diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e5040a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+av_permissions.h
+flask.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8af7a69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+config SECURITY_SELINUX
+	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+	select NETWORK_SECMARK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "NSA SELinux boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'selinux', which allows SELinux
+	  to be disabled at boot.  If this option is selected, SELinux
+	  functionality can be disabled with selinux=0 on the kernel
+	  command line.  The purpose of this option is to allow a single
+	  kernel image to be distributed with SELinux built in, but not
+	  necessarily enabled.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+	int "NSA SELinux boot parameter default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+	range 0 1
+	default 1
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+	  'selinux', which allows SELinux to be disabled at boot.  If this
+	  option is set to 0 (zero), the SELinux kernel parameter will
+	  default to 0, disabling SELinux at bootup.  If this option is
+	  set to 1 (one), the SELinux kernel parameter will default to 1,
+	  enabling SELinux at bootup.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+	bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
+	  allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
+	  SELinux will then remain disabled until the next boot.
+	  This option is similar to the selinux=0 boot parameter, but is to
+	  support runtime disabling of SELinux, e.g. from /sbin/init, for
+	  portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult
+	  to employ.
+
+	  NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
+	  kernel hardening feature for security hooks.   Please consider
+	  using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
+	  option.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool "NSA SELinux Development Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This enables the development support option of NSA SELinux,
+	  which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing
+	  policies.  If unsure, say Y.  With this option enabled, the
+	  kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing)
+	  unless you specify enforcing=1 on the kernel command line.  You
+	  can interactively toggle the kernel between enforcing mode and
+	  permissive mode (if permitted by the policy) via /selinux/enforce.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+	bool "NSA SELinux AVC Statistics"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+	  /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+	  tools such as avcstat.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
+	int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	range 0 1
+	default 0
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
+	  that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
+	  by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
+	  kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
+	  mmap and mprotect calls.  If this option is set to 0 (zero),
+	  SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
+	  by the kernel.  If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
+	  default to checking the protection requested by the application.
+	  The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
+	  'checkreqprot=' boot parameter.  It may also be changed at runtime
+	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7161f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
+	     netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o exports.o \
+	     ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
+	     ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
+
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
+
+selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
+
+ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+
+$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
+
+quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+      cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+
+targets += flask.h av_permissions.h
+$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..635e5c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1234 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
+ *
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *	Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *	as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "classmap.h"
+
+#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512
+#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD		512
+#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM		16
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)	this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
+#else
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)	do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+struct avc_entry {
+	u32			ssid;
+	u32			tsid;
+	u16			tclass;
+	struct av_decision	avd;
+	struct avc_xperms_node	*xp_node;
+};
+
+struct avc_node {
+	struct avc_entry	ae;
+	struct hlist_node	list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
+	struct rcu_head		rhead;
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+	struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+	struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+	struct extended_perms xp;
+	struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_cache {
+	struct hlist_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
+	spinlock_t		slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
+	atomic_t		lru_hint;	/* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
+	atomic_t		active_nodes;
+	u32			latest_notif;	/* latest revocation notification */
+};
+
+struct avc_callback_node {
+	int (*callback) (u32 event);
+	u32 events;
+	struct avc_callback_node *next;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
+#endif
+
+struct selinux_avc {
+	unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+	struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+};
+
+static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+	}
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+	*avc = &selinux_avc;
+}
+
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	return avc->avc_cache_threshold;
+}
+
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold)
+{
+	avc->avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
+}
+
+static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
+
+static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form.
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @av: access vector
+ */
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+{
+	const char **perms;
+	int i, perm;
+
+	if (av == 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " null");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+	perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
+	i = 0;
+	perm = 1;
+	while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+		if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
+			av &= ~perm;
+		}
+		i++;
+		perm <<= 1;
+	}
+
+	if (av)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " }");
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ */
+static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *scontext;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
+	else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
+	else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
+ *
+ * Initialize the access vector cache.
+ */
+void __init avc_init(void)
+{
+	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
+					sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+					"avc_xperms_decision_node",
+					sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
+					sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
+					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
+
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
+		if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list)
+				chain_len++;
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+			 "longest chain: %d\n",
+			 atomic_read(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes),
+			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
+					struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
+			return &xpd_node->xpd;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+	unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+	else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+			(xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+		rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+				u8 driver, u8 perm)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+	security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+	if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+		security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (xpd->allowed)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+	if (xpd->auditallow)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+	if (xpd->dontaudit)
+		kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+		avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	}
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	dest->driver = src->driver;
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+				sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+				sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+				sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	/*
+	 * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+	 * command permission
+	 */
+	u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+	dest->used = src->used;
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+		dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+	if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+		dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+		*avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+	xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!xpd_node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+	if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->allowed)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->auditallow)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
+		if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+			goto error;
+	}
+	return xpd_node;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+			struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+	node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+	dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+	if (!dest_xpd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+	list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+	xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!xp_node)
+		return xp_node;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+	struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+	if (src->xp.len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+	if (!dest)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+	dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+
+	/* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+	list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+		dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+		if (!dest_xpd)
+			goto error;
+		avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+		list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+	}
+	node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+	return 0;
+error:
+	avc_xperms_free(dest);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+					struct av_decision *avd,
+					struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+					u8 perm,
+					int result,
+					u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+				audited &= ~requested;
+		}
+	} else if (result) {
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	} else {
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+		if (audited && xpd) {
+			if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+				audited &= ~requested;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+				   u8 perm, int result,
+				   struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+			requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_delete(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
+	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_kill(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_replace(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+{
+	hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	int hvalue, try, ecx;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+
+	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
+		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.lru_hint) &
+			(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
+			continue;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
+			avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+			ecx++;
+			if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+				rcu_read_unlock();
+				spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+	}
+out:
+	return ecx;
+}
+
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	if (!node)
+		goto out;
+
+	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes) >
+	    avc->avc_cache_threshold)
+		avc_reclaim_node(avc);
+
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	node->ae.ssid = ssid;
+	node->ae.tsid = tsid;
+	node->ae.tclass = tclass;
+	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+}
+
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+					       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
+	int hvalue;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
+		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
+		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
+		    tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
+			ret = node;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ *
+ * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
+ * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
+ * then this function returns the avc_node.
+ * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
+	node = avc_search_node(avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+	if (node)
+		return node;
+
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   int seqno, int is_insert)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
+	unsigned long flag;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
+	if (is_insert) {
+		if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+			       seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
+			ret = -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (seqno > avc->avc_cache.latest_notif)
+			avc->avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
+ *
+ * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
+ * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
+ * The access vectors and the sequence number are
+ * normally provided by the security server in
+ * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
+ * revocation notification, then the function copies
+ * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
+ * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
+	int hvalue;
+	unsigned long flag;
+
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
+		goto out;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
+	if (node) {
+		struct hlist_head *head;
+		spinlock_t *lock;
+		int rc = 0;
+
+		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
+		if (rc) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
+				avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
+				goto found;
+			}
+		}
+		hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
+found:
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+	}
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
+			 ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+			ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->state,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+	if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+				 ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+	}
+}
+
+/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a,
+			    unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
+
+	if (!a) {
+		a = &stack_data;
+		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry.  This is because
+	 * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
+	 * safe.  Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
+	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
+	 * happened a little later.
+	 */
+	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
+	    (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
+		return -ECHILD;
+
+	sad.tclass = tclass;
+	sad.requested = requested;
+	sad.ssid = ssid;
+	sad.tsid = tsid;
+	sad.audited = audited;
+	sad.denied = denied;
+	sad.result = result;
+	sad.state = state;
+
+	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+
+	common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
+ * @callback: callback function
+ * @events: security events
+ *
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
+ * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
+ * exists to add the callback.
+ */
+int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!c) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	c->callback = callback;
+	c->events = events;
+	c->next = avc_callbacks;
+	avc_callbacks = c;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
+ * @event : Updating event
+ * @perms : Permission mask bits
+ * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
+ *
+ * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
+ * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
+ * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
+ * will release later by RCU.
+ */
+static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			   u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+			   u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+			   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+			   u32 flags)
+{
+	int hvalue, rc = 0;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
+	if (!node) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Lock the target slot */
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+		if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
+		    tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
+		    tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+		    seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
+			orig = pos;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!orig) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		avc_node_kill(avc, node);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy and replace original node.
+	 */
+
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
+
+	if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+		if (rc) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (event) {
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+		if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+			avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+		avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+		break;
+	}
+	avc_node_replace(avc, node, orig);
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
+ */
+static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *head;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+		/*
+		 * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
+		 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+	avc_flush(avc);
+
+	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
+		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+			tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+			/* save the first error encountered for the return
+			   value and continue processing the callbacks */
+			if (!rc)
+				rc = tmprc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	avc_latest_notif_update(avc, seqno, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit,
+ * when the avc_node lookup fails. We get called with
+ * the RCU read lock held, and need to return with it
+ * still held, but drop if for the security compute.
+ *
+ * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just
+ * results in a bigger stack frame.
+ */
+static noinline
+struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+	security_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	return avc_insert(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
+}
+
+static noinline int avc_denied(struct selinux_state *state,
+			       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned int flags,
+			       struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state) &&
+	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver,
+			xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u32 denied;
+	struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+	struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+	struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+	int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+	xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+	BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (unlikely(!node)) {
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+		xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+	}
+	/* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+	if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+		goto decision;
+
+	local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+	local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+	local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+	xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+	if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+		 * is flagged
+		 */
+		if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
+			avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+			goto decision;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+						 driver, &local_xpd);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested,
+				driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
+				&local_xpd, 0);
+	} else {
+		avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+	}
+	xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+	if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+		avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+	denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+				driver, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+			&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags:  AVC_STRICT or 0
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Return a copy of the decisions
+ * in @avd.  Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
+ * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
+ * other errors.  This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
+ * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
+ * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
+ * should be released for the auditing.
+ */
+inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+				unsigned int flags,
+				struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 denied;
+
+	BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (unlikely(!node))
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
+	else
+		memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
+
+	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
+	if (unlikely(denied))
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
+				flags, avd);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Audit the granting or denial of
+ * permissions in accordance with the policy.  Return %0 if all @requested
+ * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
+ * another -errno upon other errors.
+ */
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata, 0);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       int flags)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata, flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
+}
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
+	 * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
+	 * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know.  It's
+	 * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
+	 * it still pointed to selinux operations.  If that is the case it's
+	 * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
+	 * avc_node_cachep.  I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
+	 * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it.  Instead I just flush
+	 * the cache and get that memory back.
+	 */
+	if (avc_node_cachep) {
+		avc_flush(selinux_state.avc);
+		/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e75dd94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
+{
+	return selinux_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe251c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7341 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *	      Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *	      Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ *		       Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *	as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>	/* for network interface checks */
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enforcing;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+		selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+		selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#else
+int selinux_enabled = 1;
+#endif
+
+static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
+	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+		selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
+static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
+
+/**
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
+ * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
+ * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+}
+
+static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netif_flush();
+		sel_netnode_flush();
+		sel_netport_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_ib_pkey_flush();
+		call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsec)
+		panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
+
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	cred->security = tsec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ */
+static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = cred->security;
+	return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
+ */
+static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return sid;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
+
+static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+	isec->inode = inode;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+	isec->task_sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+	inode->i_security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+/*
+ * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid.  The
+ * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
+ * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
+ * invalid.  The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
+ */
+static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
+				       struct dentry *dentry,
+				       bool may_sleep)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
+
+	if (selinux_state.initialized &&
+	    isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+		if (!may_sleep)
+			return -ECHILD;
+
+		/*
+		 * Try reloading the inode security label.  This will fail if
+		 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
+		 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
+		 */
+		inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of an inode.
+ */
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
+ */
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
+	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
+	 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
+	 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
+	 *
+	 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
+	 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
+	 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
+	 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+	 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
+	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+	 */
+	call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fsec->sid = sid;
+	fsec->fown_sid = sid;
+	file->f_security = fsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+	kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
+}
+
+static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sbsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	sbsec->sb = sb;
+	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sb->s_security = sbsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+	kfree(sbsec);
+}
+
+static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_error = -1,
+	Opt_context = 1,
+	Opt_fscontext = 2,
+	Opt_defcontext = 3,
+	Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+	Opt_labelsupport = 5,
+	Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
+};
+
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS	(Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
+
+static const match_table_t tokens = {
+	{Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+	{Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
+	{Opt_error, NULL},
+};
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
+		/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
+		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
+		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
+}
+
+static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+		/* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+		   error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+		   the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+		   the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+		   assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
+		if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+			if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+				pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+				       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			else
+				pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+				       sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
+	 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+	 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
+	 */
+	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+	else
+		sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
+
+	/* Initialize the root inode. */
+	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
+
+	/* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+	   inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+	   during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+	   populates itself. */
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+next_inode:
+	if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+				list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
+					   struct inode_security_struct, list);
+		struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		inode = igrab(inode);
+		if (inode) {
+			if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
+				inode_doinit(inode);
+			iput(inode);
+		}
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto next_inode;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
+ * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
+ * mount options, or whatever.
+ */
+static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	int rc = 0, i;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	char tmp;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
+
+	tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+	/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
+		if (tmp & 0x01)
+			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+		tmp >>= 1;
+	}
+	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
+		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+
+	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	i = 0;
+	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
+					     sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_free:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
+		      u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+		if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
+		    (old_sid != new_sid))
+			return 1;
+
+	/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
+	 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
+	 */
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		if (mnt_flags & flag)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
+ * labeling information.
+ */
+static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0, i;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
+	struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
+	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
+	char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
+	int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
+	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
+
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
+		if (!num_opts) {
+			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+			   server is ready to handle calls. */
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+			"before the security server is initialized\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
+		/* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+		 * place the results is not allowed */
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
+	 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
+	 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
+	 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
+	 *
+	 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
+	 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
+	 * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
+	 * will be used for both mounts)
+	 */
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+	    && (num_opts == 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
+
+	/*
+	 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
+	 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
+	 * than once with different security options.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+			continue;
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			fscontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+					fscontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			context_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					context_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
+			rootcontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+					rootcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+
+			break;
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			defcontext_sid = sid;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+					defcontext_sid))
+				goto out_double_mount;
+
+			sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
+			goto out_double_mount;
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
+		/*
+		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
+		 * filesystem type.
+		 */
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+					__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
+	 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
+	 * line and security labels must be ignored.
+	 */
+	if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
+	    strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
+		if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
+		    defcontext_sid) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+			rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
+						     current_sid(),
+						     current_sid(),
+						     SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
+						     &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		goto out_set_opts;
+	}
+
+	/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+	if (fscontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+	 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+	 * the superblock context if not already set.
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
+	if (context_sid) {
+		if (!fscontext_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							  cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			sbsec->sid = context_sid;
+		} else {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+							     cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (!rootcontext_sid)
+			rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
+
+		sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+	}
+
+	if (rootcontext_sid) {
+		rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
+						     cred);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
+		root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	}
+
+	if (defcontext_sid) {
+		if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+			sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
+			       "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
+							     sbsec, cred);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
+	}
+
+out_set_opts:
+	rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
+	return rc;
+out_double_mount:
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
+	       "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+				    const struct super_block *newsb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+	char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+	char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+	if (oldflags != newflags)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
+		goto mismatch;
+	if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+		if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
+			goto mismatch;
+	}
+	return 0;
+mismatch:
+	pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
+			    "different security settings for (dev %s, "
+			    "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+					struct super_block *newsb,
+					unsigned long kern_flags,
+					unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+
+	int set_fscontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_context =	(oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
+	int set_rootcontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
+
+	/*
+	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+	 * place the results is not allowed.
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
+	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
+
+	/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
+	if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+		return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+
+	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+	newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
+
+	newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
+	newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
+	newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+
+	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
+		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+		newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
+	if (set_context) {
+		u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+
+		if (!set_fscontext)
+			newsbsec->sid = sid;
+		if (!set_rootcontext) {
+			struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+			newisec->sid = sid;
+		}
+		newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+	}
+	if (set_rootcontext) {
+		const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+		struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+
+		newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
+	}
+
+	sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
+				  struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	char *p;
+	char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+	char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
+	int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+	/* Standard string-based options. */
+	while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
+		int token;
+		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+		if (!*p)
+			continue;
+
+		token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
+
+		switch (token) {
+		case Opt_context:
+			if (context || defcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!context) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_fscontext:
+			if (fscontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!fscontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_rootcontext:
+			if (rootcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!rootcontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case Opt_defcontext:
+			if (context || defcontext) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+			if (!defcontext) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out_err;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_labelsupport:
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			pr_warn("SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
+			goto out_err;
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+				       GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (fscontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (context) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (rootcontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+	if (defcontext) {
+		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+	}
+
+	opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+	return 0;
+
+out_err:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
+	kfree(context);
+	kfree(defcontext);
+	kfree(fscontext);
+	kfree(rootcontext);
+	return rc;
+}
+/*
+ * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
+ */
+static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char *options = data;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	if (!data)
+		goto out;
+
+	BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_err;
+
+out:
+	rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+
+out_err:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
+			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *prefix;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		char *has_comma;
+
+		if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+			has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+		else
+			has_comma = NULL;
+
+		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case SBLABEL_MNT:
+			seq_putc(m, ',');
+			seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+			continue;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return;
+		};
+		/* we need a comma before each option */
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, prefix);
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+		seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+	}
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
+		if (rc == -EINVAL)
+			rc = 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
+
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+	case S_IFREG:
+		return SECCLASS_FILE;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return SECCLASS_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+		case SOCK_RAW:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+	case PF_INET6:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+			else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
+				return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+			else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
+						  protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
+				return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DCCP:
+			return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_NETLINK:
+		switch (protocol) {
+		case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_XFRM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_ISCSI:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_GENERIC:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_RDMA:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		}
+	case PF_PACKET:
+		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+	case PF_KEY:
+		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	case PF_APPLETALK:
+		return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
+	}
+
+	if (extsockclass) {
+		switch (family) {
+		case PF_AX25:
+			return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IPX:
+			return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
+		case PF_NETROM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ATMPVC:
+			return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_X25:
+			return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ROSE:
+			return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
+		case PF_DECnet:
+			return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ATMSVC:
+			return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_RDS:
+			return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IRDA:
+			return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
+		case PF_PPPOX:
+			return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
+		case PF_LLC:
+			return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_CAN:
+			return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
+		case PF_TIPC:
+			return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_BLUETOOTH:
+			return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IUCV:
+			return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
+		case PF_RXRPC:
+			return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ISDN:
+			return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
+		case PF_PHONET:
+			return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
+		case PF_IEEE802154:
+			return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
+		case PF_CAIF:
+			return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
+		case PF_ALG:
+			return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
+		case PF_NFC:
+			return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_VSOCK:
+			return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
+		case PF_KCM:
+			return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
+		case PF_QIPCRTR:
+			return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
+		case PF_SMC:
+			return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
+		case PF_XDP:
+			return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
+#if PF_MAX > 45
+#error New address family defined, please update this function.
