Update Linux to v5.10.157
Sourced from [1]
[1] https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.10.157.tar.xz
Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com>
Change-Id: I7b30d9e98d8c465d6b44de8e7433b4a40b3289ba
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
index cbe1d6c..c84bef1 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
@@ -86,25 +86,31 @@
.help = "disable\tturn off latent entropy instrumentation\n",
};
-static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed;
-/*
- * get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed.
- * This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because
- * the entropy doesn't come from here.
- */
+static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT deterministic_seed;
+static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[32];
+static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf);
+static int urandom_fd = -1;
+
static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void)
{
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) {
- ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1);
- seed >>= 1;
- if (ret & 1)
- seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL;
+ if (deterministic_seed) {
+ unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed;
+ w ^= w << 13;
+ w ^= w >> 7;
+ w ^= w << 17;
+ deterministic_seed = w;
+ return deterministic_seed;
}
- return ret;
+ if (urandom_fd < 0) {
+ urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ gcc_assert(urandom_fd >= 0);
+ }
+ if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) {
+ gcc_assert(read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) == sizeof(rnd_buf));
+ rnd_idx = 0;
+ }
+ return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++];
}
static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type)
@@ -549,8 +555,6 @@
tree type, id;
int quals;
- seed = get_random_seed(false);
-
if (in_lto_p)
return;
@@ -585,6 +589,12 @@
const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv;
int i;
+ /*
+ * Call get_random_seed() with noinit=true, so that this returns
+ * 0 in the case where no seed has been passed via -frandom-seed.
+ */
+ deterministic_seed = get_random_seed(true);
+
static const struct ggc_root_tab gt_ggc_r_gt_latent_entropy[] = {
{
.base = &latent_entropy_decl,
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
index 48e141e..dacd697 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
@@ -431,6 +431,23 @@
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * STRING_CST may or may not be NUL terminated:
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gccint/Constant-expressions.html
+ */
+static inline bool string_equal(tree node, const char *string, int length)
+{
+ if (TREE_STRING_LENGTH(node) < length)
+ return false;
+ if (TREE_STRING_LENGTH(node) > length + 1)
+ return false;
+ if (TREE_STRING_LENGTH(node) == length + 1 &&
+ TREE_STRING_POINTER(node)[length] != '\0')
+ return false;
+ return !memcmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(node), string, length);
+}
+#define STRING_EQUAL(node, str) string_equal(node, str, strlen(str))
+
static bool stackleak_gate(void)
{
tree section;
@@ -440,13 +457,13 @@
if (section && TREE_VALUE(section)) {
section = TREE_VALUE(TREE_VALUE(section));
- if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".init.text", 10))
+ if (STRING_EQUAL(section, ".init.text"))
return false;
- if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".devinit.text", 13))
+ if (STRING_EQUAL(section, ".devinit.text"))
return false;
- if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".cpuinit.text", 13))
+ if (STRING_EQUAL(section, ".cpuinit.text"))
return false;
- if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".meminit.text", 13))
+ if (STRING_EQUAL(section, ".meminit.text"))
return false;
}