Merge branch 'datagram_packing' into message_reordering
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b05c962..975b3ba 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@
Features
* Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This
is controlled by the maximum fragment length as set locally or negotiated
- with the peer, as well as new per-connection MTU option, set using
+ with the peer, as well as by a new per-connection MTU option, set using
mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
- * Add support for fragmentation of outoing DTLS handshake messages.
+ * Add support for auto-adjustment of MTU to a safe value during the
+ handshake when flights do not get through (RFC 6347, section 4.1.1.1,
+ last paragraph).
* Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram,
enabled by default.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index c1fad6a..b6700fc 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1400,23 +1400,28 @@
* the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the
* \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
*
+ * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on
+ * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of
+ * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
+ *
* \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for
* example when a PMTU estimate becomes available from other
* sources, such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
*
- * \note This only controls the size of the packets we send.
- * Client-side, you can request the server to use smaller
- * records with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
+ * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
+ * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
+ * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the
+ * server to use smaller records with \c
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
*
* \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been
* configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting
- * lower limit (after translating the MTU setting to a limit
- * on the record content length) is used.
+ * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used.
*
* \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size
- * of datagrams sent. It cannot be used to increase the
- * maximum size of records over the limit set by
- * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
+ * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It
+ * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over
+ * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
*
* \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will
* result in an error when trying to send data.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
index 2c0684f..3f595a3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@
} future_record;
} buffering;
+
+ uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index eceac91..5fccedf 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -109,9 +109,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static uint16_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
- uint16_t mtu = ssl->mtu;
+ uint16_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
if( mtu != 0 && mtu < MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN )
return( (int) mtu );
@@ -184,6 +185,15 @@
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
return( -1 );
+ /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1
+ * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first
+ * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes.
+ * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be
+ * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work
+ * on most non-IP stacks too. */
+ if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min )
+ ssl->handshake->mtu = 508;
+
new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
/* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */
@@ -7832,10 +7842,29 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 )
+ return( ssl->mtu );
+
+ if( ssl->mtu == 0 )
+ return( ssl->handshake->mtu );
+
+ return( ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ?
+ ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ (void) ssl;
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl );
@@ -7844,9 +7873,9 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->mtu != 0 )
+ if( ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 )
{
- const size_t mtu = ssl->mtu;
+ const size_t mtu = ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl );
const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret;
@@ -7862,7 +7891,7 @@
if( max_len > mtu - overhead )
max_len = mtu - overhead;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 657aa8a..b77c096 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -5143,7 +5143,28 @@
-c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
-C "error"
+# Test for automatic MTU reduction on repeated resend
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU: auto-reduction" \
+ -p "$P_PXY mtu=508" \
+ "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \
+ crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key\
+ hs_timeout=100-400" \
+ "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+ crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server8.key \
+ hs_timeout=100-400" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -C "error"
+
# the proxy shouldn't drop or mess up anything, so we shouldn't need to resend
+# OTOH the client might resend if the server is to slow to reset after sending
+# a HelloVerifyRequest, so only check for no retransmission server-side
not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -5160,7 +5181,26 @@
mtu=512" \
0 \
-S "resend" \
- -C "resend" \
+ -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -C "error"
+
+not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, simple handshake, nbio" \
+ -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \
+ "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \
+ crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key \
+ mtu=512 nbio=2" \
+ "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+ crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server8.key \
+ mtu=512 nbio=2" \
+ 0 \
+ -S "resend" \
-s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
-c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
-C "error"
@@ -5171,9 +5211,10 @@
# Since we don't support reading fragmented ClientHello yet,
# up the MTU to 1450 (larger than ClientHello with session ticket,
# but still smaller than client's Certificate to ensure fragmentation).
-#
# A resend on the client-side might happen if the server is
# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "resend"' below.
+# reco_delay avoids races where the client reconnects before the server has
+# resumed listening, which would result in a spurious resend.
not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -5187,7 +5228,7 @@
"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
key_file=data_files/server8.key \
- mtu=1450 reconnect=1" \
+ mtu=1450 reconnect=1 reco_delay=1" \
0 \
-S "resend" \
-s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
@@ -5363,6 +5404,25 @@
-c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
-C "error"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+client_needs_more_time 2
+run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU + 3d, nbio" \
+ -p "$P_PXY mtu=512 drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \
+ "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \
+ crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key \
+ hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512 nbio=2" \
+ "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
+ crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server8.key \
+ hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512 nbio=2" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \
+ -C "error"
+
# interop tests for DTLS fragmentating with reliable connection
#
# here and below we just want to test that the we fragment in a way that
@@ -5372,6 +5432,7 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_gnutls
run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls server, DTLS 1.2" \
"$G_SRV -u" \
"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
@@ -5387,6 +5448,7 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
+requires_gnutls
run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls server, DTLS 1.0" \
"$G_SRV -u" \
"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \
@@ -5403,6 +5465,7 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_gnutls
run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls client, DTLS 1.2" \
"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 server_addr=::1 \
crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
@@ -5418,6 +5481,7 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
+requires_gnutls
run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls client, DTLS 1.0" \
"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 server_addr=::1 \
crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \
@@ -5527,6 +5591,7 @@
##
## # gnutls-cli always tries IPv6 first, and doesn't fall back to IPv4 with DTLS
## requires_ipv6
+## requires_gnutls
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
@@ -5544,6 +5609,7 @@
##
## # gnutls-cli always tries IPv6 first, and doesn't fall back to IPv4 with DTLS
## requires_ipv6
+## requires_gnutls
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
## requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C