+#endif
+		}
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 u16 tclass,
+				 u16 flags,
+				 u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
+	char *buffer, *path;
+
+	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+	else {
+		if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
+			/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+			 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+			 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+			while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+				path[1] = '/';
+				path++;
+			}
+		}
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
+					path, tclass, sid);
+		if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+			/* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
+			*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+			rc = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
+		return 0;
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
+		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+		   server is ready to handle calls. */
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+			list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	task_sid = isec->task_sid;
+	sid = isec->sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+		   Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+		if (opt_dentry) {
+			/* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+			dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
+			 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
+			 * that first.  We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
+			 * two, depending upon that...
+			 */
+			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			if (!dentry)
+				dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+		}
+		if (!dentry) {
+			/*
+			 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+			 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+			 * be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+		context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!context) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			dput(dentry);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		context[len] = '\0';
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+		if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+			kfree(context);
+
+			/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
+			rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			len = rc;
+			context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
+			if (!context) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			context[len] = '\0';
+			rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+		}
+		dput(dentry);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+				pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
+				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
+				       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				kfree(context);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
+			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
+							     context, rc, &sid,
+							     sbsec->def_sid,
+							     GFP_NOFS);
+			if (rc) {
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
+				kfree(context);
+				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
+				rc = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		kfree(context);
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+		sid = task_sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
+					     sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+		sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
+		sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+			 * procfs inodes */
+			if (opt_dentry) {
+				/* Called from d_instantiate or
+				 * d_splice_alias. */
+				dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+			} else {
+				/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+				 * find a dentry.  Some filesystems really want
+				 * a connected one, so try that first.
+				 */
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+				if (!dentry)
+					dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+			}
+			/*
+			 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+			 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+			 * could be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			if (!dentry)
+				goto out;
+			rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
+						   sbsec->flags, &sid);
+			dput(dentry);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+		if (!sid || rc) {
+			isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+	}
+
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+	u32 perm = 0;
+
+	switch (sig) {
+	case SIGCHLD:
+		/* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+		break;
+	case SIGKILL:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+		break;
+	case SIGSTOP:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* All other signals. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return perm;
+}
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
+#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
+			       int cap, int audit, bool initns)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+	ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		if (rc2)
+			return rc2;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+   The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+   data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			  struct inode *inode,
+			  u32 perms,
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				const struct path *path,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     u32 av)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
+   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+   check a particular permission to the file.
+   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
+   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			 struct file *file,
+			 u32 av)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
+	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+	rc = 0;
+	if (av)
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
+ */
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 struct inode *dir,
+				 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+				 u32 *_new_isid)
+{
+	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
+		*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+	} else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+		   tsec->create_sid) {
+		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
+		return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+					       dsec->sid, tclass,
+					       name, _new_isid);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+		      struct dentry *dentry,
+		      u16 tclass)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid, newsid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = inode_security(dir);
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+			  &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+					   &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid, sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK	0
+#define MAY_UNLINK	1
+#define MAY_RMDIR	2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+		    struct dentry *dentry,
+		    int kind)
+
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int rc;
+
+	dsec = inode_security(dir);
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	av = DIR__SEARCH;
+	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (kind) {
+	case MAY_LINK:
+		av = FILE__LINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_UNLINK:
+		av = FILE__UNLINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_RMDIR:
+		av = DIR__RMDIR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
+			__func__, kind);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+			     struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			     struct inode *new_dir,
+			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 av;
+	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+	int rc;
+
+	old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
+	old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
+	old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
+	new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+
+	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_isec->sid,
+			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, old_isec->sid,
+				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
+	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
+		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
+		new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, new_isec->sid,
+				  new_isec->sclass,
+				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct super_block *sb,
+			       u32 perms,
+			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= FILE__READ;
+
+		if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+	} else {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+		if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= DIR__WRITE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= DIR__READ;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= FILE__READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+	}
+	if (!av) {
+		/*
+		 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
+		 */
+		av = FILE__IOCTL;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */
+static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+{
+	u32 mysid = current_sid();
+	u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
+				      struct task_struct *to)
+{
+	u32 mysid = current_sid();
+	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (mysid != fromsid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+				  BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
+					  struct task_struct *to)
+{
+	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
+	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
+					struct task_struct *to,
+					struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 sid = task_sid(to);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				     unsigned int mode)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	u32 csid = task_sid(child);
+
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			   int cap, int audit)
+{
+	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!sb)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmds) {
+	case Q_SYNC:
+	case Q_QUOTAON:
+	case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+	case Q_SETINFO:
+	case Q_SETQUOTA:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+		break;
+	case Q_GETFMT:
+	case Q_GETINFO:
+	case Q_GETQUOTA:
+		rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
+	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
+				    NULL);
+	}
+	/* All other syslog types */
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
+ * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
+ * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
+
+	rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+				 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		cap_sys_admin = 1;
+
+	return cap_sys_admin;
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+	if (tracer)
+		sid = task_sid(tracer);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sid;
+}
+
+static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
+{
+	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+	int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
+	int rc;
+	u32 av;
+
+	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
+		return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
+
+	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
+		return 0; /* No change in credentials */
+
+	/*
+	 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
+	 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
+	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
+	 * the old and new contexts.
+	 */
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
+		av = 0;
+		if (nnp)
+			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
+		if (nosuid)
+			av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
+		if (!rc)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
+	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
+	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
+	 */
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					 new_tsec->sid);
+	if (!rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+	 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
+	 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
+	 */
+	if (nnp)
+		return -EPERM;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	int rc;
+
+	/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
+	 * the script interpreter */
+	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
+		return 0;
+
+	old_tsec = current_security();
+	new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+
+	/* Default to the current task SID. */
+	new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+	new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
+
+	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+	new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
+	new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+	new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+
+	if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
+		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
+		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+
+		/* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+					     &new_tsec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
+		 * transition.
+		 */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = bprm->file;
+
+	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Check for shared state */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
+					  NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
+		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
+			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+			if (ptsid != 0) {
+				rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						  ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+				if (rc)
+					return -EPERM;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
+		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
+				  NULL);
+		bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
+{
+	return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
+					    struct files_struct *files)
+{
+	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
+	unsigned n;
+
+	tty = get_current_tty();
+	if (tty) {
+		spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
+		if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
+
+			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+			   Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+			   rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+			   open file may belong to another process and we are
+			   only interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+						struct tty_file_private, list);
+			file = file_priv->file;
+			if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+				drop_tty = 1;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
+		tty_kref_put(tty);
+	}
+	/* Reset controlling tty. */
+	if (drop_tty)
+		no_tty();
+
+	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
+	if (!n) /* none found? */
+		return;
+
+	devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
+	if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+		devnull = NULL;
+	/* replace all the matching ones with this */
+	do {
+		replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+	if (devnull)
+		fput(devnull);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+	if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+	flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+	/* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
+	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
+	 * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
+	 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+	 * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
+	 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
+	 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
+	 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* protect against do_prlimit() */
+		task_lock(current);
+		for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+			rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+			initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
+		}
+		task_unlock(current);
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
+			update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
+ * due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct itimerval itimer;
+	u32 osid, sid;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	osid = tsec->osid;
+	sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	if (sid == osid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
+	 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
+	 * flush and unblock signals.
+	 *
+	 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
+	 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
+	 */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
+			memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
+			for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+				do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
+		}
+		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+		if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
+			flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+			sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+			recalc_sigpending();
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	}
+
+	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
+	 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	__wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	superblock_free_security(sb);
+}
+
+static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
+{
+	if (plen > olen)
+		return 0;
+
+	return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
+{
+	return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
+}
+
+static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
+{
+	if (!*first) {
+		**to = ',';
+		*to += 1;
+	} else
+		*first = 0;
+	memcpy(*to, from, len);
+	*to += len;
+}
+
+static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
+				       int len)
+{
+	int current_size = 0;
+
+	if (!*first) {
+		**to = '|';
+		*to += 1;
+	} else
+		*first = 0;
+
+	while (current_size < len) {
+		if (*from != '"') {
+			**to = *from;
+			*to += 1;
+		}
+		from += 1;
+		current_size += 1;
+	}
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
+{
+	int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
+	char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
+	char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
+	int open_quote = 0;
+
+	in_curr = orig;
+	sec_curr = copy;
+
+	nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nosec) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nosec_save = nosec;
+	fnosec = fsec = 1;
+	in_save = in_end = orig;
+
+	do {
+		if (*in_end == '"')
+			open_quote = !open_quote;
+		if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
+				*in_end == '\0') {
+			int len = in_end - in_curr;
+
+			if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
+				take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
+			else
+				take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
+
+			in_curr = in_end + 1;
+		}
+	} while (*in_end++);
+
+	strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
+	free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc, i, *flags;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	char *secdata, **mount_options;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	secdata = alloc_secdata();
+	if (!secdata)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
+	flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+			continue;
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+			root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		}
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out_free_opts:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+out_free_secdata:
+	free_secdata(secdata);
+	return rc;
+out_bad_option:
+	pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	goto out_free_opts;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
+			 const struct path *path,
+			 const char *type,
+			 unsigned long flags,
+			 void *data)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
+					   FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+	else
+		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
+				   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_alloc_security(inode);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+					u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
+				       ctxlen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					  struct qstr *name,
+					  const struct cred *old,
+					  struct cred *new)
+{
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = new->security;
+	tsec->create_sid = newsid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				       const struct qstr *qstr,
+				       const char **name,
+				       void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 newsid, clen;
+	int rc;
+	char *context;
+
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+		dir, qstr,
+		inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+		&newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+		isec->sid = newsid;
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (name)
+		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+
+	if (value && len) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+						   &context, &clen);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		*value = context;
+		*len = clen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+				     bool rcu)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
+	if (IS_ERR(isec))
+		return PTR_ERR(isec);
+
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+				  rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
+}
+
+static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
+					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+					   int result,
+					   unsigned flags)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
+
+	rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	u32 perms;
+	bool from_access;
+	unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+	u32 audited, denied;
+
+	from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+	/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+	if (!mask)
+		return 0;
+
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
+	if (IS_ERR(isec))
+		return PTR_ERR(isec);
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
+				     from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
+				     &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+	__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
+
+	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+			      ATTR_FORCE);
+		if (!ia_valid)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
+		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
+	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
+	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
+
+	if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
+		return false;
+	if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+		   ordinary setattr permission. */
+		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	}
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+		if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+			struct audit_buffer *ab;
+			size_t audit_size;
+
+			/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+			 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+			if (value) {
+				const char *str = value;
+
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+			} else {
+				audit_size = 0;
+			}
+			ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+					     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+			audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
+						   size, &newsid);
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
+					  sid, isec->sclass);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid,
+			    sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
+					int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
+		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
+		       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+		   ordinary setattr permission. */
+		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	}
+
+	/* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+	   You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	u32 size;
+	int error;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
+	 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
+	 * use the in-core value under current policy.
+	 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
+	 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
+	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
+	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
+	 */
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
+						      isec->sid, &context,
+						      &size);
+	else
+		error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+						&context, &size);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	error = size;
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = context;
+		goto out_nofree;
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+out_nofree:
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!value || !size)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+	if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+	*secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+	if (new_creds == NULL) {
+		new_creds = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new_creds)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tsec = new_creds->security;
+	/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
+	selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
+	tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	*new = new_creds;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	/* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+	 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+	 * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Discard */
+	/*
+	 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+	 * by selinux.
+	 */
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+			     file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	if (!mask)
+		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
+		/* No change since file_open check. */
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	return file_alloc_security(file);
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file_free_security(file);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+		u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc;
+	u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+	u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+	ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+	ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+	ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+	if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  ssid, fsec->sid,
+				SECCLASS_FD,
+				FD__USE,
+				&ad);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
+	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
+				    ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+				    requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int error = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FIONREAD:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIBMAP:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+	case FIONBIO:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIOASYNC:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+
+	case KDSKBENT:
+	case KDSKBSENT:
+		error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
+		break;
+
+	/* default case assumes that the command will go
+	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+	 */
+	default:
+		error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int default_noexec;
+
+static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
+				   (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+		/*
+		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
+		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
+		 * This has an additional check.
+		 */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				  PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (file) {
+		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+		u32 av = FILE__READ;
+
+		/* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+		if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+		if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+		return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+	}
+
+error:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (file) {
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+		ad.u.file = file;
+		rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
+				    FILE__MAP, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
+				   (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long reqprot,
+				 unsigned long prot)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+		int rc = 0;
+		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
+		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
+		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
+			   ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
+			     vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
+			    vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
+		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+			/*
+			 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+			 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
+			 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
+			 * modified content.  This typically should only
+			 * occur for text relocations.
+			 */
+			rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_SETFL:
+		if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+			err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
+			break;
+		}
+		/* fall through */
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+	case F_GETFL:
+	case F_GETOWN:
+	case F_GETSIG:
+	case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
+		/* Just check FD__USE permission */
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_OFD_GETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLK:
+	case F_OFD_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+	case F_GETLK64:
+	case F_SETLK64:
+	case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+		err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+	u32 perm;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	if (!signum)
+		perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+	/*
+	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+	 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+	 * Task label is already saved in the file security
+	 * struct as its SID.
+	 */
+	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
+	/*
+	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+	 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+	 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+	 * new inode label or new policy.
+	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+	 */
+	return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			      unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
+	 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+	cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
+	kfree(tsec);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	old_tsec = old->security;
+
+	tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+	*tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, secid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
+			   NULL);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		tsec->sid = secid;
+		tsec->create_sid = 0;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, isec->sid,
+			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+			   KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
+			   NULL);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
+	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	/* init_module */
+	if (file == NULL)
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+					SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
+
+	/* finit_module */
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+				SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+				    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case READING_MODULE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_MODULE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = task_sid(p);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+				unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (!flags)
+		return 0;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
+		av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
+	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
+		av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
+
+	/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+	   lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+	   upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
+	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	u32 secid;
+	u32 perm;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+	if (!cred)
+		secid = current_sid();
+	else
+		secid = cred_sid(cred);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+				  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(p);
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+	if (ih == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+	if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = ih->protocol;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
+	ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (proto)
+		*proto = nexthdr;
+
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+		struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+		struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+		ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	/* includes fragments */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
+			     char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (ad->u.net->family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
+		if (ret)
+			goto parse_error;
+		addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
+				       &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
+		goto okay;
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+	default:
+		addrp = NULL;
+		goto okay;
+	}
+
+parse_error:
+	pr_warn(
+	       "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
+	       " unable to parse packet\n");
+	return ret;
+
+okay:
+	if (_addrp)
+		*_addrp = addrp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_type;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
+					   nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	if (unlikely(err)) {
+		pr_warn(
+		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
+		       " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
+					    conn_sid);
+	else
+		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
+{
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+		*socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				       secclass, NULL, socksid);
+}
+
+static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+
+	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+				 int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	u32 newsid;
+	u16 secclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
+	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				      int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!kern) {
+		err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		sksec->sclass = sclass;
+		sksec->sid = sid;
+		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
+		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+				     struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+	sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
+	sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+   Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+   permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 family;
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+		char *addrp;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, node_perm;
+
+		/*
+		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		switch (family_sa) {
+		case AF_UNSPEC:
+		case AF_INET:
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
+				/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
+				 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
+				 */
+				if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+					goto err_af;
+				family_sa = AF_INET;
+			}
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto err_af;
+		}
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
+
+		if (snum) {
+			int low, high;
+
+			inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
+
+			if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
+			    snum > high) {
+				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+						      snum, &sid);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+				err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						   sksec->sid, sid,
+						   sksec->sclass,
+						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+				if (err)
+					goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (family_sa == AF_INET)
+			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		else
+			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid,
+				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	return err;
+err_af:
+	/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+}
+
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+	 * for the port.
+	 */
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid, perm;
+
+		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
+		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	sid = isec->sid;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
+	newisec->sclass = sclass;
+	newisec->sid = sid;
+	newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size, int flags)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+					      struct sock *other,
+					      struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	int err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = other;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+			   sksec_other->sclass,
+			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* server child socket */
+	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
+				    sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* connecting socket */
+	sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+					struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
+				    char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
+				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 if_sid;
+	u32 node_sid;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   peer_sid, if_sid,
+			   SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    peer_sid, node_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       u16 family)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return 0;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 peer_sid;
+
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active) {
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	char *scontext;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+	err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
+				      &scontext_len);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (scontext_len > len) {
+		err = -ERANGE;
+		goto out_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+
+out_len:
+	if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+	kfree(scontext);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+	u16 family;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+	else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+		family = PF_INET6;
+	else if (sock)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	else
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+		isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+		peer_secid = isec->sid;
+	} else if (skb)
+		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+
+out:
+	*secid = peer_secid;
+	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+	if (!sksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+	sk->sk_security = sksec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+	kfree(sksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+{
+	if (!sk)
+		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+	else {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+		*secid = sksec->sid;
+	}
+}
+
+static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+		inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
+	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
+ * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
+ * already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	u32 conn_sid;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+		 */
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
+					      &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+
+	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+		 */
+		sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
+	} else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
+		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+		 */
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+	 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+	 * plug this into the new socket.
+	 */
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ep->secid = conn_sid;
+	ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
+
+	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				     struct sockaddr *address,
+				     int addrlen)
+{
+	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+	void *addr_buf;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	addr_buf = address;
+
+	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+		if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		addr = addr_buf;
+		switch (addr->sa_family) {
+		case AF_UNSPEC:
+		case AF_INET:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (optname) {
+		/* Bind checks */
+		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+			err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+			break;
+		/* Connect checks */
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
+			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
+			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+			 * primary address is selected.
