arg,
                                      data_t *key,
                                      data_t *input,
-                                     int first_part_size )
+                                     int first_part_size_arg )
 {
     psa_key_handle_t handle = 0;
     psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg;
     unsigned char iv[16] = {0};
     size_t iv_size = 16;
     size_t iv_length = 0;
@@ -2769,7 +2785,7 @@
                             PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type ) );
     ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_buffer_size );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned int) first_part_size < input->len );
+    TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len );
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1, input->x, first_part_size,
                                    output1, output1_buffer_size,
@@ -3519,13 +3535,13 @@
 
     memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) );
 
-    /* A default generator should have no capacity. */
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &func, &capacity ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( capacity, 0 );
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &init, &capacity ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( capacity, 0 );
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &zero, &capacity ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( capacity, 0 );
+    /* A default generator should not be able to report its capacity. */
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_generator_capacity( &func, &capacity ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_generator_capacity( &init, &capacity ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_generator_capacity( &zero, &capacity ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
     /* A default generator should be abortable without error. */
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_generator_abort(&func) );
@@ -3632,18 +3648,18 @@
     psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
 
     TEST_ASSERT( psa_generator_read( &generator, output_buffer, buffer_size )
-                 == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); // should be PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:#183
+                 == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &generator, &capacity )
-                 == PSA_SUCCESS ); // should be PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:#183
+                 == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_generator_abort( &generator ) );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( psa_generator_read( &generator, output_buffer, buffer_size )
-                 == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); // should be PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:#183
+                 == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &generator, &capacity )
-                 == PSA_SUCCESS );// should be PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:#183
+                 == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
 exit:
     psa_generator_abort( &generator );
diff --git a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
index 23d5c2c..bb92d8f 100644
--- a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
+++ b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_values.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_core.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_invasive.h" />
+    <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_service_integration.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_storage.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="..\..\library/psa_crypto_storage_backend.h" />