+			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+			 * selinux_socket_connect().
+			 */
+			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr_buf += len;
+		walk_size += len;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+				  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+	 * the non-sctp clone version.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				     struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	int err;
+	u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
+	u32 connsid;
+	u32 peersid;
+
+	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	req->secid = connsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+				   const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
+	/* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
+	   new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
+	   So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
+	   time it will have been created and available. */
+
+	/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
+	 * thread with access to newsksec */
+	selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	u32 tsid;
+
+	__tsec = current_security();
+	tsid = __tsec->sid;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+				      struct flowi *fl)
+{
+	fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
+
+	tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tunsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	tunsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	*security = tunsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+	kfree(security);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	/* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+	 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+	 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+	 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			    TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+	 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+	 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+	 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+	 * protocols were being used */
+
+	sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	tunsec->sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+
+	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == -EINVAL) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
+			       " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+			       " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
+			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
+			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+			if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
+			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
+				err = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore */
+		if (err == -ENOENT)
+			err = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       const struct net_device *indev,
+				       u16 family)
+{
+	int err;
+	char *addrp;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 netlbl_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+		if (err) {
+			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
+			return NF_DROP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (netlbl_active)
+		/* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+		 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
+		 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
+		 * protection */
+		if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
+			return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				      u16 family)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled())
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+	 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+	 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (sk) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		if (sk_listener(sk))
+			/* if the socket is the listening state then this
+			 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+			 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+			 * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
+			 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+			 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+			 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+			 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+			 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+			 * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+			 * security label in the packet itself this is the
+			 * best we can do. */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sid = sksec->sid;
+	} else
+		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
+					struct sk_buff *skb,
+					const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
+					struct sk_buff *skb,
+					const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
+						int ifindex,
+						u16 family)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 proto;
+
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+	sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+		return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct net_device *outdev,
+					 u16 family)
+{
+	u32 secmark_perm;
+	u32 peer_sid;
+	int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	char *addrp;
+	u8 secmark_active;
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+
+	/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
+	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
+	/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
+	 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
+	 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
+	 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
+	 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+	 *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+	 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+	 *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+	 *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+	 *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+	 *       connection. */
+	if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+	    !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+		 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+		 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+		 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
+		if (skb->skb_iif) {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+				return NF_DROP;
+		} else {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		}
+	} else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
+		/* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+		 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
+		 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+		 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+		 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+		 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+		 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+		 * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
+		 * for similar problems. */
+		u32 skb_sid;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+		 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+		 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+		 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+		 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+		 * pass the packet. */
+		if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			default:
+				return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+			}
+		}
+		if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	} else {
+		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+		 * associated socket. */
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
+	if (secmark_active)
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+				 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		u32 if_sid;
+		u32 node_sid;
+
+		if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, if_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+		if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, node_sid,
+				 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
+			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+	}
+
+	return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+}
+
+static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
+			      u16 sclass)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->sid = current_sid();
+	perm->security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
+	perm->security = NULL;
+	kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+	msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	msg->security = msec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+
+	msg->security = NULL;
+	kfree(msec);
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+			u32 perms)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = ipc_perms->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = msq->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(msq);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(msq);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = msq->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	int perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = msq->security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+	 */
+	if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
+		 * message queue this message will be stored in
+		 */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can this process send the message */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+				  MSG__SEND, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+				  MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				    struct task_struct *target,
+				    long type, int mode)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
+	int rc;
+
+	isec = msq->security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid,
+			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = shp->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			  SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(shp);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(shp);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = shp->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	int perms;
+	int err;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+		perms = SHM__LOCK;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
+			     char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+		perms = SHM__READ;
+	else
+		perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec = sma->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			  SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(sma);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(sma);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	isec = sma->security;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+		break;
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+		perms = SEM__WRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
+			     struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (alter)
+		perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+	else
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	av = 0;
+	if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+	if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+	if (av == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
+}
+
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+	*secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (inode)
+		inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       char *name, char **value)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	u32 sid;
+	int error;
+	unsigned len;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	__tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+
+	if (current != p) {
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+				     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		sid = __tsec->sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+		sid = __tsec->osid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->create_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+	else {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	return len;
+
+bad:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct cred *new;
+	u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
+	int error;
+	char *str = value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+	 */
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
+	else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+	if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
+		if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+			str[size-1] = 0;
+			size--;
+		}
+		error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
+						&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+			if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+				struct audit_buffer *ab;
+				size_t audit_size;
+
+				/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+				 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+				ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+						     GFP_ATOMIC,
+						     AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+				audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+
+				return error;
+			}
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(
+						      &selinux_state,
+						      value, size, &sid);
+		}
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+	   performed during the actual operation (execve,
+	   open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
+	   checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+	   operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+	tsec = new->security;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
+		tsec->exec_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+		tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
+				     NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto abort_change;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		if (sid == 0)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+		error = -EPERM;
+		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
+			error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
+							    tsec->sid, sid);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto abort_change;
+
+		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+		ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+		if (ptsid != 0) {
+			error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					     ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+			if (error)
+				goto abort_change;
+		}
+
+		tsec->sid = sid;
+	} else {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto abort_change;
+	}
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return size;
+
+abort_change:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+				       secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+	kfree(secdata);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+						ctx, true);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
+			     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+
+	ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsec = cred->security;
+	if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+		ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else
+		ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	k->security = ksec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
+
+	k->security = NULL;
+	kfree(ksec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				  const struct cred *cred,
+				  unsigned perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
+	   permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
+	   appear to be created. */
+	if (perm == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ksec = key->security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
+				     &context, &len);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = len;
+	*_buffer = context;
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+	struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
+
+	err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
+	ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+	ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
+	ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
+			    INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
+					    u8 port_num)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+	struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
+
+	err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
+				      &sid);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
+	strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
+	ibendport.port = port_num;
+	ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
+			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
+			    INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
+{
+	struct ib_security_struct *sec;
+
+	sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	sec->sid = current_sid();
+
+	*ib_sec = sec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
+{
+	kfree(ib_sec);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				     unsigned int size)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
+	if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	struct bpf_prog *prog;
+	struct bpf_map *map;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
+		map = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = map->security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
+		prog = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = map->security;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+			    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+			    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!bpfsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+	map->security = bpfsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+
+	map->security = NULL;
+	kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!bpfsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+	aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+
+	aux->security = NULL;
+	kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+#endif
+
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+			selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+			selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
+		      selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+			selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+			selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+	if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
+		selinux_enabled = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled) {
+		pr_info("SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+	enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
+	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+	selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
+
+	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+	cred_init_security();
+
+	default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
+
+	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
+					    sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avc_init();
+
+	avtab_cache_init();
+
+	ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+	hashtab_cache_init();
+
+	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+
+	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+	else
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
+{
+	superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
+
+	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+	iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+   all processes and objects when they are created. */
+security_initcall(selinux_init);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+
+static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_forward,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_forward,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+	{
+		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_output,
+		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+	},
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+	return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+				     ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+	nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+				ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
+	.init = selinux_nf_register,
+	.exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
+	if (err)
+		panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
+{
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
+}
+#endif
+
+#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	if (state->initialized) {
+		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (state->disabled) {
+		/* Only do this once. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	state->disabled = 1;
+
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
+
+	selinux_enabled = 0;
+
+	security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
+
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
+	/* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
+	selinux_nf_ip_exit();
+
+	/* Unregister selinuxfs. */
+	exit_sel_fs();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a4b89d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ * Pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of Infinband PKEYs to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally
+ * developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more
+ *   information)
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt {
+	int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey {
+	struct pkey_security_struct psec;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_ib_pkey_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_ib_pkey_lock);
+static struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt sel_ib_pkey_hash[SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_hashfn - Hashing function for the pkey table
+ * @pkey: pkey number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the pkey table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given pkey.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(u16 pkey)
+{
+	return (pkey & (SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_find - Search for a pkey record
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey_num
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the pkey table and return the matching record.  If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_ib_pkey *sel_ib_pkey_find(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+	idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey_num);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pkey, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+		if (pkey->psec.pkey == pkey_num &&
+		    pkey->psec.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+			return pkey;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_insert - Insert a new pkey into the table
+ * @pkey: the new pkey record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new pkey record to the hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_ib_pkey_insert(struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds
+	 */
+	idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey->psec.pkey);
+	list_add_rcu(&pkey->list, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size == SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_ib_pkey *tail;
+
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(
+				sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list.prev,
+				lockdep_is_held(&sel_ib_pkey_lock)),
+			struct sel_ib_pkey, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else {
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size++;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a pkey using the policy
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a pkey by querying the security
+ * policy.  The result is added to the pkey table to speedup future
+ * queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *new = NULL;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+	if (pkey) {
+		*sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(&selinux_state, subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+				   sid);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+	 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+	 */
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new)
+		goto out;
+
+	new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+	new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;
+	new->psec.sid = *sid;
+	sel_ib_pkey_insert(new);
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid - Lookup the SID of a PKEY
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a PKEY using the fastest method
+ * possible.  First the pkey table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+	if (pkey) {
+		*sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_flush - Flush the entire pkey table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the pkey table
+ *
+ */
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey, *pkey_tmp;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(pkey, pkey_tmp,
+					 &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+			list_del_rcu(&pkey->list);
+			kfree_rcu(pkey, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_ib_pkey_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(sel_ib_pkey_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bdf973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
+ * is released under below copyrights:
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ *	@field: the field this rule refers to
+ *	@op: the operater the rule uses
+ *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
+ *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ *	This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ *	If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ *	@sid: the context ID to check
+ *	@field: the field this rule refers to
+ *	@op: the operater the rule uses
+ *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ *	@actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ *	-errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+			     struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ *	@rule: rule to be checked
+ *	Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef899bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the AVC.
+ */
+struct avc_entry;
+
+struct task_struct;
+struct inode;
+struct sock;
+struct sk_buff;
+
+/*
+ * AVC statistics
+ */
+struct avc_cache_stats {
+	unsigned int lookups;
+	unsigned int misses;
+	unsigned int allocations;
+	unsigned int reclaims;
+	unsigned int frees;
+};
+
+/*
+ * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message.
+ */
+struct selinux_audit_data {
+	u32 ssid;
+	u32 tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 requested;
+	u32 audited;
+	u32 denied;
+	int result;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * AVC operations
+ */
+
+void __init avc_init(void);
+
+static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
+			      struct av_decision *avd,
+			      int result,
+			      u32 auditdeny,
+			      u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		/*
+		 * auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
+		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+		 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
+		 * assume:
+		 *
+		 * denied == READ
+		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+		 * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+		 *
+		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+		 * ACCESS
+		 */
+		if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+			audited = 0;
+	} else if (result)
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	else
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+		   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+		   struct common_audit_data *a,
+		   unsigned flags);
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
+ * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
+ * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
+ * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
+ * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
+ * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
+ * before calling the auditing code.
+ */
+static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			    u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			    struct av_decision *avd,
+			    int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a,
+			    int flags)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+			      requested, audited, denied, result,
+			      a, flags);
+}
+
+#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2	/* update extended permissions */
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned flags,
+			 struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
+		 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       int flags);
+
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE		2
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE		4
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET		8
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE	16
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE	32
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE	64
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS		256
+
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
+
+/* Exported to selinuxfs */
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page);
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc);
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold);
+
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88c384c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+
+#include "flask.h"
+
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno);
+
+/* Class/perm mapping support */
+struct security_class_mapping {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1];
+};
+
+extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd5fe0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \
+    "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map"
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
+    "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+    "open", "execmod"
+
+#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
+    "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom",  \
+    "sendto", "name_bind"
+
+#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
+	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP_PERMS  "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", \
+	    "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", \
+	    "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", \
+	    "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", \
+	    "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin", \
+	    "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time", \
+	    "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write", \
+	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
+		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ *	 and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
+struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
+	{ "security",
+	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
+	    "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
+	    "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
+	    "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", "validate_trans", NULL } },
+	{ "process",
+	  { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
+	    "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",
+	    "getsession", "getpgid", "setpgid", "getcap", "setcap", "share",
+	    "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh",
+	    "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
+	    "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
+	    "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
+	{ "process2",
+	  { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+	{ "system",
+	  { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
+	    "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
+	{ "capability",
+	  { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "filesystem",
+	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
+	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
+	    "quotaget", NULL } },
+	{ "file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
+	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
+	{ "dir",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name",
+	    "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },
+	{ "fd", { "use", NULL } },
+	{ "lnk_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "chr_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "blk_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sock_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "fifo_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tcp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "udp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "rawip_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "node",
+	  { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+	{ "netif",
+	  { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "key_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "unix_stream_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
+	{ "unix_dgram_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sem",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
+	{ "msgq",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "enqueue", NULL } },
+	{ "shm",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "lock", NULL } },
+	{ "ipc",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_route_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_nflog_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_xfrm_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_selinux_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_iscsi_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_audit_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
+	    "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_fib_lookup_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_connector_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_netfilter_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_dnrt_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "association",
+	  { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_generic_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_scsitransport_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_rdma_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_crypto_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "appletalk_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet",
+	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+	{ "key",
+	  { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "dccp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
+	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
+	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2",
+	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
+	{ "tun_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
+	{ "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
+		      NULL } },
+	{ "cap_userns",
+	  { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "cap2_userns",
+	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sctp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
+	{ "icmp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "ax25_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ipx_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netrom_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmpvc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "x25_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rose_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "decnet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmsvc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rds_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "irda_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "pppox_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "llc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "can_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tipc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "bluetooth_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "iucv_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rxrpc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "isdn_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "phonet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ieee802154_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "caif_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "alg_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "nfc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "vsock_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "kcm_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "qipcrtr_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "smc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "infiniband_pkey",
+	  { "access", NULL } },
+	{ "infiniband_endport",
+	  { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+	{ "bpf",
+	  {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
+	{ "xdp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ NULL }
+  };
+
+#if PF_MAX > 45
+#error New address family defined, please update secclass_map.
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e30eca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Interface to booleans in the security server. This is exported
+ * for the selinuxfs.
+ *
+ * Author: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b17a19e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of pkeys to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+#define _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void);
+
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f93f69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
+{
+    "null",
+    "kernel",
+    "security",
+    "unlabeled",
+    "fs",
+    "file",
+    "file_labels",
+    "init",
+    "any_socket",
+    "port",
+    "netif",
+    "netmsg",
+    "node",
+    "igmp_packet",
+    "icmp_socket",
+    "tcp_socket",
+    "sysctl_modprobe",
+    "sysctl",
+    "sysctl_fs",
+    "sysctl_kernel",
+    "sysctl_net",
+    "sysctl_net_unix",
+    "sysctl_vm",
+    "sysctl_dev",
+    "kmod",
+    "policy",
+    "scmp_packet",
+    "devnull",
+};
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c721454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                    Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+void sel_netif_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif	/* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8671de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux interface to the NetLabel subsystem
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ *
+ * This program is free software;  you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;  without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See
+ * the GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error,
+			int gateway);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 *type,
+				 u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				u16 family,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+				     int level,
+				     int optname);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr);
+
+#else
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				      u16 family,
+				      int error,
+				      int gateway)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
+					       struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
+					       struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					       u16 family,
+					       u32 *type,
+					       u32 *sid)
+{
+	*type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					       u16 family,
+					       u32 sid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
+					     struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+						    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
+						   u16 family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
+						    u16 family)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+					      struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      u16 family,
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+						   int level,
+						   int optname)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+						       struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..937668d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+
+void sel_netnode_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netport.h b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1ce896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+
+void sel_netport_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc5e26b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
+ *
+ *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *		Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *		Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *		James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *	as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+
+struct task_security_struct {
+	u32 osid;		/* SID prior to last execve */
+	u32 sid;		/* current SID */
+	u32 exec_sid;		/* exec SID */
+	u32 create_sid;		/* fscreate SID */
+	u32 keycreate_sid;	/* keycreate SID */
+	u32 sockcreate_sid;	/* fscreate SID */
+};
+
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+enum label_initialized {
+	LABEL_INVALID,		/* invalid or not initialized */
+	LABEL_INITIALIZED,	/* initialized */
+	LABEL_PENDING
+};
+
+struct inode_security_struct {
+	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode object */
+	union {
+		struct list_head list;	/* list of inode_security_struct */
+		struct rcu_head rcu;	/* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
+	};
+	u32 task_sid;		/* SID of creating task */
+	u32 sid;		/* SID of this object */
+	u16 sclass;		/* security class of this object */
+	unsigned char initialized;	/* initialization flag */
+	spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct file_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;		/* SID of open file description */
+	u32 fown_sid;		/* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+	u32 isid;		/* SID of inode at the time of file open */
+	u32 pseqno;		/* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
+};
+
+struct superblock_security_struct {
+	struct super_block *sb;		/* back pointer to sb object */
+	u32 sid;			/* SID of file system superblock */
+	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
+	u32 mntpoint_sid;		/* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
+	unsigned short behavior;	/* labeling behavior */
+	unsigned short flags;		/* which mount options were specified */
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct list_head isec_head;
+	spinlock_t isec_lock;
+};
+
+struct msg_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;	/* SID of message */
+};
+
+struct ipc_security_struct {
+	u16 sclass;	/* security class of this object */
+	u32 sid;	/* SID of IPC resource */
+};
+
+struct netif_security_struct {
+	struct net *ns;			/* network namespace */
+	int ifindex;			/* device index */
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this interface */
+};
+
+struct netnode_security_struct {
+	union {
+		__be32 ipv4;		/* IPv4 node address */
+		struct in6_addr ipv6;	/* IPv6 node address */
+	} addr;
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this node */
+	u16 family;			/* address family */
+};
+
+struct netport_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for this node */
+	u16 port;			/* port number */
+	u8 protocol;			/* transport protocol */
+};
+
+struct sk_security_struct {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+	enum {				/* NetLabel state */
+		NLBL_UNSET = 0,
+		NLBL_REQUIRE,
+		NLBL_LABELED,
+		NLBL_REQSKB,
+		NLBL_CONNLABELED,
+	} nlbl_state;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlbl_secattr; /* NetLabel sec attributes */
+#endif
+	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
+	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
+	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
+	enum {				/* SCTP association state */
+		SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+		SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+	} sctp_assoc_state;
+};
+
+struct tun_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;			/* SID for the tun device sockets */
+};
+
+struct key_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;	/* SID of key */
+};
+
+struct ib_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;        /* SID of the queue pair or MAD agent */
+};
+
+struct pkey_security_struct {
+	u64	subnet_prefix; /* Port subnet prefix */
+	u16	pkey;	/* PKey number */
+	u32	sid;	/* SID of pkey */
+};
+
+struct bpf_security_struct {
+	u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+};
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23e762d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Security server interface.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+
+#define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
+#define SECSID_WILD			0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
+#define SECCLASS_NULL			0x0000 /* no class */
+
+/* Identify specific policy version changes */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE		15
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL		16
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6		17
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS	18
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS	19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS		19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB		20
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS	21
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS	26
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS	27
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE	28
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES	29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL	30
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND		31
+
+/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND
+
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
+#define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
+#define FSCONTEXT_MNT	0x02
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT	0x04
+#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT	0x08
+#define SBLABEL_MNT	0x10
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x0100
+#define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS		0x0400
+
+#define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
+#define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR	"rootcontext="
+#define DEFCONTEXT_STR	"defcontext="
+#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
+
+struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
+
+extern int selinux_enabled;
+
+/* Policy capabilities */
+enum {
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
+	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
+};
+#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
+
+extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * type_datum properties
+ * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+ */
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY	0x0001
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE	0x0002
+
+/* limitation of boundary depth  */
+#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
+
+struct selinux_avc;
+struct selinux_ss;
+
+struct selinux_state {
+	bool disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool enforcing;
+#endif
+	bool checkreqprot;
+	bool initialized;
+	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+	struct selinux_avc *avc;
+	struct selinux_ss *ss;
+};
+
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->enforcing;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+	state->enforcing = value;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION];
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap);
+
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
+struct av_decision {
+	u32 allowed;
+	u32 auditallow;
+	u32 auditdeny;
+	u32 seqno;
+	u32 flags;
+};
+
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+	u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+	u8 used;
+	u8 driver;
+	struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+	struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+	struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+	u16 len;	/* length associated decision chain */
+	struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
+
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+			    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid);
+
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 callsid, char *username,
+			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
+
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 tclass);
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass);
+
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
+
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid);
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK		3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS		4 /* use the genfs support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE		5 /* no labeling support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT	6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE		7 /* use native label support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX		7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
+
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb);
+
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				   u32 *sid);
+
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+					    struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+					    u32 *sid)
+{
+	return -EIDRM;
+}
+
+static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+					 u32 sid,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
+
+/*
+ * status notifier using mmap interface
+ */
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+#define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION	1
+struct selinux_kernel_status {
+	u32	version;	/* version number of thie structure */
+	u32	sequence;	/* sequence number of seqlock logic */
+	u32	enforcing;	/* current setting of enforcing mode */
+	u32	policyload;	/* times of policy reloaded */
+	u32	deny_unknown;	/* current setting of deny_unknown */
+	/*
+	 * The version > 0 supports above members.
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int seqno);
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+extern int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state);
+extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
+extern struct path selinux_null;
+extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0b4653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+
+#include <net/flow.h>
+
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi *fl);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+	struct net *net;
+
+	down_read(&net_rwsem);
+	for_each_net(net)
+		rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+	up_read(&net_rwsem);
+}
+#else
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad,
+					      u8 proto)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
+					      int ckall)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c738c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *		      Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE	64
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX	1024
+
+struct sel_netif {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct netif_security_struct nsec;
+	struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static u32 sel_netif_total;
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netif_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock);
+static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the network interface table, it returns the
+ * bucket number for the given interface.
+ *
+ */
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+	return (((uintptr_t)ns + ifindex) & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network interface table and return the record matching @ifindex.
+ * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
+					       int ifindex)
+{
+	int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+		if (net_eq(netif->nsec.ns, ns) &&
+		    netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex)
+			return netif;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_insert - Insert a new interface into the table
+ * @netif: the new interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new interface record to the network interface hash table.  Returns
+ * zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ns, netif->nsec.ifindex);
+	list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
+	sel_netif_total++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table
+ * @netif: the existing interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing interface record from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
+	sel_netif_total--;
+	kfree_rcu(netif, rcu_head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface by quering the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network interface table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+	struct sel_netif *new = NULL;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+
+	/* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
+	 * currently support containers */
+
+	dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex);
+	if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), invalid network interface (%d)\n",
+			__func__, ifindex);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (netif != NULL) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	new->nsec.ns = ns;
+	new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
+	ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*sid = new->nsec.sid;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	dev_put(dev);
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
+			__func__, ifindex);
+		kfree(new);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the interface table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (likely(netif != NULL)) {
+		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netif_sid_slow(ns, ifindex, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function removes the entry matching @ifindex from the network interface
+ * table if it exists.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_kill(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+	if (netif)
+		sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_flush - Flush the entire network interface table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netif_flush(void)
+{
+	int idx;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
+		list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+			sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
+					     unsigned long event, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
+
+	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
+		sel_netif_kill(dev_net(dev), dev->ifindex);
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler,
+};
+
+static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
+
+	register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netif_init);
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..186e727
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux NetLabel Support
+ *
+ * This file provides the necessary glue to tie NetLabel into the SELinux
+ * subsystem.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
+ *
+ * This program is free software;  you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;  without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See
+ * the GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
+ * security attributes.  If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
+ * up future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   u16 family,
+					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+					   u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
+	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
+		netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
+ * the socket's attribute cache.  Returns a pointer to the security attributes
+ * on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+		return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+	secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid,
+					    secattr);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
+
+	return secattr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value
+ * return the cache, otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
+							const struct sock *sk,
+							u32 sid)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
+	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+		return secattr;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+	netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
+ * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
+ * done.  This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
+ * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
+{
+	netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+		netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @family: the socket family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 *type,
+				 u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+						     &secattr, sid);
+	else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	*type = secattr.type;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 u16 family,
+				 u32 sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
+	struct sock *sk;
+
+	/* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
+	 * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
+	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+	if (sk != NULL) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
+			return 0;
+		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
+	}
+	if (secattr == NULL) {
+		secattr = &secattr_storage;
+		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid,
+						    secattr);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			goto skbuff_setsid_return;
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
+
+skbuff_setsid_return:
+	if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state,
+					    ep->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto assoc_request_return;
+
+	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+	 */
+	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	} else {
+		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
+ * @req: incoming connection request socket
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
+ * the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
+ * will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
+ * is complete.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid,
+					    &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto inet_conn_request_return;
+	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+inet_conn_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
+ * @sk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
+ * socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
+ * we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (family == PF_INET)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+	else
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
+ * @sock: the socket to label
+ * @family: protocol family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
+ * SID.  Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+	if (secattr == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+		break;
+	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
+ * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @ad: the audit data
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
+ * against the receiving socket.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				u16 family,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (!netlbl_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+						     &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
+	else
+		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (sksec->sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+		perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		break;
+	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+		perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		break;
+	default:
+		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option.
+ * Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt().
+ */
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname)
+{
+	return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) ||
+		(level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
+ * options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
+ * access; otherwise allow the access.  Returns zero when the access is
+ * allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+				     int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+	if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
+	    (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
+	     sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		lock_sock(sk);
+		/* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the
+		 * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options
+		 * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */
+		rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
+		release_sock(sk);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (rc == -ENOMSG)
+			rc = 0;
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
+	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
+	 * the socket */
+	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+	if (secattr == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+	release_sock(sk);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a8a725
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Netlink event notifications for SELinux.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct sock *selnl;
+
+static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_setenforce);
+		break;
+
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_policyload);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
+		struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->val = *((int *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
+		struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	int len;
+	sk_buff_data_t tmp;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+
+	len = selnl_msglen(msgtype);
+
+	skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_USER);
+	if (!skb)
+		goto oom;
+
+	tmp = skb->tail;
+	nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len, 0);
+	if (!nlh)
+		goto out_kfree_skb;
+	selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data);
+	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp;
+	NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = SELNLGRP_AVC;
+	netlink_broadcast(selnl, skb, 0, SELNLGRP_AVC, GFP_USER);
+out:
+	return;
+
+out_kfree_skb:
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+oom:
+	pr_err("SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __func__);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE, &val);
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno);
+}
+
+static int __init selnl_init(void)
+{
+	struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
+		.groups	= SELNLGRP_MAX,
+		.flags	= NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
+	};
+
+	selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
+	if (selnl == NULL)
+		panic("SELinux:  Cannot create netlink socket.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(selnl_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afa0d43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netnode_bkt {
+	unsigned int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netnode {
+	struct netnode_security_struct nsec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netnode_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock);
+static struct sel_netnode_bkt sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr)
+{
+	/* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order
+	 * affects the hash function dramatically */
+	return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv6 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr)
+{
+	/* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they
+	 * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this
+	 * later if needed */
+	return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @family: address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr.  If an
+ * entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(__be32 *)addr);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
+		if (node->nsec.family == family)
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(__be32 *)addr)
+					return node;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (ipv6_addr_equal(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6,
+						    addr))
+					return node;
+				break;
+			}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table
+ * @node: the new node record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new node record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	switch (node->nsec.family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_netnode *tail;
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev,
+						  lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)),
+			struct sel_netnode, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else
+		sel_netnode_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address by quering the
+ * security policy.  The result is added to the network address table to
+ * speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+	struct sel_netnode *new = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (node != NULL) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
+		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6,
+					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
+		new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	new->nsec.family = family;
+	new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+	sel_netnode_insert(new);
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n",
+			__func__);
+		kfree(new);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest
+ * method possible.  First the address table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+	if (node != NULL) {
+		*sid = node->nsec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netnode_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netnode *node, *node_tmp;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(node, node_tmp,
+					 &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list) {
+				list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+				kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_netnode_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netnode_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a141ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs.  This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *   (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE       256
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT   16
+
+struct sel_netport_bkt {
+	int size;
+	struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netport {
+	struct netport_security_struct psec;
+
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netport_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netport_lock);
+static struct sel_netport_bkt sel_netport_hash[SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_hashfn - Hashing function for the port table
+ * @pnum: port number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the port table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given port.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
+{
+	return (pnum & (SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @port: pnum
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network port table and return the matching record.  If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netport *sel_netport_find(u8 protocol, u16 pnum)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(pnum);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list)
+		if (port->psec.port == pnum && port->psec.protocol == protocol)
+			return port;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_insert - Insert a new port into the table
+ * @port: the new port record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new port record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+	idx = sel_netport_hashfn(port->psec.port);
+	list_add_rcu(&port->list, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list);
+	if (sel_netport_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+		struct sel_netport *tail;
+		tail = list_entry(
+			rcu_dereference_protected(
+				sel_netport_hash[idx].list.prev,
+				lockdep_is_held(&sel_netport_lock)),
+			struct sel_netport, list);
+		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+	} else
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port by quering the security
+ * policy.  The result is added to the network port table to speedup future
+ * queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+	struct sel_netport *new = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (port != NULL) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (new == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	new->psec.port = pnum;
+	new->psec.protocol = protocol;
+	new->psec.sid = *sid;
+	sel_netport_insert(new);
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n",
+			__func__);
+		kfree(new);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid - Lookup the SID of a network port
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port using the fastest method
+ * possible.  First the port table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct sel_netport *port;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+	if (port != NULL) {
+		*sid = port->psec.sid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sel_netport_sid_slow(protocol, pnum, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_flush - Flush the entire network port table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netport_flush(void)
+{
+	unsigned int idx;
+	struct sel_netport *port, *port_tmp;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(port, port_tmp,
+					 &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list) {
+			list_del_rcu(&port->list);
+			kfree_rcu(port, rcu);
+		}
+		sel_netport_hash[idx].size = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netport_hash[iter].list);
+		sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netport_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cec812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Netlink message type permission tables, for user generated messages.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/inet_diag.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct nlmsg_perm {
+	u16	nlmsg_type;
+	u32	perm;
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
+{
+	{ RTM_NEWLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_SETLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWPREFIX,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETMULTICAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETANYCAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETNEIGHTBL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_SETNEIGHTBL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWADDRLABEL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELADDRLABEL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETADDRLABEL,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETDCB,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_SETDCB,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWNETCONF,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNETCONF,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNETCONF,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWMDB,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELMDB,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE  },
+	{ RTM_GETMDB,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWNSID,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNSID,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETNSID,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWSTATS,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_GETSTATS,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ RTM_NEWCHAIN,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELCHAIN,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETCHAIN,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
+{
+	{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DESTROY,		NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
+{
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWAE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETAE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_REPORT,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_MAPPING,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
+{
+	{ AUDIT_GET,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+	{ AUDIT_SET,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST_RULES,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
+	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+	{ AUDIT_TRIM,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_TTY_GET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+	{ AUDIT_TTY_SET,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT	},
+	{ AUDIT_GET_FEATURE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+	{ AUDIT_SET_FEATURE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+};
+
+
+static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize)
+{
+	int i, err = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tabsize/sizeof(struct nlmsg_perm); i++)
+		if (nlmsg_type == tab[i].nlmsg_type) {
+			*perm = tab[i].perm;
+			err = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
+		/* RTM_MAX always points to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3.
+		 * If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+		 * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+		 * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCHAIN + 3));
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET:
+		/* If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+		 * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+		 * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_MAPPING);
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
+		if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+		     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+		    (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+		     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
+			*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
+		} else {
+			err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
+					 sizeof(nlmsg_audit_perms));
+		}
+		break;
+
+	/* No messaging from userspace, or class unknown/unhandled */
+	default:
+		err = -ENOENT;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3a5a13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2079 @@
+/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ *  Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *	Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
+   Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+enum sel_inos {
+	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
+	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
+	SEL_ENFORCE,	/* get or set enforcing status */
+	SEL_CONTEXT,	/* validate context */
+	SEL_ACCESS,	/* compute access decision */
+	SEL_CREATE,	/* compute create labeling decision */
+	SEL_RELABEL,	/* compute relabeling decision */
+	SEL_USER,	/* compute reachable user contexts */
+	SEL_POLICYVERS,	/* return policy version for this kernel */
+	SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
+	SEL_MLS,	/* return if MLS policy is enabled */
+	SEL_DISABLE,	/* disable SELinux until next reboot */
+	SEL_MEMBER,	/* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
+	SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+	SEL_COMPAT_NET,	/* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
+	SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
+	SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+	SEL_STATUS,	/* export current status using mmap() */
+	SEL_POLICY,	/* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
+	SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */
+	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
+};
+
+struct selinux_fs_info {
+	struct dentry *bool_dir;
+	unsigned int bool_num;
+	char **bool_pending_names;
+	unsigned int *bool_pending_values;
+	struct dentry *class_dir;
+	unsigned long last_class_ino;
+	bool policy_opened;
+	struct dentry *policycap_dir;
+	struct mutex mutex;
+	unsigned long last_ino;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+
+	fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(*fsi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fsi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&fsi->mutex);
+	fsi->last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+	fsi->state = &selinux_state;
+	fsi->sb = sb;
+	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i;
+
+	if (fsi) {
+		for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+			kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	}
+	kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
+	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+}
+
+#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET		0x01000000
+#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET		0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET		0x04000000
+#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET	0x08000000
+#define SEL_INO_MASK			0x00ffffff
+
+#define TMPBUFLEN	12
+static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   enforcing_enabled(fsi->state));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int old_value, new_value;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	new_value = !!new_value;
+
+	old_value = enforcing_enabled(state);
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
+		length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
+				      NULL);
+		if (length)
+			goto out;
+		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
+			new_value, old_value,
+			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			audit_get_sessionid(current),
+			selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
+		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
+		if (new_value)
+			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value);
+		if (!new_value)
+			call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+	}
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_enforce NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_enforce,
+	.write		= sel_write_enforce,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
+	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
+		security_get_reject_unknown(state) :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_handle_unknown,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(fsi->state);
+
+	if (!status)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	filp->private_data = status;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+				       page_address(status),
+				       sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+				  struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct page    *status = filp->private_data;
+	unsigned long	size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+	BUG_ON(!status);
+
+	/* only allows one page from the head */
+	if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+	/* disallow writable mapping */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+		return -EPERM;
+	/* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+	vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+	return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+			       page_to_pfn(status),
+			       size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_handle_status,
+	.read		= sel_read_handle_status,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_handle_status,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+	int enforcing;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value) {
+		enforcing = enforcing_enabled(fsi->state);
+		length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
+		if (length)
+			goto out;
+		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
+			enforcing, enforcing,
+			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+			audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
+	}
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_disable NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_disable,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policyvers,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+			unsigned long *ino);
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   security_mls_enabled(fsi->state));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_mls,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+struct policy_load_memory {
+	size_t len;
+	void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
+
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -EBUSY;
+	if (fsi->policy_opened)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!plm)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(state)) {
+		inode_lock(inode);
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(state));
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+	}
+
+	rc = security_read_policy(state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	fsi->policy_opened = 1;
+
+	filp->private_data = plm;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	if (plm)
+		vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+	BUG_ON(!plm);
+
+	fsi->policy_opened = 0;
+
+	vfree(plm->data);
+	kfree(plm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct policy_load_memory *plm = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
+	unsigned long offset;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+	get_page(page);
+
+	vmf->page = page;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+	.fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+	.page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+		/* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+		vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
+	vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_policy,
+	.read		= sel_read_policy,
+	.mmap		= sel_mmap_policy,
+	.release	= sel_release_policy,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sel_make_bools(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	ssize_t length;
+	void *data = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EFBIG;
+	if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	data = vmalloc(count);
+	if (!data)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count);
+	if (length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (length)
+		goto out1;
+
+	length = count;
+
+out1:
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+		"auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
+		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+		audit_get_sessionid(current));
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+	vfree(data);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_load,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *canon = NULL;
+	u32 sid, len;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(state, buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, sid, &canon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, canon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(canon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", fsi->state->checkreqprot);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	unsigned int new_value;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_checkreqprot,
+	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
+					const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
+	char *req = NULL;
+	u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	req = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(req);
+		req = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oldcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	newcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	taskcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!taskcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(state, osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = count;
+out:
+	kfree(req);
+	kfree(oldcon);
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(taskcon);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_transition_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_validatetrans,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
+ */
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+
+static ssize_t (*const write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+	[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
+	[SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
+	[SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
+	[SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
+	[SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
+	[SEL_CONTEXT] = sel_write_context,
+};
+
+static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t rv;
+
+	if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+	if (rv > 0) {
+		simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
+		rv = size;
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
+	.write		= selinux_transaction_write,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * payload - write methods
+ * If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
+ * and the length returned.  Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
+ */
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	security_compute_av_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+
+	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
+			  avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
+			  avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
+			  avd.seqno, avd.flags);
+out:
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	int nargs;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!namebuf)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+	if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
+		goto out;
+	if (nargs == 4) {
+		/*
+		 * If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
+		 * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
+		 * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
+		 * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
+		 * of the supplied name; splitted by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+		 */
+		char   *r, *w;
+		int     c1, c2;
+
+		r = w = namebuf;
+		do {
+			c1 = *r++;
+			if (c1 == '+')
+				c1 = ' ';
+			else if (c1 == '%') {
+				c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+				if (c1 < 0)
+					goto out;
+				c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+				if (c2 < 0)
+					goto out;
+				c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
+			}
+			*w++ = c1;
+		} while (c1 != '\0');
+
+		objname = namebuf;
+	}
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+					      objname, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(namebuf);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_change_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
+		goto out;
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
+	u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon;
+	int i, rc;
+	u32 len, nsids;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!con)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!user)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_get_user_sids(state, sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
+	ptr = buf + length;
+	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(state, sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+		if (rc) {
+			length = rc;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+			kfree(newcon);
+			length = -ERANGE;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
+		kfree(newcon);
+		ptr += len;
+		length += len;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree(sids);
+	kfree(user);
+	kfree(con);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_member_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -ERANGE;
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  context size (%u) exceeds "
+			"payload max\n", __func__, len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out:
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(tcon);
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
+{
+	struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		ret->i_mode = mode;
+		ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = current_time(ret);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int cur_enforcing;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index);
+	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
+		ret = cur_enforcing;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
+			  fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+out_free:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return ret;
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+	goto out_free;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value)
+		new_value = 1;
+
+	fsi->bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+	length = count;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_bool,
+	.write		= sel_write_bool,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
+				      const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
+
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = 0;
+	if (new_value && fsi->bool_pending_values)
+		length = security_set_bools(fsi->state, fsi->bool_num,
+					    fsi->bool_pending_values);
+
+	if (!length)
+		length = count;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
+	kfree(page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_commit_bools_write,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
+{
+	d_genocide(de);
+	shrink_dcache_parent(de);
+}
+
+#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
+
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dir = fsi->bool_dir;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	char **names = NULL, *page;
+	int num;
+	int *values = NULL;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/* remove any existing files */
+	for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	fsi->bool_num = 0;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = NULL;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = NULL;
+
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = security_get_bools(fsi->state, &num, &names, &values);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, names[i]);
+		if (!dentry)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+		if (!inode) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
+		if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			iput(inode);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+		ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
+					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
+					   page);
+			sid = SECINITSID_SECURITY;
+		}
+
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+	fsi->bool_num = num;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = names;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = values;
+
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return 0;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+	if (names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+			kfree(names[i]);
+		kfree(names);
+	}
+	kfree(values);
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+			   avc_get_cache_threshold(state->avc));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
+					     const char __user *buf,
+					     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	unsigned int new_value;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			   SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
+			   NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	avc_set_cache_threshold(state->avc, new_value);
+
+	ret = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = avc_get_hash_stats(state->avc, page);
+	if (length >= 0)
+		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.write		= sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
+		if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
+			continue;
+		*idx = cpu + 1;
+		return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	loff_t n = *pos - 1;
+
+	if (*pos == 0)
+		return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
+}
+
+static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
+
+	if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+		seq_puts(seq,
+			 "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees\n");
+	} else {
+		unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
+		unsigned int misses = st->misses;
+		unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
+		seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
+			   hits, misses, st->allocations,
+			   st->reclaims, st->frees);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{ }
+
+static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
+	.start		= sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
+	.next		= sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
+	.show		= sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
+	.stop		= sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= seq_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i;
+	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
+		{ "cache_threshold",
+		  &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
+		{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+		{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#endif
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+		if (!dentry)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+		if (!inode) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	char *con;
+	u32 sid, len;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsi->state, sid, &con, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
+	kfree(con);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_initcon,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, security_get_initial_sid_context(i));
+		if (!dentry)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+		if (!inode) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_class,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_perm,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	int value;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+
+	value = security_policycap_supported(fsi->state, i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policycap,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
+				struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = dir->d_sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i, rc, nperms;
+	char **perms;
+
+	rc = security_get_permissions(fsi->state, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
+		if (!dentry)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+		if (!inode) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+		/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+		inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+		kfree(perms[i]);
+	kfree(perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
+					struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+	if (!inode) {
+		dput(dentry);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+	inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &fsi->last_class_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+	rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+
+	int rc, nclasses, i;
+	char **classes;
+
+	/* delete any existing entries */
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->class_dir);
+
+	rc = security_get_classes(fsi->state, &classes, &nclasses);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+	fsi->last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(fsi->class_dir, classes[i],
+					      &fsi->last_class_ino);
+		if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+		rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
+				class_name_dir);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+		kfree(classes[i]);
+	kfree(classes);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	unsigned int iter;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->policycap_dir);
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
+		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir,
+					      selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
+		else
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, "unknown");
+
+		if (dentry == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
+		if (inode == NULL) {
+			dput(dentry);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+			unsigned long *ino)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, name);
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+	if (!inode) {
+		dput(dentry);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+	inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+	inc_nlink(inode);
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	/* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+	inc_nlink(d_inode(dir));
+
+	return dentry;
+}
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+	int ret;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+		[SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
+					S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */ {""}
+	};
+
+	ret = selinux_fs_info_create(sb);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->bool_dir);
+		fsi->bool_dir = NULL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
+	if (!dentry)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+	if (!inode) {
+		dput(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+	isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	fsi->class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->class_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->class_dir);
+		fsi->class_dir = NULL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	fsi->policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities",
+					  &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir);
+		fsi->policycap_dir = NULL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	pr_err("SELinux: %s:  failed while creating inodes\n",
+		__func__);
+
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+		      int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
+{
+	return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
+}
+
+static void sel_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+	kill_litter_super(sb);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "selinuxfs",
+	.mount		= sel_mount,
+	.kill_sb	= sel_kill_sb,
+};
+
+struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+struct path selinux_null;
+
+static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
+{
+	struct qstr null_name = QSTR_INIT(NULL_FILE_NAME,
+					  sizeof(NULL_FILE_NAME)-1);
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+	if (err) {
+		sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not mount!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
+		selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
+	}
+	selinux_null.dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(selinux_null.mnt->mnt_root,
+						&null_name);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.dentry)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not lookup null!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.dentry);
+		selinux_null.dentry = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_sel_fs);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+void exit_sel_fs(void)
+{
+	sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+	dput(selinux_null.dentry);
+	kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
+	unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0417cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ *	Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
+
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
+{
+	static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+	static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+	static const u32 r1 = 15;
+	static const u32 r2 = 13;
+	static const u32 m  = 5;
+	static const u32 n  = 0xe6546b64;
+
+	u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) { \
+	u32 v = input; \
+	v *= c1; \
+	v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+	v *= c2; \
+	hash ^= v; \
+	hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+	hash = hash * m + n; \
+}
+
+	mix(keyp->target_class);
+	mix(keyp->target_type);
+	mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+	hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+	hash ^= hash >> 13;
+	hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+	hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+	return hash & mask;
+}
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+		  struct avtab_node *prev, struct avtab_node *cur,
+		  struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *newnode;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+	newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	newnode->key = *key;
+
+	if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (xperms == NULL) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		*xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+		newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+	} else {
+		newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+	}
+
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(h->htable, hvalue, newnode,
+				       GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO)) {
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+			/* extended perms may not be unique */
+			if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+				break;
+			return -EEXIST;
+		}
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+	if (!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *
+avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
+	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return NULL;
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+	     cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+			return &cur->datum;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+	for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+	     cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	specified &= ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+	for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+		cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
+		while (cur) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+				kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+						temp->datum.u.xperms);
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+	}
+	flex_array_free(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+	h->nslot = 0;
+	h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	h->htable = NULL;
+	h->nel = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+	u32 mask = 0;
+	u32 shift = 0;
+	u32 work = nrules;
+	u32 nslot = 0;
+
+	if (nrules == 0)
+		goto avtab_alloc_out;
+
+	while (work) {
+		work  = work >> 1;
+		shift++;
+	}
+	if (shift > 2)
+		shift = shift - 2;
+	nslot = 1 << shift;
+	if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
+	mask = nslot - 1;
+
+	h->htable = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct avtab_node *), nslot,
+				     GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!h->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+ avtab_alloc_out:
+	h->nel = 0;
+	h->nslot = nslot;
+	h->mask = mask;
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
+	       h->nslot, nrules);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	chain2_len_sum = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+		cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+			chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+	       "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+	       tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+	       chain2_len_sum);
+}
+
+static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
+	AVTAB_ALLOWED,
+	AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
+	AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
+	AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	AVTAB_CHANGE,
+	AVTAB_MEMBER,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+	AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
+};
+
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+		    int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
+				   struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+		    void *p)
+{
+	__le16 buf16[4];
+	u16 enabled;
+	u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
+	int i, rc;
+	unsigned set;
+
+	memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+	memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+	if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
+		if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		items = 0;
+
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.source_type = (u16)val;
+		if (key.source_type != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.target_type = (u16)val;
+		if (key.target_type != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		key.target_class = (u16)val;
+		if (key.target_class != val) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+		enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
+
+		if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
+		    (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+			if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+				key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
+				datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+				rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (items != items2) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+			       items2, items);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	items = 0;
+	key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+	key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+	    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	set = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+		if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
+			set++;
+	}
+	if (!set || set > 1) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+			(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
+				"support extended permissions rules and one "
+				"was specified\n", vers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+			xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+		datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+	} else {
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+			return rc;
+		}
+		datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+	}
+	if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+}
+
+static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
+			 struct avtab_datum *d, void *p)
+{
+	return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 nel, i;
+
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!nel) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+				pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
+			else if (rc == -EEXIST)
+				pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad:
+	avtab_destroy(a);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+{
+	__le16 buf16[4];
+	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+	buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+	buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+	buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+	rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+			buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+				ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+	} else {
+		buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+		for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(a->htable, i); cur;
+		     cur = cur->next) {
+			rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+					      0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d652fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class.  An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * 	Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
+struct avtab_key {
+	u16 source_type;	/* source type */
+	u16 target_type;	/* target type */
+	u16 target_class;	/* target object class */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED		0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW	0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY		0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV		(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION	0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER		0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE		0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE		(AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED	0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW	0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT	0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS		(AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+				AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+				AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
+};
+
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION	0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER	0x02
+	/* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+	u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+	/*
+	 * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+	 * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+	 * specifies which permissions are included.
+	 */
+	u8 driver;
+	/* 256 bits of permissions */
+	struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+	union {
+		u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+		struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+	} u;
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+	struct flex_array *htable;
+	u32 nel;	/* number of elements */
+	u32 nslot;      /* number of hash slots */
+	u32 mask;       /* mask to compute hash func */
+
+};
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+
+struct policydb;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+		    int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
+				  struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+		    void *p);
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
+					  struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+#endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f49e522
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *	    Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+
+	struct cond_expr *cur;
+	int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (cur = expr; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		switch (cur->expr_type) {
+		case COND_BOOL:
+			if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return -1;
+			sp++;
+			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[cur->bool - 1]->state;
+			break;
+		case COND_NOT:
+			if (sp < 0)
+				return -1;
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case COND_OR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_AND:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_XOR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_EQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		case COND_NEQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	int new_state;
+	struct cond_av_list *cur;
+
+	new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
+	if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+		node->cur_state = new_state;
+		if (new_state == -1)
+			pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+		/* turn the rules on or off */
+		for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+			if (new_state <= 0)
+				cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			else
+				cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+		}
+
+		for (cur = node->false_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+			/* -1 or 1 */
+			if (new_state)
+				cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			else
+				cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+
+	rc = avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
+{
+	struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
+	for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		/* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
+		kfree(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr; cur_expr = next_expr) {
+		next_expr = cur_expr->next;
+		kfree(cur_expr);
+	}
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->true_list);
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->false_list);
+	kfree(node);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
+{
+	struct cond_node *next, *cur;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		cond_node_destroy(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
+					      sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
+					      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	booldatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS];
+	if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, booldatum->value - 1, key,
+			       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+		BUG();
+	p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+	if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!booldatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+		goto err;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto err;
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	key[len] = '\0';
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct cond_insertf_data {
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cond_av_list *other;
+	struct cond_av_list *head;
+	struct cond_av_list *tail;
+};
+
+static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = data->p;
+	struct cond_av_list *other = data->other, *list, *cur;
+	struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+	u8 found;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+	 * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+	 * cond_te_avtab.
+	 */
+	if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+		if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+			goto err;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+		 * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+		 * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+		 *
+		 * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+		 * be any other entries.
+		 */
+		if (other) {
+			node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
+			if (node_ptr) {
+				if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+					goto err;
+				}
+				found = 0;
+				for (cur = other; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+					if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
+						found = 1;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				if (!found) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+				pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
+	if (!node_ptr) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	list = kzalloc(sizeof(*list), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!list) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	list->node = node_ptr;
+	if (!data->head)
+		data->head = list;
+	else
+		data->tail->next = list;
+	data->tail = list;
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	cond_av_list_destroy(data->head);
+	data->head = NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list, struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 len;
+	struct cond_insertf_data data;
+
+	*ret_list = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	data.p = p;
+	data.other = other;
+	data.head = NULL;
+	data.tail = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
+				     &data);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	*ret_list = data.head;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+	if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 len, i;
+	int rc;
+	struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	/* expr */
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		expr = kzalloc(sizeof(*expr), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!expr)
+			goto err;
+
+		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+		if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			kfree(expr);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (i == 0)
+			node->expr = expr;
+		else
+			last->next = expr;
+		last = expr;
+	}
+
+	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_node_destroy(node);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_node *node, *last = NULL;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	u32 i, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!node)
+			goto err;
+
+		rc = cond_read_node(p, node, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (i == 0)
+			p->cond_list = node;
+		else
+			last->next = node;
+		last = node;
+	}
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
+			      struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	struct cond_av_list *cur_list;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next)
+		len++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next) {
+		rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur_list->node, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+		    struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_expr *cur_expr;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	int rc;
+	u32 len = 0;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next)
+		len++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->expr_type);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->bool);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->true_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->false_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+	u32 len;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next)
+		len++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = cond_write_node(p, cur, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+		return;
+
+	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+			node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+			services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+	}
+	return;
+
+}
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+		return;
+
+	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+				node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+			 * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+			 */
+			avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+		if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+				(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+			services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ddb43e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "../include/conditional.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr {
+#define COND_BOOL	1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT	2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR		3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND	4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR	5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ		6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ	7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST	COND_NEQ
+	__u32 expr_type;
+	__u32 bool;
+	struct cond_expr *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct cond_av_list *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+	int cur_state;
+	struct cond_expr *expr;
+	struct cond_av_list *true_list;
+	struct cond_av_list *false_list;
+	struct cond_node *next;
+};
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e563be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'.  Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT		1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND		2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR		3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR		4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES		5 /* attr op names */
+	u32 expr_type;		/* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1		/* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2		/* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4		/* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8		/* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16	/* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32		/* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64		/* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128		/* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256		/* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512		/* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024		/* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+	u32 attr;		/* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ     1		/* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ    2		/* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM    3		/* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4		/* domby  */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5		/* incomp */
+	u32 op;			/* operator */
+
+	struct ebitmap names;	/* names */
+	struct type_set *type_names;
+
+	struct constraint_expr *next;   /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+	u32 permissions;	/* constrained permissions */
+	struct constraint_expr *expr;	/* constraint on permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *next;	/* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2260c44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy.  Security contexts are
+  * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure.  This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+	u32 user;
+	u32 role;
+	u32 type;
+	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
+	struct mls_range range;
+	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+	mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->user = src->user;
+	dst->role = src->role;
+	dst->type = src->type;
+	if (src->str) {
+		dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!dst->str)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		dst->len = src->len;
+	} else {
+		dst->str = NULL;
+		dst->len = 0;
+	}
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(dst->str);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	kfree(c->str);
+	c->str = NULL;
+	c->len = 0;
+	mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	if (c1->len && c2->len)
+		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
+	if (c1->len || c2->len)
+		return 0;
+	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
+		(c1->type == c2->type) &&
+		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f624f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *      Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define BITS_PER_U64	(sizeof(u64) * 8)
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep;
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 &&
+	       (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+	       !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n1 || n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *new, *prev;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+	n = src->node;
+	prev = NULL;
+	while (n) {
+		new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!new) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		new->startbit = n->startbit;
+		memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
+		new->next = NULL;
+		if (prev)
+			prev->next = new;
+		else
+			dst->node = new;
+		prev = new;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Export a SELinux extensibile bitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
+	unsigned long e_map;
+	u32 offset;
+	unsigned int iter;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (e_iter == NULL) {
+		*catmap = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (*catmap != NULL)
+		netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+	*catmap = NULL;
+
+	while (e_iter) {
+		offset = e_iter->startbit;
+		for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
+			e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
+			if (e_map != 0) {
+				rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
+							   offset,
+							   e_map,
+							   GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (rc != 0)
+					goto netlbl_export_failure;
+			}
+			offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+		}
+		e_iter = e_iter->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+netlbl_export_failure:
+	netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to import
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Import a NetLabel category bitmap into a SELinux extensibile bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
+	struct ebitmap_node *e_prev = NULL;
+	u32 offset = 0, idx;
+	unsigned long bitmap;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		rc = netlbl_catmap_getlong(catmap, &offset, &bitmap);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto netlbl_import_failure;
+		if (offset == (u32)-1)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* don't waste ebitmap space if the netlabel bitmap is empty */
+		if (bitmap == 0) {
+			offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (e_iter == NULL ||
+		    offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+			e_prev = e_iter;
+			e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (e_iter == NULL)
+				goto netlbl_import_failure;
+			e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+			if (e_prev == NULL)
+				ebmap->node = e_iter;
+			else
+				e_prev->next = e_iter;
+			ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+		}
+
+		/* offset will always be aligned to an unsigned long */
+		idx = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(e_iter, offset);
+		e_iter->maps[idx] = bitmap;
+
+		/* next */
+		offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	/* NOTE: we should never reach this return */
+	return 0;
+
+netlbl_import_failure:
+	ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+	int i;
+
+	if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+		if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+			n1 = n1->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+		for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
+			i--;	/* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+		if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+			u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+					 __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+			if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+				return 0;
+		}
+
+		while (i >= 0) {
+			if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
+				return 0;
+			i--;
+		}
+
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+	if (e->highbit < bit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+		if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit)
+			return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+	prev = NULL;
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+		if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit) {
+			if (value) {
+				ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
+			} else {
+				unsigned int s;
+
+				ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+				s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+				if (s < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+					return 0;
+
+				/* drop this node from the bitmap */
+				if (!n->next) {
+					/*
+					 * this was the highest map
+					 * within the bitmap
+					 */
+					if (prev)
+						e->highbit = prev->startbit
+							     + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+					else
+						e->highbit = 0;
+				}
+				if (prev)
+					prev->next = n->next;
+				else
+					e->node = n->next;
+				kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, n);
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+		prev = n;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	if (!value)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+	ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
+
+	if (!n)
+		/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+		e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+
+	if (prev) {
+		new->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = new;
+	} else {
+		new->next = e->node;
+		e->node = new;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+	if (!e)
+		return;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n) {
+		temp = n;
+		n = n->next;
+		kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, temp);
+	}
+
+	e->highbit = 0;
+	e->node = NULL;
+	return;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+	u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
+	u64 map;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc, i;
+
+	ebitmap_init(e);
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+		       "match my size %zd (high bit was %d)\n",
+		       mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* round up e->highbit */
+	e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+	e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
+	if (!e->highbit) {
+		e->node = NULL;
+		goto ok;
+	}
+
+	if (e->highbit && !count)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit);
+
+		if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
+			       startbit, mapunit);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
+			       startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+			struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!tmp) {
+				pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			/* round down */
+			tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+			if (n)
+				n->next = tmp;
+			else
+				e->node = tmp;
+			n = tmp;
+		} else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+			       " comes after start bit %d\n",
+			       startbit, n->startbit);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+
+		index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+		while (map) {
+			n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+			map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
+		}
+	}
+ok:
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	ebitmap_destroy(e);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	u32 count;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u64 map;
+	int bit, last_bit, last_startbit, rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+	count = 0;
+	last_bit = 0;
+	last_startbit = -1;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			count++;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+	}
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	map = 0;
+	last_startbit = INT_MIN;
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+			__le64 buf64[1];
+
+			/* this is the very first bit */
+			if (!map) {
+				last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+				map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* write the last node */
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+			rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			/* set up for the next node */
+			map = 0;
+			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+		}
+		map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+	}
+	/* write the last node */
+	if (map) {
+		__le64 buf64[1];
+
+		/* write the last node */
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+		rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+{
+	ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
+							sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
+							0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6aa7cf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits.  Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	64
+#else
+#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS	((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
+					/ sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE	BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE		(EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT		1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x)					\
+	(((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+	struct ebitmap_node *next;
+	unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+	u32 startbit;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;	/* first node in the bitmap */
+	u32 highbit;	/* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+						  struct ebitmap_node **n)
+{
+	unsigned int ofs;
+
+	for (*n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+		ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+		if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+			return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+	}
+	return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+						 struct ebitmap_node **n,
+						 unsigned int bit)
+{
+	unsigned int ofs;
+
+	ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit + 1);
+	if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+		return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+
+	for (*n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+		ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+		if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+			return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+	}
+	return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit)	\
+	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit)	\
+	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+				       unsigned int bit)
+{
+	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+					unsigned int bit)
+{
+	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+					unsigned int bit)
+{
+	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)	\
+	for (bit = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &n);	\
+	     bit < ebitmap_length(e);			\
+	     bit = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &n, bit))	\
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap);
+#else
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif	/* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebfdaa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep;
+
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
+			       int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
+			       u32 size)
+{
+	struct hashtab *p;
+	u32 i;
+
+	p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p)
+		return p;
+
+	p->size = size;
+	p->nel = 0;
+	p->hash_value = hash_value;
+	p->keycmp = keycmp;
+	p->htable = kmalloc_array(size, sizeof(*p->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->htable) {
+		kfree(p);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		p->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	cond_resched();
+
+	if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) == 0))
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	newnode->key = key;
+	newnode->datum = datum;
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (!cur || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cur->datum;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+
+	kfree(h);
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int ret;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	info->slots_used = slots_used;
+	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+		hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
+			sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
+			0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e3e42b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values.  The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary.  The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES	0xffffffff
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+	void *key;
+	void *datum;
+	struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+	struct hashtab_node **htable;	/* hash table */
+	u32 size;			/* number of slots in hash table */
+	u32 nel;			/* number of elements in hash table */
+	u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key);
+					/* hash function */
+	int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2);
+					/* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+	u32 slots_used;
+	u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
+ * the new hash table otherwise.
+ */
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
+			       int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
+			       u32 size);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+  0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *k, void *d);
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *k);
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args);
+
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39475fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
+{
+	int i, l, len, head, prev;
+	char *nm;
+	struct ebitmap *e;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+
+		/* categories */
+		head = -2;
+		prev = -2;
+		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+			if (i - prev > 1) {
+				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+				if (head != prev) {
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+				}
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+				len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+				head = i;
+			}
+			prev = i;
+		}
+		if (prev != head) {
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+		}
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+					 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				len++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+			struct context *context,
+			char **scontext)
+{
+	char *scontextp, *nm;
+	int i, l, head, prev;
+	struct ebitmap *e;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	scontextp = *scontext;
+
+	*scontextp = ':';
+	scontextp++;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
+					   context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+		scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
+
+		/* categories */
+		head = -2;
+		prev = -2;
+		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+			if (i - prev > 1) {
+				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+				if (prev != head) {
+					if (prev - head > 1)
+						*scontextp++ = '.';
+					else
+						*scontextp++ = ',';
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+					scontextp += strlen(nm);
+				}
+				if (prev < 0)
+					*scontextp++ = ':';
+				else
+					*scontextp++ = ',';
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+				strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+				scontextp += strlen(nm);
+				head = i;
+			}
+			prev = i;
+		}
+
+		if (prev != head) {
+			if (prev - head > 1)
+				*scontextp++ = '.';
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = ',';
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+			scontextp += strlen(nm);
+		}
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+					 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = '-';
+		}
+	}
+
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+	return;
+}
+
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
+				  sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
+	if (!levdatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+	 * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+	 * p->p_cats.nprim.
+	 */
+	return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+				p->p_cats.nprim);
+}
+
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
+{
+	return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
+		mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
+		mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+	 */
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+	if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+		return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `*scontext'.  Update `*scontext' to
+ * point to the end of the string representation of
+ * the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
+ * copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
+ * Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
+ * MLS fields.
+ *
+ * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
+		       char oldc,
+		       char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context,
+		       struct sidtab *s,
+		       u32 def_sid)
+{
+
+	char delim;
+	char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+	int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
+		if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
+			*scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
+	 * default if provided.
+	 */
+	if (!oldc) {
+		struct context *defcon;
+
+		if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			goto out;
+
+		defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
+		if (!defcon)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract low sensitivity. */
+	scontextp = p = *scontext;
+	while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
+		p++;
+
+	delim = *p;
+	if (delim != '\0')
+		*p++ = '\0';
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp);
+		if (!levdatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		if (delim == ':') {
+			/* Extract category set. */
+			while (1) {
+				scontextp = p;
+				while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
+					p++;
+				delim = *p;
+				if (delim != '\0')
+					*p++ = '\0';
+
+				/* Separate into range if exists */
+				rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.');
+				if (rngptr != NULL) {
+					/* Remove '.' */
+					*rngptr++ = '\0';
+				}
+
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table,
+							  scontextp);
+				if (!catdatum) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+						     catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				/* If range, set all categories in range */
+				if (rngptr) {
+					int i;
+
+					rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
+					if (!rngdatum) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+						rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+						if (rc)
+							goto out;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (delim != ',')
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (delim == '-') {
+			/* Extract high sensitivity. */
+			scontextp = p;
+			while (*p && *p != ':')
+				p++;
+
+			delim = *p;
+			if (delim != '\0')
+				*p++ = '\0';
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (l == 0) {
+		context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+				 &context->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	*scontext = ++p;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
+	   the value of tmpstr */
+	tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+	if (!tmpstr) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(freestr);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+				struct mls_range *range)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range into the  context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &range->level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+			 struct context *usercon)
+{
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+		/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
+			*usercon_sen = *user_def;
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
+			*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
+			*usercon_sen = *user_low;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+		   if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+		   that of the user's default clearance (but
+		   only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+		   the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+		if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
+			*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+		else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
+			*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *c)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	struct ebitmap bitmap;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+	int l, i;
+
+	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
+					  sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
+						   c->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
+			int rc;
+
+			catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+						  sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
+			if (!catdatum)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+		ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
+		c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock)
+{
+	struct range_trans rtr;
+	struct mls_range *r;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	int default_range = 0;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+		/* Look for a range transition rule. */
+		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
+		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
+		rtr.target_class = tclass;
+		r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr);
+		if (r)
+			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
+
+		if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+			if (cladatum)
+				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
+		}
+
+		switch (default_range) {
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+		}
+
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true))
+			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+		else
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+		return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+
+	/* fall through */
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
+	context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
+ * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   &secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+	if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
+		secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
+ * NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
+ * both the low and high categories of the context.  Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+				   secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+	memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+	       sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
+
+	return 0;
+
+import_netlbl_cat_failure:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a3ff7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *	Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		       char oldc,
+		       char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context,
+		       struct sidtab *s,
+		       u32 def_sid);
+
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *context);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+			 struct context *usercon);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
+			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
+					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..068e0d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+	u32 sens;		/* sensitivity */
+	struct ebitmap cat;	/* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+	struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4eadd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3536 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
+ *
+ *	Added Infiniband support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+#define _DEBUG_HASHES
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+	"common prefixes",
+	"classes",
+	"roles",
+	"types",
+	"users",
+	"bools",
+	"levels",
+	"categories",
+};
+#endif
+
+static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
+	2,
+	32,
+	16,
+	512,
+	128,
+	16,
+	16,
+	16,
+};
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+	int version;
+	int sym_num;
+	int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 3,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 3,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 3,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
+		if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) {
+			info = &policydb_compat[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return info;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	int rc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!role)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+	if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(role);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft = k;
+	unsigned long hash;
+	unsigned int byte_num;
+	unsigned char focus;
+
+	hash = ft->stype ^ ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+	byte_num = 0;
+	while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
+		hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
+	return hash & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft1 = k1;
+	const struct filename_trans *ft2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = ft1->stype - ft2->stype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+
+}
+
+static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key = k;
+	return (key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
+		(key->target_class << 5)) & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
+
+	return v;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+
+	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = roles_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
+	if (!p->filename_trans) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
+	if (!p->range_tr) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.  The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations.  The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	comdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS];
+	if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, comdatum->value - 1, key,
+			       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+		BUG();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	cladatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES];
+	if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, cladatum->value - 1, key,
+			       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+		BUG();
+	p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	role = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!role->value
+	    || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
+	    || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES];
+	if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, role->value - 1, key,
+			       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+		BUG();
+	p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	typdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (typdatum->primary) {
+		if (!typdatum->value
+		    || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
+		    || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES];
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, key,
+				       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+			BUG();
+
+		fa = p->type_val_to_struct_array;
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, typdatum,
+				       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+			BUG();
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	usrdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!usrdatum->value
+	    || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
+	    || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS];
+	if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, usrdatum->value - 1, key,
+			       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+		BUG();
+	p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	levdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!levdatum->isalias) {
+		if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
+		    levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS];
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, levdatum->level->sens - 1, key,
+				       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+			BUG();
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	struct flex_array *fa;
+
+	catdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!catdatum->isalias) {
+		if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS];
+		if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, catdatum->value - 1, key,
+				       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+			BUG();
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+	common_index,
+	class_index,
+	role_index,
+	type_index,
+	user_index,
+	cond_index_bool,
+	sens_index,
+	cat_index,
+};
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
+{
+	struct hashtab_info info;
+
+	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+	       "longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
+	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hash_eval(s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+			 p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+			 p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+	else
+		pr_debug("SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
+			 p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+			 p->p_bools.nprim);
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
+		 p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+#endif
+
+	p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
+					 sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
+					sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
+					sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Yes, I want the sizeof the pointer, not the structure */
+	p->type_val_to_struct_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct type_datum *),
+						       p->p_types.nprim,
+						       GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!p->type_val_to_struct_array)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
+				 p->p_types.nprim, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		p->sym_val_to_name[i] = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(char *),
+							 p->symtab[i].nprim,
+							 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
+					 0, p->symtab[i].nprim,
+					 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		comdatum = datum;
+		hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+	if (expr) {
+		ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+		if (expr->type_names) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+			ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+			kfree(expr->type_names);
+		}
+		kfree(expr);
+	}
+}
+
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		cladatum = datum;
+		hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
+		constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+		while (constraint) {
+			e = constraint->expr;
+			while (e) {
+				etmp = e;
+				e = e->next;
+				constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+			}
+			ctemp = constraint;
+			constraint = constraint->next;
+			kfree(ctemp);
+		}
+
+		constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+		while (constraint) {
+			e = constraint->expr;
+			while (e) {
+				etmp = e;
+				e = e->next;
+				constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+			}
+			ctemp = constraint;
+			constraint = constraint->next;
+			kfree(ctemp);
+		}
+		kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		role = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		usrdatum = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+		ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	if (datum) {
+		levdatum = datum;
+		ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+		kfree(levdatum->level);
+	}
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+	common_destroy,
+	cls_destroy,
+	role_destroy,
+	type_destroy,
+	user_destroy,
+	cond_destroy_bool,
+	sens_destroy,
+	cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	kfree(ft->name);
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+	kfree(key);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+{
+	if (!c)
+		return;
+
+	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+	context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+	    i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+		kfree(c->u.name);
+	kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+	struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+	int i;
+	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
+	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
+		hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+			flex_array_free(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+	}
+
+	kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+	kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+	kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+	if (p->type_val_to_struct_array)
+		flex_array_free(p->type_val_to_struct_array);
+
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
+		c = p->ocontexts[i];
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
+		}
+		p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	g = p->genfs;
+	while (g) {
+		cond_resched();
+		kfree(g->fstype);
+		c = g->head;
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
+		}
+		gtmp = g;
+		g = g->next;
+		kfree(gtmp);
+	}
+	p->genfs = NULL;
+
+	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+	for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+		cond_resched();
+		kfree(ltr);
+		ltr = tr;
+	}
+	kfree(ltr);
+
+	for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		cond_resched();
+		kfree(lra);
+		lra = ra;
+	}
+	kfree(lra);
+
+	hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+
+	hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
+
+	if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+			struct ebitmap *e;
+
+			e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+			if (!e)
+				continue;
+			ebitmap_destroy(e);
+		}
+		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
+	}
+
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	struct ocontext *head, *c;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = sidtab_init(s);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of memory on SID table init\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+	for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!c->context[0].user) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  SID %s was never defined.\n",
+				c->u.name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+				c->u.name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
+{
+	if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role)
+{
+	if (!role || role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type)
+{
+	if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+		/*
+		 * Role must be authorized for the type.
+		 */
+		role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+		if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+			/* role may not be associated with type */
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * User must be authorized for the role.
+		 */
+		usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+		if (!usrdatum)
+			return 0;
+
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
+			/* user may not be associated with role */
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 items;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  range overflow\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  truncated range\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > 1)
+		r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	else
+		r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading low categories\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (items > 1) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading high categories\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: mls:  out of memory\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+bad_high:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
+				     struct policydb *p,
+				     void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid security context\n");
+		context_destroy(c);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *str;
+
+	if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (!str)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* it's expected the caller should free the str */
+	*strp = str;
+
+	rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	str[len] = '\0';
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 len;
+
+	perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 len, nel;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!comdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, comdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
+{
+	ebitmap_init(&t->types);
+	ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
+}
+
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
+				struct constraint_node **nodep,
+				int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nexpr;
+	int rc, i, j, depth;
+
+	lc = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+		c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!c)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (lc)
+			lc->next = c;
+		else
+			*nodep = c;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		le = NULL;
+		depth = -1;
+		for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+			e = kzalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!e)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			if (le)
+				le->next = e;
+			else
+				c->expr = e;
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+			e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NOT:
+				if (depth < 0)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_AND:
+			case CEXPR_OR:
+				if (depth < 1)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth--;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ATTR:
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				if (p->policyvers >=
+					POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+						e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
+						(*e->type_names),
+						GFP_KERNEL);
+					if (!e->type_names)
+						return -ENOMEM;
+					type_set_init(e->type_names);
+					rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
+					if (rc)
+						return rc;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			le = e;
+		}
+		if (depth != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		lc = c;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	__le32 buf[6];
+	u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cladatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+
+	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (len2) {
+		rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey);
+		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unknown common %s\n",
+			       cladatum->comkey);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, cladatum->permissions.table, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+		/* grab the validatetrans rules */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
+				ncons, 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	int rc, to_read = 2;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+
+	role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!role)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 3;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+			       OBJECT_R, role->value);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = 0;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	int rc, to_read = 3;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 len;
+
+	typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!typdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 4;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+		u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+		if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
+			typdatum->primary = 1;
+		if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
+			typdatum->attribute = 1;
+
+		typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	} else {
+		typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	}
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: mls:  error reading level categories\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	int rc, to_read = 2;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+
+	usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		to_read = 3;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, usrdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 len;
+
+	levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!levdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!levdatum->level)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, levdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 len;
+
+	catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!catdatum)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) =
+{
+	common_read,
+	class_read,
+	role_read,
+	type_read,
+	user_read,
+	cond_read_bool,
+	sens_read,
+	cat_read,
+};
+
+static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct user_datum *upper, *user;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = user = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		struct ebitmap_node *node;
+		unsigned long bit;
+
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped boundary",
+			       (char *) key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
+				continue;
+
+			pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+			       "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct role_datum *upper, *role;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = role = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		struct ebitmap_node *node;
+		unsigned long bit;
+
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped bounds\n",
+			       (char *) key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
+				continue;
+
+			pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+			       "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
+
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct type_datum *upper;
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	int depth = 0;
+
+	upper = datum;
+	while (upper->bounds) {
+		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+			       (char *) key);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		upper = flex_array_get_ptr(p->type_val_to_struct_array,
+					   upper->bounds - 1);
+		BUG_ON(!upper);
+
+		if (upper->attribute) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+			       "bounded by attribute %s",
+			       (char *) key,
+			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->p_users.table,
+			 user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->p_roles.table,
+			 role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->p_types.table,
+			 type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+	cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, name);
+	if (!cladatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return cladatum->value;
+}
+
+u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
+	comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
+	if (comdatum)
+		perdatum = hashtab_search(comdatum->permissions.table,
+					  name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		perdatum = hashtab_search(cladatum->permissions.table,
+					  name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
+}
+
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+	struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+	int i, rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 nel;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!rt)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		} else
+			rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!r)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt = NULL;
+		r = NULL;
+	}
+	hash_eval(p->range_tr, "rangetr");
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	kfree(rt);
+	kfree(r);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
+	char *name;
+	u32 nel, len;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc, i;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		otype = NULL;
+		name = NULL;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ft)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		otype = kmalloc(sizeof(*otype), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!otype)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* length of the path component string */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		/* path component string */
+		rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->name = name;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+		otype->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
+		if (rc) {
+			/*
+			 * Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system
+			 * will not boot.
+			 */
+			if (rc != -EEXIST)
+				goto out;
+			/* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */
+			kfree(ft);
+			kfree(name);
+			kfree(otype);
+		}
+	}
+	hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(ft);
+	kfree(name);
+	kfree(otype);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	int i, j, rc;
+	u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+	struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newgenfs)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+				pr_err("SELinux:  dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+				       newgenfs->fstype);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		newgenfs->next = genfs;
+		if (genfs_p)
+			genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+		else
+			p->genfs = newgenfs;
+		genfs = newgenfs;
+		newgenfs = NULL;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!newc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
+			     l = c, c = c->next) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+					pr_err("SELinux:  dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+					       genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+				len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+				if (len > len2)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			newc->next = c;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = newc;
+			else
+				genfs->head = newc;
+			newc = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (newgenfs) {
+		kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+		kfree(newgenfs);
+	}
+	ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+			 void *fp)
+{
+	int i, j, rc;
+	u32 nel, len;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		l = NULL;
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!c)
+				goto out;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = c;
+			else
+				p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+			l = c;
+
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				/* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */
+				if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+					goto out;
+				if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
+					goto out;
+
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6: {
+				int k;
+
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+			case OCON_IBPKEY:
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(*((__be64 *)nodebuf));
+
+				if (nodebuf[2] > 0xffff ||
+				    nodebuf[3] > 0xffff) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[2]);
+				c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[3]);
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p,
+							       fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				if (buf[1] > 0xff || buf[1] == 0) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				c->u.ibendport.port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p,
+							       fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
+	int i, j, rc;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 len, nprim, nel;
+
+	char *policydb_str;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+	rc = policydb_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Read the magic number and string length. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+		       "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb string length %d does not "
+		       "match expected length %zu\n",
+		       len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!policydb_str) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+		       "string of length %d\n", len);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+		kfree(policydb_str);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	policydb_str[len] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb string %s does not match "
+		       "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+		kfree(policydb_str);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	/* Done with policydb_str. */
+	kfree(policydb_str);
+	policydb_str = NULL;
+
+	/* Read the version and table sizes. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+	    p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb version %d does not match "
+		       "my version range %d-%d\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+		p->mls_enabled = 1;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+				"(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+				p->policyvers);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+	p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
+	p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to find policy compat info "
+		       "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
+		le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
+			le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
+		       info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = read_f[i](p, p->symtab[i].table, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+
+		p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+	if (!p->process_class)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+		rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	ltr = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		tr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tr)
+			goto bad;
+		if (ltr)
+			ltr->next = tr;
+		else
+			p->role_tr = tr;
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+			tr->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		} else
+			tr->tclass = p->process_class;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
+		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role))
+			goto bad;
+		ltr = tr;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	lra = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ra)
+			goto bad;
+		if (lra)
+			lra->next = ra;
+		else
+			p->role_allow = ra;
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
+		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
+			goto bad;
+		lra = ra;
+	}
+
+	rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = policydb_index(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
+	p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
+	if (!p->process_trans_perms)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = range_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	p->type_attr_map_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct ebitmap),
+						  p->p_types.nprim,
+						  GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+		goto bad;
+
+	/* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
+	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim,
+				 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+		struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+		BUG_ON(!e);
+		ebitmap_init(e);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+			rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+		/* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	policydb_destroy(p);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items;
+	int rc, eq;
+
+	eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+	if (eq)
+		items = 2;
+	else
+		items = 3;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+	if (!eq)
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (!eq) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_trans *r = p->role_tr;
+	struct role_trans *tr;
+	u32 buf[3];
+	size_t nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
+		nel++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->role);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(tr->type);
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->tclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	u32 buf[2];
+	size_t nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+		nel++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
+			 void *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table->nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+
+	if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+			     void *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nel;
+	int rc;
+
+	for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+			buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+			buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				if (p->policyvers >=
+					POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+					rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
+					if (rc)
+						return rc;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	struct constraint_node *c;
+	__le32 buf[6];
+	u32 ncons;
+	size_t len, len2;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	if (cladatum->comkey)
+		len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+	else
+		len2 = 0;
+
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+	if (cladatum->permissions.table)
+		buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table->nel);
+	else
+		buf[4] = 0;
+	buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (cladatum->comkey) {
+		rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* write out the validatetrans rule */
+	ncons = 0;
+	for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+		ncons++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct role_datum *role = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+	size_t items, len;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+		u32 properties = 0;
+
+		if (typdatum->primary)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+		if (typdatum->attribute)
+			properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+	} else {
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+	}
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+	char *key = vkey;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	size_t items, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = strlen(key);
+	items = 0;
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+		buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+	BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum,
+				void *datap) =
+{
+	common_write,
+	class_write,
+	role_write,
+	type_write,
+	user_write,
+	cond_write_bool,
+	sens_write,
+	cat_write,
+};
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+			  void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j, rc;
+	size_t nel, len;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		nel = 0;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+			nel++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+				buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+				nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+				len = strlen(c->u.name);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6:
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+					nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_IBPKEY:
+				*((__be64 *)nodebuf) = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+
+				nodebuf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+				nodebuf[3] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+				len = strlen(c->u.ibendport.dev_name);
+				buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+				buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibendport.port);
+				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	size_t len;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	len = 0;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+		len++;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		len = 0;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+			len++;
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+			len = strlen(c->u.name);
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	int *cnt = ptr;
+	*cnt = *cnt + 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	struct range_trans *rt = key;
+	struct mls_range *r = data;
+	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+	int rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc, nel;
+	struct policy_data pd;
+
+	pd.p = p;
+	pd.fp = fp;
+
+	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
+	nel = 0;
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* actually write all of the entries */
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype = data;
+	void *fp = ptr;
+	int rc;
+	u32 len;
+
+	len = strlen(ft->name);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 nel;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	unsigned int i, num_syms;
+	int rc;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 config;
+	size_t len;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+	/*
+	 * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+	 * to simplify the writer.  There are other tests dropped
+	 * since we assume this throughout the writer code.  Be
+	 * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+	 */
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+		       "  Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
+		       POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	config = 0;
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
+		config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+	if (p->reject_unknown)
+		config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+	if (p->allow_unknown)
+		config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+	/* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+	len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+		    "version %d", p->policyvers);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+		rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	num_syms = info->sym_num;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+		struct policy_data pd;
+
+		pd.fp = fp;
+		pd.p = p;
+
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table->nel);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = cond_write_list(p, p->cond_list, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = range_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+		struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+		BUG_ON(!e);
+		rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..215f8f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data:  individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal common value */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* class value */
+	char *comkey;			/* common name */
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;	/* common datum */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* class-specific permission symbol table */
+	struct constraint_node *constraints;	/* constraints on class permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *validatetrans;	/* special transition rules */
+/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE         1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET         2
+	char default_user;
+	char default_role;
+	char default_type;
+/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW     1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH    2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH        3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW     4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH    5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH        6
+	char default_range;
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal role value */
+	u32 bounds;			/* boundary of role */
+	struct ebitmap dominates;	/* set of roles dominated by this role */
+	struct ebitmap types;		/* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 type;		/* program executable type, or new object type */
+	u32 tclass;		/* process class, or new object class */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_trans *next;
+};
+
+struct filename_trans {
+	u32 stype;		/* current process */
+	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
+	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
+	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
+	u32 otype;		/* expected of new object */
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	u32 bounds;		/* boundary of type */
+	unsigned char primary;	/* primary name? */
+	unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal user value */
+	u32 bounds;			/* bounds of user */
+	struct ebitmap roles;		/* set of authorized roles for user */
+	struct mls_range range;		/* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+	struct mls_level dfltlevel;	/* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+	struct mls_level *level;	/* sensitivity and associated categories */
+	unsigned char isalias;	/* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal category bit + 1 */
+	unsigned char isalias;  /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+	u32 source_type;
+	u32 target_type;
+	u32 target_class;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+	__u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from
+ * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows
+ * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials.
+ */
+struct type_set {
+	struct ebitmap types;
+	struct ebitmap negset;
+	u32 flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes.  This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry.  Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+	union {
+		char *name;	/* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+		struct {
+			u8 protocol;
+			u16 low_port;
+			u16 high_port;
+		} port;		/* TCP or UDP port information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr;
+			u32 mask;
+		} node;		/* node information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr[4];
+			u32 mask[4];
+		} node6;        /* IPv6 node information */
+		struct {
+			u64 subnet_prefix;
+			u16 low_pkey;
+			u16 high_pkey;
+		} ibpkey;
+		struct {
+			char *dev_name;
+			u8 port;
+		} ibendport;
+	} u;
+	union {
+		u32 sclass;  /* security class for genfs */
+		u32 behavior;  /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+	} v;
+	struct context context[2];	/* security context(s) */
+	u32 sid[2];	/* SID(s) */
+	struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+	char *fstype;
+	struct ocontext *head;
+	struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES   2
+#define SYM_TYPES   3
+#define SYM_USERS   4
+#define SYM_BOOLS   5
+#define SYM_LEVELS  6
+#define SYM_CATS    7
+#define SYM_NUM     8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID	0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS		1 /* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT	2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF	3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE	4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE	5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6	6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY	7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT	8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM	9
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+	int mls_enabled;
+
+	/* symbol tables */
+	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct flex_array *sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+
+	/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+	struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+	struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+	struct flex_array *type_val_to_struct_array;
+
+	/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+	/* role transitions */
+	struct role_trans *role_tr;
+
+	/* file transitions with the last path component */
+	/* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+	struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
+	/* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+	struct hashtab *filename_trans;
+
+	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+	/* linked list indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+	struct cond_node *cond_list;
+
+	/* role allows */
+	struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+	/* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+	   TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+	struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+	/* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+	   a persistent label mapping or use another
+	   fixed labeling behavior. */
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+
+	/* range transitions table (range_trans_key -> mls_range) */
+	struct hashtab *range_tr;
+
+	/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
+	struct flex_array *type_attr_map_array;
+
+	struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
+	struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
+	/* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+	size_t len;
+
+	unsigned int policyvers;
+
+	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
+	unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
+
+	u16 process_class;
+	u32 process_trans_perms;
+};
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
+extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
+extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS    1
+
+/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN	0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN	0x00000004
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+	char *data;
+	size_t len;
+};
+
+struct policy_data {
+	struct policydb *p;
+	void *fp;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > fp->len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+	fp->data += bytes;
+	fp->len -= bytes;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+	size_t len = bytes * num;
+
+	memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+	fp->data += len;
+	fp->len -= len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
+{
+	struct flex_array *fa = p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num];
+
+	return flex_array_get_ptr(fa, element_nr);
+}
+
+extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
+extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3def29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3728 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *	Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ *      Added support for NetLabel
+ *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+/* Policy capability names */
+char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
+	"network_peer_controls",
+	"open_perms",
+	"extended_socket_class",
+	"always_check_network",
+	"cgroup_seclabel",
+	"nnp_nosuid_transition"
+};
+
+static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
+
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
+{
+	rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
+	mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
+	*ss = &selinux_ss;
+}
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext,
+				    u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
+			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
+{
+	u16 i, j;
+	unsigned k;
+	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+	if (!map)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	i = 0;
+	while (map[i].name)
+		i++;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+	out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map->mapping)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
+	j = 0;
+	while (map[j].name) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+
+		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
+		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+		if (!p_out->value) {
+			pr_info("SELinux:  Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+			       p_in->name);
+			if (pol->reject_unknown)
+				goto err;
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			print_unknown_handle = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		k = 0;
+		while (p_in->perms[k]) {
+			/* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+			if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+				k++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+							    p_in->perms[k]);
+			if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+				pr_info("SELinux:  Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+				       p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+				if (pol->reject_unknown)
+					goto err;
+				print_unknown_handle = true;
+			}
+
+			k++;
+		}
+		p_out->num_perms = k;
+	}
+
+	if (print_unknown_handle)
+		pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+	out_map->size = i;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	kfree(out_map->mapping);
+	out_map->mapping = NULL;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
+{
+	if (tclass < map->size)
+		return map->mapping[tclass].value;
+
+	return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
+{
+	u16 i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+		if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 int allow_unknown)
+{
+	if (tclass < map->size) {
+		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
+		u32 result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		avd->allowed = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		avd->auditallow = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+		 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+		 * should audit that denial
+		 */
+		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+			result |= 1<<i;
+		avd->auditdeny = result;
+	}
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	return p->mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+				struct context *scontext,
+				struct context *tcontext,
+				struct context *xcontext,
+				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+	u32 val1, val2;
+	struct context *c;
+	struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+	struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+		switch (e->expr_type) {
+		case CEXPR_NOT:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_AND:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_OR:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_ATTR:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return 0;
+			switch (e->attr) {
+			case CEXPR_USER:
+				val1 = scontext->user;
+				val2 = tcontext->user;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_TYPE:
+				val1 = scontext->type;
+				val2 = tcontext->type;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ROLE:
+				val1 = scontext->role;
+				val2 = tcontext->role;
+				r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								  val2 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								  val1 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								    val2 - 1) &&
+						   !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								    val1 - 1));
+					continue;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_L1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H1:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L2H2:
+				l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOM:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_NAMES:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			c = scontext;
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+				c = tcontext;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+				c = xcontext;
+				if (!c) {
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+			}
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+				val1 = c->user;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+				val1 = c->role;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+				val1 = c->type;
+			else {
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+	char **permission_names = args;
+
+	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *scontext,
+				    struct context *tcontext,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 permissions,
+				    const char *reason)
+{
+	struct common_datum *common_dat;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *tclass_name;
+	char *scontext_name = NULL;
+	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+	char *permission_names[32];
+	int index;
+	u32 length;
+	bool need_comma = false;
+
+	if (!permissions)
+		return;
+
+	tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+	/* init permission_names */
+	if (common_dat &&
+	    hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
+				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* audit a message */
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+			     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+		u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+				 need_comma ? "," : "",
+				 permission_names[index]
+				 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+		need_comma = true;
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	/* release scontext/tcontext */
+	kfree(tcontext_name);
+	kfree(scontext_name);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				     struct context *scontext,
+				     struct context *tcontext,
+				     u16 tclass,
+				     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context lo_scontext;
+	struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
+	struct av_decision lo_avd;
+	struct type_datum *source;
+	struct type_datum *target;
+	u32 masked = 0;
+
+	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
+				    scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!source);
+
+	if (!source->bounds)
+		return;
+
+	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
+				    tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!target);
+
+	memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+	memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+	lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+	if (target->bounds) {
+		memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+		lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
+	}
+
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
+				  tcontextp,
+				  tclass,
+				  &lo_avd,
+				  NULL);
+
+	masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+
+	if (likely(!masked))
+		return;		/* no masked permission */
+
+	/* mask violated permissions */
+	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+	/* audit masked permissions */
+	security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+				tclass, masked, "bounds");
+}
+
+/*
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+		struct extended_perms *xperms,
+		struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+		/* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+			xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+	} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+		/* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+		security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+					node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+	}
+
+	/* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
+	if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+		xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	if (xperms) {
+		memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+		xperms->len = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+		if (printk_ratelimit())
+			pr_warn("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+	 * this permission check, then use it.
+	 */
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!sattr);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!tattr);
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+					avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+					avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+					avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+				else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+					services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+			}
+
+			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+					avd, xperms);
+
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+	 * the MLS policy).
+	 */
+	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If checking process transition permission and the
+	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+	 * pair.
+	 */
+	if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
+	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+		for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (!ra)
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the given source and target types have boundary
+	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+	 */
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+				 tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+					   struct context *ocontext,
+					   struct context *ncontext,
+					   struct context *tcontext,
+					   u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+	kfree(o);
+	kfree(n);
+	kfree(t);
+
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+					  u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *ocontext;
+	struct context *ncontext;
+	struct context *tcontext;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	if (!user)
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
+	else
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
+	if (!ocontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, oldsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
+	if (!ncontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, newsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, tasksid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext,
+					  tcontext, constraint->expr)) {
+			if (user)
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			else
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+								     ocontext,
+								     ncontext,
+								     tcontext,
+								     tclass);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *old_context, *new_context;
+	struct type_datum *type;
+	int index;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
+	if (!old_context) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, old_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
+	if (!new_context) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+		       __func__, new_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+	/* type/domain unchanged */
+	if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
+		goto out;
+
+	index = new_context->type;
+	while (true) {
+		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
+					  index - 1);
+		BUG_ON(!type);
+
+		/* not bounded anymore */
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		if (!type->bounds)
+			break;
+
+		/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+		rc = 0;
+		if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
+			break;
+
+		index = type->bounds;
+	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char *old_name = NULL;
+		char *new_name = NULL;
+		u32 length;
+
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context,
+					      &old_name, &length) &&
+		    !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context,
+					      &new_name, &length)) {
+			audit_log(audit_context(),
+				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+				  "seresult=denied "
+				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+				  old_name, new_name);
+		}
+		kfree(new_name);
+		kfree(old_name);
+	}
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
+	avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+					struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+		if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+			return;
+	} else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+		if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+					xpermd->driver))
+			return;
+	} else {
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+				xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+				xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+		xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+			memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+					sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+		}
+		if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+				xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+					node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+		}
+	} else {
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid,
+				      u32 tsid,
+				      u16 orig_tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	xpermd->driver = driver;
+	xpermd->used = 0;
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+				scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!sattr);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+				tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!tattr);
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
+			     node;
+			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
+						&avkey, xpermd);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid,
+			 u32 tsid,
+			 u16 orig_tclass,
+			 struct av_decision *avd,
+			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	u16 tclass;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
+	xperms->len = 0;
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  xperms);
+	map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+		     policydb->allow_unknown);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid,
+			      u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass,
+			      struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  NULL);
+ out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len = 0;
+
+	if (context->len) {
+		*scontext_len = context->len;
+		if (scontext) {
+			*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!(*scontext))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the size of the context. */
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
+
+	if (!scontext)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!scontextp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+	 */
+	scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+		sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+	mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
+
+	*scontextp = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+		return NULL;
+	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					u32 sid, char **scontext,
+					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (scontext)
+		*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len  = 0;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+			char *scontextp;
+
+			*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+			if (!scontext)
+				goto out;
+			scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
+					    *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!scontextp) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*scontext = scontextp;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  called before initial "
+		       "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	if (force)
+		context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
+	else
+		context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
+				      scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat:  Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+				    struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+				    char *scontext,
+				    u32 scontext_len,
+				    struct context *ctx,
+				    u32 def_sid)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	context_init(ctx);
+
+	/* Parse the security context. */
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	scontextp = (char *) scontext;
+
+	/* Extract the user. */
+	p = scontextp;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Extract role. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
+	if (!role)
+		goto out;
+	ctx->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Extract type. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+	oldc = *p;
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
+	if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+		goto out;
+
+	ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+		goto out;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		context_destroy(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+					int force)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+	struct context context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* An empty security context is never valid. */
+	if (!scontext_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+	scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+	if (!scontext2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (force) {
+		/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+		if (!str)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
+				      scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+		context.str = str;
+		context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
+		str = NULL;
+	} else if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+	context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+out:
+	kfree(scontext2);
+	kfree(str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+				       sid, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
+	struct context *scontext,
+	struct context *tcontext,
+	u16 tclass,
+	struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
+		  " scontext=%s"
+		  " tcontext=%s"
+		  " tclass=%s",
+		  n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+	kfree(s);
+	kfree(t);
+	kfree(n);
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct context *newcontext,
+				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+				  const char *objname)
+{
+	struct filename_trans ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
+
+	/*
+	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+	 */
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+		return;
+
+	ft.stype = stype;
+	ft.ttype = ttype;
+	ft.tclass = tclass;
+	ft.name = objname;
+
+	otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
+	if (otype)
+		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 orig_tclass,
+				u32 specified,
+				const char *objname,
+				u32 *out_sid,
+				bool kern)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc = 0;
+	bool sock;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		switch (orig_tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+			*out_sid = ssid;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*out_sid = tsid;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcontext);
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (kern) {
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+	} else {
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map,
+							  tclass));
+	}
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/* Set the user identity. */
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+			newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		} else {
+			/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+			/* Use the process user identity. */
+			newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the related object owner. */
+		newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the role to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true))
+			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		else
+			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the type to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+			/* Use the type of process. */
+			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		} else {
+			/* Use the type of the related object. */
+			newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avkey.specified = specified;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+	if (!avdatum) {
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (avdatum) {
+		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+		newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+	}
+
+	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (objname)
+		filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
+	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+		for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
+		     roletr = roletr->next) {
+			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
+			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
+			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
+				/* Use the role transition rule. */
+				newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Set the MLS attributes.
+	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+			     &newcontext, sock);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext,
+							tcontext,
+							tclass,
+							&newcontext);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(state,
+				    ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+		     struct context *context,
+		     void *arg)
+{
+	struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+	if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+		return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
+	struct context *context)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
+		pr_warn("SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+			s);
+		kfree(s);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct policydb *oldp;
+	struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'.  Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+			   struct context *c,
+			   void *p)
+{
+	struct convert_context_args *args;
+	struct context oldc;
+	struct ocontext *oc;
+	struct mls_range *range;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
+		goto out;
+
+	args = p;
+
+	if (c->str) {
+		struct context ctx;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!s)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+					      c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(s);
+		if (!rc) {
+			pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+			       c->str);
+			/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
+			kfree(c->str);
+			memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
+			goto out;
+		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+			pr_err("SELinux:   Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+			       c->str, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Convert the user. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+				  sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the role. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+			      sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
+	if (!role)
+		goto bad;
+	c->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Convert the type. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+				  sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
+	if (!typdatum)
+		goto bad;
+	c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+	if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	} else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
+		 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
+		 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
+		 */
+		mls_context_destroy(c);
+	} else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+		 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+		 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+		 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+		 * initial SIDs.
+		 */
+		oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+		while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+			oc = oc->next;
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!oc) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to look up"
+				" the initial SIDs list\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		range = &oc->context[0].range;
+		rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+							    &oldc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+	context_destroy(c);
+	c->str = s;
+	c->len = len;
+	pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+	       c->str);
+	rc = 0;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+		state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
+			selinux_policycap_names[i],
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
+				i);
+	}
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *newpolicydb);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
+	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
+	struct selinux_map newmap;
+	struct convert_context_args args;
+	u32 seqno;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+	oldpolicydb = kcalloc(2, sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oldpolicydb) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		policydb->len = len;
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &state->ss->map);
+		if (rc) {
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
+		if (rc) {
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		security_load_policycaps(state);
+		state->initialized = 1;
+		seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+		selinux_complete_init();
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
+		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+	rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	newpolicydb->len = len;
+	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+	if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+		pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+	else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+		pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+
+	rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+		policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Clone the SID table. */
+	sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
+
+	rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	 * in the new SID table.
+	 */
+	args.state = state;
+	args.oldp = policydb;
+	args.newp = newpolicydb;
+	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to convert the internal"
+			" representation of contexts in the new SID"
+			" table\n");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+	memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
+
+	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps(state);
+	oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.size = newmap.size;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+	policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
+	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+	kfree(oldmapping);
+
+	avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
+	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
+	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+
+	rc = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+err:
+	kfree(newmap.mapping);
+	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+	policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+
+out:
+	kfree(oldpolicydb);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+	size_t len;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	len = p->len;
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+		    c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+		    c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+		    c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+			break;
+
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+		    !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+			     dev_name,
+			     IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+			break;
+
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						  &c->context[0],
+						  &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						   &c->context[1],
+						   &c->sid[1]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*if_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+	int i, fail = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+			fail = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain,
+		      void *addrp,
+		      u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	switch (domain) {
+	case AF_INET: {
+		u32 addr;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+			goto out;
+
+		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		while (c) {
+			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+			goto out;
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		while (c) {
+			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+						c->u.node6.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		rc = 0;
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs.  Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 fromsid,
+			   char *username,
+			   u32 **sids,
+			   u32 *nel)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
+	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+	struct user_datum *user;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
+	int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+	*sids = NULL;
+	*nel = 0;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	context_init(&usercon);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
+	if (!fromcon)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username);
+	if (!user)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	usercon.user = user->value;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!mysids)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
+		role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
+		usercon.role = i + 1;
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
+			usercon.type = j + 1;
+
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+						 &usercon))
+				continue;
+
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			if (mynel < maxnel) {
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			} else {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+				mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (!mysids2)
+					goto out_unlock;
+				memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+				kfree(mysids);
+				mysids = mysids2;
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (rc || !mynel) {
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!mysids2) {
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+		struct av_decision dummy_avd;
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
+					  fromsid, mysids[i],
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+					  &dummy_avd);
+		if (!rc)
+			mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+	kfree(mysids);
+	*sids = mysids2;
+	*nel = j;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				       const char *fstype,
+				       char *path,
+				       u16 orig_sclass,
+				       u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	int len;
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc, cmp = 0;
+
+	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+		path++;
+
+	sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass);
+	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	if (!genfs || cmp)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	if (!c)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!c->sid[0]) {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	*sid = c->sid[0];
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype,
+		       char *path,
+		       u16 orig_sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+					  &sbsec->sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*len = 0;
+		*names = NULL;
+		*values = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	*len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+	if (!*len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*names)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*values)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+		(*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				      GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*names)[i])
+			goto err;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+err:
+	if (*names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+			kfree((*names)[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(*values);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int i, rc;
+	int lenp, seqno = 0;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+	if (len != lenp)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+			audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+				sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				!!values[i],
+				policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+				audit_get_sessionid(current));
+		}
+		if (values[i])
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+		else
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+	}
+
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (!rc) {
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
+		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	int rc;
+	int len;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+	if (index >= len)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *policydb)
+{
+	int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
+	char **bnames = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+		booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+		if (booldatum)
+			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+	}
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (bnames) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+			kfree(bnames[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(bnames);
+	kfree(bvalues);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	struct context *context1;
+	struct context *context2;
+	struct context newcon;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) {
+		*new_sid = sid;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcon);
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context1) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
+	if (!context2) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			__func__, mls_sid);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	newcon.user = context1->user;
+	newcon.role = context1->role;
+	newcon.type = context1->type;
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+						      &len)) {
+				audit_log(audit_context(),
+					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
+					  "invalid_context=%s", s);
+				kfree(s);
+			}
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	context_destroy(&newcon);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero.  Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value.  A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ *                                 | function return |      @sid
+ *   ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ *   no peer labels                |        0        |    SECSID_NULL
+ *   single peer label             |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, consistent labels   |        0        |    <peer_label>
+ *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+				 u32 xfrm_sid,
+				 u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+	*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+	 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+	 * single or absent peer SID/label */
+	if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+		*peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+	 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+	 * is present */
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+		*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
+	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+	 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+	 */
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+	 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+	 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+	 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+	 * expressive */
+	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct class_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **classes = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!classes[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*nclasses = 0;
+		*classes = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
+	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*classes)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+			*classes);
+	if (rc) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+			kfree((*classes)[i]);
+		kfree(*classes);
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **perms = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!perms[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	int rc, i;
+	struct class_datum *match;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
+	if (!match) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
+			__func__, class);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+	*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*perms)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (match->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+				get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+			*perms);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+
+err:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+		kfree((*perms)[i]);
+	kfree(*perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap.  Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	int rc;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+	u32 au_seqno;
+	struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (rule) {
+		context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+		kfree(rule);
+	}
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+	struct role_datum *roledatum;
+	struct type_datum *typedatum;
+	struct user_datum *userdatum;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* only the above fields are valid */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tmprule)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr);
+		if (!userdatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		if (!roledatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr);
+		if (!typedatum)
+			goto out;
+		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rc) {
+		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+		tmprule = NULL;
+	}
+
+	*rule = tmprule;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+			     struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct context *ctxt;
+	struct mls_level *level;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+	int match = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) {
+		match = -ESTALE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+			  sid);
+		match = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+	   without a match */
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+			  field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+			 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+		switch (op) {
+		case Audit_equal:
+			match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					     level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_not_equal:
+			match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_lt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					       level));
+			break;
+		case Audit_le:
+			match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+					      level);
+			break;
+		case Audit_gt:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+				 !mls_level_eq(level,
+					       &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+			break;
+		case Audit_ge:
+			match = mls_level_dom(level,
+					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return match;
+}
+
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
+		err = aurule_callback();
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+	if (err)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+	return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache.  This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				      u32 sid)
+{
+	u32 *sid_cache;
+
+	sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (sid_cache == NULL)
+		return;
+	secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+		kfree(sid_cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*sid_cache = sid;
+	secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+	secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID.  If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation.  If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups.  Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+				   u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+	struct context ctx_new;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		if (ctx == NULL)
+			goto out;
+
+		context_init(&ctx_new);
+		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		rc = -EIDRM;
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
+			goto out_free;
+
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+
+		ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+	} else
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return 0;
+out_free:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	int rc;
+	struct context *ctx;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	rc = -ENOENT;
+	ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+				  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	int rc;
+	struct policy_file fp;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
+
+	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fp.data = *data;
+	fp.len = *len;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
+	return 0;
+
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24c7bdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+	struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+	u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_ss {
+	struct sidtab sidtab;
+	struct policydb policydb;
+	rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
+	u32 latest_granting;
+	struct selinux_map map;
+	struct page *status_page;
+	struct mutex status_lock;
+};
+
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+				struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+					struct avtab_node *node);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd75a12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
+(sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	s->htable = kmalloc_array(SIDTAB_SIZE, sizeof(*s->htable), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!s->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+	s->shutdown = 0;
+	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && sid > cur->sid) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && sid == cur->sid)
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	newnode->sid = sid;
+	if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
+		kfree(newnode);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		wmb();
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue];
+		wmb();
+		s->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	s->nel++;
+	if (sid >= s->next_sid)
+		s->next_sid = sid + 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len)
+		return &cur->context;
+
+	if (!cur || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) {
+		/* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
+		sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+		cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+		while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
+			cur = cur->next;
+		if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return &cur->context;
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0);
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
+}
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void sidtab_update_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_node *n, int loc)
+{
+	BUG_ON(loc >= SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN);
+
+	while (loc > 0) {
+		s->cache[loc] = s->cache[loc - 1];
+		loc--;
+	}
+	s->cache[0] = n;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
+						  struct context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context)) {
+				sidtab_update_cache(s, cur, SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN - 1);
+				return cur->sid;
+			}
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *node;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++) {
+		node = s->cache[i];
+		if (unlikely(!node))
+			return 0;
+		if (context_cmp(&node->context, context)) {
+			sidtab_update_cache(s, node, i);
+			return node->sid;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	*out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	sid  = sidtab_search_cache(s, context);
+	if (!sid)
+		sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+	if (!sid) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+		/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
+		sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+		if (sid)
+			goto unlock_out;
+		/* No SID exists for the context.  Allocate a new one. */
+		if (s->next_sid == UINT_MAX || s->shutdown) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto unlock_out;
+		}
+		sid = s->next_sid++;
+		if (context->len)
+			pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+			       context->str);
+		ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+		if (ret)
+			s->next_sid--;
+unlock_out:
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*out_sid = sid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+	       "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
+	       max_chain_len);
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			context_destroy(&temp->context);
+			kfree(temp);
+		}
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree(s->htable);
+	s->htable = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+}
+
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int i;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags);
+	dst->htable = src->htable;
+	dst->nel = src->nel;
+	dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
+	dst->shutdown = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++)
+		dst->cache[i] = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+	s->shutdown = 1;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1a1d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_node {
+	u32 sid;		/* security identifier */
+	struct context context;	/* security context structure */
+	struct sidtab_node *next;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+struct sidtab {
+	struct sidtab_node **htable;
+	unsigned int nel;	/* number of elements */
+	unsigned int next_sid;	/* next SID to allocate */
+	unsigned char shutdown;
+#define SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN	3
+	struct sidtab_node *cache[SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN];
+	spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag);
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src);
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a121de4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+	struct page		       *result = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (!state->ss->status_page) {
+		state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+
+		if (state->ss->status_page) {
+			status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+
+			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+			status->sequence = 0;
+			status->enforcing = enforcing_enabled(state);
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+			 * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+			 * So, application can know it was updated.
+			 */
+			status->policyload = 0;
+			status->deny_unknown =
+				!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
+		}
+	}
+	result = state->ss->status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int enforcing)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->enforcing = enforcing;
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int seqno)
+{
+	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+
+		status->sequence++;
+		smp_wmb();
+
+		status->policyload = seqno;
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(state);
+
+		smp_wmb();
+		status->sequence++;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc2ce94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
+{
+	const char *p, *keyp;
+	unsigned int size;
+	unsigned int val;
+
+	val = 0;
+	keyp = key;
+	size = strlen(keyp);
+	for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+		val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+	return val & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2)
+{
+	const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+	keyp1 = key1;
+	keyp2 = key2;
+	return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+{
+	s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
+	if (!s->table)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	s->nprim = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d75fcaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values.  The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+	struct hashtab *table;	/* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91dc378
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
+ *	      Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ *  Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ *
+ *           Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *	as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * USAGE:
+ * NOTES:
+ *   1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
+ *	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
+ * ISSUES:
+ *   1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
+ *   2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
+ *   3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <net/udp.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (ctx &&
+		(ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
+		(ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+				   gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	u32 str_len;
+
+	if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+	    uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+	    uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+				     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	*ctxp = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
+ */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return;
+
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+	 * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi *fl)
+{
+	u32 state_sid;
+
+	if (!xp->security)
+		if (x->security)
+			/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
+			return 0;
+		else
+			/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
+			return 1;
+	else
+		if (!x->security)
+			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
+			return 0;
+		else
+			if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				/* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+				return 0;
+
+	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+
+	if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			     fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+	if (dst == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+	x = dst->xfrm;
+	if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+
+	if (sp) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+
+				if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+					sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
+					if (!ckall)
+						goto out;
+				} else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+					*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	*sid = sid_session;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	if (skb == NULL) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		*sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
+{
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
+
+	if (!old_ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+			  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new_ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	char *ctx_str = NULL;
+	int str_len;
+
+	if (!polsec)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+				     &str_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+
+	x->security = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+out:
+	kfree(ctx_str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
+ * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
+ * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then
+ * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
+ * gone thru the IPSec process.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	if (sp) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sk_sid, peer_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+/*
+ * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
+ * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
+ * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
+ * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_COMP:
+		/* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+		 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+		 * check. */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *iter;
+
+		for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = xfrm_dst_child(iter)) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
+}